THREATS TO REGIONAL SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA

Threats to Regional Security in Latin America The Revival of the FARC BY EMMA TRAYNOR

In August 2019, ex-members of las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s largest guerilla rebel group, whose name in English translates to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, announced a recall to arms against the Colombian government, in defiance of a three-year-old peace deal. Aside from being detrimental to peace in the region, the FARC’s resurgence has two potential implications for American national security and general global security. In 2009, Colombia produced an estimated 90 percent of total global cocaine exports, with North America and Western Europe as the main sources of demand; the FARC was responsible for 60 percent of Colombian cocaine that was exported to the U.S. that same year. A revival of the group’s criminal activity could cause U.S. cocaine imports to skyrocket, adding to the already record-high levels of cocaine production and, conversely, increasing the FARC’s funding. Additionally, Colombia’s proximity to Venezuela and disputed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s relationship with the FARC jeopardize U.S. efforts to depose Maduro.

Developed as a Marxist-Leninist group in 1964, the FARC was created in response to deeply-rooted economic inequality in Colombia due, in part, to disproportionate land ownership. The FARC recruits men and women of all ages from largely rural areas. Organized into “blocs” based on their region with a “Secretariat” of about 12 members who lead operations, the FARC’s central activities include attacking Colombian security forces, setting landmines, and blowing up oil pipelines, bridges, and other infrastructure. In the 1990s, the group became involved in Colombia’s extensive cocaine production in an effort to increase funding. They also secured funding through extortion and kidnappings for ransom, which they vowed to stop in a statement in February 2012. In 2008, 2010, and 2011, several leaders of the group were killed, and in 2016, estimates put the FARC forces at around 6,000 to 7,000, down from 16,000 in 2001. In 2016, after 52 years of violence, the Colombian government, the FARC, and other rebel groups signed a peace agreement, the Havana Peace Accords. As a result, the FARC disarmed and transitioned to a political party, the Revolutionary Alternative Common Force, which currently has 10 mandated seats in the Congress of Colombia. Despite being officially disbanded, an estimated 1,700 to 3,000 members of the FARC continue to commit crimes and acts of violence.

In August 2019, Iván Márquez, the leader of the FARC negotiating team during peace talks and a representative in the Colombian Congress, announced his intention to return to guerrilla warfare. He invoked the universal right of people to rise up against oppression and blamed the government for failing to honor the terms of the peace agreement. This is a sentiment echoed by human rights groups and ex-FARC fighters who criticize Colombian president Iván Duque Márquez and former president Álvaro Uribe for failing to implement important aspects of the peace deal. Two-thirds of the Havana Peace Accords’ 578 provisions have been ignored under Duque’s government.

Yet, many ex-guerrillas do not want to rearm. Members of the newer political wing of the FARC, including former guerrilla leader and now party leader Rodrigo Londoño (also known as Timochenko), have condemned Márquez’s decision and reaffirmed their commitment to peace. Other ex-combatants, many of whom live in reincorporation zones, value the peace that they achieved “after all Left: Iván Márquez, former FARC commander who has returned to arms

the years fighting in the mountains.” They do point out, however, the hundreds of ex-FARC members who have been killed in the years since the Havana Accords and the governmental neglect that rural communities experience.

President Duque claims that the FARC is using their ideology as a cover for criminal activity, calling them “narco-terrorists.” Former Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, who won a Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the 2016 peace negotiations, speculates that the leaders of the resurgence merely want to avoid extradition to the U.S. for their drug crimes. While Márquez has not been seen in a year, he and his fellow guerrillas are believed to be hiding in Venezuela.

The FARC conflict in Colombia also has deeper implications for the current crisis in Venezuela. The U.S. State Department and the Colombian government have confirmed that disputed President Maduro of Venezuela has been allowing Colombian rebel groups to seek refuge in the Venezuelan Amazon, which the FARC uses as a staging ground for cocaine shipments from Colombia through Mexico and Brazil. Groups here receive arms in return, which are distributed to the FARC in southeastern Colombia. Not only does support from a neighboring government increase the FARC’s ability to regroup, Venezuela’s widespread access to guns grants Colombian rebel groups an advantage they do not have on their home soil. Additionally, the threat of increased violence on the already tumultuous Colombia-Venezuela border looms, as thousands of Venezuelan refugees pour in, putting innocent Colombians and Venezuelans at risk. Here, they face intense violence and personal danger as rebel groups, including the FARC, threaten, rape, and kill people in the rural areas where they operate, as well as recruit child soldiers.

Policies regarding the revival of the FARC in Colombia should be closely linked with policy regarding Venezuela and Maduro’s regime. By controlling the negative influence the current Venezuelan administration has on the FARC, the rebel group’s power could be seriously diminished. Politically, several actions have been taken to stifle Maduro. In late September, Duque requested that international sanctions be placed on Maduro’s regime in order to halt Venezuelan support for the FARC and drug trafficking in the region. He also referenced the potential for the invocation of the successful Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, an agreement that classifies aggression toward one American state as aggression toward all American states. The U.S. has already been levying sanctions on Venezuela since 2017, increasing them as the situation there has devolved. Meanwhile, Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó has been recognized as interim president by over 50 countries, including the United States. International bodies like the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank have accepted representatives from Guaidó’s administration rather than that of Maduro.

While drug trafficking is a clear concern, the international community’s first priority should be ending the humanitarian crisis in Colombia and Venezuela. By stabilizing the region, drug trafficking and violence will decrease. The focus of U.S. foreign policy should primarily be on rural areas where the FARC is most active. U.S. economic aid, as well as a continued aid partnership with the United Nations will help Colombia carry out the tenets of its peace plan. In addition, progress markers should be implemented; if Colombia continues to neglect peace plan implementation, the U.S. and UN should consider targeted sanctions or another form of repercussions. Putting the peace plan into effect is crucial to both quell the concerns of FARC members who have rearmed and squelch avenues for dangerous and illegal activities. It is important that the U.S. exhaust all forms of peaceful action before resorting to violence. While an overthrow of the Maduro regime may be quick and effective, the U.S. has been criticized in the past for its covert and overt tampering in foreign affairs (i.e. the Iran-Contra Affair, the CIA’s support of the Polish labor union Solidarity, and the Secret War in Laos); if it is involved, dramatic action could backfire and discredit the U.S.’s attempts to help. By getting a handle on the unrest in Colombia and Venezuela, the FARC’s influence on regional security, the drug trade, and the peace process will diminish.