U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

CORPORATE RISK SERVICES

U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment PART FIVE JAN. 15, 2021

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Table of Contents OVERVIEW 3 SITUATION UPDATE 4

POLITICAL UPDATE 4

SECURITY RESPONSE UPDATE 4 FACT-CHECKING JAN. 6 4 TRENDS 7

FRAGMENTING GROUPS 7

CHARACTERISTICS 8

CHANGING PLATFORMS 9

DISINFORMATION 9

TARGETING 9

ADDITIONAL FACTORS 12 PLANNED EVENTS 12 JAN. 17 - JAN. 20 12 JAN. 19 - JAN. 20 13 “LOCAL LEVEL” 14 GENERAL CALLS FOR VIOLENCE 15 COUNTER-PROTESTS 15 ASSOCIATED SECURITY CONCERNS 16 RECOMMENDATIONS 16 SOCIAL MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS 16 PERSONAL SAFETY 16 BUILDING SECURITY & ON-SITE SAFETY 17 METHODOLOGY & SCOPE 18 G4S SECURITY RISK OPERATIONS CENTER 19

Disclaimer: This report was prepared for the exclusive use of the recipient. It may contain proprietary, confidential information of either the recipient or G4S Corporate Risk Services (CRS) and is not intended for public disclosure. Any dissemination or reproduction of the report is governed by the applicable contract or letter of agreement between the recipient and CRS. Any disclosures outside of the contract terms must be authorized in writing by CRS. The findings in this report are based on information provided by the recipient and information to which CRS was provided access. CRS does not assume any responsibility or liability for the failure to detect, identify or make known any additional hazards, threats or areas of risk beyond what is identified in the report. Additionally, CRS makes no representations or warranties with respect to the recipient’s use of the report nor to any third party relating to information contained in this report.

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This report is the fifth in a series monitoring the security environment leading up to, during and following the U.S. presidential election. It aims to prepare businesses for possible contingencies during the election period and how these contingencies may impact physical security.

OVERVIEW G4S assesses that there is a continued, elevated risk of political violence particularly by far-right individuals and groups. This risk is assessed as highest for government facilities, politicians, social media companies that have blocked President Trump and/or cracked down on certain discourse, media companies, and individuals in leadership positions across these industries. The risk of white supremacist attacks has also increased.

G4S emphasizes that while there is a significantly elevated risk of political violence in Washington, D.C., and at government properties across local, state and federal levels across state capitols, security precautions should also be reviewed for companies and individuals who have made any political statements or contributions. Extremist groups are increasingly calling on followers to attack on the “local level� and are also increasingly supporting the targeting of individuals.There have been multiple discussions identified on far-right forums that specifically recommend targeting elsewhere while law enforcement is focused on government assets and personnel. Furthermore, G4S emphasizes that this risk is expected to continue in the near term, and is not expected to dissipate immediately after Jan. 20.

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SITUATION UPDATE

Security Response Update

The Jan. 6 violence in Washington, D.C., led to five confirmed deaths, including the murder of one police officer. President Trump has since stated “Millions of our citizens watched on Wednesday as a mob stormed the Capitol and trashed the halls of government” as well as “In light of reports of more demonstrations, I urge that there must be no violence, no lawbreaking and no vandalism of any kind. That is not what I stand for, and it is not what America stands for.”

Law enforcement on the local and federal level are continuing widespread investigations into those who took part in the violence. At least 70 individuals have so far been charged, with hundreds of criminal cases expected in connection with the Jan. 6 events at the Capitol.

Charges include the theft of national security and defense information, assault on federal and local law enforcement, possession of an unregistered firearm and felony murder.

Political Update Present-Elect Joe Biden is to be sworn in as the next President of the United States on Inauguration Day, Jan. 20.

Meanwhile, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a non-binding resolution on Jan. 12 to call for the 25th Amendment to be invoked to remove President Trump from office. Vice-President Pence has stated that he will not invoke this resolution. Consequently, on Jan. 13, the House of Representatives voted in favor of impeaching President Trump for “willfully inciting violence against the Government of the United States.”

The next stage of this impeachment will be a trial in the Senate, which would need to pass with a two-thirds majority to convict Trump. This would require all Democrats and at least 17 Republicans to vote in favor of impeachment.

Current statements by senior politicians suggest that the impeachment trial is not expected to take place until after Jan. 20. Debate continues about whether an impeachment trial can take place after a President has left office, but precedence (albeit more historic and on more local levels) does exist. (Bloomberg) If the Senate votes to convict Trump, a second vote could bar him from holding future office, and this would only require a majority vote to pass.

The violence on Jan. 6 led to a number of resignations, including by the U.S. Capitol police chief, Senate SergeantAt-Arms and House Sergeant-At-Arms.

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Local and national security agencies have also increased security measures for the coming days and weeks, in preparation of further potential violence (notably expected events between Jan. 17-20.) The Mayor of D.C. extended the state of public emergency through 3 p.m. on Jan. 21, and President Trump has approved a state of emergency for D.C. This allows federal assistance to supplement response efforts. A state of emergency has further been declared in Utah, and may be declared in additional states.

At least 20,000 National Guard troops are expected to be in Washington, D.C., to provide additional security including a 24-hour watch at the U.S. Capitol. Additional security personnel (including National Guard in some areas) are also expected at state capitals around the country. Physical security enhancements are under way in D.C. and across various state capitals. These range from the addition of physical barriers to boarding up windows. Furthermore, significant road closures are expected in Washington, D.C., and potentially around some states’ Capitol buildings during these dates.

FACT-CHECKING JAN. 6 In acknowledgement of the current high volume of false reporting and misinformation campaigns, G4S is providing this section to clarify these claims. Many people who gathered on Jan. 6 remained peaceful and may never have intended to participate in violence themselves. However, there were individuals and groups present that expressly stated an intent for violence.

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Claim: There was no violence perpetrated by those who gathered on Jan. 6.

Response: he violence that occurred resulted in five deaths, including that of U.S. Capitol Police Officer Brian D. Sicknick. This has been confirmed by the US Capitol Police. Additionally, the acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia has confirmed that the explosive devices left outside of the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee were real devices with timers. An armed individual was also arrested and is charged after law enforcement found his vehicle containing firearms, ammunition and components to construct 11 Molotov cocktails. A different individual is facing federal charges after arriving in possession of firearms and having stated that he was planning on killing House Speaker Pelosi on live TV. G4S further reviewed videos of physical fights between police and individuals outside and within the Capitol. Moreover, G4S has reviewed videos found on farright forums of violence within the Capitol (for example, a group of individuals chasing an African American police officer in a highly threatening manner.) Finally, the conversations on far-right forums before and after Jan. 6 support that there were individuals who gathered with the express intent of committing violence (see previous G4S reporting.)

Claim: The violence committed was not by pro-Trump or far-right individuals.

Response: While it is possible that left-wing individuals were present, G4S assesses that the main physical risk was posed by supporters of President Trump and far-right individuals and groups.

Claims that the woman who was killed, Ashli Babbit, was a Black Lives Matter or Antifa protestor in disguise have been discredited. Her social media shows that she was a Trump supporter, and a QAnon follower. Many far-right organizations have embraced her as a martyr of their movement (even creating a flag of her.)

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Figure 1. Proud Boys Acknowledging Identity of Babbit (Telegram / Proud Boys)

G4S is aware of specific claims that two individuals who were photographed within the capitol are actually Antifa.

This false reporting includes a zoomed in image of the first individual (wearing fur, with a flag painted over his face) at a Black Lives Matter rally. The full image from this rally shows him as a counter-protestor, holding a sign that states “Q Sent Me.” He has been identified as Jake Angeli, and is reportedly a frequent right-wing protestor in Arizona.

There are several videos of Angeli voicing his support for President Trump, and Angeli has contacted media and identified himself as a QAnon supporter, specifically dispelling the rumors of his involvement in Antifa, since Jan. 6.

Significant misinformation also exists for a second individual, who has a beard and long hair. This individual has been misidentified as a member of the ‘Philly Antifa’ group. These individuals are not the same person, and have distinct, different tattoos.

Finally, far-right individuals and groups have expressed intent and claimed violence on Jan. 6. This includes posting photos and videos from within the Capitol building after it was breached, which G4S has not seen elsewhere publically.

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Response: While there are videos that suggest complicity of individual law enforcement officers, these did not reflect the policy of their departments, and officers are actively being investigated. Several Capitol Police have already been suspended, and law enforcement and military branches are investigating members who reportedly took part in the Jan. 6 violence. Additionally, there are videos of protestors and law enforcement in physical fights. At least one individual who breached the Capitol was killed by law enforcement, and at least one police officer was killed (see above). Indeed, the response by law enforcement has led to some far-right individuals now speaking out against the police in general.

Figure 4. Fighting Between Police and Pro-Trump Supporters (Telegram / Proud Figure 2. Full Image of QAnon Supporter, Jake Angeli (The Dispatch Fact Check)

Boys)

Claim:

Those who breached the Capitol were protesters not involved in insurrection or terrorism.

Figure 3. Proud Boys Statement Against Claims That Antifa Was Involved (Telegram / Proud Boys)

Claim: Police and law enforcement were — on an

organizational level — supporting protesters. OR The police — as an organization — welcomed individuals into the Capitol.

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Response: Terrorism is herein defined as “the calculated use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective.” Insurgency is herein defined as a “term historically restricted to rebellious acts that did not reach the proportions of an organized revolution. It has subsequently been applied to any such armed uprising, typically guerrilla in character, against the recognized government of a state or country.” (Encyclopedia Britannica) G4S Corporate Risk Services

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Many people who gathered on Jan. 6 remained peaceful and may never have intended to participate in the violence themselves. However, there were individuals and groups present that expressly stated the above objectives both before and after Jan. 6.

This includes social media discussions by accounts seen as leaders within far-right organizations (i.e. not by unknown potential ‘infiltrators’ of these groups).

Figure 7. Examples of Negative Sentiment Towards Police (Telegram / Proud Boys)

TRENDS Figure 5. Individual supporting domestic terrorism (Telegram)

Figure 6. Individual supporting domestic terrorism (Telegram)

Claim: These protestors can’t be far-right or pro-Trump because those individuals support law enforcement.

Response: There are several frictions between and within far-right and pro-Trump groups at the moment.

One of these includes attitudes toward law enforcement.

While many Trump supporters support them, there are increasingly groups of pro-Trump supporters and the far-right that do not. In addition to the above Figure 4, G4S has identified a large number of conversations that highlight negative sentiment toward police and other law enforcement.

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Fragmenting Groups Despite the calls on social media for some type of violent altercations, the breach of the U.S. Capitol, while on some level successful for those participating in the violence, did not ultimately appear well coordinated. In reviewing video footage and first-hand accounts, once the protestors were inside there was little coordinated effort about what to do next or where to go. Most of the iconic photos from inside the capitol showed individuals wandering around, taking selfies and stealing items. There is no unifying organization or ideology among these groups, which makes identifying the threat a challenge. The emerging threat of political violence demonstrates evolving group dynamics both within and among various alt-right groups,such as Proud Boys, the III%ers, Oath Keepers,and multiple white supremacist groups.

There are serious divides amongst those who reject violence versus those that support it, individuals and groups who support President Trump and those who do not, those who no longer support law enforcement versus those who adamantly do and those who are motivated primarily due to race and specifically white-supremacy and/or anti-Semitism versus those who are not.

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President Trump’s most recent statements (see above, Situation Update), in combination with the bipartisan and widespread negative labeling of the Jan. 6 events,including insurrection, terrorism and extremism, has decreased the likelihood of peaceful, pro-Trump supporters continuing to attend protests at least outside of their local groups.

There are also pro-Trump supporters who are now more emboldened and desperate to take action, seeing Jan. 6 as a failed mission and expressing interest in acting before it’s ‘too late.’ Some of these individuals have formed conspiracy theories around Trump’s most recent statements against violence.

Figure 8. Proud Boys Disavowing Trump (Telegram)

Meanwhile, G4S has identified a significant number and entire groups of more radical pro-Trump supporters who view Trump’s recent statement and inaction as a betrayal.

Many of these individuals are expressing strong frustration that the Jan. 6 violence did not go further and continue to express interest in facilitating more widespread violence.

Far-right, including white supremacist groups are actively encouraging members to recruit and indoctrinate the aforementioned individuals toward their ideologies.

The combination of the above factors has made it likely that pro-Trump supporters committed to remaining peaceful are less likely to attend large, nationwide protests, but that the overall risk of political violence continues to be very high and may even have increased since Jan. 6. These acts of violence are more likely to be isolated acts of violence, akin to lone-wolf terrorism or supported by local, smaller groups. As such, they may occur with little or no warning

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Figure 9. Discussions of ‘Lone Wolf Attacks’ and Calls for Violence (4Chan)

Characteristics G4S emphasizes that the individuals and groups posing a risk of political violence are not unified in one ideology or movement, and there are many calls for individuals to act on a local level. This results in a less predictable situation, as an individual’s characteristics may significantly change the type and sophistication of attack they could plan and execute (i.e. the access they have through their employment or their knowledge set.)

Common characteristics in recent acts of political violence, property destruction and thwarted political violence schemes include: •

•

•

•

Violent actors are self-starters. Individuals will interpret statements from online sources, media or politicians for themselves and decide how to take action; Actors look for opportunity. These may include easy or nearby targets, public figures whose office and residences are easily located and government buildings; Actors operate within an echo chamber. The digest of online material and limited news sources provide clues about areas of grievance and the individuals who are targeted; and Actors are mostly untested. Despite the purposeful dress and accessorizing of military gear and weapons, most participants are untested in their fabled “fight against tyranny” or the government or vote-steal, etc.

Gaining experience and membership after each event, they are in a ‘learn-as-you-go’ mode, and despite G4S Corporate Risk Services

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some members having military or law enforcement experience, this does not mean they operate as a cohesive unit or have a unified mission or standard operating procedure. One troubling outcome of the breach of the U.S. Capitol is that it appears to have emboldened some individuals. Members of these groups who are also members or former members of military and law enforcement also pose a higher risk in this regard.

Changing Platforms Social media platforms are removing far-right and extremist content, including calls for violence at a significantly accelerated rate. This and especially the social media app Parler being offline (at least temporarily) has put the locations of far-right and extremist groups’ communications in flux, and they are evolving on a daily rate.

Many far-right groups have continued to focus on Telegram, and communications are also continuing on 4Chan and individual websites. With Telegram channels being removed on an individual basis, groups and individuals with larger followings are continually posting ‘backup’ channels in case theirs is removed. There are also frequent posts on these channels advising followers on changing settings on their phones to ensure that apps can’t be deleted without their consent. Meanwhile, specifically followers of QAnon are moving more toward Gab.

Figure 10. Proud Boys Telegram Channel Advising Followers Of Backup Channel (Telegram)

There are also increasing references to organizing outside of social media to form local (physical) groups as well as deep web (including dark net) communications, and references to other alternative means of communication online.* 9 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

* As this report is open to the public, G4S has removed specific sources, links and names throughout the report that could lead potential supporters of these movements toward them. If you work within security leadership for your organization, G4S can provide further details. Contact information is available at the end of this report.

Disinformation In addition to far-right individuals and groups actively distributing factually inaccurate information to their followers,for example, widespread conspiracy theories, G4S has identified posts actively encouraging infiltration and disinformation campaigns against groups that they view as opposed to their ideologies and beliefs, such as Black Lives Matters. G4S identified multiple incidents of far-right groups distributing repositories of URLs for these groups on platforms such as Telegram.

Targeting Government Assets and Individuals Across the far-right social media discussions and planned events that G4S reviewed, the most frequent targets for proposed violence and/or are government buildings and individual politicians. While there have been specific plans identified for capitol buildings (see Planned Protests), and this remains a significant concern, G4S cautions against only expecting and preparing for the same types of violence as on Jan. 6. This is especially the case due to the varied membership and groups involved. Moreover, a common discussion across disparate groups in recent days has been advice to avoid these types of protests — even calling the planned, armed “Million Militia March” the “Million Martyr March” due to the likelihood of being arrested. Several groups go further, recommending that supporters target elsewhere, while law enforcement is focused on government assets and particularly focused on Washington, D.C. (see Soft Targets, below).

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large political contributions.

Figure 12. References to Media and Big Tech Being Identified As Discussed Targets (Twitter)

Counter-Protesters In recent months, one of the highest risks for violence at protests occurred when protestors met counterprotestors. There have been multiple cases of serious violence between groups. This includes fist fights, stabbings and vehicular rammings. G4S assesses that this is almost certainly going to continue. Moreover, as white supremacist ideologies increase amongst some groups, there is a risk of more targeted attacks on racial groups or based on anti-Semitism. These types of attacks have been proposed on far-right forums, including the targeting of Black Lives Matter protestors.

Figure 11. Post recommending targeting elsewhere while law enforcement is focused in D.C. (Telegram)

Media and Social Media The media has been a long-standing target for grievance amongst pro-Trump groups as well as far-right individuals who do not support President Trump. This negative attitude and focus on the media has been further propelled and significantly escalated in recent weeks, particularly with multiple social media platforms removing President Trump from their platforms and accelerating their removal of content that is deemed extremist or condoning violence. G4S identified increasing calls to target media, and particularly social media, offices, assets and leadership. Far-right groups are sharing information on 10 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

While G4S did not identify any discussions specifically referring to this, there may be an elevated risk of white supremacist attacks on Jan. 18, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, due to the current elevated tensions and rhetoric on white supremacist forums.

Soft Targets and Local Targets References to “soft targets” and “local targets” are increasing at a rapid rate. Soft targets refer to potential targets that are not well protected (i.e. compared to hard targets, such as military or law enforcement assets.)

Posts that specifically refer to soft targets are not tending to recommend the same specific examples. However, these have included offices (such as social media and big tech headquarters or data centers), public utilities and G4S Corporate Risk Services

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individuals’ homes. G4S recommends heightened vigilance looking for insider threats for businesses that have made political statements or are otherwise associated with a political stance.

G4S has identified particularly concerning posts recommending that far-right followers target soft targets and local targets on dates when law enforcement is expected to be focused elsewhere.

Figure 13. Post recommending targeting soft targets on the local level. (Parler)

Individuals One of the most significant trends G4S has identified is an increasing call to target individuals as representatives of their beliefs or companies. This is most notably being seen in calls to commit violence against politicians, but has also been identified against individuals who are viewed as having “betrayed” President Trump, been involved in alleged voter fraud, leadership figures in media and social media companies and other individuals who are listed due to racial or anti-Semitic reasons. Personal details, including home addresses and e-mail addresses for these individuals are being shared in far-right groups and websites when they’ve been identified.

Figure 15. Post Referring to “Enemies List”.

Figure 16. Post Calling For, And Threatening, Assassinations (Parler)

Protests targeting individuals are not limited to far-right groups. Potentially as a result of more people working from home during COVID-19, G4S has started to identify a slight increase in protests in general being organized in front of individuals’ homes and individuals being identified and harassed in public (for example, at airports.)

Law Enforcement

Figure 14. Post recommending targeting soft elsewhere while law enforcement

While less common, there is an upward trend in posts suggesting violence toward law enforcement. Some farright individuals have expressed feeling betrayed by the reaction of law enforcement on and since Jan. 6 (see also above, Figure 4, and 7.)

is focused in the Capitol. (Parler)

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Now,’ ‘Rally For the People’s Demands’ and ‘Yellow Vest Protest.’ Additionally, a continuation of frequent protest topics is expected to continue (i.e. Black Lives Matter and protesting police violence). Moreover, G4S notes that marches are being organized to celebrate Jan. 18, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, which this year could face an elevated risk of counter-protests or white supremacist violence (although calls for this have not been specifically identified.)

Figure 17. Hostility Expressed Toward Law Enforcement (Pro-Trump Website)

Additional Factors Security risks will further be significantly impacted by a number of factors, which could escalate or mitigate the threat. These include: • Security Response and Posture • How Key Political Events Transpire, e.g. the Senate impeachment trial • Political Responses to Jan. 6 • Organizations’ Responses to Jan. 6 • Statements By Key Political Figures • Weather Conditions • Acts or Attempted Acts of Violence, including against a political figure, or civilians One aspect to consider in regard to the impact the security response could have is that the timeline for a planned act of violence could be accelerated if a potential attacker feels they are at risk of being caught or being investigated.

Any protests that relate to politics or race face a heightened risk of being met by counter-protests and therefore of violent confrontations. The likelihood of protest violence based on location has been discussed in greater length in the first and particularly the second part of this series (published Sept. 28 and Oct. 29, 2020.)

The following should in no way serve as a comprehensive list of all planned protests, but rather represent protests that are being featured for their references to being armed, committing violence or are otherwise featured for their potential for political violence.

Jan. 17 – Jan. 20 It has been widely reported that from noon on Jan. 17 through Jan. 20 protests have been scheduled across all 50 state capitols and at the U.S. Capitol, as well as calls to “storm” government buildings across local, state, and federal levels (particularly if President Trump is removed from office.)

PLANNED EVENTS Aside from the protests outlined below, G4S has identified countless more being planned throughout the coming weeks, and particularly now through Jan. 20 across the U.S. These include protests in support of and many protesting against President Trump. Protest titles identified include ‘America First,’ ‘Accountability March,’ ‘Convict Trump,’ ‘Arrest Insurrectionists,’ ‘Stand By Trump,’ ‘Trump Out 12 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

Figure 18. Call for Protest on Jan. 17 (8kun)

While several groups that G4S has reviewed are publically disavowing this event (even forming a widespread conspiracy theory that it is being organized by authorities or by media companies to trap them), this could be a case of intentional disinformation by groups, a lack of G4S Corporate Risk Services

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communication between groups and simple confusion due to the disruptions in communications. It also reflects that these groups are not unified. There are unconfirmed reports that this event is being organized by the Boogaloo Bois. Regardless of the organizer, there are a large number of individuals expressing frustrations about Jan. 6 not having gone further. The sentiment expressed in this call for protest align with what is being expressed across various social media forums, and particularly amongst those Trump supporters who have expressed a willingness to commit violence and see the final days of his term as a ‘last chance.’

Pelosi.

Figure 20. Description of Page Formerly Advertising the ‘Million Militia March’

Figure 19. Post on 4Chan Warning Against the Jan. 17 Protest

Jan. 19 - Jan. 20 The majority of posts identified across far-right social media, which call for a larger protest, are focused on Jan. 20 (with some suggesting arriving and starting on Jan. 19.)

While these events are also being disavowed by some groups, discussions about this event are more frequent.

Of particular note is a protest referred to as the “Million Militia March” (nicknamed the “Million Martyr March” by individuals who recommend against supporters attending this event.) This is the event being referred to above in Figure 19. This event likewise encourages attendees to come armed, and encourages the execution of Nancy 13 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

Figure 21. Call to Protest, Armed, On Jan. 19.

Both the ‘Refuse to be Silenced’ march and ‘Million Militia March’ appear to be geared toward supporters of G4S Corporate Risk Services

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President Trump who continue to wish to fight for him or continue to protest their allegations of election fraud.

Many posts were identified that expected Jan. 6 to be a “day of reckoning,” which fell short of their expectations, and now see Jan. 20 as their aforementioned ‘last chance.’

identified for these protests, some local events do have flyers that depict violent graphics (see below flyer for Portland, Oregon. Portland has notably been a location that experiences violence at protests more frequently.)

Figure 22. Reference to Jan. 20 as the ‘Day of Reckoning’ (QResearch)

Meanwhile, groups that do not support President Trump appear to be alternating between telling their supporters to either stay home and quiet away from detection, or capitalize on these protests by attacking elsewhere (see above ‘Targeting,’ and below ‘Local Level,’ There are also isolated references by apparent supporters of President Trump referring to targeting other locations.

Figure 23. Isolated Reference to Targeting Elsewhere Instead of D.C. (4Chan)

In addition to far-right protests planned for Jan. 19 & 20, G4S has also identified nationwide protests against U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE). These protests appear to be focused on using inauguration day to send a political message to the incoming president.

Figure 25. Planned Protest Against ICE in Portland, Oregon

“Local Level” As outlined in the above ‘Local Targets’ trend, G4S has identified particularly concerning posts recommending that far-right followers target soft targets and local targets on dates when law enforcement is expected to be focused elsewhere.

Figure 24. Planned Protest Against ICE (Telegram)

While calls for widespread violence have not been 14 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

Figure 26. Suggestion of “act locally” (Pro-Trump Website)

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General Calls for Violence

Counter-Protests

Finally, G4S notes that outside of formal calls to gather and protest, there continue to be a very high quantity of posts condoning and calling for violent action. A poll on the Proud Boys Telegram channel showed 75% voted for wanting “total war.”

This analysis is largely focused on far-right violence as this is assessed as having increased most significantly in the past month, due in large part to groups feeling antagonized by recent political events. While other forms of political violence are possible, they are not expected to have significantly altered.

G4S has reviewed groups calling for racial justice, protesting against police brutality and specifically protesting far-right movements and fascism. While there are undoubtedly individuals across these movements who are more extremist themselves, G4S has not identified a significant increase in calls for violence amongst the groups reviewed on a larger scale.

Figure 27. Proud Boys Poll On Whether Members Wanted “Total War”

G4S continues to assess an elevated risk of political violence, including the risk of isolated acts of terrorism as well as a potential for mass violence. There are many individuals who are expressing frustration that Jan. 6 did not go further.

There have been continued calls to form counter-protests, and G4S assesses that violence at protests is most likely where counter-protest groups meet. Communications within groups such as Black Lives Matter appear to currently be focused on continued grievances, hostility toward farright individuals and white supremacists and anger toward what many supporters view as a racially-motivated double standard in the response by law enforcement to the violence on Jan. 6. In the below image, it is unclear what is meant by “take the airports,” but this could be in reference to trying to prevent far-right individuals from flying to D.C.

Figure 29. Poll on a Black Lives Matter Telegram Channel, Asking For Responses To Jan. 6 Violence Figure 28. Call for Violence (Telegram)

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ASSOCIATED SECURITY CONCERNS The following security considerations should be taken into account due to the heightened risk of political violence (including domestic terrorism) and of civil unrest: •

•

•

Disruption to Emergency Response: Emergency responders will likely be focused in protest areas, potentially experiencing staffing shortages in other areas. Moreover, traffic disruptions and road closures may severely reduce emergency response times, particularly downtown and during key protest dates.

Property Damage: There is an elevated risk of property damage near protest sites, and some individuals have indicated planned intent to cause damage. Any buildings, vehicles or other assets that show a political preference are more likely to be targeted.

Other Crime: Potential criminals may see the emergency response resources being focused in particular areas,such as around Capitols or at protests, and use this as an opportunity to commit crimes. This has been seen on multiple occasions across the U.S. in recent months. For example, on Nov. 3 as many as 50 armed people systematically broke into at least seven businesses in Oakland, California, seemingly with the understanding that police were focused on political demonstrations in other areas. This looting continued on Nov. 4.

RECOMMENDATIONS While these recommendations particularly relate the coming days through Jan. 20, G4S emphasizes that there is an elevated risk projected for the near- to mediumterm. This is not expected to dissipate on Jan. 20, and is particularly a risk as major political developments or statements occur (such as if the Senate convicts Trump in an impeachment trial.) The security situation should be continually monitored and reassessed as new events occur that could impact the threat level. These recommendations 16 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

are particularly geared toward businesses with locations near protest sites, federal and state buildings or businesses that have — on an organizational or leadership level — made political statements or contributions. Businesses that have taken action against far-right groups are also at an elevated risk. G4S recommends the following safety and security plan for businesses and their employees:

Social Media Considerations • Social media monitoring, including access to the dark net is recommended to identify threats to businesses and their leadership, particularly if they have made political statements or contributions and especially if these or other political actions have been featured in the media (including local media).

• A clear company policy on out-of-bounds activities for employees is recommended.

Personal Safety The following apply particularly to senior leadership employees, and especially those who have made any political statements, contributions, or actions or are seen as a figurehead for a company that has done so.

• Employees should review current security protocols with existing security teams, including traveling to and from work, security at personal residences, review of travel etc. Discussion may include ways to change up travel routine, work locations, routes as well as discussion with employee’s family (as necessary) that involve awareness, limiting identifying features (e.g., remove stickers on cars that advertise school, youth sports teams, vanity plates etc.) and encouraging smart online practices that limit posting of personally identifiable information.

• Employees should vary their transportation routes and arrival and departure schedules, as is feasible.

Keeping the same routines every day puts an individual at greater risk for being targeted.

• Employees should always drive or ride in vehicles with the doors locked and windows up; this should G4S Corporate Risk Services

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be conveyed to family members of senior leadership and practiced in personal vehicles — not just work vehicles.

• Senior leadership employees may need to review security practices during air travel. Public figures have been harassed at airports and on flights with greater intensity in recent weeks.

Building Security and On-Site Safety • Office locations should have on-hand emergency preparedness kits, and ensure a portion of the staff and employees have basic first aid training and a few members have more advanced first aid training to assist in case of emergencies.

• Routine emergency drills should be performed at facilities to mimic a range of security threats, including active shooter, natural disaster, power failure, medical emergency etc.

• Security managers for rural locations should review quick reaction force options with local law enforcement.

• Ensure a robust, and anonymous reporting mechanism is in place for employees to report concerns over actions of colleagues, things posted, said or screenshots, which may imply an attack on the facility and/or company.

• Personnel review of recent employee complaints and/ or complaints of an employee, recent firing etc. should be screened and social media accounts reviewed as appropriate.

• Businesses within a 0.5 mi radius of State Capitol Buildings that have seen protests in recent months, or within 0.5 miles of the Washington Monument, Freedom Plaza, Capitol Building or Congress, should consider closing their locations starting at 4 p.m. on Jan. 19 through 8 a.m. on Jan. 21 at which point the local security situation can be reassessed.

• Protests are likely in the coming days. Protests can change quickly and companies are urged to monitor local police social media feeds and local news coverage closely to stay up to date on nearby protests and breaking events. G4S Security Risk Operations Center can also be reached for situational updates. The 17 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

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default should be to act with extreme caution and leave sooner rather than later in the event of a nearby protest.

A heightened security posture will be needed through the month of January in downtown Washington, D.C., and in State Capitols that have experienced large protests or violence. This should only be relaxed upon completion of an updated security assessment.

Transportation routes should be reviewed and contingency plans made with alternative backup routes, both in case of road closures and particularly if the primary route comes near protest sites. This is especially the case if needing to move people or goods through these areas.

All unsecure motor vehicles should be moved ahead of any planned protests in the area. If facilities do not have secure parking (underground garage or fenced in) any vehicles left in open parking lots or on the street should be moved, if it is safe to do so.

Businesses should remove any unattended merchandise or other valuables that are not well secured ahead of any planned protests and either stow them in a nonvisible, nonaccessible location, or move them off-site if possible and if it is safe to do so.

Companies with business sites near planned protests should assess the outside of their critical infrastructure to see if there are any unsecured objects that could be used by individuals for blockades or projectiles. These items should be removed and secured. If renting, work with the landlord to secure items or mitigate access to them.

Businesses should review emergency procedures with staff members. Employees who may be working at business sites should not be alone and be prepared with an evacuation plan if needed. Employees should remember that emergency services response times may be impacted in areas where there are protests.

Businesses should ensure that all smoke detectors are functioning, fire extinguishers are available and exit doors are clear and working and plan for possible delays to emergency response times.

No employees should be at facilities after dark when there are ongoing protests in the area until the situation appears to be calming down.

After reviewing protests since May 2020, G4S notes G4S Corporate Risk Services

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that most acts of violence — clashes with police, clashes among individuals, vandalism, looting and arson — occurred in the evening and night. If physical presence is absolutely necessary near a protest site, additional security measures should be adopted to ensure employee safety. G4S is able to provide tailored assessments for this purpose.

• Facilities within a 15 block radius of protests should consider locking doors and covering up large glass windows that face the street.

• Companies may wish to remind employees of the risk associated with political stickers on personal cars parked near busy streets or other highly transited areas that could become easy targets for property damage and vandalism.

• Companies may want to consider the presence of any political signs on their property that could highlight their business as a target for property damage and vandalism.

METHODOLOGY SCOPE

is Jan. 14, 2021, and for social media (including darknet sources), is Jan. 12, 2021.

As this report is open to the public, G4S has removed specific sources, links and names throughout the report that could lead potential supporters of these movements toward them. If you work within security leadership for your organization, G4S can provide further details.

Contact information is available at the end of this report.

&

This intelligence assessment relies on an analysis of intelligence gathered via open-source networks such as online search engines, media and social media pages.

Darknet sources were also reviewed.

This report is analytical and should be viewed as a method for preparing for potential security risks rather than a list of guaranteed outcomes. This report is intended for a wide audience and individual businesses’ risks will vary depending on their business type, key leadership and the locations of their assets. G4S is able to provide tailored risk assessments upon request.

This assessment is not intended to examine how different political policies or ideologies may impact businesses, nor is it an assessment of election result validity. This report is limited in scope to a security assessment.

The information cut-off date for major political events 18 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

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G4S SECURITY RISK OPERATIONS CENTER For questions regarding this report or for immediate assistance, please call:

G4S Security Risk Operations Center services include:

G4S Security Risk Operations Center: (866) 604-1226 Alternate Phone: (866) 943-8892

g4s.us 19 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment

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