Nuclear Explosion Monitoring - 60 Years of Science and Innovation | Program Guide

NUCLEAR EXPLOSION MONITORING

YEARS of SCIENCE a n d I N N O VAT I O N

Program Guide

November 30, 2016 • Capitol Hill #NEM60

Schedule of Events NOVEMBER 30, 2016

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SENATE DIRKSEN BUILDING

1:00 – 3:00 PM TECHNOLOGY EXHIBIT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC

Staff present to provide demonstrations

3:00 – 3:10 PM OPENING OF EVENT

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Frank Klotz Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security & Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Dept. of Energy

3:10 – 3:20 PM GUEST SPEAKER

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3:20 – 3:30 PM

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ROOM: SDG-50

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CAPITOL HILL

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WASHINGTON, DC

David Merker Director of Nuclear Treaty Monitoring, Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), U.S. Dept. of Defense W. Randy Bell Director of the International Data Centre Division, CTBTO PrepCom Dr. Steven Ashby Director, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Al–Sharif Nasser bin Nasser Managing Director, Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS)

4:25 – 4:40 PM BREAK

GUEST SPEAKER

Lassina Zerbo Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom)

3:30 – 3:40 PM

4:40 – 4:55 PM KEYNOTE

Dr. Ernest Moniz U.S. Secretary of Energy

4:55 – 5:10 PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thomas Countryman Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Dept. of State

John Kerry U.S. Secretary of State (to be confirmed)

3:40 – 4:25 PM

5:10 – 5:15 PM

PANEL DISCUSSION: MONITORING AND VERIFICATION: TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION

Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood–Randall Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Dept. of Energy

Moderator: Madelyn Creedon Principal Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Dept. of Energy

KEYNOTE

CLOSING OF EVENT

5:15 – 6:15 PM RECEPTION AND EXHIBIT DEMONSTRATIONS

Senate Dirksen Building 23

Sign In Enter Building

Food & Drinks

Exit Building

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Room: SDG-50 Floor Plan

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR DETONATION DETECTION SYSTEM (USNDS) GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) AND DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM (DSP) SATELLITE MODELS

IMS MODELS AND EQUIPMENT

USNDS sensors are hosted on board GPS and DSP satellites to detect nuclear explosions on or above the surface of the Earth. These sensors are part of the Atmosphere and Space segment of the US Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS) in support of the AFTAC Nuclear Treaty Monitoring Mission.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) uses seismic, acoustic, hydroacoustic, and radionuclide sensors to monitor the earth for nuclear explosions. The Nuclear Arms Control Technology (NACT) program of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) performs operations and maintenance for the majority of the 36 U.S. IMS stations.

This display includes models of IMS stations operated by the United States, interactive seismic and infrasound elements similar to those used in these stations, and a wireless central recording facility that will allow you to interact with the equipment.

9 21 DEPLOYABLE ANALYSIS SYSTEM (DAS) The Deployable Analysis System (DAS) capability allows for soil gas samples collected on the ground or whole air samples collected in an airplane to be analyzed for radioactive xenon, or radioxenon, isotopes giving the United States the ability to perform in-the-field measurement and analysis of radioxenon. U.S. scientists are continually researching gas processing methods to reduce analysis time and improve detection of hard to measure isotopes. Full integration of multiple gas processes into a mobile system affords unprecedented sensitivity and radioxenon measurement and analysis capability to the nuclear explosion monitoring and verification community.

10 ADVANCED ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH EQUIPMENT (AARE) GAS COLLECTION SPHERE AND PARTICLE COLLECTION FILTER ASSEMBLY These are the collection media used onboard the U.S. Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) WC-135 aircraft to collect potential radioactive particulate and gaseous debris emitted from suspected nuclear explosions.

A typical collection sortie collects approximately 12 whole air (gas) samples (36 spheres) and 9 particle samples (9 filters). AFTAC field systems and laboratories perform nuclear measurements on these samples to detect the presence of radioactive debris that may have been released from the suspect event.

RADIONUCLIDE AEROSOL SAMPLER-ANALYZER (RASA) AIR FILTER The Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler-Analyzer, or RASA, is one of the world’s most sensitive radioactive particle detectors. Created by U.S. scientists at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), the RASA system is used today in the International Monitoring System (IMS). The RASA moves large volumes of air through filters, such as the one shown here, to collect trace amounts of radioactive material. This material could be part of the actual exploded nuclear device, in the form of radioactive debris, or it could be radioactive material created by the effects of the nuclear explosion. Spectrometers measure radioactive debris caught on filters to help distinguish whether a suspect event was a nuclear explosion, naturally occurring radioactivity, or if it is from a peaceful man-made process (e.g., medical isotope production, nuclear power reactor).

21 RADIOXENON DETECTOR A specialized nuclear detection system, like the model shown here, is designed to measure the few cubic centimeters of radioactive xenon gas, or “radioxenon”, collected following a suspected nuclear explosion.

Radioxenon is emitted from nuclear explosions, and can often be detected even if the explosion was conducted underground.

The measurement of a radioxenon gas sample can take up to 24 hours to complete, but once the data is collected and analyzed, the measurement can give important information needed to determine whether a nuclear explosion has occurred.

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RADIONUCLIDE AEROSOL SAMPLER-ANALYZER (RASA) “HOCKEY PUCK”

“ENRICHING REFLUX” RADIOACTIVE XENON GAS COLLECTION UNIT

This compressed air filter, or Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler-Analyzer (RASA) “hockey puck” allows scientists to better detect radioactive debris. The distribution of the material is compacted and therefore easy to move close to a nuclear spectrometer. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) operates the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission (CTBTO PrepCom)-certified U.S. radionuclide analysis laboratory “RL16” in Richland, Washington. At RL16 and 15 other worldwide radionuclide laboratories of the International Monitoring System (IMS), gaseous samples and compressed air filters are measured to an even higher level of sensitivity than the already ultra-sensitive equipment located at IMS radionuclide stations.

21 “SAUNA BOTTLE” CONTAINER FOR RADIOACTIVE XENON GASES While this Swedish Automatic Unit for Noble gas Acquisition container or “SAUNA bottle” does not contain anything radioactive, bottles such as these are collected from measurement stations across the world that could contain radioactive xenon isotopes, or radioxenon, from a nuclear explosion. Complex air separation systems at forty global radioxenon measurement stations separate trace amounts of radioactive xenon gas and measure the radioactive content. Following the measurement, the small amount of sample that was measured is automatically stored in bottles such as this for retrieval and subsequent analysis in a certified radionuclide analysis laboratory.

Radioactive xenon gas was detected from previous nuclear test explosions conducted by the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (North Korea) and helped to confirm that the DPRK explosions were in fact nuclear.

In this unit, scientists are exploring a novel research and development (R&D) process called “enriching reflux.” Here gases are collected and re-routed in multiple passes to increase the enrichment levels of gases needed to make sensitive measurements.

U.S. scientists are continually pushing the envelope to lower and lower detection limits to keep up with potential adversaries’ improvement in concealing their activities.

This unit is one example of an R&D endeavor for improving the timeliness, s electivity, and power usage associated with radioactive noble gas collection for nuclear explosion monitoring and verification.

22 OSIRIS RADIONUCLIDE DETECTOR The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (OSIRIS) system uses a measurement-restriction approach to limit information displayed on radioisotopes to a select set of 17 fission products. These radioisotopes, with half-lives ranging from days to years, have been identified by a group of international technical experts as being relevant to the detection and identification of a nuclear explosion. Using OSIRIS, inspectors can detect underground nuclear explosions without revealing proliferation sensitive information.

23 ON-SITE INSPECTION (OSI) NOBLE GAS SAMPLING Sampling of soil gases near the surface above the site of a suspected underground nuclear explosion is an important part of the OSI protocol for determining whether a nuclear explosion has actually occurred. It is important to capture the best possible explosion-produced noble gas signatures of radioxenon and Argon-37 in the soil if they exist, and the strength of these signatures depends on environmental conditions such as atmospheric pressure fluctuations. The Smart Sampler is an automated sampling system intended to sample at those times when atmospheric conditions are most likely to allow collection of gases from the subsurface. Additionally, automated sample acquisition allows soil gas samples to be obtained when inspectors cannot be present such as during storms, which are often the best times for sampling.

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GRAVIMETERS

SPECTRORADIOMETERS

Gravimeters are used in gravity surveys to measure very small changes in the pull of gravity from place to place or over time. Gravitational attraction depends on underlying geology, and on elevation, latitude, the time of day (due to tidal effects from the Sun and Moon) and underground structures. Gravity surveys can contribute to nuclear explosion monitoring by helping in the detection of cavities or chimneys that may have developed during an underground nuclear explosion.

Field-portable spectroradiometers are specialized light meters that collect light wavelengths to measure surface reflectance across a wide range of visible and near-infrared wavelengths. A spectroradiometer measures the range of spectral radiance to detect different materials accurately in the field under real-world conditions. For nuclear explosion monitoring applications, they can produce field spectra to help map surface anomalies and provide ground truth information and calibration for remote measurements.

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MAGNETOMETERS

PORTABLE SEISMIC MINI ARRAYS

Magnetometers are measurement instruments used for two general purposes: (1) to measure the magnetic strength of a material; or (2) to measure the strength and/or direction of the magnetic field at a point in space. Magnetometers are widely used for measuring the Earth’s magnetic field and can detect various magnetic anomalies. They contribute to nuclear explosion monitoring by detecting subsurface features such as wires, pipes, and other iron-rich objects that might have been used for nuclear explosion infrastructure.

26 HANDHELD GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS (GPS) Global positioning systems (GPS) use a constellation of well-known satellites to accurately locate the user within the inspection area by providing coordinate and elevation data. Whereas handheld GPS units (shown here) are faster but less accurate, differential GPS (dGPS) units deliver higher resolution but require more time to set up.

GPS units contribute to nuclear explosion monitoring by providing information as to the positions of artifacts or anomalies that may be indicators of a nuclear explosion.

Portable seismic mini arrays are designed to detect tiny earth movements. Such movements can occur when stress built up in rock as a result of an underground nuclear explosion is released. The portable seismic mini array stations are so sensitive that they can detect a brick falling through a vertical distance of only one meter from up to 2-3 kilometers away. As many as 50 of these portable seismic arrays can be deployed over a typical inspection area, producing an extremely sensitive capability for the detection of the effects of a recent underground nuclear explosion.

31 BACKPACK ON-SITE ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING KIT This backpack kit allows inspectors to collect simple environmental samples (e.g., soil and biota) while in the field. The kit includes sample jars, trowels, gloves, sealed bags, swipe kits, and other items. Collection of other environmental samples, such as subsurface and atmospheric gas and water, require more complex equipment.

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RADIATION PAGER

IN SITU GAMMA SPECTROSCOPY FOR RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS DETECTION

This simple device is designed to protect personnel from high radiation doses. It is similar to devices used by law enforcement, hazardous material (hazmat) teams, and first responders in the United States. This pager will sound an alarm if inspectors encounter a large radiation source. If the pager alarms, the inspectors retreat, note the location, and report to the base of operations. Inspectors would be alerted to make further investigations of the relevance of the alarm.

31 HIGH SENSITIVITY BACKPACK RADIATION DETECTOR On many on-site inspection missions, inspectors will wear a sensitive radiation detector in a backpack as they conduct their initial survey operations. It is similar to detectors used by first responders to conduct baseline radiation surveys prior to major events in the United States. The detector literally talks to the inspector during the mission about the gamma-rays that are detected, indicating areas of potential elevated radiation levels. Later, back in the base of operations, analysts can upload the data into an inspection mapping application to understand and document what was found. It is sensitive enough to detect even modest size leaks of radioactive material from fractures following an underground nuclear explosion.

31 MOBILE DETECTION SYSTEM FOR LARGE AREA SURVEY A fast, safe, and sensitive way to find hot spots from an underground nuclear explosion is to drive or fly a large radiation detector over the inspection area while looking for gamma-rays from decaying radionuclides. It is similar to systems used by first responders to search for lost or stolen radioactive materials or to conduct aerial surveys after a radiation dispersal incident in the United States.

An operator using a laptop computer can observe the incoming radiation data and Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) location in real time overlaid on a map of the inspection area. After a driving or flight mission, the data are further processed into a mapping application. The increased sensitivity allows inspectors to survey large areas quickly using a car or aircraft and to provide detailed radiation maps.

This is a high-resolution radiation detector thatcan detect, measure, and report very small quantities of relevant radionuclides deposited on the ground from an underground nuclear explosion. It is similar to systems that the United States would use after a nuclear power plant release to map the deposition. It can detect radiation levels far below those detected by the radiation pager or backpack system.

A 15-minute measurement in a suspect location is all it takes to reveal evidence of relevant radionuclides. If these are detected, the type, quantity, and location of these radionuclides will be essential to understanding the nature of an underground nuclear explosion and to determining whether it was in fact nuclear.

32 ULTRA-HIGH PURITY NUCLEAR DETECTOR This novel, ultra-pure detector helps determine the origin of radioactive suspect events. Air collected following a suspected nuclear explosion is sent through a processing system to remove the small portion that could contain radioactive argon (Argon-37). The purified argon is placed into this specialized refined ultra-high purity copper detector and its radioactivity content is measured to determine whether the sample originated from a nuclear explosion.