Prevention of violent radicalisation - Methodological guide for the development of a local strategy

Page 1

European Forum for Urban Security

Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Methodological guide for the development of a local strategy

Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism Methodological guide for the development of a local strategy En complément de la publication “Prévenir et lutter contre la radicalisaIn addition to the publication "Preventing and countering radicalisation at the local level" published in 2016, Efus has developed this methodological guide for local authorities. This guide details each stage of the development of a local strategy for the prevention of radicalisation, from political mobilisation to its conception and evaluation through a diagnosis. For each one, methodological advice is provided, explaining possible obstacles and ways to overcome them, as well as presenting examples of local practices. This advice comes from the experience of many communities with diverse profiles and partners of the "LIAISE 2 - Local Authorities against Violent Extremism" project, but they are not universal. Each territory, depending on their local situation, is encouraged to adapt their implementation. This guide, published by the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus), is the result of work that took place between 2016 and 2018 as part of the LIAISE 2 "Local Authorities Against Violent Extremism" project. Project managers Farid Bounouar, Juan Cristellys and Emilie Petit drafted the document under the supervision of Elizabeth Johnston, General Delegate. Götz Nordbruch, expert from the German association, also contributed. Use and reproduction for non-commercial purposes are royalty-free provided the source is acknowledged. Translation: Nathalie Elson Revision: Nathalie Bourgeois, Alexander Farrell Layout: Marie Aumont, ISBN: 978 2 913181 65 6 Legal deposit: December 2017 European Forum for Urban Security 10 rue des montiboeufs 75020 Paris, France Tel: +33 (0) 1 40 64 49 00 - Co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union. This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

European Forum for Urban Security

Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Methodological guide for the development of a local strategy

Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism



The development of this guide was made possible thanks to the involvement of the local partner communities who mobilised to implement pilot actions to prevent radicalisation and agreed to share their analysis of this process. We sincerely thank the elected representatives and technicians who have agreed to share their experiences and knowledge. The contributions of the associated partners and external partners who participated in, inter alia, the coordination meetings and thematic seminars also contributed to our work and we thank them for their assistance. Moreover, this project, in particular the implementation of local actions, would not have been possible without the contribution of the experts who contributed to the support of the communities. We thank them for their collaboration and the quality of their work. A special thanks goes to Gรถtz Nordbruch from the association who contributed to all stages of this project from its conception to the writing of the guide, as well as all through the running of the seminars and the support of the local communities. His work was appreciated by all partners. Our gratitude also goes to all the institutions and people who welcomed us and helped us organise our seminars: the City of Bordeaux, the City of Leuven and the Belgian Forum for Prevention and Urban Safety, the European Confederation of Probation and the City of The Hague, the Italian Forum for Urban Security and the City of Rimini, the City of Barcelona and the Generalitat of Catalonia. Finally, we also express our gratitude to the European Commission for its financial support, without which our project and this guide could not have been completed.


Partners Alexandroúpolis (GR), Augsburg, Düsseldorf, Essen (DE), Bagneux, Bordeaux, Sarcelles, Toulouse (FR), the Generalitat of Catalonia, L'Hospitalet de Llobregat (ES), Bologna, Reggio Emilia (IT), Brussels, Liège (BE), Malmö (SE), Setubal (PT), the German, Belgian, French and Italian Forums for Urban Safety and Non-Governmental Organisations and the European Confederation of Probation.

Associated partners The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Internal Security Service) of Bremen, State of Bavaria (DE), Brno (CZ), Rotterdam (NL), the non-governmental organisation Culture Interactive e.V.

External partners Montreuil, County Council of Val d'Oise (FR), Barcelona (ES), Charleroi, Leuven (BE), The Hague (NL).

Editor’s notes As Efus considers that gender equality must be systematic and constant and as such promotes gender equality in all its activities, we have deliberately avoided using words that imply gender bias in this publication.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism


>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Introduction................................................................. p. 8 Part 1 – Is developing a local strategy to prevent violent radicalisation a necessity for all local authorities?.................................................................. p. 11 1.1. Local components and impact of radicalisation..................... p. 12 1.2. A phenomenon that can affect any local authority................. p. 15 1.3. Taking the time to develop a strategy..................................... p. 17

Part 2 - Guiding principles......................................... p. 18 2.1. Preventing radicalisation or violent extremism?.................... p. 19 2.2. Responding to all violent extremisms.................................... p. 21 2.3. Integrating the strategy for the prevention of violent radicalisation into a global strategy............................... p. 22


Part 3 - Steps for developing and implementing a strategy on a political mobilisation................................................. p. 25 3.1. Political mobilisation........................................................................p. 26 3.2. Mobilising and securing a partnership................................... p. 29 3.3. Training local stakeholders.................................................... p. 33 3.4. Conducting a shared local diagnosis...................................... p. 45 3.5. Communicating..................................................................... p. 53 3.6. Designing local actions.......................................................... p. 58 3.7. Evaluation.............................................................................. p. 67

Appendix and references........................................... p. 75


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism


>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As part of the LIAISE European project "Local Institutions Against Violent Extremism”, which was led by the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) between 2014 and 2016, a first publication was produced on the role of local authorities in this field: Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level. Its aim was to present the main elements of knowledge stemming from research on radicalisation leading to violent extremism and share recommendations for local authorities committed to preventing this phenomenon, or wishing to do so. This publication is divided into thematic chapters1. It provides the main elements to be included in a local prevention strategy, the role of local authorities and practical insights. Efus was able to continue this work from January 2016 to December 2017 as part of the LIAISE 2 project, co-funded by the European Union, gathering 34 partners from ten different countries2. The main objective of this second project was to support local and regional authorities in implementing local pilot actions to prevent violent radicalisation. Seventeen pilot actions, i.e. practices that were innovative for the local authorities that implemented them, were therefore developed and implemented as part of this project. These actions focused on various aspects of the prevention of radicalisation and varied according to local needs and the progress of each partner on such topic. Some local authorities who had not yet developed a local strategy for the prevention of radicalisation started by setting up a working group to mobilise local stakeholders and develop a partnership strategy. Others, 1-Understanding radicalisation and raising awareness of local actors / Developing a multi-sectoral local strategy / Supporting families and providing the necessary tools / Prevention and resilience strengthening / Deradicalisation and disengagement / Counter-narratives 2-Alexandroupolis, Augsburg, Bagneux, Barcelona, Bologna, Bordeaux, Brno, Brussels, Charleroi, Dusseldorf, Essen, The Hague, L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, Liège, Leuven, Malmö, Montreuil, Paris, Reggio Emilia, Rotterdam, Sarcelles, Setubal, Toulouse; the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Bremen, the State of Bavaria, the Generalitat of Catalonia, the County Council of Val d'Oise, the German, Belgian, French and Italian Forums for Urban Security, Ufuq, Culture Interactive eV and the European Confederation of Probation (CEP).


who had already defined their priorities, developed actions on specific topics, such as family support, counter-narratives or disengagement3. They have all been supported by Efus and by European experts for the implementation of these actions. Based on the experience of developing pilot actions and on the European exchanges conducted during these two years, the LIAISE 2 project partners have developed a methodological guidebook to delve further into the recommendations provided by the publication Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level. This guide details each stage of the development of a local strategy for the prevention of radicalisation, from political mobilisation to its design, diagnosis and assessment. For each one, methodological advice is provided, explaining the potential obstacles to the strategy and ways to overcome them. Local practices are also presented. These recommendations come from the experience of many communities with varying profiles. However, they should not be considered as universal. Each locality, depending on their local situation, is asked to adapt them. As a reminder, the work of Efus and partner cities focuses on radicalisation leading to violent extremism (see definitions in the box below). For easier reading, this strategic guide will use the term “prevention of violent radicalisation�.

3- See the complete list of pilot actions in the annexes


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Radicalisation: although its definition remains controversial, radicalisation is generally considered as the process by which an individual or a group of people adheresto extremism or radicalism. This phenomenon can therefore be considered as a progression into various forms of extremism (right or left, anarchist or religious, or even ecologist). Radical / Radicalism: the lexical analysis of the term “radical� indicates a return to the roots, to the essence of something. Radicalisation and being radical can lead to radicalism and not to extremism. Radicalism implies the idea of a fundamental change in the status quo within society, an attitude which refuses any compromise by going to the very end of the logic of its convictions. This can lead to progressive changes. Therefore, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King are considered as advocates for radicalism and fought for the freedom and the rights that are today part of our core values.


Cognitive Extremism: it refers to concepts that, according to current liberal democracies, are diametrically opposed to the fundamental values of a society. It presupposes an attempt to impose the supremacy of a certain ideology or belief on a society, by refusing to recognise the democratic and human rights principles. Behavioural /violent extremism: refers to the violent means and methods used by extremist individuals to achieve their goals by ignoring the lives, rights and fundamental freedoms of others.



Part 1


Is developing a local strategy to prevent violent radicalisation a necessity for all local authorities?



Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

The need to involve local and regional authorities in policies for preventing and fighting against violent radicalisation is now recognised in European and national texts4. More and more of these local authorities are developing local strategies and actions. However, many European local authorities are involved in different ways, with several not having tackled the issue yet. Should all local authorities develop a strategy to prevent violent radicalisation?

1.1. Local components and impacts of radicalisation

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Although violent extremism is transnational in nature, it also has local impacts. Similarly, certain radicalisation factors have local components:

 Violent extremism (attacks, violations of physical integrity...) generally occurs in cities. Local authorities must then take care of victims, address the feeling of insecurity within the population, secure public spaces and strengthen social cohesion...

 Complaints on living conditions in local neighbourhoods, discrimination, the negative influence of peer groups, a lack of social cohesion or urban and social environments may be factors contributing to radicalisation5;

4- European Forum for Urban Security, The role of local authorities in European national strategies against radicalisation, 2016 ; European Forum for Urban Security, Local authorities in European and international guidelines to fight radicalisation, 2016 5- Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone, Eva Entenmann, “Fear thy neighbor”, ICCT, ISPI, The George Washington University, 2017, pp.77-100. This report describes the influence of local configurations (group dynamics, social and urban environment...) on the processes of radicalisation and thus the differences between European countries and within a same country. This study is based on case studies in Germany, Belgium, France, Italy and Norway.


 Radicalised people and their families are part of the city. Municipalities have to acknowledge the helplessness of these families that need support. Besides, local authorities are also sometimes required to take part in preparing for the return of radicalised individuals from war zones, whether or not they have been in prison. The presence of radicalised people or an attack can degrade the image of a city, which may have an impact on social cohesion, tourism or the resilience of locals...

>>>>>>>>>> Radicalisation factors6 Many factors come into play during a radicalisation process. Radicalisation is not the result of a single reason, and, depending on the person, different factors are at stake. Swedish academic, Magnus Ranstorp, talks of a “kaleidoscope of factors”. Non-exhaustive list of factors:

Individual socio-psychological factors; Social factors; Political factors; Ideological and religious dimensions; Role of culture and identity issues; Trauma or other trigger mechanisms; Group dynamics; Mental health issues; These factors can be categorised in different ways, and some researchers refer to these factors as “pull” and “push”. The following factors may push someone into radicalisation: social, political and economic grievances; a feeling of injustice and discrimi-

6-RAN issue paper, The root causes of violent extremism, Janvier 2016 home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

nation; personal crises or tragedies; alienation; a fascination for violence; a search for answers when seeking for the meaning of life; identity crisis; social exclusion; alienation; marginalisation; disappointment with democratic processes; polarisation, etc. The following factors may pull someone towards radicalisation: a personal quest; a sense of belonging to a cause; an ideology or a social network; power and control; a sense of loyalty and commitment; a feeling of excitement and adventure; a romantic view of an ideology or a cause; the possibility of being a hero; personal redemption, etc.

>>>>>>>>>> Local authorities, together with their partners, are able to respond to these issues, more specifically for the following reasons:

 Proximity to citizens: they are present on the ground and can establish direct contact with citizens, which allows them to have a good understanding of local issues, be aware of the needs of the population and be able to provide appropriate answers;

 They are in charge of important policies for the prevention of radicalisation regarding the type of factors that come into play in this phenomenon7: social cohesion, youth, education, health, sport, local police...

 Although their competences vary from one European country to another, they generally coordinate crime prevention policies and are therefore particularly relevant for taking on the prevention of violent radicalisation, as the underlying causes are quite similar.

7- Efus, Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level, 2016 - chapter “Understanding radicalisation and raising awareness among local actors”


1.2. A phenomenon that can affect any local authority

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While violent radicalisation does not affect all local authorities with the same magnitude, experience shows that all are concerned by this phenomenon:

 The geographical distribution of the attacks showed that local authorities with very different profiles could be affected (urban, suburban or rural areas / large and medium-sized cities...).

 The profiles of radicalised individuals and their places of residence are also very diverse, demonstrating that violent radicalisation does not just occur in large cities or marginalised neighbourhoods, nor is it about gender or social background8.

 The radicalisation of an individual is a combination of personal and environmental factors that vary from one person to another. Factors taken separately are not always alarming but their combination may trigger the start of a radicalisation process. These factors are found everywhere and cities should be aware of them.

 Given the scale of the phenomenon, it must be considered that all territories may be affected, in particular by the dissemination of extremist ideas on internet and by the mobility of groups across European countries (e.g. jihadist networks, identity movements, etc.).

Polarisation, understood as the process of reinforcing the differences between groups in a society that can lead to increased tensions, is seen by many researchers and policy makers as a potential cause of amplification of the various psychological and social factors that make individuals vulnerable to radicalisation. Indeed, increasing divisions and hostility in society and between specific groups can

8- See for example, Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone, Eva Entenmann, “Fear thy neighbor”, ICCT, ISPI, The George Washington University, 2017, pp. 15-17


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

trigger an “us and them” thinking and ultimately constitute the optimal breeding ground for radical environments and extremist movements. Thus, polarisation should be considered as both a possible cause and a consequence of radicalisation and violent extremism. his polarisation is an inherent element of life in society and can T affect all cities. It is, however, possible to limit its development. This is an aspect to be considered when developing a strategy to prevent violent radicalisation.

>>>>>>>>>> EcoPol project, Brussels, Belgium (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The aim of the EcoPol Project (Ecology of polarisation in schools) is to better understand the polarisation mechanisms in schools and counter their effects. Through training in talking circle techniques and regular methodological support given to the participating institutions, the aim is to provide teachers with techniques to work with their students on empathy, listening, emotion management and cognitive capacity skills to engage in thinking about sensitive topics. EcoPol is the result of analysis and consultation work carried out jointly by the General Direction of Public Instruction and the Health Orientation Prevention Service (Service Prévention Orientation Santé, SPOS) of the city of Brussels, the SéSame Mental Health Centre and the Bravvo PreRad Unit.

>>>>>>>>>> Finally, it is important to remember that preventing violent radicalisation essentially means limiting the factors involved in its process, i.e., working on people’s resilience and strengthening their critical thinking, fighting against discrimination and preventing family breakups, etc. As a general rule, a strategy to prevent violent radicalisation contributes to strengthening social cohesion, which is what many local communities are seeking.


1.3. Taking the time to develop a strategy

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Several local authorities reported they had started working on preventing violent radicalisation after waves of individuals headed to war/ conflict areas or after an attack within their territory. Of course, any local authority will want to avoid such situations, which is why it seems essential to act as early as possible to prevent the phenomenon before it becomes engrained in the local community. In addition, these critical situations require urgent immediate responses, which has been the case for several local partner authorities of the LIAISE 2 project. They therefore advise their peers to start work as early as possible in order to:

 Base the work on a diagnosis by taking the time to collect the required data;

 Mobilise their partners at the start of the diagnosis phase and during the development of the strategy, which then encourages their involvement during the implementation of the actions;

 Take the time to define an actual communication plan to respond to questions from the media and the public in a transparent manner and with clear objectives.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Part 2 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Guiding principles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>


2.1. Preventing radicalisation or violent extremism?

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Peter Neumann, Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, identifies two public policy models on radicalisation leading to violent extremism9 :

 Model 1: Policies that seek to prevent the phenomenon as early as possible from the very start of the radicalisation process, even if it does not necessarily lead to violent extremism.

 Model 2: Policies that focus on violent acting out and therefore consider warning indicators later in the raPeter Neumann, Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, identifies two public policy models on radicalisation leading to violent extremismdicalisation process. These are schematic models, with many other possibilities and variations between the two. The purpose here is not to give an opinion in favour of one or the other, but rather to draw attention to the fact that this means deciding on the orientation of the public policy on this topic. National strategies more or less meet the requirements of these two models and are different from one country to another because of history, culture, legal context or public policies already in place in each country. At a local level, selecting one or the other is often guided by national strategies, but depending on the legislation, local authorities may be free to choose their own model. It is essential that the approach be selected by consultation with local partners who will be involved in the strategy. At a minimum, partners must find the approach clear and explicit in order to define their position and indicate whether they wish to contribute. As the subject of violent radicalisation is particularly sensitive, unclear political orientations can lead to mistrust by the partners and be counterproductive.

9 - Peter R. Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization”, International affairs, 2013


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

The main limitations of these models are as follows:

 Model 1: By seeking to prevent radicalisation well in advance, there is a risk of infringing people’s rights (including freedom of conscience and expression) by criminalising all behaviours perceived as radical and stigmatising certain populations10. The radicalisation process is indeed inherently on a scale and may lead to many other things than violent extremism, including radicalism that is not a crime and can even bring changes perceived as progressive. On the other hand, there is a risk of pushing radical movements underground, which may have a counterproductive effect with these movements turning to violence11.

 Model 2: by seeking to avoid the shift towards behavioural extremism, there is a risk of cognitive extremism developing which, according to some, can undermine social cohesion, foster polarisation and thus fuel the vicious “polarisation-radicalisation” circle. This strategy would therefore be counterproductive in the medium and long term. In reality, local authorities generally implement strategies that combine these two models. In order to avoid their pitfalls, it is recommended to:

 Define clear and shared objectives, respecting the skills and ethics of everyone;

 Enforce one's policy while complying with human rights and fundamental freedoms that are essential to security;

 Distinguish between the field of social cohesion and that of security, both of which are interlinked and complementary;

 Define short, medium and long term objectives to avoid counterproductive effects.

10- See for example on this subject a criticism of the French model: National Advisory Commission on Human Rights, “Opinion on the Prevention of Radicalisation”, 2017 11- McCauley and Moskalenko, Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism , Psychology Department, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, 58 8~ Pennsylvania, USA , 2008


2.2. Responding to all violent extremisms

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Europe has for many years been confronted with various extremist movements that are more or less abundantly covered in the press and are high or lower on the political agenda, depending on the period. Recently, the evolution of jihadism, the increasing attacks claimed by extremists of this movement and its increased visibility have helped focus attention on this phenomenon. At the same time, other extremist movements have not disappeared and some, on the far right in particular, have become more powerful12. Yet, although there is growing evidence in political texts and discourses of the need to define strategies to prevent all forms of extremism, few national and local strategies actually do. Yet, focusing on one single type of extremism has several consequences:

 Underestimating other forms of violent extremism is a risk to social cohesion and security, since they may carry on growing if local stakeholders are not trained to identify them and respond adequately. All forms of extremism, whether religious and/or political and/or cultural, represent a danger.

 Stigmatising specific communities and thus contribute to discrimination and a sense of exclusion that can fuel extremism.

 Different types of extremism reinforce one another; treating a single form of extremism is therefore counterproductive and a comprehensive approach is recommended.

12- National Coordinator for Security and Counterrorism, Ministry of Security and Justice, Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 42, The Hague, July 2016; Hearing of Patrick Calvar, Director General for Internal Security, National Defense and Armed Forces Commission, Tuesday 10 May 2016, Report No. 47 (France)


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Whatever shape extremism takes, similar factors13 can be found in radicalisation paths. Most preventive actions can therefore help prevent different forms of extremism. However, this does not exclude the need to understand the different extremist pathways, their discourses and their resonance with the target audience in order to adapt the content of prevention actions. It is indeed essential to understand why one type of extremism may recruit many more followers now than another that had more impact ten years ago. By understanding what makes these types of extremism attractive and what needs they fill in a given context, it becomes possible to adapt public policies.

2.3. Integrating the strategy for the prevention of violent radicalisation into a global strategy

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Choosing in which public policy area the policy on the prevention of violent radicalisation will be integrated is a political choice, hence at the discretion of each local authority. As the underlying causes of radicalisation and the public policy areas that need to be involved (sport, culture, education, employment, fight against discrimination...) are quite similar to those that concern crime in the general sense, many local authorities include the prevention of radicalisation is their crime prevention strategy. However, some LIAISE partner local authorities have included it into other public policy areas, such as the protection of democracy, the fight against discrimination, or youth...


13- “Same Anger, Different Ideologies: Radical Muslim and Neo-Nazi�, New York Times, March 5, 2015

What seems essential after assessing various local configurations is that the policy for the prevention of violent radicalisation should not be isolated from other public policies for several reasons:

 Although violent radicalisation is a specific issue, some of its characteristics (young subculture, need to belong to a group, family issues...) are not new and can be found in other issues already dealt with by cities (criminality, parenthood support...). It therefore seems essential to rely on the city’s experience in similar areas14. The policy for the prevention of violent radicalisation must be given its own strategic objectives and be well identified but it can also be integrated transversally into other city public policies.

 Various public policies should be mobilised, which requires the cooperation of several partners. Generally these partners already have partnership working habits for other public policies (e.g. prevention of criminality) on which it seems wise to rely, especially as a partnership on radicalisation can be sensitive.

 Cities generally have several partnerships in place and already bring together the partners to be mobilised for the prevention of radicalisation. In order to avoid overstretching these partners, prevent duplication and ensure all actions are optimally coordinated, it is important consider integrating the radicalisation issue into these existing partnerships.

14- Matthew Davies, Richard Warnes, Joanna Hofman, Exploring the transferability and applicability of gang evaluation methodologies to counter violent radicalisation, RAND Europe, 2017 RR2120.pdf


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> Municipal Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation, L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, Spain (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The city of L'Hospitalet de Llobregat (Spain) has developed a strategy for the prevention of radicalisation through an operational group gathering various services and associations from the city. This partnership was built on the successful cooperation between the city services (social services, mediation services and municipal police) and different departments of the Generalitat of Catalonia (regional police and education institutions), which was set up several years ago to prevent violence between youth gangs.



Part 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Steps for developing and implementing a strategy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

The objective of Part 3 is to present the different steps for developing and implementing a local strategy for the prevention of radicalisation. The order given for these steps is only indicative, some steps can be switched around, some strategies may require several back-and-forths between the steps. For example, training, which is essential before a diagnosis, is also important once the needs are better identified.

3.1. Political mobilisation

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3.1.1. Patchy but essential political mobilisations As with any public policy, the definition of strategic orientations is an essential prerequisite. This is particularly the case for radicalisation as it is a sensitive issue. Clear objectives and political support given to the technicians are essential for mobilising the partnership and implementing actions. The first local authorities that have worked on the prevention of violent radicalisation are those who have been confronted either directly (violent actions of groups or individuals, departures or returns of locals to/from war zones, associations legitimising violence locally) or indirectly (place of residence of sympathisers, national or international events on their territory). Within its network, Efus has found that the political mobilisation of European local authorities is patchy. Not all countries have yet recognised the role of cities in the prevention of radicalisation, and the political or cultural histories of each country and the individual sensitivity of each elected official explain why the degree of mobilisation varies from one territory to another. Faced with this situation, technicians have expressed their difficulty in receiving a clear political order, which is essential to mobilising partners. The issue of preventing violent radicalisation may indeed lead to ambivalent feelings of misunderstanding, disinterest and fear from elected officials and technicians.


There are usually three main obstacles:

 A misunderstanding of the issue caused by a lack of awareness;  A reluctance to commit to this issue considering that it is a security problem that falls within the State’s responsibility;

 A fear of stigmatising one’s city by openly implementing a policy for the prevention of radicalisation.

3.1.2. The role of technicians in political mobilisation The role of local authority technical staff is to provide expertise and support to elected representatives for decision-making. The administration must be proactive so its elected representatives may carry out their actions in accordance with expectations and commitments made to the population. A local authority technician can begin by formally making recommendations and suggest a course for action on the prevention of violent radicalisation. Such a memo must remain confidential and is intended for elected representatives only. It must therefore be short, educational and allow elected representatives to make decisions and establish a strategy with full background knowledge. LIAISE 2 partner local authorities have identified triggers as well as elements that are particularly relevant for informing and mobilising elected representatives. It is strongly recommended to include the following in such a memo:

 Elements on the city’s background in terms of radicalisation. By obtaining data on the extent and characteristics of the phenomenon at a local level, often provided by State services, as well as feedback from field workers and local population, it becomes possible to understand how the city is affected and what the priorities for action should be.

 How the national strategy operates and role of local authorities. Elected representatives should be informed of the provisions stated in the texts and how local authorities’ actions and that of the State complement one another. It is also important not to forget that local authorities can act on the three prevention levels (primary, secondary, tertiary) and contribute to detection and reporting.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> There are three levels of prevention:

 Primary prevention, which is general and collective, intervenes upstream through public policies or measures whose main purpose is not to fight against radicalisation but that can usefully contribute to it;

 Secondary prevention is targeted at those at risk of radicalisation;  Tertiary prevention is meant to prevent reoccurrence, reoffending and disengagement.

>>>>>>>>>>  Puggest a working methodology for the development of the strategy, specifically highlighting the need for a shared diagnosis and a co-construction with local partners.

 The memo must raise the issue of articulating the policy for the prevention of radicalisation with other policies implemented by the city. It is also essential to indicate which service will be steering the strategy for the prevention of radicalisation.

 Suggest raising awareness of other elected representatives. In order to remove any obstacles that elected representatives may encounter when working on violent radicalisation, awareness-raising sessions must be organised. Involving elected representatives in initiatives led by local or national partners (meetings organised by the State, conference-debate, theatre-forum, film screening, testimonies) is also recommended.

 Illustrate with examples of actions implemented in other cities. To do so, elected representatives should take part in networks that allow exchanges with local authorities committed to the issue and benefit from their experience and advice15. It is indeed easier for a local authority to take part if its action is part of a movement involving other cities rather than if it feels isolated.


15- Examples of networks: French and European Forums for Urban Security, Alliance of European Cities Against Violent Extremism, Strong Cities Network, Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)

3.2. Mobilising and securing a partnership

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To manage the strategy, relying on a network of partners is essential. These partners must be able to act on factors that are at play in the radicalisation and disengagement processes. Organising the partnership, via an operational working group, for example, must promote the emergence of a common culture on radicalisation and allow actions in a coordinated and complementary way. An inventory of all stakeholders and measures likely to be used is a prerequisite. At least two circles of stakeholders should be determined. On one hand, those who form the hard core of the partnership who are on the front line because of their fields of intervention and their missions. They are asked to take part in developing a strategy and in actively implementing it. These are mostly stakeholders with whom local authorities are already working on other issues such as criminality. On the other hand, there are stakeholders associated in a more ad hoc manner who are not taking part in the definition and steering of the strategy. For example, local media who are essential links can be mobilised for actions on communication, alternative narratives or media education. Local authorities member of the Efus network, and more specifically, those who took part in the LIAISE 2 project, generally gave priority to the following partners (non-exhaustive list): Associated partners

Why is it important to mobilise this partner?

State Public Security Force

Essential partner for all security issues, both on the preventive and repressive aspects.

State Intelligence Services

In many countries, in charge of coordinating the exchange of sensitive information on radicalisation.

Judicial Services

Key player in secondary (people becoming radicalised) and tertiary (radicalised people) prevention, particularly for the socio-judicial monitoring of people involved and for their reintegration.

Prison Services

In prison or on probation, these are professionals able to detect and manage radicalising or radicalised people. They are also essential partners in preparing for the return of those convicted during their probation or at the end of their sentence.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

State representative (national or federal)

In charge of implementing the national strategy. Close links to be established to ensure coordination and consistency with the local strategy.

Local Police

At the heart of many actions in the field of prevention, law enforcement and exchange of information.

Educational institutions

Major stakeholders for the prevention, identification, reporting and monitoring of young people becoming radicalised.

Social workers

At the heart of many different social situations, essential actors of prevention, detection and care.

Community Youth and Sport Service

The actions of youth and sport services are essential tools for social inclusion, learning citizenship and civic engagement. Youth workers, educators, youth leaders or sports leaders are in constant contact with young people and can therefore play a role in identifying problematic situations and implementing prevention actions.

Stakeholders from the world of culture

Major stakeholders in the dissemination of ideas, creation and citizen mobilisation who must be included in the projects to broaden the field of intervention and stimulate artistic creation (support counter-narratives, opening doors to the world, sharing of cultures, building resilience).

Health services

May be required to play a role in providing medical care or psychological support to radicalised, radicalising individuals or their families. Mental health services are especially essential for understanding and monitoring complex situations. Professionals working with people experiencing difficulties in their professional integration.

Professional integration

Housing services

Local associations


May be brought in to intervene on this factor as a primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, as the social and professional inclusion/exclusion can influence a radicalisation process. Have many frontline stakeholders that can be mobilised and receive awareness training as they can contribute, for example, to diagnosing a neighbourhood and identifying problematic situations (caretakers, community workers). Stakeholders at the heart of cities and essential for social cohesion and citizen mobilisation. Vital link especially for raising awareness and supporting families.

Victim Support Associations and Associations Against Violence Against Women

Essential support for care given to victims and for all types of prevention work (public awareness raising actions, participation in restorative justice initiatives). Families can be mobilised at different levels, including through associations. The family environment is an important factor in radicalisation processes, where the family may be able to help build resilience. Raise awareness in families to be able to identify and respond to risks of radicalisation.

Families and associations representing families

Family narratives and peer group discussions are excellent prevention tools. Providing support to families affected by the radicalisation of a loved one through existing associations is important. It is important to note that it is often difficult for families to feel free to speak on this topic. Gaining their trust is an essential prerequisite. To do so, it is advisable to rely, for example, on usual parenthood support structures as well as places where parents can exchange their experience and where families feel at ease.

University Research

Representatives of religious communities

The link between research and field action is essential to make the most of radicalisation process and public policy analysis. University actors can be mobilised at any stage, especially for training and diagnosis as well as for assessing implemented measures. Depending on the diagnosis, consider the mobilisation of religious communities when there are recognised representatives of the various religious components of the territory with whom an exchange is possible. They may act during primary prevention actions (citizenship, interculturality...) as well as for individual monitoring or alternative narratives. Experience has shown that maintaining regular contact on topics such as social cohesion or interculturality rather than directly starting dialogue on radicalisation may be advisable in order to avoid any fear of stigmatisation.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

As for each partnership, the involvement of the different partners is likely to vary in intensity and duration. Nevertheless, given the importance of the issue, many partners are often volunteers and contribute positively to the implementation of the local strategy for the prevention of radicalisation.

>>>>>>>>>> Information Centre on Violent Salafism, Essen, Germany (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The Wegweiser office in Essen is part of a country-wide network of counselling centres in the field of prevention and intervention. The office builds on an established network of local partners in the field of crime prevention and in working with youth and schools, including different departments of the municipality and the police as well as civil society organisations. It is integrated in a broader strategy aimed at fostering exchanges and cooperation within the administration and with other local partners.

>>>>>>>>>> The partners of the LIAISE 2 project met the following major obstacles when mobilising the different partners. This should be anticipated when launching the process. These obstacles, already well known to crime prevention stakeholders, seem stronger here because of the very sensitive nature of the subject of violent radicalisation:

 Institutional deadlocks. Some partners may feel that there is too much focus on radicalisation and be reluctant to take part in the process. Others are reluctant to collaborate with partners working in areas of intervention which they feel are too far removed from their own fields of expertise (e.g. police/justice services and social/educational services). It is better to have previously established working relations on other topics for easier working relationships.


 The reluctance of some partners to exchange information of a confidential nature. The framework of ethical rules in the field of crime prevention should be maintained. However, we must recognise that professionals often seem more reluctant to exchange on the topic of radicalisation. It is a subject which is often little-known or even alarming for some. A strong method adapted to everyone’s code of ethics would also be useful.

 The prevention of violent radicalisation requires the mobilisation of existing actions in other fields such as education, culture or crime prevention. It is important to use existing work as much as possible so as not to give the impression to professionals who have been mobilised for years that a completely new public policy has been created. In some cities, this may have led to misunderstandings and frustration on the part of professionals who felt their involvement was not recognised.

3.3. Training local stakeholders

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The implementation of a local strategy depends, among other factors, on the capabilities and knowledge of local stakeholders in charge of the actions. As a result, tooling up the stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of the strategy, whatever their area of intervention, is key to ensure the objectives are met. For the prevention of radicalisation, this training prerequisite for local stakeholders has proved to be a priority, both at national and local level, particularly because of the urgent and new nature of the issue. This has led a large number of European cities to set up training programs for local stakeholders. Furthermore, the increasing availability of national and European funding for this purpose has greatly increased the number of dedicated trainings. Due to its urgent character, local authorities may have faced some difficulties such as adapting the contents to the various audiences, selecting the right experts or mobilising all the partners.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

In order for the training to meet the needs of the various stakeholders while fostering a collective work dynamic, it is recommended to take into account certain guiding principles when preparing programmes and training sessions. These recommendations are based on the experience of Efus member local authorities and on Efus' experience in providing training sessions.

3.3.1. Including the training in a global and operational approach As mentioned earlier, radicalisation is a complex issue that may be a concern for local stakeholders (technicians, associations, elected representatives...). This may result in questions on the relevance of actions taken (am I really concerned, is it useful?) which can lead to deadlocks. This can be the case with training sessions. To avoid this, it is recommended to:

 Discuss with the participants, before the training, the purpose and specific objectives of the sessions and the reasons for which they are invited to take part;

 Specify that the sessions are part of a global approach aimed at defining and implementing prevention actions;

 Try to ensure progressive training content so that participants understand the evolution of their knowledge;

 Discuss the training with stakeholders beforehand to find out what their needs are, so that the training provided meets their expectations;

 Ensure that the department in charge of organising the training is clearly identified as the legitimate bearer of the process.

3.3.2. Adapting training programmes to different audiences Within a local territory, each stakeholder has specific skills and missions. The knowledge needed by these actors to develop their


activities may therefore vary according to these criteria. In local authorities, three main types of target audiences for training can be identified:

 Elected representatives  Service supervisors  Field stakeholders (professionals and associations) In addition to the fact that these audiences do not need the exact same information, it is recommended not to mix them in training sessions in order to establish a trusting environment. Some local stakeholders, such as community workers, may feel more comfortable and ask more questions if they take part in a training with their peers rather than their supervisors. It is therefore essential to adapt the content of the training sessions to each audience. To do so, the content of the training must be prepared beforehand according to the needs, expectations and knowledge of the different stakeholders. Questionnaires can be used to collect this type of information. Here are some typical questions that can be asked:

 To what extent is the neighbourhood where you work affected by the phenomenon of violent radicalisation? How does this affect your work?

 Have you already attended training sessions? If so, what was the topic and what information did they provide?

 Are you already implementing actions to prevent radicalisation or are you already involved in certain actions? If so, which ones?

 What are your training needs on violent radicalisation? Below, you will find elements that can be included in the first general training sessions on radicalisation according to the three identified audiences. It should be specified that the training elements presented below are only a starting point to allow local stakeholders to start a working dynamic on this topic. Once this dynamic is created, more thematic sessions may be organised according to needs (counter-narrative, support for families, resilience of young people...).


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> Training on secularism and religion Considering the lack of knowledge about the jihadist movement in communities and the confusion often made between religious rigour, challenges to secularism and violent extremism, Efus recommends organising an awareness raising session on secularism and religion before moving to radicalisation. A specific session on jihadism may also be needed to address any question about this type of extremism and be able to work on all forms of extremism in the following sessions. For example, the association in Germany runs training courses for primary prevention stakeholders on violent religious extremism. These trainings are not limited to the transmission of information on extremist religious ideologies and related prevention strategies, but also include modules on the role of religion in young cultures, identity issues, discrimination and racism. The aim is to work on topics that are not necessarily related to radicalisation, but that are also potential vulnerability factors among youth and young adults. Furthermore, these modules lead participants to reflect on their own attitudes to these issues, and how the latter can affect their work and their relationships with the young.


Elected representatives Local elected representatives above all have a role of political leadership. As a result, improving their knowledge on radicalisation and its prevention should not necessarily focus on technical or operational elements, but rather on a political interpretation of the problem. Objectives of the training:

 Improve the understanding of the phenomenon and specifically understand how a radicalisation process operates as well as the factors to be taken into account in public policies;

 Analyse the role of local authorities, and more specifically elected representatives, in (local and national) prevention strategies.


Service supervisors They are in charge of the implementation of strategic orientations decided by elected representatives and the technical steering of the actions. As such, in addition to understanding the phenomenon, the content of their training must focus on operational and governance aspects. Objectives of the training:

 Understand the radicalisation phenomenon and raise awareness on the need for a preventive approach at local level.

 Assist in drawing up an inventory of existing resources for the definition and implementation of prevention actions.

 Facilitate the mobilisation of stakeholders on the ground, the partnership lead and the definition of the strategy.

Field workers They are in direct contact with the public (mediators, social workers, municipal police, associations, educators...). With their presence on the ground, they are able to collect information to better understand the situation at a local level, as well as intervene with target audiences. Objectives of the training:

 Understand the radicalisation phenomenon and raise awareness on the need for a preventive approach at local level.

 Become familiar with indicators of a shift into radicalisation, while highlighting the risks and potential counterproductive effects of untrained stakeholders using these tools.

 Question their own professional prevention practices to better understand the issue and opportunities in terms of intervention with the public.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> Training of local police, Bologna, Italy (LIAISE 2 pilot action) As part of the LIAISE 2 project, the municipality of Bologna organised a two-day training event on how to detect early signs of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. Mainly aimed at local police officers and social workers, the course was given by a researcher specialised in radicalisation issues, who is a member of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), Luca Guglielminetti. The aim was to give local stakeholders tools and knowledge to better prevent radicalisation at an early stage.

>>>>>>>>>> Raising awareness among local stakeholders, Alexandroupolis, Greece, (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The municipality of Alexandroupolis (Greece) designed and organised awareness-raising sessions on radicalisation leading to violence for students and young professionals as well as for local practitioners working in the field of crime prevention and security. Sessions were tailor-made to the needs, experience and field of activity of each of the two categories of participants.

>>>>>>>>>> Training of prison social workers and probation officers, Generalitat of Catalonia and Confederation of European Probation, Spain (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The Generalitat (government) of Catalonia organised jointly with the Confederation of European Probation (CEP) a series of awareness sessions for prison social workers and probation officers to help them better detect signs of radicalisation when conducting interviews with offenders’ families. Indeed, they can provide, voluntarily or unwittingly, useful information on the behaviour of their relative and possible signs of radicalisation, which can be used to prevent it.


The training courses were outsourced by experts in radicalisation but also in socio-addictions and sects. A total of 148 social workers and probation officers in Catalonia were trained.

>>>>>>>>>> 3.3.3. Suggestions for training content

Elected representatives Common core training

Service supervisors

Field workers

-Definitions: radicalisation, extremism, radicalism -Local causes and impacts of radicalisation -Mechanisms and factors contributing to radicalisation processes - Presentation of national systems and the involvement of local authorities within these systems - Role of radicalisation prevention and possible intervention levels (primary, secondary, tertiary prevention) - Examples of local actions implemented in other cities in France and Europe.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Specific content

Elected representatives

Service supervisors

Field workers

Role of elected representatives:

- Indicators of a shift into radicalisation, reporting and management procedures

- Indicators of a shift into radicalisation, reporting and management procedures

- Types of stakeholders to mobilise and actions to be implemented for the different levels of intervention and target audiences

- Role of different stakeholders and actions to be implemented for the different levels of intervention and target audiences

Role of supervisors:

- Issues relating to exchanging confidential information

- Definition of strategic priorities - Political leadership for these actions - Horizontal (municipal services) and vertical (regional, national, supra-national) coordination - External communication (with residents, the media)

- Operational leadership for these actions - Horizontal coordination (between municipal services) - Internal communication between partners


- Analysis of professional practices for the implementation of prevention actions and individual care

3.3.4. Defining the nature of the training courses Train or raise awareness? The term “training”16 often proves to be very ambitious when compared with the knowledge and skills passed on during the course. This can create frustration among participants based on their expectations and thus jeopardise the working dynamic. To avoid this, it may be better to present the courses as thematic awareness sessions. This is all the more relevant for stakeholders who will not necessarily be expected to actually implement actions or follow them up, such as elected representatives. Moreover, given the novelty of the radicalisation issue and the concern it may cause, the use of the term “awareness” may be more reassuring than that of “training”, which is perhaps too functional, particularly for field workers. It may indeed be more suitable in order to engage those who might be reluctant to work on this topic.

>>>>>>>>>> Webinar series “Extremist Radicalisation - Challenge for local authorities and potential for prevention”, German and European Forum for Urban Security (DEFUS), Germany (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The German and European Forum for Urban Security (DEFUS) and the Institute for Applied Prevention Research of the German Congress on Crime Prevention jointly organised a series of eight webinars to address different facets of extremism and radicalisation. The format of the webinars was particularly successful with research participants from different cities, enabling to share their local experiences. Webinars are a cost-effective way to reach larger audiences than with traditional seminars.

>>>>>>>>>> 16- It should be remembered that training is “the act of providing someone, a group, with the knowledge needed for carrying out an activity.” (Larousse Dictionary). To check the acquisition of this knowledge, participants should be tested.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Training of trainers The training of trainers is very often considered as a solution to ensure the dissemination of knowledge among local stakeholders. It makes it possible to train a small number of people who are then themselves in charge of training other professionals, usually colleagues in their organisation or field of intervention. In view of the important training needs on the prevention of radicalisation, this method can indeed be relevant. In order to ensure a smooth operation, it is necessary to:

 ensure that the organisations the participants are coming from are prepared to give them time off work to disseminate the information they received during their training;

 assess the knowledge of the trained stakeholders before they themselves become trainers;

 provide support during the first training courses set up by the trainers to assist them if necessary. Depending on the case, the term “trainer” is perhaps a little ambitious. Depending on the content of the training course and the abilities of the people trained, we may prefer the term “referent training”. In this case, the people who are trained become a “resource” for their peers on radicalisation and can provide awareness-raising and advice sessions on the development of actions.

>>>>>>>>>> Training of trainers, Bordeaux, France (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The city of Bordeaux has set up a training course for trainers for a dozen professionals working in organisations related to young people and/or families. These professionals followed five training modules and are now relay (secondary) trainers in charge of delivering information sessions and keep up the momentum in their organisations and localities. The training modules included the following topics:

 Understand the radicalisation phenomenon and be able to identify, prevent and alert (2 sessions);


 Suggest an alternative: training on resilience tools to work with young people and families (3 sessions). In addition, these professionals will be part of the A.G.I.R. (Action Globale d’Intervention sur la Radicalisation, Global action for interventions on radicalisation) territorial network. This network is a platform for exchanging good practices and elements on “worrying” or “significant” behaviour.

>>>>>>>>>> BOUNCE Project - Resilience tools and training of trainers Efus is a partner of the Stresavoria II project (BOUNCE), led by the Belgian Home Office. The aim is to train professionals from ten pilot local authorities in using the BOUNCE methodological toolbox. The selected cities include Augsburg, Düsseldorf (Germany), Liège, Leuven (Belgium), Bordeaux, Montreuil (France), Göttingen, Amsterdam (The Netherlands), Landskrona, Malmö (Sweden). The BOUNCE training tools have been developed based on scientific research on ways to strengthen the resilience of young people against violent radicalisation. BOUNCE is a set of three training and awareness-raising tools for young people and their social environment. These tools provide a positive response to the issue of preventing violent radicalisation at an early stage. BOUNCE tools are designed as preventive measures to be put in place when issues of violent radicalisation arise or, better still, prior to these situations. They provide young people and their environment with resources to manage the challenges they face. In order to disseminate these tools, the Belgian Home Office organised training sessions for the trainers in the project’s ten partner cities. These courses are aimed at practitioners working with young people and their families. After an initial three-day course, these professionals received support for another three days to help them implement the tools. The toolbox is available on the project website. Training can be requested on:



Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

3.3.5. Bringing knowledge up to date Despite its omnipresence in public, media and political debate, violent radicalisation remains a rather poorly understood issue. Research itself is constantly evolving, even on the definition of radicalisation and on the mechanisms of the process. Furthermore, the phenomenon is constantly evolving. The example of the shift indicators is quite significant. You only need to read through the indicators published by national institutions in Europe in 2013 to realise that some of these signals called “weak” or “strong” are no longer relevant. This is partly due to the ability of radicalised individuals, as well as recruiters, to change their behaviour and conceal signals of radicalisation (e.g. tattoos in right-wing extremists). The methods themselves are evolving and the securing of public spaces, for example, must constantly adapt, or even anticipate, new forms of terrorist attacks. Similarly, new issues related to violent radicalisation emerge on a regular basis. The issue of monitoring minors returning from conflict zones was not a priority when the first training of local stakeholders took place. Now, this issue is an essential challenge for local authorities and requires to train stakeholders in contact with families and minors. Considering the phenomenon’s constant changes as well as new events that come up in research, particularly with regards to the assessment of prevention measures, it is essential to regularly update the existing knowledge of stakeholders involved in prevention measures. It is obvious that most local authorities do not have the internal resources to ensure academic and political monitoring of advances in this matter. However, there are several opportunities for local stakeholders to ensure this knowledge is up to date, namely:

 Partnership with the academic sector through universities to access reports/fact sheets on the topic and contributions from specialists;

 Participation of local stakeholders, primarily those in charge of guiding prevention strategies, with networks aiming to share experience and learning on the subject.


3.4. Conducting a shared local diagnosis

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Adopting a strategic approach is to follow a plan to achieve medium and long-term goals, rather than making ad hoc decisions aimed at achieving short-term goals. This approach requires up to date knowledge on the local situation. Establishing a diagnosis is the starting point for this approach17. With a diagnosis, it becomes possible to:

 Define the context with a general presentation of the demography, the economy and other characteristics of the city (poverty rate, school dropout rate, unemployment...). Security or social needs observatories can be very useful in this respect;

 Analyse the characteristics of the issue studied as well as any related problems (magnitude, trends, distribution and impacts);

 Establish a profile of at-risk individuals, including gender, age and socio-economic characteristics of these groups;

 Identify partners involved in these issues as well as actions carried out, if it is possible to assess their impact;

 Assess the political and institutional environment to identify opportunities for developing preventive actions;

 Identify the city’s opportunities, strengths and potential, including social capital, civil society and existing projects which the future strategy can build upon.

3.4.1. Stakeholders to be mobilised A multi-institutional partnership Given the complexity of the issue and the diversity of radicalisation factors as well as public policies to be considered, it is necessary to

17- Efus, Methods and Tools for a Strategic Approach to Urban Security, 2016


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

involve partners from various areas of intervention in the diagnosis, who can provide additional elements depending on their perspective.

>>>>>>>>>> Mobilising and ensuring consistency in the local partnership, Toulouse, France (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The city of Toulouse, supported by Efus, organised awareness-raising and work meetings to mobilise several institutions: youth services, education, urban policy, sports, leisure, culture, municipal police, prefecture, justice system, departmental council, national education system, family allowances fund, funding partners, associations. These meetings allowed for sharing actions carried out by each of the partners, determining local needs in terms of prevention of radicalisation and building momentum around coherent and strengthened actions for the prevention of radicalisation in the Toulouse area.

>>>>>>>>>> The population It is also important to involve the population in the diagnosis in order to get their perception of the issues, their expectations and also allow locals and civil society organisations to be involved in the development of the strategy and the implementation of actions. Care must be taken to involve a representative sample of the population in order to take all opinions into account, including minorities. This is even more essential as the perception of social cohesion and the feeling of insecurity can vary significantly from one group to another and, consequently, so can their expectations. For confidentiality purposes, locals are involved in the diagnosis of background elements but not for assessing the profiles of radicalised people. Furthermore, to avoid fuelling fears and prejudices, it may be important to not display the word “radicalisation�, but to instead get them involved in more general topics (discrimination, relationship with institutions, sense of solidarity, etc.).


Academics In addition, it may be interesting to involve radicalisation researchers and experts:

 There is already a large quantity of academic literature to help better understand the phenomenon, and it is constantly evolving;

 The phenomenon is rapidly evolving (recruitment methods, propaganda, style of attack...) and requires partners to be aware of the latest developments;

 Public policies on the topic are rapidly evolving; many actions are put in place in Europe; it is useful to always know the state of play and have a set of practices;

 Researchers can be involved in the diagnosis. As an example, sociological studies or ethnographic surveys may help understand local issues differently.

>>>>>>>>>> Federal programme for the prevention of radicalisation, Berlin, Germany The city of Berlin runs the state programme to prevent radicalisation (Landesprogramm Radikalisierungsprävention), which is the hub for all activities on the issue sponsored or co-sponsored by the city. Within the framework of this programme, formal cooperation has been set up with the Berlin School of Economics and Law (Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht, HWR). Experts from HWR’s department for police and security management continually review and evaluate the measures taken by the city and give guidelines and recommendations on how to improve strategies against radicalisation. It will also ensure that state-of-the-art knowledge on violent radicalisation and its prevention are part of the training and vocational training for future decision makers in business, law enforcement and public administration.

>>>>>>>>>> 47

Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

3.4.2. Gaining the trust of partners Violent radicalisation is a complex issue that is often a concern for stakeholders on the ground who feel helpless, or even insecure about the response they provide. It can therefore be difficult for them to share information with their peers that, on the one hand can place them in a complicated situation because they reveal shortcomings or the need to adjust their actions, but, on the other hand, the information may be confidential. Gaining the trust of partners is therefore a prerequisite before carrying out any diagnosis. To do so, the following is required:

 Clearly state who is leading the process and that professionals have been authorised by their superior to take part;

 Explain the political expectations and aims of the diagnosis so that professionals know what the information will be used for;

 Clearly define who must be involved at the different steps of the diagnosis, as well as the information required. For example, a local stakeholder could share information on the situation in a specific neighbourhood, but may have less information about the partnership between his department and other professionals. His supervisor, on the other hand, will have this information but may not have much knowledge about the younger population and families from a given area. Making this distinction is essential so as not to put partners in a difficult position by having them take part in discussions in which they cannot really participate because they do not have the required information or are not authorised to disclose it.

 Have a clear plan from the start so that partners can estimate the investment that will be expected from them during the process. Carrying out a violent radicalisation diagnosis requires time, especially during the trust-building phase. It is essential to not lose partners who may have underestimated the extent of the process.

3.4.3. Having a common definition and common goals Essential prerequisites for a correct diagnosis include having common definitions and sharing knowledge on the issue for several reasons:


 Local stakeholders need to properly understand the radicalisation process and factors that come into play in order to be able to provide the relevant data to measure the scale of the phenomenon locally.

 It may be necessary, for example, to explain that discrimination or the inability to take part in public life can be a factor contributing to radicalisation. This means that indicators for discrimination and the level of citizen participation are needed.

 Stakeholders must take ownership of the public policy objectives being put in place. Is the issue violent extremism, cognitive extremism or a behaviour classed as anti-social? This must absolutely be understood to avoid any misunderstandings between stakeholders and to be able to establish common indicators.

 Poor concept management can lead to stigma. Professionals can of course report facts, but also report people based on poor indicators, which could stigmatise certain people, communities or neighbourhoods. By organising awareness-raising discussions before starting the diagnosis, a group dynamic can be created and trust-building foundations established between partners. This will lead to a good understanding of the issues to use the relevant tools and indicators as part of the diagnosis.

3.4.4. What data should be collected?

Data for analysing the presence and extent of radicalisation factors to determine how vulnerable or resilient a city may be. This data will be particularly useful for creating primary prevention actions. This requires making a list of the main factors which can contribute to a person's radicalisation (analysing the profiles of people affected in the area can be useful to get a grasp of the most common factors) and then determining which indicators measure the extent of these issues in the area.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

For instance:

 Discrimination: results of victimisation surveys, complaint rates, studies on local access to employment, demonstrations against this phenomenon...;

 Feedback from stakeholders on the ground about tensions (or their increase) in schools, youth organisations, sport clubs...;

 Existence of sites which are historically or symbolically important for extremist groups (statues of famous people, cemeteries...) ;

 Presence — actual or imagined — of violent extremism in the city (official or unofficial places of worship, associations whose activities serve other purposes than that for which they were established, rumours about illegal groups...);

 Analysis of extremist views, conspiracy theories, speeches advocating radical change held in the public space and online...;

 Feedback from social workers in contact with families who, without officially asking for help, can share information or worries about their families and neighbourhoods;

 Local impact of the geopolitical situation;  ...

This data will be particularly useful for determining secondary and tertiary prevention actions. For instance:

 Elements on the extent of the phenomenon in the city (number of people reported, affected areas within the city...). It is important for a city to know how it is affected by the phenomenon, in particular to avoid speculation or underestimating the situation.

 Elements on the profile of radicalised or radicalising people: age, sex, area of residence, family situation, school situation... The name of these people is not required, but by collecting this type of information prevention actions can be better targeted (which group is the


most affected, what causes can be uncovered from their radicalisation process…). It may sometimes be difficult to get hold of this information which is usually held by state services. However, if anonymity is guaranteed, these services should not refuse to share this information, even more when it is essential to leading the strategy. It is important to explain clearly what information is required from the services that hold that data, while making it very clear that obtaining the names is not the ultimate goal. s an example: In some areas, the number of girls reported is much A higher than in others and higher than the number of boys. This information will certainly encourage local stakeholders to set up specific actions targeting girls.

Listing existing actions on which the strategy can be based. Some of these actions already meet the strategy’s objectives and can then be maintained or even strengthened, others will have to be adapted and others newly created. This is important to avoid duplicating actions and wasting human and financial resources, but also to mobilise stakeholders by valuing the work they already do. For example, a table of this type can be distributed to the different partners and discussed during a meeting.

Presentation of the action

Is it already “indicated / labelled” as prevention of radicalisation? (yes/no + comments)

Do you think it could contribute to the prevention of radicalisation? (yes / no with potential comments)

What need does this action meet?

If this action were to be included in a strategy for the prevention of radicalisation, which elements should be modified / added / strengthened?

Action 1 Action 2


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

3.4.5. Which tools should be used? The following tools usually involved in a diagnosis can be used: literature review, individual interviews, working groups, statistical study... It may be relevant to give priority to individual interviews with:

 Stakeholders most concerned by the issue who have a lot of information;

 Stakeholders who might be suspicious of the process and with whom it is important to take the time to discuss the issue individually. For working groups, the number of participants should be limited to about twenty people to ensure it is a participative process. The questions asked to start the discussion can for example include the following:

 As part of your professional activity, are you confronted with the issue of violent radicalisation (within your department, among the members of the public with whom you work...)? If yes, what are the problems encountered?

 What indicators did you use to understand the issue and measure the phenomenon?

 What are your training needs with regards to violent radicalisation?  Are you already implementing actions to prevent radicalisation that could be integrated into certain other actions? Or do you know of actions that could be included in this strategy?

 What do you think are the priorities to be included in the partnership strategy for the prevention of radicalisation in the community?

 ...

>>>>>>>>>> PreRad Unit, Asbl Bravvo Brussels, Belgium The aim of the PreRad unit is to prevent and manage, in the medium and long term, risks associated with people who are becoming radical-


ised, have already been radicalised or have been convicted of terrorism in the most affected neighbourhoods. It specifically relies on a confidential support unit for assisting people and an integrated approach bringing together different departments of the city (schools, medical and psycho-educational centres, public social support centre, community centres, prevention service, population service, local police). In 2013, the asbl Bravvo led a first diagnosis on radicalisation based on the multidisciplinary findings of front-line stakeholders in a neighbourhood called Laeken Centre neighbourhood. In order to take into account how the phenomenon was evolving and to be able to adapt actions carried out, Bravvo plans to establish a new diagnosis, which will including the issue of polarisation, this time on a city-wide scale. While waiting for this overall diagnosis, the PreRad unit is producing an annual report that provides interesting data on the situation in Brussels. This report is based on the work carried out by the unit (listening and support), regular exchanges with partners, information provided by unit officers on geopolitical issues, and research. It contains elements on the evolution of the geopolitical situation and its local impact, the profile of the people affected by radicalisation, the needs expressed by families, the recruitment methods and the content of the speeches advocating radical change. Priorities and recommendations can be taken from these. The 2016 annual report of the PreRad unit is available here:

>>>>>>>>>> 3.5. Communicating

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Communication is an essential aspect of the correct implementation and clarity of a strategy. This strategy meets different objectives depending on the audience to which it is addressed. For a municipality,


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

two levels of communication can be identified:

 Internal communication aimed at informing and facilitating the mobilisation of all partners involved in a strategy;

 External communication aimed at informing stakeholders not involved in local actions (citizens, media, other public administrations...) on the methods used and the situation in the area. Communication on the prevention of violent radicalisation meets specific objectives and requires particular attention to certain points of the prevention strategy. The main elements identified by partner local authorities of the LIAISE 2 project are presented below as part of the implementation of their pilot projects.

3.5.1. Objectives Gaining the trust of partners and valuing their commitment (internal communication) As mentioned above, the partnership around the prevention of radicalisation at city level remains fragile because of the sensitivity of the issue and the possible misunderstandings and concerns it brings to light. As such, communication between partners must be transparent in order to build trust. To do so, particular attention must be paid to:

 Regular communication between partners through meetings at predetermined regular intervals;

 Having a clear strategy with common definitions, described in a document that is available for everyone;

 Ensuring regular reports are prepared on actions taken. Adding legitimacy to the strategy (internal and external communication) It may be difficult to communicate about actions for the prevention of radicalisation. This may be due to sensitive issues such as partnerships with former extremists or because the impact of these actions is usually


measured in the medium and long term, which makes it difficult to communicate about rapid results. This can lead to questions about the use of public resources and the relevance of the actions taken. To avoid this risk, it is essential to communicate regularly on actions implemented and progress made. This is also vital for continued political support and funding.

Promoting the city's commitment (external communication) Communication can be used to promote actions by cities wanting to show their commitment to this issue. This is often the case when the city needs to address the population’s concerns, meet the needs of professionals and respond to questions from the media.

3.5.2. Elements of vigilance Avoid jeopardising the implementation of actions and putting the people involved at risk In some cases, it is better to discuss the project as a whole without giving out details about any action or the stakeholders involved. It is important to remember that some people involved in the prevention of radicalisation may have to work with individuals at risk or already radicalised, located in specific areas and often known by locals. This information, if made public, may jeopardise the implementation of such measures and put the professionals involved at risk. Furthermore, visible sponsoring by institutions around certain measures led by stakeholders from society or associations can become a hindrance to the smooth operation of these actions and their impact. Making an institutional lead visible can discredit the actions undertaken with the target audience. This is particularly the case for counter-narrative actions that require the involvement of people perceived as credible by the target audience they are aiming to influence.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Counter-narrative video, DĂźsseldorf, Germany (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The city of DĂźsseldorf initiated a project in a local youth centre to encourage young people to produce a video featuring alternative narratives to extremist content on social networks. To avoid possible harm to the authenticity of the message (in which the city had no role), the project managers decided not to mention the funding sources in the video.

>>>>>>>>>> Risk of stigmatising certain audiences Outside of stakeholders in the city, some actions seek to directly involve representatives of civil society. This is particularly the case when working with young people and families, with the production of counter-narratives or implementation of mentoring schemes very often based on citizens participation. The latter may not want to display their participation in a prevention measure, because of the risk of being stigmatised due to their involvement. Therefore, to ensure the smooth implementation of actions, some discretion is needed regarding their development and the visibility of those involved, particularly with the media. This risk of stigmatisation also exists for communities or neighbourhoods that may be the target of preventative interventions. If certain areas or population groups benefiting from actions for the prevention of radicalisation are made public, this may attract the attention of the media and other locals, leading to questions concerning the choice of target audience/area (i.e. is there a problem in this neighbourhood or with this population group?).

>>>>>>>>>> Working with the families One of the actions carried out with the families by certain local authorities is the organisation of discussion workshops to build trust with those people affected by radicalisation. They often do not want to make


their situation and their involvement in prevention actions public. As a result, the public administrations in charge of these actions can vary the level of information they share in order not to stigmatise these audiences. For example, local authorities may decide to communicate the existence of these measures without specifying where the meetings take place in order to guarantee the anonymity of the people involved. Some local authorities may simply decide not to communicate about these actions. In any case, considering these options with the people involved, especially before communicating with the media, is essential.

>>>>>>>>>> Care to be taken in selecting the terms used Given the sensitive nature of the issue and the lack of knowledge on the phenomenon, particularly among the local population, the use of terms such as “radicalisation” or “extremism” to communicate around prevention actions can lead to misunderstandings and a possible feeling of insecurity among some professionals and communities. These people are also exposed to further stigmatisation if they are associated with actions linked to radicalisation, violent extremism or terrorism. To avoid this, some local authorities may decide to display their actions using more general terms (see the examples in the boxes).

>>>>>>>>>> “Mammakraft” (mothers' power), Malmö, Sweden (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The city of Malmö (Sweden) has set up a network of mothers in different neighbourhoods to discuss their experiences and provide tools and support for other mothers. This project, entitled “Mammakraft” (mothers’ power), revolves around issues of parenthood and communication with loved ones. During the sessions, and because of the line of questions asked by the mothers and identified by social workers, radicalisation was included in the topics discussed but not mentioned in any external communication on this action.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> Prevention is better than cure: the role of young people in the prevention of radicalisation, Reggio Emilia, Italy (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The city of Reggio Emilia (Italy) has set up training sessions for young people on different types of radicalisation and their impact on communities. These youths then organised debates on issues of social cohesion and resilience of migrant communities, including refugees. The sessions were not directly linked to notions of “terrorism” or “extremism” and attracted an audience that might otherwise have been reluctant.

>>>>>>>>>> The type of terms selected by political decision-makers remains a key issue as the latter are often required to speak to the media, particularly after events that may be related to the topic (arrests, attacks, demonstrations, people leaving for conflict zones...). They must be reassuring and not polarising, i.e. not target a specific community and not scaremonger. Any other attitude would be counterproductive as it would fuel polarisation, which itself fuels violent extremism. As a result, communications highlighting principles such as social cohesion and resilience of the area as a whole can help reduce tensions in the public debate at local level.

3.6. Designing local actions

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Actions must be adapted to meet local needs and therefore defined according to the results of the diagnosis. There is no standard strategy for the prevention of violent radicalisation that can reproduced in every city. The aim of this section is to provide guiding principles for the development of local actions.


3.6.1. Taking action on the three levels of prevention, and combining individual care and collective actions It is important for a strategy to include the three levels of prevention (primary, secondary and tertiary) and implement actions for all audiences and on different issues. Local authorities have a role to play at each of these levels of prevention, but their role will not always be the same. They can be pilots or partners, depending on the skills required. While primary prevention actions in particular fall under the jurisdiction of local authorities, tertiary prevention actions, for example, which are aimed at radicalised people and their disengagement, are often led by other stakeholders such as judicial services. Local authorities also have a role to play, but more as partners. It is therefore necessary to define the roles during the development of the strategy in order to respect each stakeholder’s specialist area. In addition, it is important for a strategy to include individual care actions as well as collective actions. In most European countries, state services have set up individual care measures in a relatively close partnership with municipal services. Individual care actions, which mainly concern secondary and tertiary prevention, are aimed at radicalised people or those identified as at risk of radicalisation. They target an audience which is already vulnerable. A strategy to prevent violent radicalisation must also act as close to the start of the process as possible, through actions that strengthen the resilience of citizens and areas. These actions are part of primary prevention and are mostly collective, addressing a much wider audience. The different levels of prevention, the individual and collective actions complement each other and make it possible to address the full issue.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> Municipal plan for the prevention of radicalisation, Bagneux, France (LIAISE 2 pilot action) The town of Bagneux (France) has put in place a local plan for the prevention of violent radicalisation that includes actions on all three levels of prevention and targets a variety of audiences. The implementation of actions takes place in several stages:

 Raising awareness/Training: raising awareness among elected representatives and municipal staff on the phenomenon of violent radicalisation and the prevention role of locals, with interventions by an academic.

 Primary prevention: raising awareness and discussions with the population (youth and family) around the documentary by Jasna Krajinovic The empty room, which tells the story of a Belgian family affected by radicalisation, and the testimony of the mother, Saliha Ben Ali.

 Secondary and tertiary prevention: the city will set up a local partnership unit allowing local stakeholders to exchange confidential information on complex situations and contribute to the care of radicalised people or in the process of becoming radicalised.

>>>>>>>>>> 3.6.2. Taking action on the entire kaleidoscope of factors Many factors can affect the radicalisation process and they all must be taken into account by a prevention strategy. The aim is to act to prevent the appearance of “push” factors and to strengthen the “pull” factors (see the box on factors in Part 1). Local and regional authorities can act relatively directly on various factors. But many local authorities do not want to commit to actions taking the geopolitical context into account because they have very little influence, if any, on the geopolitical context. Yet, this context exists, the public is aware of it and it has an impact on the feel of a city,


on local conversations and on grievances that may occur at a local level. Moreover, extremists have no qualms in using these geopolitical issues to feed their propaganda and recruitment (conflicts in the Middle East, arrival of refugees in Europe...). They use it to call upon the youth to get involved through violence. If no alternative explanation is given or other commitment suggested, the door is left open for these extremist narratives. It is therefore essential to also address these issues, not for direct action but to avoid ignoring them and provide answers other than those put forward by extremists. The creation of videos offering alternative narratives, the organisation of debates or exhibitions dedicated to these issues or the dissemination of information about various international causes are all tools that can be used.

>>>>>>>>>> In 2013, the Belgian Home Office issued a two-page leaflet entitled “Helping the Syrian population: Yes but how?�. Aware that the situation in Syria gives rise to a feeling of injustice and rebellion and a need for commitment among many young Belgians, the Home Office wanted, with this leaflet, to suggest other ways to help the Syrian population rather than leave for war zones. To do so, it reminds people of the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Syria, gives examples of associations it is possible to get involved with and informs people of the risks of leaving for a war zone.

>>>>>>>>>> Finally, since radicalisation factors and processes vary according to the gender of the people involved, it is also important to take this dimension into account when defining actions.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> Turnup: a movie project for girls, Augsburg, Germany (LIAISE 2 pilot project) The city of Augsburg (Germany) ran a video project directed at young girls and women to build resilience against violent, religious extremist propaganda. While this project explicitly responded to messages in jihadist media, it was placed in the broader context of the city’s policy on gender equality and empowering women. This contextualisation helped to avoid stigmatisation and enabled the transfer of knowledge and experiences to other municipal departments.

>>>>>>>>>> 3.6.3. Relying on the existing and experimenting As stated in the introduction, it is important that a radicalisation prevention strategy is included as part of a global strategy and not totally disconnected from other public policies. Efus recommends that the actions included in the strategy be based on what already exists to benefit from existing partnerships and expertise. The aim is also to use actions in other public policies (education, social cohesion, etc.) that can contribute to the prevention of radicalisation. Likewise, experience in similar areas such as crime prevention can help develop specific actions for radicalisation. Existing actions may simply require a slight modification of their content or an improvement of the skills of the professionals in charge. For example, cities usually have parenting support actions that allow parent-to-parent exchanges, with the support of professionals, on issues they may face. These meetings can be used to allow parents to speak freely on radicalisation, raising awareness of the phenomenon. The existing format is interesting, but the content needs to be adapted and professionals properly trained so that they can discuss radicalisation with the parents.


>>>>>>>>>> Parent-Police exchange group, Valentinj school, Rotterdam, The Netherlands In Rotterdam, police are assigned to neighbourhoods and are specifically responsible for crime prevention and for maintaining good relations with the population. In the district of Valentinj, a primary school regularly organises discussion time between the parents of pupils and the police officer assigned to their neighbourhood. These meetings are used for discussions on the general feeling in the neighbourhood, any issues encountered, or the actions of the police. The topics covered vary. The regular nature of the meetings and the mainly preventive nature of the intervention makes it possible to build trust between the parents and the police. When issues with radicalisation started appearing in the neighbourhood, parents naturally broached the subject during these meetings. It was then easier for the police to raise the families’ awareness, help them and provide information to aid prevention.

>>>>>>>>>> Building on these already existing actions will add further value to the work of local stakeholders, optimise resources and ensure consistency with other public policies in the city. In addition, the exchange of practices between local authorities at national and European level is very useful. It allows the identification of actions that can respond to similar problems and benefit from advice to create such actions18.

18- Several networks organise exchanges between local authorities on violent radicalisation and have databases presenting local practices, e.g. Efus, RAN, and the Strong Cities Network.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> Participatory Forum Theatre, Sarcelles, France (LIAISE 2 pilot action) An exchange between the cities of Brussels, Molenbeek (Belgium), Montreuil and Sarcelles (France) took place in 2016. Prevention professionals from Sarcelles went to Brussels and Molenbeek for a day of exchanges on professional practices for the prevention of radicalisation. The city of Sarcelles met with the Vaartkapoen Association, which had set up a theatre company made up of mothers from Molenbeek fighting against radicalisation. These women then held a theatre forum (a participatory theatre technique) in front of Sarcelles professionals and mothers in 2017.

>>>>>>>>>> As violent radicalisation is an issue with very specific characteristics and quite new for local authorities, there is a need for innovation. Innovating in one's own city does not necessarily mean a new action never implemented elsewhere must be invented from scratch. It may be an existing action in another city that can be used as an inspiration adapted to the local context. In any field, experimentation is essential to adapt to evolving issues and this is even more true for violent radicalisation, which is new to local public action. Experimentation is then encouraged if it is based on a solid methodology that includes an assessment component to determine at the end of the experiment whether the action meets the needs and can be continued.

3.6.4. Which stakeholders should be solicited for implementing the actions? As discussed above, it is important to build on existing partnerships. It is also essential to bring in specific expertise. Involving external people can be very rewarding for the strategy. The action benefits from an outside perspective, a person with highly specific expertise, or elements


that would be impossible to find internally (testimonies from parents, reformed criminals...). It may be particularly relevant to mobilise associations specialising in radicalisation or more generally on resilience.

>>>>>>>>>> Psycho-social care for radicalised youth or their families: “PsyRad”, Liège, Belgium (LIAISE 2 pilot action)) The city of Liège (Belgium) has set up a project called PsyRaD which is an action research project aiming to develop a psychosocial support tool for young people becoming radicalised or their families, with the aim of social integration. The project is driven by the city's Prevention Plan, in collaboration with the University of Liège (Psychology of Crime). The method is built with the help of the police and youth welfare services. The support developed and implemented by this University-City partnership could also be a complement or an alternative to a sanction. Discussions with judicial authorities on this subject are ongoing.

>>>>>>>>>> Many local authorities have chosen to rely on external expertise (academics, specialised associations, consultancy firms...). Because the issue is fairly recent and because of the political urgency that sometimes exists, certain local authorities have, faced with a thriving “market”, had difficulty in selecting suitable experts. For a good working relationship with external service providers, Efus recommends adhering to the following steps: 1. First assess the option of relying on various existing local structures in the area because:

 They have a good knowledge of the area and the people because of their local roots;

 Partnership working relations are already in place;


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

 Expertise on topics such as criminality or youth is valuable and essential for leading actions to prevent radicalisation. It is therefore better to rely on structures that already have this expertise and allow them to learn about radicalisation so that they include this issue in their practices. These stakeholders should be involved from the beginning of the diagnosis to identify potential partners and help to broaden the approach.

2. If the needs cannot be met by any of the usual partners, specifications must be prepared to use an external service provider. Very precise specifications should be drawn up, possibly involving the main local partners involved in the strategy. Then, they should take part in the selection of these service providers: the provision of services can be better assessed (considered from various points of view), and in this way the external partner will be better accepted by local stakeholders. Do not hesitate to seek advice from other cities that may have already worked with the potential services providers.

3. Once the provider has been selected, they must regularly report back on the implementation of the action and local partners must remain involved in its strategic management. It can be useful to set up a steering committee involving the main partners. This committee can set objectives and a schedule, guide the mission and be the recipient of the various deliverables. It is also in charge of supervising the evaluation. The role of the steering committee is to ensure that the action is part of the local strategy, meets the objectives set and is consistent with other actions being carried out.


3.7. Evaluation

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In recent years, EU member states have significantly increased funding of local programmes and projects intended to prevent radicalisation, or to intervene in cases where radicalisation has already been observed. The evaluation of strategies and actions is an important tool to ensure the quality and effectiveness of approaches and experiences implemented, build trust in the effectiveness of local policies, but also ensure accountability of project managers and justify public funding. However, evaluation does not only respond to public scrutiny and possible criticism; it is an essential part of any prevention scheme to allow re-assessments, on the basis of scientific data, of its basic premises and a continuous development of strategic and methodological choices. It is not only limited to the assessment of results, but also includes a review of the implementation process and provides crucial information to adapt strategies and actions to specific targets. In addition, it facilitates the transfer of knowledge and experiences to other sectors of community services19. Both internal and external evaluations are possible, with both approaches having respective advantages and disadvantages. While external evaluations tend to allow for more objective assessment of premises, strategic coherence and impact, internal evaluations facilitate adjustments and adaptations of strategic and methodological choices. Even if an external evaluation is planned, it is essential to involve the internal stakeholders. Most evaluations combine both approaches. In many ways, evaluation of projects preventing radicalisation faces similar challenges to the evaluation in other fields of crime prevention20. In the field of primary prevention, for instance, the aim is to

19- Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Peter Romaniuk, Rafia Barakat, Evaluating Counter Extremism Programming. Practice and Progress. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Goshen, 2013, 3-8 20- Impact Europe, Synthesis report on the state-of-the-art in evaluating the effectiveness of counter-violent extremism interventions; Rand Europe, Cambridge 2014


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

prevent a problem from occurring; effectiveness is based on a nonevent. Evaluation thus often builds on assessments of the plausibility of the project’s strategies and methodologies and the consistency of their implementation, rather than on quantitative indicators of success. Even in cases of intervention and exit projects that are focused on radicalised individuals, the definition of measurable indicators is problematic. This relates, among other things, to the definition of “cases”: Who is defined as a case, and on what basis? For instance, someone who has shown interest in (violent) extremist websites? Someone who is involved in extremist activities but does not support the use of violence? Or someone who is promoting violence? Similar problems exist in defining success: does success imply a rejection of violence, a denunciation of underlying ideologies, or even an explicit support of democratic values and principles? Evaluation is not meant to provide answers to these questions; it aims to evaluate the consistency and clarity of the project’s definitions of goals and objectives. The evaluation should therefore focus on the following aspects.

1. Pertinence: Are the objectives of the project in line with the actual problems and the overall policy goals? While many projects aim at preventing radicalisation before it takes place, prevention projects often respond to the local authority’s urgent needs; in some cases, they are developed and implemented in reaction to observed tensions and conflicts. The aim of evaluations is to assess the connection between the project and the overall strategies pursued at a local level, and to weigh up possible contradictions and mid-term side effects. For example: in the event that a project is targeted at young women vulnerable to radicalisation, it is important to assess its links to larger municipal strategies focused on gender equality.


2. Evidence-based diagnosis and premises: Do the project’s diagnosis, premises and methods reflect recent academic research and recommendations? Academic research about the causes of radicalisation remains contested; the same holds true for recommendations regarding prevention strategies and methods. Evaluation is a tool to assess the project’s reflection of recent academic debates and contributes to confirming or refuting the often-polarised assessments about appropriate responses to radicalisation. The implication of researchers in the development and evaluation of projects facilitates the development of evidence-based strategies and their implementation, ensuring the use of assessed data to improve academic research and debate. For example: A project intended to produce online content to respond to violent extremist propaganda in social media should reflect ongoing controversies about concepts of counter and alternative narratives.

3. Qualification and training: are the project staff qualified and trained to implement the project? Prevention of radicalisation is a relatively new task for most actors working on the ground. Qualified staff are often difficult to find, and the development of methodological standards is still in its early stages. External evaluation is a tool that allows staff to be well aware of the implied challenges. It also allows evaluation of the responsiveness of project managers when addressing emerging topics and changing contexts, and to select and train staff accordingly.

4. Internal coherence: are the project’s various objectives coherent? Preventing radicalisation is a complex challenge; defining priorities poses considerable problems. Yet, objectives have to been defined; this also implies a clear definition of the limits of the project, as stakeholders often risk overstretching the scope and estimated impacts of projects and actions. The aim of evaluation is to assess the feasibility of


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

declared intentions and expected goals in the light of existing resources, qualifications and partners involved in the project.

5. External coherence: Are the project’s objectives coherent with other actions/projects implemented by the municipality? The prevention of radicalisation is a multi-disciplinary effort that requires actions on various levels and in different fields. Evaluation is a tool to assess the responsiveness of the project/action to the complexity of this challenge, and how the partners integrate the project’s activities as part of other types of activities carried out on the ground. For example: A prevention project targeted exclusively at young Muslims might have stigmatising effects and contradict activities for the prevention of discrimination and social cohesion.

6. Involvement of target groups The prevention of radicalisation requires knowledge about the groups targeted by the respective actions, and an awareness of their concerns and perspectives. As in other fields of crime prevention, involving target groups in the development and implementation of preventive actions ensures responsiveness and acceptance of the respective measures. Evaluation allows assessing such involvement and helps to identify possible objections that could significantly hold back the successful implementation of any activity.

7. Effectiveness: Does/did the project achieve its intended results? SMART criteria (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-restricted goals) have become a standard feature of project management. These criteria are particularly helpful in the field of primary prevention where measurable indicators of success (i.e. successful interventions with x number of individuals) do not exist. They allow, for example, predefinition of the expected number of training sessions or the number of participants reached through workshops and seminars, and thus provide important information about the implementation process.


While the achievement of these criteria can be checked internally, external evaluation allows these goals to be put in a wider context and to be compared with other projects and actions implemented in other fields and cities.

8. Impact: What are the direct and indirect impacts of the project? Prevention projects aim to change attitudes and behaviour, or build the resilience of defined target groups. These impacts are difficult to measure, and it is difficult to prove causal relations between a project and observed changes. In addition, primary prevention often builds on mid- or long-term impacts that are not immediately observable. Evaluation therefore aims to document the subjective experiences of participants and partners in order to identify non-quantifiable results – such as raising practitioners’ awareness or building self-confidence among young people – that are crucial for any sustainable strategy of prevention.

9. Implementation: Is/was the project implemented as planned? How do/did those involved respond to possible challenges? Prevention projects and actions implemented at a local level are limited in scope and time; yet policy makers, citizens and the media often seek immediate results. This risks increasing the pressure on involved stakeholders to prove efficiency and impact, and makes them less likely to acknowledge challenges and failures in the implementation process. Evaluation can assess the readiness of stakeholders to respond to unexpected challenges and the transparency of implemented changes. Readjustments and failures are part of most pilot projects; evaluation is a tool to appraise responsiveness to such challenges.


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

>>>>>>>>>> The city of Malaga (Spain) adopted its first plan for peaceful coexistence and prevention of the violent radicalisation for 2017-2020. For each part of the plan, the city, in partnership with the University of Malaga, developed three types of indicators:

Quantitative indicators defined as numerical measures of change;  Qualitative indicators defined as the opinion or the perception of the people evaluated. They facilitate the understanding of changes in processes, attitudes, beliefs, motives and behaviours.

 Outcome indicators: They compare quantitatively or qualitatively planned goals and achieved results. English version: content/galerias/1-ssociales/First-Cross-cutting-Plan-for-the-Conviviality.pdf Spanish version: content/galerias/1-ssociales/I-Plan-Transversal-por-la-Convivencia.pdf

>>>>>>>>>> IMPACT Europe is a toolkit developed for professionals in the field of preventing and countering violent extremism. It includes detailed guidelines to design evaluations implement them. IMPACT Europe has formulated the following recommendations: 1. Plan the evaluation when you design the intervention 2. Decide what you want to know, not what is easy to do 3. Specify your methodology 4. Plan for data collection 5. Use quantitative methods where appropriate


6. Consider economic evaluations, if and where appropriate 7. Plan longitudinal designs to measure long-term effects 8. Consider evaluation methods and designs that pay more attention to the context in which interventions take place Source :


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

References and bibliography >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Efus documentation  Efus, The role of local authorities in European national strategies against radicalisation, 2016  Efus, Local authorities in European and international guidelines to fight radicalisation, 2016  Efus, Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level, 2016  Efus, Methods and Tools for a Strategic Approach to Urban Security, 2016 Research, studies and articles  Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (France), “Avis sur la prévention de la radicalisation”, 2017  Impact Europe, Synthesis report on the state-of-the-art in evaluating the effectiveness of counter-violent extremism interventions; Rand Europe, Cambridge 2014  Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone, Eva Entenmann, “Fear thy neighbor”, ICCT, ISPI, The George Washington University, 2017  Matthew Davies, Richard Warnes, Joanna Hofman, Exploring the transferability and applicability of gang evaluation methodologies to counter violent radicalisation, Rand Europe, 2017  McCauley and Moskalenko, Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism, Psychology Department, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, 58 8~ Pennsylvania, USA , 2008


 Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Peter Romaniuk, Rafia Barakat, Evaluating Counter Extremism Programming. Practice and Progress. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Goshen, 2013  Peter R. Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization”, International affairs, 2013  Ranstorp Magnus, Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe, Routledge, New York, 2010  RAN issue paper, The root causes of violent extremism, January 2016  Same Anger, Different Ideologies: Radical Muslim and Neo-Nazi, New York Times, March 5, 2015


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Appendix: List of pilot actions and practice sheets

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  Alexandroupolis (Greece) - Raising awareness among local stakeholders  Augsburg (Germany) - Turnup: a movie project for girls  Bagneux (France) - Municipal plan for the prevention of radicalisation  Bologna (Italy) - Training on the role of local police in preventing violent radicalisation in cities  Bordeaux (France) - Training of trainers and creation of the A.G.I.R. network (Global Response Action to Radicalisation)  Brussels (Belgium) - EcoPol project  Düsseldorf (Germany) - Counter-narrative video  Essen (Germany) - Information Centre on Violent Salafism  German and European Forum for Urban Security (DEFUS) (Germany) - Webinar series “Extremist Radicalisation - Challenge for local authorities and possibilities for prevention”  Generalitat of Catalonia and Confederation of European Probation - Training of prison social workers and probation officers  L'Hospitalet de Llobregat (Spain) - Municipal Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation  Liège (Belgium) - Psycho-social care for radicalised youth or their families: “PsyRad”


 Malmö (Sweden) - Mammakraft (mothers’ power)  Reggio Emilia (Italy) - Prevention is better than cure: the role of young people in the prevention of radicalisation  Sarcelles (France) - Participatory Forum Theatre  Setubal (Portugal) – Preventing radicalisation at local level  Toulouse (France) - Mobilising and aligning local partnerships


Prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism

Methodological guide for the development of a local strategy This guide details each stage of the development of a local strategy for the prevention of radicalisation, from political mobilisation to its design, diagnosis and assessment. For each one, methodological advice is provided, explaining the potential obstacles to the strategy and ways to overcome them. Local practices are also presented. These recommendations come from the experience of many communities with varying profiles. However, they should not be considered as universal. Each locality, depending on their local situation, is asked to adapt them.

Issuu converts static files into: digital portfolios, online yearbooks, online catalogs, digital photo albums and more. Sign up and create your flipbook.