Introduction–SocialRoboticsandtheGoodLife
TheNormativeSideofFormingEmotionalBonds With Robots
JaninaLoh,WulfLoh
RobotsandTheirTasksinSociety
Robotshaveexistedasaconceptthatisstillcommontodayforahundred years.Historically,theterm“robot”goesbacktotheCzechword“robota”, whichstandsforwork,hardlabor,andforcedlabor.KarelČapekfirstused itintheplayR.U.R.Rossum’sUniversalRobots(1921)torefertohumanoid contraptionsthatareattheserviceofhumans.Thishistoricalvisionofthe robotasanartificialslavesubsequentlywastheguidingideashapingthedevelopmentofrobotics.1
Withoutdoubt,robotscannowbefoundinmanyareasofhumanlife.Industrywasthefirstsectortheymadetheirentranceintoaroundthemiddleof the20thcenturywiththe Unimate2 robot.Particularlyinthisarea,robotsare assignedtojobsthatareconsidered“dull,dangerous,anddirty”.Althoughit isanythingbutclearwhichactivitiesfallunderthiscategory(Marr2017),any socio-ethicaldoubtsarisingfromthishavenotbeenabletoputastoptothe advancingrobotizationofindustrialproduction.Today,tasksthatareconsideredboringbecausetheyarerepetitiveandmonotonous,aswellasdirty
1By“robot”,wemeananelectro-mechanicalmachinethata)hassomeformofindependentbody,b)possessesatleastoneprocessor,c)isequippedwithsensorsthatcollect informationabouttheworldd)aswellaswithatleastoneeffectorthattranslatessignalsintomechanicalprocesses.Arobot’sbehaviore)isoratleastappearsautonomous, enablingittof)interactwithorinfluenceitsenvironment(cf.Loh2019a:7;Misselhorn 2013:43).
2Acompositeof“universal”and“automation”;constructedbyJosephEngelbergerin 1961.
andevendangerous,areincreasinglybeingperformedbyrobotsonassembly lines,inproductionhallsandwarehousesaroundtheglobe.TheKukarobots intheautomotiveindustryandtheAmazonwarehouserobotsarebutsome recentexamplesofthisphenomenon.
SocialRoboticsandRobotsasSocialCompanions
Robotsareincreasinglyenteringthepersonalsphereofeverydayhumaninteraction.Thisareaofso-called socialrobotics ischaracterizedbyalargenumberofeverydayactivities,thatatthesametimecanbeveryprivateandsensitiveforvariousreasons(Breazeal2002;Duffy2008,2004;Fongetal.2003; Markowitz2015;Seibtetal.2016;Fronemannetal.2022).Themainfieldsin whichrobotsareemployedherearetherapyandcare,specificallyintheform ofactivationandkeepingcompany,butalsoeducationandevensexuality, friendship,andlove.Inthoseareas,theattributionofthethreeDsnolonger applies.Evenwhentherobotsareprimarilydesignedasauxiliarytoolsfor dailytasks,thetypicalactivitiesaremarkedbyinterdependenceandphysical and emotionalcloseness.
FromrobotsforsalesassistancesuchasPaul(whoguidescustomers throughtheaislesoftheelectronicsretailerSaturn),carerobotslikeCare-OBot,entertainmentrobotssuchasPepper,tosexrobots(Markowitz2015:41), areallexamplesforthegrowinggroupofsocialrobotsthatareusedinclose proximitytohumans.Dependingontheirrespectivetasksandtheextentto whichtheyenterintodirectinteractionwithhumans,theyneedtopossess socialskillsinsomeform.Thisanthologyisdedicatedtothemandtothe questionabouttherelationshipstheyallegedlyformoraresupposedtobe abletoformwithhumans.
Inthisregard,theauthorsofthisanthologytakeacloserlookatthree topicsofsocialroboticsinparticular. Thefirstpart revolvesaroundquestions ofdefiningandunderstandingbasicelementsofhuman-robotinteraction (HRI).CharlesEss,DavidGunkel,AnnaStrasser,andEvaWeber-Guskar examinethebasicanthropologicalandontologicalassumptionsofHRI,ask whatwemeanby“socialagent”and,correspondingly,by“artificialsocial agent”,addresswhetherinteractionwithrobotsshouldbereconsideredin general,andwhenitismorallyappropriatetospeakofsuccessfulHRI.
Thesecondpart dealswithquestionsofthedesignofrobotsassocialcompanions,theimitationofemotions,andcorrespondingorassociatedreac-
tionssuchastrustandexpectationswithregardtothebehaviorofarobot. CordulaBrand,LeonieN.Bossert,ThomasPotthast,JacquelineBellon,and TomPoljanšekintheircontributionscovertheethicalimplicationsthatarise fromtheembodiedandanthropomorphicdesignofrobots.
Finally,inthe thirdpart,theauthorsaddresswhetherspecificemotional relationshipswithrobotsarepossible,namelycaring,loving,andsexualrelationships.ImkevonMaur,LilyFrank,CindyFriedman,SvenNyholm,and KarenLancasterareconcernedwiththepossibilityandethicalappropriatenessoftheseformsofrelationshipsanditsrepercussions.
PartI–Understanding,Defining,Conceptualizing: RobotsasSocialCompanions
AlreadyČapekraisesnumerousphilosophical,ethical,andanthropological questionsinhis“R.U.R.Rossum’sUniversalRobots”.Theseinclude,forexample,thenatureofman,theresponsibilityofscientists,andwhatitmeansto formanemotionalbondwithanotherbeing.Forinstance,hispieceendswith theprospectofaloveaffairthatseemstobedevelopingbetweentworobots. Thus,inthehistoricalunderstandingoftherobotestablishedbyČapek,a broadfoundationisalreadylaidforthediscussionsthatweretoariseinthe decadesthatfollowedandthatextendintosocialrobotics.Isitpossibleto liveagood,successfullifewithandaroundrobots,includingformingintimateromanticandsexualrelationshipswiththem?
Inhistext“Virtues,Robots,andGoodLives:WhoCares?”, CharlesEss deals withthesequestions,whichalsoconcernedČapek,fromavirtueethicsperspective.Maybeareformulated,“relational”virtueethics,supplementedbyan “ethicalpluralism”,canhelpcircumventtheproblemsofan“ethicalrelativism andcomputer-mediatedcolonization”?Bywayofapplyingvirtueethicstosex roboticsasanexampleofemotionallyintimaterelationshipswithrobots,Ess isskeptical,however,thatasexualhuman-machinerelationshipcaneverbe saidtobetruly“complete.”Ontheotherhand,itistooquicktosimplydepreciaterobotsonthebasisof,say,theirlackofautonomy,asthisultimately leadstoa“reinscribingoftraditionalpatriarchalandracistattitudes”.Therefore,itisnecessarytofurtherdevelopa“pluralistic”ethicsofvirtueintoan “ethicsofcare”appropriatetothecurrentdevelopmentsinsocialrobotics.
Inordertoanswerthequestionwhetherrelationshipswithrobotsaredesirable,DavidGunkel,EvaWeber-GuskarandAnnaStrasser,firstaddressthe
statusofrobotsingeneral.Canweunderstandthemasagentswithwhom genuinerelationshipsarepossibleorarerobotsunabletotranscendtheir traditionalobjectstatus?Withtheseconsiderations,theauthorstieinwith abroadtraditioninrobotethics,inwhichbasicallythreecurrentscanbedistinguished.
Withinthefirstresearcharea,authorsasktowhatextentrobotscanbe consideredaspotentialmoralagents(Floridi/Sanders2004;Misselhorn2013; Moor2006;Sullins2006;Wallach/Allen2009).Accordingly,theyconsiderthe degreetowhichrobotsarecapableofmoralactionandwhichcompetencies theymustpossesstothisend.Dependingontherespectiveunderstandingof agency,morality,andthecompetenciestoberealizedforthispurpose,this includestheattributionoffreedomandautonomyasaconditionformoral action,cognitivecompetencies(suchasthinking,mind,reason,judgment,intelligence,consciousness,perception,andcommunication),butalsoempathy andemotions.Definingthe“minimalconditions”forunderstandingrobotsas “socialagents”isalso AnnaStrasser’s concerninhertext“FromToolUsetoSocialInteractions”.Forthispurpose,sheconsidersthecaseof“jointactions”as anexamplefor“socialinteraction”andseekstoestablishamoreappropriate understandingofHRIortherelationshipsweenterintowithrobots.
Withinthesecondarea,authorsdealwiththequestionwhetherrobots shouldberegardedasmoralpatients,i.e.asobjectsofmoralconsideration (Damiano/Dumouchel2018;Darling2012,2017;Duffy2003,2004,2008; Gerdes2017;Johnson2011;Tavani2018).Theseapproachesareconcerned withhowtodealwithartificialsystems,whatkindofmoralvaluetheymay have,eveniftheymaybeincapableofmoralagencythemselves.Topics include,forexample,theformulationofcodesofethicsincorporations,the desirabilityandpossibilityofrelationshipswithandtorobots,thequestion ofexploitingor“enslaving”robots,ortheassessmentoftheuseofrobots fortherapeuticpurposes.Somethinkersdiscussthepossibilityofascribing rudimentaryrightstosometypesofrobots.JustasImmanuelKantin§ 17ofthesecondpartofhisMetaphysicsofMoralsisopposedtocruelty towardsanimals,becausethiswouldleadtomorallyquestionableattitudes inushumans,KateDarling,forexample,arguesinfavorofrobotrights becausepeoplearethenmorelikelytomaintaintheirmoralvirtuesinother interactionsaswell.
Nonetheless,thefactthatrobotsareregardedmerelyasmoralpatients doesnotprecludethepossibilityofhumanshavingemotionalrelationships withthem.Againstthebackgroundofthispossibility, EvaWeber-Guskar inher
text“Reflecting(on)Replika:CanWeHaveaGoodAffectiveRelationshipWith aSocialChatbot?”rejectsthepossibilityofarelationshipcomparabletothat betweenhumans,usingtheexampleofthesocialchatbotReplika.However, Weber-Guskaralsoemphasizesthat“thelackofemotionalmutuality”does notjustifyageneralrejectionofthepossibilityofaffectiverelationshipswith “socialoremotional(ized)AI”.
Athirdstrandwithinroboticsethicstranscendstheobviousdichotomy betweenmoralagencyandpatiency.Authorsherediscussalternativestothe classicaldistinctionbetweensubjectsandobjectsofmoralaction.Withinthe frameworkofthese“inclusive”or“inclusivist”approaches(Loh2019a,2020, 2022),thefocusisonproblemswithatraditionalconceptionofthe(human) personthatunderliesthenotionofthemoralagent.Theunderstandingof thehumanbeingasthecoreofethicalthinking,asthemainmoralagent,as thepivotoftheattributionofabilities,competences,andvaluesisquestioned andchallengedintheseinclusiveapproaches.
Inhistext“TheRelationalTurn:ThinkingRobotsOtherwise,” DavidGunkel describestheprojectofsuchaninclusiveapproachinorderto“introduceand formulateameta-ethicaltheory”.First,hetakesalookatthepeculiaritiesof theclassical,exclusiveethicalpositions.Inasecondstep,hethenoutlineshis alternativeofarelationalThinkingOtherwise,andinathirdstepmeetspossibleobjections.Gunkelisthusconcernedwithageneralnewunderstandingof thepossibilityofenteringintorelationshipswithrobots.Heshowsthatquestionsofmoralstatusofandpotentialrelationshipswithrobotshavelessto dowiththerobotsthemselvesandmoretodowith“usandthelimitsofwho isincludedinandwhatcomestobeexcludedfromthatfirst-personplural pronoun,‘we.’”
PartII–Design,Imitation,Trust: AnthropomorphizationanditsFunctionforSocialRobotics
Robotsassocialcompanionscanonlycarryouttheiractivitiesincloseproximitytohumans,iftheyareacceptedbypeopleintheirimmediateprivate space.Peopledonotwanttobeassistedintheirpersonalhygienebyscaryor repulsivemachines,theydonotwanttobecaredforandtouchedmentally andphysicallybycoldapparatuses–thisseemsaprettystraightforwardassumptionandisthereforeatthebottomofalmostallsocialrobotdesign.The latterisquasiunanimouslycateredtoanimageofrobotsthattheirhuman
userscanidentifywithandthusengagewithmoreeasily.Theyare,accordingtoKateDarling,“specificallydesignedtosociallyinteractwithhumans” (2012).Suchatrust-inspiringdesignisinmanycasesanthropomorphic(i.e., human-like),ormorerarely,zoomorphic(i.e.,animal-like).
Theanthropomorphizationofnon-humanentitiesdoesnotonlyconcern theirouterform,butcanalsorefertotheirbehaviorandthustotheattributionofhumancompetencies(Fink2012:200).Therefore,inthefieldofsocialrobotics,adistinctionissometimesmadebetweenanthropomorphicdesign,whichprimarilycomprisesexternallyperceptiblecriteriasuchas“shape, speechcapabilities,facialexpression,”andthelike,andanthropomorphicinteractiondesign,whichtargetsthe“socialphenomenonthatemergesfrom theinteractionbetweenarobotandan[sic!]user”andissometimescalled “anthropomorphism”(inthepropersense)(allcitationsinLemaignanetal. 2014:226;cf.Złotowskietal.2015).
Ourcapacityforanthropomorphizationseemstobeapsychologicalfact andthusprimarilyatopicofthesocialsciences,psychology,and(inthecontextofrobots)scienceandtechnologystudies.However,theanthropomorphiclensthroughwhichweoftenviewandevaluatethenonhumanworld frequentlyservesasavehicleforplacinghumanizedbeingsinthemoraluniverse(see EvaWeber-Guskar’s textinthisvolumeformoreonthis).Afterall, themorehumanweassessacounterpart,themoresimilarwemakeittoourselves,themoreweidentifywithit,themorewillingwearealsotoassignit a(moral)valuesimilartothatofhumans.Indeed,weareforcedtodosoto acertainextentifwedonotwanttobeargumentativelyinconsistent.The anthropomorphicgazegivesamoralvaluetoallbeingsitencounters.
Inpsychology,anthropomorphizationistraditionallyviewedinanegativelight,“asabias,acategorymistake,anobstacletotheadvancementof knowledge,andasapsychologicaldispositiontypicalofthosewhoareimmatureandunenlightened,i.e.,youngchildrenand‘primitivepeople’”(Damiano/Dumouchel2018:2;cf.Duffy2003:180-181).Someauthorsevengoastep furtherbydeclaringhumanizedrobotstobeakindof“‘cheating’technology”thatisethicallyproblematic(Turkle2011:514).Humanizedrobotsnot onlydeceiveusintobelievingthattheypossessmentalstates,butalsointo the“illusionofrelationship”thatwecanactuallyonlyenterintowithhumans (Turkle2005:62;cf.Damiano/Dumouchel2018:1;Lin2012:11).
Thisargumentofadeceptivetechnologyora“cultureofsimulation” (Turkle2011)canbeinterpretedintermsofvirtueethics,insofarasthegood lifeimportantlyalsodependsonhumanrelationships(Nussbaum2007).In
thissense,humanscommitamoralerrorwhentheyreplacehuman-human relationshipsasthegenuineformofrelationshipwithamirageevoked byarobot(seealsothetextby CharlesEss inthisvolume).3 Accordingly,a “simulatedfeelingisneverfeeling,simulatedloveisneverlove”(Turkle2010: 4;cf.Damiano/Dumouchel2018:5).
Thetraditionallynegativeconnotationofanthropomorphisminpsychology4 iscounteredbystudiesinsocialroboticsthatcontrasttheseconcerns withapositiveinterpretationofthehumancapacityforanthropomorphization.Forexample,LuisaDamianoandPaulDumoucheloutlineanoptimistic approachthatviewsanthropomorphismnotasa“cognitiveerror”but“asa fundamentaltool”(2018:5)thatcansupportandenhanceHRI.Theystate thatwhatmakessocialrobotsspecialisthatthey“tendtoblurthetraditional ontologicalcategoriesthathumansusetodescribetheworld,”mostnotably thesubject-objectdichotomy,butalsothecategoriesofanimateandinanimate,sentientandnon-sentient(2018:4)(onovercomingthesubject-object dichotomyininclusiverobotethicsapproaches,seealsothetextby David Gunkel inthisvolume).
Otherauthorsviewanthropomorphizingrobotsonlyas“desirablewhere itenhancesthefunctionofthetechnology”(Darling2017:174).Humanscan andshouldidentifywithsocialrobotsusedineldercareandhouseholds,as thesemachinesinteractwiththeirownersinanintimateway.Otherwise, theywouldbeunableorunwillingtoengagewiththeartificialsystem.On theotherhand,authorsconcludethatarobotmust“notbetoosimilartoa humanbeingifitissupposedtoelicitempathy”(Misselhorn2009:117).Often referringtotheso-called“uncannyvalley”(Mori1970:33-35),theyarguethat otherwise,theinabilitytoclearlycategorizetherobotadequatelyaccording tosuchimportantcategoriesasanimate/inanimatewillirritate,repel,and scareus.
Itisinterestingtonote,however,thatwithregardtothequestionof whetheritmakessensetodesignrobotsinsuchawaythatpeoplecanengage
3Theargumentagainstanthropomorphismcanalsobespelledoutdeontologicallyand utilitarian:deontologically,ifIneglectmydutiestowardsotherpeople,forexample, becauseofmyemotionalattachmenttoarobot;andutilitarian,ifIshould,forexample,attributetheabilitytosuffertorobotsduetoanthropomorphizingthem,and thereforeincludetheminthecalculationoftotalutility.
4Thereisalsoapositiveinterpretationofanthropomorphisminpsychology,pointing outthatundertheanthropomorphicgazenonhumanbeingscanbecome“familiar, explainable,orpredictable”(Fink2012:200).
andformrelationshipswiththem,thefocusisprimarilyonpositiveemotional formsofrelationshipssuchascare,love,andfriendship.Asdiscussedearlier, negativeaffectiverelationshipsaremostlyusedasreasonsforrejectingan anthropomorphicdesign.Intheirtext“YouCanLoveaRobot,ButShould YouFightWithit?”, JacquelineBellon and TomPoljanšek raisethequestionof whethersuch“frustrated-relatedconceptsofhumanemotion”canalsobeat timesconducivetoagoodlife.Ifthisisthecase,thesimulationofnegative emotionsshouldnotbeexcludedinHRI.
Insocialrobotics,thequestionofappropriatedesignofrobotshasso farbeenlimitedtodirectinteractionincloseproximitybetweenhumans andmachines.Intheirtext“EmpathicMachines?EthicalChallengesofAffectiveComputingfromaSustainableDevelopmentPerspective”, CordulaBrand, LeonieN.Bossart and ThomasPotthast extendthisnarrowperspectiveusinga justice-basedapproach,namelythe“SustainableDevelopmentframework”. Bydoingso,theyevaluatewhetherandhowthepresumedadvantageof“affectivecomputing”canactuallyberealizedforallhumansinajustandneedsbasedway.
PartIII–Care,Love,andSexWithRobotsasSocialCompanions
Dependingonthestatuswearewillingtoascribetorobots(PartIofthis volume)anddependingontheirdesign,whichcanbeattractiveorrepulsive tous(PartIIofthisvolume),somepeopleactuallyenterintofriendly,sexual, caring,orlovingrelationshipswithrobots.Inaveryliteralsense,itissex robotsthatareclosesttous.
Formostpeople,sexroboticsmaysoundlikepuresciencefiction.Inreality,however,therearealreadyseverallargeinternationalcompaniesthat mass-produceandsellsexrobots–includingtwoChinesecompanies(DS DollRoboticsandShenshenAllIntelligentTechnologyCo.)andonefromthe USA(RealDollwithRealBotix).TrueCompanyin2010wasthefirstcompany intheworldtolaunchasexrobotcalledRoxxxy.Roxxxyhadinteractivecapabilitiessuchas,accordingtothenowofflinehomepage,“hearwhatyousay, speak,feelyourtouch,movetheirbodies,aremobileandhaveemotionsand apersonality.”Roxxxywassaidtobeabletodevelopitsownpersonality(oras manydifferentrolesasdesired)throughinteractionwithitsusers.Butitwas alsopossibletogiveheroneoffivepre-programmedpersonalities.Besides that,shecouldbegivendifferenthairstylesandhaircolors.Asidefromthe
aforementionedskills,Roxxxyshouldhavealsobeenableto“listen,talk,carry onaconversationandfeelyourtouch”andeven“haveanorgasm”(TrueCompanion2019).
OtherexamplesincludeShenshenallIntelligentTechnology’sEmma robot,MattMcMullen’ssexrobotHarmony(Realbotix),Samanthathatis supposedlyequippedwitha“moralcode”,aswellasLumiDoll’ssexrobotKylie (Mlot2018;Morgan2017).Itisclearthatinsexrobotshighlyquestionable genderstereotypesareoftentimesupheldandheteronormative,patriarchal, instrumentalizing,anddiscriminatorypowerstructuresareconfirmed(see alsothetextby CharlesEss inthisvolume).Asaresult,thespectrumofethical issuesisevident(Cheoketal.2017;Danaher2017;Danaher/McArthur2017; Kubes2019;Levy2012,2008;Loh2019b;Scheutz2012;Whitby2012).
Inhertext“GrannyandtheSexbots”, KarenLancaster dealswiththepossibilityandmoraldesirabilityofusingsexrobotsineldercare.Indoingso, sheaddressesnotonebuttwotabootopics–asidefromsexrobotics,thefact thatolderpeoplemayalsohaveawishtoexperienceafulfilledsexuality.
Atthesametime,Lancaster’stextbridgesthegapbetweentwofieldsof socialrobotics,namelybetweensexroboticsontheonehandandmedical, therapeuticandnursingroboticsontheother.Here,too,theuseofsexrobots isdiscussed.Butapartfromsexrobots,numerousassistancesystemsarealreadybeingusedtodaytosupportcaregiversinthemedical,therapy,and nursingsectorsintheiroftenextremelyphysicallyandmentallydemanding work.Fromliftingandtransportsystemstocompanionrobotsthatactivate, entertain,andtherebyreduceloneliness,totherapyrobotsthatpromotecommunicationwithpatients,abroadspectrumofartificialsystemsexistsfora varietyofdifferenttasksinhospitals,therapy,andcarefacilities.Onefield thathasbeendevelopingsteadilyforagood15years,forexample,istherobot useinthetherapyofchildrenwithautism(Richardsonetal.2018;critically Elder2017).
TheartificialsealParoisagoodexampleofazoomorphicallydesigned careassistancerobot.Paroismodeledafterayoungharpsealandmainlyused ingeriatriccareandtherapy,especiallyforpeoplewithseveredementia.These peopleparticularlytendtoisolatethemselvesfromtheirhumancaregivers, butoftenopenuptoanimals.Asarobot,Parocannotbeaccidentallyhurtas itmighthappentorealanimals.Nonetheless,itissaidtooffermanyofthe benefitsofaregularhuman-animal-interactiontherapyintheseapplication contexts(Shibata/Wada2011;Wadaetal.2008).
Becauseofthenumerouschallengesassociatedwithrobotsaspotential socialcompanions,somethinkersareskepticalaboutthequestionofwhether itmakessenseorismorallydesirabletodeveloprobotsinsuchawaythat humanswanttoformrelationshipswiththem.Inthisvein,inhertext“Alice DoesnotCare.Or:WhyitMattersThatRobots‘Don’tGiveaDamn’, Imkevon Maur alsorejectstheuseofcarerobotswiththeaim“toreduceloneliness”. Since“realcare”involvesbothmeaningsoftheword,robotsareaccording tohernotcapableofcaringinthissense.Evenmore,peopleruntherisk of“givingupexpectationsofrealcareandtruerelationships”whentheyget involvedwithrobots.
Thedebatesabouttheprosandconsofthepossibilityandespeciallythe moraldesirability(intermsofagoodlife)ofemotionalrelationshipswith robotsarepointedlysummarizedinthetext“EmotionalEmbodimentinHumanoidSexandLoveRobots”by CindyFriedman, SvenNyholm,and LilyFrank. Bywayofthreeethicalquestions,theydiscusssomeofthecentralapproaches torobotethics,andindoingsobringtotheforefrontthechallengesweface inthetheoreticalconception(cf.PartIofthisvolume),theactualdesign(cf. PartII),andthepracticaluseofrobotsaspotentialsocialcompanions(cf. PartIII).
Theauthorsofthisanthologyshowthatthechallengeswefaceregarding thequestionsofthegoodlifeandthepossibilityofemotionalrelationships withrobotsareundoubtedlymanifold.Buttheyalsoshowthataddressing thesequestionsisworthwhileaswebecomemoresensitivetothecomplexity ofasocietyintheageofdigitalization,automation,androbotization.
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