In Our Interest
HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN MAKE IMMIGRATION
POPULAR
ALEXANDER
KUSTOV
paper a few years ago1 and received my first reactions from a wider audience, I noticed that many people were interpreting my argument primarily in terms of its implications for policy communication and elite messaging. If it is true that voters care deeply about their compatriots, as some have referenced and interpreted my work, then policymakers should be able to make immigration more popular by creating more effective narratives emphasizing the benefits of immigration to receiving countries. While I do not think that this interpretation is wrong, I have long felt that it is incomplete since it overlooks the actual policies in place.
Meanwhile, others continue to question how realistic hypothetical preferences for more nationally beneficial immigration policies are in real-world politics. After all, despite international migration’s enormous benefits to both receiving and sending countries, few voters are unabashedly pro-immigration, and few political parties run on an explicitly pro-immigration platform. Instead, anti-immigration forces always seem to have a competitive edge. Elected officials often dismiss the possibility of liberalizing even the most beneficial immigration pathways as not electorally viable, fearing backlash from immigration-skeptical constituents.2
Some have also justifiably asked how this work can align with my previous research showing that changing people’s minds on immigration is incredibly hard.3 This collaborative research suggests that most observed changes in immigration attitudes likely stem from random fluctuations in survey responses rather than from substantive opinion shifts. Drawing on the best available longitudinal survey data across countries, my colleagues and I found that most people maintain their general stance toward immigration, even in times of economic or refugee crises. These findings imply that any change in communication strategy for immigration is unlikely to significantly alter public pro-immigration sentiment on its own.
Over the past several years, I have thought a lot about the practical implications of widespread altruistic nationalism and sociotropic concerns for successful persuasion and productive policy changes on immigration issues. Part II approaches these implications by setting out a framework of what I call “durable persuasion by demonstrably beneficial policymaking.” Drawing on the voter preference evidence
presented in part I and the literature on good governance and policy feedback, I consider the few systematic ways in which freer immigration, or consistently high immigration flows, can become legitimate in the electorate.
Overall, I conclude that having long-running, selective immigration policies that attract needed workers or otherwise demonstrably benefit citizens are a necessary and major contributory condition for this to happen. No matter how smart policy communication is, what ultimately matters are the policies on the ground. At least descriptively, the only major countries where freer immigration is practiced and popular are those with a highly selective immigration system. There are also no major countries with a highly selective system where immigration is relatively unpopular.
In the rest of this chapter, I assess what it takes for persuasion efforts on freer immigration to be successful and long-lasting. I start with a discussion of framing strategies as the most immediate practical implications of the argument presented in this book. According to this interpretation, for freer immigration to be popular, policy communication should be framed predominantly in terms of national interest. I show that, while such strategic communication is a good start, it is ultimately not enough to ensure sufficient support for immigration owing to the constant availability of alternative competing frames. I then show that even more complex interventions, such as correcting misperceptions about immigration or reducing prejudice against immigrants—assuming they can be at least somewhat successful—are also insufficient to secure the public endorsement of more open immigration admission policies. The primary reason for this is that people’s perceptions, no matter how mistaken they may be, are and must be grounded in their interests and the political reality.
Chapter 6 provides a proof of concept for the general idea of persuading voters by implementing new policies. In particular, I use new data on historical changes in immigration policy and politics from across European countries and the United States to examine what actually happens when governments adopt pro-immigration reforms broadly aimed at benefiting the nation. Despite the common fear of populist backlash, I show that pro-immigration policy changes are generally not associated with either greater popular concerns about immigration or populist voting, at least in the short run. If anything,
global recession, Brexit, the 2016 election of Donald Trump, and the 2015–2016 European refugee crisis. In other words, we demonstrated that immigration attitudes are not very sensitive to changes in economic conditions, migration flows, or political environments. This finding is further corroborated by another recent paper I coauthored that reveals that even the COVID-19 pandemic, despite halting most global immigration, has had a minimal impact on people’s long-term views on the issue.6
Why are people’s views on immigration so stable? Most of all, our research supports the central role of socialization and deep-seated predispositions. Most people’s stance on immigration policy simply reflects their early life experiences and personality traits, such as those related to racial prejudice or parochial altruism. Acknowledging this, our study questioned the role that (mis)information and contextual factors play in people’s immigration attitudes, and we found that these factors explain only a small amount of difference in these attitudes. While major political events or large campaigns may shift people’s views on particular immigration issues in the short term, those changes are small, and people eventually revert back to their initial beliefs.
However, all this evidence does not necessarily imply that people cannot change their minds following some underlying change in the objective conditions in the longer term. As described earlier, people who unconditionally oppose or support freer immigration no matter what are rare. Policymakers and advocates can and should try to change people’s minds by meeting voters where they are: acknowledging their current concerns about immigration, recognizing the persistence of their biases, and making compromises on immigration reforms that will be appealing despite these preconceptions. In particular, the evidence on altruistic nationalism presented in part I implies that many voters who currently oppose freer immigration can be persuaded to change their minds if they believe that immigration is to their country’s benefit.
In this respect, most voters across the Atlantic have already been persuaded, perhaps even pre-suaded, that certain types of immigration— such as that of skilled workers—are beneficial and desirable.7 Importantly, people do not need to be convinced of this fact through any
Regardless of what one believes about the merits of framing immigration in terms of national interest or any other important value, however, such communication considerations can only matter so much. After all, counterframing is always a possibility, and most arguments either for or against immigration clearly invoke multiple complementary frames. I am also not familiar with any evidence suggesting that appeals to national interest can reduce the effectiveness of humanitarian arguments, or the other way around.
On the brighter side, the underlying stability of immigration attitudes also implies that it is hard for any particular communication strategy to make voters more anti-immigration. When far-right politicians use anti-immigration rhetoric in their campaigns, they can usually raise the issue’s salience only among those who are already anti-immigration.17 And there is little evidence that using populist or other divisive rhetoric to frame immigration issues matters much for persuasion. People vote for right-wing populists because they already agree with the populists’ substantive policy position that immigration is harmful, not because they find their rhetoric particularly appealing.18
While people do respond to elite cues and at times are willing to change their minds based on elite messaging, this generally works only for issues that do not affect people personally and only when the messaging comes from trusted copartisan leaders.19 Unfortunately, as I show in my most recent research, those who oppose immigration also tend to care more about it than those who support it.20 While there is some evidence that center-right politicians taking proimmigration positions may be persuasive,21 it is difficult to imagine widespread pro-immigration messaging being adopted by parties that are currently anti-immigration or by politicians incentivized to stoke anti-immigration views among their base.
According to the vast literature in social sciences (as discussed in chapter 2), a key reason that many voters currently believe that immigration is harmful is not because of insufficient emphasis being placed on its benefits or too much populism being present in policy communication. The reason is prejudice, broadly conceived, including both ignorance of basic immigration facts and animus against foreign out-groups.
“Increased immigration: What do you do when the most economically beneficial policy in the world is virtually the least politically popular? Alexander Kustov’s In Our Interest takes a can-do approach by experimentally investigating the best ways to close the gap. His answer: Countries should prioritize ‘demonstrably beneficial’ high-skilled immigration so voters stop picturing liberalization as charity or national suicide. Even refugees benefit if the stereotypical immigrant is a star.”
Bryan Caplan , author of Open Borders: The Science and Ethics of Immigration
“Not only is Kustov’s book a highly rigorous and insightful analysis of general public attitudes toward immigration in affluent democracies, it is also loaded with practical recommendations for designing immigration policies that can win broad support. Kustov’s cross-national approach and use of experimental data are particularly illuminating. The timeliness of this book and its relevance to ongoing policy debates can hardly be overstated.”
Wayne A. Cornelius , coeditor of Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective
“There’s an abyss between what the empirical evidence tells us about the economic and social benefits of immigration and what the average person believes about immigration. Those tasked with convincing the public about the benefits of welcoming newcomers usually make an immigrant-centered argument that appeals to compassion. Kustov convincingly shows that only appeals that tell us immigration is good for us and our countries, when backed by good policies, will work to make immigration popular. This perspective isn’t only refreshing. It’s perfectly consistent with the facts on how immigration is a net positive. This is an important book for anyone interested in the future wellbeing of their country.”
Zeke Hernandez , author of The Truth About Immigration: Why Successful Societies Welcome Newcomers
“Anti-immigration politics are on the march. In this synthetic, deeply researched book, Kustov demonstrates that we misunderstand that opposition: citizens are not implacably anti-immigration. Kustov’s path forward fosters support for immigration by addressing the altruistic concerns underpinning opposition. Moral clarity, conceptual novelty, and extensive evidence—from many strengths, one great book.”
Daniel J. Hopkins , author of The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized
Alexander Kustov is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
U.S.A. Cover design: Chang Jae LeeCover image: © Shutterstock
