Bentham Brooks Institute Research Journal 2022-23

The Bentham Brooks Institute (BBI) is a student-led think tank based at University College London. Its mission is to inspire talented students to pursue careers in academia, think tanks, and the public sector. Through a yearly research program, the BBI brings students together to produce high quality, peer-reviewed research papers providing concrete policy recommendations and pragmatic solutions to some of the world’s most pressing issues.

The BBI proposes a yearly research agenda to encourage students to delve into an area about which they are passionate. The research agenda for the academic year 2022-2023 consisted of the following areas:

• Green Growth and Sustainability

• Global Health and Safety

• Social Justice and Equality

• Technological Risk and Governace

• Conflict and State-building

• Democratic Deficit and Authoritarianism

The Bentham Brooks Institute Committee would like to thank all the advisors and peerreviewers, without whom this publication would have never been possible. The time they set aside to guide and support researcher along the way has been invaluable.

Green Growth and Sustainability: Improving Sustainability Frameworks: A comparative analysis of the views of stakeholders on the EFRAG’s European Sustainability Reporting Standards………..………..........................................................................................................3

Social Justice and Equality: The Integration of Ukrainian Migrants: A Study of the UK and Poland?.....................................................................................................................................40

Technological Risk and Governance: Critical Assessment of the EU Data Governance Act: To what extent does the EU Data Governance Act effectively enable NGOs in achieving open data sharing for social benefit? ................................................................................................64

Improving Sustainability Frameworks: A comparative analysis of the views of stakeholders on the EFRAG’s European Sustainability Reporting Standards

Juliette Helfi1, Krishna Chetlapalli, Yan Hong, Maria Patouna, Vyacheslav Stupak, Marleen Walther.

Published April 2024

Abstract

Transparency and scope of corporate disclosures are essential to fostering the reliability of sustainability frameworks. Yet, academic research and empirical reviews alike point to shortcomings in the global climate information architecture. In this context, the draft European Sustainable Reporting Framework aimed at designing a stringent framework for non-financial reporting. We argue that the different stakeholders will generally agree with the European Union’s purpose of implementing a sustainable framework. Yet, we view the letters as a lobbying and communication exercise to improve and undermine the European Sustainability Reporting Standards. Analysing 203 letters from the public consultation organised by the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) following the release of the draft European Sustainability Regulation Standards (ESRS), we find that the detailed feedback from the stakeholders’ letters reflects a large consensus. Stakeholders are predominantly concerned about the necessary harmonisation and consistency, the scope of disclosure requirements and the quality of standards. However, our analysis shows there is less concord on topics where groups focus more narrowly on their self-interest. Particularly, financial and non-financial actors focused on the organisation and financial burden the project would imply and underlined the perceived excess in granularity while NGOs are most concerned with standards, disclosure requirements and sustainability reporting.

Keywords: sustainability, EFRAG, reporting, climate architecture, financial actors, NGOs

Introduction

In June 2020, the EU mandated the EFRAG with the aim to improve the comprehensiveness and auditability of sustainability reporting. The EFRAG is a private organisation affiliated with the European Commission aimed at serving European public interests in the field of sustainability reporting. The EFRAG elaborated a game-changing set of non-financialreporting standards:the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS). The purpose of publicly available sustainability reporting is to provide relevant, faithful, comparable and reliable information. The EU commission made it clear this regulatory effort would involve stakeholders.

Regulatory policy making is a ground on which different stakeholders, ranging from business associations to NGOs, engage in the process of rulemaking directed by a standardsetter. The depth of engagement of different stakeholders

impacts how rules will be designed, and hence which group will have their interest better taken into account. In an era where consensus-building processes have been institutionalised to the point of becoming crucial in regulatory policy-making, the EU has debated with the stakeholders concerned by this piece of legislation at different stages of the project. The ensuing public consultation resulted in stakeholders issuing position papers expressing their views on the project.

Our study aims at analysing the comments of different stakeholders in the public consultation initiated by the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) on the new European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) to uncover the balancing of feedback processes between stakeholders with diverse interests and policy-makers at the European level.

Analysing 203 letters sent by fourteen different stakeholders ranging from audit, NGOs, financial, and nonfinancial corporations, institutions to businesses, to the EFRAG in response to the first draft of the ESRS, we used an abductive qualitative approach. That is, we collected the data to “explore a phenomenon, identify themes and explain patterns'' (Saunders et al , 2019). Starting from the qualitative analysis, we computed a cross-sector table, using the number ofreferences tospecific themes inthe lettersso as tochallenge the results thatwe found foreach sectorindividually and bring a renewed comparative perspective on the findings.

Yet, considering the challenges, this study calls for further research to investigate the EFRAG’s response to the stakeholders and the final version of the ESRS. Limitations in the scope ofthe studyare due totimeand resourceavailability. In this paper, we find that the detailed feedback from the stakeholders’ letters reflects a large consensus. Stakeholders are predominantly concerned about the necessary harmonisation and consistency, the scope of disclosure requirements and the quality of standards. However, our analysis shows there is less concord on topics where groups focus more narrowly on their self-interest. Particularly, financial and non-financial actors focused on the organisation and financial burden the project would imply and underline the perceived excess in granularity while NGOs are most concerned with standards, disclosure requirements and sustainability reporting.

Following our findings, we advocate for more consultative sessions between the EU and the different stakeholders during the reporting phase so that reporting can be improved continually to adjust to the needs and conditions of stakeholders. In this sense, adjustability will be introduced from a perspective of the ever-evolving construction of the standards, not to bypass the regulation requirements.

By examining the consultative process on non-financial sustainability standards, this study lays out a case for other consultative initiatives in policy-making. Combining the European Union’s top-down approach with stakeholders’ bottom-up recommendations, this study sheds light on lobbying logic and calls for cautious incorporation of stakeholders' demands in line with the European Union’s regulation goals. This paper makes an original contribution as it offers a highly detailed analysis of a large panel of stakeholders’ feedback on the European Sustainability Reporting Standards. The letters’ analysis offers a new perspective on stakeholders’ reactions to the implementation of a coercive regulation. The lack of convergence and defensive positionsadopted on a diverse range oftopics shows that feedback letters are a lobbying and communications exercise to influence policy-making.

The paperisstructured asfollows. Section Ibrieflypresents background information on sustainable finance concepts paramount to understanding the evolution of sustainable and

responsible governance features globally and outlines the EU’s track record in terms of sustainable financial and nonfinancialreporting. Section IIcritically exposes thestateofthe literature on sustainability reporting and identifies potential gaps to be addressed. Section III specifies the methodology that we used to read, classify and analyse the stakeholders’ letters. In sections IV and V, we provide a detailed sector and cross-sector analysis shedding light on distinct as well as comparative elements addressed by the stakeholders.Section VI 4 outlines policy recommendations, incorporating some of the demands raised by the stakeholders while ensuring thatthe regulation will not be significantly watered-down.

1. Context

Priortodelving intothe literature review, understandingthe context related to sustainable finance is paramount as it would provide the foundation for the ensuing concepts. This section defines and provides a brief history regarding the various conceptions associated with sustainable finance such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), and Environmental, Social, and Governance factors (ESG). The section then focuses on the European Union’s sustainable finance design, reporting the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group’s involvement in the process, describing taxonomy and disclosure, and focusing on the 2014/95/EU directive and the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD).

Corporate Social Responsibility, Socially Responsible Investing, and Environmental, Social, and Governance factors all share origins with deep-rooted historic and moral influences which guided both corporate and individual behaviour towards business practices and business transactions (Townsend, 2020; Agudelo et al., 2019). However, it was in the 20th century when CSR, SRI, and ESG began to evolve into the broadly defined and heterogenous concepts understood today with CSR mainly relating to corporate behaviour and its impact on society, and SRI and ESG factors emphasising investor behaviour towards the consideration of social, ethical, and environmental good (Sandberg et al., 2009).

Until the 1950s CSR mainly consisted of philanthropic behaviour from corporations and the “protecting and retaining (of) employees”. (Agudelo et al., 2019), and it was not until the 2000s that there was a broadly accepted consensus on the interpretation of CSR as being mainly focused on ethical corporate behaviourand corporate behaviourpromoting social good. Between the 1950s and the 2000s many events amended the idea ofCorporate SocialResponsibility, aswellasSocially Responsible Investing, from mainly being related to philanthropy and the protection of employees to corporations’

attested responsibility towards ethical practices and their impact on society, attributable to the rise of protest culture of the 1950s and 1960s, regulatory committees affecting corporate behaviour in the 1970s, international collaboration spreading awareness on corporate failures in the 1980s, and globalisation and greater international cooperation in the 1990s (Agudelo et al., 2019). The European Union was principal in setting up a standard consensus on the definition of CSR and played an important role in expanding the scope of CSR. In the 2000s, the European Commission adopted that CSR entailed “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society and outlined what an enterprise should do to meet that responsibility” (European Commission, 2011), setting up a global understanding of CSR and actively applying the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

The evolution of SRI can be seen in parallel with the evolution of CSR, with most of the episodes affecting the idea of CSR also affecting SRI. (Townsend, 2020) While SRI is terminologically, definitionally, strategically, and practically heterogeneous between cultural groups and different actors, the broad consensus holds that SRI is “the integration of certain non-financial concerns, such as ethical, social or environmental, into the investment process” (Sandberg et al., 2009). Investors participate in socially responsible investing by screening and engaging with corporations and investments that not only bring a greater financial return, but ones that also result in social good for example through the promotion and protection of human rights, the environment, and diversity.

Heterogeneity in SRI can be seen through the various strategies that investors engage with such as negative screening, divesting, positive investments, community investing, and shareholder activism (Sandberg et al., 2009; Cundill et al., 2017; Corporate Finance Institute, 2023). Historically SRI was associated with negative screening and divesting, as many investors abstained from investing in stocks that were perceived to be against the social good examples of which include the tobacco industry, the gambling industry, and the military (Townsend, 2020). While negative screening and divesting are still strategies used by socially responsible investors, the integration of ESG factors for the investment process is also heavily developed, making it a very common investmentstrategyforsocially responsible investors in recent times.

Environmental, Social, and Governance factors were broadly integrated into SRI following an initiative in 2006 by the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment along with the UN EnvironmentProgramme Finance Initiative and UN Global Compact. The initiative defined responsible investment as “the integration of environmental, social, and governance criteria into mainstream investment decision-

making and ownership practices” (Principles for Responsible Investing, n.d.; Sandberg et al., 2009), establishing a “definitional consensus” on responsible investing (Sandberg et al., 2009). ESG, while not only focusing on disclosure, makes iteasy forinvestors toinvestinsocially and sustainably responsible corporations guiding corporations to disclose standards relating toEnvironmental (Climate Change, Natural Resources, Pollution and Waste, Environmental opportunities), Social (Human Capital, Product Liability, Stakeholder Opposition, Social), and Governance (Corporate Governance, Corporate Behavior) criteria (Principles for Responsible Investing, n.d.).

The European Union’s history in establishing sustainable financialand non-financialreporting inline with CSR and SRI measures goes back to the 1990s when the European Union was seeking to create a transparent financial reporting market “to gain access to capital markets outside of Europe'' (Maystadt, 2017). To arrive at this, the European Commission and the European Parliament decided to adopt the IASB’s (International Accounting Standards Board) International Financing Reporting Standards in 2002 and mandated EUlisted companies to base financial statements on the IFRS from 2005 onwards. To check to see if the IASB standards were reliable and compatible with European Standards, the European Commission was given the task of adopting or rejecting standards on the advice of EFRAG (the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group). EFRAG provided technical advice to the European Commission and since then has been a technical advisor to the European Commission on accounting matters such as the ESRS and CSRD of late (Fenwick, 2023). The global financial crisis however led to transformation within EFRAG and sustainable financial reporting as criticsargued thatthereporting contributed topart of the financial crisis, leading to the EFRAG developing into a new board representative of the main stakeholders and responsible for the decision making of the body (Maystadt, 2017).

Non-financial reporting within the European Union since 2018 has been regulated by the EU Directive 2014/95/EU, the Non-financial Reporting Directive (NFRD), providing a framework for non-financial disclosure. The NFRD took the place of accounting directive 2013/34/EU, after amending it, and extended the scope of disclosure regulation (Green Finance Platform, 2021). For companies falling within the scope of the directive, the directive provides a framework for publishing information in the categories of “environmental matters, social and employee aspects, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and diversity on board of directors” (Directive 2014/95/EU), overall outlining ESG requirements. NFRD is also supplemented by Article 8 of the Taxonomy Regulation requiring companies to include statements on how their activities are “associated with

environmentally sustainable economic activities” (Green Finance Platform, 2021). Under the NFRD all large EU-listed companies, accounting for around 11700 organisations, are required to include non-financial statements based on guidelines provided by the directive (Fenwick, 2023; Green Finance Platform, 2021).

The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) is a directive within the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) that seeks to expand the scope of nonfinancial reporting. It would amend the NFRD as the following non-financial reporting directive. CSRD, an initiative of the European Green Deal which aims to make the European Union carbon neutral by 2050, directly addresses the UN Sustainable Development Goals and focuses on environmental,social,and governance factors.CSRDexpands the scope of the NFRD by covering more corporations under the directive and requires them to provide non-financial reports. With this reporting directive, the number of corporations required to disclose non-financial reports would almost quadruple to about 50,000 EU businesses compared to those required to disclose under the NFRD, as not only large corporations but also small and medium enterprises would be required to disclose non-financial information (Fenwick, 2023). CSRD also mandates disclosure regarding value chains and mandates disclosure through double materiality.

In April of 2022, EFRAG issued an initial draft of ESRS allowing for a public consultation of the standards to which EFRAG received 298 “unique position papers” from different sectors. Based on the consultation, EFRAG updated some of the standards (Fenwick, 2023). In December of 2022, ESRS and CSRD were approved, with the standards applying to some companies by 2024 at the earliest (Fenwick, 2023).

2. Literature review

2.1 The Shift Towards Sustainability Disclosure Frameworks

In recent months, the landscape of sustainability reporting and ESG disclosure has experienced a noticeable shift away from the “alphabet soup” of various voluntary disclosure frameworks provided by private ratings agencies such as Refinitiv and MSCI (Haddon, et al., 2022) and towards the creation of a new group of frameworks that aim to give companies, investors and consumers, a more reliable, standardised, and comprehensive setofdisclosures (Securities

and ExchangeCommission,2022). Prominently, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), which is a private organisation affiliated with the European Commission aimed at serving European public interests in the field of sustainability reporting, has released a draft of their EU Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS). The ESRS is a mandatory disclosure framework for sustainability reporting using a double materiality approach that, along with other initiatives such as the EU taxonomy and SFRD, aims to combat the ongoing climate crisis.

Hence, in this literature review, we will aim to evaluate the effectiveness and limitations of the ESRS, particularly with regards to its usage of mandatory disclosure and double materiality. In doing so, we seek to illustrate the gap in existing literature on sustainability reporting concerning the perspectives of key stakeholders (firms, NGOs and standard setters etc.) on the introduction and implementation of new, mandatory disclosure frameworks that are centred around novelconcepts like double materiality. Ourstudy is conducted with the goal of filling this gap and providing much-needed insight on how the recent changes in the landscape of sustainability reporting will affect stakeholders.

We will also conduct a comparative study of the ESRS and two other notable disclosure frameworks, the United States’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) framework and the independently developed framework under the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB). All three aimtobegin phase-inimplementation by 2023 (Haddon, et al., 2022) but differ greatly in their scope, jurisdictional authority and prescriptiveness.This section ofthe literature review aims to illustrate the lack of harmonisation that already exists between the three main disclosure frameworks even before their widespread implementation, making our study on the impact of said lack of harmonisation at an international level on stakeholdersinthe EU,even moresalientinits contribution to existing literature regarding sustainability reporting.

2.2 Voluntary and mandatory disclosures

The introduction of sustainability disclosure frameworks in important regions such as the EU and the US marks a general trend in the world of sustainability reporting from voluntary disclosure towards mandatory disclosure. Out of the three frameworks mentioned above, the ESRS and SEC are both mandatory disclosure frameworks while the ISSB remains as a voluntary disclosure framework due to its lack of jurisdictional authority (Haddon, et al., 2022). Mandatory disclosure is seen as an improvement by academics and regulatory bodies over voluntary disclosures due to two main reasons: (1) it reduces the likelihood of greenwashing and (2)

it allows regulators to ensure a more stringent methodology is used in sustainability reporting.

First, greenwashing is defined as “the act of misleading consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service”anda greenwashingfirmis therefore engaginginboth “poor environmental performance and positive communication about its environmental performance “ (Delmas & Burbano, 2011) simultaneously. According to empirical studies conducted on over 1500 companies from 12 countries, the probability that a company would engage in greenwashing is much lower in countries where mandatory disclosure frameworks exist (Mateo-Marquez, et al., 2022) and can force companies to be more transparent and honest aboutsustainabilityperformance as comparedtocountriesthat rely on voluntary disclosure frameworks.

Secondly, research carried out by the OECD have found that popular, private ESG ratings agencies such as Refinitiv and MSCI, which are often used by companies to voluntarily disclose ESG data, make use of problematic methodologies in their calculation of environmental (E) scores (OECD, 2022). These methodologies ascribe a disproportionately heavier weightage to the quality of a company’s corporate policies, targets and objectives and a disproportionately lower weightage to more tangible metrics like greenhouse gas emissions data. The study concludes that, if left to voluntarily disclose sustainability related information, most companies willend up with inflated Escores thatdo not accuratelyreflect their actual sustainability efforts.

Hence, the adoption of mandatory disclosure frameworks, while placing a heavier burden on the shoulders of firms to disclose a greater and more refined amount of information, helps to create a more stringent and stable regulatory environment that is more aligned with the goals of sustainabilityreporting and ESGdisclosure thatourregulatory institutions set out to achieve in the first place.

2.3 Double materiality

Next, a distinct feature of the ESRS is its adoption of the double materiality concept. Materiality originates from the discipline of accounting, where the exclusion of an item from a financial report was considered material if said item’s importance was such that its inclusion would then reasonably be expected to lead to a change in the judgement of a person who is reading the report (Messier, et al., 2005). Materiality has since been adopted for usage in sustainability reporting, where it is used to determine whether certain sustainability related issues are material and should therefore be included in disclosures (Jorgenson, et al., 2022).

While definitions and standards for materiality vary depending on the entity that defines it, two broad definitions of materiality have been widely accepted and used by many existing disclosure frameworks and other regulatory bodies: (1) financial materiality and (2) impact materiality. The former takes a so-called “outside-in” perspective on sustainability issues, and is concerned with how external factors like social and environmental issues can affect a company’s internal operations and enterprise value (Abhayawansa, 2022). Financial materiality therefore aligns more with the interests of investors. The latter looks at sustainability reporting from the “inside-out” perspective. Impact materiality focuses on how a company’s operations can affect the external environment in terms of social and environmental impacts and as such, is more aligned with the interests of stakeholders such as civil society and consumers.

What sets the ESRS apart from other existing or planned disclosure frameworks, is the fact that, it holds companies accountable forreporting underboth types ofmaterialitylisted above, rather than just one. The ISSB’s disclosure framework for example, uses a single materiality approach of only requiring financially material information to be disclosed. Whereas the ESRS defines double materiality as the union of impact and financial materiality, meaning that a sustainability matter is seen as material if it falls under the definition of impact materiality, financial materiality, or both (EFRAG, 2022). In theory, this approach would allow the ESRS to overcome the challenge of an overly myopic view on sustainability reporting that is characteristic of single materialityapproaches.Thisis illustrated by thecriticismsthat have been voiced against the ISSB’s usage of single materiality. Academics have been quick to point out that a narrow definition of materiality, such as financial materiality in the case of the ISSB, would exclude the critical inside-out perspective thatmanystakeholdersvalue.Thisleadstoserious sustainability-related issues like negative externalities, to be overlooked, which could then engender trends of shorttermism among companies (Adams & Mueller, 2022). The ESRS’s double materiality on the other hand, would feasibly avoid this problem because the inclusion of both prevailing definitions of materiality would require firms to engage with the perspectives ofmultiple stakeholders and notjustinvestors alone. This approach would more accurately account for the existing relationships between firms, their stakeholders and wider society in the context of sustainability (Adams, et al., 2021).

With that being said, double materiality is not without its shortcomings as well. Notably, many have called for frameworks like ESRS to give a greater degree of consideration for the dynamic nature of materiality in

sustainability matters (Marchi, 2021). One way in which double materiality might overlook the dynamic nature of sustainability matters is in the fact that sustainability matters can often change and intensify overdiffering time horizons. In the short-term, unpredictable events such as the global COVID-19 pandemic can cause issues to rapidly become material in the short term. Meanwhile, other sustainability matters may be considered unimportant in the present day but will intensify to become material in the long-term. An example of this would be negative externalities, which are costs or benefits borne by third parties. The implications of externalities on stakeholders might only be observable and thus, reportable if they trigger certain reactions from affected stakeholder groups in the long term (Cooper & Michelon, 2021), and as such, double materiality will have to expand its time horizon to include such matters.

Furthermore, there is also the problem of rebound and boomerang effects, which are implications of a company’s inside-out impact that the company itself ends up being exposed to as an outside-in impact. An example is provided by EFRAG: for a company inagriculture, the consequences of depleting land and biodiversity of a field could directly affect the yield of the crops and hence, the financial margin” (EFRAG, 2022). Hence, critics have pointed out that double materiality would presenta false dichotomy between financial and impact materiality that overlooks these rebound and boomerang effects (Abhayawansa, 2022) which might in turn, lead to confusion for companies over whether issues are considered material or not and from whose perspective an issue might be seen as material (Jorgenson, et al., 2022).

As it stands, despite some limitations, the ESRS’s double materiality approach remains one of the more comprehensive definitions of materiality currently being used. In the next section, we evaluate whether differences in materiality definitions and other aspects might lead to divergences between the ESRSand other proposed disclosure frameworks.

2 4 Comparative study between ESRS, SEC and ISSB

While all three disclosure frameworks mentioned thus far are still undergoing changes before implementation, it is already evident from the information released to the public thus far that any attempts at harmonisation between the three frameworks will be, at best, superficial. Based on what we have observed from our literature review, we can identify six key dimensions with which the three disclosure frameworks diverge significantly: (1) jurisdictional authority, (2) acceptance of alternative reporting, (3) target audience, (4) materiality, (5) scope and (6) prescriptiveness. We shall cover

each in detail to illustrate why harmonisation at an international level at this juncture is already a significant challenge.

Jurisdictional Authority As mentioned earlier, the ESRS and SEC frameworks are mandatory disclosure frameworks for large companies and all SEC registrants within the jurisdiction of the EU and US respectively (Haddon, et al., 2022) while the ISSB remains voluntary. This implies that companies with operations in both the US and EU will be required to follow the disclosure frameworks of both the ESRS and SEC, which may generate confusion.

Acceptance of Alternative Reporting.  Simply put, it is yet unclear if each regulatory body will recognize the legitimacy of complying with a disclosure framework other than their own within their respective jurisdictional boundaries. For now, the 13 SEC does not allow firms under their jurisdiction to comply with alternative disclosure frameworks while the ESRS does, but only if the alternative framework is able to meet certain standards which are also still unconfirmed (Haddon, et al., 2022).

Target Audience Although, sustainability reporting should be targeting the interests of society as a whole in theory, in practice, the fact that the ISSB’s parent organisation, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the SEC are both organisations created with investors as their first priority (Giner & Luque-Vilchez, 2022) could lead to differences in objectives and motivations behind each framework.

Materiality.

As mentioned extensively already, the ESRS is adopting double materiality as its approach while the ISSB and SEC use single materiality. While we have already established the merits of a double materiality approach, the inconsistency between the definitions of materiality between each framework could lead to issues such as a loss of competitiveness among firms complying with the ESRS. Since the ESRS is much more demanding, events such as the case of human rights violations in China’s Xinjiang cotton industry, where Western companies like Nike that expressed their disapproval of the situation were hit with intense boycotting fromthe Chinese market,would disproportionately affect companies complying with ESRS as compared to companies that comply with other frameworks (Giner & Luque-Vilchez, 2022). As mentioned by Giner & LuqueVilchez, if companies voluntarily disclosed their disapproval of such events, this would bring about competitive disadvantages but also positive reputational effects. However, ifEU companies areforced intodisclosing disapprovalofsuch events due to mandatory disclosure frameworks, then they may suffer a competitive disadvantage as compared to their

competitors that lie outside of the ESRS’ jurisdiction. These non-EU competitors are under no obligation to disclose disapproval and can continue to conduct business and operations within the Chinese market as per normal. Moreover, the positive reputational effects that EU firms would have accrued for disclosing their disapproval of the human rights violations in Xinjiang would largely be negated if they are perceived to have disclosed their disapproval involuntarily. With that being said, such deleterious effects on competitiveness are likely to be less significant for large multinational corporations which also happen to be the companies that are more likely to be active in international markets in the first place. Hence, there remains a possibility that the competitive disadvantages arising from divergent definitions of materiality might only pose a significant threat to a small proportion of medium sized firms that engage heavily with foreign markets.

Scope

As of now, only the ESRS framework includes environmental, social and governmental disclosures, whereas the SEC and ISSB have only included environmental and climate-related disclosures within their scope. Although, both the SEC and ISSB have also indicated plans to expand their scope to eventually encompass the entirety of ESG in the future (Haddon, et al., 2022).

Prescriptiveness While all three frameworks generally took inspiration from the same set of disclosure recommendations from the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), the level of prescriptiveness used by each differs greatly. For example, the ESRS and ISSB both require all firms complying with their framework to include scenario analysis within their disclosures as a tool to help them formulate better forward-looking policies while the SEC remains laxer on its usage (Haddon, et al., 2022). The ESRS also includes numerous additional disclosures such as an integration of disclosures with the EU Taxonomy regulation, that the SEC and ISSB lack. This gives the ESRS a much more granular and detailed list of disclosures for firms to comply with compared to the other two frameworks.

In summary, the differences listed above seem to be consistent with the “contested arena” concept proposed by Afolabi, Ram and Rimmel, in which they liken the field of sustainability reporting to be a contested arena with complex interactions between the major stakeholders such as companies, politicalinstitutions and rule enforcers (regulatory bodies like EFRAG and SEC) (Afolabi, et al., 2022). The lack of harmonisation between frameworks is explained as a result of each actor purposefully attempting to maintain their own influence and relevance in determining the rules and authority within the sustainability reporting arena, and that the diversity

of interests and beliefs of each of the major actors within the arena will ultimately act as the main obstacle for achieving harmonisation. The way forward appears to be through the facilitation of knowledge-exchange and cooperation between the regulatory bodies of the three frameworks in an effort to establish a “global sustainability reporting baseline” (Giner & Luque-Vilchez, 2022) that can allow for “comparability and consistency of application across jurisdictions''.

2.5 Con2clusion of literature review

To conclude, our literature review has produced two key findings. Firstly, the introduction of a novel approach towards sustainability reporting using double materiality represents a concerted effort from the ESRS to cover the wide range of stakeholders involved in sustainability reporting. Though this is a more holistic approach compared to the ISSB or SEC, a double materiality approach is still expected to be vulnerable to dynamic changes in global events and rebound and boomerang effects. As such, ourstudy aims toinvestigate how the various EU stakeholders are reacting to the introduction of double materiality and other aspects of the ESRS. Secondly, we find thatthe ESRS, ISSB and SEC are fundamentally, very different frameworks and that harmonisation between the three on an internationallevelis unlikelytobe very significant at their respective stages of implementation and so our study will also focus in on how this lack of harmonisation might implicate EU stakeholders and how we might mitigate said implications.

3. Methodology

The focus of this study is to analyse the comments and responses of different stakeholders in the public consultation initiative by the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) on the new European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS)tosee whatimprovements can be made to the framework. This research is valuable as it helps identify areas where improvements can be made to the ESRS framework, which could lead to more effective and comprehensive sustainability reporting. First, we expect that the stakeholders will push for the harmonisation of the ESRS

and its convergence with otherpieces of regulation such as the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB). Second, we expect to find that double materiality and rebuttable presumption are divisive depending on the sector. Third, we believe thatdisclosures ofScope 3 emissions are controversial due to the difficulty in measuring them and unequal conditions. Fourth, in some sectors, we expect to find that due to limited resources, SMEs will struggle to comply with the disclosure requirements on the value chain and this could constitute a competitive disadvantage. Lastly, we positthatthe transition and phase-in approach will be a point of disagreement between the different stakeholders as little time has been included in the ESRS to adjust to the numerous disclosure requirements.

The letters were accessed and selected through the EFRAG website which were openly published for public review. 202 out of 243 letters were used. 41 letters were not analysed because they were not written in English or could not be categorised in one of the 12 stakeholder groups. By extension, we only focused on the letters relevant to our initial research questions which focused on concerns of stakeholders. The letters were divided into 12 categories (seen in Table 1). The categories of stakeholders were set by our research team after a thorough review of all letters and relying on the EFRAG categorization.

evocative attribute” to the text (Saldana, 2013, p. 31). To create a code hierarchy, a number between one and three (the “weight”) was attributed to each code to denote its importance (3 being the most important and 1 the least important). The weighting system was used to maximise the methodological use of NVivo. The weighting of themes was decided based upon the salience of themes in the literature review and the first reading of the sample of letters before starting to code. This hierarchy helped us organise the codes efficiently. After this, sub-groups were created under each code to organise the information. Figure 1.1 and 1.2 demonstrate the 14 codes, their sub-groups, and their weight.

Table 1: List of categories

The research team focused on 14 key themes in the letters (as seen in Figure 1.1 and 1.2). These themes were inputted intoa qualitative text-analysissoftware, NVivo,underspecific “codes.” A code in qualitative analysis is a short phrase that assigns a “summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or

Figure 1.1: NVivo Codebook part 1

One of the challenges was that readers could interpret the terminology of “codes” differently which would alter our results. To solve this, the research team outlined a clear terminology to minimise subjectivity during analysis. For example, “materiality” was defined as the effects of climate change on finance and corporate activities. “Double materiality” added a layer to the “material” conception by including the impacts of finance and corporate activities on climate change (Täger, 2021). Along the same lines, “rebuttable presumption” was defined as a way to circumvent disclosure obligations by classifying disclosures as not material for the undertaking. By outlining an agreed-upon terminology, the research team was able to locate the appropriate themes more efficiently. Along the same lines, the members paid attention to the equivalence of words. For example, terms such as “convergence” and “harmonisation” could be used interchangeably in some letters and differently in others. To overcome this obstacle, each letter was read critically, and themes were extracted from specific keywords in NVivo.

To analyse the themes in the letters, qualitative and abductive methods were used. The qualitative method was implemented to quantify non-numerical data extracted from written text. The qualitative data set provided an opportunity for in-depth analysis where relationships between sectors and the “codes” emerged and produced well-grounded and contextualised explanations. During this research, the process of data collection and analysis was interrelated. For example, the letters were critically assessed during the collection phase and then again during the final analysis. This way, the quantitative method allowed us to understand the stakeholder’s beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour toward the EFRAG much better. Furthermore, this helped shape the direction of data collection during the abductive approach. An abductive approach involves the collection of data to identify themes and explain patterns in the letters (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2019, p. 796). This approach was chosen (instead of inductive or deductive) as it allowed us to explore the relationships between concepts and measure themes quantitatively. Consequently, we were able to move back and forthbetween theory todata (as indeduction) ordata totheory (as in induction) while we were identifying themes (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2019, p. 155). In other words, the abductive approach combined both deductive and inductive methods to enable effective data collection.

NVivo was used to organise the themes and find patterns in the letters. We chose to use NVivo because this software facilitates common qualitative techniques for organising, analysing, andsharing data collected. Forthis research,NVivo was used to group the various “codes” and compare the occurrence of themes to determine the relevant concerns of

stakeholders. Firstly, the research team created a “codebook” outlining the 14 major themes and sub-groups. This allowed us to gather material from the letters and observe the emergence of patterns. Secondly, the research team uploaded all letters from a specific category they were assigned into an NVivo file. The letters from each industry were grouped into different files. Thirdly, the letters were treated by selecting and coding the themes outlined in the codebook. In other words, the first coding cycle is analysis (taking the letters apart). The second cycle of coding is synthesis as the team assembled codes to find meanings (Saldaña & Omasta, 2018). During the treatment of the letters, the members looked for concerns regarding questions such as:

• Whatmainmessage does the authorofthe letterwant to convey?

• Is the information in the letter factually accurate?

• What recommendations and solutions do the authors propose?

To access the extensive list of questions, please refer to our research protocol in Appendix 3

To extract relevant themes, the research team implemented specific filters in NVivo to find relevant information from keywords. Additionally, the length of coded paragraphs in comparison to the whole letter was considered to see the relevance of certain topics. Finally, the excerpts that the members coded were annotated to rely on the notes when writing the finalanalysis. As aresult,the research teamarrived at finding the relevance of themes by computing word matrixes for each sector and comparing the emergence of themes.

The research teamchose this approach foranalysisand data collection because it allowed us to comprehensively analyse each letter and ensure thatrelevant themes were identified. By extension, acombination ofqualitative andabductive methods provided the best means for our research team to detect the most salient concerns of stakeholders and address the relevant aspects of our research question. We also reviewed previous research studies and consulted experts about our methods which showed that a combined approach of individual text analysis and computational data collection is mostappropriate when working with a large amount of text. Furthermore, a strength of our research is that we followed established methods and protocols for analysing and collecting data through NVivo and ensured its reliability and validity. The teamkeptdetailed records ofthe methods used andsteps taken to ensure that the results could be replicated and verified by other researchers. A possible limitation is that despite coding the letters there is an element of subjective human interpretation which could alter how themes were classified.

Another possible limitation is that the EFRAG already released new policy recommendations during this research. Despite this, our analysis demonstrates alternative changes and alterations that could be made. As a result, our research provided detailed and comprehensive answers about how the sustainability framework could be improved.

4. Sector Analysis

4.1 Audit

Institutions fromthe auditsectorare mostly concerned with issues related to harmonization and consistency, the concept of ‘double materiality’, the transition period and phase-in approach and disproportionate granularity.

We have coded 31 direct references to recommendations for the harmonisation of sustainability standards. 71.42% of the Audit institutions’ letters refer to “harmonisation and consistency”. Audit institutions urge EFRAG to work towards an accepted global baseline on sustainability reporting standards. More specifically, ACCA, Accountancy Europe, ASSIREVI and the Association of International Accountants encourage enhanced coordination and collaboration between EFRAGand the ISSB, supporting theidea ofa globalbaseline. However, as the CFA Institute highlights, the challenge “is thatmultiple jurisdictions are working on the same disclosures at the same time. Each is using similar ingredients but using a different recipe which will result in a different outcome in standards and different disclosures for investors…while the idea of a global baseline is a worthy goal, the reality is that the three mostsignificantbodies are developing differentversions simultaneously and even basic disclosures that should be part of a baseline are simply different” (CFA, 2022). Although the organisation welcomes the pursuit of a global baseline, it underlines that there “needs to be consensus on what a global baseline really means…it needs to be a shared pursuit and objective” (ibid).

Regarding ‘double materiality’, 60.71% of the Audit institutions’ letters refer to this concept: 5 out of audit firms are strongly supportive of the ‘double materiality’ approach. The IMA is the only respondent who is coded as being “against” the idea; they argue that “the term needs to be reconciled with conventional concepts and financial market regulations” and therefore encourage the “standard setters to use the term ‘impact accounting’ rather than the confusing terminology ‘double materiality’” and note that “this suggested rephrasing would not change types of information that an entity gathers for disclosure, but it would identify the specified user for reported information”. Numerous audit institutions strongly suggest that EFRAG defines and clarifies

the ‘double materiality’ terminology and that it provides more application guidance and illustrative examples to help the implementation. Characteristically, the institutions unanimously call for “more guidance and clarity” to “support practical implementation” as well as “illustrations on double materiality” (Accountancy Europe, 2022; ASSIREVI, 2022; CNCC, 2022; PANA, 2022; PwC, 2022).

Regarding audit institutions’ views on issues related to the value chain, 21.42% of the letters refer to this issue. In their references, the institutions call for “further explanations, illustrations and guidance as it relates to the value chain requirements and its boundaries” (ESRS, 2022). Indeed, “this should include clarity on how indirect relationships with all third parties along the whole value chain should be treated” and “more guidance on the calculation and reporting of metrics in respect of different elements of the value chain is needed” (PwC, 2022). The Institute of Public Auditors in Germany (IDW, 2022) suggest that EFRAG considers “a phasing-in approach in the context of value chain information i.e., thatindividualstandards allow more time before requiring reporting of information that will have to be obtained from within the reporting entity’s value chain”. SRA (2022) argues that “that value chain information should be at a less detailed level. This lowers the reporting burden that may inadvertently be placed on suppliers that fall outside the proposed scope of the CSRD.”

Indeed, audit institutions are also concerned with the transitionperiod:67.85% oftheir letters refer tothe ‘transition period and the phase-inapproach’. Theyexpress concerns that “the feedback received in such a compressed comment period may not be sufficient to ensure that standards are of good quality and capable of implementation (ACCA, 2022). The Charted Accountants of Ireland (2022) characteristically state that “the time allowed of approximately three months is insufficient for EFRAG to receive an adequate response from all relevant stakeholders… we would recommend a longer phasing-in period as well as a prioritisation of matters to be reported on in the earlier years”. The Institute of Public Auditors in Germany (IDW, 2022) agrees, and urges “consideration of a phasing-in approach whereby corporate sustainability reporting would initially focus on key disclosures, with further granular disclosure requirements gradually introduced over time”. The Association of International Accountants (2022) feels that “EFRAG has tried to do too much, too soon”. Overall, audit institutions fear that the deadlines and the pressures on the organisation are taking precedence over substance, quality and realism.

Another recurrent comment amongst audit institutions’ letters is that standard requirements are too granular: 50% of the letters discuss this issue. When considering the level of

detail and quantity of information to specify in the standards, the European Contact Group characteristically suggests that EFRAG retains “only those disclosures that are the most urgent requirements of the EU legal framework”. This is because “too wide-ranging and granular requirements… run the risk of turning the reporting process into an extensive compliance exercise while obscuring the sustainability information to the detriment of users (FAR, 2022). Numerous institutions are worried that the granularity and complexity of disclosures “are likely to lead to information overload and reduce its quality”; it “mayimpair effective reporting and lead toa compliance exercise” (ASSIREVI;NorwegianInstitute of Public Accountants).

4.2 Academic

Institutions from the academic sector are mostly concerned withissues relatedtoclimate standards,the conceptof‘double materiality’, sustainability reporting and harmonisation and consistency. 57.14% of the academic sector’s letters refer to ‘standards’. Regarding climate standards, Oxford University (2022:2) is particularly concerned with greenhouse gas emissions. It highlights that EFRAG allowing the use of industry-average data “rather than specific and traceable data fundamentally undermines the integrity of Scope 3 measurements” and rather, “the only acceptable assurance for a GHG emissions report be a ‘present fairly opinion,’ which would deny assurance to Scope 3 reports based substantively on 5 industry-average data. Such true-and-fair audit opinions would enable entities’ GHG reports to have the same reliabilityas theirfinancialstatements,and, like these, provide a sound basis for investment decisions and accountability for corporate performance”. Also, the Value Research Centre (2022:8) underlines that “EFRAG fails to cover specific goals within the Biodiversity theme aimed at (N5-B) Humane, Compassionate Treatment of All Animals, and (N5-C) Zero Palm Oil Use”. To reduce the risk of greenwashing, the use of specific standards should be limited.

28.57% of the letters in the academic sector are in favour of the ‘double materiality’ concept. Characteristically, the Friedrich-Alexander University (2022:3) holds that “the concept of double materiality leads to a truly sustainable transformation of companies and prevents the short-term greenwashing efforts”. However, it also argues for the “building block approach in that on the one hand financial materialityis applied forthe IFRSS and on the otherhand, the inside-out perspective is part of the reporting for the ESRS according to the concept of double materiality (ibid). The Value Research Centre’s (2022:6) response is coded as ‘against’, because they argue that “while EFRAG’s reports emphasise a double materiality focus, the disclosure approach that they have currently published unfortunately enables further value washing within the impacts that they require companies to report”.

57.14% of the academic sector’s letters discuss issues related to ‘sustainability reporting’. The Friedrich-Alexander University (2022:1) highlights that “onlylarge capital marketoriented companies that have already disclosed corresponding sustainability reports in the past will probably be able to cope with the increasing challenges of sustainability reporting…softened reporting requirements could cushion the burdens at the beginning in order to gradually introduce the companies to the new, considerably extended reporting requirements”. The Leibniz Institute (2022:1) argues that “the definition of relevant ESG metrics is crucial – it should be science-based and clearly separate from the political process of formulating and issuing regulatory rules”.

Harmonisation and comparability were mentioned in 42.85% of the academic sector’s letters.The institutions argue that to create a holistic sustainability reporting framework, standards ought to be harmonised despite diverging understandings of materiality

Figure 2: References to each theme in the audit institutions

Figure 3: References to each theme in academic institutions

Figure 4: References to each theme in the consumer institutions

4.3 Consumer

Looking at the consumers' responses towards the EFRAG draft, their comments focus on standards, harmonisation and consistencyas wellas the concept of‘double materiality’. The DSW’s strongly recommends consolidating all governancerelated standards and is concerned with the phrasing ofArticle 29b because it could constitute a “huge step backwards in the quality of governance reporting” by implying the deletion of some standards (2022:1). Also, Consumers Internationalurges “the CSRD tomake clearreferences tothe ISSB tosupport the creation of the global baseline for capital markets, and to GRI to maintain consistency with double materiality” (2022:1). The organisation is in favour of “enhanced compatibility to make every endeavourtoestablish ISSB as the globalbaseline for sustainability-related financial disclosures” (ibid).

4.4 ESG reporting

Institutions from the ESG Reporting sector are mostly concerned with issues related to harmonisation and consistency, standards and disclosure requirements.

All the letters from this sector’s institutions refer to ‘harmonisation and consistency’. The Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative (VCMI) and the Investor Relations Society call for greater consistency; the latter is concerned that “EFRAG’s current proposed draft ESRSs are not fully interoperable with the ISSB standards” (2022:2) and therefore “ideally, the EU will adopt the ISSB’s standards or will closely align their disclosure requirements with the ISSB standards as explained by their building blocks approach” (PRI 2022), VCMI “recommends advocating for alignment of the ISSB standardswith the ESRS, andcallsupon EFRAGand the European Commission to continue cooperation with the ISSB, inorderto reach a globalconsensus and avoid divergent standards” (2022:5).

71.42% of this sector’s institutions refer to ‘standards’. Specifically, regarding GHG emissions standards, the VCMI “recommends strengthening the disclosure requirements regarding carbon credits to increase market transparency and allow users of the reported information to properly assess the nature and quality of those carbon credits, and therefore their level of credibility” (2022:6).

28.57% of the letters discuss issues related to ‘materiality’. When it comes to financial materiality, “GRI strongly recommends aligning this definition with the approach of the ISSB, which focuses on ‘enterprise value’, rather than on general ‘value creation’ and ‘capitals’. This alignment will also help drive the consistent application of financial materiality globally” (2022:2)

71.42% of the ESG Reporting sector’s letters discuss ‘disclosure requirements’. Characteristically, GRI “disagrees that all mandatory disclosure requirements established by the ESRS shall be presumed to be material and recommends reviewingthis approach”(ibid).PRIis infavourof“additional guidance and disclosure requirements on: (i) considering interlinkages between risks, opportunities and impacts arising from all sources, such as management decisions; and (ii) aggregating risks, opportunities and impacts to measure total financial consequences and impacts on people, planet and the environment (cf. Question 10). This would help to ensure that information on various sustainability issues is not reported in silos” (2022:6).

4.5 Financial institutions

The qualitative data analysis of the letters from financial institutions demonstrates that the theme of harmonisation (found in 69% of the letters) and sustainable reporting (found in 66.7% of the letters) are the main concerns of European companies. For example, financial institutions stress the importance of aligning the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) with frameworks such as the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB), the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Global Reporting Initiative, and SEC. Additionally, disclosure requirements, transition periods, and value chains are highlighted by the companies and connected to the theme of “harmonisation”.

This concern is natural as the institutions want to ensure a consistent reporting landscape for investors and stakeholders globally. Frameworks that demand different requirements create a risk of market fragmentation and additional costs for European companies that are already struggling from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing war (Garrault, 2022). Furthermore, institutions argue that a collaborative approach between regulations will create an efficient model to support current national and international policies that could help companies achieve the targets of the Paris Agreement.

Financial institutions also highlight that the current sustainable reporting requirements will create challenges for policymakers, industries, and investors as they require to disclose copious amounts of information (found in 66.7% of the letters). Consequently, this will lead to immense administrative challenges and additional costs for the companies. Additionally, several companies stress that EFRAG's disclosure requirements should not lead to the publication of information that is confidential according to national labour, business law, or other relevant national frameworks. In otherwords, they worry thatthe EFRAGis not compatible with European confidentiality laws. As a result,

some companies emphasise that the ESRS should adopt "leaner" disclosure requirements to protect sensitive information.

The broad disclosure requirements propelled some companies to advocate for extending the "phase in" period as this will give more time for institutions to provide relevant sustainability information and prevent administrative burdens (found in 64.3% of the letters). Along the same lines, some institutions questioned how they should cover value chains mentioned in the EFRAG. For example, some propose to focus on direct supplies and direct customers while others suggest adopting a phased approach to value chain reporting.

This analysis shows the interlocking nature of many concerns raised. The lack of harmonisation leads to issues of reporting which calls into question disclosure requirements, transition periods, and value chains. Therefore, holistic changes to the ESRS will be more effective at resolving the concerns of financial institutions. For example, according to many institutions, the main priority is to align the ESRS with other environmental frameworks currently implemented to ensure institutions agree on the disclosure requirements, the transition periods, and concerns regarding value chains.

4.6 Standards organisations

The main themes highlighted in the letters from standards organisations are harmonisation (80%) and sustainable reporting (50%). The main issue expressed is the various terminologies used in different frameworks that make reporting more complicated for organisations. By using agreed-upon terminology, standards organisations can avoid misunderstandings and “duplications” of information. For example, three letters mention that the conception of “materiality” displayedby the EFRAG diverges from the ones expressed by frameworks such as the IFRS, ISSB, GRI, and SEC. Additionally, the vagueness of the “reporting boundaries” in section 2.3 and its relation to the value chain is questioned and needs clarification.

28

A uniformity of language between standards will mitigate topics subject to interpretation and ensure consistent reporting requirements. Consequently, by converging towards a single set of definitions and standards, organisations can have a clear structure for sustainable reporting which would accelerate the reporting process. Furthermore, consistency between frameworks would prevent unnecessary losses of costs in the collection of data and measurement ofemissions for standards organisations. Therefore, clarifying definitions highlighted by standards organisations should be a priority for the EFRAG.

Figure 5: References to each theme in the ESG reporting institutions

Figure 6: References to themes in financial institutions

Figure 7: References to themes in National Standard Setter Organisations

4.7 Non financial institutions

Non-financial institutions “produce goods and services for the market and do not, as a primary activity, deal in financial assets and liabilities” (UK Office for National Statistics). 43 letters fit into that category. As shown in the following graph, the main areas that non-financial corporations addressed were disclosure requirements (72%), harmonisation and consistency (79%) and standards (63%).

More precisely, a recurring theme within harmonisation and consistency was the need to align with other international initiatives such as the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) to avoid the unnecessary duplication of sustainability reporting. The interoperability with other EU legislations has also been pointed out as a challenge to the ESRS applicability. Noncompliance with the requirements of the CSRD is highlighted as problematic. Specifically, within the ESRS Governance package, diversity policy raises questions as it is not covered by European Law.

As far as disclosure requirements are concerned, many corporations underline the difficulty of complying with the high level of granularity required in the ESRS. As mentioned by BMW, “ESRS contain no less than 137 disclosures requirements with many “sub disclosures''. Data may not be available or not reliable for some of the disclosure requirements. In the Scope 3 emission case (indirectemissions that occur in a company’s value chain), only approximations can be made for now, corporations call for a delay of 6-12 months in gauging Scope 3 emissions as they represent an incremental change towards more sustainability. Relying on the Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials (PCAF) Standard or the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) might be a realistic solution. The call for a broad disclosure requirement on greenhouse gas emissions should however be rejected since it would significantly reduce the ambition of disclosure on GHG which is currently one of the biggest problems linked to ESG implementation in the economy. In addition, a majority of corporations criticise the disclosure of sensitive information that might harm their competitiveness. For example, the American Chamber of Commerce deplores that “details of raw material cost, and on payment practices' could significantly harm the reporting company's ability to compete. Yet, this fear should be nuanced as the EFRAG ‘s DraftESRSis supported by substantive research on the impact companies might suffer from after the introduction of the ESRS. It is however true that medium-sized companies will be particularly affected by these disclosures due to their limited resources.

Standards are often criticised as being too complex and making the exercise of sustainability reporting arduous. Suggestions of a “core and comprehensive approach” to streamline the reporting exercise and make ESRS enforceable have been made. Concerns about the ability to report on Resource use and circular economy due to the current lack of data are understandable. However, this should serve as an excuse to downplay the ESRS ambitious standard. Instead, progressive implementation on E5 should be considered More specifically, “biodiversity” (19%), “climate standards” (22,5%) and “own workforce” (19%) are the most addressed standards in the letters.

More generally, non-financial corporations have asked for an extended and gradual phase-in approach (56%) as well as increased specificity of definitions since some terms could lead to different interpretations (42%) (e.g. own workforce, value chain, fair remunerations, double materiality, financial impact).

Ultimately, the debate around rebuttable presumption and double materiality is divisive since non-financial corporations in majority agree with the relevance of introducing double materiality in their reporting while the rebuttable presumption has been discarded due to its impracticability.

4.8 Non governmental organisations

The qualitative data analysis of letters from NGOs reveals that the key issues of this sector are connected to Standards, Harmonisation and Consistency. Most of the NGO’s advocate for environmental concerns, vulnerable populations (such as indigenous and people with disabilities), as well as pro-bono consulting organisations on environmental finance. The major source of worry in standards was the sub-code 'affected communities,' specifically its disclosure requirements. Individuals' effect inside the value chain and understanding of diversity across sectors and geo-locations appeared to be lacking for this industry. These issues seeped into harmonisation recommendations, notably on comparability and convergence. In their comments on EFRAG, European NGOs frequently recommend that affected communities be represented in cross-cutting standards to increase clarity and convergence. As a result,many companies emphasise the need of aligning the EFRAG framework with the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB).

NGOs commend EFRAG for adding concerns about affected communities, notably the consequences on indigenous people. The three most vocal companies were Climate Company, Club EMAS, and DIHR. DIHR was the biggest advocate specifically for improving standards related to affected communities. Notable as well is Shift 22 who was in the top three of NGOs’ coding about standards. Standards

are addressed 92.6% in the letters submitted by NGOs, with 72% referring explicitly to affected communities (Graph1). Thisemphasisisunderstandablegiven thatthese organisations frequently represent the interests of minority communities (Schnellbach, 2012). However, the methodology was said to lack due diligence on an individual's influence on the value chain. For example, in ESRS S3-affected communities, cultural rights are stated alongside economic and social rights but do not include cultural diversity. This is emphasised since local concerns and culture will have varying effects inside each community. Capitals Corporate states: “A wider set of stakeholders are identified by businesses when conducting sustainability assessments beyond contractual groups. These should include, but are not limited to, local and affected communities, workers in the value chain and citizens.” As a result, several companies have pushed EFRAG to focus on sector-specific criteria that include performance-related disclosures about value chain employees and affected communities.

This industry critiqued the ambiguous definitions and methods that make comparison and convergence difficult. Particularly when it comes to the Standards and the lack of a unified data approach. For example, 63% mentioned ‘Harmonisation and Consistency’ and ‘Lack of Definitions and Methodology’ in 59% of letters. Including precise definitions in the ESRS standards will assist uniform data creation, allowing firms' achievements and development to be compared:“We recommend that the ESRS clarify how information should be gathered and when these approximation processes should be used ensuring thatadequate incentivesare given to collect data'' (DIHR). Improving definitions and methodology will in turn improve comparison and convergence. This is especially true for the impacted community standards, since many elements overlap with all three E, S, and G standards. As a result, many businesses advocate aligning the framework with the four-part International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) framework. The purpose of ISSB and ESRS is the same: to assist organisations in communicating their sustainability performance to stakeholders. Although their methodologies and degrees of governance differ, their aims and structure are similar enough to match frameworks.

Furthermore, according to our second hypothesis, "we should discover that double materiality and rebuttable presumption are two of the most addressed concerns and are controversial depending on the industry." In accordance with this view, the concepts, particularly rebuttable presumption, were not widely used inside the NGO sector. Double materiality was referenced in 48% of letters, whereas rebuttable presumption was cited 14.8%. (Figure 10). The overall response to double materiality was encouraging, with

46% of corporations in favour and 15% opposed. Companies, on the other hand, suggested a better definition of double materialityand aframework forhow itshould beincorporated. CDP Europe states, “a double-materiality approach in sustainability reporting is the right way to go,” yet suggests, “with reference to the impact on people and planet, the definitions should be fully aligned with the GRI Standards.’ Similarly comments for clearer definitions and structure to improve harmonisation were made concerning rebuttable presumptions.

Thus, the NGO sector is preoccupied with standards, harmonisation, and consistency, which are largelythe resultof a lack ofdefinition and defined frameworks. As a result,many letters advocate for harmonising the ESRS framework with the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB).

4.9 Public authority

Qualitative analysis of the public associations (PA) sector indicates thatPAs are primarily concernedaboutthe following three key aspects of the ESRS, as reflected by the high density of their corresponding coding references in Figure 11: (1) Harmonization both externally with other disclosure frameworks and internally with other EU laws, mentioned in 94% of letters with 79 total references, (2) a lack of clarity with definitions, methodologies and language used, mentioned in 78% of letters with 32 total references and (3) Scope 3 emissions standards, which overlap with concerns regarding transition periods of small-medium enterprises (SME), mentioned in 78% and 67% of letters respectively, with 27 references for climate standards and 21 references for a transition period and phase-in approach. In addition, (4) the PA sector broadly supports double materiality with 67% of public associations adopting a for/nuanced stance, but broadly rejects the inclusion of rebuttable presumption with 56% of public associations adopting an against/nuanced stance.

It is no surprise that PAs would see the harmonisation of ESRS with other disclosure frameworks, with the IFRS being the most mentioned, as a top priority. A lack of harmonisation between ESRS and other frameworks would essentially constitute “non-tariff trade barriers” between the EU and the rest of the world. The relatively stricter and more prescriptive regulatory environment that would be created by the ESRS in EU might also lead to the rise of regulatory arbitrage by firms with less ofan exposure tothe EU marketand a corresponding decrease in the competitiveness of firms that are fully reliant on the EU market (Alamillos & de Mariz, 2022). Moreover, some PAs, like the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group of ESMA, have called for EFRAG to improve its interoperability with the already crowded and complex arena of regulation in the EU, suggesting that the current version of

Figure 8: References to the most important themes in the non financial institutions (%)

Figure 9: References to themes in the non financial institutions (%)

Figure 10: References to themes in non-governmental organisations (%)

the ESRS will lead to an overload of unnecessary reporting information from companies when coupled with additional regulatory requirements from the CSRD, taxonomy and SFRD.

Next, PAs were also concerned with the lack of clarity observed in the ESRS. Common points for clarification included the relationship between cross-cutting standards and sector-specific standards, and definitions of key terminologies such as “value creation” and “time horizon”. Additionally, many PAs also commented on the heavy usage of terminologies and abbreviations that would unnecessarily obfuscate the process of disclosure for many companies.

Third, PAs also showed a much more pronounced concern forreporting standards relating toscope3 emissionscompared to any other standard within the ESRS. On one hand, PAs generally commend EFRAG for the ambitiousness of their climate standards in trying to lower scope 3 emissions, which represent a staggering 75% of all greenhouse gas emissions fromcompanies on average (Lloyd, et al., 2022). On the other, PAs are extremelyconcerned with the lack of guidance shown by EFRAG towards helping SMEs in the value chain to conduct credible reporting. In fact, SMEs are often disproportionately burdened by the costs of ESG reporting as compared to larger firms (Gjergji, et al., 2021), so PAs would naturally be invested in balancing the extensiveness of scope 3 emissions reporting against costs incurred for SMEs in the EU.

Lastly, there is the overall stance of PAs on the contentious decision of the EFRAG to structure the ESRS around the concepts of double materiality and rebuttable presumption.

PAs are generallyinfavourofthe ESRS’double materiality principle, as PAs are not fundamentally motivated by profits but rather, have vested interests in the environmental impact of the entities it represents and in the environmental risks that might affect the entities it represents. Hence, the combination of both financial and impact materiality represents a step in the right direction from their perspective. Reservations on whether EFRAG can provide adequate guidance toentities for determining what issues are covered under double materiality are the main reasons for the 6 recorded “nuanced” opinions.

Contrarily, the PA sector is generally against the inclusion ofrebuttable presumption intothe ESRS. This is primarily due to concerns that rebuttable presumption acts counterproductively to the overall goal of double materiality. ESMA, for example, suggests that the burden of providing adhoc justifications for all rebuttals to presumed materiality will only exacerbate the problem of excessive information overload.

4.10 Rating agencies

Four letters fit into the category of rating agencies: companies that provide analyses and assessments to assist investor communities regarding corporations’ financial, as well as, environmental, social, and governance standing. The four rating agencies that submitted letters of response to the exposure draftare Impak,Moody’s Corporation, Morningstar, and MSCI. The main areas addressed through the letters are reactions and recommendations towards sustainability reporting (75%), standards (75%), harmonisation and consistency (75%), materiality (75%), and double materiality (100%).

Among the four letters, three directly welcome the sustainability reporting of ESRS, with Impak’s letter going as far as agreeing with full consensus on ESRS and welcoming the standards EFRAG set regarding disclosure and double materiality. Most rating agencies obtain information on corporations’ financial and ESG standings through very laborious processes, often through questionnaires or analysis of public information such as the news or public reports (Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2019). ESRS’ mandatory disclosure would ease up the labour-intensive process for rating agencies as financial and ESG information becomes more easily available, which could indicate openness towards the reporting directive.

With regard to materiality and double materiality, there is an overallpositive consensus. Three outofthe fourcompanies fully welcome the idea of double materiality, but also give recommendations for the standard such as reducing the scope of subjectivity through clear instructions on what should be included or excluded. Morningstar has a more nuanced perspective on double materiality, and believes that companies should focus more on financial materiality, but acknowledges how double materiality responds to the needs of some investors. With regards to impact materiality, two out of the four rating agencies recommend not only the recognition of negative risks but also of positive impact materiality.

While materiality is a topic referenced in all of the letters, standards are the most referenced topics overall among the letters. Recommendations towards specific standards are most discussed in the letters. Recommendations to environmental standards, including climatestandards, biodiversity, andwater and marine resources, are most discussed, followed by governance standards, specifically a company’s own workforce, and then social standards, specifically affected communities.

Table 2: Table of overall opinions of public associations on double materiality and rebuttable presumption

Figure 12: References to the most important themes in rating agencies (%)

Harmonisation with other disclosure agreements is also focal in the letters. The letters discuss comparability with various other disclosure agreements such as ISSB, TCFD, GRI, and SASB, and most recommendations regarding harmonisation relate to how specific standards should adhere to the “better standards” of another disclosure agreement or other EU laws.

Recommendations towards disclosure requirements, value chain, rebuttable presumption and a lack of definition and methodology are also discussed through the letters but are not as extensively discussed as the topics aforementioned in this section. Topics relating to disproportionate granularity, feedback from shareholders, and transition period and phase are not discussed at all in the letters.

4.11 Unlisted non-financial

Unlisted non-financial corporations are non-financial corporations of which shares are not listed on a stock exchange. Thirteen letters from unlisted non-financial corporations were analysed and the main areas addressed through the letters are harmonisation and consistency discussed in 92.3% of the analysed letters, lack of definition and methodology (76.9%), sustainability reporting (69.2%), disproportionate granularity (61.5%), materiality(61.5%), and standards (61.5%)

Harmonisation and consistency is the topic referenced in most letters. The letters mostly discuss comparability with other international principles and sustainable disclosure agreements such as the ones set by the US SEC, ISSB, GRI, TFCD, and SASB, and also make recommendations on specific standards of ESRS to converge with standards of other disclosure agreements. Many letters also discuss and recommend EFRAG to directly cooperate with other regulatory bodies for analogous standards. Interoperability with EU Regulations is also a topic discussed, and letters recommend interoperability with especially EU Taxonomy regulation, and SFDR. Relating to interoperability, the letters also discuss variance among definitions between different regulations set by the EU, as well as a lack of definitions and methodologies for certain standards. The letters recommend EFRAGtoimprove the clarity ofmethodologies and standards and the overall consistency of definitions among different regulations.

While harmonisation and consistency is the topic discussed in most of the letters, standards are the most referenced topics overall among the letters. References for the topic are mainly recommendations made towards specific standards. The standards most discussed are climate and environmental standards, affected communities, governance standards, and standards regarding own workforce.

Almost all of the corporations that discussed disproportionate granularity believe that the level of granularity is very extensive and that it is not useful for the users of the data. Most recommendations include the call for prioritisation of granular data. Regarding materiality and double materiality, only two corporations accept with full consensus the idea of double materiality. The majority of corporations hold a nuanced view regarding materiality and double materiality and make recommendations for altering materiality and double materiality. Most comments regarding the topic of sustainability reporting present a positive view towards ESRS and show support for the initiative. Regarding rebuttable presumption, all of the corporations that talked about it are against it.

References to most important themes in the unlisted non-financial institutions (%)

Figure 13: References to

Figure 14:

Figure 15: References to themes in the unlisted non-financial institutions (%)

5. Cross-sector analysis

This section compares and contrasts the sectors. To summarise our hypothesis, we assumed that stakeholders would most likely agree with EFRAG’s purpose, which has been the overall consensus. Furthermore, there is support for Hypothesis 1 that stakeholders propose aligning ESRS with ISSB. We predicted double maternity, rebuttablepresumption, and Scope 3 emission disclosures to be contested themes in the second and third hypotheses, but they were less salient across all sectors than expected. Fourth, because of SMEs, we anticipated value chains to be important as well, but they were less so than projected. Finally, we hypothesised that the transition and phase in approaches would converge across industries. Although there is some support for hypothesis 5, the convergent code between sectors was harmonisation and consistency.

This section focuses on audit, non-financial institutions, financial institutions, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These have the most letters, making them the most conclusive. Finally, the section concludes with a general comparison.

5.1 Code analysis

Overall, the most prominent subject across all sectors was harmonisation and consistency, which was coded in 67.9% of letters (Appendix 1: Table C). However, we anticipated others, such as double materiality, transition and phase-in approach, and rebuttable presumption to be more prominent. The second most important factor (53.7%) was standards, followed by disclosure requirements (52.7%). (Appendix 1: Table C). When we consider the next two most stated codes, we observe that harmonisation plays a significant part in comprehending and organising ESRS. Inconsistency within EFRAG inevitably flows into other sections of the framework in terms of how standards and their requirements are conducted and understood.

Despite the fact that the top three codes contradict our premise, severalpredicted codes were nonetheless noteworthy when placed in the 'next top three' (Figure 16). Materiality is referenced in 43.1% of the letters and double materiality in 42.6%. (Appendix 1: Table C). To some extent, it confirms that double materiality is widely supported.

However, the prominenceofrebuttable presumption, which is in the "pre-bottom three," deviates from hypothesis 2. (Appendix 2). It appeared in 27.3% of the letters. When double materiality and rebuttable presumption are combined, the distinct difference in salience is intriguing. To evaluate whether something is important enough to be included in financial statements, the rebuttable presumption requires double materiality. As a result, double materiality must be

clarified in order to successfully conduct rebuttable presumptions, which may explain the fixation on double

5.2 Audit and non-financial corporations

The audit and non-financial sectors are concerned with similar issues. First, focusing on audits, their most salient codes were the highlighted: harmonisation and consistency, double materiality, transition period and phase-in approach, and disproportionate granularity (Appendix 1: Table C). With a +35.2% positive deviation from the mean, the most prominent issue was harmonisation and consistency (Appendix 1: Table D). It is worth mentioning that the majority of industries have a positive deviation for this code, and audits do not have the largest proportion. The least coded issue was balancing prescriptiveness with usability, which had a negative divergence from the mean of -36.2%. (Appendix 1: Table D). This also appears to be the case for most industries, with audits having the third biggest negative deviation. Disclosure requirements (-38.4%) are also not important concerns for audits. It is the only industry for which the code (which is very visible generally) has a negative divergence.

Summarising non-financial institutions, they concentrated on harmonisation and consistency, disclosure requirements, and standards. The most notable was harmonisation, which

Figure 16: Most to least salient codes in letters across all sectors (according to Table C: Appendix 1)

had a positive deviation of 33.2%, which is comparable to the audit deviation (+35.2%). (Appendix 1: Table D). The least salient subject, similar to the audit, was balancing prescriptiveness and usability, with the biggest negative divergence across all sectors of -41.2%. Finally, with a positive deviation of 33.4%, input from stakeholders is a prominent subject exclusively for non-financial entities (Appendix 1: Table D Given thatthese organisations dealwith stakeholders more directly and regularly to develop long-term trust and credibility, the focus on this code is understandable.

Similar percentages in codes (a 10% difference) for audit and non-financial organisations include materiality (46.4% vs 44.2%), rebuttable presumption (46.4% vs 37.2%), and transparency (10.7% vs 16.3%). (Appendix 1: Table C). For balancing prescriptiveness and usability, both sectors have a negative deviation of -36.2% (audit) and -41.2% (nonfinancial) (Appendix 1: Table D). The relatively comparable positive deviations of35.2%and 33.2%forharmonisation and consistency are not significant (Appendix 1: Table D). Because the commonalities are shared by all industries, the agreement is less relevant.

Both specified Scope 3 measures, which are unique to their industries. In Scope 3, the audit emphasises the necessity for particular and verifiable data, and non-financial institutions are critical of the time allotted to assess emissions. Both consider Scope 3 measurements to be untrustworthy. Granularity is likewise given increased attention in both areas, but under distinct codes standards (audit) and transparency (non-financial). Both sectors desire more clarity and consistency within double materiality, which is why they both advocate for aligning ESRS with ISSB.

The percentage of salience inside the letters varies significantly. The greatest variation is in disclosure requirements, which differ by 57.8 percent. Audits cited the code 14.3% of the time, whereas non-financial 72.1% (Appendix 1: Table C). Sustainability reporting and criteria differ by 37.9% and 27.1%, respectively (Appendix 1: Table C). Furthermore, in relation to hypothesis 4, value chains are explicitly targeted by auditors, most likely as a result of their assessments of the accuracy and reliability of financial statements for a range of enterprises, including SMEs.

5.3 Audit and financial institutions

Audit and financial institutions have less in common than audit and non-financial institutions. Their similarities are mostly focused on the parallels that exist across all industries. Outlining financialinstitutions first,they were concerned with harmonisation and consistency, as well as sustainable reporting. Both codes exhibited a 23% positive deviation (Appendix 1: Table D). The need of sustainability reporting is

heightened since financial institutions are the only industry with a positive variance for this code. The leastfrequent topic, with a negative deviation of -38.9% (Appendix 1: Table C), is balancing prescriptiveness and usability; yet, this is visible across several industries. Financial institutions, on the other hand, have the second-lowest deviation score. With a positive deviation of 33.2%, value chains are the most prominent among financial institutions. This is understandable given that their institutional structure is directly related to valuer chains.

The following principles are shared by audit and financial institutions: balance and prescriptiveness (0% vs 4.7%), materiality (46.4% 44.2%), and harmonisation and consistency (71.4% vs 79.1%). (Appendix 1: Table C). Both institutions showed a negative deviation for balancing prescriptiveness and usability (-36.2% vs -38.9%), with financial institutions slightly more (Appendix 1: Table D). Audit and financial organisations both have a positive deviation for harmonisation and consistency (35.2% vs 23%), with audit somewhat more favourable. As a result,similarities are unimportant because they are shared by all industries.

Surprisingly, the audit and financial industries disagree on several critical areas, including standards (27.1% difference), sustainability reporting (37.9% difference), and the most significant disclosure requirements (57.8% difference). The wide disparity in disclosure requirements is attributable to financial institutions placing a high priority on requirements that may result in the publication of confidential information. Confidentiality also plays a role in sustainability reporting, explaining a positive departure of 23% for financial institutions whereas audit showed no significant deviation for this code.

Overall, the most important difference between the two sectors is their explicit proposal for a longer phase-in period, which supports H5. Furthermore, the value chainreceived less attention than predicted on average; however, this is not the case for audit and financial institutions. Both urge that the value chain disclosure standards be harmonised.

5.4 Audit and NGOs

While the audit and NGOs sectors share many similarities, they also have numerous distinctions. To begin, NGOs are most concerned with standards (92.6% of letters), disclosure requirements (81.5%), sustainability reporting (70.4%), and harmonisation and consistency (63%). (Appendix 1:Table C). The most noticeable code is standards, which has a positive divergence of44.4%. (Appendix 1: Table D). The institutional objective of fighting for specific individuals and communities explains the NGO's focus on standards. As a result, its goal inside ESRS is to focus on "affecting communities.” Moreover, distinct to NGOs, its least salient codes have a

negative deviation of -33.3%: rebuttable presumption and disproportionate granularity (Appendix 1: Table D). This contradicts H2, which predicts that rebuttable presumption will be divisive. Notably, the NGO sector is the only one that does not have a positive divergence for harmonisation and consistency.

Audits and NGOs share a concern for harmonisation and consistency (71.4% vs 63%, respectively), lack of definition (51.7% vs 59.3), and materiality (46.4% vs 40.7%). (Appendix 1:Table C).They do not, however, have acommon major deviation, even within the salient codes where most sectors appear to concur (Appendix 1: Table D). The two sectors have a substantial and distinct focus on materiality, which may be related to their mutual commitment to serving the public interestand engaging with stakeholders. As a result, materiality would be a commonality since it is a fundamental part of ESRS that assists organisations in ensuring that their risk management and reporting activities are focused on the issues that are most important.

Audits, on the other hand, contradict with NGOs in the percentage of codes referenced. Rebuttable assumption (31.6% difference), disproportionate granularity (35.2%), balanced prescriptiveness (40.7%), sustainability reporting (52.5%), disclosure requirements (56.9%), and standards (56.9%) are among these. These disparities may be attributed to their divergent core aims, roles, and problem-solving approaches. As a result, NGOs, particularly as compared to audits, place minimal emphasis on transition periods and phase-in approaches because their major focus is on representation. As a result, audits and non-governmental organisations have different missions.

5.5 Financial and non-financial corporations

Overall, financial and non-financial corporations focus and disregard themes thatotherindustries do as well. Forexample, both sectors have lowsalience incoding balance and usability, with financial institutions having a negative deviation of38.9% and non-financial entities of -41.2%. (Appendix 1: Table D). A positive variance was also seen for harmonisation and consistency, with 23.0% for financial institutions and 33.2%for non-financialinstitutions (Appendix 1: Table D). In terms of percentage salience inside a letter, these industries also agree on disproportionate granularity (26.2% vs 32.6%), disclosure requirements (64.3% vs 72.1%), and materiality (38.1% vs 44.2%). These are concepts that are easily relevant to every industry, and the effectiveness of one influences the efficacy of the other. This might explain the unique congruence between the three codes.

The largest differences within the codes are not particularly illuminating when compared to previous comparisons, with

the largest differences being approximately 30%. Table C in Appendix 1 reveals that 21.4% of financial institutions mention feedback from stakeholders in their letters, compared to 46.5% of non-financial institutions. Transparency (a 25.1% change) and standards (a 31.8% change) are two more topics where the two sectors contradict (Appendix 1:Table C). With a positive deviation of 23%, sustainability reporting is also a prominent term for financial companies; nevertheless, this code is insignificant for non-financial institutions (Appendix 1: Table D). While the finance industry emphasises sustainable reporting the most, the non-financial sector concentrates on standards. The financial sector's criticism of standards, on the other hand, leaks into sustainability reporting, making it more challenging. These two sectors focus on different themes, but highlight the general consensus of which codes are most important.

5.7 Non-financial institutions and NGOs

The parallels and distinctions between non-financial entities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are noteworthy. First,there aretwo prominentthemes:value chain (46.5% vs 48.1%), double materiality (46.5% vs 44.4%), and materiality (44.2% vs 40.7%). (Appendix 1: Table C). While these themes are consistent for non-financial and nongovernmental organisations, they are low in percentage mentions of letters as compared to other sectors. The shared lower significance of these issues might be related to nonfinancial and non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) indirect participation inside finance. Both are notable for their emphasis on disclosure obligations within standards. NGOs, on the other hand, concentrated on non-financial representation among "affected communities" and the complexities of "biodiversity," "climate standards," and "own workforce."

NGO and non-financial entities differ in various ways, which is unexpected. The percentage variances in the following codes are the greatest: balance and usability (36% difference), transition and phase-in approach (29.9%), standards (29.8%), and sustainability reporting (36.8%). (Appendix 1: Table C). Furthermore, non-financial entities have a -41.2% negative deviation for balancing prescriptiveness and usability and a 33.2% positive deviation for harmonisation and consistency, but NGOs do not. NGOs, on the other hand, have a negative deviation of -33.3% for excessive granularity and rebuttable assumption, but nonfinancial entities really don't.

5.7 Financial and NGOs

Despite their extremely diverse concerns, financial institutions and non-governmentalorganisations share notable commonalities. Lack of definition (52.4% for financial vs 59.3% for NGOs), materiality (38.1% vs 40.7%),

sustainability reporting (66.7% vs 70.4%), and harmonisation and consistency (66.7% vs 63.0%) are among the codes with equal importance. Lack of definition has been an unusual convergence feature across previously examined industries. The absence of definitions and methods, according to both NGOs and financial institutions, limits the efficacy of harmonisation and uniformity. They also believethatharmony is an underlying topic that pervades all others.

The differences are unsurprising after conducting a comparative analysis of the sectors above. NGOs seems to be unique in its salience towards balance and usability and standards, as well as the unimportance placed on rebuttable presumption. Thus, understandable, these are the codes with the largest differences between the sectors. Financial institutions have a negative deviation for balance and usage and a positive deviation in sustainability reporting while NGOs do not. Furthermore, NGOs have a negative deviation for disproportionate granularity and rebuttable presumption which financially does not. The sector's largest difference is likely financial institutions' large emphasis on phase-in approach which would be expected in H5, yet NGO’s specific focus on standards concerning affected communities.

5.8 Overall Comparison

Taking a broader look at the codes, each sector focuses on different themes that match their interests. Balancing prescriptiveness and usability is only a salient term for public authority (63.1%) and has the most negative deviations compared to other codes. Thus one could conclude it was either not a significant problem or the other focuses needed more attention and improvements. Feedback from stakeholders and disproportionate granularity was also an uncommon theme and only salient for non-financial corporations (33.4%) and unlisted non-financial, respectively (Table E). Standards were only salientforNGOs with a 38.8% positive deviation (Table E). Across the comparative section, this has been a key difference that separated NGOs from other sectors. NGOs specifically focused on the integration and recognition of affected communities, a category within standards. Principally, harmonisation and consistency are crucial themes that all sectors agree upon. This proves abundant evidence to approve H1 particularly as each sector recommends aligning ESRS with ISSB.

Hypothesis 2 focused on the divisiveness of double materiality and rebuttable presumption. Double materiality is only a salient term for rating agencies which is surprising considering ourhypothesis andweightofcodes places a heavy emphasis on this theme, thus we expected ittobe more salient, particularly in significant sectors. There is a consensus that sectors agree with double materiality but due to the issue of harmonisation, it lacks clear direction and thus employability.

As a result, a rebuttable presumption is one of the least mentioned codes and only salient for public authorities (Table E). Itwas more divisive acrosssectors than double materiality.

Furthermore, disclosure requirements were only salient for citizens (Table E). For H3, we analysed some sectors that do focus on disclosures of Scope 3 and mention its ineffectiveness. However, it was mostly a concern for nonfinancial institutions, the sector that mentioned disclosure requirements the third most after citizens and NGOs. In terms of H4 the focus on SMEs and their disclosure requirements affecting competitive disadvantageare salientina few sectors, not across the board. Disclosure requirements were also not concentrated directly towards SMEs but many about requirements within standards. Additionally, the value chain is only salient for financial institutions, yet within the value chain, there is little mention of SMEs. SMEs are mostly discussed in the audit sector.

Numerous components mentioned this subject, there was not a consistent pattern. As a result, Hypothesis 5 is disproven in the sense that this theme would converge sectors. Instead, the role was given to harmonisation and consistency, which was only a significant phrase for ESG reporting (Table E), but was coded with a positive divergence from the mean in most sectors in Table C in Appendix 1.

Financial institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are the sectors that stand out from the others, with three themes coded with a considerable divergence (Appendix 1:Table D). NGOsstand outeven more since theirhigh salient codes, such as disproportionate granularity and rebuttable presumption, are stated less frequently in other industries (Appendix 1: Table C). Interestingly, despite the fact that these two sectors have the largest discrepancies owing to their diverse aims and techniques, they both agree that the overall issue is harmonisation and consistency. Financial and nonfinancialorganisations thathave coding thematic similarlybut focus on various parts inside are the most comparable.

In sum, the cross-sector analysis has revealed the diversity of stakeholders’ answers to the ESRS. Themes are prioritised depending on individual interests. Yet, ifstakeholders reassert theirsupportforthe ESRSregulation and unanimouslycallfor the harmonisation of standards at the global level, disagreement on the importance of themes such as doublemateriality or rebuttable presumption demonstrates stakeholders’ divergent positions when it comes to concrete regulatory measures.

6. Policy Recommendations

Our review of the consultative process on the elaboration ofnon-financial reporting standards inthe EU offers a number of significant insights. Overall, the detailed feedback from the stakeholders’ letters reflects a large consensus. Stakeholders are predominantly concerned about the necessary harmonisation and consistency, the scope of disclosure requirements and the quality of standards. As predicted in our hypotheses, stakeholders also pushed for watered-down constraints on SMEs and advocated for a phase-in approach to smoothen the implementation.

However, ouranalysisshowsthere is less concord on topics where groups focus more narrowly on their self-interest. Particularly, financial and non-financial actors focused on the organisation and financialburden the project would imply and underlined the perceived excess ingranularity while NGOsare most concerned with standards, disclosure requirements and sustainability reporting.

It is important to recall that the EU-stated policy goal is to implement a regulation (the ESRS) that will channel companies to adopt processes of activity compatible with a sustainable perspective. As self-regulation has failed and greenwashing is rife that would undercut the EFRAG’s work, suggestions made bydifferentstakeholders should notbe used to push back on the ESRS. In noway policy recommendations should scale down the stringent regulatory framework proposed by the EFRAG as it would conflict with the EU’s. That is why some comments made by different actors should not be upheld. In particular, recommendations asking to significantly reduce the disclosure requirements and their granularity, to remove scope 3 emissions or to downplay or even discard the concept of double materiality should not follow suit.

Policy-makers should particularly take heed of harmonisationdemands thatare recurringacross stakeholders’ remarks. Harmonisation should be divided into two phases. First, ensuring the interoperability with other European regulations such as the 2014 directive is central. This would require enhanced coordination with previous legislation to corroborate the compatibility of the ESRS. More specifically, further details on disclosure requirements should be made available to ensure that there is no breach of previous legislations, especially with respect to employees' diversity disclosure. Second, seeking to synchronise the ESRS with other frameworks such as the ISSB or the GRI is a desired outcome. Yet, coordination should not entail retro pedalling measures concerning double materiality. As the ISSB and the EFRAG have differing visions on sustainable standards, harmonisation seems to be limited by technical diverging approaches. Hence, we recommend thatthe EFRAG and ISSB

work hand in hand on sustainable standards to the extent possible.

EFRAG’s conceptualisation of materiality as twodimensional received a lot of attention in the stakeholders’ comment letters, especially those received from the rating agency, public authority, audit and consumer sectors. The overallresponse is encouraging, yetnumerouscomments have beenclassifiedas “nuanced” because oftheircallforguidance and clarity. A second issue thatwas highly controversial is the reputable presumption. This mostly concerned stakeholders from the public authority, audit and financial institutions sectors, and only 5 letters in total adopted an “in favour” stance.

Evidently, our second hypothesis is not fulfilled. On average across sectors, stakeholders are supportive of introducing double materiality in their reporting provided that they are given the necessary guidance, clarity and consistency in terms of metrics. Contrariwise, the concept of rebuttable presumption has been found almost unanimously unworkable. Therefore, we recommend that EFRAG retains its double materiality approach as the basis for sustainability disclosures but further elaborates on the terminology, provides substantial application guidance as well as illustrative examples to support practical implementation. We also recommend that the rebuttable presumption is abandoned, and EFRAG rather adopts a simpler method for materiality assessment, encompassing both impact materiality and financial materiality, with due consideration to their intersection.

Another contentious issue is the disclosure of scope 3 emissions (indirect emissions that are not produced by a company but are part of its value chain emissions). As a central disclosure requirement due to its direct impact on carbon footprint, calls to remove scope 3 emissions should be discarded as they would downplay the regulation’s goal. However, the current difficulty to measure scope 3 emissions due to a lack of accessible data should be taken into account by the European Union. Accordingly, a phase-in approach of disclosure requirements for scope 3 emissions should reduce stakeholders’ difficulties in complying with the requirements. Additionally, relying on existent tools such as the Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials or the Greenhouse Gas Protocolinthe meantimetomeasurecarbon emissionsappears to be a realistic solution. In order to improve clarity, the European Union should develop an additional guidance tool that would help companies better frame scope 3 emissions.

In line with our fourth hypothesis, the stakeholders’ commentletters highlightthat,due tolimited resources, SMEs are expected to struggle to comply with the disclosure requirements on the value chain, facing a disproportionate

burden. The letters voicing this concern are mostly from the financial institutions, public authorities and rating agencies. Indeed, the public authority was highly concerned about EFRAG’s lack of sufficient guidance and support for SMEs when requesting them to conduct credible reporting across the value chain.

We acknowledge the importance of a stringent regulatory framework that promotes ambitious sustainability reporting standards in order to truly achieve a green transition. Therefore, we hold that SMEs sustainability reporting at the value chain level is not a question of if, but a question of when and how. We encourage SMEs to embrace sustainable reporting and recognising that transition into a green business model is no easy task, we recommend that EFRAG takes further and meaningful action to protect SMEs from the trickle-down effect. We suggest that the EU organises webinars and other informative sessions whereby SME business leaders are brought together to share insights on impact and non-financial reporting; exchange technical advice, develop their understanding of the reporting requirements, receive guidance from EFRAG experts while also building a network for sustainably-minded SMEs. Given that SME will require time before adapting into the necessary green practices, we suggest thatthe information required from SMEs to be limited and gradually increasing; for the first year it could initially encompass in-house information and the inclusion of value chain information is postponed until the second or third year.

The transition period and phase-in approach are a point of convergence amongst the different stakeholders, not in terms of reference frequency, but substance of those references. The letters addressing this issue are mostly from the audit, financial and public authority institutions. Their comments unanimously highlight the need for an extended and gradual phase-in approach that will enable institutions to provide the necessary sustainability information; to overcome immaturity of reporting and address methodological challenges. This aligns with our fifth hypothesis.

Therefore, we urge EFRAG to include a much-needed three-year phase in provision. EFRAG could develop a list of disclosure requirements that will be prioritised and others that will be phased-in to subsequent years. We recommend initially focusing on the key corporate sustainability disclosure requirements,and requiring furthergranularity over time. This will prevent time constraints to take precedence over substance and quality of standards. EFRAG was criticised for trying to do ‘too much too soon’, and this would be an opportunity to demonstrate its responsiveness to the needs of the stakeholders and its commitment to quality reporting.

Acknowledgements

The Green Growth and Sustainability Team would like to thank Dr. Jared Finnegan (UCL) Dr. Peter Warren (UCL) and Dr. Agnieszka Smolenska (European Banking Institute) for their guidance and support in the research methodology, the concretisation of hypotheses and discussions about the EFRAG and sustainable regulation frameworks.

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[27] Principles of Responsible Investing (n.d.). “What is responsible investment?” [online] PRI. Available at: https://www.unpri.org/introductory-guides-to-responsibleinvestment/what-is-responsible-investment/4780.article

[28] Saldaña, J.M. (2013) The coding manual for qualitative researchers. Sage.

[29] Sandberg, J., Juravle, C., Hedesström, T.M. and Hamilton, I. (2008). The Heterogeneity of Socially Responsible Investment. Journal of Business Ethics, 87(4), pp.519–533.

doi:10.1007/s10551-008-9956-0.

[30] Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2019) Research methods for business students. Harlow: Pearson.

[31] Schnellbach, C. (2012). The Role of NGOs in Promoting Minority Rights in the Enlarged European Union. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 13(4), pp.497–512. doi:10.1080/15705854.2012.731937.

[32] Securities and Exchange Commission, (2022). Enhancement and Standardization Of Climate-Related Disclosures, s.l.: Securities and Exchange Commission.

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[34] Townsend, B. (2020). From SRI to ESG: The Origins of Socially Responsible and Sustainable Investing. The Journal of Impact & ESG Investing, 1(1), pp.1–16.

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Appendix 1: Code tables

Table A: Number of references on main codes per sector

E.g.: 14 letters out of 28 in the audit category mentioned disproportionate levels of granularity

Table B: Number of references on main codes per sector

Table C: References on main codes per sector as percentages

Table D: Deviation from the mean per sector

Appendix 2: List of letters analysed for the paper

Appendix 3: NVivo research protocol

1/ Research Approach

The approach we will opt for the data analysis is an abductive approach as defined in the Handbook for Research Methods for Business Students (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2019, p. 796): “ An approach to theory development involving the collection of data to explore a phenomenon, identify themes and explain patterns, to generate a new- or modify an existingtheory which is subsequently tested”.

2/ Creating our Team codebook and code hierarchy:

Aim for a clear code structure and use descriptions to make the purpose of a code clear for all team members. The CodeBook will comprise the themes that we deemed important before starting our content analysis based on the literature review and the sample of letters that we have already read. These themes are ordered according to a “weight” (their importance in the study).

3/ Adding new Codes while reading

It is possible to add new codes while you are reading the letters. However, you will need to follow this three steps process if you wish to do so:

a) What is the new code adding to our analysis?

b) Is the new code recurrent in many letters? Or, is it present in a restricted number of letters, revealing a new perspective?

c) Why do I think it is necessary to add the new code?

4/ What are we exactly looking for in the letters:

• Pre-defined research axes (i.e. double-materiality, rebuttable presumption, disclosure requirements, harmonisation, consistency, carbon emissions, greenwashing, lobbying…)

• Some themes might appear in a selection of letters (i.e. human rights in AmazonWatch Letter and Danish HR Institute)

With these new themes that appear while we read, two options are possible:

• Include them

• Rule them out

If we include them, it might be only briefly to illustrate differences between stakeholders. If we rule them out, it’s because they are not relevant or not developed enough to add something to the study.

One very important thread in our analysis is: what is the goal of the EFRAG draft on ESRS? Is it Climate oriented? Is it ESG oriented? Everyone speaks of harmonisation but the goal of the EFRAG and the goal of the ISSB are different. Their underlying goal to do something to regulate is the same YES. So, how do we reconcile that contradiction between reality and what is in the letters? What does the EU want out of the ESRS draft?

In the letters, are different stakeholders working on the context or on the form of the regulation? Do they focus on the obligation to tick boxes or do they go further and analyse the content?

• What main message does the author of the letter want to convey?

o Is it only to show his/her agreement with the EFRAG work?

o Is it to point out some points that are perfectible?

o Is it to defend his/her specific interest?

o Is what the author says correct? Are there any distortions or fact-checking needed?

o What does the stakeholders' argumentation rely on?

o Are there new propositions made by the authors?

5/ What is our strategy?

Use filter options on NVivo to identify salient themes and the use of words in a particular context.

Other axes:

• Work on equivalence: for example use of synonyms: convergence/harmonisation: are these words used interchangeably or there is a nuance and a justified choice?

Word Search on Nvivo: (2 options)

• Group words together and search accordingly

• No possibility to group words together so we search and see the occurrences

When using NVivo, it is important that you annotate the excerpts you code so that we can rely on those notes for the analysis.

The Integration of Ukrainian Migrants: A Study of the UK and Poland

Paree Deasi1, Ioana Paun , Thea Pali , Nadia AlAjmi, Katharina Haslauer,and Georgie Unerwood

1 Research Team Leader

Published April 2024

Abstract

This paper examines the integration of Ukrainians who have migrated to Poland and the UK following the Russian invasion in 2022. Itdelves into housing policies, visa schemes, and access to the labourmarket,education, and healthcare available to these refugees. Since integration is a mutual process requiring political and public acceptance in host countries, political rhetoric, and public attitudes towards migrants in Poland and the UK are also investigated. In Poland, there is a strong correlation between the political rhetoric advanced by the Government and the media outlets and the public opinion. Our findings suggest that both British and Polish housing and visa schemes must provide for enhanced safeguards and secure stable long-term housing for refugees. Both countries face considerable challenges to successfully ensure access to health care, the labour market, and education institutions. In Poland, the mainissue appears tobe the shiftfromshort-term medicalresponses and housing solutions to long-term policies aiming at sustainable integration in the labour force and social life in the host country. A striking feature of UK policy is the effort to remove barriers when it comes to access to health care, education and especially the labour market, which presents a turn after years of deterrent refugee policies.

Keywords: migration, Ukraine, refugees, asylum, integration policy

1. Introduction

It has been a little more than a year since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The warwageson, Ukraine has managed tostand its ground, and we see regular updates in the news about missile strikes, territories lost and reclaimed, foreign military assistance, and so on. In the midst of this, an area that has often been passed over is the situation of the Ukrainians who were forced out of their homes due to the ongoing conflict in their country.

The latest figures from the UNHCR record 8 087 952 Ukrainian refugees, which amounts to roughly 20% of Ukraine’s population, scattered across Europe as of February 21, 2023 (CReAM research team, 2023). In fact, as many as 18 843 973 citizens fled Ukraine due to the war and 10 438 840 have returned to the country since as seen in Fig 1 below.

Poland, which shares a border with Ukraine, received the greatestnumberofrefugees overtime with a cumulative 9 751 646 Ukrainians crossing the border to Poland (UNHCR, 2023). As of now, Poland still hosts 1 563 386 refugees. The country was praised for its “remarkable” response and the Polish citizens’ “outpouring of spontaneous solidarity” (UN News, 2022). This came as somewhat of a surprise to us considering the fact that the right-wing, populist government

[Source: UCL CReAM research team, 2023]

with its anti-immigrant rhetoric still enjoys popular support (The Data Team, 2018; Mudde, 2022).

The United Kingdom granted 162 700 refugees from Ukraine visas tomove tothe UK temporarily. In contrasttoPoland, the UK government was widely criticised for its handling of the refugee situation as “chaotic” and “lacklustre” (Amnesty International UK, 2022). However, the UK was slightly similar to Poland in terms of public and political attitudes towards immigration public opposition to immigration increased in the 2010s (Blinder and Richards, 2020) and antiimmigration themes emerged in political discourse (Portice and Reicher, 2018). In fact,this sentimentwas one ofthe main drivers of Brexit.

This contrast between the two countries is interesting yet puzzling, so in this paper, we chose to study and compare the situation of Ukrainian refugees in the two countries. More specifically, we look at “migrant integration” as it is a comprehensive measure covering the political, socioeconomic and cultural dimensions of migration (Coussey & Christensen, 1997). With this study, we hope to uncover the reasons behind the UK and Poland’s differing successes in the integration of Ukrainian refugees. This is important to investigate not just for improving the current situation of refugees in the two countries, but also in a broader sense to guide future policy to make the integration of migrants smoother and safer.

2. Literature Review

It has been a little more than a year since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The warwageson, Ukraine has managed tostand its ground, and we see regular updates in the news about missile strikes, territories lost and reclaimed, foreign military assistance, and so on. In the midst of this, an area that has often been passed over is the situation of the Ukrainians who were forced out of their homes due to the ongoing conflict in their country.

2.1 Integration of Migrants

In order to begin examining the integration of Ukrainian migrants into the host UK and Polish societies, it is essential to first define its fundamental terms migrants and integration both of which are not clear cut.

"Migrant” is a broad and open-ended term with no universally accepted definition. Migrant workers, family members, asylum seekers, political and other refugees, irregular/illegal immigrants, and sometimes even international students and seasonal workers all fall into the category of "international migrants" (Werth et al., 1997; Perruchoud & Redpath, 2019, pp.132-3). However, migration as a concept is nuanced and contains sub-categories depending on the duration of stay, the voluntariness ofmovementand otherfactors. In particular, the Ukrainian nationals who moved to foreign countries like the UK and Poland following the Russian invasion are ‘refugees’.

As defined by the UNHCR following the 1951 Geneva Convention a refugee is a person ‘who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion’ (UNHCR, 2010).

Migrant “integration” too has no common definition and it is contingent upon the country and context (Penninx, 2003). However, it can largely be understood as the two-way process of mutual accommodation between the migrants, both as individuals and as groups, and the receiving/host society (Coussey & Christensen, 1997). Comprehensive approaches to migrant integration seek to ensure that migrants can fully engage in the hostsociety socio-economically, politically, and culturally.

Since integration concerns complicated phenomena and refers to a very widespread field, it is not possible to restrict its evaluation to a single unit of measurement. Although indicators vary from country to country as per the make-up of the population and the legal and policy framework, scholars have identified a few common dimensions of integration (Charsley & Spencer, 2019; Coussey & Christensen, 1997):

• Access to the labour market

• Housing and social services

• Education

• Involvement in community life and democratic processes

• Mortality, fertility, and demographic changes

• Social: Integration with other people, relationships, and social networks

• Cultural: In the sense of values, attitudes, and behaviour

• Identity: Sense of belonging, local and national identity

Charsley and Spencer (2019) also identified the factors facilitating the integration process:

1. Individual: Gender, age, language skills

2. Families and socialnetworks:Care responsibilities,social support, and contacts

3. Opportunity structures in society: Job market, housing, civil society, public attitudes, and discrimination

4. Policy: Rights, welfare systems, educational policy, language tuition, anti-discrimination legislation

After thoroughly reviewing the available literature on the various aspects of migrant integration, we found that not all the dimensions and factors of integration have been studied widely or sometimes at all. Thus, given this constraint, we have chosen to focus on the following areas to enhance clarity in this literature review:

• Housing

• Social integration (health, employment and education)

• Political rhetoric and public attitudes

2.2 Housing

The EU recognises housing and accommodation centres for refugees and asylumseekers as a key means toeffective social integration, though there remain many barriers to it. In 1999 the EU established the basis of the Common European Asylum Policy (CEAS), seeking to harmonise the reception conditions for asylum seekers, whereby the EU Council Directive established a framework for action by laying down a minimum standard for the reception of asylum seekers (Szcezepanikova, 2013). The first phase of the CEAS established the criteria and mechanisms for determining member state responsibilities for examining asylum applications, while the second phase sought to establish common guarantees and a uniform status for those granted protection as partofthe EU’sambition togo beyond minimum standards and develop a single asylum procedure (De Wever, 2007).

In 2004, the European Council further adopted the Common Basic Principles (cbPs) on immigrant integration, and in 2005 the European Commission developed these principles into a framework with action points at the national and European levels (De Wever, 2007). While important as a foundational framework to pursue action on, the establishment of these agendas at a supranational level has not always translated effectively into national implementation, as they leave significant scope for individual states with regard to the provision of material reception conditions for asylum seekers, often resulting in a disparity between EU policy and national policy (Szcezepanikova, 2013).

The Council of Europe has further pointed out the disconnection between objectives and policies of the national government and local authorities, which have an equally ‘distinctive role to play in the design and implementation of refugee and integration policies’. The Council has called on national governments to provide the necessary legal framework and infrastructure to develop their action (Meer, Dimaio, Hill, Angeli, Oberg and Emilsson, 2021).

The lack of coordination between national and local levels bears problematic consequences for housing, manifesting itself in the lack of assistance to private housing markets or access to social housing, and often resulting in poor quality and organisation of accommodation centres and housing (De Wever, 2007). Further, as individual states retain a considerable degree ofautonomyovertheirpolicieson asylum and integration, some countries have posed greater barriers to integration than others.

The UK’s introduction of the Hostile Environment Policy in 2012 exemplifies how giving states greater scope over

national asylum policies can in some cases worsen conditions for asylum seekers and refugees. It has been seen to operate as a form of ‘coercion and bullying’ aimed at manipulating behaviour through the use of threats toremove welfare as well as housing and ultimately manipulate people to leave the country through the weaponization of deterrence. Britain’s exit from the EU further gave them complete autonomy over such policies (Fekete, 2020).

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine saw countries across Europe work to amend and introduce new policies to facilitate a more effective process ofintegration forUkrainianrefugees. This study uses the comparison points of the UK and Poland to show how the scope states retain over their own policies results in a disparity between policy effectiveness on the integration of Ukrainians depending on the country receiving them. The rapid responses of both countries which initially saw an outpouring of support have led rise to claims of double standards regarding the treatment of Ukrainians compared to other nationalities who appear unprotected by the same legal framework (OHCHR, 2022). The particular lack of a strong anti-discrimination policy in Poland has made other policies inefficient, notably those on housing (Lukasiewicz, 2017). Concerns on the integration and housing for Ukrainian refugees have now shifted from the welcome stage to longerterm considerations, the question of secure long-term housing for Ukrainians poses increasing uncertainty and instability.

2.3 Social Integration (Health, Employment, Education)

The realisation of the deterrence paradigm in many European countries since the 1980s (such as the UK's Hostile Environment Policy 2012 mentioned above) do not only impacthousing butmanyaspects ofsuccessfulandsustainable integration into European host societies. Aside from policies of non-admission, non-arrival and offshore asylum processing, indirect deterrence measures limit access to education (especially tertiary and vocational training), and an array of integration services (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, 2017).

In the UK, refugees which have not yet been granted official refugee status are excluded from the Refugee Integration and Employment Service (Da Lomba, 2010, p. 424). The deterrence policy approach conflicts with the principle that integration starts upon arrival, and that asylum seekers' initial experiences determine the success of social integration in the long term (Da Lomba, 2010, p. 424). Moreover, studies have found a negative association between asylum support systems and refugees’ health (mental health especially), as such a policy framework is largely socially exclusionary (Bakker et al., 2016, p. 129).

The provision of access to basic health care remains uncontested. All EU member states have formally recognized the right to the highest attainable standard of health (Lebano et al., 2020, p 2). In the UK refugees are entitled to free health

care through the National Health Service. Nonetheless, inequalities in access to health services persist between migrants and non-migrants (varying according to country), largely due to legal, communication, and language barriers (Lebano et al., 2020, p 1).

Access to the labour market is extremely restricted, although inthe Directive 2013/33/EU issued by the EU in2013 requires member states to ensure access to employment for refugees within 9 months after arrival. Several member states opted out of this directive, including the UK, where asylum seekers do not have the right to work (Da Lomba, 2010, p. 423). There are numerous practical reasons why asylum seekers might struggle to find employment, even if they were no legal restrictions in place: the lack of language skills, and difficulties to prove professional qualifications, amongst others. However, the case is strong for allowing asylum seekers to work: The economic and social downsides include an incurrence of extra cost in supporting refugees, a waste of professional skills and long-lasting effects on asylum seekers as they find themselves in pronounced dependency relationships, being deprived of the source of empowerment employment offers (Da Lomba, 2010, p. 424).

In terms of education, the very same EU Directive of 2013 states that all member states should provide education for children under 18. Furthermore, children are entitled to preschool education and eligible for special programmes and assistance underthe same conditions as EU citizens (Directive 2013/33/EU). Legislation in the UK is more restricted: While education is compulsory for children between the age of five and sixteen, access to pre- and post-school education is limited. Asylum seekers must pay oversea tuition fees at UK universities which severely hampers their ability to pursue higher education (Da Lomba, 2010, p. 422). Since 2015, however, there is a growth in the number of universities offering scholarships tomigrants (Morrice, 2022,p. 254). This development underscores the pivotal role civil society, including education institutions, plays in the social integration of refugees as they can navigate their admission and scholarship policy relatively independently from government deterrence measures.

2.4 Political Rhetoric and Public Attitudes

Political rhetoric encompasses the ways politicians may persuade the general public as well as the academic study of this kind of public speaking (Tileagă, 2014). Political attitudes, however, take into account peoples' beliefs and values. Analysis of such attitudes allows for predicting how people will behave (in terms of voting, for example) by gaining an understanding ofthe motivating forces behind their actions.

In light of the war in Ukraine, which officially started with Russia’s invasion of Ukrainian land in 2022, it has become apparent that different countries have taken different approachestoaidUkrainian refugees. BothPoland andthe UK

have a history of the general population holding negative attitudes towards immigration (Bachman, 2017; Blinder & Richards, 2020), however, as of now, Poland has accepted nearly 1.6 million refugees and the UK only around 155 000.

Reviews of news articles and questionnaire statistics from the past two decades offer an overview of the changes in political rhetoric and public perception of Ukrainian refugees compared to previous attitudes towards immigration and asylum-seekers in the UK, and respectively, Poland.

Firstly, there has been an overall decline in intolerance towards immigrants and an increased preference forUkrainian refugees in comparison to other ethnicities and nationalities (Bachman, 2017), which explains why Poland and the UK have been much more lenient with their policies to accept refugees as a consequence of the war in Ukraine.

Nonetheless, historically in the UK, there has largely been a preference for reduced migration (Blinder and Richards, 2020). The findings of polls and surveys conclude that there is, undoubtedly, an objection to immigration. However, it is important to note that individual characteristics – such as skill level, country of origin, ethnicity, culture, religion, etc – carry strong weight in influencing people's tolerance. When discussing potential reasons for opposition to immigrants, Stansfield and Stone (2018) identified the perception of immigrants as 'criminal threats' to be the most important. Studies refute correlations betweenimmigration and increased crime rates, however, the public still maintains the view that recentimmigrants are criminal threats (McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Similarly, building upon this anti-immigrantsentiment, politicians adhered to rhetoric criminalising immigrants by misrepresenting evidence on the rates and severity of crimes committed (Morris, 2013). In literature, this social and political phenomenon is regarded as the “criminalization of immigration”, describing the process of manipulating statistics to fuel ethnic prejudice (Pickett, 2016). Moreover, extensive research has demonstrated that the media pushes forward a narrative damaging the image of immigrants (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, 2008; Esses et al.2008). Thus, Połońska-Kimunguyi (2022) conducted a quantitative and qualitative study focused on two mainstream publications in the UK, one of them, left-wing (The Guardian), and the other one, centre-right (The Times). Her methodology involved mapping mentions of keywords, selecting articles from 2015 to 2018 from both publications, and then subjecting them to critical discourse analysis (CDA). Thus, the findings reveal that both publications contribute to shaping the image of Europe as ‘under siege’ (Forket et al., 2020), to fuel the discourse of closing borders and restricting migration.

Notably, in particular, with regard to Ukrainian refugees, scholars (Stansfield and Stone, 2018) acknowledge that there is not sufficient data to hypothesize how UK citizens perceive the criminal threat of EU immigrants compared to non-EU ones. Furthermore, Stansfield and Stone (2018) recognise two limitations in their study which are related to cross-sectional

data and the inability to quantitatively assess specific contextual threats. Nevertheless, recent research (Rolfe, Katwala and Ballinger, 2022) examining immigration attitudes posits that the public influenced the government in designing policy schemes (e.g. 'Homes for Ukraine') to increase the number of Ukrainian asylum-seekers admitted in the UK.

When discussing reasons for opposition to immigration and a preference for decreasing the number of admitted asylumseekers, scholars (Thérová, 2022) invoke two theories: the self-interest theory and the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981). The first one encompasses economic factors (Mayda, 2006), arguing that increased competition for resources prompts states to adopt stricter immigration policies. The social identity theory identifies a collective cultural threat associated with foreigners (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014), driving states to oppose immigration on the grounds that minorities would erode the culture, traditions, and customs of the host country.

In the social and political context of Eastern Europe, previous research drawing on the social identity theory (Brubaker, 2017) identified prevalent exclusionary attitudes caused by ethnically oriented nationalism (Thérová, 2022). Recent studies (Thérová, 2022) support these findings by further demonstrating that Polish citizens are much more welcoming towards ethnically similar immigrants than to those of other ethnicities. This can explain Poland’s drastic shifts in public attitudes and political rhetoric in accepting asylum-seekers before and after the war in Ukraine. For instance, refugees from the Middle East and North Africa have been subjected to a narrative constructed to put them (the out-group) in opposition to Polish citizens (the in-group), while Ukrainian refugees have been perceived as part of the in-group (Hargrave, Homel, and Dražanová, 2023).

Generally, scholars trace the emergence of negative narratives around refugees in Poland to 2015, which coincides with ‘Europe’s Refugee Crisis’, and recognise the PiS party's (national-conservative and right-wing populist) government as the main actor, followed by conservative media and the Catholic Church, in reinforcing these narratives (Hargrave, Homel, and Dražanová, 2023). Thus, analysts (Klaus et al., 2018) argue that 2015 represented the point when islamophobic, xenophobic, and racist rhetoric became part of the mainstream political discourse. The PiS government later channelled this sentiment into their campaigns.

In contrast, Ukrainian refugees benefit from positive attitudes. Scholars (Hronešová, 2022) attribute this phenomenon to Ukraine and Poland having a historically ‘common aggressor’. Supporting this hypothesis, Hargrave, Homel, and Dražanová (2023)have conducted interviews, which conclude that Polish citizens perceive Ukrainian refugees as part of the in-group as they align with “European values”.

In conclusion, it has become apparent how the political forces have used cultural and historical aspects of each country to influence the level of acceptance of Ukrainian refugees in comparison to other ethnicities and nationalities – Ukrainians are viewed to be more European and thus culturally closer to British and in particular Polish people. However, it still remains unclear how just and fair this type of preference during policy-making is towards other warrefugees. The level of influence that politicians' speeches and their political rhetoric have had on the general public in forming their views about immigrants requires further investigation, as it is crucial to understand whether the actions of the countries are a true reflection of the people's values or rather the mere result of political manipulation. Hence, it is important to understand on a deeper level why the differences in the aid offered to refugees between Poland and the UK have arisen.

3. Methodology

This paper uses a case study approach to analyse the integration of Ukrainian refugees in Poland and the UK. We draw our data from secondary sources such as newspaper articles, reports from humanitarian organisations and government agencies, as well as some academic papers that have studied certain aspects of our topic. The “integration” of migrants has a broad scope, but there are constraints in the availability of secondary data for very specific variables like fertility, sense of identity, and so on. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, we will study integration by dividing the topic up intothe same broadcategoriesas those intheliterature review:

• Housing and visa schemes

• Social integration (health, employment and education)

• Political rhetoric and public attitudes

Since we wanted to study particular and in-depth differences between the policies and outcomes in the two countries, our research is qualitative in nature. This has the benefit of being better suited to inform future policies in the countries that we study but has the disadvantage of not necessarily being generally applicable to inform every country’s migration and refugee integration policies.

Furthermore, we used secondary data because we had a time constraint and also did not have the resources available to conduct any primary research. While this has the drawback of introducing a potential bias in our findings because we did not collect the data ourselves, we made sure to draw data from a variety of credible sources. In this way, we believe that we have avoided systematic biases and improved the accuracy of our results and the conclusions we drew from them.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Housing and Visa Schemes

The following section examines how the UK and Poland have accommodated the asylum applications and housing demands of Ukrainian refugees. It begins by outlining how their respective asylum policies have historically diverged, and how these differences continue to manifest themselves in housing. It then explores the visa and housing schemes adopted by Poland and the UK, discusses the pros and cons of these schemes, and considers the long-term challenges both countries now face in light of wavering support and the economic downturn in Europe.

4.1.1 Overview

Poland and the UK have historically adopted differentpolicies on housing for refugees and asylum seekers. Whilst the UK was a member of the European Union, it was required to work within the EU’s established framework onasylumpolicy, such as the 1999 Common European Asylum Policy. This framework left significant scope for individual states (Szczepanikova, 2013, 131) concerning the provision of material reception conditions for asylum seekers, resulting in a disparity in the national implementation of EU policy. Even while under the same framework, Poland and the UK were able to adopt different policy approaches to the reception and housing of refugees. Britain’s exit from the EU furthered its autonomy over asylum policy. This contextualises how and why European countries have been able to respond so differently to the Russia-Ukrainian war.

Prior to the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland and the UK faced notable challenges regarding the integration of refugees. From 1995 to 2020, 125,000 people fleeing war and persecution made their way to Poland, of which 3% made it their permanent home, and over 25% were at risk of homelessness (Fundacja Ocalenie, 2021). The UK’s Hostile Environment Policy, introduced in 2012 by the then-Home Secretary Theresa May, intentionally made integration extremely difficult for refugees. It has since been extensively criticised for ‘not considering migrants as deserving of the same human rights protections as others’ (Audibert, Dikoff, and Schulkind, 2022) and for acting as a tool for ‘coercion and bullying’, through its use of threats to remove welfare, housing; this ultimately served to manipulate people into leaving the UK through the weaponisation of deterrence (Fekete, 2020, 97). This set a discouraging precedent for how both countries would respond to the Russia-Ukraine war.

In light of the Russia-Ukraine war Poland and the UK rapidly accommodated their asylum policies to facilitate smoother integration. How they did so notably differed and saw Poland praised for its efforts while the UK was condemned for not having done enough. As the welcome period has worn off and future considerations have setin, bothcountries face mounting challenges and pressure to accommodate the long-term demands of refugees.

4.1.2 UK’s Response

Poland and the UK have historically adopted differentpolicies on housing for refugees and asylum seekers. Whilst the UK

was a member of the European Union, it was required to work within the EU’s established framework onasylumpolicy, such as the 1999 Common

4.1.3 Poland’s Response

Poland was praised by the UN for its ‘warm welcome’ of Ukrainian refugees following the outbreak of war (OHCHR, 2022). There was an outpouring of support for Ukrainians, with 77%ofPoles found tohave taken partinhelping refugees in the early months of the war (Higgins, 2022). Despite their unpreparedness, the Polish government swiftly made legal amendments to facilitate smoother visa applications and integration processes. In March 2022, Polish Parliament passed an act on the assistance of Ukrainian nationals (European Commission, 2022). This involved codifying the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), granting Ukrainian citizens a PESEL, allowing them access to the Polish labour market, health care, and education, as well as giving them the right to residence for 18 months, social assistance and other benefits (Reidy, 2022; Higgins, 2022). Poles fromalloverPoland pickedup refugees fromthe border, provided them with rooms in their own houses, helped with bureaucracy, organised crowdfunding, cooked meals, and opened free “shops” (Overhaus, Talik, and Feffer, 2023).

It was noted at this time by Neil Brighton, the Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) Poland director, that while ‘the government created… a really enabling legal environment for Ukrainian refugees to be in Poland’, there was a ‘gap between what is envisioned as a result of this enabling special act and what some of the reality will be for people who maybe get left behind’(Reidy, 2022). As thewarhas progressed,this concern has been cemented. It will be shown that despite these theoretical legal frameworks, there are extensive barriers in practice to the social integration of refugees.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales, pointed out that in Poland ‘most [refugees] are hosted as guests in private homes by Polish people… this is why I do not see refugee camps’ (OHCHR, 2022). While Poland has largely succeeded in moving people out of temporary housing and into independent lodging, emergency and community centres still remain in Poland, particularlyinthose towns nearthe border (Olson, 2022). This accommodation can often be inadequate and provide a poor quality of living. Though others can sometimes offer a wide range of resources, such as the shelter in the border town of Przemysl opened in August 2022, which provides safety, meals, hygiene kits, guidance on psychological support, legal advice, support finding a job, and long-term accommodation (Danish Refugee Council, 2022). Nevertheless, the Polish government would benefit from taking further action to establish independent housing for refugees and turn away from temporary shelters in the long run.

The Polish government also created online portals such as the “Website for citizens of Ukraine” and the “Cases Handling

Module” to help Ukrainian refugees in Poland obtain information about theirstay in Poland and tohelp themfillout applications for temporary residence permits (Lesinska, 2023).

4.1.4 Discussion and Criticism

There are several similarities as well as differences between the refugee settlementschemes ofthe twocountries.The UK’s approach is more restrictive than Poland’s and the rest of the EU’s from the offset for two reasons: one, not all Ukrainian nationals are automatically eligible as they need either UK family connections or sponsorship and two, they must apply for a visa in advance.

In light of the Polish government’s swift policy changes to accommodate Ukrainian refugees, criticisms emerged of double standards regarding the treatment of refugees coming from elsewhere. Morales highlighted that in Poland ‘third country nationals are not protected under the same legal framework’ and ‘those with specific vulnerabilities including the ones with irregular migratory status face heightened difficulties in obtaining residence permits and proper shelter’ (OHCHR, 2022).

The UK was similarly criticised for ‘its lip-service having exposed its political calculation and hypocrisy which are also evident in its controversial history of dealing with refugee crises’ (Global Times Reporters, 2022). The UK’s treatment of Syrian refugees is identified as a comparison point. Britain granted 22 000 visas to Ukrainian refugees in under a month, while they resettled just20 000 Syrian refugees oversixyears. Raed Al-Saleh, chief of the White Helmets charity in Syria, called on the government by stating that ‘the preferential treatment of Ukrainian refugees is there – we can see it. It is double standards. Refugees should be treated equally’ (Person, 2022). The ‘painful contrast’ between the treatment of Ukrainian refugees and those coming from other places ‘exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees’, and highlights wider concerns about the ‘deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection’ (Venturi and Vallianatou, 2022).

Moreover, the UK government has come under heavy fire in the media for various issues and gaps in their visa schemes. Firstly, the UK’s paperwork for obtaining visas was criticised for being long and cumbersome. The UK’s home secretary was denounced by Ian Blackford, leader of SNP, for the "slowest, most bureaucratic, and incompetent refugee responses in the whole of Europe", while French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin condemned the UK's "totally inadequate response" and "lack of humanity" (Global Times Staff Reporters, 2022). Refugees themselves denounced the UK’s visa regulations and perceive their complex rules as a means “to ensure Ukrainians do not come to the UK” (Global Times Staff Reporters, 2022). In fact, a whistle-blower working on Britain’s Homes for Ukraine scheme has revealed that he and his colleagues “don’t know what we’re doing” and

claims the scheme has been “designed to fail” in order to limit numbers entering the UK (Townsend, 2022a). Hundreds of frustrated Ukrainian families and sponsors pulled out of the Homes for Ukraine scheme because of delays in issuing visas totraveltothe UK, withsome refugees subsequentlyreturning to their war-torn country (Townsend, 2022b). These issues could have been resolved with swifter action and stronger leadership from the UK government.

Secondly, the Homes for Ukraine scheme has proven to be deeply flawed in ensuring the safety of refugees. Despite sponsors and guests being required togo through database and security checks (GOV.UK, 2023), the matching process between sponsors and refugees has been criticised for its lack of safety. Given that the majority of migrants are women or children (Walsh and Sumption, 2022), they are more vulnerable and ata higherrisk ofhuman trafficking and sexual exploitation (Cockbain and Sidebottom, 2022). While the scheme involves a visit from the council to the refugees lodging once they havesettled toensure thereare no problems, it does not take into consideration that issues may arise after the visit, and that guests may be coerced into concealing any existing issues. There have been several cases of British men offering Ukrainian women a place to stay in exchange for sex, or upon the basis that they would share the same bed. Louise Valvey, head of safeguarding at Refugee Action, has stated “what we have is a government run scheme that is leaving women at risk of sexual exploitation” (Morgan, 2022), calling it “tinder for traffickers” (Syal, 2022). She points out that current criminal record checks do not identify those sexual predators without a criminal record.

Besides this, the unclear policy for the Homes for Ukraine scheme also heightens the risk of domestic servitude under exploitative placement conditions (Cockbain and Sidebottom, 2022). The fact thatsuch grave safetyconcerns were raised by experts shows thatthe UK governmenthas been rathermyopic in its construction of refugee policy. Moreover, it also demonstrates that the government has not implemented the lessons they learnt from past refugee crises in which similar concerns were raised (UNHCR and British Red Cross, 2022). The UNHCR called on the UK to take action to develop a ‘more appropriate matching process’, stating that there must be repercussions if a host is found to threaten a refugee (UNHCR, 2022). The UK government merely responded to this claim by stating that there were already robust checks in place by both the Home Office and local governmentagencies (UN News, 2022).

The UNHCR further raised concerns about the 6-month minimum duration period for housing refugees, as hosts cannot always afford to house for that long, precluding room availability for shorter periods (Syal, 2022). Additionally, refugees are not eligible for housing benefit as part of a universal credit claim, exposing them to a risk of homelessness if their accommodation with family members or sponsors breaks down (Grierson, 2022). In fact,reporters from the Guardian discovered that hundreds of Ukrainian refugees

in the UK had been left homeless as soon as July 2022 after the relationship withtheirhostsbroke down(Iqbaletal., 2022). This highlights a fundamental problem in the UK’s two schemes for Ukrainian refugees the government is effectively evading the responsibility and accountability of developing a fully funded and comprehensive refugee resettlement scheme by placing it upon UK residents.

Thirdly, the UK lacked clear centralised guidance in the months following the war. The failures of the Homes for Ukraine scheme are a clear illustration of this. Apart from the issues already mentioned previously, the government did not help match sponsors to refugees for the scheme (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2022) but rather left it to NGOs to pick up their slack. Additionally, while Poland made websites and provided help and information online to the refugees, there was a shortage of helpful official information and guidance for refugees, local authorities, hosts and businessesinthe UK. As alternative organisations stepped up to fill this gap, there was a high volume of decentralised and fragmented material and initiatives which caused confusion, sometimes making it harder for refugees to access the support they needed (Cockbain and Sidebottom, 2022).

Scotland and Wales’“Super Sponsor Scheme” proved equally flawed. Functioning alongside Homes for Ukraine, this scheme sought to remove the need for refugees to be matched with a sponsor prior to being permitted to travel to the UK in ordertoexpedite theprocess. However, itended upinrefugees arriving in the UK with nowhere to stay and thereby being placed in hotels and other short-term accommodations unfit for long-term living, where local councils supported them untilpermanenthouseswere found (Hill,2022). In Wales, half of the refugees arriving were under this scheme, the majority of which were housed in hotels, while another 1,500 remained in Welsh Government procured accommodation (‘Local Democracy Reporter’, 2023). As a result, both Wales and Scotland paused these visa schemes for a minimum of 3 months respectively on June 10 and July 13, and are yet to be returned to.

The Polish government was swifter and more effective in implementing policy and providing aid. Since they did not have visa and administrative restrictions, Ukrainian migrants were able to benefit from this quicker than in the UK. This is beneficial to refugees as research has found that shorter asylum waiting times had a large positive impact on integration, long-term employment outcomes and mental health (Walsh and Sumption, 2023).

However, similar to the UK, Poland’s policies have the shortcoming of having inadequate measures of protection for Ukrainian refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2022) of which 90% are women and children (UN Women and CAREInternational, 2022). The rape of a 19-year-old refugee consolidated concerns thatpeoplemay take advantageofrefugees’hardship and uncertainty, almost all of whom are female (May, 2022). Placed in such proximity to Ukraine, they also face the threat

of human trafficking at border crossings. National and local authorities have collaborated with the Polish border guard to prevent this and facilitate rapid border crossings of vulnerable women, but Hilary Margolis, senior women’s rights researcher at Human Rights Watch, points out that the general lack of basic protection measures still risks exposing refugees to serious abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

4.1.5 Long Term Considerations

Concerns have now shifted from initial refugee reception, and the focus is on long-term integration. As the 6-month period of Homes for Ukraine came to a close, homelessness in the face of a harsh winter boomed as no exit strategy was anticipated. Adis Sehic, policy and research officer at the charity Work Rights Centre, has highlighted that ‘people were expecting that after six to eight months, the Government would have a plan’, but there has been no exit strategy, ‘and we’re seeing the effects of that now’ (Williams, 2022). As of the start of December 2022, around 3 000 of the 100 000 refugees who came to the UK under the Homes for Ukraine and Family scheme had been made homeless, equating to a rise of over 300% in the number of Ukrainian refugee householdswho became homelesssince data wasfirstreleased in June 2022 (Kenyon, 2022). Additionally, there have been declining numbers of sponsors in light of the cost of living crisis and high levels of inflation across Europe as people can no longer continue to afford to host.

As Poland’s agenda shifted from the welcome phase to full integration, they have struggled to accommodate long-term needs of housing and employment. Resources are running dry in Poland as they too are faced with the cost of living and budget strains from inflation. This is magnified by the fact they lack the same funds as some ofthe richercountries across Europe even though dealing with the highest refugee influx of all host countries. Subsequently, as in the UK, hosts cannot continue to afford to house people and many refugees are losing their temporary housing. This decline in sponsors has accompanied the decline in the general public mood towards refugees. The Polish government has further been criticised for not having done enough to increase the capacity of the Polish housing market.

The UK government has nevertheless attempted to take some measures to respond to concerns. To counteract declining numbers of sponsors, they have increased ‘thank you payments’ by 40% so that up to £500 a month can be claimed, and the duration ofpayments istobeextended from12 months to 2 years to give more time for guests to find independent accommodation (Hymas, 2022). As well as providing immediate solutions, the UK government has committed to longer-termmeasures toreduce homelessness among refugees by giving £650 million to councils to fund housing for refugees, of which £500 million will go towards a scheme that aims to buy 4 000 homes for Ukrainian and Afghan refugees (Hymas, 2022). Glasgow has further been offering empty homes as residences to refugees (‘Local Democracy Reporter’, 2022).

Poland has also taken measures to increase the capacity of the housing market.They established a strategy ofintegration that established more public housing by renovating vacant properties. Warsaw is currently renovating around 2 000 existing apartments to accommodate refugees and has plans to invest further in housing schemes in years to come (Reidy, 2022). Nevertheless, it is unclear when these plans will be completed, and there remain more immediate problems for those refugees facing homelessness.

As a result of these economic strains, the Polish government has scaled back financial support for refugees regarding accommodation costs. As part of their amendment to the Special Law on assistance for Ukrainians, new financial conditions were introduced. From February 1, 2023, Ukrainians who stay in Poland for over 120 days must cover 50% of the costs of their accommodation, and from May 1, those staying over 180 days must cover 75% of their costs. Exemptions to this include pensioners, single mothers, and people with disabilities. On top of this, they are enforcing further controls on benefits and stricter rights on residence (Bleona, 2022). However, itis notable that these rules may not affect huge numbers as few Ukrainians are still residing in the accommodation centres that are enforcing these rules, with most having moved into private rental apartments (Olson, 2022).

Wales has also scaled back services with the introduction of additional financial controls for refugees in temporary government-funded accommodation. From January 9 2023, government-funded daily meals were reduced from three to two, and free toiletries and laundry services were removed, as was funding for animal care. After five weeks, those refugees who turn down two offers to move onto permanent accommodation will further face a service charge of £25 a week to £37 for a family of four or more. These changes could affect up to 1,500 people. Wales has stated that this is not being done out of economic strain, but to better facilitate the process of integration in order to ‘increase people’s independence and reduce the financial disparity’ (Deans, 2022).

As barriers to integration increasingly materialise, these policy adjustments highlight that Ukrainian refugees’ ‘honeymoon period is getting over’ (Pandey, 2022). Despite waning public and material support, the situation in Ukraine is getting no better and as the threat of war remains constant, the influx of refugees looks set to increase (Farmer, 2022). While Poland has to a degree delivered in providing independent accommodation, and the UK is taking both immediate and future action to soften the process of integration now that the initial reception stage has ended, both countries could be going further in taking action to secure safe and stable long-term housing for Ukrainian refugees.

5. Social Integration: Access to Healthcare, the Labour Market, and Education

The following section will examine access to healthcare, the labour market and education for Ukrainian refugees in the UK and Poland respectively.

5.1 Healthcare

5.1.1 The United Kingdom

UK migrant policy decisions have largely been taken according tothe deterrence paradigmsince the end ofthe Cold War. Refugees were entitled toprimary care and NHSservices free of charge. In 2012, however, the government explicitly stated that it aims to create a "hostile environment" (Kang, Tomkow and Farrington, 2019, p. 537), a policy approach that included restricting refused refugees’ entitlement to NHS care. In 2017, charges for health services were extended for refugees: Although GP consultation remained free of charge, communityservicesallied toprimary healthcare hadtobe paid for prior to treatment. These policy decisions presented a significant barrier to accessing healthcare: Studies have found that 13% of vulnerable immigrants' GP registrations were refused incorrectly and illegitimately on the basis of their immigration status (Kang, Tomkow and Farrington, 2019, p. 537).

The UK government's approach to migration policy shifted considerably since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. New legislation was drafted aiming to facilitate refugees' access to health care. According to the government’s Ukraine Migrant Health Guide, Ukrainian refugees have fee-free access tomost NHS services (Great Britain. Office for Health Improvements and Disparities, 2022). This constitutes a change of the NHS charges for overseas' visitors’ regulations 2015 which states that persons that are not ordinarily UK residents must pay charges for NHS services (The National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2015). Ukrainians are only exemptfromcharges, however, if they are eligible for the sponsor visa route (Great Britain. Office for Health Improvements and Disparities, 2022).

The 2012 and 2017 legislation, as well as the growing antimigration sentiment within the population and government, reflects an intensification of the deterrence paradigm, as these policies aimed to discourage asylum claims and make the UK a less attractive target country (Bakker, Cheung, and Phillimore, 2016, p. 118). In practice, these policies created explicit barriers for refugees to access health care services: Language barriers, which were exacerbated by the lack of interpreters presentinpractices, resulted inlong-termphysical, mental and social harm, as patients received the wrong treatment, felt embarrassed, low in their self-esteem, and excluded from the community (Kang, Tomkow and Farrington, 2019, p. 539). These effects were accepted as part of the broader deterrence policy framework. The difference in policy approach to Ukrainian refugees is considerable, though it concerns less the actual provision of services - most nonUkrainian refugees before February 2021 did have access to primary care, according to UK law (Lebano et al., 2020, p 1). There is, however, a stark difference in the accessibility and accommodation of Ukrainian refugees in the UK health system (Great Britain. Office for Health Improvements and

Disparities, 2022). The positive accommodation will likely result in more positive personal experiences and prevent mental and social harm.

Indicative of the different approach is the Arrivals from Ukraine:advice forprimary care guide, which states explicitly GP practices' responsibility to ensure interpretation and translation services to be made available free and at any point of delivery. They are also explicitly instructed to consider the impact of culture, religion, and gender on health. This awareness proved to be lacking in other refugees' experiences inthe past(GreatBritain. UK Health Security Agency, 2022).

This differential treatment might reflect what Morris has argued for, namely that the public and government's perception of Ukrainian refugees is significantly less hostile and biased, as they conform to the archetypical refugee imagines in the UN 1951 Refugee Convention (Morris, 2022, p. 251).

5.1.2 Poland

The Polish healthcare system faces great challenges, regardless of the strong influx of Ukrainian refugees requiring services:The Polish Healthcare systemranks 5th inthe EU for unmet healthcare needs, has one of the EU's lowest GDP health expenditures and one of the lowest doctor-per-1000 citizen ratio (OECD / European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017). Thus, access to health care is hampered for Polish citizens and refugees alike. Immigrants applying for refugee status have a right to healthcare services tothe same extentas persons covered by insurance are entitled to services financed from public funds. These services include but are not limited to basic medical care, psychological care, specialist medical care, and hospitalization (Domalewska and Zakowska, 2019, p. 7).

In the face of the influx of Ukrainian refugees into Poland, the government quickly took a number of measures to ensure the accommodation of Ukrainians in the national healthcare system. Experts remark that these quick policy decisions and implementations are remarkable, as the healthcare system faced difficulties to provide sufficient care for years due to a lack ofspending and poorpublic health management(Howard, 2022, p.1). In a statement from March 2022, the Polish government announced that it had arranged 7 000 beds for Ukrainian refugees across 120 hospitals, and established 8 reception points along the Ukrainian borderproviding medical aid and triaging cases (Howard, 2022, p.1). The provision of medical services is nonetheless highly dependent on volunteer healthcare workers and private initiatives such as Doctors for Ukraine (Lekarze dla Ukrainy), an online platform connecting Ukrainian refugees with Polish doctors offering free consultation (Doctors for Ukraine, 2022).

After the 2015 refugee crisis, the Polish government did not, as opposed to the UK, adopt a clear deterrence policy

approach simply because it was no target country and did not receive many refugees (Kowalski, 2019, p. 972).

Independently of policy reality, political rhetoric became increasingly polarised around the theme of migration and reflected the high level of antipathy toward foreigners within the population (Klaus, 2022, p. 85). At the same time, Poland dealt with an influx of Ukrainian refugees since 2014 due to the annexation of Crimea and the fighting in the Donbas region. These refugees were quite successfully integrated into the labour (Klaus, 2022, p. 83). Nonetheless, opinion polls show that only one in four Poles admitted to liking Ukrainians in 2018 (Klaus, 2022, p. 86). This shift in public perception of Ukrainian refugees might explain the overwhelming support of civil society and volunteers which has been crucial in maintaining the provision of healthcare services.

5.2 Labour Market

5.2.2 The United Kingdom

The UK government adhered to a deterrence policy approach, as mentioned above, before the beginning of the war in Ukraine. This applies to access to the labour market as well. From 1986 to 2002, asylum seekers had the right to work if their claim had not been processed within six months, or to undertake vocational training (Da Lomba, 2010. p. 423). The withdrawal of that right in 2002 resulted in long-term effects of unemployment as the lack of access to training opportunities eventually led to the loss of skills (Bloch, 2007. p. 22).

The policy response tothe influx of Ukrainian refugees differs crucially from the government's previous migration employment regulations: Ukrainian refugees have the same employment rights as British citizens. Ukrainians obtain that right by supplying a BRP or a visa, which is a requirement for all Ukrainians that arrive in the UK via the family and sponsorship schemes (Great Britain. Home Office, 2022). Moreover, the government provides services which actively encourage and facilitate access to the labour market: A platform for employers to share their job offers has been set up, and the 'Find a Job' service aims to help Ukrainians find employment opportunities that match their skills and provides guidance on job applications. Ukrainians are also eligible for support such as training schemes and work experience (Great Britain. Home Office, 2022).

The factthatUkrainians have the righttowork is a remarkable difference in the treatment of Ukrainian refugees and nonUkrainian refugees prior to the Russian invasion in February 2021, especially since the UK declared integration in the labour market and employability central to successful social integration afterasylumhas been granted (Calo, Montgomery, and Baglioni, 2022, p.2). The prospect of long-term employabilityis considerably higherforUkrainian refugees as they are exposed to a lower risk of deskilling and mental

health impact of a prolonged state of unemployment without being in education or training (Calo, Montgomery, and Baglioni, 2022, p.2). Non-Ukrainian refugees face another disadvantage if they have been eventually granted asylum: The forced break fromtraining and employment, coupled with a broader discourse of deservingness is likely to contribute to the stigmatisation ofunemployed refugees with asylumstatus, which in turn affects their mental health and overall social integration (Da Lomba, 2010, p. 424)

5.2.3 Poland

Poland has a multi-layered labour migration policy: Refugees applying for asylum need to obtain a work permit in order to enter the labour market. Polish law is not flexible in granting work permits, in fact, refugees face increasingly severe barriers toaccesseven basic public services (Domalewskaand Zakowska, 2019, p. 6). At the same time, the system of entrusting work to foreigners is a very liberallabour migration policy. This scheme was put in place in 2007 and provides an easy path to obtain a work visa for 12 months, which was predominantly used by Ukrainians since its inception (Klaus, 2022, p. 76). Low unemployment, an economic boom, and the emigration of Poles to EU states created a gap in Poland's workforce which Ukrainian temporary workers filled (Klaus, 2022, p. 83). Hence, employers have grown used to the presence of Ukrainian workers in the labour market (Klaus, 2022, p. 84).

Ukrainians who now arrive in Poland as refugees do not face the restrictions other refugees encountered prior. Ukrainian nationals have full access to the Polish labour market, and no work permit is required (Poland. Office for Foreigners, 2022). In line with the objectives of the previous systemof entrusting work to foreigners, the Polish government announced that there are up to 500 000 available jobs in Polish provinces. However, most Ukrainian refugees are over-skilled for these positions. Additionally, observers note the risk of refugees either remaining unemployed or being pushed into jobs below their qualification level with comparatively low salaries because of problems to recognise qualifications (Katsiaficas, 2022).

In the past,especially in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, the Polish government adhered two a two-tiered strategy: A strong anti-immigrant securitization discourse dominated public debate, while at the same time, the Polish economy relied on migrant workers, a significant difference to the situation in the UK (Klaus, 2022). The presence of these temporary workers, mainly Ukrainians, became increasingly normalised and their identity was detached from the stigmatised stereotype of refugees from the Middle East and global south. The isolation of Ukrainian refugees from the common anti-migrant rhetoric and public sentiment enables the government now to adopt the liberal policy approach toward Ukrainian refugees without outright contracting the populist narrative (Klaus, 2022, p. 86).

5.3 Education

5.3.3 The United Kingdom

The legal policy framework in the UK is based on the Human Rights Act of 1998 which enshrines the right to access education. First, the School Admissions Code requires that children in public care shall be given the highest priority in admission policies of primary and secondary schools. Secondly, the Fair Access Protocol lays out a strategy to place vulnerable and newly arrived children and states that children are eligible for premium funding (McIntyre and Hall, 2020, p.586). Concerning access to higher education, refugees face significant barriers. They are subject to oversea fees and are not eligible for student support, funds, or hardship loans (Da Lomba, 2010, p.422).

Children and young people arriving from Ukraine have, according to the above outline policies, access to primary and secondary education. Local authorities and schools are responsible for the application process which ought to be completed in a maximum of 15 days. Out of 11 400 pupils who have applied for school places, 87% have gotten a place, according to the government's education hub in September 2021 (Great Britain. Department of Education, 2022). There is a considerably high number of students who have not applied for a school place, which might be because they pursue education via an online platform which the Ukrainian government has set up for displaced Ukrainian children in order to supply them with Ukrainian learning material (Great Britain. Department of Education, 2022).

Access to higher education has been facilitated for Ukrainian refugees: they are eligible for home fee status, subject to the condition of being an ordinary resident in the UK. Furthermore, they are entitled to student finance. The UK government has distributed over four million pounds to UK universities to fund support for Ukrainian nationals, accordingly, scholarships and hardships funds are offered by many institutions. In the course of the twinning programme, UK universities partner directly with Ukrainian universities to mutually recognise credits, share student well-being support and organise summer courses (Parliament. House of Commons, 2022).

Ukrainian refugees in primary and secondary education face similar difficulties as other groups of refugees in the past. Scholars have criticised the UK government for addressing refugee education inthe broaderimmigration policy discourse which has been dominated by hostile rhetoric and a deterrence approach, rather than discussing it in a public education framework (McIntyre and Hall, 2020, p. 583).The programme of academisation led to a higher focus on academic achievement, and the move away from the Every Child Matters policy (a multi-agency, holistic approach to child development) toward a policy based on the rationale that autonomy, markets, and choices constitute the key drivers of

social mobility, has increasingly led to higher vulnerability and invisibility of refugee pupils (McIntyre and Hall, 2020, p. 586). However, Ukrainian nationals aiming to enter higher education face significantly fewer barriers than refugees with other nationalities before them. The fact that they are eligible for home fee status suggests, again, a form of preferential treatment of Ukrainian refugees by facilitating access to key pillars of successful long-term social integration such as higher education and the labour market.

5.3.4 Poland

In Poland, the EU Council Directive 2013/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents provides the right to attend primary and secondary school on the same basis as Polish citizens. Furthermore, refugees are entitled to special programmes and assistance, such as Polish language classes. The Polish educationalpolicy aims to "create a cooperative, friendly, and safe study environment" (Domalewska and Zakowska, 2019, p.9) in order to transfer "universal values, such as character, brotherhood, and respectforothercultures" (Domalewska and Zakowska, 2019, p.9) to facilitate long-term social integration and economic assimilation.

It was estimated that 700 000 to 1 000 000 Ukrainian children will need to enter Polish schools, which requires a growth of school capacities of 14% (Mazzini, 2022). The Polish governmenthas taken measures toquickly integrateUkrainian teachers into the Polish school system to facilitate the transition forUkrainian pupils (UNICEF, 2022). Additionally, the number of students per classroom has been increased (Koschalka, 2022). Thus, the Polish education system provides Ukrainians with both the option of pursuing the Ukrainian curriculum via distance learning and to enrol and participate in the Polish educational system.

The Polish government has taken measures to facilitate access to tertiary education as well. Admission policies and criteria have been adjusted (students can enrol although they might lack necessary documentation), and tuition fees for full-time study in Polish suspended. Additional support includes the provision of student accommodation, and the app 'Chatbot' to make information about student enrolment and financial aid available (European Education and Culture Executive Agency, 2022, p.12).

The Polish government proved more flexible and adaptable to integrate Ukrainian nationals into their education compared to the UK, by allowing them to both pursue the Ukrainian curriculum and the option of fully committing to Polish education. What might prove problematic is that the very focus of the national history curriculum is the exclusion of other nations and ethnicities. The PiS party changed the curriculum as part of its cultural programme so that it reflects the party's version of Polish history, including its biases (Mazzini, 2022). Ukrainian refugees' accommodation has

been swift and welcoming which is largely due to the government's quick and effective policy action and the fact that Ukrainians were framed as ethnically similar and worthy of protection in the public discourse. Nonetheless, there are bound to be long-term problems in reconciling the nationalist narrative of the Polish nation with the integration of millions of Ukrainians. These problems are likely to emerge in the context of education.

5.4 Education

In this section the effects of political rhetoric and attitudes in terms of migration in the UK and Poland, respectively, will be analysed to show the factors that contributed to the final outcome of the UK accepting only around 150 000 Ukrainian refugees, while Poland accepted around 1.6 million (Statista, 2023). Both countries have distinct histories and political backgrounds, whichis whynews articles,public opinion polls, and academic journals analysing the events leading to the formation of the current political rhetoric in each country will be analysed to draw out the patterns and causes.

5.4.1 The United Kingdom

The UK is notoriously known for being hostile towards immigrants, as well as refugees. To better understand how the UK ended up forming its hostile political rhetoric towards immigrants I will be reviewing the main events and societal trends from 1999 until 2019, as mostly reported by Shabi (2019) in The Guardian. Consequently, I will compare Shabi's conclusion – that the media's negative and excessive reporting formed the hostile public attitudes towards immigration – to numerical data collected about media reporting and public attitudes from the same time period. Finally, I will analyse the positive shift in public attitudes towards immigrants in the 2020s in the light of the Ukrainian War.

Statisticalfindings aboutpublic attitudes towards immigration show that in 1997 only 3% of the UK population considered immigration to be a key issue, whereas, in 2016 (around the time of the EU referendum) 48% of the population held that view (Shabi, 2019). In just under two decades the number had increased 16 times, which represents a significant shift in the public's priorities and worries.

By 2004 the rejection rate of asylum applications reached its all-time high with 88%of themgetting rejected (Sturge, 2022). But instead of the public's worries subsiding over time, it only continued to rise. Shabi (2019) describes that around the time ofthe financialcrash in2008, the media had gone fromneutral reporting to seemingly creating a toxic narrative around the numbers, race, and ethnicity of the immigrants entering the UK. This became evident from how despite the UK's 'neoliberal economic globalisation' causing great market deregulation, the media's main focus at the time was on immigrants 'flooding' into the UK.

The scrutiny continued in the late 2000s and the public was presented with contentabout“Slovakspongers”and “cheating Czechs” (Shabi, 2019). This type of negative language was also used by the Daily Mail in their story about the “flood of bogus asylum-seekers swamping Dover” and statements such as “Gypsies invade Dover hoping for a handout” were seen in the Independent too (Shabi, 2019). This makes it apparentthat defamatory language was often used to describe immigrants entering the UK at that time, which fed into the biases that British people already held about immigrants.

This is particularly surprising given that Blanchflower and Lawton's 2008 paper “The Impact of the Recent Expansion of the EU on the UK Labour Market,” highlighted how in actuality “the UK open[ing] its borders to a flow of highly skilled, motivated, educated, low-cost mobile workers upon EU-enlargement was a stroke of genius,” as it positively influenced the UK economy. However, mainstream media failed to report the positive contributions of immigration, which resulted in disproportionately negative and partly inaccurate reporting.

Furthermore, according to the Southampton and Winchester Visitors Group's article “How Does the UK Compare With Other Countries?” (2018), 41% of the Home Office's asylum application decisions were overturned by the court in 2016, which highlights how biased the decisions made by governmentofficials and civilservants really were. Itwas also noted by advertisers in the late 2010s that the widely held negative attitudes towards asylum seekers started to increasingly get generalised to all forms of immigration (Shabi, 2019).

However, the UK government failed to neutralise the public's worries and negative attitudes regarding immigration despite its positive effectson the labourmarket(Shabi, 2019). Instead, the government ended up increasing negative rhetoric surrounding the topic: as a result of great public pressure in 2010 David Cameron (the UK's prime minister at the time) attempted to introduce a 'target' number of 'net-immigration', but due to the Tory party's inability to meet their promises the public got further enraged (Shabi, 2019).

Shabi (2019) then raises the question: could the effects of excessive and mostly negative coverage of immigration in the media have formed the hostile public opinion and notthe other way around?

The statistics (see Figure 2) posted by the Migration Observatory “A Decade of Immigration in the British Press” (2016) partly contradict Shabi's (2019) idea, as in the years 2008 until 2012 the number of articles mentioning 'immigration' or 'migration' was at the lowest point. Consequently, this doesn't necessarily support the notion that 'excessive' media attention spurred negative attitudes towards immigration. The number of articles mentioning these topics only rapidly increased in the years 2013 to 2015, which came

after the steady increase in immigration-related issues in the country. Hence, increased coverage of immigration makes sense as the aftermath and reflection of public attitudes and worries.

Figure 2

[Source: Allen, 2016]

Additionally, in the graph published by the Migration Observatory depicting the “Issueindex forimmigration” inthe years 2006 to 2015 (see Figure 3) we can see that it was exactly around 2014 when'immigration'started overtaking the 'economy' as the main issue in the UK. This mirrors the findings in Figure 2, where the media started mentioning immigration at a higher rate around 2014. Therefore, the idea that the media was reporting the public's concern about immigration, rather than blowing it out of proportion, seems to be corroborated by the Migration Observatory's findings.

Figure 3

[Source: Allen, 2016]

Further, the graph from the Migration Observatory depicting the level of 'opposition to immigrants/immigration' from 1964 to2018 (seeFigure 4), shows thatthe levels ofopposition have significantly decreased over time and reached an all-time low

in 2018. This is also reflected in the increasingly positive language being used by the media and politicians in recent years – for example, Jeremy Corbyn (member of the UK parliament) stated in 2019 that free movement “enriches the lives of all of us” (Gye, 2020).

[Source: Allen, 2016]

Furthermore, according to Ipsos (2022), it is increased awareness and understanding of immigrants’ contribution in important areas such as health and social care, which has led people to form a more positive conception of immigration. Their research (see Figure 5 below) shows how since October 2016 nearlyhalfofthe British people have heldratherpositive attitudes inregard tothe impact,which immigration has on the UK (Ipsos, 2022). This demonstrates that there is general agreementindata when itcomes to the claimthat immigration is not being viewed as negatively anymore as it was in the previous decades.

Source: Ipsos, 2022

However, with this shift towards more positive public attitudes, there's also been a change in the opinions regarding the level of media attention given to immigration. When earlier a lot of concern was raised due to presumed excessive media coverage, then in 2022 around 44% of British people

thought that immigration has been discussed too little rather than too much (Ipsos, 2022). This raises the question of how to then accurately determine when the media has potentially exacerbated an issue and when it has actually reflected genuine public concern. Further research into the media's positive and/or negative effects over time would allow for more confident conclusions.

Nevertheless, despite growing positive attitudes, polling from 2022 still shows that British people are not satisfied with the way their government is handling immigration (Baker, 2022). On top of this, around 41% of British people state that “too many people are being allowed to claim asylum in Britain” and 52% that “not enough is being done to stop channel migrant crossings” (Baker, 2022). This shows that even if the general discourse around migration has become less hostile and negative, the general dissatisfaction with migration policies and the government's decision-making in this area persists.

Now, when the Ukrainian Warstarted on the 24th ofFebruary, 2022, another poll was conducted and surprisingly 63% of people in the UK supported the idea of introducing a scheme to resettle Ukrainian refugees who had to flee their country as a result of the war (English, 2022). This number rose to 75% and has stayed relatively unchanged ever since (English, 2022).

The politicians' positive attitude has been considered a major factor in forming this supportive public attitude towards Ukranians – Boris Johnson (UK Prime Minister at the time) stated that the UK “is well out in front in [its] willingness to help with refugees” (Asthana, 2022). He was also one of the first world leaders to firmly side with Ukraine in this war by stating that Vladimir Putin “must fail” (Kampfner, 2022). Additionally, Liz Truss (UK foreignsecretary atthetime;later UK Prime Minister) continued this supportive tone by saying that the UK “will keep going further and faster to push Russia out of the whole of Ukraine” (Kampfner, 2022).

The UK proceeded to give overwhelming military support to Ukraine, however, was more reserved when it came to refugees. This was in contrast with the Prime Minister’s statement: the UK will “be as generous as we could in our support to Ukrainian refugees and the Home Secretary set out the extra resources we're putting in place into processing visas for those Ukrainians who have been forced to flee” (Morrison, 2022).

The UK received a significant amount of international criticism for its conservative approach to accepting refugees with even the French president, Emmanuel Macron, expressing his concern by saying that “despite all the grand statements… the British government continued to apply current rules that meant they did not welcome Ukrainian refugees who wanted to reach Britain” (Casey, 2022). An immigration and asylumlawyer,ColinYeo,statedthatthewar

Figure 4

Figure 5

had created an emergency situation requiring flexible refugee policies for which the “EU countries have waived the visa requirements” and that it is “hard to see why the UK thinks it’s special in that respect” (Casey, 2022).

Furthermore, the Financial Times proceeded to call the UK's refugee policies as “shameful” due to their rigidity (Casey, 2022). The situation thus became quite dire for the Ukrainians who had to flee their country in a rush, often forgetting to bring passports or not having sufficient time to prepare all the documents to meet the UK's demanding entry requirements. Consequently, Boris Johnson had to admit that “Ukrainian refugees could be forcibly removed to Rwanda if they arrive in the UK through unauthorised means” (Blewett, 2022).

Despite all of this, UK politicians kept expressing how warm and helpful the UK is towards Ukrainians: “I think we're a very welcoming nation” said Keir Starmer to The Times (Simons, 2022). The attempts to show solidarity and emphasise the closeness that British people felt to Ukranians were well expressed by Matt Hancock (who was the Secretary ofState forHealth and SocialCare atthe time)inhis statement on Twitter: “I will be signing up and opening my home to support our Ukrainian friends. I urge everyone who is able to help to register and welcome a family in desperate need. We must stand with Ukraine” (Simons, 2022).

Nevertheless, it has become clear that despite increased positive public attitudes towards Ukranians, the UK government is still unwilling to change its conservative approach to immigration. This situation is particularly perplexing given the extent of the government's contradictory behaviour: they make continuous statements to the public expressing greatsympathy towards Ukranian refugees and yet they refuse to adapt the immigration policies, despite the public's great dissatisfaction with them.

Megan Baker (2022) summarised this issues in her article “The Dangers of the British Government’s Immigration Rhetoric” by saying that “the government needs to modify its inflammatory language and stop perpetuating misinformation about refugees to avoid stirring up hate towards refugees, the consequences of which we have potentially already seen.”

In conclusion, it has become apparent that both the British media and the government contributed a considerable amount to the development of hostile political rhetoric in regard to immigration. Under-reporting or completely ignoring the positive effects that immigration has had on the UK seemed to have a particularly strong effect on the public, as people reported their attitudes shifting from negative to positive upon becoming more aware of said positive effects. Most importantly, this research showed that the British government's conservative and rigid approach to immigration failed to resolve the general public's concerns with excessive immigration in the 2000s and 2010s, as well as, prevented the

UK from accepting more Ukrainian refugees in 2023 despite the public's growing willingness and positive attitudes.

Consequently, it becomes clear why during Russia's violent attack against Ukraine, which by February 2023 had killed an estimated 100 000and displaced around 14 million Ukrainians (Nagorski et al., 2023), the UK had accepted only around 150 000 refugees (Statista, 2023).

5.4.2 Poland

A resounding majority in Europe favors supporting Ukraine and accepting Ukrainian refugees, with Poles having the most positive views towards these measures, according to early surveys of public opinion in Europe regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war and its participants (Fichtelstein et al., 2022). It is, thus, no surprise that Poland has received around 1.6 million Ukrainian refugees as of February 14, 2023 (Statista, 2023).

However, it is to be noted that, as European countries in general, Poland’s previous attitudes towards immigrants were far from welcoming and supportive. According to extended research, the media in Europe frequently portrays refugees, especially those coming from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as dehumanised, passive masses who constitute a danger to the continent's security, economy, and values (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017). Poland, in this case, makes no exception.

Figure 6

Source: Hargrave, Homel, and Dražanová, 2023

Figure 6 above confirms the conclusions reached by researchers (Hargrave, Homel and Dražanová, 2023), namely that although having just a little impact on Poland itself, the so-called "refugee crisis" in Europe in 2015 sparked significantly higher levels of anxiety. In contsrast, 1.3 million Ukrainians are thought to have entered Poland before the recent outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine in 2022 (Jówiak and Piechowska, 2017). This was Poland's first significant mass immigration in contemporary times. This begs the question -

why has Poland’s attitude toward immigration changed so drastically?

Essentially, this can be tied to the country’s internal political rhetoric and perception of immigrants as identity politics undoubtedly plays a critical role. It is because of the public perception of Ukrainian refugees that Poland has received and sheltered astounding numbers of refugees. In this sense, research employing collocation analysis, a technique used in corpus linguistics, has revealed that the displaced Ukrainians were mostly referred to as (war) refugees and discussed in relation to their travel to and reception in Poland (ZawadzkaPaluektau, 2022). The construction of such a narrative around Ukrainian refugees is crucial for their acceptance into Polish society. By this logic, we would assume that a different rhetoric would lead to an alternative outcome. The result is indeed different for refugees portrayed as, for instance, “economic migrants”, which translates into negative public attitudes (Meidert and Rapp, 2019). Unsurprisingly, this was the case of refugees coming from the Middle Eastern and North African region (Vollmer and Karakayali, 2017).

Anotherdimension important toconsiderinthe analysis ofthe political rhetoric surrounding Ukrainian refugees in Poland refers to their common history. The speeches delivered by the President of Poland in May 2022 at the Verkhovna Rada are builtaround a sense ofin-group solidarity between Poland and Ukraine, referencing the common aggressor:

“I thank you today for defending Europe from the invasion of barbarity and new Russian imperialism, for showing tyrants their place, for proving that the spirit of a free nation is stronger!” (President of the Republic of Poland, 2022)

“As Poland, we have long warned Europe about the imperial inclinations of Russia and Putin – against the desire to restore the influence of the Soviet Union, and perhaps even of tsarist Russia.” (President of the Republic of Poland, 2022)

“By the works of history Ukraine and Poland have a unique political opportunity ahead of them as two kindred nations from the same part of Europe.” (President of the Republic of Poland, 2022)

Previous studies (Krawatzek and Goldstein, 2022) have concluded that Poles consider their Ukrainian neighbours to be "brothers'' since they share a Slavic background and centuries of history. This view is strengthened by feelings of nostalgia and a “slightlyneo colonialmindset”. In otherwords, Ukraine’s and Poland’s sense of solidarity is tied to their common past of being satellite states in the Soviet sphere of interest.

Having examined the theoretical frameworks that account for Poland’s generalpositiveattitude towards receiving Ukrainian refugees, we will now draw on surveys on public opinion and

analyses of media publications to determine whether the rhetoric of the government and the press is consistent with the public perception.

Source: Centre for East European and International studies (ZOiS), 2022

As of March 2022, a survey conducted in Poland focusing on people aed between 16 and 34 years old, has revealed that almost50%ofyoung Polish people believe thatPoland should shelter as many Ukrainian refugees as possible. Moreover, it appears that young Poles mirror the general belief of Polish people, that of which Poland should continue to receive and shelter growing numbers of Ukrainian refugees. It is to be mentioned that this narrative is directly reflected in individual behaviour. The GLOBSEC Research Centre for Democracy and Resilience (2022) reinforces previous findings, by concluding that 68% of participants in their survey would welcome a Urkainainrefugee as a family member, 77%would do so as a close friend, and more than 80% as guests or fellow residents. The general attitude of support of the public is mirrored by the Polish Government as well. It is to be noted that Poland’s most popular party, the Law and Justice party (PiS) is right-wing and populist and national-conservative, and nevertheless supports aiding Ukrainian refugees. The head of Poland's ruling Law and Justice party, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has stated that every Pole should help Ukraine in its conflict with the invaders (The First News, 2022). Moreover, the Government has established methods of incentivizing Poles to take in Ukrainian refugees by announcing that they would receive $9 per day for each Ukrainian refugee they took in. In terms of policymaking, the Polish Parliament has passed a law supporting Ukrainian refugees (Notes from Poland, 2022).

This general positive attitude of the Polish citizens and the Government is also mirrored by media outlets. ZawadzkaPaluektau (2022) has conducted a comprehensive study analyzing the rhetoric of media outlets in Poland. She has overviewed a corpus of 320 news articles published between 1st of March, 2022 and 7th of March, 2022 collected from the most popular publications across the political spectrum. After examining one of the best selling tabloids, “Fakt”, the liberal “Gazeta Wyborcza”, and the conservative right-leaning “Rzeczpospolita”,Zawadzka-Paluektau(2022)concludedthat the rhetoric has been at worst, neutral to the invasion of

Ukraine, and, at best, supportive of Ukrainian refugees and denouncing Putin’s war.

These findings reveal that support toward Ukrainian refugees is not dependent on political beliefs, and is subsequently mirrored in both Governmental approaches, political speeches, and media outlets. Therefore, we find a strong correlation between public perception and political rhetoric toward Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Even if the UK Government feels more sympathetic towards Ukrainian refugees, it's complicated and rigid migration system makes it very difficult for the government to make changes quickly and efficiently when faced with new situations.

The current hostile migration policies and political rhetoric that the UK has, according to research, doesn't even achieve its aims of discouraging more irregular migrants from coming to the UK as well as encouraging the irregular migrants already in the UK to leave (Hennessey, 2021). Hence, it should be replaced by a different and less hostile type of approach towards migration policy-making.

One of the most important aspects that needs to change is providing more legal ways of entering the UK, for example easier VISA requirements as a lack of legal pathways of entering a country is what causes more irregular migrants (Hennessey, 2021).

Employmentrestrictions should be decreasedaswelltoensure that migrants can provide for themselves as well as contribute to British society and aren't instead pushed into poverty by the hostile system and a lack of opportunities (Hennessey, 2021).

It is also important to ensure that politicians are held responsible for their words – degrading and hostile language to create a negative perception of migrants in this case should be regulated and have consequences. Same goes for big promises and statements – politicians making pledges to help out refugees and not following up on their statements with actions further contributes to misleading the public and preventing accurate perception of issues being formed by the general public. Politicians and the government should not be contradictory and misleading with their words nor actions.

Given the fact that Poland has been welcoming of Ukrainian refugees generally because of a positive political rhetoric, it is imperative to construct a sustainable yet robust framework to ensure stability over time, especially if, by any chance, the narrative around Ukrainian refugees changes. Therefore, Poland should focus on developing a legal framework ensuring protection for refugees.

In accordance with international human rights and refugee legislation, the Polish government should make sure that the legal framework for refugees is thorough, unambiguous, and inclusive. This should cover safeguards for refugees, accessibility to the asylum process, and non-refoulement.

The Polish government should also guarantee that Ukrainian refugees are safe from harm, including discrimination, exploitation, and violence. This involves providing appropriate shelter, healthcare, and education for refugees, as wellas protecting themagainstarbitrary arrestorforced return to Ukraine.

The Polish and UK governments must take action to deliver simultaneously on both short and long-term considerations. While efforts have been taken to invest in long-term housing opportunities, further effort should be taken in the meantime, for instance in making empty lodgings and residences available to refugees, as Glasgow has done, to counter a rise in refugee homelessness.

The UK should devise a more efficient matching process between sponsors and hosts which establishes more efficient safeguarding in regards to background checks and additional council visits, establishing better access to psychological support and complaint mechanisms over a longer period after having settled into their accommodation.

The UK should also consider and develop an eventual exit plan from the Homes for Ukraine scheme that allows for a smooth integration of Ukrainian refugees into UK society (tie to visas). Action should be further taken to facilitate a shift from temporary lodgings, particularly in Poland, in which provisions for and access to long-term independent housing for Ukrainian refugees could be improved.

As priorities increasingly shift towards the full integration of Ukrainians into society in establishing their financial and social independence, Poland and the UK should take action to smoothen this process. While Wales and Poland have taken measures to scale back financial support for refugees in an attempttofacilitate theirintegration, itisimportanttoconsider that the influx of refugees is still increasing. It should be considered that some refugees have had longer to settle into these countries, and that the scaling back of financial support may prove more challenging and a barrier to refugees' wellbeing in contrast to those refugees who have arrived more recently. It may be beneficial to create an integration policy for refugees depending on how long they have been in the country, whereby those arriving more recently are provided more financial support, and once they reach a certain period of time where they have a basis/ the means for independence, financial aid is then scaled back. (re-word)

The process of providing sustainable long-term measures alongside urgently needed short-term services to Ukrainian refugees proves to be challenging for Poland in the provision

of health care specifically. At the moment, the majority of the provision of medical support services is delivered by volunteers since the national health care system is structurally unable to cater for the needs of both Polish citizens and refugees. Hence, it is imperative to substantially increase the number of doctors relative to the population, and establish a dense and comprehensive system of hospitals and medical practices. Furthermore, it is advisable to simplify the procedures for Ukrainian medical personnel to access the workforce inthe health sector, and provide opportunities toreand up-skill for Polish citizens in order to incentivise them to pursue a career in the healthcare sector.

For the UK, the challenge of delivering short-term relief and support as well as implementing measures for sustainable long-term integration, lies in the education sector. Although access to primary and secondary education for Ukrainian refugees is legally guaranteed, the UK government should implement a dualstrategy, supporting the use of the Ukrainian online-school platform while at the same time attending classes in UK schools. The number of mandatory classes attended in UK schools should be reduced according to the extent to which learning is pursued via the online platform. It is nonetheless indispensable to ensure attendance in UK schools in order to provide the children with the social environmentofa schoolthataids themintheirpersonal,social, and academic development, as well as their successful assimilation into British society.

Lastly, the UK and Poland must bridge the gap between their treatment of Ukrainians and ‘third country nationals’. This does no32wt only encompass a political redressing of housing policies, but the policy approach to asylum seekers and refugees as a whole. The UK must not systematically disadvantage non-Ukrainian ‘third country nationals’ in their access to health care. Barriers of language, bureaucracy, and accommodation must be removed by ensuring access of all non-English speaking refugees to an interpreter and information material about the British health care system in the respective mother tongues.

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Critical Assessment of the EU Data Governance Act: To what extent does the EU Data Governance Act effectively enable NGOs in achieving open data sharing for social benefit?

Angela Zhou1, Patrycja Jasiurska, Gabriel Chow, Antoine Roux De Luze, Caroline Tian

1Research Team Leader

Published April 2024

Abstract

This paper examines the largely unexplored intersection ofdata sharing and non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs), focusing on the European Union Data Governance Act (DGA). Employing a governance approach, the study assesses the DGA's effectiveness in facilitating open data sharing for social benefit within the NGO sector. The analysis, spanning theoretical foundations, policy context, methodology, and case findings, identifies key opportunities and challenges. Acknowledging limitations, the paper concludes with four concise recommendations for the European Commission, contributing valuable insights to the discourse on science and technology policy and the practical implications of the DGA for NGOs.

Keywords: EU Data Governance Act, NGOs, technology policy

1. Executive Summary

Compared to other science and technology policy areas such as healthcare and finance, the interaction between data sharing and non-government organisations (NGOs) has not been widely researched. Accounting for the information deficit in the non-scientific realm and aiming to be more applicable to a wider audience, the following research applies a governance approach to assess the extent to which the EU Data Governance Act (DGA) effectively enables NGOs in achieving open data sharing for social benefit. Departing from a presumption of ‘openness’ where data is considered free for (re)use and (re)distribution by default, the analysis works backward to identify the opportunities and challenges of datasharing practices in the NGO context as envisaged within the DGA’s governance framework.

Introducing the theoretical background of data sharing and adaptive regulatory governance in Section 2.1, the policy context in which the DGA has been implemented including complementary data and digital regulatory instruments within the European Digital Strategy is outlined in Section 2.2. Section 3 provides both an overview of the methodology and

research design before presenting the case findings in Section 4. Further broken down into subsections, the analysis focuses on data availability, data accessibility and data interoperability. Key opportunities and challenges to the DGA’s role ineffectivelyenabling NGOs toachieveopen data sharing for social benefit are illustrated respectively. Addressing limitations to the analysis in Section 5, the report concludes with four summary recommendations for the European Commission in Section 6.

1.1. Methodology

Working with Wonder Foundation, an NGO based in London concerned with poverty alleviation by empowering women and girls through access to education and vocational training, a case study approach was undertaken to understand interactions of NGOs with data regulations and further identify data-related challenges faced by NGOs. Frequently requiring access to not only public sector data such as staff details of the public offices responsible for children and education and data on children leftoutof the education system but also data on other NGOs providing care for children in aspects other than education tostrengthen inter-organisational

cooperation, semi- structured interviews were conducted with a representative from the organisation and which revealed key data-related challenges that are analysed in Section 4. Complemented with legal text analysis, immediate policy gaps and limitations in the DGA were identified which further informed several policy recommendations to improve the DGA infurtherpromoting open data sharing forsocialbenefit.

1.2. Opportunities

The DGA’s strategic ambitions and regulatory instruments demonstrate opportunities for improving data availability, data accessibility and data interoperability in both the nonprofit sector and the wider data-sharing landscape. Data availability is improved through an emphasis on data altruism and the implementation of system intermediaries such as Data Altruistic Organisations (DAOs). Encouragingstakeholders to make their data available for public interests will in turn increase the amount of data readily available for re-use, including the availability of public sector data for NGOs in undertaking their organisational activities. NGOs are further able to register as DAOs through data altruism consent forms which not only ensure their legal protection and make efforts to encourage data sharing more effective in the long term but also improve data availability from the harmonisation of legislation on consent models across the EU digital landscape.

In addition to DAOs, new categories of system intermediaries implemented by the DGA pose a form of systems innovation which has the potential to not only overcome traditional barriers to data sharing and improve data accessibility. NGOs can benefit from Data Intermediaries (DIs) by either directly becoming one themselves or indirectly from improved data accessibility. DIs can provide the technical infrastructure required for open data sharing whilst maintaining adequate cybersecurity measures and leveraging privacy-enhancing technologies to improve data accessibility without compromising on privacy. DIs can enhance the capacity for undertaking data-intensive research by gaining credibilityand trustworthiness from meeting EU standards and also creating a revenue stream from data-related services to further advocacy efforts for NGOs with limited financial capabilities. Alternatively, NGOs can participate in data intermediation by becoming a Data Cooperative (DCs) which is a subcategory ofdata intermediaries owned and democratically controlled by its members. Voluntarily aggregating data and making it available to fellow members and other users is not only symbolic of an attempt to address power imbalances within the data economy but also contributes to improving both data availability and accessibility.

Furthermore, the DGA poses an opportunity to improve data interoperability by challenging traditional understandings of data ownership and steering towards a more open, accessible

data economy to include a wide range of stakeholders. Technological requirements for public sector organisations to make data available in machine-readable formats directly improve interoperability by making information easier to process and analyse. The DGA’s standardised framework for data intermediation further improves data interoperability by removing legal uncertainties and enhancing multi-stakeholder collaboration. Additional compliance requirements for member states to identify a national point of contact for data sharing further facilitate multi- sectoral collaboration and improve whole-system data interoperability.

1.3. Challenges

Despite the above opportunities, several challenges remain in the DGA’s role in effectively enabling NGOs to achieve open data sharing for social benefit. Improved data availability is hindered by ambiguously defined concepts of ‘data altruism’ and data sharing for ‘purposes of general interest’ which are subject to interpretation and lacks incentives for voluntary data sharing. Legislative tensions with the GDPR introduce additional bureaucratic and administrative challenges which further increase risks of lock-in and decentivise NGOs from registering as system intermediaries.

Furthermore, the current data intermediation framework lacks specificity and strictcompliance requirements remaindifficult for organisations to meet and further exercise improved data accessibility. Demanding high capabilityrequirements such as having appropriate legal status, capacity for data protection, and good levels of transparency and accountability, compliance becomes too burdensome for organisations such as NGOs and is likely to distract rather than empower their advocacy efforts. Resembling a one-size-fits-all solution, the DGA’s framework fails to account for the different business models that data intermediaries operate on and lacks adequate financialfunding fororganisations tosustainand even register under the framework. Resulting in higher operational costs and higherservice prices, DIs lack competitivenessand appeal to customers and are likely to become outcompeted by nonDGA firms entering the data intermediation market. An overreliance on data intermediaries further poses a risk of lock-in resulting in diminished user trust and the challenge of generating a sufficient user base. Whilst the EU’s vision to establisha European DataInnovation Board (EDIB)following the DGA reflects ambitions to address power imbalances in the data economy, it remains to be contested whose interests are being represented. The option for various stakeholders to engage with the DGA does not equal guaranteed participation and stakeholders willrequire exposure torelated digitalknowhow and surpass relevant technical standards to engage effectively with the DGA.

Finally, improved data interoperability is challenged by the lack of legal interoperability with other EU legislation. Illusions of well-integration into the EU policy context are challenged by persistent tensions with alternative data protection principles prohibiting data sharing by default and pose a risk of exacerbating existing power imbalances in the data economy and contributing to institutional lock-in. Terminology discrepancies between the DGA and GDPR leave data rights and responsibilities subject to interpretation and failure to address the complex relationship between personal data, non-personal data, and mixed data sets further exacerbates areas of confusion and conflict between the legislative frameworks.

1.4. Recommendations

Section 6 concludesthe reportwith fourkey recommendations forthe EU Commission. Firstly, a clarification ofthe interplay between the DGA with other EU legislation on data is critical to ensure its successful implementation. Particularly in the case of regulating the re-use of personal data held by public sectororganisations,the broad nature ofthe DGA’s legislative framework risks undermining personaldata protection rules in the GDPR which may result in weakened levels of personal data protection and the potential for the DGA to be used as a scapegoat to advance economic interests to the detriment of users’ privacy rights. Whilst there exists an opportunity for connectivity between the DGA and the GDPR, regulatory intervention is required to reduce legislative tensions and increase alignmentbetween the DGA and the GDPR and more markedly within the EU strategy for data.

Furthermore, the DGA currently plays a role in sustaining power imbalances between state and non-state actors, and the clarification of policy priorities and promotion of multi-sector and multi- stakeholder collaboration is required to improve human-centricity and participation in its policy design and implementation. Clarity around data ethics standards and on terms such as ‘data altruism’ and data sharing for ‘purposes of general interest’ is required to increase inclusivity and greater emphasis on multi-stakeholder and multi-sector collaboration can help remediate current data-related challenges faced within the NGO context such as the lack of a formal information- sharing structure between the public and nonprofitsectors. In practice, a co-design approach can be applied to facilitate more knowledge sharing around digital rights and technologies and which is inclusive and representative of the values, experiences, and perspectives of those affected by data-driven technologies.

The success of the above recommendations is further dependent on the redesign of a more concrete implementation strategy which accounts for unique context factors. Current compliance rules for system intermediaries under the DGA

reflect a one-size-fits-all approach and lack incentives for registration. To ensure greater levels of compliance and registration, the DGA needs to account for the different business models that system intermediaries operate on and recognise the compliance challenges pertaining not only to different models of system intermediaries but also to the sectors they operate in. Similarly, different standards exist for different data-sharing partners and are often influenced by trust and power dynamics. Different sectors and organisations have different levels of readiness and capabilities for data sharing and the diversity in the market setup, exchanged data types and usage types demonstrate the need for tailored solutions to ensure fair market competition between organisations.

Finally, the provision of adequate incentives and resources to encourage the re-use of public sector data and altruistic data sharing is required to increase compliance and registration with the DGA in the NGO context. Technical and social capability requirements should be clarified from not only the onset of the implementation of the DGA but also programmes devised for the continuous re-evaluation of compliance feasibility. Additional resources should also be provided for capability building within organisations to meet compliance requirements and enhance participation. Alternatively, direct efforts could be made to reduce technical and infrastructural barriers for NGOs to register as a system intermediary. User or data-subject empowerment remains a major weakness. Typical reservations towards open data sharing are often unfounded and many individuals and organisations lack awareness of its actual benefits and long-term opportunities. In addition to the provision of adequate incentives to encourage participation in altruistic data sharing, greater emphasis is needed on the informal education of both data providers and users, and the building of knowledge-based organisations to ensure long-term, effective, and sustainable usage of data-sharing infrastructure in the European Digital Single Market.

2. Policy Problem

2.1. Theoretical Perspectives

Several key theoretical perspectives have been identified to analyse the DGA. Involving a network of stakeholders from both the public and non-profit sectors, the DGA can be approached as a form of systems innovation. Analysed along the three dimensions of data accessibility, data availability, and data interoperability, the importance of human-centricity and human participation in data governance is assessed whilst accounting for how different aspects of public sector capabilities and adaptive regulation governance solutions can

be applied to improve the DGA in effectively enabling NGOs in achieving open data sharing for social benefit.

2.1.1. Public Sector Innovation

A systems innovation approach regards innovation as a sociotechnical regime consisting of a network of agents and emphasises the importance of the institutional context in which interactions between actors and processes take place (Edquist, 1997). Involving stakeholders from both the public and non-profit sectors and also heavily articulated in relation tootherregulations inthe European DigitalStrategy, the DGA can be approached as a form of systems innovation in the public sector where data sharing constitutes the main form of innovation.

Innovation implementation in the public sector faces several challenges and barriers. Public sector organisations are prone toentrenched practices which frequentlylead tolock-inwhere traditional practices are continued in preference to better alternatives and innovation systems become resistant to changes intheirsocio-technicalconfiguration. The currentEU data sharing regulatory landscape exhibits signs of technological lock-in reinforced by institutional lock-in where policy ambitions for achieving ‘open by default’ data sharing are increasing dependency on system intermediaries and legislative instruments. Within a networked innovation system, data subjects and users risk becoming locked-in with market-selected data-sharing standards and are faced with several bureaucratic and administrative challenges which decentivise stakeholders from participating in data governance frameworks altogether.

Despite posing an opportunity for not only the harmonisation and integration of data sharing but also for triggering wider innovation within the EU digital economy, the DGA’s ability to remediate the effects of lock-in is dependent on developing whole-systemadaptive capabilities. Atthe governance level, adaptive governance capabilities refer to the ability of policymakers to design and implement policies effectively, to take a broad view of the innovation system, and to build government competencies. Given the DGA’s involvement with stakeholders in both the public and non-profit sectors, an additional consideration for technological, social and human capabilities is required for effective governance and to ensure the development of a long-term, sustainable data sharing innovation system

2.1.2. Data Sharing

The following analysis draws insights from technology governance concepts such as ‘knowledge sharing’ and ‘social learning’ which departs from the idea that everyone can learn fromeveryone else;societylearns abouttechnology whilstthe technology in turn learns about society. Often cited as a key

governance challenge, narrow assumptions about social needs, solvable problems, and economic problems can be solved through improved ‘social learning’ and data sharing (Stilgoe, 2018). In practice, social learning is presented as an overarching ideal encompassing modular practices such as data sharing and information sharing, both as independent practices and also as constituents of knowledge sharing. Engaging with questions such as ‘Who is learning, what are they learning and how are they learning?’ the model challenges the role and importance of social learning along two dimensions: How can social learning be improved? And how can social learning become democratised through ‘data sharing’? (ibid.) Departing from these insights, the analysis framework is conceptualised along the three dimensions of data availability, data accessibility, and data interoperability to assess the key opportunities and challenges for NGOs in effectively engaging with data sharing as regulated by the DGA.

2.1.3. Human -centricity and Human Participation

Broadly defined as the facilitation of diverse engagement of civil society actors and researchers to ensure that data sharing will not benefit the few but the many, increased expectations for public administration in providing access to information and data have since attributed human-centricity as one of the main challenges for data governance in Europe (Lomas et al., 2020; Overdiek, 2022). In information management and governance studies, critical reflections on shifts in the nature and maturity practices in EU public administration proposed a maturity model for developing and managing information governance in a public corporate context (Lomas et al., 2020). Identifying three different scopes of evaluation relating to people (leadership, expertise, citizen inclusion), systems (framework design, process development), and ethics (laws, regulations, directives, standards, obligations), strong imperatives for increasing human embeddedness in public administration are evident and adjacent research on humanrights centred approaches to data reinforce the importance for considering equivalent approaches in data governance (Shepherd et al., 2020).

Similarly, a focus on the centralisation of information rights and human values is evident in research around digital protection law and data rights. Broadened understandings of ownership such as the expanding notion of “data controller” from the GDPR - referring to an entity that “alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data (Article 4(7) GDPR) - are evident as users find themselves increasingly acting as joint controllers with their service providers (Edwards et al., 2019; Inkpen, K. et al., 2019). Joint-controllership is reproduced in the DGA where despite promises of greater stakeholder involvement, it continues to rely on consent-based data

altruism practices which assert greater responsibility on data subjects. Several legal and technical challenges remain in joint-controllership such as prejudicing of data rights and a consequent impedimentto both the developmentand adoption of privacy- protective technologies (Edwards et al., 2019). Positioning itself as a human-centric approach to data governance which differs from previous market-oriented approaches, the degree of human- centricity and participation in the DGA remains subject to contestation.

2.1.4. Adaptative vs Anticipatory Governance

Targeting areas in science and technology policy engaging in fast-paced innovation and under pressure from the uncertain nature of technological risks (such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices), amodelofadaptivegovernanceallowspolicymakers to modify regulations as science and uses change without passing new legislations (De Grandis et al., 2022). Comparatively, a model of anticipatory governance advocates a non-predictive approach and is characterised by activities designed to build broad-based capabilities in foresight, engagement, integration, and ensemble (Guston, 2014). Extended throughout society, anticipatory governance emphasises cooperation between stakeholders such as scientists,policymakersand thecitizen public,and encourages actors to reflect on their position and role during technology production.

Several insights can be drawn from the two comparable governance approaches. An adaptive regulatory approach draws attention to not only the entrenched, institutionalised processes of planned adaptation in the design of regulatory frameworks and governance but also a deficit in current evaluations of the performance and public value proposition of adaptive regulations (De Gradis et al., 2022). Such an emphasis on the consequences of adaptive regulations on the stakeholders illustrates the risk of lock-in and identified measures ofregulatory adaption, agility, and flexibilityfurther inform key analytical dimensions of the assessment of the DGA. Drawing insights from an emphasis on broad-based capabilities in anticipatory governance, public sector capabilities are further accounted for when identifying policy gaps and devising recommendations for the DGA. Demonstrating an imperative to consider alternative regulatory governance frameworks, an effective governance approach requires consideration for systematic planning, knowledge-sharing and adaptive capabilities.

2.2. Policy Context

The European Digital Strategy aspires to create a single marketfordata thatwillgrantthe European Union world-class competitiveness and more sovereignty over the data landscape.In particular, itaims toestablish common European

data spaces that will allow the largest possible number of organisations to access vast datasets for the benefit of the wider economy and society while guaranteeing its holders' secure control over it.

With the EU recognising the major economic and societal potential of data, the European Commission has shown a sustained interest in optimising data-sharing practices within its borders. In late 2020, the European Council raised “the need to make high-quality data more readily available and to promote and enable better sharing and pooling of data, as well as interoperability” (European Council, 2020). This willingness came with the identification of a number of obstacles to data sharing in the EU: low trust in data sharing, issues related to the re- use of public sector data and data collection for the common good are among them (European Commission, 2022). This process culminated in the winter of 2020 with the introduction of a ‘digital regulation package’, an ambitious data and digital regulation project composed of fouracts:the DigitalMarkets Act(DMA), the DigitalServices Act (DSA), the Data Act and the Data Governance Act (DGA). The collective package aims to ensure greater accessibility to data and improved interoperability through the foundation of a cross-sectoral data governance framework.

2.2.1. Digital Markets Act (DMA)

Entered intoforce on November1st,2022, the DigitalMarkets Act (DMA) represents the European Union’s attempt to regulate Big Tech and focuses on the most powerful actors in the field of platform gatekeeping. Taking an approach similar to that of competition law, the DMA’s goal is to prevent unfair practices by gatekeeper platforms and is hence characterised as “an internal market-oriented harmonization measure” (Leistner, 2021).

2.2.2. Digital Services Act (DSA)

Entered into force on November 16th, 2022, the Digital Services Act (DSA) also focuses on the legal dimension of the matter and is designed as a first step towards a modern legal framework that would allow for more effective protection of the fundamental rights of online users, as well as maintaining a fair and open online platform environment by combating large platforms that set themselves up as private rule-makers due to their outsize influence in the digital economy. In practice, it regulates the conduct of digital platforms mediating between consumers and goods, services and content, and is especially concerned with the trade and exchange of illegal goods, services and content online (European Commission, 2022).

2.2.3. Data Act

Issued on the 23rd of February 2022, the Data Act’s primary goal is to ensure “fairness in the allocation of value from data among actors in the data economy and to foster access to and use of data” (European Commission, 2022). This aim remains market-focused, the broader policy goal being enabling data sharing and use across sectors through common European data spaces, contributing to a European market for data (Leistner, 2021).

2.2.4. Data Governance Act (DGA)

Published on June 3rd, 2022, the Data Governance Act(DGA) entered into force 20 days later and will be applicable from September 2023. The DGA is a cross-sectoral instrument with three core objectives: (1) make more data available by regulating the re-use ofpublicly-held, protecteddata;(2)boost data sharing through the regulation of novel data intermediaries; and (3) encourage the sharing of data for altruistic purposes, and provides a range of strict regulations to facilitate reuse of publicly-held data in a way that enhances trust (European Commission, 2022).

In addition to technicalrequirements toensure the privacy and confidentiality of data either through practical tools such as encryption or contractual tools, public sector bodies are required to establish transparent and proportionate fees for reuse. Similarly, the European Commission worked with an underlying assumption that the achievement of its core objectives would notbe possible withoutthe regulation ofnew data intermediation services, designed to act as neutral third parties connecting data owners and providers with data users. Providers of data intermediation services would have to meet strict specifications, aimed at ensuring that they will function as trustworthy organisers. This stems from the DGA's emphasis on the transparency and neutrality of intermediaries, inan effort tolimit externalities such as the risk ofmisuse, and thereby increase the trust placed in them by stakeholders. The DGA further introduces a new concept in the field of data regulation: ‘data altruism’. Defined by the European Commission as “the consent by data subjects to process personal data pertaining to them, or permissions of other data holders to allow the use of their non-personal data without seeking a reward, for purposes of general interest, such as scientific research purposes or improving public services.” (The National Law Review, 2020). Possible for being interpreted both as a tool for achieving organisational aims and asthe endgoalinitself, wecaution the distinction between ‘data altruism’ as a practice which enables stakeholders to further their own cause and as a proxy for achieving goals of ‘open by default’ types of data sharing.

2.2.5. Towards Altruistic Data Sharing

The reuse of publicly-held data is not novel. Published in 2019, The Open Data Directive (ODD)was already a firststep in this direction but was limited in scope as it only applied to publicly available information held in the public domain and did not apply to protected data held by these same public bodies, from which vast amounts of knowledge could potentially be gained without it being at odds with their protected nature. More specifically, this concerns data protected by third- party rights (e.g. business secrets, personal data or intellectual property) which require special rules at the national or European level in order to be reused.

Targeting nine sectors where a more effective data-sharing framework could boost innovation: health, environment, energy, agriculture, mobility, finance, manufacturing, public administration and skills, the European Commission believes that increased data availability from the DGA would benefit European citizens, for example by allowing more trusted and effective data sharing for general public interest projects, improved development of products and services, better training for AI systems, and increased transparency in governance (European Commission, 2022). The European Commission further believes that there exists a will to engage in voluntary and consensual sharing of data, but which is “hampered by a lack of data-sharing tools” (European Commission, 2022). Hence the DGA’s ambitions to create a “framework for voluntary registration of entities that collect and process data made for altruistic purposes,” which would then become recognised as trustworthy organisations based on EU rules ofconduct(European Council, European Parliament, 2022).

The facilitated access to data sought by data altruism as a tool is a major stake in light of the needed development of AI solutions within the European Union, which is currently hindered by the numerous barriers to accessing data held by private and even public actors. A similar observation applies to other sectors where research plays a significant role, such as health, climate action and mobility. The DGA further aims to improve data findability and accessibility by bringing European nations to centralise their data into single information points and combine these national single information points into a European-wide single access point.

3. Policy Problem

3.1. Introduction

A case study analysis was undertaken to assess the degree to which the DGA effectively enables NGOs in achieving open data sharing for social benefit. Reflected within the DGA’s three core objectives to increase data availability, boost data sharing, and encourage the sharing of data for altruistic

purposes, the DGA’s strategic ambitions and governance instruments evidence opportunities for improved data availability, accessibility, and interoperability in both the nonprofit sector and in the EU data economy. Whilst improved availability, accessibility and interoperability of data enables NGOs to further their advocacy efforts and enhances their participation within the wider data landscape, it also carries many additional risks. Engaging frequently with data and data sharing in their operational activities, the following case study helps to better understand the interactions of NGOs with data regulations and identifies changes that could be made to the DGA to further promote open data sharing for social benefit.

3.2. Research Design

Combining a case study approach with legal text analysis, the research is designed to engage with the DGA from the perspective of a currently active NGO. Not only does this approach help identify immediate limitations in the DGA but also allows for a focused analysis of the most important datarelated challenges faced by NGOs and how the DGA can alleviate them.

Working with Wonder Foundation, an NGO based in London concerned with poverty alleviation by empowering women and girls through access to education and vocational training, our research design consists of a one-time, 30-minute, semistructured interview with a representative from the organisation. As partoftheirorganisationalactivities, Wonder Foundation frequently requires access to both public sector data such as staff details of the public offices responsible for children and education, data on children left out of the education system, and also data on otherNGOs providing care forchildren inaspects otherthan education tostrengthen interorganisational cooperation.

Questions asked during the interview include: How does your organisation interact with data? For what purposes are they used and what are the data sources? How significant is data accessibility to your organisational activities and do you have any problems with data accessibility? Are you aware of the DGA, or equivalent data regulations in the UK and how does itaffectyourwork? Finally, do you recognise anychanges that need to be made to the DGA, or equivalent regulations in the UK, to improve its suitability to your organisation in terms of improving your access to data and enhancing your organisational activities? Our interview with Wonder Foundation revealed three key data-related challenges, insights from which will be discussed and further analysed in more detail in Section 4.

4. Policy Problem

NGOs such as Wonder Foundation face a diverse range of data-related obstacles which have varying degrees of impact on their organisational activities and advocacy efforts. The following section analyses the DGA’s regulatory framework in terms of the opportunities and challenges that arise when engaging with NGOs. The extent to which the DGA effectively enables NGOs in achieving open data sharing for social benefit will be assessed along the three dimensions of data availability, data accessibility, and data interoperability.

4.1. Data Availability

Wonder Foundation is primarily concerned with poverty alleviation by empowering women and girls through access to education and vocational training and conducts a core programme aimed to support migrant girls aged 14-18 in getting a place within the British school system. Such core programmes require extensive data on the number of migrant girls arriving in the UK and their ages, how long it takes for them to get a place at school, and the percentage of these children who remain in school and those who drop out. However, public sector data on children left out of the education system is limited and has resulted in the organisation resorting to sending out Freedom of Information requests (FOIs) to all local authorities responsible for children and education. Not only does this increase human capability demands within the organisation butposes a challenge initself as oftentimes contacts for local authorities are decentralised and inaccessible. The best databases with these contact details are usually those informally constructed by other activists in the past and shared online. However, these are often incomplete and outdated.

4.1.1. Opportunities

The limited availability of public sector data poses a key challenge for NGOs in performing their organisational activities which the DGA is able to address through its regulation on data altruism. Codified for the first time in the DGA, the concept of “data altruism” informally refers to the voluntary and consensual sharing of data without receiving a reward where organisations make their data available for objectives of general interest such as scientific research purposes or improving public services. Contributing to broader aims of fostering the reuse of more public sector data, the DGA’s attempt to regulate civic data altruism is designed to encourage citizens and organisations alike to make their data available for public interests and, in turn, increase the amount of data readily available for (re)use. According to the EU Commission, improved data availability will further improve policy design and implementation, and witness sectoral improvements in health, labour skills and mobility, further triggering wider innovation within the EU digital economy.

Furthermore, NGOs are able to register as Data Altruism Organisations (DAOs)through dataaltruismconsentforms. In addition to standard eligibility requirements where registered organisations must be of non-profit character, relevant transparency and safeguard requirements further allows these organisations to enjoy legal protection which may subsequently make efforts to encourage data sharing more effective in the long term and improve data availability. As outlined in Article 17 (5) of the DGA, registered organisations must keep complete and accurate records and draft annual reports on their activities. Records must include ‘natural and legal persons’ given the possibility to process data, the purpose of processing, and any fees paid. Such demands ensure that in situations where data is misused, the board will be able to hold perpetrators accountable. Member states are also compelled to designate an authority to maintain a register of official DAOs. There are also mechanisms in place where the legal person has the right to lodge a complaint with the relevant national authority against a provider of data-sharing services in cases of abuse. Uniform data altruism consent forms can further become an opportunity to harmonise legislation on consent models across EU member states and thereby easing data sharing within Europe (Shabani 2021, p.2).

4.1.2. Challenges

Despite the above opportunities, the DGA’s effective engagement with NGOs is hindered by the ambiguously defined concept of ‘data altruism’ and additional bureaucratic and administrative challenges. Current definitions of ‘data altruism’and data sharing for‘general interest’remain subject to interpretation and further introduce problems in relation to incentives for voluntary data sharing. Some have associated ‘general interest’ with ‘public interest’ but the purpose and scope of general interest activities remain to be precisely defined (Open Future, 2021).

Furthermore, a system of dual authorities is created between the DGA and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and which will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4.3.2. Instead ofsteering the processing ofpersonaldataforaltruistic purposes away from the definitions outlined in the GDPR, conditions for consent to data processing are left to an implementing act to be adopted later as defined in Article 22 of the DGA (Veil, 2022). These new procedures such as registers, seals of approval, and registration/record-keeping obligations generate a series of bureaucratic burdens that are likely to further decentivise NGOs from registering as a data altruism organisation in addition to the compliance burden of the GDPR (Veil, 2022). This is likely to further introduce administrative confusion as compliance with data protection requirements is considered separate from compliance with the requirements of the DGA where Article 20 (3) presupposes

that the ‘authorities will just have to cooperate’, with no mechanism to solve disputes (Veil, 2022). Such bureaucratic and administrative challenges are demonstrative of institutional lock-in, simultaneously decentivising participation with data regulation frameworks and locking-in those subscribed to a system of inefficiency and suboptimality.

4.2. Data Accessibility

In addition to supporting migrant girls getting a place within the British school system, the Wonder Foundation works closely with migrant communities and requires access to data on both migrantdemographicsandsurvey information on their motivations to migrate. In addition to data availability challenges, much of the required information is inaccessible due to the lack of a formal structure for information sharing between the public and non-profit sectors which poses a further key challenge for NGOs in performing their organisational activities. Due to the current inaccessibility of required information, Wonder Foundation further suspects that local authorities fail at not only sharing but also the primary collection of data needed for human rights monitoring.

4.2.1. Opportunities

The DGA’s regulatory framework creates new categories of system intermediaries responsible for facilitating trust and open data sharing for social benefits. In addition to data altruism organisations introduced in Section 4.1.1., data intermediaries and data cooperatives are system intermediaries capable of improving data accessibility.

Data Intermediaries

Organisations such as NGOs have limited infrastructural and technological capabilities and can benefit from data intermediaries by either directly becoming one themselves or indirectly from improved data accessibility. Data intermediaries can provide the technical infrastructure that enables sharing of data whilst maintaining adequate cybersecurity measures, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETS), and creating trusted research environments (CDEI, 2021). In particular, PETs can be leveraged to enable data to be accessible to the data user while protecting the data subject’s privacy and further allowing sensitive data to be more available for usage (CDEI, 2021). Due to neutrality requirements, data intermediaries mitigate the risk of data misuse as the third-party organisation can ensure that the information is handled and processed appropriately.

Furthermore, data intermediaries can enhance the capacity for undertaking data-intensive research and further advocacy efforts inorganisations with limited financialcapabilities such

as NGOs. In becoming a data intermediary, an NGO gains credibility and trustworthiness from meeting EU standards and has the opportunity to create a revenue stream from datarelated services. Various NGOs serve the purpose of data intermediation and use this functionality to improve their organisationalefficiency and influence, furthercontributing to improving system-wide data accessibility.

Moreover, operating on a ‘pay to play’ model, data intermediaries are able to overcome traditional barriers to data sharing and can further be considered a form of systems innovation through its creation of new business models. Data intermediaries are required under the DGA to enlist themselves on a public register accessible by clients and facilitate the easier discovery of datasets, provide assurance to data holders and subjects, and provide legal expertise and common data standards (Leistner, 2021; CDEI, 2021). Such a standardised framework for data intermediation further contributes to improving data interoperability which will be further discussed in Section 4.3.

Data Cooperatives

Alternatively, NGOs can participate in data intermediation by joining a data cooperative. Data cooperatives operate as a subcategory of data intermediaries and are owned and democratically controlled by its members (Janssen and Singh, 2022). As organisations that use the data of its members for social benefit, they are grassroots driven and governance is in the powerofpeople as citizens voluntarily aggregate theirdata together (Hafen, 2019). NGOs are able to improve both data availability and accessibility by working together to pool their data and make them available to fellow members and other users. Data cooperativesare symbolicofanattempttoincrease human-centricity and human participation, whilst addressing power imbalances of the data economy through rebalancing the relationship between subjects, platforms and third-party data users (Micheli et al, 2020). Data cooperatives can further subvert prominent issues around data in the modern age such as the use of surveillance capitalism by large tech companies, contributing to efforts to resist data colonialism (Calzada, 2021).

4.2.2. Challenges

Whilst increased registration of data intermediaries and increased availability of such services will likely encourage more frequent and larger scales of data sharing, it is not guaranteed that the regulatory framework will result in a greater number of data intermediaries and improved data availability and accessibility. The effective role of data intermediaries depends on the demand for intermediation and the extent to which organisations feel encouraged by

regulatory clarity and standardisation requirements to participate.

Regulatory Charity

The current framework for data intermediation lacks specificity for effectively improving data accessibility. In January 2023, the European Commission mandated member states to make six categories of datasets available free of charge including data on mobility, environment, and company ownership. Equivalent specific directives are required to ensure that mechanisms regulated under the DGA are suitable for supporting NGOs in their organisational activities and advocacy efforts. In the case of the Wonder Foundation, categories of data regulated under the DGA should be expanded to include data necessary for human rights monitoring. Moving away from traditional data collection and analysis which tends to concentrate on national averages and risk masking underlying disparities, UN guidance on a Human Rights-Centred Approach to Data advocates for data disaggregation where information is broken down intosmaller sub-collections.Targeting dataon marginalisedminorities and vulnerable populations, the inclusion of data necessary for human rights monitoring in the DGA followed by data disaggregation enables the effective identification and measurement of inequalities among population groups (OHCHR 2018, 7).

Compliance Requirements

Compliance issues arise as some of the regulations may be difficult for data intermediaries to comply with intrinsically. Article 12 (1) of DGA specifies that data intermediation services providers cannot use data for purposes other than for the benefit of data users, which compels intermediaries to develop procedures for compliance. However, as not all intermediaries are able to centrally store data or decryption keys, developing procedures for compliance is difficult due to data fragmentation (Finck and Carovano, 2022). The DGA demonstrates a one-size-fits-all approach in its inability to consider blockchain-based data intermediaries where compliance is practically impossible. One cannot exactly probe for compatibility with the DGA’s security standards of privacy with the use of crypto tokens and wallets and whether this form of data intermediaries can use automated market makers to regulate access price to their datasets is also another issue, particularly in regards to whether it is FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non- discriminatory). It remains unclear how blockchain-based data intermediaries could be interoperable with other data intermediaries.

Furthermore, successful recognition and registration as a data intermediary under the DGA demand high human capability requirements which are difficult for organisations such as

NGOs to meet. An organisation interested in taking up such a role needs to have appropriate legal status and capacity for data protection and also ensure good levels of transparency and accountability. It may be too burdensome for an NGO to become a data intermediary or join a data collective. Compliance efforts can distract the organisation from its organisational activities and advocacy efforts rather than supporting them in open data sharing for social benefit.

Market Competition

There exists an evident lack of incentive for existing data intermediaries to register under the DGA and data intermediaries are often not provided with enough financial funding to be able to sustain or even opt into this framework in the first place. A narrow interpretation of the neutrality obligation where data intermediaries are forbidden from using the data for purposes other than for the benefit of data users means that data intermediaries are unlikely to be able to compete with tech giants entering the data intermediation market (Finck and Caravano, 2022). One such business strategy is vertical integration, which allows a company to make data available to third parties and benefit from thirdparty data flows (Blankertz and Specht, 2021). Critically, vertical integration remains an option for competitors of data intermediaries (e.g. Big Tech), allowing them to grow their businesses and cut down their service costs. Resulting in higher operational costs and higher service prices, data intermediaries lack competitiveness and appeal to customers and are likely to become outcompeted by non-DGA firms in the data intermediation market.

Furthermore, data intermediaries are likely to be placed at a disadvantage as they mustsubmita notification toa competent national authority due to the notification framework. Operating in areas where safeguarding public interests is important, data intermediaries are unlikelyto stand a chance against the data-sharing services provided by Big Tech firms. The current lack of guidance also suggests that data sharing in practice will be less than the DGA is aiming for, as there is legal uncertainty which will limit the operations of data intermediaries. Nonetheless, non-profit entities including NGOs are exempt from the notification framework (Gellert and Graef, 2021).

However, an overreliance on intermediaries has security risks as they are incentivised to pursue their own advantages to the detriment of their clients. These digital platforms can benefit from economies of scale and data-related economies of scope, meaning they can entrench their positions by producing lockin effects resulting in diminished user trust which has been cited by the European Commission to be the main reason why data intermediaries find it difficult to build a sufficient user base (von Ditfurth and Lienemann, 2022). To overcome this

challenge, the DGA should seek to prohibit forms of behaviour that result from conflicts of interest. For instance, the limitations imposed by Article 12 (a and e) of the DGA on the scope of services offered by data intermediaries are due to concerns of vertical and horizontal integration, where if successful, data intermediation services would become too dominant (von Ditfurth and Lienemann, 2022).

Power Imbalance

Finally, the DGA is hindered fromachieving its core objective of increased data accessibility due to its role in sustaining power imbalances between the state and non-state actors. Not only are non-state actors excluded from the oversight process but there is an additional risk for the DGA in only achieving performative inclusivity. The DGA has introduced new mechanisms to improve data accessibility but the provision of such mechanisms does not guarantee participation. Mechanisms may be underused or the data-sharing space may become dominated bystakeholders fromthe privatesectorand limit the ability of NGOs to access data needed for their organisational activities and advocacy efforts. The lack of sufficient empowerment for NGOs seeking to expand their access to data is contradictory to the legislative focus on altruism and stakeholders will need to be exposed to related digital know-how and surpass relevant technical standards in order to identify with the regulatory ambitions and engage effectively with the DGA.

Furthermore, the EU’s vision to establish a European Data Innovation Board (EDIB) following DGA involves an expert group to advise on making the bestchoice for data sharing and reusing. However, it remains to be contested whose interests these experts represent (Bruzzone and Debackere, 2021). Centres of power need to be rebalanced towards individuals and collectives through non-commercial and public institutions and alternative data governance models promoting broad, society-wide representation in its governing bodies to avoid capture by private interests (Ada Lovelace Institute, 2022). In addition tothe provision ofmechanisms forenabling choice and competition for stakeholders, the values, experiences and perspectives of those affected by data-driven technologies need to be represented and accounted for to ensure human-centricity and participation.

4.3.

Data Interoperability

The lack of a formal structure for information sharing demonstrates limited data interoperability between the public and non-profit sectors and has resulted in the Wonder Foundation becoming reliant and dependent on networking and forming relationships with individual civil servants. Whilst manageable, not only is this form of obtaining access to data time-consuming, but also unsustainable. Staff

members with whom the relationships have been formed may change with little notice, further affecting stable access to information in the longer term. Improved data interoperability is required for NGOs to more effectively and sustainably engage with data and data sharing in their operational activities.

4.3.1. Opportunities

Aligned with strategic goals outlined in the 2015 EU document ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’, the DGA demonstrates ambitions to increase ‘interoperability’ and ‘inclusivity’ in the European data economy (European Commission, 2015). Broadly referring to more efficient connections between demand and supply as well as across borders, interoperability is regarded with common agreement among the member states as a feature that will boost the competitiveness of the European Digital Single Market. The DGA marks a step towards realising this goal by challenging traditional understandings of data ownership and steering toward a more open, accessible market of data to include a wide range of actors to engage in data sharing and reusing, which also aligns with the goal of a more inclusive e-society as highlighted in the 2015 EU Digital Single Market Strategy document.

Data interoperabilityis furtherimproved through Article 25 of the DGA which requires public sector organisations to make data available in machine-readable formats, which makes information easier to process and analyse. Such requirements allow stakeholders to be able to easily transfer their data from one provider to another and are enhanced through the DGA’s standardised framework fordata intermediation. Introduced in Section 4.1, data intermediaries are self- enhancing and improve data interoperability by removing legal uncertainties and enhancing collaboration between different stakeholders such as data providers and data users. Additionalrequirements such as Article 8 of the DGA which requires member states to identify a national single point of contact for data sharing further facilitate multi-sectoral collaboration and improve whole-system data interoperability.

4.3.2. Challenges

Opportunities for improving data interoperability are undermined by legal interoperability issues, namely in the DGA’s articulation with other EU legislation. Illusions of well-integration into the European policy context are challenged by persistent tensions with alternate data protection principles prohibiting data sharing by default. Data protection law comes across as being “the elephant in the room” for data policymaking in the EU and the DGA serves to enhance existing power imbalances and contribute to institutional lock-in (Graef and Gellert 2021, 3).

Introduced in Section 4.1, a system of dual authorities is created between the DGA and the GDPR and encounters a number of issues with respect to differences in terminology as well as the difficult distinction between the processing of nonpersonal data and personal data. Employing different terminologies torefertodata holders and datasubjects,as well as data users and data controllers, this discrepancy in terminology may lead to conflicting interpretations of rights and responsibilities, potentially resulting in confusion and conflict between the two legislative frameworks. To mitigate these issues, it is necessary to examine the extent to which these overlapping concepts intersect, as well as the implications of such intersections for the protection of individual rights and the fulfilment of organisational responsibilities under both the DGA and the GDPR. This analysis will help to clarify the relationship between these conflicting terminologies and the potential implications for stakeholders in the EU data governance landscape.

Furthermore, the DGA fails to address the complex relationship between personal and non-personal data. The dynamic nature ofpersonaldata and its frequentcoupling with non-personal data results in cases of ‘mixed datasets’, rendering the distinction between personal and non-personal data impossible. Representing more than half of the European data economy, mixed datasets constitute a grey area in the DGA as no mention is made of them (European Commission, 2022). The DGA further overlooks data’s fluid nature where non-personal data can also become personal data just as personal data can be derived from non-personal data (Graef and Gellert, 2021). Whilst the DGA does distinguish between personal and non-personal data, it complicates this further by only putting forth specific guidelines for both data types. Due to the fluidity and duality of data, mixed datasets fall subject tointerpretation underdifferentEuropean legislations, namely the free flow of non-personal data regulation (FFNPDR) and the GDPR (Graef & Gellert, 2021). Ambitions for data interoperability are undermined if the complex relationship between personal and non-personal data is not addressed as the GDPR would prevail on such issues of overlap.

5. Limitations

5.1. Theoretical Limitations

Key theoretical perspectives were identified in Section 2.1 to form a foundation on which to critically and effectively engage with the regulations under the DGA. Despite our research findings, severallimitations remaininourassessment of how the DGA effectively enables NGOs in achieving open data sharing for social benefit.

Firstly, the governance approach to analysis draws insights from adaptive and anticipatory governance frameworks but faces the same critique in that these forms of governance are exclusive to situations of threat and uncertainty. Data sharing is nota novelpractice butis alwayssituated within a particular context e.g. healthcare, finance etc. Whilst results from the case study have greatly helped inform the analysis of data sharing in the NGO context, the analysis remains unlikely to consider all possible configurations of open data sharing involving the DGA. Furthermore, Fuller (2009) challenges whether the discussion of a yet non-existent phenomenon will help ‘prime’ society for the phenomenon. Stipulating that “to imagine is to invite, to name is to conjure,” he argues that regulatory governance models can become “too close” to the technology to the point where it no longer becomes an effective governance instrument. Our departure from the presumption of “open by default” in data sharing falls susceptible to this critique.

Secondly, despite the focus on human-centricity and participation being a key emphasis in regulatory governance, it is often argued to be too close to the public realm and risks stunting public engagement (Fuller, 2009). When data and data sharing are approached as composites of a wider sociotechnical system, the relationship shared between the DGA and the NGO is complex and involves inherent power structures. Yet, the human-centric focus in the analysis is limited and fails to consider other approaches such as consideration for how the DGA represents the power dynamics that are enacted in systems of data sharing and how it accounts for the variety of relationships that people have with data-sharing systems (Ausloos et al., 2019). Despite the isolated focus on NGOs, alternative forms of relations between the DGA and distincttypes ofstakeholders within the NGO context remain to be considered.

Thirdly, attributable to the recency of the DGA and the lack of accessible published academic studies, the theoretical approach is limited to broadly drawn insights from a limited range of academic sources and focuses on areas which were considered the most important in informing the analysis. Several gaps can be identified. Particularly evident is the inadequate definition of what constitutes “effective” engagement between the DGA and NGOs. Similarly, despite making an initial distinction between two different interpretations of data sharing as a tool for achieving organisational aims and as the end goal in itself, the following analysis showcases minimal engagement with these interpretations and would benefit from first synthesising a more comprehensive theoreticalframework before delineating focused definitions for key terms used.

5.2. Methodological Limitations

Several limitations are further evident in the methodology used. Whilst the paper utilises both primary and secondary qualitative data to investigate the effectiveness of DGA in empowering related stakeholders, the primary qualitative data collection was limited in scale due to practical reasons such as accessibility of stakeholders, time constraint and research ethics considerations. In an ideal situation, several interviews would have been conducted with different types of NGOs and stakeholders in order to triangulate the conclusions drawn and increase the validity of the study.

Similarly, data altruism is a relatively new concept and there are limited existing empirical studies on the topic to draw on as evidence. As such, a direction for future research on the DGA would be to ground the analysis in empirical evidence after the policy is officially in practice. Given the above, results from the case study may not be representative enough to be generalised but proffer unique insights into current and prospective engagements between the DGA and a key stakeholder.

6. Policy Recommendations for the European Commission

The current EU Vision for a Shared Europe has reduced broad policy issues into questions about the functioning of markets and marginalises the role of public institutions and other nonmarket actors. The DGA becomes applicable from 24th September 2023. Despite the best intentions and potential opportunities the DGA poses for enabling NGOs in achieving open data sharing for social benefit, several challenges remain to its effective implementation. The following policy recommendations address the European Commission directly and urge immediate attention to remediate key issues identified in the earlier analysis.

6.1. Clarification of interplay between the DGA with other EU legislation on data regulation

Successful implementation of the DGA is dependent on its interplay with other existing and future European legislation on data sharing such as the GDPR and the Data Act respectively. Particularly in the case of regulating the re-use of personal data held by public sector organisations which is already regulated by the GDPR, itis criticalthatthe legislation clarifies the interplay between the DGA and the GDPR so that the former doesn’t complicate but complement the current EU data governance landscape.

The DGA currently doesn’t modify existing data protection rules but tensions generated with the GDPR demonstrate a wider problem of balancing between existing and new

regulations. Where the legislative framing of the DGA is too broad, data protection rules in the GDPR risk being undermined and results in weakened levels of personal data protection and potentialfor the DGA to be used as a scapegoat to advance EU’s economic interests to the detriment of users’ data protection and privacy right(Open Future, 2021). Greater alignment is required with personal data protection in the GDPR to the extent of reducing the scope of the DGA to only sharing of non-personal data.

Sharing comparable potential and legislative capabilities, an opportunity for interconnectivity exists between the DGA and the GDPR where the two serve a global model for trusted data sharing across system intermediaries (Open Future, 2021). Regulatory intervention through means ofrepealoradaptation is required to reduce legislative tensions and increase alignment within the EU strategy for data.

6.2. Clarification of policy priorities and promotion of multi-sector and multi- stakeholder collaboration

Furthermore, greater clarification is required with regard to the policy priorities ofthe DGA and further acknowledgement of its role in sustaining power imbalances between state and non-state actors.

Policy priorities such as greater inclusivity in data sharing need to be demonstrated in more than just political narratives. This includes not only clarity around data ethics standards but also around terms such as ‘data altruism’ and data sharing for ‘purposes of general interest’ which are currently ambiguous and subject to interpretation. The scope of general interest activities needs to be precisely defined and the term ‘altruism’ is problematic as its definition in the DGA is linked to the concept of ‘consent’ under the GDPR. Similar new concepts should be avoided entirely to avoid confusion with other legislations and the creation of competing regimes.

Greater emphasis on multi-stakeholder and multi-sector collaboration is required to remediate immediate issues such as the lack of formal information sharing structures between the public and non-profit sectors. Where the current discourse is exclusionary of non-state actors, a co- design approach should be undertaken to facilitate more knowledge sharing around digital rights and technology. Values, experiences and perspectives of those affected by data-driven technologies need to be represented and accounted for to ensure humancentricity and public participation in policy design and implementation.

6.3. Redesign of implementation strategy accounting for unique context factors to ensure fair market competition for system intermediaries

Success of the above recommendations is dependent on the design of more concrete implementation strategies which accounts for unique context factors. Current compliance rules for system intermediaries, particularly in the case of data intermediaries, reflect a one-size-fits-all approach and lack incentives for registration under the framework.

The DGA needs to account for different business models that system intermediaries operate on and recognise compliance challenges pertaining not only to different models of system intermediaries but also to the sectors they operate in. Different sectors have different levels of readiness and capabilities for data sharing and the diversity in market setup, exchanged data types, and usage types demonstrate the need for sector- and case-specific solutions. Not only are personal data platforms different from industrial data platforms, but different cases of data sharing regulations should be accounted for such as rights-based, tech-complexity-related, and political, proprietary data sharing.

Additionally, different standards exist for different datasharing partners. Whilst organisations have the ability to push back against donor data requests, their capability is greatly influenced by trust and power dynamics (Fast, 2022). Power structures both current and emerging should be considered in policy design and implementation (Overdiek, 2022). As such, the legislation requires redesign and tailoring to organisations operating with different business models and capabilities to ensure fair market competition.

6.4. Provision of adequate incentives and resources to encourage re-use of public sector data and altruistic data sharing

In addition to recognising specific compliance challenges for NGOs, greater clarity is required around technical and social capability requirements from not only the onset of its delivery but also continuous re-evaluation of its feasibility. Additional resources should also be provided for capability building within organisations to meet compliance requirements and enhance participation. Alternatively, direct efforts could be made toreduce technicaland infrastructuralbarriers forNGOs to register as a system intermediary. Further expansion of categories of data regulated under the DGA to include data necessary for human rights monitoring with well-defined exclusions would enhance the legitimacy of the DGA as a human-rights-centred approach to data.

User or data-subject empowerment remains a major weakness of the DGA regulatory framework. Departing from an assumption of the active data subject, such unrealistic expectations on individuals tomake informed decisions leaves a significant gap between key policy priorities and disinterested individuals and organisations (DataGovHub,

2022). Not only are typical reservations towards open data sharing often unfounded, but many individuals and organisations lack awareness of its actual benefits and longterm opportunities (Gringras and Roper, 2021a; Gringras and Roper, 2021b). In addition to the provision of adequate incentives to encourage participation in altruistic data sharing, greater emphasis is needed on the informal education of both data providers and users, and the building ofknowledge-based organisations to ensure long- term, effective and sustainable usage of data-sharing infrastructure in the European Digital Single Market.

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Measuring the Effects of Intrastate Conflict on State Stability in Africa

Ingrid Wittendorff Humblen1, Anna Puci, Anouska Jha, Dawid Mliczek, Dicle Bulut, Maria Victoria Chilari

1 Research Team Leader

Published April 2024

Abstract

Today, many countries struggle with intrastate conflict, with the result being fragility and a hindrance to development. This paper aims to test the effects of intrastate conflict on the fragility of African states. We hypothesize that intrastate conflict can in part explain the high levels of state fragility among African states. We find a positive relationship between states' overall Fragile States Index (FSI) score and the amount of time spent in armed conflict. We also find the “Security Apparatus” FSI indicator to be more strongly correlated with intrastate conflict than the “Economy” indicator. Despite this general trend, two countries did not conform to this relationship: Eritrea and Tunisia. We explore why this is the case through an in-depth analysis of internal factors. On this basis, we form a policy recommendation aiming to guide more fragile countries to mitigate state fragility after conflict, drawing on success stories from countries such as Tunisia.

Keywords: intrastate conflict, fragility, FSI, Africa, security, development

1. Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, intrastate warfare has persisted as the dominant form of armed conflict. Particularly affecting states with low capacity, political instability, and poor economies, intrastate conflict can be seen as both a consequence and acause ofstatefragility(Dupuy etal., 2016). With the global security environment shifting towards an increasing rarity of interstate war, it is crucial to understand and pay attention to the dynamics of intrastate conflict. While international attention tends to fall on interstate wars, such as the current political focus on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, civil conflicts are ever increasing in number, longevity, and complexity (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Davies et al., 2021). Of particular interest is Africa, a region that has struggled with internal conflict as a major developmental issue since the end of European colonial rule. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the consequences and effects of such conflicts on states in Africa.

In addition to having faced years of civil war, Africa remains the most fragile continent in terms of state capacity (Fund for Peace, 2022). We aim to explore the relationship between internal conflict and state fragility using the Fund for Peace’s (FFP) “Fragile States Index” (FSI). In fact, the FSI was based on the organization's former conflict assessment framework,

suggesting a correlation between the two phenomena. The extensive aggregation of state capacity and stability factors makes this index a comprehensive measure of the vulnerability of states to collapse, or “states fragility”. In this analysis, we argue that the presence of armed conflicts has contributed to Africa’s high levels of fragility and that this is of interest because it can inform our approach to civil war recovery.

It is important to note that Africa is a diverse continent, with over 50 sovereign states, cultural heterogony, and a complex history. However, due to a shared experience of colonialism and recent developmental challenges across states, we believe the African continent can be approached as a model system with which one can study state fragility. Furthermore, Africa has experienced a large number of intrastate wars throughout its history and remains the most conflict-ridden region today. This makes it a region of particular importance when studying the effects of and recovery from civil war. Thus, this study will focus on Africa as a whole, whilst acknowledging the limitations of this approach. Overall, we hope our method will allow us to examine a shared experience of development, conflict, and state fragility.

To summarize the methodological methods and research design of this paper, we will examine the effects of civil

conflict on state fragility in Africa. We do this by doing a regression analysis, testing the average effect of each year spent in a state of armed conflict on the Fragile State Index score in 2022, with the hypothesis that every additional year will increase FSI score. Additionally, we aim to identify outlier states, for example, states that have not been made more fragile by a recent internal conflict. This will allow us to examine the internal factors that have hindered or facilitated the recovery from civil war in African countries. This will inform a case study into countries with conflict and fragility profiles thatdeviate fromthe average. The goalofouranalysis is to expand our understanding of the conflict-fragility nexus, and to contribute to the development of sustainable and effective post-conflict recovery policies.

Through our analysis, we attempt to gain insight into how we can mitigate the negative impact that intrastate conflict has on states. Foreign interventions and post-war recovery policies have mixed success rates, and there is no universally accepted course of action for recovery in post-war countries. . With a better understanding of how states are affected by civil war, we lay out a proposal for a more effective policy framework, which aims to encourage recovery after intrastate conflict and the mitigation of its negative effects on state fragility. This framework will be developed focusing on the most fragile states of Africa, while drawing on countries that have more successfully mitigated fragility as a consequence of conflict. The aim of our policy recommendations and of this paper as a whole is to set out concrete steps to counteract the negative effects imposed by internal conflict on states.

2. Literature Review

Generally, there is a lack of literature that takes a broad approach to the effects of intrastate conflict on state fragility in Africa. Studies that focus on post-conflict shifts in fragility are concerned with individualconflicts and on specific aspects of fragility. For example, one can find studies on the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria and its impacts on agriculture, economy (Adelaja, 2019), education (Abdulrasheed et al., 2015), and similarly concentrated impact-studies. Furthermore, while there is ample literature and a well developed theoretical frameworks on how state fragility can lead to uprisings (e.g. Cederman et al., 2011, Buhaug et al., 2014),we are interested in understanding the inverse relationship - how intrastate conflict can contribute to state fragility. This topic ought to be more closely covered, particularly with a focus on Africa. Improving our understanding of the effects of intrastate conflict is the first step towards developing informed and effective post-war recovery policies.

Scholars haveanalyzedthe relationship between intrastate war and state fragility in both directions; the literature is not consistent in its use of either as the explanatory variable. However, this might be because the relationship between state fragility and conflict takes the form of a cycle, as argued by Collier (2007). In his “Conflict Trap” theory, Collier argues that intrastate conflict remains a primary cause of state fragility, and that, in turn, state fragility is an enabler for conflict to arise. This cyclical relationship is a challenge for individual states and the international community. States are too fragile to escape the “Conflict Trap” once affected, and fragilityis only worsened with time.Collierfurtherargues that such conflicts tend to spill over borders, spreading to neighboring states, such as in the cases of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC in the 90s, and Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa in the 60’s to 70’s. Evidently, intrastate conflict can be detrimental to both national and regional stability and development. Despite the cycle theory, we approach conflict as the explanatory variable and fragility as the outcome of the relationship. We take this approach because we believe efforts to support development would be more effective if they focus on mitigating the negative effects of specific issues such as conflict, rather than taking on too broad a task in attempting to stabilize states from scratch so that issues like conflict do not occur.

For example, Fang et al. (2020) looks at the impact of postcolonial conflict on African economic development. The paper looks at 45 Sub-Saharan African countries from 19892019, with a resurgence of conflict-related deaths since 2010. The results from growth regressions show that on average, annual growth in countries in conflict is about 2.5 percentage points lower, and the cumulative impact on per capita GDP only increases over time. Evidently, conflicts lead to a decline in the productive capacity of an economy. While the authors find that already strong institutions and fiscal fundamentals helptomitigate the adverse economic impactofconflict,these prerequisites are not met in many African states. Thus, the effects of conflict on the economy are detrimental to the development of states that are already among the most vulnerable in the world. Whilst efforts of the current literature to analyze methods of preventing armed conflict from arising are vital, the international community must also learn how to minimize and counteract negative effects when conflicts do inevitably occur. To successfully do this, one should take into account the unique historical and political landscape of conflict in Africa.

2.1 Historical, Regional and Political context

The relatively high level of fragility amongst African states is a relevant case study because this phenomenon is often attributed to the continent's shared experience with

colonization and imperialism. While the effects ofcolonialism globally remain heterogeneous, Heldring and Robinson (2012) argue that this heterogeneity is more muted in Africa. This would make the study of post-colonial conflict in Africa relevant, as opposed to conducting a global study of all postcolonial states. Furthermore, conflict in Africa is often linked to colonial era governance such as communalizing policies (Lange et al., 2021), cartography (Amadife and Warhola, 1993), and underdeveloped political institutions (Henderson and Singer, 2000).

One study exploring the link between conflict and state fragility is Gates et al. ‘Consequences of Civil Conflict’ (2010). Using conflict duration and deadliness as conflict measures on the seven UN Millennium Development Goals, Gates argues that armed conflict and State Fragility impede development by decreasing GDP growth, especially with conflicts lasting longer than five years. The geographical scopecovers Sub-saharan Africa andSouth Asia,howeverthis overlooks the specific historical context of regional insurgencies through political fragility. We believe that a study with focus on Africa alone would provide more focus results that will be better fit to inform development and conflict recovery policy. While Gates’ results match the hypotheses of this paper, the approach to Africa and South Asia as one unit of interest overlooks the historical and political differences between the two regions, making the conclusions of the paper difficult to apply to policies developed for either region.

2.2 The state of conflict

Explicit scholarship on the quantified link between internal conflict and state fragility are exhibited by Adeto (2019) who focuses on the Horn of Africa region. Adeto utilizes the Fragility Indices of Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia to explore how conflict dynamics (defined as violent acts of political self-interest) in the post-colonial era, has shaped the region’s State Fragility and security, for example through the return of clan warfare. As one of the most fragile regions on the continent, this analysis provides further grounds to our hypothesis. As the conclusions reached by Adeto may be applicable tootherparts ofAfrica, ourcontinent-scaleanalysis will add to this theory.

Another article of interest is Bøås (2020), which focuses on consequences of insurgency to reveal how extra-legal governance plays a role in the deformation of political orders. Bøås addresses the ‘clusters’ of fragility in the Sahel region, which is prone to jihadist insurgencies. Overall, Bøås argues that Sahel insurgency groups stem from transhistorical social identities, where groups both attack and govern regions in a ‘hierarchical structure which establishes economic provision

ina destabilizedstate. Yetthe quantification ofaspects ofstate fragility are relatively unexplored, as the article ends its analysis at the level of qualitative political fragmentation. For this reason, we hope to take a quantitative approach to the question and reserve our case study analysis for countries that are found to be statistical outliers of our regression.

Overall, the literature suggests a potential to quantify the link between conflict and fragility in a region such as Africa. This demonstrates that research requires further analysis into the relationship between internal conflict and state fragility. Furthermore, we have found reasonable grounds to believe that the experience of intrastate conflict will increase a state's level of fragility.

2.3 Intrastate conflict

To analyze the relationship between state fragility and intrastate conflict, we will be using a data set aggregated by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) with original data by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Davies et al. (2022). Thus, we approach the topic of intrastate conflict using the definition provided by the Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Firstly, we define a state-based armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.” (UCDP, 2022). Specifically, intrastate conflicts are “conflicts between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries”.

We aggregate these definitions to create a focused scope of data: in out paper, “intrastate conflict” refers to “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year, with no interference from other countries.”. It is important to note that some scholars (such as The Correlates of War project) define conflict by 1000 annual battle related deaths, rather than 25. This disparity in approach will provide different outcomes in analyses such as our own. We argue that the 1000 deaths threshold excludes minor conflicts, coups and terrorist movements. However, these conflicts will arguably have an effecton the fragilityofa state. Forthe purpose ofourresearch design, we find 25 annual battle related deaths to be a reasonable definition. By this definition, the dataset identifies each yeara country has spentina state ofconflict as individual data points. This will allow us to test the effect of each additional year spent in conflict on the fragility of African states.

2.4 State Fagility

The Fragile States Index (FSI) was developed by the Fund for Peace (FFP) to identify pressures and fault lines that may contribute to destabilizing states. In addition to measuring economic, political, and social pressures such as fragmentation and weak institutions, it also can help identify when pressures outweigh capacity in a country (Li et al., 2022 ). It can thus be a valuable tool in measuring the performance and capacity of African states post-civil war. Specifically, the indicators can be arranged in four categories: cohesion, economic, political and social indicators. As demonstrated, these indicators and their subcategories may be expected to have some correlation with internal conflict. All simultaneouslyrelatetothefeasibility ofconflicts taking place and are expected to be negatively affected by the occurrence of conflict. While the Conflict Trap theory and subsequent literature tends to focus on economic factors of fragility, we have established that political and social factors are closely linked to both economic development and conflict. An index as broad as the fragile states index allow will allow us to

The FSI collects data from 3 streams which are collated into the finalindex scores. The streams are triangulated toleverage the strength from each approach. The first stream is content analysis, which includes the 12 indicators broken into various sub-indicators. Boolean searches are conducted through content aggregation such as media reports and other forms of qualitative data. Raw data software is used to assess the saliency of each source, and the results are added to the FSI index score (FFP, 2017). The second stream is pre-existing statisticaldata,such as data fromWHO, UN, and WorldBank, while the third stream is qualitative reviews in the final stage to mitigate false assumptions (ibid.). In addition to this methodological approach, benefits of the FSI include its ability to provide a holistic overview that informs the ranking of states in terms of economic growth, inequality, and human rights abuses. Additionally, the data in use is accessible, providing an opportunity for deeper analysis.

It is also important to acknowledge the limitations of the FSI. Scholars have criticized the use of the index to justify statebuilding and foreign intervention in African countries, often placing thematthe top ofthe fragility rank incomparison with Western countries (Melber, 2016). Likewise, the FSI has been used as a short-term measurement of a state's capacity to use coercive force, establish institutional stability, and bureaucratic functioning, while overlooking parallel cultural and economic biases (Ziaja & Fabra, 2010). Despite these limitations, the Fragile States Index enables us to aggregate the many aspects of state capacity that have been linked to conflict by different scholars. To an extent, a model of the effects of civil war using this index can provide us with a

generalized overview of the greater overarching relationship between and as a basis on which further analysis into the effect of individual indicators.

3. Methodology

3.1 Hypotheses

Based on the general theories and established hypotheses within the conflict literature, we expect to find a positive correlation between state fragility and intrastate conflict. Explicitly, we hypothesize that per additional year spent in a state of intrastate conflict, FSI score will increase. We test this correlation by creating a regression model of the effects of intrastate conflict on FSI score. The model will be presented in detail below.

H1: There is a positive correlation between the number of years spent in an intrastate conflict and FSI score. This correlation will strengthen as more recent conflicts are taken into account.

Furthermore, we have discussed economic recovery as vital to recovery from conflict. Therefore, we create two additional regression models: one using only the FSI “E1 Economic decline” indicator and the other using the “C1 Security Apparatus” indicator as outcome variables. E1 covers factors of public finances, and economic conditions, climate and diversification, whilst C1 outlines security threats, militarization, the use of force and paramilitary activity. The purpose of creating these additional regressions is that we want to see how different indicators relate to intrastate conflict. We expect the C1 indicator to be close to entirely explained by our intrastate conflict data, due to its factoring of military activity and violence.

H2: There is a positive correlation between the number of years spent in an intrastate conflict and “E1 Economic Decline” FSI indicator score. This correlation will strengthen as more recent conflicts are taken into account.

H3: There is a positive correlation between the number of years spent in an intrastate conflict and “C1 Security Apparatus” FSI indicator score. This correlation will strengthen as more recent conflicts are taken into account

Since we also expect intrastate conflict to have a strong correlation with economic decline, we can compare the effects of the explanatory variable on E1 and C1. Any difference in the significance of either model would prove to be of interest and would contextualize theeffects ofintrastate conflicton the economy.

Furthermore, we assume that the recency of intrastate conflict has an effect on state fragility. Therefore, in addition to our regression model using all data points from 1960-2021, we compare this with models using data only from1960-2000 and from 1960-1980. The purpose of this is to test whether the correlation coefficient is stronger when more recent conflicts are included, and weaker when only considering historical conflicts. We believe that the correlation coefficient will be stronger for the category accounting for conflicts taking place in the last 20 years, as opposed to exclusively looking at the long-term effects of conflicts that ended decades ago.

We believe that the overall findings of our analysis will provide us with valuable information about the effects of intrastate conflict,both overtime and on specific areas ofstate fragility. This will allow us to make informed policy recommendations concerned with how states can recover from, and in turn mitigate future intrastate conflict.

3.2 Confounders

The purpose of using the FSI is that it is broad and allencompassing. It gives a good cross-categorical overview of variables of fragility. Many of the variables that tend to be used as control variables in conflict-related literature are already accounted for by the index.

Two potential confounders we considered were geographical or climatic factors, as well as legacies of colonialism. Firstly, it is commonly accepted that countries facing environmental adversities, such as droughts, famines, natural disasters, and natural resource disputes tend to be more fragile. (Miguel et al., 2004; Maino and Emrullahu, 2022). These factors might also be the root of conflict. Furthermore, it has been argued that geographical factors such as mountainous terrain can increase the feasibility of a conflict arising. Such terrain is found to have an effect on spatial inequalities, ethnic disparities and horizontal grievances (Carter et al., 2019; Weidmann and Saleyhan, 2012). However, we argue that these variables are either directly or indirectly accounted for by the FSI: environmental and food related factors are included in the S1: Demographic Pressures indicator, while infrastructural development and spatial inequalities are accounted for in the E2: Uneven Economic Development and P2: Public Services indicators.

As for colonial legacies, we have previously addressed arbitrary borderlines, metropole-incited group disparities, and weak institutions as consequences of colonialism. These factors may in turn increase the likelihood of internal conflict. Like environmental factors, these variables are accounted for by the index, dispersed in several indicators across all four categories. Furthermore, we have previously argued that colonialism had a relatively homogenous effect on development on the African continent. Therefore, while

colonialism is confounded with both state fragility and conflict, we do not find reason to expect that colonial history would have any external effects on conflict and fragility that are not already accounted for by the FSI.

4. Data Analysis

4.1 Data Treatment

Our causal question is how does the number of years spent in civil conflicts by African states affect their State Fragility Index as measured in 2022. Firstly, we filtered the State Fragility Index data to only include 54 African states. We filtered the conflict data to only include the region of interest (African states) and the conflict type of interest (intrastate, side A is always a government; side B is always one or more rebel groups; there is no involvement of foreign governments with troops). We made sure that state names match between two datasets and there is no mismatch due to syntax/language preference.

The data format before our editing for purpose has rows for each year of each conflict. We divided the whole period that is described by the data (the earliest intrastate conflict occurred in 1960 and the most recent one took place in 2021) into 3 periods: 1960-1980, 1960-2000 and 1960-2021. We counted the number of years spent in the state of intrastate conflict (the number of input points per state) within these three periods to create a “Years in Intrastate Conflict” variable. This approach lets us analyze the impact of the recency of the conflict as well as the impact of the cumulative number of the years spent in a civil conflict by the states since 1960.

From these three data groups, we built 3 simple regression models where the outcome variable is FSI score as measured in 2022 and the explanatory variable is the number of years spent in a state of intrastate conflict by states. We added 6 additionalregressions todetermine the effectofone additional year of intrastate conflict in the three periods on the “E1 Economic Decline” and the “C1 Security Apparatus” indicators of the FSI. The coefficient of the independent variable expresses howmuch each yearspentinacivilconflict increases the State Fragility Index Score or respective components of the score as measured in 2022 in each period.

4.2 Results

4.2.1 Effects on overall FSI score

A regression model was fitted to determine if there is a relationship between the number of years spent inconflict and state fragilityin2022. According tothe regression model(Fig.

1 Appendix), every additional year of civil war in African countries from 1960 to 1980 resulted in a significant increase in the total FSI score of the country as measured in 2022 (Model 3: beta = 0.27, p-value < 0.05). Meanwhile, every additional year of civil war in African countries from 1960 to 2000 resulted in a 0.36 increase in the 2022 FSI (beta = 0.36, p-value < 0.05). Lastly, every additional year of civil war in African countries from 1960 to 2021 resulted in a more significant increase in the total Fragility Index Score (beta = 0.90, p-value < 0.01).

Evidently, the relationship between the number of years spent in conflict and state fragility is stronger when we consider more recent conflicts. Furthermore, we accept our Hypothesis 1 that there is a positive correlation between the number of years spent in an intrastate conflict and FSI score, which will strengthen as more recent conflicts are taken into account. We follow this conclusion by testing the relationship between the number of years spent in conflict and specific indicators of state fragility.

4.2.1 Effects on C1 Security Apparatus Indicator

Our second set of regression models (Fig. 2 Appx.) focuses on the Security Apparatus component of the Fragility Index Score. The Security Apparatus component expresses the state fragility caused by the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. According to our second set, every additionalyearofintrastate conflictinAfrican countries from 1960 to 1980 resulted in a significant increase in the C1 FSIindicatorofthe average country as measured in2022 (beta = 0.037, p-value < 0.05) . Every additional year of intrastate conflict in African countries from 1960 to 2000 resulted in a further significant increase in the C1 FSI indicator (beta = 0.049, p-value < 0.05). Overall, every additional year of intrastate conflict in African countries from 1960 to 2021 resulted in an even more significant increase in the S1 FSI indicator (beta = 0.12, p-value < 0.01).

Evidently, the Security Apparatus indicator was also correlated with intrastate conflict, as we expected. This may be explained by considering that intrastate conflict has had a strong effect on militarization and may pose real or perceived security threats to the state, even if fighting has subdued to under 25 battle related deaths per year in 2022. We hypothesized (H2) to find such a significance due to the seemingly strong correlation between the proxies used to measure the C1 indicator and variables of conflict. However, it is also interesting to analyze whether indicators that have less of a clear correlation with wars and violence are affected by conflict to the same degree. Following, we test the effects of intrastate conflict on the economy.

4.2.1 Effects on E1 Economic Decline Indicator

Our third set of regression models (Fig 3 Appx.) uses the “E1 Economic Decline” indicator of the FSI score as outcome variable. The Economy component expresses the state fragility related to economic decline that is measured by per capita income, Gross National Product, unemployment rates, inflation, productivity, debt, poverty levels, or business failures. According to this set of models, the relationship between the amount of years spent in a state of civil war and economic decline remains insignificant(beta = -0.00 - 0.01, pvalue > 0.05), for all three models, although the correlation coefficientwas slightlyhigherwhenconflicts from2000-2021 were taken into account.

Thus, we can dismiss our Hypothesis 3 and conclude that the effects of time spent under intrastate conflict on economic decline is not strong. When compared side by side with the results for the C1 regression models, it is evident that other fragility indicators have had a more substantial contribution to variation in overall FSI score as a result of conflict. To conclude our data analysis, our hypotheses H1 and H2 were proven to be correct. However, the correlation between intrastate conflict and E1 was not significant.

We also identified two outlier countries, which will be discussed below.

5. Case Studies

Having established a positive relationship between the experience of intrastate conflict and SFI score, but lacking some contexton whataspects ofthis correlation are strong, we now wish to do an in-depth case study of two of the countries from our dataset that do not fit our estimated model. While scholars have attempted - with varying results - to pinpoint how long it takes states to “bounce back” economically and otherwise after war (e.g.: Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Przeworkski, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), this remains subjective to each case. Therefore, we will discuss Eritrea and Tunisia as outliers inourmodel; Eritrea has not faced long nor recentintrastateconflicts, butis highly fragile.Tunisia has had a recent conflict but this has not majorly affected its fragility. We hope tounderstandwhy somecountries managetorecover fromconflict,and why some countriesmightbe fragile despite the absence of intrastate conflict.

5.1 Eritrea

Eritrea is one of the outliers of our regression analysis. The country has not seen a recent civil war, while still being fairly fragile in 2022. This warrants an analysis of potential

contributing factors. In 2022, Eritrea’s overall fragile states index amounted to the relatively high score of 95.9 (FFP, 2022), placing it 12th out of all the African States. Whilst Cohesion (C2)and Social(S1, X1) indicators have a relatively low average (7.3 and 7.2 respectively), it is largely the Political indicators that push Eritrea towards the forefront of state fragility, particularly looking at ‘State legitimacy’ and ‘Human Rights and Rule of Law’. Eritrea’s government, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), have had particular failures in ensuring democratic elections and freedomofpress. This is demonstrated by Eritrea’s high levels of media censorship and control, with the Committee to Protect Journalists calling it the world’s “most censored country” (Zere, 2016, p.34), alongside the World Freedom Index rating it second to last in the entire world in 2021 (Reporters Without Borders, 2022).

This level of censorship and control, however, is only one of the ways that the government has hindered democracy since Eritrea’s dictator, Isaias Afwerki, assumed office without election since independence in 1993. Since then, despite the creation of the transitional constitution that aimed for implementing democratic elections, all elections have been indefinitely postponed since then by the Eritrean president (Herdu, 2003). Although Eritrea does hold local elections, these regional governments hold little to no power, and thus cannot deal with the problems of the people. As highlighted by their higher score in ‘Group Grievance’ (8.6), the people do not have the right to organize in different political parties, there are no free and independent media, and no freedom to express personal views on political topics without fear of governmentinformants and the likelihood ofdetention for any indication of dissidence (Freedom House, 2022).

This also links with Eritrea’s high score in the ‘Human Rights and Rule of Law’, considering that the lack of democracy and freedomofexpression has led toincreased human rights abuse inthe country. According totheHumanWorldReportin2022, Eritrea’s government forces have committed numerous war crimes in recent years. Since the late 90s, there has been a direct attack on the freedom of Religion and the PFDJ have been imprisoning those that do not assign to the four denominations that the government recognises: Sunni Islam, Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Evangelical Churches. This group of people as well as political dissidents are facing unlawful, prolonged and abusive detentions (Human Rights Watch, 2021) that are conducive to Eritrea’s high score in the political indicator. Additionally, during the Tigray War in Ethiopia (2020-2022), it has been recorded that the Eritrean Defene Forces (EDF) have carried out “largescale massacres, summary executions, widespread sexual violence including rape, gang rape, and sexual slavery…”

(Ibid., 2021) that have highlighted a large infraction on their human rights practices.

Eritrea has not had a civil war for more than 40 years, with the last one occurring between two political parties within Eritrea (EPLF against the ELF) 1980-1981. This war, however, is not as impactful as the conflicts that Eritrea has had with its bordering state. The Eritrean Independence War ended in 1991 and Eritrea had gained complete de facto independence after being under Ethiopian annexation since 1962. This, alongside the subsequent Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict thatoccurred inbetween1998-2000 has meantthatdemocracy was stunted under the guise of concluding conflict in order to enforce the constitution that planned for elections. The state fragility and democratic instability to this day has stemmed from how these international wars have placed Afwerki in the highestposition ofpowerasthe Presidentofthe PFDJ, leading to authoritarian rule. Therefore whilst factors such as the economy could somewhat improve (as GDP Annual Growth Rate in Eritrea averaged 4.87 percent from 1991 until 2021 (African Development Bank, 2023)), aspects in the political indicator could not. This correlates without findings that economic decline may not be an effect of conflict. In the case ofEritrea otherindicators have contributed to the levelofstate fragility, despite the lack of a recent civil war.

5.2 Tunisia

In 2022, Tunisia ranked 93rd in the Fragile States Index (FSI), positioning it much stronger than countries in the Horn of Africa region, such as Eritrea (FFP, 2022). This section will discuss potential explanations for Tunisia’s relatively strong post-conflict recovery. The conflicts in reference will be the Arab Uprisings of 2011, and the March 2016 ISIS insurgency on the Tunisian border town of Ben Guerdane (Hinds, 2014)

One explanation of recovery is increased economic and military aid on the international stage. Tunisia experienced a spike in its Social external intervention indicators, X1, from 2010- 2015 (3.7-6.9) (FFP, 2022) This is in line with Weilandt’s (2020) analysis of the increase in the political and economic incentives enforced by the EU following popular uprisings in the region from 2010-2011. Accordingly, the data supports initiatives such as the EU providing financial assistance to empower actors within the Tunisian civil society organizations, and projectsstabilizing election monitoring and access to global markets (Weilandt, 2020). The Tunisian Revolution in 2016, whilst increasing the intensity of the Economy indicator from 6.9 to 7.9 on the FSI, has led to relatively little variation in its other indicators.

The intensity of the Security Apparatus Indicator has decreased from 7.9 to 7.2; as the European Institute of the Mediterranean suggests, Tunisia is a test case for the nexus

between security development and co-operation among international actors (Faleg, 2017). The terrorist attacks at the Bardo Museum on 18 March 2015, perpetrated by the Islamic State and its recruitment of young Tunisian men, has forced Tunisian security forces to reform rapidly (ibid.). Several challenges still remain, such as the need to maximize comprehensive defense strategies. However, external financial and military intervention has regulated, to an extent, the dangers of a decentralized security apparatus. For example, three weeks after the Bardo attack, the US Administration announced itwould triple its military spending and training in the region, increasing its budget from $32.9 to $99 million (ibid.). Moreover, since July 2016, NATO has been advising Tunisian authorities on the development of a Tunisian Intelligence Fusion Centre and training for the Special Operations Forces (Shah, 2020). As a result of preventative measures, programs such as the loans from the United States Agency for International Development, which provided Tunisia$500 million inaffordable financing in2016, has boosted economic reform by targeting economic growth through loans, access to capital, and technical assistance from the Ministry of Finance (ibid.). As a result of these various external initiatives, Tunisia’s post-conflict recovery has not impeded on its defense and economic security as we expected in Hypothesis 2 and 3. While it does correlate with the predictions found in the regression model for E1, it does not reflect the average results of the other models.

Thus, we might turn to other variables, such as political leadership. The state of democracy in Tunisia has been seen as a unique ‘success story’ of the post-Arab spring uprisings. In 2013, after the assassination of two secular politicians, Chokri Belaid and Mohammed Brahmi, the Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party which had one the national election and formed a coalition in2011 afterthe disbanding ofBen Ali, organized new elections and formed the ‘Tunisia National Dialogue Quartet’ in September (Bajec, 2022). Two rounds of free elections were held in 2014 and 2019. During the transition, Ben Ebessi (President 2014 – 2019) and Rached Ghannousi (Speaker of the Parliament) formed a grand coalition government (ibid.). Moreover, Tunisia features a powerful Tunisian General Labour Union, Order of Lawyers and Human Rights League, which mediated the 2013 National Dialogue (Marzo, 2018). Combined with international financial/military aid, and Tunisia’s cooperation with the six German political Foundations, Tunisia’s democratic transition is considered a factor in its role as a confounder in the hypothesis that the effect of insurgency has a negative effect on the Security Apparatus Indicators (ibid.).

Overall, external intervention, combined with a regionally distinct democratic transition which promotes the cooperation of Unions and public-political partnership, has shaped

Tunisia’s post conflict recovery. However, it is important to acknowledge the limits to this thesis. For example, the FSI Economy Indicator has increased by 10 points since 2016, rising from6.9 to7.9 (FFP, 2022). Severalfactors may explain this. For example, in 2017, the national unity government failed to implement growth-stimulating reforms, leading to a rising inflation rate and tax hikes, leading to several protests in 2018 and the lowest voter turn-out since 2011 (Boukhars, 2017). Additionally, whilst Group Grievance, an indicator of socio-political divisions and corruption, has decreased by 0.7 points from 2016-2022, a wider analysis of regional anxieties requires the qualification of this (FFP, 2022). For example, based on an analysis by the International Republican Institute, 23% of survey respondents have personally experienced corruption with the police, and 18% have faced corruption in hospital settings (Kaddachi and Zina, 2022). Tunisia’s Security Apparatus and Economic Indicators has ranked it 93rd in the overall Fragility Index, however a further analysis of citizens’ anxieties about economic and social security must be considered as factors impeding a fully ‘successful’ democratic transition. Despite recentconflict,Tunisia remains more fragile than Eritrea. This may be attributed todifferences in economic capacity upon, during and after conflict, and because of Tunisia’s positive experience with democracy and external interventions.

6. Limitations and Discussion

From these cases studies, we understand that 1) countries may be experiencing wars, armed conflicts, or internal issues that are not classified as intrastate conflicts, and 2) that all armed conflict of large enough scale to be classified a “intrastate wars” may not be of an extensive enough scale to trigger a change instate fragilityscore. Such dynamics ofconflictmake any estimation of the effects of civil war difficult. It also puts to question our definition of intrastate conflict as 25 battle related deaths per year. In the case of Tunisia, this seems to have included civil uprisings that were not extensive enough to have triggered significant change in fragility score. This demonstrates that there may have been states in our dataset that have high fragility scores for other reasons, and have had minor violent interactions between the state and non-state parties. In this case, our model might have overstated the effect of intrastate conflict on FSI score.

Furthermore, it would have been beneficial to do a case study into more countries. Ideally, we would have also analyzed the internalmatters instates thatdid fitthe model.This could have been either states that have spent a lot of time in a state of conflict and have a high FSI score, or states that have not suffered from conflict and have low FSI scores. This would

have allowed us to analyze and look for any external factor that might have putthe state athigher or lower risk of conflict. Potentially, we might have also been able to identify factors that give the country a low fragility score, and consider whether this factor has also kept the country out of conflict. Such information would be valuable as itwould furtherinform ourpolicy recommendations,and givean outline for“success” in terms of state fragility.

Based on the findings in our data analysis and case studies, we found that economic factors were not as significantly affected by intrastate conflict as we expected. Instead, Political and external factors were more significantly affected in our case studies. While we should not look at only two countries (that were outliers in our regression models) to draw conclusions, it does leave the question ofwhetherwe should have given more consideration topoliticalindicators. When taking intoaccount that our definition of intrastate conflicts relied on the conflict being state-based, we may expect such violence to have an effecton politics andgovernance. Wesuggestthatfuture work should analyze intrastate conflict and its impact on FSI’s P13 indicators, or other proxies for political stability.

With these findings and considerations in mind, we will now lay out a proposal for a more effective policy framework, which aims to encourage recovery after intrastate conflict and the mitigation of its negative effects on state fragility. Having already analyzed Eritrea as a particularly fragile state, the policy implementation section will focus on how we may minimize state fragility in the Horn of Africa region. This is overall the most fragile region in Africa and most of the countries’ FSI scores have been worsening in recent years. The recommendations we developed draw on our findings in our case study of Tunisia, which has successfully mitigated fragility as a consequence of conflict. Thus, our policy recommendations are not exclusively applicable to the Horn of Africa, and we see them as concrete steps to counteract the negative effects imposed by internal conflict on states.

7. Policy Solutions

7.1 Executive Summary

In the many cases within the horn of Africa, state fragility has come as a consequence of conflict or civil war, of which the length and recency have generally increased the level of fragility. Accordingly, there must be both international and domestic ventures in order to improve the economic and security repercussions ofthese cycles ofviolence and conflict. Considering the impact of foreign action, it is important that bodies such as the World Bank focus on fomenting international economic participation in aiding fragile

economies that come as a result of internal conflict. Furthermore, with aid from the UN and the EU, there should be more focus on improving the security apparatus in order to push for long-term changes to cohesion factors, leading to increased political freedom. However, whilst international aid will improve state fragility, there is no doubt that there needs to be domestic aims in building relationships with regional actors in order to increase the efficacy of international aid and local strategies.

7.2 Problem

Since 2017, there have been impediments to state fragility in parts of Africa. One of the regions in which FSI scores are particularly worsening is the Horn of Africa, namely, Eritrea, Etopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudans. This includes a major conflict in Ethiopia, which descended into civil war with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation from in 2018. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has also led to a triangular conflict between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. Several conflicts have been recorded in light of the transition to democratic rule, violations of human rights and governmental dysfunction. As this paper suggests, the longitude and recency of conflict has a negative effect on state fragilityindicators, namelythe ‘Security Apparatus’indicator. The wider implication is that there is a nexus between state fragility and intrastate conflict. Whilst this paper supports the causal hypothesis of intrastate conflict on state fragility, the long-term effect suggests a cycle of conflict, leading to a weakened state, leading to further conflict. Consequences will include the diffusion of conflict across boundaries through a process of social learning, and internal displacement.

Conflict itself has multiple inflections. The World Bank identifies three strands of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Firstly, there exists inter-communal contestation over resources, exacerbated by pressures such as climate change and rapid demographic growth. For example, in Somalia, the combined impacts of climate change and conflict have left 7.7 million Somalians in need of humanitarian assistance. 2.9 million have been displaced from their homes. Secondly, regional fragility and conflict dynamics are threatened by fractured social contracts. In Ethiopia, an Amnesty International report concludes that the abuse by authorities on Tigrayan civilians threatens peace and security in the Horn by spreading into neighboring Afar and Amhara, leading to 50,000 civilians being displaced to Sudan and causing further border security alongside Tigray. Thirdly, the insufficiency of funding from international actors has constrained efforts to respond to conflict. There are several new initiatives, such as the European Union plan to allocate 4134 million to humanitarian projects inEthiopia, Kenyaand Somalia, and the UN Office for Coordination on Humanitarian Affairs and EU

Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations’ pledge to donate $1.4 billion. However, these funding mechanisms fall far short of the UN humanitarian partner’s request for $4.4 billion funding. Moreover, funding must be directed to trusted actors, rather than governments with ulterior motives. For example, the World Bank notes that from 1965-1988, the Tanzanian economy declined by 0.5% per year, with average personal consumption decreasing 43%. During this period, western aid, especially from Scandinavia, funded $10 billion to the Tanzanian government, led by Julius Nyerere.

To counter state fragility as a long term impact of conflict national governments must provide audited financial and political aid in the short-term aftermath of conflict. Aid must be substantial to have a long-term positive impact on security and economy in the Horn of Africa through targeted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and must include direct relationship building with trusted leaders and civilians, to promote autonomy in the Horn and ensure long-term stability.

7.3 Policy Alternatives

The existing policy towards state fragility has largely focused around preventative strategies in reducing the level of conflict and violence in the countries that have a high state fragility score. The World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) aims to reduce the impacts of fragility through “preventing and mitigating” in order to work towards the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals of promoting peace and prosperity (Work Bank Group, 2020). In this lies the policy of “systematizing partnerships with humanitarian, development, security, and peacebuilding actorsatthe country level” and streamlining financial processes such as MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) investment to allow for both social and economic policy-making. However, what seems to be clear is that whilst there is claim to focus on ‘preventing’ FCV, the existing policies seem to be more geared towards mitigating the negative consequences on aspects such as the economy through examples such as microfinance loans to lessen the impacts of the conflicts. However, we may propose that entities such as the World Bank would, keeping preventative aims in mind, invest into more socially uniting causes to make way for increased harmony and less fractured social contracts. This can be done through an increased investment in educational programs that may seek to improve relations between regions or ethnic groups that have caused FCV in areas such as Ethiopia as a result of the Tigray Wars.

Furthermore, when considering state fragility in terms of indicators such as ‘Group Grievance’ or ‘State Legitimacy’, after withdrawing funding to infrastructure projects in 2020, the EU announced a 'no more roads' approach towards Eritrea

and diverted their spending towards areas in Sudan as a retaliation to the Eritrean violation of Human Rights (Jurjens, 2020). However, whilst this approach may seem justifiable in the aim of creating more democratic freedom, it has in fact lessened the level of foreign direct investment that would develop infrastructure and quality of lives of the civilians that have to recover from internal conflict. Considering how Eritrea still does have otherinvestors such as China thatinvest into infrastructure improvement (Human Rights Watch, 2020), the impact of the EU withdrawal was not completely effective. In place of this withdrawal, what may be more effective is to encourage and fund increased cooperation between Eritrea and other international actors that seek to trade investment and increased economic advancement for improvements in the political expression and thus the impacts of conflict on state fragility.

7.4 Policy Recommendation

Firstly, national and bloc governments must provide financial funding through direct financial aid and foreign direct investment, targeted to rebuilding political and civilian structures. We have learned from the case of Tunisia that a strong economic capacity and economic relationships with external actors can help countries mitigate the effects of civil war. FDI flows are a catalyst for growth, as it brings capital and technology into the region. From 2016-18, 64% of total FDI flows went to Ethiopia, which also received 50% of regional total aid. South Sudan and Eritrea were the lowest recipients of aid, gaining 0.9% and 0.7% of FDI flows respectively. However, many African countries have vowed to promote foreign investments, particularly with $2.5 trillion worth of infrastructure projects estimated to be completed by 2025. In post-conflict situations, construction must be the first sector to receive FDI, particularly energy and transport infrastructure. There is already a precedent for this. For example, Djibouti has announced a $442 million investment from the United Arab Emirates to build a new port. Additionally, the regional infrastructure plan, the ‘Horn of Africa Initiative’, by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, has prioritized interconnectivity on transport and energy via interconnection links. However, as a White&Case Africa Focus paper suggests, $1.4 billion in additional FDI is required to target 4 sectors often affected in the short and long term by civil conflict. This includes transport, electricity, technology, and sanitation. FDI flows in infrastructure in the post-conflict period will provide the long term foundations and institutions for stability, and offer employment opportunities to those who may be displaced and in need of economic agency as a defense against political corruption. An overview of employment in key sectors such as infrastructure and services is provided below. In all cases, the share of employment in infrastructure is below 20%.

Therefore, FDI flows into this sector will boost short-term security by providing regenerated transport, energy and housing links, whilst also securing long-term talent in infrastructure planning, construction, and investment management.

Secondly, national governments must build strong relations with trusted local actors. Improving governance and political indicators such as state legitimacy may allow countries to better navigate the post-war recovery process, as demonstrated in our analysis of Tunisian exceptionalism. Specifically, indirect cash-transfer programs can often be cost-ineffective, and direct funding to local actors is nominal. Forexample, inSomalia, money provided by humanitarianaid organizations have been spent on non-Somali UN personnel ratherthan localactors vested with thetrustofrestoring apostcivil war nation. A diplomatic initiative, involving appointing members of a department of the national government to understand the values and intentions of local actors, is key in ensuring all economic aid is substantial. The importance of local and regional actors is shown in several cases. For example, in 2003 the Ethiopian community launched the Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition project, which initiated higher household incomes and crop yields. Moreover, regional aid may prove a localized, utilityreliable source of aid. Bodies include the Economic Community of West African States, which aims to create a monetary union through cultural integration. The Arab Maghreb Union is another regional source. The Treaty forming the AMU was signed in 1989, and the documents assume not only financial aid, but also deepened economic integration and progressive approximation of the political and security sphere. These localized bonds may provide closer monitoring of the use of funding. However it is also important to consider whether regional bodies hold enough resources for widespread aid. This will require local, continental and international supply chains to ensure that all sources have the required training and financial ability to resolve political and social instability in the Horn of Africa. In relation to the specific recommendations of this paper, it will also require transnational cultural alignment to ensure effective establishment, to mitigate support for emerging undemocratic leaders.

Acknowledgements

The Conflict and State-building Team would like to thank Dr Buğra Süsler (UCL) and Dr Tom O’Grady (UCL) for guidance on research design and methodological approach.

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Figure 1

Total State Fragility Index Score Models

Figure 2

C1 – Security Apparatus Models

Figure 3

E1 – Economic Decline Models

A Tale of Two Americas: From January 6th to January 8th, a Report on Anti-Democracy Insurrections

Caio Goolsby1, Daniel Harding, Emilija Palivonaitė, Matei Sava, Ioana Turcan

Published April 2024

Abstract

The 21st century has witnessed a persistent and precipitous decline in democracy across the globe. As part of this growing trend, two of the world’s largest democracies, the United States and Brazil, have been challenged by their outgoing President and his supporters who refuse to accept the results of the election. These challenges have culminated in two seemingly identical attempted insurrections, on the 6th of January, 2021 and the 8th of January 2023 respectively. During these riots, protestors stormed and occupied government buildings in an attempt to overturn the results of a democratic election and disrupt the democratic process. This report provides a systematic point-by-point comparison of the rioters, the major political figures involved, media coverage of the event, the government’s response, and the public’s reaction. It finds that the riots primarily differed significantly in the role of the military, the government’s immediate response, and the involvement of the outgoing president. In the end, it also makes several public policy recommendations to prevent and mitigate the impact of such events in the future.

Keywords: democratic backsliding, insurrection, US politics, populism

1. Introduction

In the 21st century, democracy has faced one crisis after another. Authoritarianism, populism, and anti-democratic movements have spread across the globe in what has been dubbed the ‘third wave of autocratization’ (Lindberg, and Lührmann, 2019). In the past decades, scholars such as Lührmann, Lindburg, Manning, Burrows, and many others, have consistently observed a global decline in democracy, in which ‘an unprecedented 36 democratic regimes have broken down and autocratization processes have been set inmotion in more countries than ever before’ (Obiagu, 2021; Boese, Lindberg, and Lührmann, 2021; Manning and Burrows, 2021). While the causes of this have been hotly debated in academic circles, with answers ranging from digitization to stagflation, the fact that democracy is facing a global decline and crisis is rarely disputed.

Perhaps the greatestsymbolofdemocratic backsliding ineven the most secure Western democracies occurred on the 6th of January, 2021, when supporters of the then-President of the United States, Donald Trump, stormed their legislature in an attempt to overturn the results of the 2020 US Presidential

election. To many scholars, it has served as a case study into how political violence, populism, and lack of faith in democratic institutions have grown in Western democracies, contributing to their decline and the autocratization of politics (Kleinfeld, 2021; Fried, 2022). Two years later, nearly to the day, Brazil’s democracysuffered an eerily similarattack when supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro seized the headquarters of all three branches of government on the 8th of January, 2023 as they called for the overthrow of the democratically-elected government headed by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

These two attempted insurrections against the democratic process immediately drew comparisons in the news media, with the videos of Bolsonaristas breaking into the Brazilian congressional building seeming to be nearly identical to those of Trump supporters climbing into the Capitol building (The Washington Post,2023). This poses the obvious question as to how similar these two events and their responses actually were, but it also leads to the deeper question of what can be done to safeguard our democracies in the face of such blatant populist political violence targeting nations’ democratic institutions.

In this report, we attempt to answer these questions by systematically qualitatively comparing the two attempted insurrections. Relying heavily on primary-source videos, messages, and public social media posts, as well as government reports and media coverage, we specifically compare and contrast the rioters themselves, the actions of the outgoing administrations, the response of the incoming administrations, the reaction by the public and the media, and the narrative before the riot. Due to the obvious surface similarities of the two events, we hypothesised that that the differences between the two would be few and shallow, with any deviation in the response to the event being explained by the fact that the US insurrection took place while Donald Trump was still in office, making it an autogolpe, while Lula had already become President in Brazil by January 8th.

Upon closer investigation, this perspective is highly flawed. Broadly, the two riots are extremely similar events, whose causes, actions, build-up, and coverage are neatly parallel. However, there are some deep, fundamental differences between the two movements, specifically that of the outgoing President’s involvement following their defeat in the election and the role of the military. As predicted, the response to the attempted insurrection seems to differ wildly between the two countries, but besides the impact of the timing of the riot, it appears that Brazil’s more powerful institutions allowed a more swift and more decisive reaction to the riot.

2. Literature Review

First, it is vital to analyse and investigate literature surrounding broader trends related to these. Namely, to look at literature involving greater currents around populist movements and rhetoric which will allow us to explain and analyse these movements with a greater wealth of knowledge. This is because these anti-democratic insurrections were following on from the loss of power of populist presidents so to look at these, we first need to analyse the literature surrounding the rise of populism which prefaced these insurrections. The rise of populist politics has perhaps been one of the most important political trends within the twenty first century with an LSE blog attesting that the number of identifiable populist governments has increased five-fold in less than two decades as of 2018 (Ross, 2019). The rise of populism globally and in the USA and Brazil is not a disputed phenomenon, however the causes of this are. Subsequently it is necessary to navigate the literature surrounding the mentality and causes for this rise of populism amongst voters as it allows us to set the correct framework to analyse the subsequent election denial and anti-democratic insurrections following from the populist’s loss of power.

Within academic circles revolving around populism there is a contentious debate on seeking to identify the root of this rising popularity of populist politics, whether this is simply a reactionary expression of public disapproval or if it is entrenched within longer currents of political apathy. Populism has generally been defined as containing a mistrust of the so-called ‘elite’ and placing an emphasis on ‘the people’ who feel their voices and frustrations are being ignored or not heard. Cas Mudde defines populism as ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, arguing that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.’ (Mudde, 2004) Although the idea of the ‘pure people’ is often defined ambiguously by right-wing populists such as Bolsonaro and Trump, it generally denotes ethnic or cultural distinctions whereas left-wing populists tend to emphasise other factors such as class. Whilst Goodhart argues that this increase of populist politics, and its subsequent fallout, such as election denial, protests, and antidemocratic insurrections, are fundamentally due to the great divide between the ‘Somewheres’ and the ‘Anywheres’ whereby society has an increasing gulf between the ‘leftbehind’ people and the elite, who as a result are more likely to be drawn to populism (Goodhart, 2020).

In analysing the rise of figures such as Bolsonaro and Trump, and the subsequent deterioration of democratic institutions and ideals in the wake of their election losses, and the insurrections at the Capitol in the USA and the violence in Brazil, it is necessary to formulate a greater understanding of the currents of thought underpinning these movements. Whilst Goodhart has argued for these populist agendas to be fuelled by a great and ever-growing gulf between the masses of left-behind people and the political elite, others such as Moisés Naím argue that populism is not even an ideology in and of itself (Naím, 2022). Rather, populism can simply be seen as a tool or means for political actors to obtain power via its persuasive rhetoric which captures the masses. Subsequently, populist rhetoric can be seen as a simple political weapon to gain popularity. Furthermore, the previous success of the populism of Bolsonaro and Trump has been seen as purely reactionary, and the subsequent uprisings as reactionary too. This is because the initial support for Bolsonaro and Trump, like other populists, has often been seen through a reactionary lens, whereby populism and its supporters tend to stem from short-term factors and fears, such as immigration, law and order, globalisation, financial crisis etc. Hence, populism has been seen as having strong ties to nationalist ideas: ‘national populism is only distinguished from nationalism and racism in that its supporters do not see themselves in these terms (Davies, 2018). This idea of supporters of Trump and

Bolsonaro having racist undertones and simply reacting to perceived issues of immigration, corruption, election fraud etc. has been challenged by Eatwell and Goodwin, who argue that the rise of populism is far more complex than a simple response to simple issues. Instead, they argue that this awakening of populist spirit in the twenty-first century is more nuanced than this approach and that it is entrenched within a long-term and deep mistrust of the liberal establishment and political elite as well as growing scepticism and trust in traditional democratic politics (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2020). Their approach tends towards a view which then subsequently allows us to analyse these anti-democratic insurrections within the context of the initial rising tide of populism being seen as an active rejection of liberal democracy.

A balanced view of seeing Bolsonaro and Trump’s political style of populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ with a ‘restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ (Freeden,1998) is a grounded view within academia and subsequently provides relevant framework to investigate these anti-democratic insurrections following their loss of power as well as the threat to democracy both presidents posed. Whilst some literature has tried to show sympathy towards populist leanings in Brazil and the USA, there is a general consensus that the coming to power of populists like Bolsonaro and Trump have been instrumental in democratic backsliding as they have had more authoritarian tendencies in their election rhetoric and presidencies(Weizenmann, 2019). The view that Bolsonaro and Trump both set the necessary background for antidemocratic insurrections due to their consistent democratic backsliding and populist rhetoric as well as attempts to deny the validity of election results is, generally speaking, a common view within academia. For instance, backsliding has been seen as prominent during Bolsonaro’s presidency due to his frequent criticism of the electoral system, judiciary as well as a partaking in a mirage of anti-democratic rallies (Muggah, 2021). Democratic backsliding and the shift towards more authoritarian tendencies within democracy has been seen as a global phenomenon within the twentieth century, highlighted by the cases of Brazil and the USA which have resulted in a form of ‘democratic recession’ as populist figures such as Bolsonaro and Trump have continuously weakened democracy (Igarape Institute, 2020). Fukuyama, who was responsible for the idea of the ‘end of history’ following the collapse of communism and fall of the Berlin Wall, recently stated in 2017 that we have entered a ‘democratic depression’, due to backsliding present in major democracies due to the expansion of populist politics in the Americas and Europe. President Trump has been seen, akin to Bolsonaro, as a major source of backsliding within his own democracy due to him ‘violating democratic norms,

attacking free media, and treating political opponent as illegitimate.’(Gerschewski, 2018) Subsequently, the general literature surrounding Bolsonaro and Trump’s presidency seem to reach a justified consensus of a ritual trend towards autocratization and democratic backsliding pervasive in their rhetoric and presidencies.

Furthermore, there has also been much commentary on how the democratic backsliding on populist leaders such as Trump and Bolsonaro and their undermining of the electoral process, namely their election denial rhetoric, was instrumental in undermining democratic ideals and, at least, partially responsible for anti-democratic insurrections following their loss of power. For instance, in the lead up to his campaign for a 2nd term as president, the ‘Trump administration recently shifted its “law and order” messaging to target local Democratic Party politicians from urban areas, particularly on the campaign trail.’(Kishi and Jones, 2020) Additionally, the literature indicates an agreement that both presidents engaged in casting constant doubt over the validity of the election process in the run up to their most recent elections. Both presidents constantly fed a narrative of election fraud in an attempt to undermine the democratic process. This is exemplified by Bolsonaro, who was a routine apologist of Brazil’s military dictatorship during his years as a fringe politician, suggesting that the vote could be cancelled unless the system is reformed, as he stated: ‘Either we do clean elections in Brazil, or we don’t do elections at all.’(Jeantet, 2021) This rhetoric which prefaced protests in Brazil following Bolsonaro’s election loss can be seen as a form of him attempting to negate the election process as he was trailing Lula in early polling in the presidential race. Subsequently ‘his claims of fraud have led analysts to express concern that he may be laying the groundwork for his own version of the Jan. 6 Capitol riot in Washington where supporters of Donald Trump alleged he had been robbed of victory.’(Jeantet, 2021). Furthermore, Trump’s ‘post-truth rhetoric’ has been seen as equally responsible for the shift in public attitudes to the validity of the electoral process.(McComiskey, 2017) Subsequently, a wealth of literature does seem to support the view that the democratic backsliding and populist rhetoric of leaders like Trump and Bolsonaro was pivotal to undermining the democratic process and hence responsible in such anti-democratic insurrections which refused to accept the election results.

Therefore, whilst the causes of the rise of populism and presidents such as Trump and Bolsonaro have been disputed within academia, the subsequent effects of these presidencies have had a more unanimous agreement. This is because both Bolsonaro and Trump in their rhetoric and presidencies were key proponents of democratic backsliding, in particular their undermining of the electoral process has been seen as crucial

to allowing for the correct circumstances for anti-democratic insurrections to occur.

3. Background of Events

At the outset, it is important to establish a working set of facts regarding the lead up to and events of the January 6th and 8thriots. Undoubtably, the reader of this paper has been accosted with a plethora of narratives regarding the events of those days, and perhaps of the major figures in the two movements. However, for the purposes of this report, it is important to set aside an individual’s preconceived notions and the often unfounded accounts that litter social media. What follows is an attempt to, albeit briefly, summarise the context in which the two events took place.

3.1 January 6th, 2021

3.1.1 2020 Election Campaign

Immediately prior to the 2021 riots, the United States had undergone one of the most contentious elections in American history. On one hand, you had the Democratic candidate Joe Biden, the former Vice-President under Barak Obama, a centre-to-centre-left career politician, by American political standards. On the other, the Republicans nominated thenPresident Donald Trump, a former businessman-turned controversial political figure, who sought re-election after winning the 2016 general election. Despite their initial focus on socialjustice, thecampaignswere dominated bythe spectre of the COVID-19 pandemic which had been profoundly altering the nature of American life and the economy since March 2020 (AJMC, 2021. Unsurprisingly, as a cross-cutting issue impacting the public’s physical, mental, and economic welfare, it acted as a crucial point of contention in the election and post-election debates. Then-Former-Vice-PresidentBiden campaigned on a more stringent response to the pandemic: encouraging mask mandates, vaccinations, quarantine, and thorough testing, while Donald Trump took clamped down on travel, but did not encourage much else, often citing concerns about the impact on the economy (Lewis, 2021). Notably, he spread multiple dubious or conspiratorial medical theories, such as touting the use of hydroxychloroquine (Milman, 2020). However, his other responses included establishing a centralized testing system, the mass production of medical supplies, and signing a stimulus check to ease the economic burdens (The White House, 2020). Moreover, then-president Trump framed the pandemic as a part of his geopolitical feud with China, blaming themfor the spread of the virus (Milman, 2020). As the pandemic had devastated the nation’s economy, with almost 10 million people losing their jobs, economic recovery and strengthening were very salient points of

contention (Hess, 2020). To that end, Biden’s strategy promised to raise the minimum wage and invest in green energy, while Trump focused more on creating jobs by stimulating the economy (BBC News, 2021; BBC News, 2020a).

Other prominent issues addressed in the election included reactions to the civil unrest as a part of the Black Lives Matter movement. It is estimated that about 15 million to 26 million people in the United States have participated in demonstrations over the death of George Floyd and others at the hand of law enforcement officials (Buchanan et al., 2020). In response, Biden’s campaign highlighted the importance of criminal justice reform, as well as grants for minority communities, while Trump proposed the creation of a database to trace police misbehaviour (BBC News, 2021; BBC News, 2020a).

On the question of climate change, stances differed, as Biden proposed re-joining the Paris Climate Agreement, as Trump championed the extraction and use of American energy resources (Gross, 2019). Other debated issues included immigration, foreign relationships, education, trade and gun control

3.1.2 Election and the Lame Duck Period

The election itself was also quite unique. Due to the COVID19 restrictions that differed from state to state, along with the American constitution which grants the managing of elections up to individual states, the exact mechanisms of voting were subject to great variability. Therefore, there were over 60 lawsuits brought up by the Trump administration or its allies across multiple states (Reuters, 2021b). All of these lawsuits were consequently dismissed. Nonetheless, several key issues related to the allegations of fraud could be discerned. Firstly, postal voting, the proportions of which have increased due to

the pandemic, wasscrutinisedasa waytocastfraudulentvotes (Parks, 2020). Next, the voting machines, supplied by Dominion Voting Systems, were alleged to be owned by the 'radical left' and in turn have 'deleted 2.7 million Trump votes nationwide' (Giles and Horton, 2020). Moreover, dead voters were alleged to have cast pro-democrat votes (Pengelly, 2021). Other alleged voting irregularities included there bundles (BBC News, 2020b). Notably, these claims were debunked as false and, as a result, dismissed by the courts (McGraw, 2022).

3.1.3 January 6th

On the day of the insurrection, the affirmation of the Electoral College ballot count was taking place at the capitol. While the joint session of the Congress was taking place, president Trump was holding a rally for his supporters in front of the White House. Ahead of the event, Trump tweeted a reaffirmation of the fraud allegations, saying that the 'corrupt process never received legislative approval' (BBC News, 2022). As the session was in progress, Trump gave a speech reinforcing his earlier claims about unlawful and 'stolen' elections, ending it by saying 'we fight like hell and if you don't fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore' (BBC News, 2022). Before the speech was concluded, however, a crowd gathered outside the Capitoland began to barge past the barriers and into the building (Macfarlane and McDonald, 2023). Although the Capitol police officers at the scene were holding back the rioters, eventually the line was breached. The insurrectionists, many wearing 'Trump 2020' merchandise and some even tactical gear (Farrow, 2021), began roaming through the corridors of the capitol.Meanwhile, the proceedings atthe Senatechamber were stopped and the people in danger, including vice presidentMike Pence, evacuated. The protestors destroyed the property at the scene and broke into the cabinets of the lawmakers' as well as the Senate chamber (Lonsdorf et al., 2022). The mayhem continued for hours until eventually, the police managed to secure the interior and force the rioters out

(Lonsdorf et al., 2022). Nonetheless, there were numerous cases ofinjuriesand fivepeople, including policeofficerBrian D. Sicknick who was protecting the building, died on the day (Cameron, 2022).

3.2 January 8th, 2023

3.2.1 Historical Context

Any discussion of the events in Brasilia on January 8th must begin with a cursory review of 20th-Century Brazilian political history and, specifically, the role of the military and American interference in domestic politics. The Brazilian military has long been involved with Brazilian politics and government, even since the formation of the first Brazilian Republic in 1889 after a military coup d’etat (Akkoyunlu, 2022, pp. 37). Since then, the military has returned to seize control of the government twice. First, the pseudo-fascist dictator Getulio Vargas led Brazil following the Pacification Junta who took power during the Revolution of 1930 (Dulles, 1967, pp. 4). Interestingly, after being deposed in 1945 by the very military which gave him power in the first place, President Vargas won the Brazilian general election in 1951, thereby making him the democratic President of the Republic for another three years, even after his decades-long dictatorship (Dulles, 1967, pp. 5-6). However, his presidency was cut short due to an apparent suicide in 1954 after the military againcalled forhis resignation inthe face ofa scandal involving the death of a military officer (Dulles, 1967, pp. 56).

In 1964, the military re-entered Brazilian politics by removing the centre-left President Joao Goulart and installing a military dictatorship that lasted for over two decades (Napolitano, 2018). While its extent is still generally debatable, the United States undoubtedly supported and encouraged this last coup d’etat when then-President John F. Kennedy authorised the deployment of an aircraft carrier among many other supplies to the military officers launching their coup in Operation Brother Sam (Parker, 1979, pp. 70). With US backing, the military was able to take possession of the Brazilian government and would not relinquish its control until the late 80s, after a period of slow reform and the gradual reintroduction of democratic elements (Napolitano, 2018).

In the less than forty years since the Military Dictatorship, they have notbeen completelyabsentfromthe politicalsphere either. This has included military commanders threatening an intervention if then-former-President Lula was allowed to run for president in 2018, the military taking control over Rio de Janeiro, mass resignations, and the recent normalisation of political appointees (Consumer News and Business Channel, 2018; Reuters, 2022; The Associated Press, 2021; Phillips, 2018; Demori, 2018; Harig, 2021). Thus, it is important to highlight how in Brazilian politics the military is not considered a passive bystander as it is in the United States and most other Western powers. There is a documented history of interventionist policies and attitudes when it comes to Brazilian domestic politics, and the notion of the military reasserting itself within the government is neither foreign nor unappealing to many (Poder, 2022, pp. 360).

3.2.2 2022 Election and Campaign

In Brazil, the official presidential campaign for 2022 only lasted from August 16th until September 29th (The

Economist, 2022). During the entirety of this period, the campaign seemed to be primarily a contest between two personalities: then-President Jair Bolsonaro and then-Former PresidentLula Inacio da Silva (serving from2003-2011),with Silva appearing to have a lead over Bolsonaro for most of the contest (Harrison, 2022). Lula was making a shocking return to politics after an earlier controversial criminal conviction as part of the larger Lava Jato, Car Wash, corruption investigation which prevented him from running in the 2018 Presidential election; however, said conviction was overturned in2019 (Brito, 2021). It should be highlighted here that as Bolsonaro won the 2018, his connections with Judge Moro, the Federal judge who convicted and sentenced Former President Lula, have been called into question, and suspicions ofthe convictions being politically motivatedhave been raised (Phillips, 2019).

Regardless, by 2022, the stage was clearly set for a campaign between these two populist icons of Brazilian politics. Bolsonaro continued tohold broad supportamong the wealthy and the rural voters, with strong backing from evangelical communities and those concerned about violence (Harrison, 2022; VICE News, 2023a; VICE News, 2023b). Detractors of his presidency often pointed tohis handling ofthe coronavirus pandemic, which included hundreds of thousands of deaths across Brazil and his vaccine scepticism, especially his odds claims such as that the vaccine would turn individuals into crocodiles (Harrison, 2022). Yet his supporters would highlight a booming Brazilian economy and lowering crime rates, with Bolsonaro famously using his military experience to highlight his ability to fight crime and keep the cities safe (Harrison, 2022; VICE News, 2023a; VICE News, 2023b). It was during this campaign where then-President Bolsonaro began to promote and use election denial rhetoric (Reuters, 2021). In one notable speech, he claimed that if he did not win the election inthe firstround ofvoting, then the elections were rigged against him (Alves, 2022). This was not an isolated case, and he continued to claim there was an attempt to steal

the election away from him by the left. Yet by election day, Bolsonaro had amassed massive popular and institutional support for his campaign, with official backing from his Partido Liberal, the successor to the party of the military dictatorship (Progressistas), and some centre or centre-right parties (Republicanos, PSC) (Moliterno, 2022).

Lula, on the other hand, found backing from his Worker’s Party (the infamous PT), multiple Brazilian Communist Parties (PCdoB, PC, PSTU), and most of the centre-left (Cidadania, PDT, PSB) (Moliterno, 2022). His support drew more heavily from the poor, especially in the North-east region of Brazil where the public still held fond memories from his Presidency (Justiça Eleitoral, 2022; Harrison, 2022). Notably, while the world dealt with the Great Recession during Lula’s presidency, he presided over one of the largest booms in the Brazilian economy and the creation of a massivelysocialwelfare program, the bolsa familia (Harrison, 2022). His critics instead often attacked him, however, for his record, and supposed compliance with corruption during his Presidency, as well as his stance on crime (Harrison, 2022). Moreover, there is a strong perception among Bolsonaristas thatPresidentLula is a socialistora communist,a factthathas provoked much antagonism towards him (Pieper, 2022). It is not insignificant that claims that the democratically chosen president was a communist were used as the pretext for the 1964 military coup d’etat (Parker, 1979).

The election itself went quite smoothly. In the first round of voting on October 2nd, neither candidate won a majority of the votes, with 48.43% of votes for Lula and 43.20% for Bolsonaro (Justiça Eleitoral, 2022). Due to the Brazilian electoral system requiring the President to secure a majority of ballots, this automatically led to a runoff on October 30th (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2022). Lula managed to clinch victory in said run off, 50.9% to 49.1% (Justiça Eleitoral, 2022) The Superior Electoral Tribunal, the Brazilian Federal Agency responsible for running and supervising elections

such as that for President of the Republic, informed the presidents of the results of the election on the evening of the 30th, and officially proclaimed Lula as the President-elect on December 6th 2022 (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2022; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2022).

3.2.3 Lame Duck Period and Inauguration

In the aftermath of the election, PresidentBolsonaro remained noticeably silent, refusing toeven speak toreporters for2 days following his defeat (Gibbs, 2022). Even then, he would continue to refuse to concede his defeat, while not publicly making a play to contest the results in a brief statement made on November1st(Gibbs, 2022). Forthe restofhis presidency, Bolsonaro would privately, and occasionally formally contest the results of the election, such as submitting a formal challenge to the election results, citing software bugs, three weeks after the election (Biller and Bridi, 2022).

His claims were During the same period, Bolsonaristas, the supporters of the outgoing President, began to demonstrate their displeasure with the results of the election, varying from an outrightdenial of the second round of elections on the basis of electoral fraud, to a fundamental distrust of the incoming President, Lula (Jeantet, 2022). These protests began as nonviolent demonstrations in nearly every Brazilian city and most major international cities where the predominantly

Bolsonaro-supporting diaspora gathered to call for the overturning of the election (Jeantet, 2022). Even in London, there are videos of protesters filling Piccadilly Circus on November 2nd calling for a military intervention to ensure the continuation of then-President Bolsonaro’s government (Brasileirosemlondresoficial, 2022). The protests quickly escalated as truckers, one of the most ardently pro-Bolsonaro occupations, began blocking and occupying major highways across the country (Jeantet, 2022). These protests continued for weeks until various police, and in one instance football fans, managed to clear them for major roadways (Malleret, 2022). In Brasilia, Bolsonaristas camped outside of the Brazilian military headquarters, calling for the military to intervene (Elms and Taylor, 2023). Protests and various calls for civil and military interventions to overturn the election results continued throughout until January 8th (Elms and Taylor, 2023). The violence escalated even further when rioters attempted tostormthe FederalPolice Headquarters and torched cars in the streets of Brasilia after the arrest of a indigenous Bolsonarista, thereby prompting heightened concerns over the security of the Federal District (Buschschlüter, 2022; Phillips, 2022). On the 28th of December, Bolsonaro flew to the United States, two days before his successor’s inauguration on January 1st(Marcelino, 2022).

3.2.4 January 8th

On January 8th, the ongoing, near constant protests in the Capitol city escalated dramatically. In the early morning, buses contracted by an unknown source began delivering over a thousand Bolsanaristas to the ever-growing encampment outside of the Military Headquarters (Polglase et al., 2023; Elms and Taylor, 2023). The protestors, escorted by a small number of Brazilian Federal District police officers, began making their way to Three Powers Plaza around 14:00 BST (Polglase et al., 2023; Elms and Taylor, 2023). While passing the National Congress, at around 15:00 BST, the protesters broke through police barricades andstormed thecongressional building, with a large number of protesters climbing the roof

of the Congressional building and subsequently entering the building itself by breaking glass windows (Polglase et al., 2023; Elms and Taylor, 2023). Subsequently, the protesters moved onto the Three Powers Plaza, where they were able to storm the Presidential Palace and the Supreme Court at will (Polglase et al., 2023; Elms and Taylor, 2023). Despite the ever growing police presence, it took hours before the police attempted to reenter the taken buildings, with order being restored only after 19:00 BST (Polglase et al., 2023; Elms and Taylor, 2023).

4. Methodology

In ordertoassess the events inas detaileda manneras possible and consequently provide meaningful results, we have decided to analyse the actions of each one of the most prominent characters in the events. Namely, we have included the rioters, the police force, the presidents who lost the race, the government, and the media. The choice of these groups and actors has given us the ability to provide a nearlycomplete overview of the events to analyse the research question in more detail. Furthermore, each of the broad categories was divided further, to cover the different aspects of the topic. These subsections were tailored to each of the actors accordingly. More specifically, when looking at the rioters, we have concentrated on the motivations, objectives, actions and organisation. In the case of the defeated presidents, we distinguished the periods of pre-election, postelection but pre-insurrection, during and after-insurrection periods. As for the reactions of the government, we compared the arrests, investigations that ensued, promises and the actions of the winning party. In terms of public and media reaction, we focused on news reporting, socialmedia coverage and the reactions in the international arena. After comparing the two insurrections by the proposed metrics, we move on to discuss the governments' involvement in overseeing the mitigation of the fallout and draw our conclusions.

5. Analysis and Results

5.1 Rioters

For both insurrections, the rioters who decided to storm their nation’s capitals were the primary manifestation of popular discontent. In this section, the motivations, organisation, and actions of those who participated in the two events will be placed under scrutiny, compared, and analysed.

5.1.1 Objectives for ‘Protest’

For the January 6th riot, there were five main objectives: to prevent the counting of electoralcollege votes by Congress, to pressure the administration to overturn the results of the election, to instigate a broader revolution against the ‘deep state,’ a nebulous term that President Trump used to describe the establishment which disapproves of him, to voice their objections to the results of the 2020 election, and to punish certain individuals perceived as threats. Ostensibly, the riot occurred on January 6th because that was the date of Congressional certification of the election results. Thus, during Trump’s rally prior to the riot, the protest seemed to be an attempt to put pressure on those counting the votes, especially Vice-PresidentMike Pence who was presiding over the proceedings (Hodgson and Matthews, 2022). This can be observed in many interviews done at the scene of the riot and on twitter (Mek, 2021; Nelson, 2021; House Select January 6th Committee, 2022f). However, once itseemedclearthatthe certification would go through regardless, many protestors seemed tobe motivated by a desire toexpress theirdispleasure violently and to prevent the joint session of Congress from certifying the electoral vote count (House Select January 6th Committee, 2022f). Beyond this, there were two more extremely active, but much smaller, objectives of certain groups of protesters. Some conspiracy-theorist attendees saw the protest as the beginning of a prophesied revolution that would keep Donald Trump in power and end the supposed tyrannical rule of the deep state (Kunzelman, 2022; House Select January 6th Committee, 2022e, pp. 637). On the other hand, there were also militant groups, such as the Proud Boys and the Oathkeepers, whose private messages and statements indicated they were targeting individuals they deemed a threat to themselves and to the United States, such as the democratic leadership and Mike Pence (House Select January 6th Committee, 2022a; House Select January 6th Committee, 2022f; Melendez, 2022).

On the other hand, the riots in Brasilia seemed to only have two main objectives: to encourage the military to overthrow

the results of the previous election and to violently express their anger at the government. In fact, almost all of the antidemocratic protests following President Lula’s victory over Former President Bolsonaro on October 30th have focused on these goals. Beginning on election day itself, many Bolsonaristas began calling for a military intervention to prevent the inauguration of Lula (Polglase et al., 2023; Elms and Taylor, 2023; Jeantet, 2022). In Brasilia, protesters had been camping out in front of the military headquarters for weeks in an attempt to encourage a coup d’etat Polglase et al., 2023; Elms and Taylor, 2023). As discussed earlier, the prospect of a military intervention is not foreign in Brazil, and when the military police began being involved in the riots, it seemed many were sympathetic to the protester’s cause. This will be considered further later. Coupled with the fact that the riot took place on a Sunday when the targeted buildings were empty, and that all other legal available recourses were expended, the only available objective was to violently express their frustration and to try to instigate a coup. This second desire can be seen in the extensive and unnecessary damage caused to the public building, such as the needless destruction of a centuries-old clock.

5.1.2 Actions During ‘Protest’

The actions taken by the rioters during the protests themselves can also be considered as a specific point in comparison. While the similarity of the riots themselves, specifically the storming of major government buildings, is self-evident, the methods and actions of the protesters during the riot have some striking similarities and notable differences.

Perhaps the most significant of these differences lies in the comportment of the rioters once inside of the stormed building, the US Capitol in the United States and the

Presidential Palace, the National Congress, and the Supreme Court in Brazil. A comparison between the damages and extent of vandalism reveals that the rioters in Brasilia were significantly more violent and prone to vandalism. In testimony, it appears that the total cost of physical damages to the US Capitol of January 6th totaled 2.7 million USD, which included the left of a podium, damages from entering, and the impact of pepper spray and tear gas on paintings (UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTHONY VUKSANAJ

Sentencing Memorandum, 2022; Smith, 2022). While there are no published accounts of the monetary cost of damages done to Government property in Brazilia, a report by the National Historical and Artistic Heritage Institute in Brazil indicates that the damages were much more extensive and severe than that of the US capitol. This included the cutting of a 1.5 million USD painting, the vandalization of countless statues and desks, smashing of windows, damages done to a centuries old clock (Porterfield, 2023; Perpétuo and Goulart, 2023). Partially, this can be attributed to the fact that three buildings were invaded in Brazil, compared to only one in the US, and thatthe governmentlosttotal controlofthe buildings, allowing many more rioters to stream in.

However, even the few rioters who managed to break into the US Senate chamber had a peaceful conversation with a police officerwhere one rioterclaimedthathe ‘beenmakin’sure they ain’t disrespectin’ the place’ after leading a prayer (The New Yorker, 2021). This is a stark contrast to the invasion of the Brazilian building, where protestors defaced murals, broke tables, took out fire houses to spray around, and generally treated their surroundings much more roughly (Popular Front, 2023).

However, there were otheractions during the attacks thatwere remarkably similar. On January 6th and January 8th, both groups quickly overwhelmed the limited police presence guarding the targeted government buildings and then entered said buildings by forcing their way through doorways and breaking windows (The Washington Post, 2023). They both

targeted individuals in the government they viewed as responsible for conspiring against their preferred candidate, with notable targets being Alexadre de Moraes in Brazil and Mike Pence in the United States (Andrade, 2023; Fialho, 2023; Metrópoles, 2023; House Select January 6th Committee, 2022b; House Select January 6th Committee, 2022f). Both shared similar chants, with bolsonaristas shouting the buildings they are occupying are ‘theirs’ and Trump rioters shouting ‘Whose house? Ourhouse’repeatedly, highlighting how both groups viewed their actions as legitimate (Popular Front, 2023; The New Yorker, 2022). A substantial portion of protestors in both cases were adorned with their nation’s flag and colours, red, white and blue in the United States, and green, gold, and blue in Brazil (Popular Front, 2023; The New Yorker, 2022). Notably, they also used alternative symbols, such as the Confederate battle flag, Brazilian football jerseys, and MAGA hats (Popular Front, 2023; The New Yorker, 2022). Despite how dissimilar Bolsonaro and Trump’s reaction to the protests were, images of and references to the former presidents were consistently present. Symbols and references to God were also prominent in both cases (Metrópoles, 2023; The New Yorker, 2021). Even further, both used encrypted communications and private forums to spread their news on messaging services such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and Parler (Garcia, 2023). All of these similarities highlight the parallel underlying motivations of the protesting groups: dislike of the new regime, distrust in official news sources, disillusionment, nationalism, religion, a belief that they truly represent the will of the people, even in the face of evidence, and demagoguery.

5.1.3 Treatment of Police Officers

The rioters also had a generally similar relationship with police officers on the scene. Both Bolsonaro and Donald Trump had the strong support of law enforcement during their campaigns, and many believed the police would support the riots (Paraguassu, 2021; Lange, 2020). This belief seems to have been more prevalent in Brazil, with Bolsonaristas cheering when the military police first arrived thinking they were there tosupport them (Rios, 2023). Casualconversations between rioters and police officers was not uncommon, especially in the early stages of both riots (The New Yorker, 2021;Terra, 2023). However, as the riots progressed, and both sides escalated, greater violence and hostility ensued between

the two groups, evidenced by the beating up of Michael Fanone, the attack of a mounted officer in Brasilia, and the destruction of congressional police cars in Brazil (Marques, 2023; Eixo Político, 2023; Schaffer, 2022). However, it should be noted that the Brazilian riots seemed to more specifically target police, military, and military police officers in the sense that it called for them to reassert themselves in Brazilian politics by replacing Lula with Bolsonaro, a sentiment that was not visibly present on January 6th.

5.1.4 Claims of Commercial-Sector Involvement

Yet, one more principle discrepancy between the two should be noted. Supposedly, there was heavy involvement by the Brazilian agricultural sector in attempting to organise the events of January 8th, 2023. The current Brazilian minister of Justice, Flávio Dino, has made repeated claims to this effect, specifically accusing them of contracting hundreds of buses to ferry Bolsonaristas toBrasilia (Debusmann, 2023). Moreover, in a recent court filing by the Brazilian Solicitor-General specifically implicates If true, however, it would reveal a willingness on the part of the commercial sector to aid in the violent riots that was not nearly as present in the United States (Advocacia-Geral da União, 2023).

5.2 Reaction by the Outgoing Administration

The behaviour of the then-incumbent presidents is also a crucial part of the discussion, as the words and actions of such public figures have the potential to influence both the public and the political elite. Four distinct periods can be discerned for the study of the presidents' communications and behaviour: before the lost elections, after the elections but before the insurrection, during the insurrection and after it.

5.2.1 Pre-election Period

The earliest period, before the election, was similar in both situations, as the presidents raised suspicions about the possible fraud prematurely. For example, Trump notably stated that ''we want to make sure the election is honest and I am not sure that it can be'' on the 24th of September - more than a month before the election day. In particular, Trump has criticised the transparency of means of voting, such as mail-in ballots and automated vote-counting systems (Williams and Chaggaris, 2020). Similarly, Bolsonaro preemptively cast doubts about the legitimacy of the upcoming elections, amplifying his message through social media (Friedrich, 2022). More specifically, he was concerned with the electronic vote-casting system, which was less preferable to him compared to paper ballot casting (Reuters, 2021). Bolsonaro was quoted saying 'if this method

continues, they're going to have problems'. Moreover, both presidents used the same denial tactics before the earlier elections that they won: Trump in 2016 (BBC News, 2016) and Bolsonaro in the 2018 general elections (Friedrich, 2022).

5.2.2 Post-election, Pre-insurrection Period

After the lost elections, however, the behaviours started to differ. Trump not only persisted with the earlier attitude, but he also escalated by backing the bids to overturn the election results in four key states: Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin (Zurcher, 2020). Bolsonaro likewise continued promoting the idea of fraudulent elections and pushed for an investigation into the legitimacy of the results. In both cases, evidence of significant fraud during the election was absent (Downie, 2022). However, Bolsanaro condemned violence due to the results of the election during his last presidential address, two days before leaving office (Sá Pessoa, 2022).

5.2.3 During the Insurrection

On the day ofthe insurrection, the actions and responses ofthe two Presidents were different. On the day of the insurrection, then-incumbent president Trump made an official speech before the events occurred. In it, he encouraged his supporters to march on the Capitol and 'fight like hell' (Naylor, 2021). During the violent confrontations, the then-president tweeted that 'USA demands the truth', while propelling his earlier claims of hoax (BBC News, 2022). Not an hour later he tweeted again, this time asking the insurrectionists to 'remain peaceful' and in a later video asking them to 'go home' (BBC News, 2022). Nonetheless, he insisted on calling the participants 'great patriots' (BBC News, 2022). Meanwhile, Bolsonaro seemed to lay low in Florida, thousands of kilometres away from the scene of insurrection (Mansoor, 2023). There, according to a message posted on January 10th on his own Twitter account, the former president underwent

surgery, related to a stabbing in 2018. And yet, on the same day, he still claimed that the elections were fraudulent while condemning the violence and riots themselves (The Economist, 2022).

5.2.4 After the Insurrection

Lastly, it is necessary to comment on the events that followed the violent coups at the countries' parliaments. In the case of the US, Trump's public statements changed throughout. After the immediate aftermath of the January 6th, the president seemed to be siding with the rioters, even going so far as to call them 'great people' (Cohen, 2021). Later, however, he backtracked and condemned the events (Breuninger, 2021). Nonetheless, the former president persisted with the denial narrative, stating that '[]'. Notably, the claims of fraud resurfaced in the 2022 mid-term elections, with many Republican candidates backing the rhetoric (Bianco, Wolfe and Gardner, 2022). In contrast, as the aftermath of the bolsonarista insurrection still unravels, the future actions of Bolsonaro cannot be commented on. Nonetheless, he does seem to uphold the rhetoric of denial, as mentioned earlier.

All in all, the behaviour of the two presidents seems fairly similar, although differences in the former leaders' presence during the insurrection and Bolsonaro's denunciation of violence before the insurgency stand out as contrasting.

5.3 Reaction by the Incoming Administration

5.3.1 Arrests

Arrests havebeen made following both theJanuary 6thriotand the Brazilian Congress attack, however, the approach seems to differ. In the US case, twenty-four hours after the attack, of the 2,000 - 2,500 protesters (BBC News, 2019) less than 100 were arrested in connection with the events (LA Times, 2021) (most of them on suspicion of COVID-19 curfew violations).

In Brazil, on the 9th of January (one day after the event), Brazilian Justice Minister Flavio Dino reported that authorities have detained 1,500 people (CNN, 2023). After January 6th, the FBI requested help from the public to identify rioters (CNBC, 2021), leading to charges against more than 950 people, as of January 2023. This was possible because of the help received from digital investigators (the Sedition Hunters), who archived and preserved terabytes of evidence fromsocialmedia platforms (Huffington Post,2022). Ofthose charged, 500 pleaded guilty, while 380 were sentenced (NPR, 2023). While no senior political figures were arrested in the US investigations, Brazil’s former Minister of Justice and Public Security Anderson Torres was arrested on his return to Brazil, on January 14th. After serving as a minister under President Bolosnaro, at the time of the Congress storming he was in charge of public security in Brasilia (Reuters, 2023). Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who ordered Torres’ arrest, cited alleged "omission" and "connivance" as the grounds for charges.

5.3.2 Investigations

In response to the Capitol attack, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced plans to create an independent commission to investigate the crimes committed on January 6th (CNN, 2021). While passing the House, the proposal was defeated by Senate Republicans. On the 30th of June, with the help of two Republican representatives, Democrats in the House passed a resolution to establish the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. This bipartisan committee (eight Democrats and two Republicans) started its investigation in late July 2021. After conducting more than 1,000 interviews and 10 public hearings (The Guardian, 2022), on December 22nd 2022, the committee released its final report. Most of the findings presented focused on FormerPresidentTrump’s role inthe event:Trump has “purposely disseminated false allegations of fraud related to the 2020 Presidential election”; “sought to corrupt the U.S. Department of Justice”; “summoned tens of thousands of supporters to Washington for January 6th”; “refused repeated requests overa multiple hourperiod thathe instructhis violent supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol, and instead watched the violent attack unfold on television” (HoR, 2022). Trump was subpoenaed in October 2022 for documents and testimony, but his lawyers sued, blocking its effect. When the final report was published, the subpoena was dropped (ABC News, 2022).

In parallel with the House Committee investigation, the Department of Justice (DoJ) launched its own investigation into the January 6th events. On the one hand, the DoJ has been probing Trump’s involvement in the Capitol attacks. To that extent, several individuals with ties to Trump and State officials have been subpoenaed. The House Committee has

also approved criminal referrals against Trump to the DoJ. On November 18th, US Attorney General Merrick Garland opened the Smith special counsel investigation, appointing Jack Smith to further investigate Trump’s role in the January 6th riot, together with his mishandling of classified documents. On the other hand, as stated, through the FBI, the DoJ arrested more than 900 rioters and still continues its pipe bomb investigation.

In Brazil, the investigation into the January 8th attack on the Congressis ledby the BrazilianSupreme Court,who, less than two weeks after the event, ordered the arrest of Anderson Torres and decided to investigate Former President Bolosonaro (who is currentlyinthe US and has applied forUS visa) for possible “instigation and intellectual authorship of the anti-democratic acts that resulted in vandalism and violence” (AlJazeera, 2023). Furthermore, a judge of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court accepted a complaint againstBolsonaro filed by the governing coalition. As a result, the Electoral Court opened an investigation against the former Brazilian president for abuse of power during elections (The Rio Times, 2023).

5.3.3 Trump’s Impeachment

One day after the insurrection, House Democrats already unveiled initial impeachment articles against President Trump. On the 11th of January, Representatives David Cicilline (D-R.I.), Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) and Jamie Raskin (DMd.) introduced their article of impeachment (LA Times, 2021, b), charging the former president with “incitement of insurrection” over the January 6th events (NPR, 2021). The same day, Speaker Pelosi asked then-Vice-President Mike Pence to invoke Section 4 of the 25th Amendment to assume the role of acting president. As Pence refused to do so, on the 13th of January the House passed the impeachment article by 232-197, with 10 Republicans joining all Democrats in favour of the resolution. However, by a vote of 57–43, the Senate failed tosecure the two-thirds supermajority needed toconvict Trump, therefore he was acquitted. Seven Republican senators joined the Democrats in voting for conviction. One notable reaction was that of Minority and Republican leader, Mitch McConnell, who stated that Trump’s actions were disgraceful and that the former president “is practically and morally responsible for provoking the events of the day” (CNN, 2021, b), despite voting for his acquittal.

5.4 GOP Leaders' Reaction

Apart from Mitch McConnell, several other prominent GOP figures strongly criticised the insurrection and President Trump’s involvement in it. Some examples include Senators Ted Curz, Rand Paul, Lindsey Graham, and Rick Scott; and

Representatives Marco Rubio, Chip Roy, Kevin McCarthy, and Mario Diaz-Balart. At the one-year anniversary of the Capitol attacks, Republicans were more muted, choosing to seemingly divert the focus on Democrats' brazen “attempts to use January 6 to support radical election reform and changing the rules of [Congress] ” (PBS, 2022). Notably, Republican Congresswoman Liz Cheney - a constant critic of Donald Trump, who served as the vice-chair of the House Select Committee - has been removed from her leadership position within the GOP. In the 2022 midterm elections, she lost renomination in Wyoming to the Trump-endorsed Harriet Hageman. Conversely, divisive figures like Rep. Marjorie TaylorGreene -who stillclaims the 2020 Presidentialelection was stolen from Trump and suggested that “January 6 rioters should have been more aggressive when they stormed the Capitol” (Forbes, 2022) - gain prominence within the party.

5.5 Reaction by the Public and the Media

There never was any calm before the storm. As previously stated, tension was already very high in both the United States and Brazil, with important election denialism claims. A large part of the population in both countries was disowning the election on the basis of voter fraud, yet it still remained questionable, whether or not these claims and discontents could lead to a larger mobilisation. Media played an essential role innotonly prompting butalsocovering thediscontentthat led to the riots. In the United States, the tipping point and triggering element for mass mobilisation arguably was then President Donald Trump’s tweet on the 18 of December (Figure 17).

A New York Times article titled “ ‘Be There. Will be Wild!’ : Trump all but circled the date” (Barry and Frenkel, 2021) affirms the importance of this tweet as having transformed what was an uncoordinated, raucous online mob fuelled by rage and conspiracy theories, into a coordinated, mission-

driven mob, that now had a date for its protest: “Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, be wild!”. On Twitter, and mainly on smaller social apps associated with conservatives, such as Parler, a huge wave of communication on this subject formed. Arieh Kovler, political analyst and writer at Unherd, shared in a chain of tweets (Kovler, 2020) communications from Trump supporters on their plans for January 6th. His findings clearlyshow howTrump’s tweetfurtherprovoked his base, which saw his message as a call for action : “Either Trump is calling on us to protest or calling on us to prevent an insurrection… we have to be there”; “We have been waiting for Trump to say the word”; “I have been waiting for his, he called on us we the people, patriots, never give up.”; “he obviously called on us we the people us”; “Trumps tweet said “Wild” implying wild West in my mind.” Very quickly, coordination also occurred on more critical details, such as whether or not to bring arms : “Does Daddy want as armed or not !?!?!”; “If you aren’t marching armed by then is there a point at all to marching?”; “If you don’t go armed cause it’s illegal, just get on the cattle car the the concentration camp now and save everyone the time”. This anticipation of violent action and use of an exclusionary language is a marker of communications and statements from the losing parties on social media platforms.

Interestingly, this storm of election denialism and support for Trump also blew strongly in Brazil, with numerous hashtags emerging. Hashtag #GoTrumpReeleito would reach the Trending Topics of Twitter in Brazil and in total, there were no less than 23,418 thousand tweets between October 2020 and February 2021 (Viana and Nemer, 2022). Such hashtags constitute what the Technology and Social Change Project at the Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy terms “Viral sloganeering” (Technology and Social Change Project at the Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, n.d.). Viral sloganeering is “the tactic of creating short, catchy phrases intended to deliver persuasive, disruptive messaging.” These “must expand past their community of origin and creators into the public sphere.” in

order to reach maximum effectiveness. “The outcome of viral sloganeering often is the popularisation of previously underused words or phrases - effective tools in keyword squatting”. This process of “keyword squatting” is the “tactic of creating online content around a specific search-engineoptimised term so as to determine the search results of that term.” which allows the appropriation of “keywords around breaking news events, social movements, celebrities, and wedge issues.” #GoTrumpReeleito illustrated this by its reference to other hashtags used by Trump and Trump supporters in the United States like #GoTrump and #GoTrump2020 but also added a further layer of complexity by creating a Bolsonaro/Trump osmosis by means of a bilingual hashtag.

Moreover, matching Trump’s call to be “wild”, another online influencer, Jouberth Souza, well-known Bolsonarist and important node in Bolsonarist networks, with more than 210 000 followers, launched on January 5th the hashtag #Dia6VaiSerHistorico. Calling to his followers : “I believe in the victory of Donald Trump. And you? #Dia6VaiSerHistorico”, this hashtag, which had 286 tweets between January 5th and 6th, started a campaign in Brazil, foreshadowing what would happen on January 6th. Moreover, this same hashtag would be recycled and reused inthe protests on September 7 of 2021, during Independence day in Brazil, with the hashtag #Dia7vaiSerHistorico. Brazil also saw the creation of its own unique hashtags and keywords in the runup to January 8th 2023, such as “Festa da selma”. “Selma”, an allusion to the Jungle, and very similar to Trump’s previous tweet in its evocation of the “wild”, was one of the codes used by Bolsonarists to combine the last stages of the invasion of Praça dos Três Poderes. After Lula was sworn in as president on January first, messages appeared on messaging apps inviting people totake partinthe“Festada Selma,”orSelma’s Party. Boechatand Coelho (2023)explainhow “the organisers appeared to turn the word “selva,” or jungle into “Selma” by replacing the letter V with the letter M. The word selva is directly linked to the Armed Forces and its veterans. Over recent decades it has become a kind of war cry for both the military and those who defend them. Many of those are also Bolsonaro supporters.” An investigation by Agência Pública,

a Brazilian investigative journalism outlet, (Fonseca and Scofield, 2023) shows how the code had then reached platforms like Twitter and Instagram within a few days and was also coupled with the hashtag #BrazilianSpring, hashtag evoking anti-government protests, launched by Steve Bannon, former White House chief strategist under the Trump administration (Scofield, 2022).

News media, especially in Brazil’s case, did perhaps also contribute tothe materialisation ofthe people’s discontentand ultimately the storming of democratic institutions. Headlines such as “The Question Menacing Brazil’s Elections : Coup or No Coup?” (Nicas and Spigariol, 2022) created what can now be seen as a sortofself-fulfilling prophecy and reflections that followed January 8th 2023 also attest that a coup had been in the making and awaited : “as sad as it sounds, (I had) been waiting for this for a long time. I have been reporting on the anger and the delusion of the right wing movement here in Brazil for nearly a year and a half. And we had been fearful that something like this was going to happen.” (Barbaro et al., 2023).

Lastly, there was also a common element of referring to history in the covering of the two riots by news media. Both events were portrayed as not having been entirely sui generis, but the fruit of a long process, both with historical - referring to past uprising - and novel roots. In the case of the United States, the assault on the Capitol was “the first by a large hostile group of invaders since the British sacked the building in 1814, according to the United States Capitol Historical Society.” (Baker, 2021). For Brazil, the riot had a more recent precedent : “But Brasília is no stranger to huge, sometimes destructive protests; similar displays of outrage marked the last time anti government demonstrators swept en masse into the capital a decade ago, in 2013.” (Romero, 2023); “And this was a really concerning moment for the country because you have to remember that Brazil suffered through a military dictatorship from 1964 just to 1985, not that long ago” (Barbaro et al., 2023). For Brazil, this trauma was still relatively fresh, but witnessing uprisings where people were calling for the military to intervene and take control, was “for a lot of Brazilians… scary.” News media clearly expressed that this episode was on another scale and that “The devastation left behind on Sunday made it clear that this event dwarfed other political demonstrations in Brazil’s recent history.” (Romero, 2023).

Media conveyed in its coverage that these two riots were not happenstance, but rather born from a long process involving election denialism and cult-like loyalty to defeated leadersthese paved the way to insurrection. Media portrayed two pictures of the mob : an initial one in which the mob was a mere follower, pledging allegiance and faith to Trump and

Bolsonaro, and being animated by these leaders, to then turning into a ‘leaderless” and uncontrollable mob.

To begin with the first depiction, that of loyal followers of a leader, the New York Times distinctly conveyed this idea of a culmination of events leading up to the the January 8th insurrection by describing the mob as :“protest(ing)whatthey falsely claim was a stolen election, the violent culmination of years ofconspiracy theories” (Nicas and Spigariol,2023a)and the riot as the “Violent culmination of incessant rhetorical attacks” (Nicas and Spigariol,2023b). Similarly, inthe United States, the New York Times described “the chaos on Wednesday (as) not spontaneous, but rather (coming) after a monthslong effort to delegitimize the election and a yearslong crusade by Mr. Trump to undermine any opposition.” ( Paybarah and Lewis, 2021). The rioters are also shown tohave “followed a long conspiratorial road to the capitol” as well as a “pathway of conspiratorial stepping stones”(Williamson, 2021).

PresidentTrump’s “SaveAmerica”rally speech, characterised as “incendiary” (Barry and Frenkel, 2022) provided the mob with the encouragement needed to take charge, and on its own terms. President Trump was indeed critiqued as “inciting” his “rabid worshipers toriot” (Tiedrich,2021). Yonder,an Aifirm that tracks misinformation, had according to (Heilweil and Ghaffary, 2021) “logged more than 367,000 posts mentioning “civil war” on the platforms that it tracks.”, with a large majority of these posts “coming from Twitter, but that posts about civil war were more likely to come from users on Parler and 4chan as well as online factions, like the Proud Boys, white supremacist extremists, and communities associated with QAnon.”

In Brazil, the mob also became uncontrollable, with protestors taking itupon themselves toassure the continuityofwhat they deemed their rightful government, as opposed to the fraudridden Lula government. With formerPresidentBolsonaro out of the country, this self-assignment was even more potent : “Now, it is no longer for our beloved President Bolsonaro, but for us, for our people, for Brazil” one tweet read;the fight was now inthe hands ofthe people. Forthis reason, The New York Times, even described the events in Brazil on Sunday as “actually scarier than January 6”. Bolsonaro had already told his supporters to move on, but “his supporters were already moving forward without him. They had become so convinced, in part from his own rhetoric, and also in part from just the sea of misinformation online, that they didn’t need him anymore. The movement had become almost its own self-animating beast that was going to push forward towards the capital with or without him.” (Barbaro et al. 2023).

During the raging riots, reporting paired with social media activity helped give understanding of the events unfolding. The language used to describe the rioters was similar in both the United States and Brazil. They were described as “rioters” and a “mob” in most cases. In the United States, particular emphasis was placed on the energy and “fervor” of the mob : “Their breach came with a confused and frenzied energy,

fueled by the words of Mr. Trump” ; “there was a strange mix ofconfusion and excitement” (Tavernise &Rosenberg, 2021). The unfolding and theprogression ofthe riotswasalso heavily documented online in real time in both insurrections. Many live-streamed the riotson Youtube, Facebook, Parlerandother social media platforms (CTRL0000930027, 2021). Interestingly, a violence of the mob described as “spasmodic” and observed through its “furious offensive” and “violent sea”-like characterisation (Barry et al., 2021) was also paired with a description of a mob that marvelled, and shared with pride on social media at what it actually found once it had entered the Capitol building. The mob is described as having “broken into the home of American democracy and proudly shared the images on social media.”; “waved banners announcing its loyalties”; “Paraded”; “Brandished”; “at times appeared cheerful about their ability to wander freely inside the Capitol.”; “some gleefully posed”. (Paybarah and Lewis, 2021). This New York Times article describing the insurrection, with the use of “stunning” photos, gives an essential theatricality to the rioters actions as some “posed” or “paraded” amongst the halls of the Capitol building. This was paired with a “bewildered wonder” of a mob who “gawked at a place of wealth and beauty, adorned with art and marble” (Tavernise & Rosenberg, 2021b). Such a state of awe would however not prevent the mob from violently destroying the property within the Capitol. The riot in Brazil was covered in a similar manner with the invasion and ransacking of the “iconic buildings” in Brasilia and the description of the mob as mergiving“revoltand hooliganism”with a“grotesqueside” and “shrill humour”. (Gascon, 2023). Such an embrace of the grotesque was also noted by the English-speaking media which culminated inthe description of“Bolsonaro mob’s orgy of violence” and portrayal by the journalist George Marques of the insurrection as a “a moment of Bolsonarista joy.” Being (the mob) “almost in orgasm … in ecstasy – as if they were staging a revolution that was positive for the country” (Phillips, 2023). This sense of a collective mass delusion surfaced in multiple reportings and even depicted the protestors as a “laughing stock on the left in Brazil, framed as losers who didn’t get their way” (Barbaro et al. 2023). An article from Le Monde went further and explored the quasimysticalrealityofthese rioters,whosepsychologicalstatewas judged to be “preoccupying”, with “carnival gatherings” with “the mostfar-fetched ideas”, which manifested themselves “in very emotionally charged actions”(Meyerfeld, 2022). In the United States and Brazil alike, these ideas surfaced through the use of hero tropes and images of fighting, and even dying, like a patriot for your “homeland”. Ana Priscila Azevedo, a Pro-Bolsonaro Leader at the riots tweeted the day of the riot, using important biblical language, of an apotheosis to take place and that the “homeland will be free and we will die”.

The media did moreover not hold back in its description of the violence of the rioters, with The New York Times even referring to the scenes at the Capitol as constituting a “medieval civil war”, where rioters attacked the police using “flagpoles, crutches even chunks of wood” (Barry et al., 2021). In the Brasilia riots a similar image of “war” was observed, with “unimaginable scenes of destruction and savagery” and “acts of such violence and depredation”. (Phillips, 2023). These actions led many to characterise these acts as “terrorist”, as did Flavio Dino, the Brazilian Minister of Justice and Public Security, as well as news anchor Erick Bang on the Brazilian GloboNews television network : “What we are witnessing is a terrorist attack, the three buildings have been invaded by coup-mongering terrorists.” Lula further called the rioters “vandals, neo-fascists and fanatics”, with “fascists” being a term that would resurface especially amongst Spanish-speaking countries to describe the rioters (Cobb and Araujo, 2023).

A strong denunciatory discourse also emerged, disproving not only the former Presidents and their fraudulent claims but also discrediting the rioters. The New York Times highlights the Conservatives “wild claims” about voter fraud and the public holding fast to “the president’s fraud fictions” (Rutenberg et al., 2021). In Brazil, the landscape is alike, with “A defeated president claiming, falsely, that an election was rigged.”(Cameron, 2023). This discourse of strong condemnation is most poignant in messages issued by foreign politicalmembers and heads ofgovernments :PresidentBiden “condemns” the happenings, as President Maduro “categorically rejects” them, President Diaz-Canel “energetically condemns the violent and undemocratic acts… aimed atcreating chaos” and PresidentSanchez “categorically condemns the assault” (Cobb and Araujo, 2023). As these tweets suggest, and as would be expressed in the news media, the description and condemnation of these insurrections were paired with a reaffirmation of democratic values and the

necessity to safeguard the democratic process. A discourse of winning vs. losing was also used by the rightfullyelected side, with statements that the Constitution, and hence democracy and law and order will prevail, and will always prevail.

Ultimately, these two insurrections demand a difficult reckoning and biting the bullet. Governments will be forced to operate a hard and painful shift from the “unimaginable” to what might be shocking, but is central to the body politic. The gravity of the insurrections has been duly noted; an article from Metrópoles, a Brazilian News Media, even begins with the grave :“The contentofthe reportis veryserious” (Rabello, 2023). A common effort at Metrópoles to ‘dissect’ this coup is also observed, through the use of terms relating to the study of the human body : “Anatomia de um golpe” (Anatomy of a coup); “Radiografia do golpe” (Radiography of a coup); “Autopsia do golpe” (Gascon, 2023), (Guedes, 2023), (Rabello, 2023). As President Biden tweeted in 2022, looking back on the January 6th riot, “There is a dagger at the throat of our democracy”. (Biden, 2022).The shared understanding now is that these events were not unique manifestations in time, destined to be self-consumed, but rather manifestations of new, petrifying traditions of democratic dissent. A discourse of vulnerability is present throughout communications by political leaders reflecting on the riots; Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s tweet is indicative of this fear : “What is happening in Brazil cannot leave us indifferent. The images of the irruption into institutional offices are unacceptable and incompatible with any form of democratic dissent.” (Cobb and Araujo, 2023). The New York Times similarly expressed that for Donald Trump supporters, “the next chapter of Jan. 6 is not the ashes of a disgraced insurrection, but an amorphous new movement fueled by grievances against vaccines and President Biden, and a deepened devotion to his predecessor’s lies about a stolen election.”, which is evidently a “troubling omen” (Dias &

Healy, 2022). These two American and Brazilian nations that have been scarred, and that are yet to be free from the threat of the dagger before them, will need tosober up and attack the insidious roots of this dissent, “mass delusion” (Nicas, 2023) according to some accounts, and a general loss of faith in democracy.

In comparing both of these anti-democratic insurrections, it is vital to analyse the perspectives beforehand of both the January 6th storming of the Capitol in Washington and the January 8th chaos in Brazil, where protestors stormed Congress, the Supreme Court and presidential palace. The cases of both Brazil and USA are almost synonymous as both involved: ‘Two defeated presidents who refuse to accept reality; two sets of lies aimed at discrediting elections they lost; two violent mobs on a doomed quest to put a loser in power. The similarities even extended to rioters in each mob stealing furniture from the government buildings they stormed, as though they were collecting trophies.’(Klaas, 2023) In Brazilian case perhaps even more than the United States, this anti-democratic insurrection was definitely not a complete surprise as ‘For months, Bolsonaro’s right-wing supporters have held onto the false belief that the October 30 runoff election was stolen, and that President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva didn’t win – asking for the military to intervene and re-establish a dictatorship reminiscent of the one that dominated the country for more than 20 years.’(Charner, 2023) The likeness between Trump and Bolsonaro’s populist rhetoric and reigns in power and their subsequent claims of election fraud before and following their election loss should have definitely provided a warning of the potential for civil unrest following their defeat

The ritual democratic backsliding of both Trump and Bolsonaro and their public undermining of the democratic process served as a warning for the potential of antidemocratic riots following their loss in the presidential elections. The storming of the Capitol in Washington also provided a foreshadowing for the events inBrazil and perhaps there was a clear indication from both presidents and their supporters that they would not peacefully accept an election loss, highlighted by the constant sowing of doubt into the legitimacy of the electoral process. In the case of Brazil there was perhaps even more warning due to the events at the Capitol and Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic tendencies, such as criticising the Supreme Court and his close relationship with the military, seen through 25 Brazilian Senators expressing concerns overBolsonaro’s high levelofsupportinthe military police as early as August 2021. (Bland, 2023) Whilst the Brazilian government had the pre-warning of the events in Washington, the storming of the Capitol was perhaps not entirely surprising or unprecedented and officials in the US government should have seen the warning signs in that as

argued Eric Foner, these events were ‘not unprecedented at all’ and actually ‘represents something deeply rooted in the American experience, which is actually a hostility to democracy.’ (Hartigan, 2021)

5.6 Preparedness

Clearly in the case of both Brazil and the USA, there was a lack of preparation and anticipation of these insurrections despite prior warnings resulting in a need for answers to ‘how so many people managed to enter some of the most highly securitized buildings in the country, with practically no resistance.’ (Polglase, 2023) The intense anti-democratic fervour exhibited by both ex-presidents and their hardcore, loyalist base of supporters meant that these insurrections did not come as a total shock to both nations as political turmoil was rife in the preceding years to these events.

In Brazil, there was certainly an awareness of riots and a planned storming of official government buildings before the events ofJanuary 8th. The insurrection was clearlynota secret and was planned openly beforehand with the Brazilian government well aware of this: ‘Sunday’s protests had been openly organised online days before and intelligence services were aware of their plans. Telegram conversations seen by CNN show people messaging as early as January 5 about their intentions to storm Brazil’s Congress.' (Polglase, 2023) This highlights the events of January 8th being a coordinated and planned attack on Brazil’s democracy with the Brazilian authorities aware of this butstill slow and unresponsive to act. This is somewhat juxtaposed by the January 6th events in Washington which were not a precise nor organised attack on the Capitol as the ‘FBI has found scant evidence that the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitolwas the result ofan organized plot to overturn the presidential election result, according to four current and former law enforcement officials.’ (Hosenballand Lynch, 2021) In comparison, the scenes in Brazil’s capital were ‘While shocking, the riot was not unforeseen like the storming of the US capitol in 2021’ as academics, judges, journalists and politicians had all warned about its possibility’ because ‘much of Bolsonaro’s support base had not accepted the result of last October’s election and were openly discussing an attempt to seize back power’ as well as ‘the US Capitol attack was repeatedly held up as a cautionary tale.’ (Tirado, 2023)

Subsequently, despite having more prior knowledge of an impending anti-democratic insurrection, Brazil seemed to be less equipped or prepared to deal with riots in their capital. Furthermore, the relative youth of Brazil’s democracy in comparison to the United States and the history of their military dictatorship also indicates Brazil’s increased susceptibility to potential threats to democracy. Before his

election loss, Bolsonaro had frequently shown a hostility toward the democratic process highlighted by 7th September 2021 (Brazil’s Independence Day) ‘when he called upon his supporters to take to the streets and protest Congress and the courts following weeks engulfed with tension and speculation over a possible coup.’ (Tricontinental, 2022) However, a Senate investigation in 2021 in the United States also claimed that ‘the deadly insurrection at the US Capitol was “planned in plain sight” but intelligence failures left police officers exposed to a violent mob ofTrump supporters.’ (Smith, 2021) When looking at both these cases, whilst in Brazil there was a greater wealth of knowledge and foreshadowing of an impending attack, there was certainly an awareness of the potential for anti-democratic riots and yet both countries lacked any serious preparation for these events.

5.7 Government Oversight

As we can see that both Brazil and the USA had prior knowledge, in some form, of anti-democratic insurrections occurring in their capitols, yet both lacked the necessary preparation to prevent these attacks on their democracies occurring, which calls into question the extent of government oversight leading up to the events of January 6thin Washington and January 8thin Brasilia.

In both cases there was perhaps a neglect or undermining of the perceived threat of these protests descending into violence or being a real threat to democratic institutions. For instance, new Brazilian president, Lula, stated that ‘The Brasilia police neglected [the attack threat], Brasilia’s intelligence neglected it’ and that it could be seen that ‘police officers talking to the attackers. There was an explicit connivance of the police with the demonstrators.’ (Polglase, 2023) Similarly in the United States, the threat these rioters posed to democracy was surprisingly not combated with much rigour or planning as a ‘combination of bad communications, poor planning, faulty equipment and lack of leadership meant the warnings went unheeded, allowing the insurrectionists to overrun the Capitol and disrupt certification of Joe Biden’s election victory.’ (Smith, 2021) Furthermore, in case of January 6ththere was a complete lack of government oversight of intelligence leading up to storming of the Capitol as the senate investigation does ‘paint a portrait of bureaucratic flaws that left Capitol police scrambling to protect members of Congress and VicePresident Mike Pence’ whilst there was also a ‘failure of the FBI to collect information on domestic extremists, despite a wealthofevidence on socialmedia.’(Smith, 2021)The events of January 8thin Brazil were reminiscent of this as well as ‘Brazilian police were noticeably slow to react to the riot in Brasilia even after the arrival of more than 100 buses leading many to question whether authorities had either simply ignored numerous warnings, underestimated the

protesters’ strength or been somehow complicit.’ (Aljazeera, 2023)

Subsequently, it is evident that in both Brazil and the USA, despite prior warning of these riots, there was a significant lack of preparation and government oversight leading up to these events as, even though intelligence agencies were aware of protestors planning to storm government buildings, protestors were still able to gain access into these buildings and cause chaos. As seen by Lula describing the event at the capital as “barbaric” as a ‘lack of security had allowed Bolsonaro’s “fascist” supporters to breach barriers set up by the military outside the congressional building, the Supreme court, and the Planalto Presidential Palace.’ (Picheta, 2023) Therefore, both anti-democratic insurrections, clearly had not been foreseen well enough by authorities in Brazil and the USA, despite prior warning of the potential for these events to occur, as both were not suitably prepared for the mass of protestors attempting to undermine both countries democratic system.

6. Brief Summary and Conclusions

This section will provide a brief summary of the major points brought up in the analysis section. While the two events appeared on the surface to be quite similar, there are many surprising and crucial differences between the two, even if they are the product of similar processes.

6.1 Major Similarities

To briefly summarise the similarities between the two insurrections, there were plenty. Firstly, it is evident that conspiracy theories were prominent in both cases. Such messages alleging ‘stolen’ elections, in turn, had their impact. In both cases, rioters involved seemed to believe that the elections were unfair and constituted a plot against the population. Such ideas of governmental betrayal and control by the powerful elite were widely shared on social media, which worked as an organising tool, as well as being picked up by the mass media. Moreover, losing presidents in both cases were involved inthe spread ofpropaganda and called for investigations intoallegedly fraudulentelections. The theories were propagated not only after the announcement of results but also before the elections themselves. Additionally, during the insurrection, the security forces held up the uncontrollable mob, which eventually caused tremendous damage. Most importantly, however, both insurrections were unsuccessful; although the damage was done to the stability of democracy itself, the insurrectionists were (and still are) prosecuted in search of accountability. Moreover, the judicial system also investigated the involvement of losing presidents and relevant

political figures, additionally signalling the accountability of political elites.

6.2 Major Differences

Despite the many obvious and more subtle similarities between the two events, there are three crucial points of deviation. First, the outgoing president’s strategy deviated after the election. While former President Donald Trump actively and vocally contested the results, former President Bolsonaro’s challenges were much more subtle, with him never going as so far as to verbally state that he won his election. In part, this has been attributed to the Federal nature of Brazil’s elections, so if Bolsonaro’s defeat was fraudulent, that would greatly impact many of his closest supporters who won many seats in the legislature, in gubernatorial elections, and in state legislatures. The consequence of his decision of not continuing to claim fraud in the election was that he no longer held as much sway over the greater public movement he left in his wake. However, the damage was already done, and a recent poll found that 36% of Brazilian voters believe the election to have been fraudulent (Poder360, 2022). Without a leader or figurehead such as Donald Trump, the election deniers in Brazil were forced to rely more on grassroots campaigns among his supporters which led to multiple protests across the country which lacked a unifying message.

The second major difference was the role of the military. As discussed earlier, the Brazilian military has a much more prominent role in the political arena. Thus, their involvement was a major focal point of the Brazilian rioters, with them being the targetaudience ofthe protests ratherthan legislators, judges, or the general public. This played out in the rhetoric and actions of the Brazilian protests, who vocally called for a military insurrection and repeatedly camped outside of the military headquarters. Due to the nature of the Brazilian military, the notion that they may reinstate Bolsonaro is not foreign at all, given their historical ‘self-declared, selfappointed intervening role’ in Brazilian politics (Chakrabarti and Sutherland, 2022). This isn’t to say that the protesters in the United States were not calling for a coup, far from it, but rather their objectives were less undemocratic as they called for the intervention in the constitutionally-required process of accepting the electoral college count.

The last major point is how quickly the insurrectionists were punished. In the United States a political congressional investigation took years to release its findings, and the first person charged with crimes related to January 6th was only convicted over a year after the fact. By contrast, the Brazilian judicial system has moved quickly. In the span of a month, over 1200 individuals have been charged with crimes related

to the insurrection, more than have been charged in two years by an FBI investigation (The United State’s Attorney’s Office District of Columbia, 2023; Poder360, 2023b). One possible explanation for this is the immense power entrusted to the Brazilian judiciary, especially in comparison to the American justice system. Further, since January 6th occurred before President Biden’s inauguration, it is not inconceivable that a proper investigation from the executive branch was partially delayed due to political pressure. Another possible cause of this may be the lack offormalcentralsupportforthe protesters from the former President. Regardless, there was a much stronger and concerted effort in Brazil to identify and punish those involved in the protests. Lastly, this can also be attributed to the general lack of popular support for the January 8th attacks, with a recent poll only saying 3% of Brazilians actively support the riot, roughly half the support January 6th enjoys in the United States (Rose, 2022; Poder360, 2023a).

6.3 Conclusion

Overall, the two riots are remarkably similar events, where protesters supporting outgoing right-wing Presidents stormed important and symbolic Government buildings in their nation’s capitals. Disenfranchised with the political system they viewed as ‘rigged’ or ‘corrupt,’ many people turned to these extremist candidates and news sources which promised justice, order, and respect for ‘traditional’ values. And when these alternative candidates and news sources began claiming the system or the election was set up against them, it seems many believed that ‘big lie.’ On two days, two years and thousands of kilometres apart, these supporters violently demonstrated their remarkably similar grievances in a remarkably similar fashion, calling for their candidate to be kept in power, despite their loss in a relatively free and fair democratic election. In both cases, the world watched on in horror, with nations and news outlets alike condemning the flagrant attack on democratic values. Under the surface, however, the differences between Brazilian and United States’ politicalstructure and societyhad a marked impacton the riots and their aftermath. Relative to the United States, Brazil’s stronger judicial branch, awareness of the possibility of such an event, more centralised electoral system, and earlier inauguration led themtohavea betterandmore rapid response to the crisis; the United State’s history of military nonpartisanship meant that the risk of a military coup preventing Biden from taking power was never really an option; and lastly, the Brazilian electoral system, as well as a concerted effort to combat claims of electoral fraud, meant Bolsonaro couldn’t keep up the ‘big lie’ past election day, even if his supporters did.

7. Limitations of the Study

There are several limitations to this study. Firstly, the events in Brazil are still unfolding, meaning that it is difficult to objectively assess the actions of participating actors and the subsequent consequences following them. Secondly, the history, traditions and circumstances of democracy in the two countries are quite different. As a result, the comparison between the two countries might not be as straightforward as presented in the paper. Next, the actors discussed in this paper might not capture the full scope of the issue; there might be additional factors that were important for the analysis of the events, however, they were left out of the radar. Lastly, the recommendations derived from the comparative study might not be universal; the nature and function of democratic institutions in different countries might make the guidance difficult to apply or, in some cases, even counter-productive.

8. Policy Recommendations

8.1 Preventative Measures

The key to avoiding the repetition of the events of January 6thin the US Capitoland of January 8thin Brasilia is torebuild people's trust and faith in democracy itself as well as the electoral process. In order to prevent any more attacks on democracy, itis crucialtotackle the rootofthe problemwhich caused these insurrections. Whilst it is obvious that better preparation by intelligence services for such anti-democratic insurrections could have been vital to stopping these protests from turning into chaos and escalating into viable threats to the foundations of democracy, it is also important totackle the forces that initiated these to begin with.

8.1.1 Increasing political agency

A fundamental cause for these anti-democratic insurrections and protests against the election loss was a perception that people did not have a substantial voice in the political future of their country. A lack of a perceived political agency or say in political matters is often what allows people to be drawn to the rhetoric of populist and authoritarian leaders who promise to restore ‘power to the real people.’ The subsequent way to stop this draw toward populism and anti-democratic protests is to give people more political agency, so that they feel their destiny is not being controlled by politicians who ignore their worries. Whilst the methods in which to give people more perceived political agency can be tricky, such as the increased use ofdirectdemocracysuchas referendumsbeingsusceptible to the influence of populism they could still perhaps work as preventative measures as well as a way to give more people more access to the political system. There are other safe ways inwhich torestore people’s faith intheirown politicalagency.

One such way would be to increase governmental transparency and subsequently accountability, which would ensure that politicians would be more accountable to people as if people were able to see who politicians or parties were funded/ sponsored by as well as able to scrutinise each one of their decisions than politicians would become more accountable to their electorate meaning that they would have more incentive fulfil their duty as representatives of the people.

8.1.2 Investment in educational initiatives

Whilst increasing political agency could form some barrier to prevent the rising wave of populist politics and the spread of anti-democratic ideals, to prevent insurrections such as the ones in Brazil and USA it is also vital to restore people’s faith in the electoral process. This is because both January 6th and January 8thinsurrections were consistently plagued by election denial rhetoric and an undermining of the democratic process itself. In order to combat this then, it is vital to invest in initiatives that would educate the general populace on how the electoral system works in order to restore their faith in it. Such a method for this could be advertisements on television or posters which explain the process by which elections work. As well, this increased transparency would reignite faith inthe democratic process as it would make it more difficult for populist claims of election fraud to gain traction amongst disgruntled voters. Whilst upset and outrage is always to be expected after a loss in heated election, by building people’s faith in the validity of the election protests are less likely, seen through the use of nonpartisan groups in monitoring electoral fairness.

8.1.3 Better Preparation and Communication By Intelligence

The importance of ensuring that people believe that their political agency is meaningful as well as that the electoral process is a fair one free from corruption would have been useful in trying to avoid anti-democratic insurrections. However, in order to avoid the mass chaos of these antidemocratic insurrections, there was certainly a need for better preparation by both the US and Brazilian government in combating the perceived threat of these rioters. In both cases, better intelligence service and sharing of information between inter-governmentaldepartments would have perhaps provided a better idea of what police would have been able to anticipate and subsequently been better equipped to deal with this. An improvement in security services and better anticipation of how these eventscould have escalated would have been useful in stopping them becoming out of control and preventing the amount of damage they caused.

8.2 Mitigation Strategies During the Insurrection

However, if there is another similar attempt to overthrow a democratically-elected government, the success and failures of how the world engaged with the January 6th and January 8thriots as they occurred provide some strategies as to how to counter the rioter’s objectives.

8.2.1 Police Action

Ostensibly candidates of ‘law and order,’ both Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump enjoyed massive support from the police and the army. Thus, many thought that the police and some of the military would help the rioters in both insurrections. To some extent, this either occurred or was attempted in both nations. In order to prevent a more successful attempt at essentially ensuring the loyalty ofthe armed officers and using that as political leverage, it is important to ensure apolitical and impartial nature of the police force. While the implementation of this will vary wildly between nations, we would recommend either increasing the funding of relatively impartial existing forces, such as the United States Capitol Police, or removing political appointees from top positions in police forces that are already highly politicised. This would help ensure there is a force with the ability, capability, authority, and politicalwill tocontend with mobs of protestors attacking government institutions in the name of one political candidate or another.

8.2.2 News and Media Outlets

A common theme between Bolsonaro and Trump is the eschewing of traditional news sources. Instead, many have turned to social media and informal networks on platforms such as Whatsapp, Parler, and Telegram to receive much of their news information. Yet, traditional news sources such as newspapers, Television channels, and independent journalists still play a crucial role in how the public collects and absorbs information. Thus, it is crucial that the Fourth Estate continue to carefully monitor such events and movements. Their unbiased coverage of protest movements, along with a careful condemnation of violence and dialogue about election denial, may notonly helpsway those who would otherwise join in the riots, but it also delegitimizes the political violence in the broader public sphere. We encourage continual heavy and transparent coverage of democratic elections and any protests that might contest them.

8.2.2 International Response

As rioters occupied parts of the US Capitol building, the Brazilian PresidentialPalace, the headquarters ofthe Supreme Court, and Congress, Western leaders were very quick to condemn the protests and attempted insurrection. Continuing this practice is of paramount importance, as it serves to delegitimize the protests while signalling that any successful coup would not have international recognition, thereby weakening the would-be plotters’ plans. We encourage foreign governments tocontinue condemning suchattacksand recognizing the newly-elected leader as quickly as possible.

8.3 Mitigation Strategies After a Failed Insurrection

Finally, the threat an insurrection poses on democracy does not end once the unrest is quashed. How the government, politicians, and the media behave in the aftermath of the events can have lasting consequences: peddling disinformation, engaging inconspiracies, orslowmobilisation to prosecute are just some of the ways that democracy’s erosion can persist in the long run.

8.3.1 Investigations and Arrests

In terms of investigating the insurrection, the authorities' response must be prompt and decisive. The celerity and resolve of the Brazil Supreme Court serve as a notable example, but the line between efficiency and (judicial) overreach is a thin one. Sacrificing impartiality to ensure speedy actions corrupts the credible image that the investigating authorities must hold. The US DoJ’s approach is commendable, as it has been closely cooperating with and updating the general public. Furthermore, by complementing the law-enforcement investigation with other ones - thus, undertaking a multi-pronged approach -the governmentcould get hold of a more comprehensive account of the motivations, actions, and responsible individuals. In that regard, establishing anationalcommission -like the proposed January 6 Commission in the US - can be beneficial. The investigation should also not steer away from targeting political figureheads. The Brazil Supreme Court has swiftly granted a request from the prosecutor general’s office to investigate the role of former president Bolosonaro in the January 8th events, which comes in stark contrast with the US.

Lastly, when dealing with arrest operations at such a complex scale, better communication and information-sharing between law enforcement at the local, regional, national,and/or federal levels is essential. The investigative bodies must also ensure healthy channels of communication, and be mindful of overreach.

8.3.2 Politicians’ Rhetoric

The US and Brazil's insurrections are examples of unrest caused predominantly by the supporters of one (usually the losing) political party/leader. In the aftermath, condemnation of the event must be across the political board. This has been particularly noticeable in the US, where several GOP congresspeoplehaveinitially criticised therioters, only totone down over time. To ensure greater politicalaccountability, the media could call out shifts in rhetoric that seek to downplay the harmful effects of the insurrection, exposing narrative changes aimed at political gains to the electorate. Moreover, independent investigation is, once again, key: the report of a national commission has more authoritative value than that of a partisan body, and it could be used to enforce the legislative branch’s narrative. The party in power should avoid politicising the event: placing the blame on the opposition can lead to short-term political points, but can further erode trust in the government in the long run.

8.3.3 Public Rhetoric

Curbing misinformation regarding the insurrection should be a priority shared by media companies and the government alike. While limiting free speech is a source of genuine concern, the potential that false information has to turn into a real security threat should not be neglected. Narratives about the insurrection could be weaponized by peddling conspiracies that undermine the authority of the government or instigating further violence. Media companies should decide on the appropriate steps (be it fact-checking, labelling, strike downs, or account suspension), to ensure talking about the insurrection does not have adverse spillover effects.

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