Bentham Brooks Institute Research Journal 2020-21 by Bentham Brooks Institute

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RESEARCH JOURNAL 2020-21

MARCH 2021 We host a variety of events focused on research agendas decided for the year. Our flagship events

ABOUT US

are policy workshops, which are essentially policy-focused research training sessions led by experts, and an academic conference. BBI puts forth five annual research agendas which give student researchers a huge scope for finding a policy issue they are passionate about, and then base their further research projects on. The

The Bentham Brooks Institute is a student-led

research agendas for academic year 2020-21 are

think tank based at University College London.

as follows:

Recognising the lack of opportunities available to students to engage with public policy, five like-

State of Democracy and Authoritarianism

minded and established societies at UCL came

Diplomacy

together to pool their resources and create this

Cooperation

think tank.

Health Policy and Cooperation in Global

and

Regional/International

Health Our mission is to provide a platform for all UCL

International Conflict

students to bridge the gap between academic

Environmental Policy

research and public policy.

In its first year of operation, the Bentham Brooks

PRESIDENT'S WORD

Institute (BBI) has faced a unique set of challenges as

result

the

Coronavirus

pandemic.

Nonetheless, despite these challenges, our Research Teams rose to the occasion to produce five outstanding

research

papers

variety

stimulating current affairs topics. The papers clearly demonstrate each team's ability to demonstrate

At the BBI, we believe it is essential for young

academic professionalism as well as innovative

people to engage with international institutions

thinking in their writing.

and contribute our ideas to global issues. The future of BBI will continue to seek to provide

The first BBI research Journal is a testament to the

students with the opportunity to be given a ‘seat at

research members' and Trustees' hard work and

the

collaboration; they were faced with the challenges of

table’

major

policy

research

and

discussions. We very much hope you enjoy

working around the clock in different time zones

reading the first edition of the BBI research

under pandemic restrictions, with some staying up in

journal.

the early hours of the mornings to attend team meetings. Without a doubt, their collaboration demonstrates a high level of dedication to their

Nina Zou Porter President 2020-21

research, paving the way for BBI's future.

MARCH 2021

FIVE ALLIANCE SOCIETIES

Asiatic Affairs Society

One representative from each alliance society makes up the Board of Trustees, who provide direction and assistance to the Administrative Committee in the running of BBI.

Diplomacy Society

International Relations Society

European Horizons Society

TEDx Appreciation Society

TRUSTEES' WORD

A year ago, a group of students came together and formulated the idea to establish a student-led think tank at UCL. The idea was born out of the realisation of a lack of a suitable platform for students to engage in debate and reflection on contemporary global issues. But that was all it

2020-21 has been an extremely eventful year for

was: just an idea. An ideal that students across

all

UCL should be given ample opportunity to

and

especially

for

global

policymaking. A global health crisis, the fight

analyse real-life issues and explore possible

against social and racial injustice, climate change

solutions to them.

and pro-democracy protests have shaken the world in recent times. These events have given us plenty

Today, we have reached the end of the first year

of feed to explore upon and dissect.

of operations of the Bentham Brooks Institute (BBI) and we could not have been prouder of what

Looking forward, we hope that the BBI will

has been accomplished. What seemed like an

continue to grow and develop in terms of

insurmountable task with endless challenges from

engagement, scope and presence. The BBI will

the outset has been made possible thanks to the

continue to grow from strength to strength, and

hard work and dedication of the Administrative

this first-year has provided us with an excellent

Committee and Research Teams. The countless

platform to achieve our goals in the coming years.

hours poured into this project – even under the

We hope you enjoy the first edition of the BBI’s

trying circumstances that we have lived under for

research journal!

the best part of the last year - have collectively made the BBI’s first year a success.

Chaima Akroum, Ishmael Nicholas, Phoebe Lai, Darya Podgoretskaya, Prisha Bhandari Trustees 2020-21

MARCH 2021

We would like to thank all the advisors and peer-reviewers at BBI, without whom this publication would not have been possible. We appreciate the time set aside by our methodological advisors to conduct training sessions for our researchers, ensuring that they use the best practice research methodologies relevant to their papers. We credit all the topical advisors at BBI, who are busy academics themselves, for spending countless hours regularly mentoring, providing feedback and guiding our researchers to produce work of the highest standard. Our peer-reviewers were integral to the research process, ensuring the validity as well as suitability of papers for publication. We extend our gratitude to these groups for their continued support for BBI and commitment to further student-led research.

BOARD OF ADVISORS

PEER REVIEWERS

Dr H. Zeynep Bulutgil (University College London)

Felix Brender (London School of Economics)

Dr Maxine Chan (The Stevens Group)

Paul Drummond (University College London)

Prof Paul Ekins (University College London)

Sofia L. Escobar (Royal Holloway)

Dr Melanie Garson (University College London)

Dr Kinga Goodwi (University of Stirling)

Dr Alexandra Hartman (University College London)

Lydia A. Hiraide (Goldsmiths)

Dr Gillian Higgins (University of Glasgow)

Marissa Kemp (London School of Economics)

Dr Jasmine Ho (University College London)

Heyun (Elvis) Kim (Boston University)

Prof Catherine Liu (University of California, Irvine)

Vignesh Rajahmani (King's College London)

Dr J-P Salter (University College London)

Goley Stephanie (King's College London)

Dr Serban Scrieciu (University College London)

Sigrid Weber (University College London)

Prof Fiona Stevenson (University College London)

iii

MARCH 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDEOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY: DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19.......................................................................... 2 EU REFUGEE MIGRATION POLICY: THE CASE OF FRANCE ......................................................................... 67 KEEPING OUR FRONTLINE SAFE ............................. 121 TO WHAT EXTENT WILL AI ADVANCEMENT IN CHINA AFFECT THE RISK OF A MILITARISED INTERSTATE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA? ......................................................................... 190 EXPLORING THE LEVEL OF AMBITION IN THE UK’S GREEN RECOVERY PLAN .......................................... 263

BBI Research Journal 2021

IDEOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY: DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19

Research Lead: Leo Krapp Team Members: Aiden Chan, Hugo Claus, Jasrene Hor, Afek Shamir 2

BBI Research Journal 2021

Abstract Current geopolitical discussions are increasingly oriented towards Asia, and for good reason. The development of democracy and authoritarianism in this part of the world will have serious consequences for every other part of the globe. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to rework these consequences at

analysis reveals that it is the destructive potential of emerging nationalisms and the dangers of authoritarianism that are the true threats of COVID-19. However, we also attempt to create a more productive way of conceptualizing the state of Asian politics and international relations to develop a framework for understanding how to build a better post-COVID world.

every level. COVID-19 has also expedited the painting of China as an uncooperative, irresponsible, and overly competitive global player that poses an existential threat to Western democracy. This report engages in a qualitative analysis of historical trends, current public health policies, and discourses about the future of Asian politics to nuance these policy debates. Drawing on a variety of academic disciplines and journalistic perspectives, we analyze three different Asian countries, India, China, and Taiwan, in the context of how COVID-19 has influenced their domestic politics and international relations. Special attention is

Introduction In 1989, Francis Fukuyama announced that history had ended; liberal democracy and capitalism marked the end of “mankind’s ideological evolution1.” Published in the Summer edition of The National Interest, Fukuyama’s “The End of History?” took the unravelling of the Soviet Bloc and the growing strength of the Chinese reform movement as signs that the great Communist experiment had failed, and was ready to subsumed by a wave of history-ending liberalization and democratization. A few weeks later, this

paid to public health policy, digital

“idyllic” image was violently shattered in

technology, and political ideology. We show

the brutal suppression of the student protests

that the interaction between these three

at Tiananmen Square. Fukuyama addressed

themes has serious implications for the

this in his 1992 sequel to his famous article,

ability of the state to successfully protect and provide for its citizens. In addition, our

Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, n o. 16, 1989, pp. 3-18. 1

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but dismissed the vaporization of the

bullet to fight the schizophrenic,

Chinese Democracy Movement as a short

Centaur-state of the liberal, democratic

setback for “just another Asian authoritarian

free-market567. That being said, this beast

state” that had “lost control of significant

seems to be unkillable, having been slain

parts of society”2. Liberal democracy, and

and revived over and over in a fashion that

the rest of the world, would wait for China

brings to mind a hydra or a zombie rather

to snap out of their stupor, and then history

than a Centaur.

really would end. In the same century that Fukuyama declared In the 31 years that have passed, Western

Western ideological victory, the Mount

liberal-democratic regimes have witnessed

Pelerin Society and a group of particularly

one world-shattering crisis after another,

classically minded economists and political

social, economic, political, environmental,

philosophers started to post hoc assemble

and now all four at once. China now has the

the superweapon needed for this

world’s second largest military budget3, and

preemptively predicted victory. Friedrich

is set to pass the United States of America in

Hayek, Milton Friedman, and several others

GDP by 20284. History has not been on

unpacked classical liberal economic and

Fukuyama’s side. It has been on China’s.

social ideas, oiled them, tuned them, and

“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” a

reassembled them into a new form that

form of government equally corrupt as it is

would eventually be termed “neoliberalism.”

meritocratic, and the bewitchment of

How these ideas and projects became first a

cultural modernization and consumerism

seductive ideology and then the defining

have produced what seems to be the silver 5 2

Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History and the Last Man.” Penguin Books Ltd, 2020. 3

https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countri es-with-the-highest-military-spending/ 4 Elliott, Larry. “China to overtake US as world’s biggest economy by 2028, report predicts.” The Guardian, 26 December 2020

Wacquant, L. (2010), Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity. Sociological Forum, 25: 197-220 6 Yuan Jiang, “COVID-19 Governance: An Issue Between Plutocracy and Meritocracy?” China Daily, 15 March 2020 7 Tahuhu Korero, “Francis Fukuyama, Tiananmen Square and the ‘End’ of History.” University of Auckland History Society, 3 June 2019

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characteristics of entire era of late capitalism

the Chinese silver bullet and the Western

is a story for another time. Important for our

bulletproof vest collide and begin to

discussion is how political commentators

influence each other, ideologies of human

have begun to call neoliberalism

governance and economy continue to

“bulletproof” in reference to its ability to

interact.

survive the financial crises of 2000 and 20088. The question posed by Fukuyama’s original publication was, what form of

Thus, the stage has been set for at least

human government could succeed liberal

another decade or two of history. The

democracy and capitalism? In his opinion,

trajectory of human ideology, and the

there was no realistic answer. Neoliberalism

politics and policies that it manifests, has

represents less of a succession and more of

never been more uncertain. At an applicable

an evolution, and many radical pundits are

policy level, democratic and liberal regimes

now facing the same problem Fukuyama

are in a period of intense instability. The

faced: if 2008 could not kill neoliberalism,

“illiberal

can anything ever dethrone it?

democracies” of Hungary, the Philippines, and India are one example of how liberalism

We introduce a discussion of neoliberalism because it complicates a simplistic understanding of Western liberal democracy vs. Chinese authoritarian socialism. The sociologist Wang Hui, one of the foremost critical intellectuals in China, argues that despite several internal contradictions, neoliberalism has become deeply embedded in the Chinese political and social world. As 8

Heideman, Paul. “Bulletproof Neoliberalism.” Jacobin Magazine, 6 January 2014. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/06/bulletproofneoliberalism/

and democracy are turning against one another. Leftist populism, and any hope it held for economically motivated mobilization, has been crushed by the defeats of Corbyn and Sanders. Right-wing populism seems stronger than ever before, consolidating its power in Poland, Brazil, Japan and around the world. Nationalism, most obviously observed in America, and now in India, continues to destabilize economic cooperation at an international level. Among this chaos and ideological slippage is a singular bright spot. Taiwanese 5

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democracy continues to astound the world, and their nonchalant annihilation of a crisis that has momentarily crippled the West is just one example of the strength and morality of their governance.

As previously mentioned, the past three decades have also been characterized by “crisis,” periods of time where conventional beliefs and practices were questioned and thrown into disarray by financial, military,

From the examples mentioned above, a discussion about the trajectory of human ideology needs to take into consideration Asia, and specifically the state of democracy and authoritarianism in the region. Besides China, India and Taiwan are emerging as countries that are increasingly important to understand. These three countries, but more importantly, the space between them, hold key contributions to understanding the state of modernity around the world. One has successfully dealt with one of the most tumultuous ideological histories of any country to produce the fastest growing and most influential economy of the 21st century. One, despite an incredible demographic and cultural diversity and a democratic basis for governance, is nevertheless leading the way for religious, right-wing nationalism. And the last has, despite continual existential threats posed by the two strongest militaries in the world, successfully harnessed a democratic system to defeat COVID-19.

religious, societal, and environmental threats. The lasting economic, political, and health effects that the COVID-19 pandemic will have makes it an extraordinarily consequential crisis in and of itself. Just like Fukuyama’s analysis of the collapse of the USSR and the momentum of reform in China, crisis continues to be central to our understanding of how human ideology morphs, dies, or triumphs, and COVID-19 is no exception. This pandemic has, specifically, shown a light on the state of democracy and authoritarianism, and how different states, with different forms of governance, are able to understand and respond to this crisis. Understanding the details of this is crucial to understanding what will emerge from the rubble. In addition, COVID-19 implicates a discussion of public health policy; the role of the state, conceptions of how individuals relate to the collective, and who the economy is meant to serve are all important questions that have been raised by this pandemic. 6

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health policies rolled out to combat it, and Finally, since the dotcom bubble of 2000, one of the crises mentioned above, the digital realm has been increasingly important to all facets of human life. Technology, the internet, and surveillance

the increasing significance of digital technology and surveillance, to create applicable policy takeaways that can also contribute to an understanding of how history might continue.

have all fundamentally changed how politics and public health are conceptualized. Cambridge Analytica, Edward Snowden, Julian Assange, and Liu Xiaobo are just a few examples of how the discussions and controversies of the digital realm are inseparable from politics, democracy, authoritarianism, and ideology. Technology and surveillance have also recently become invaluable for public health responses, but they bring with them all the dangerous implications of the above discussions. Individual rights, the collective good, and the relationship between public and private institutions are important to take into consideration when analyzing the implications of surveillance in the 21st century.

We will do this in three ways. In the first section, we analyze the historical, political, and institutional conditions that shape the governmental forms of our three geographic regions of interest (India, China, and Taiwan) in order to create a more complete picture of democracy and authoritarianism in Asia. In the second section, we apply our findings from section one to two recent examples of public health crises, SARS, and COVID-19, to understand how technology has come to mediate the relationship between politics and public health. In our third section, we evaluate how the themes discussed in section two relate to domestic and international perceptions of the policies rolled out about by each of these three countries, and how these perceptions will

This paper will synthesize the three themes

shape the future of politics in this region.

presented above: the politics, institutions, and ideologies of Asian states, the incomparable disaster of COVID-19 and the

Chapter 1: Historical Perspectives

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how this relationship has affected different Quantifying Democracy and Authoritarianism

Before we discuss the relationship between a political ideologies, digital technology, and public health policy, we must first define the different approaches to conceptualizing forms of governance. In the 21st century, this discussion revolves largely around democracy and authoritarianism. The issue of finding a suitable definition of democracy has been hotly contested in political literature, and most schools of thought differ on two main lines: whether to adopt a substantive or a minimalist view, and whether to map states along a continuum from strong democracies to strong autocracies or in a dichotomous manner. To clarify, a substantive view of democracy classifies political regimes in regard to the outcomes they produce, whilst a minimalist

states capacities to respond to public health crises.

The first index we will consider is the Fragile State Index (FSI)9, which measures a state’s ability to administer its borders effectively. In the context of assessing a state’s surveillance and digital autocracy during a global pandemic, this measure will provide a medium to assess the capacity of a state to respond to crises, regardless of its ideology. Secondly, we will make use of the Polity Index10, which measures democracies and autocracies along a spectrum from 1 to 10, and applies these scores to create a ‘Polity Score’. Thirdly, we will consider Freedom House scores11, which will demonstrate how far political and civil liberties were curbed as a result of mass surveillance adopted by different regimes in an attempt to respond effectively to a crisis.

view of democracy classifies political regimes in regard to the institutions that define them. The indexes we will examine consist of a mixture of both. This will allow us to consider how mass surveillance and technology are influenced by these governmental forms, while also discussing

"Fragile States Index | The Fund For Peace". 2020. Fragilestatesindex.Org. https://fragilestatesindex.org/. 10 "Polityproject". 2018. Systemicpeace.Org. https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 11 "Countries And Territories". 2020. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world /scores.

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We will first examine India’s index scores and assess their implications on the state’s digital technology and public health policy. India receives an FSI score of 75.3/120 (120

Score of 9 (10 being the highest) in 2018

and a Freedom House score of 71 (100 being the highest) i n 2020, India’s performance on

the respective indexes presents a clear ruling

being the worst) for 2020, ranking 68/178

that it can be classified by political analysts

(178 being the best) globally. This score

as a democracy. Considering that Freedom

exhibits a weak state capacity by global

House focuses solely on civil and political

standards, likely stemming from two factors.

liberties, this score shows that India does not

Firstly, India’s large population and

breach personal privacy or erode individual

diversity of cultures creates an environment

freedoms in a way that would severely

whereby organizing a collectively run

undermine democratic politics, which is an

effective government is a demanding task.

idea we can apply to our analysis of

We will evaluate this further in the next

surveillance later.

section. Secondly, it alludes to a damaged government in itself, particularly one that fails in responding to its populations needs.

China’s index performance is strikingly

India’s lowest score in the FSI categories, is

disparate from India’s – owing to its distinct

in a subsection labelled ‘demographic

culture and centralized political sphere.

pressures related to food supply, access to

69.9/120 (120 being the worst) for 2020,

pressures’ which “measures population

China receives a slightly better FSI score of

safe water, and other life-sustaining

ranking 86/178 (178 being the best)

resources, or health, such as prevalence of

globally. The score is significantly dragged

disease and epidemics.” In the context of

down by China’s performance in the section

public health policy, ‘demographic

labelled ‘Human Rights and the Rule of

pressures’ would be the most suitable

Law.’ The section “considers the

category to analyze, and fittingly, this is

relationship between the state and its

where India’s most evident state capacity

population insofar as fundamental human

weakness lies. While India’s state capacity

rights are protected and freedoms are

warrants a mediocre score, its democracy

observed and respected.” The curbing of

index scores are impressive. With a Polity

fundamental freedoms is most explicitly

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exemplified by the system of mass

democracy; but more than that, it is an

surveillance that the Chinese state

unnervingly strong one. Taiwan receives a

orchestrates as part of its comprehensive

flawless Polity Score of 10, and an almost

security apparatus. However, it is also worth

perfect Freedom House score of 93. Due to

noting that the use of digital technology by

its civic culture, active political

the Chinese state to organize its government

participation, checks on the executive

also implicates this curbing of fundamental

branch, and respect for political and civil

freedoms, hence affecting its democracy

liberties, Taiwan outperforms India and

index performance. As such, China receives

China in a democratic contest. It would be

a Polity Score of –7 for 2018 (-10 being the

interesting to question what an FSI score for

2020 (100 being the best). The Polity Index

nature would warrant a better state capacity

resolutely classifies China as an autocracy,

than China, an autocracy. Democratic and

while Freedom House conceptualizes China

autocratic states will inevitably adopt

as an unfree state. In the same light as its

different strategies to combat public health

FSI performance, China’s breach of personal

crises, and inevitably implement policy

freedoms warrants low democracy index

differently. Considering China and Taiwan’s

scores. In the context of public health

Polity and Freedom House scores, it can be

policy, we will analyze how the breach in

assumed that an autocracy is more likely to

personal freedoms affected China’s

curb personal freedoms and increase

COVID-19 pandemic by addressing

surveillance of its citizenry in order to

surveillance and track-and-trace

respond effectively to public health, whereas

mechanisms.

a democratic state will be more hesitant to

worst), and a Freedom House score of 10 for

Taiwan would be, and if its democratic

adopt such measures, and will consult civil society to inform the decision-making Taiwan represents somewhat of an outlier in

process.

its quantitative index performance. While the FSI index does not produce data for Taiwan, the Polity Index and the Freedom

It is also worth noting that the contemporary

House Index demonstrate that Taiwan is a

history of Taiwan is characterized by

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external influence, and that even today, its

complete picture of the political, social, and

sovereignty and independence is challenged

economic dispositions of these three

both by Chinese politics and by American

countries to better evaluate the relationship

military intervention. This gives us reason to

between surveillance and ideology as it

believe that the FSI score for Taiwan could

pertains to COVID-19.

be considerably lower than expected, and raises interesting questions as to why the index chose not to acknowledge Taiwan in

Political and Institutional Histories of

its evaluations. However, a low FSI score

India

due to foreign intervention may not necessarily mean an incapacity to respond resolutely to a health crisis such as

As we discuss the effect of state ideologies

COVID-19. Perhaps political and

on their response to the coronavirus

informational insecurity may contribute to

pandemic, it is important to understand the

the development of strong mechanisms of

nature of the state. In this section we will

resistance that can lead to an ability to

discuss characteristics of one of our polities

handle a multimodal crisis such as a viral

of interest: India. We will survey Indian

pandemic. This topic will be elaborated on

political philosophy and Indian institutions

further in a future section.

and finally relate these two features to surveillance, security, and public health policy.

Upon establishing a certain quantitative assessment of our three geographic regions of interest, India, China, and Taiwan, we now turn our attention to qualifying these assessments with a history of the institutions and political philosophies of these three countries. We hope that by doing this in conjunction with the index scores presented in this section, we can create a more

Indian political philosophy is characterized by an incredible complexity, derived from the distinctive history of the country. The Indian subcontinent has been home to some of the earliest civilizations in the world, all of which developed prior to the arrival of the Europeans. The Vijayanagara Empire and Mughal Empire are two examples of 11

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powerful and complex regimes that emerged

“soul,” or ethos, and definite needs.13 The

in this geographic region. Nonetheless, since

spiritual nature of the humankind is

the post-classical period, the subcontinent

emphasized, and serves as the basis upon

has been defined by demographic and

which the purpose of social organization and

religious heterogeneity. For the purposes of

the nature of political authority are founded.

this policy report and our analysis of Indian

According to Hindu political thinkers, each

political philosophy, we will be focusing on

individual is part of a cosmic order, and has

the teachings of Hinduism as they pertain to

a dharma (moral duty); The individual’s

political philosophy. Hinduism remains one of the most important influences on modern India, and has persisted into the colonial and

karma (moral methods) then enables the

individual to realize his dharma. 14 What this means for the individual is that his freedom

post-colonial eras in shaping the

is limited because he must be dedicated to

contemporary Indian state.12

his community, which also represents the larger cosmic order. The individual must be

There are several important themes in Hindu political thought which differentiate it from Western forms. “Integral Humanism” is a key feature in contemporary India political philosophy that has deep roots in Hindu values. While Western political philosophy focuses on how the social contract formed between individuals and a collective produces social and political relations, Integral Humanism rejects the concept of the individual completely, viewing social

altruistic and humanistic, two characteristics which are much less important in Western political thought.15 Society is seen as a construct created to enable each individual to perform his karma i n order to achieve his

dharma. According to Heiman, “India seeks

for the combining and unifying factor within diversity and individuality.”16 The community is the most important component of society, explaining why Indian society is still attached to the caste system. In terms of

organization and society as a preexisting 13

natural living organism with a definite 12

Anthony J. Parel, ‘Gandhi and the Emergence of the Modern Indian Political Canon’, The Review of Politics, volume 70, issue 1 (2008)

Sikata Panda, Manas Ranjan Pujari, ‘Themes and Trends in Indian Political Thought’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, 14 Ibid 15 Ibid 16 Heiman, Betty. Facets of Indian Thought, (London, 1964), 67.

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polities, Hindu political thinkers see the

would replace the caste.19 According to

state as a form of authority which governs

Panda and Pujari, Nationalism was

the creation of the individual self, and makes

incorporated into Hindu political thought as

it possible for each individual to achieve his

a force to “restore cosmic order.”20 If the

or her dharma. 17 It is the state’s moral

nation can be envisioned as a community,

responsibility to deal with deviants of the

and the community functions as a projection

moral order in order to create a harmonious

of a larger cosmology of “order,” then

society. This legitimates a much more

devotion to the nation is justified as a

intrusive and authoritarian state.

moral/religious act. Elements of western democracies were also incorporated into the

Even though there is significant continuity between Hindu political thought and contemporary Indian political philosophy, several Western elements have also been integrated in contemporary politics due to the British presence on the Indian

nascent Indian state, such as individual freedoms and rights. However, Gandhi ensured that Indian political thought remained distinct from Western following India’s independence in 1947 whilst importing Western elements.21

subcontinent between the seventeenth and twentieth century. As a result of British colonization, the idea of the nation-state became central to Indian political thinking.18 This idea was much less prevalent prior to the arrival of the British, given that heterogeneity of India. The idea of the nation, as interpreted by Mahatma Gandhi, is that it would create a community that

Panda, Sikata and Ranjan Pujari, Manas. ‘Themes and Trends in Indian Political Thought’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, 18 Ibid

Public institutions have also been incredibly important to post-colonial Indian politics. Between its independence and the 1980s, India was dominated by the Indian National Congress and the Gandhi-Nehru clan whose political position was that the state should 19

Anthony J. Parel, ‘Gandhi and the Emergence of the Modern Indian Political Canon’, The Review of Politics, volume 70, issue 1 (2008) 20 Panda, Sikata and Ranjan Pujari, Manas. ‘Themes and Trends in Indian Political Thought’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, volume 72, issue 1 (2011) 21 Anthony J. Parel, ‘Gandhi and the Emergence of the Modern Indian Political Canon’, The Review of Politics, volume 70, issue 1 (2008)

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play an important role in Indian society.22

effectively politicized the Indian

Thus, the conception of public, nationalist

bureaucracy under the pretext that she

ownership of the country became the norm.

wanted a “committed bureaucracy” in order

After the end of the domination of the Indian

to effectively address India’s issues.25

National Congress in the 1989 election, the

Following a ban on political donations by

role of public institutions was reduced.

private corporations, political parties started

However, they still play an important

relying on illicit money to be funded. This

regulatory function.23

resulted in extensive corruption across all state institutions, a problem which remains to this day. The quasi-authoritarian laws

The period under Indira Gandhi’s

imposed by Mrs. Gandhi in the 1980s

premiership between 1966 and 1977 and

eroded institutions further. By the time the

between 1980 and 1984 was a crucial

domination of the Indian National Congress

turning point in the role of India’s

in parliament ended in 1989, Indian

institutions. Under the Indian National

institutions were in a state of destitution.

Congress domination during the 1970s and 1980s India witnessed what we can call a “Deinstitutionalization” of its political

Whilst the previous paragraph suggests that

system which saw India’s public institutions

the Indian institutions have been rendered

became completely ineffectual at

ineffective by India’s political history, there

discharging their service towards the people

are some signs of rejuvenation in certain

they were meant to serve.24 Mrs. Gandhi

settings. The Election Commission and the

Maiorano, Diego. ‘Indian Institutions in the Early 1980s: The pre-history of the Great Transformation’, Modern Asian Studies, volume 48, issue 5 (2014), 1389. 23 Subramanian, Arvind. ‘The Evolution of Institutions in India and its Relationship with Economic Growth’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, volume 23, issue 2 (2007), 198. 24

Maiorano, Diego. ‘Indian Institutions in the Early 1980s: The pre-history of the Great Transformation’, Modern Asian Studies, volume 48, issue 5 (2014), 1391.

Supreme Court exemplify this willingness to better serve the Indian people. As a result of the dispersion of political power at the end of the 1980s, a process of economic and political decentralization took place, 25

Maiorano, Diego. ‘Indian Institutions in the Early 1980s: The pre-history of the Great Transformation’, Modern Asian Studies, volume 48, issue 5 (2014), 1392.

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meaning that the states had greater leverage

developments in India during the

in governing themselves. With the

second-half of the twentieth century meant

appropriate political power, some states

that the state did not have the resources to

were able reform their institutions, and thus

provide quality healthcare for all. As a result

today there are some important disparities

market principles and supply-side policies

between institutions in different states.

were introduced in the healthcare system at

These institutions also face more scrutiny

the end of the 1980s. Today the unregulated

with the increase in media outlets. In theory,

private sector cohabits with the underfunded

this should force them be more accountable,

public sector. As a result, provision is

but the long-term effects remain to be seen.

extremely unequal. There is also an important variation of healthcare between states, meaning that an individual in Odisha

Public health policy and the healthcare

will receive very different healthcare

system in India has tried to join these

attention than one in Kerala. However, there

reforming movements to reorient their focus

are some positive examples which show that

back towards humanism. However, there is a

the Indian healthcare system is improving.

considerable amount of incongruence

Founded in 2000, Narayna Health, which is

between the intentions of these policies and

a chain of multi-specialty hospitals

their implementation. In the context of

providing low cost yet high quality

Indian political thought, health is seen as a

healthcare, is proof that the state and the

“part and parcel of life in mundane and

private sector can successfully partner up to

spiritual aspects.” Article 21 of the

address these institutional gaps. In 2015, the

Constitution makes the state responsible for

ministry of National Health released its

the lives of its citizens, as each individual

National Health Policy, which focuses on

has a state-right to “health and medical

providing affordable, effective and universal

assistance.” The National Health

healthcare. The state also recognized the

subcommittee published a report in 1948

need to promote public-private partnerships,

recommending a state managed health

which seems to be a step forward towards

policy and healthcare system, which was

the right direction given the lack of state

implemented. However, the socio-economic

resources. As mentioned above, the

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effectiveness of this policy will depend on

people, is another example that suggests that

the ability of the state to efficiently deploy

the state is pursuing a policy of mass

its limited resources.

surveillance. The state has also used lawmaking in order to promote widespread

Indian political thought privileges the community over the individual, and conceptualizes the state as a protector of the national community, entitled to interfere in the lives of individuals to pursue this goal. Even though the Indian Constitution guarantees individual freedoms and rights, the level of privacy is low. According to the research firm Compritech, India’s privacy index is 2.4 out of 5 which indicates a “systemic failure to maintain privacy safeguards.”26 In terms of surveilling its citizens, India ranks directly behind China and Russia which are considered as authoritarian states. In recent years, India has moved towards increasing surveillance rather than decreasing it. Since 2007, the state has deployed a massive surveillance program known as the Central Monitoring System (CMS) which allows the government and state institutions to surveil

censorship. The Information Technology Act of 2000 made telecommunications companies liable for the sending of “offensive or menacing,” thus establishing a system of ‘private censorship’ where the private sector has to monitor citizens. Section 66A(B) of the Information Technology Act, which was amended in 2008, allows the state to criminalize the sending of communications that are regarded as containing false or incendiary content, forcing individuals to censor themselves. The state has enabled itself to deal with dissent legally. However, it also has managed to legitimize mass public surveillance as a public goal in order to obtain the appropriate “democratic” support for these measures. In terms of surveillance, the states’ approach resembles more one of an authoritarian state rather than a democratic state.

individuals without any authorization. The Aadhaar identification system, which contains the biometric data of 1.2 billion

Political and Institutional Histories of China

Sharma, Niharika. ‘India’s among the world’s top three surveillance states’, Quartz Indian (2020)

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Our next section concerns itself with the

culture, allowed state capitalism to become

political and intellectual characteristics of

the substitute for liberalization in post-1989

our next geographic region of interest:

China.

China. We will begin with an analysis of Reform and Opening Up policies, before examining intellectual and economic

Reform and Opening Up sought to ‘redefine

transitions, and concluding with a discussion

the revolution’27. Deng Xiaoping was keen

of how these frameworks established the

to publicly adhere to the official party line of

conditions for recent developments in public

sustaining the socialist revolution, but he

health policy and digital surveillance.

wanted to ‘reform’ the methods by which this goal was pursued. Ultimately, this process sought to restore the conditions of

Contemporary China is characterized by a

stability and predictability that the country

strong and almost all-encompassing

lost in the Cultural Revolution. The primary

authoritarian regime, but it is worth

goal of the Communist Party then, in

remembering that just like India, it is

reaction to a decade of political turmoil, was

incredibly diverse. The closely intertwined

to reconsolidate the power of the CCP and

political and intellectual discourse of the

address rising levels of social anxiety.

current regime is derived from many

Pragmatic policies like de-collectivization,

differing perspectives. The economic

market reforms, and the withdrawal of

reforms started by Deng Xiaoping after the

bureaucracy from everyday life marked

death of Mao linked culture, society, and

fundamental changes from the Communist

politics to the state project of engineering

utopianism of the Maoist era28. The

unconstrained growth. However, at the heart

top-down economic reforms gave rise to

of these economic reforms and political

hopes of political reforms, which became

developments was a more fundamental goal

the central theme of the bottom-up

of maintaining and defending the legitimacy

intellectual discourse.

of the state. Economic growth, justified by “catching up” to the West and expanding the global influence of Chinese politics and

Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China, 653-6. 28 Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China, 621-3. 27

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by the concerted marginalization of the In the 1980s, an active intellectual discourse emerged out of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, galvanized by a driving force of intellectuals, scholars, and students until the tragedy of 4th June 1989. Immediately after the announcement of the ‘Four Modernization’ program, there were already calls for the Fifth, which was democratization, the height of which was the Democracy Wall Movement in Beijing of 1978-7929. The movement was ultimately suppressed by the Party as a challenge to its legitimacy. The demand for the democracy remained, with advocacy for three main

intellectual community after 1989. The party's obsession with legitimacy and survival suppressed political agitation, and the force of conservatism ultimately triumphed over the reform faction regarding political liberalization. The party leaders then saw the social forces released by the economic reforms as a threat to the legitimacy and fundamental existence of the party, which halted the reform progress until 1992. However, economic reforms returned with Deng’s Southern Tour, and the official line of economic modernization without political liberalization was confirmed31.

variants, including 1) Marxist-Humanist thought which advocated for inner-party democracy, 2) the Science and Democracy line that advocated for freedom of thought and individual enlightenment, and 3) the student-led movement that advocated for abandoning the two orthodoxies of Marxism-Stalinism and Confucianism30. The student-led movement was silenced by the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the two intellectual-led movement were suppressed 29

Jingsheng, Wei. “The Fifth Modernisation: Democracy.” Index on Censorship 8, no. 5 (September 1979): 9–11. 30 Cheek, Timothy. The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History: 221–44.

The intellectual debate for democracy and political reform persisted past 1989, but it became far more marginalized. The public became instead preoccupied with materialism and consumerism, important cultural markers of post-1989 Chinese society. The turn to consumerism was evident even in the intellectual community, as some scholars left the intellectual community and became business owners made possible by the new economic reforms Cheek, Timothy. The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History: 248-249. 31

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and part of the broader phenomenon that

modern Chinese society while also

came to be known as Xiahai32 . The general

buttressing political ideology by controlling

turn to consumerism was encouraged by the

information and cultural trends. Chinese

state as a countermeasure to the failed, but

state investment in internet infrastructure,

potentially dangerous, political agitation of

E-commerce, and digital-based sharing

the 1980s, as part of a campaign to reduce

economy all manifest and consolidate

the grievances of Chinese citizens towards

certain cultural and economic dispositions in

the state and elite corruption. The state

Chinese citizens. An apt example of this is

retained the pre-1989 model of responding

Single’s Day on November 11th, which has

to dissent in a manner that does not

become the single biggest shopping event in

implicate political liberalization, which can

the world, with sales volume exceeding 75

be seen in the high-profile anti-corruption

Billion USD in 24 hours on Alibaba33. The

campaign launched by Xi Jinping in 2012.

‘Great Fire Wall’ of China also in part led to

On the other hand, engineering economic

the growth of the tech sector. Preventing the

success to legitimize the CCP’s leadership

import of foreign tech competition from

was also a state-organized campaign to

western conglomerates like Facebook and

manage dissent. Cultural and materials signs

Google allowed local tech giants like

of prosperity, such as the rapid

Tencent and Baidu to emerged and dominate

industrialization of special economic zones

similar services on the Chinese internet.

and the 2008 Olympic Games, as well as the financial crises of the West lent credibility to the materialist and consumerist Chinese

These cultural trends are also reflected in the

model since 1992.

Chinese healthcare system, and in order to understand this more fully, we will elaborate first on the idea of “Neoliberalism with

The digital sector in China has become one of the leading forces of growth since the 2000s. It manifests the materialist culture of Cheek, Timothy. The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History: 254. 32

ham, Sherisse. “Singles Day: Alibaba sales blitz P rakes in $75 billion as Chinese shake off Covid-19.” CNN Business, Nov 12, 2020. Accessed Dec 18, 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/10/tech/singles-da y-2020-alibaba-intl-hnk/index.html. 33

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Chinese Characteristics34.” The emergence

repositioned as the muscle of neoliberal

of neoliberal ideologies and projects under

ideology, allowing it to become deeply

Thatcher, Reagan, and IMF structural

embedded in social life and healthcare, and

adjustment policies did not leave Asia

3) this new conception of the socialist state’s

unscathed. However, sociologist Wang Hui

relationship to the public sphere has allowed

argues that it is necessary to consider

technology to destroying civil society and

idiosyncratic historical conditions when

erect a surveillance state in its absence.

analyzing neoliberalism in China35. The continued presence of state regulation in economic affairs does not mean that China

In addition to influencing the institutional

is unaffected by critiques of Western

structures responsible for organizing labor,

modernism. It does, however, have

social life, and economic mobility,

interesting effects on conceptions of civic

neoliberalism has repositioned the state as

duty, development, technology, and public

responsible for engineering political projects

health.

to reproduce the conditions for the dominance of a political and economic elite. A historical example of this is the move

We continue from this claim to argue that

away from the danwei, or work-unit, and

neoliberal ideology has completely

towards the hukou, or household registration

restructured Chinese social and economic

system. Emerging from the pre-communist

institutions, as well as the way that their

agricultural organizations in the 1930s and

function and development is thought about

40s, the work unit helped organize economic

and justified. We will focus on three

production, but also reached deeply into the

different effects of neoliberal ideology in

social worlds of the citizen under socialism.

China: 1) ideas of cultural difference have

In doing so, the danwei also gave a corporal

come to dominate economic understandings

existence to the relationship between labor

of inequality, 2) the state has been

and capital, and protected the use-value of

ang, Hui and Rebecca E Karl. "The Year 1989 and W the Historical Roots of Neoliberalism in China." positions: east asia cultures critique, vol. 12 no. 1, 2004, p. 7-70. Project MUSE 35 ibid 34

an individual’s labor from becoming

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commodified36. The hukou is a more recent

this neoliberal transition has expedited the

piece of social technology, designed to tie

concentration of immense power in the

one to the city and province where one is

hands of the few and the degradation of the

born. The central Chinese state uses this to

working class.

control social mobility, and protect the value-laden dichotomy that has been created between urban centers of economic and

This process is also occurring at the level of

political power and rural geographic regions.

the Chinese healthcare. The seller-and-buyer

The hukou has clear material effects and is

relation between medical workers and

central to the functioning of state-capitalism

patients reflects the new disposition of the

through the management of the

Chinese state and the market to adhere to

contradiction in social organization between

neoliberal tendencies away from

upholding certain political ideologies and

welfarism37. A general perception exists in

manufacturing growth for a new class of

the media that health-care providers are only

urban elite. The radical political ideology of

interested in making money, and

the danwei, which structured political

doctor-patient relationships have declined

conceptions of labor and value as well as

rapidly since the 2000s, with cases of attacks

everyday life, was replaced by the

on medical personnel occurring frequently.

engineered developmentalism of the danwei,

The materialist values of entrepreneurs also

which is utilized to provide the state with the

find the profitability in the healthcare

ability to disguise their regulatory abilities

market, which sometimes led to predatory

as simply related to maximizing growth

profit-making behavior of healthcare

within the economic sphere, while actually

providers. In 2018, 250,000 faulty rabies

exerting an influence over social and

vaccines produced by Jilin-based

cultural life as well. Coupled with erosion of

Changsheng Biotechnology had been

Communist-era welfare schemes to protect the economic and social dignity of laborers, laudia Pozzana & Alessandro Russo (2006) China's C new order and past disorders: A Dialogue Starting from Wang Hui's analysis, Critical Asian Studies, 38:3, 329-351, DOI: 10.1080/146727106008 71521 36

Chen, J., Mengyun Zhou, Qiaoyong Liu, Lan Ye, Y. Cheng, Mingwei Wang and Zhan-hui Feng. “High time for ease the doctor-patient relationship in China.” Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 72 (2020): 101961

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administered to children38. After the scandal

Digital surveillance provides an excellent

was exposed, it sparked public outcry on the

example of this. The genesis of the state’s

internet. The government responded by

commitment in developing a sophisticated

ordering an investigation into the scandal,

surveillance regime stems from two factors.

and the corporation responsible was forced

Firstly, a pre-existing digital infrastructure

to withdraw its listing from the stock

gave the state the structural apparatus to

market.

develop and implement modern surveillance technology on a large scale. Secondly, the CCP’s has cemented its identity as based on

Lastly, neoliberal ideology has also granted

political totalism, enforced subservience,

Chinese technology companies a green light

and censorship of dissent. As a result, China

to emulate the state, and project their sphere

today has implemented the most notorious

of influence into the civil arena. COVID-19

system of state surveillance in the Xingjiang

has made this extremely apparent. The

province, where the Uyghur separatist

dangerous thing about this is not that these

movement is suppressed through digital

models might be exported to the West. The

monitoring and coercion39.

dangerous thing is that this creates a

Mass-surveillance is strategy of choice of

scenario where a very small amount of

the CCP in controlling resistance

technocratic elites escorts the central state

movements. China has disguised its

into the neoliberal fold, consolidating both

mass-surveillance projects by copying the

the power of both of these groups, while

American post-9/11 narrative to justify

simultaneously allowing the CCP to

draconian internal political reorganization

organize their interests even further away

towards surveillance models with the threat

from the needs of the people.

of extremist Islamic terrorism. Tibetan activists and rural peasants seeking land rights have also been the subject of digital crackdown and social control. International

uo, Lily. “China: outcry over sale of 250,000 faulty K vaccines prompts investigation” The Guardian, Jul 18, 2018. Accessed Dec 18, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/23/c hina-outcry-over-sale-of-250000-faulty-vaccines-pro mpts-investigation 38

Pantucci, Raffaello. “Uyghur Terrorism in a Fractured Middle East”. In: Terrorism and CounterTerrorism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions. Edited by Michael Clarke, Oxford University Press (2018), 157-165.

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narrative on China’s terrorist action has been

Political and Institutional Histories of

framed by a state narrative that legitimizes a

Taiwan

mass surveillance architecture. From 2001, China has implemented six new laws directly associated with anti-terrorism, four of which are focused on the Uyghur movement in particular. Overall, the CCP’s security practices comprise of supervising the narrative and organizing a legislative foundation to launch mass-surveillance on a state level.

Taiwan’s success in tackling public health threats can be attributed to its ‘socialization’ of pandemic unpreparedness40, which was triggered by the 2003 SARS crisis. Proposed by American sociologist Jeffrey Alexandra, the process of ‘socialization’ occurs when the public has deemed political elites and traditional institutions as unable to deliver on their promises to provide for the masses41. This leads to widespread public

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that the modified social contract that exists in China creates an environment where digital surveillance fulfills three important conditions for the continued existence of the Chinese central state: 1) it “justifies” the legitimacy of the CCP in accordance to a historical narrative of reforms prioritizing economic modernization over political liberalization, 2) it strengthens the public-private relationship in both the healthcare and digital technology sectors that reproduces neoliberal values, and 3) it manages dissent to secure both social order and political control.

anguish that mobilizes the civil sphere to democratize institutional cultures. The ability of democratic Taiwan to foster institutional and cultural mechanisms for crisis response through the process of socialization allows it to respond effectively to national threats, as evident from its success in tackling COVID-19. Widespread public criticism of the authorities' handling of the 2003 SARS crisis resulted in the 40

The Pandemic shows why Taiwan is a far better partner than the People’s Republic https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-o pinions/the-pandemic-shows-why-taiwan-is-a-far-be tter-partner-than-the-peoples-republic/2020/05/07/ 8af1e1c8-909d-11ea-a9c0-73b93422d691_story.htm l 41 Alexander JC. The Societalization of Social Problems: Church Pedophilia, Phone Hacking, and the Financial Crisis. American Sociological Review. 2018;83(6):1049–1078. doi: 10.1177/0003122418803376

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establishment of the Central Epidemics

to the CECC. Notably, the legal authority

Command Center (CECC) aimed at

enjoyed by the CECC is a result of previous

enhancing Taiwan’s disease control

experience with SARS and other epidemics.

capacity. The CECC is a centralized command system that plays a vital role in the early detection of diseases and the mobilization of medical resources during a public health crisis. Once a public health emergency is declared, the CECC has the legal power to coordinate the activities of every ministry as specified in the Taiwan’s Communicable Disease Control Act42. The centralized approach of the CECC allowed for the adoption of a comprehensive public health strategy during the onset of the pandemic. The CECC also facilitated public-private collaboration43, which was instrumental in the implementation of preventive measures and containment efforts. In sum, Taiwan’s effective COVID-19 response can be attributed to the pre-emptive responses adopted by both the centralized leadership of the government, and the delegation of major responsibilities 42

Taiwan’s Communicable Disease Control Act https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx? pcode=L0050001 43 Hung, Yuen Wai. “Creative Public-Private Collaborations in Taiwan and South Korea Bolster the Fight Against Coronavirus.” Stanford Social Innovation Review, 1 7 April 2020. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/creative_public_privat e_collaborations_in_taiwan_and_south_korea_bolst er_the_fight_against_coronavirus.

The authority of the CECC relies on the overall social trust of the ruling political party, which is maintained by the transparency, responsiveness, and openness of the government. The way in which Taiwan’s Center for Disease Control (CDC) tackled the public health crisis – including the timely release of precautionary measures, willingness to listen to the public, and clear communication of any privacy tradeoffs – reinforced trust in the government. In addition, mainstream media and civil society organizations have the power to scrutinize national policies and voice their concerns when existing strategies are found to be inadequate. Taiwan’s political leaders have responded to public criticism in a timely fashion by implementing quick adjustments to existing measures with inputs from civil society organizations. A democratic, transparent, and accountable decision-making framework adopted by the authorities is one of the major reasons that explain why the previous point of centralized political and legal authority is well received in Taiwan.

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Taiwan’s democratic political culture has

practices that can swiftly response to

also facilitated the effective response to the

national threats.

misinformation campaigns from China aimed at undermining trust in the Taiwanese government’s ability to tackle the COVID-19 crisis44. Taiwan’s capabilities to counter the COVID-related misinformation stems from the constant threat it faces from Chinese disinformation campaigns. Notably, Taiwan framed the COVID ‘infodemic’ as a

By analyzing the factors which underpin Taiwan’s successful COVID response, we contend that effective public health responses are attributed to three main factors, namely: 1) quality health infrastructure, 2) trust in governance and 3) high level of civic participation.

‘public crisis’ and adopted a transparent

A well-established public health

digital governance system aimed at

infrastructure facilitates a rapid coordinated

encouraging civic engagement to curb the

response, particularly in the implementation

spread of COVID-19 related falsehoods. By

of extensive containment efforts. As in

working with netizens and independent civil

many Asian countries that had experience

society organizations, the Taiwanese

with SARS, Taiwan’s well-developed

government is able to swiftly debunk

pandemic approach – harnessing big data

disinformation surrounding the COVID-19

analytics for case identification and contact

pandemic. The internet has helped Taiwan

tracing – meant that cases could be

in its efforts to tackle the pandemic by

identified and isolated relatively quickly to

providing a space for civic engagement,

prevent further community spread. Notably,

dialogue, and consensus building. The high

Taiwan’s National Health Insurance (NHI)

level of citizen engagement has allowed

database provided a robust infrastructure for

Taiwan to develop resilient preparedness

Taiwan to handle the COVID-19 pandemic by building an IT system that facilitated contact tracing and the distribution of

Lien, Yi-Ting. “Why China’s COVID-19 disinformation cam-paign isn’t working in Taiwan.” The Diplomat, 20 March 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/why-chinas-covid -19-disinformation-campaign-isnt-working-in-taiwan / 44

masks. Secondly, high level of trust in public institutions is a key cultural factor that

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prevents the rise of social polarization.

infrastructure built by the welfare state has

Social trust is underpinned by the

reinforced trust in the government’s ability

government’s transparent and effective

to provide equitable healthcare and laid a

response – the ability to disseminate

solid foundation to cope with the epidemic

accurate information swiftly, willingness to

crisis.

communicate with the public and quick adjustments to social responses. Taiwan’s socialized healthcare system has also strengthened the country’s capacity to respond to the epidemic crisis. All Taiwanese citizens are medically insured under the National Health Insurance (NHI) instituted in 1995. The NHI is a government-run single-payer compulsory social insurance plan that centralizes the disbursement of healthcare funds45. Notably, Taiwan’s achievements in democratization and political reforms only happened after its first direct presidential election in 1996. The relationship between the elected Kuomintang (KMT) government and the electorate was still being forged when SARS

Lastly, civic participation and a democratic political culture are the pre-conditions for a successful public health response. High level of civil engagement seeks to empower citizens to play their part in the fight against public health threats46 and results in the public’s voluntary adherence to government’s guidelines. The general habit of mask-wearing in Taiwan, alongside the voluntary compliance of precautionary health measures by citizens, help to stem the community spread of COVID-19. The cultivation of two-way trust between the authorities and the people can help to enhance the resilience of nations against public health threats.

occurred in 2003, therefore imposing

Taiwan’s recent institutional and political

pressure on the ruling party to implement

history, since the democratic reforms of the

universal healthcare. This led to the

1990s, has been characterized by political

replacement of separate social healthcare

accountability, civic engagement, and trust

funds with the NHI. The national healthcare 46 45

Tikkanen, Roosa et al. “Taiwan’s National Health Policy.” The Commonwealth Fund, 5 June 2020. https://www.commonwealthfund.org/internationalhealth-policy-center/countries/taiwan

Adenipekun, Oluwatemilorun. “COVID-19 – A Review of Community Participation” Think Global Health, 2 0 October 2020. https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/covid-19review-community-participation

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in government. These factors have

and individual. These are important lessons

contributed to the creation of quality

to learn for the future of public health,

healthcare infrastructure and a

surveillance, and politics.

well-coordinated system of public health policy. In addition, the adoption of integrated and interoperable digital public health systems and a culture of solidarity created an incredibly robust pandemic management response based on communication and social responsibility that

Next, we will elaborate on how these three topics have collided in more contemporary public crises, starting with an analysis of technology and politics in relation to SARS, and then using this case study as a comparative lens to address COVID-19.

capitalized on the institutional and political strengths of Taiwan. It is worth noting that Taiwan has suffered from a reasonable amount of political discord owing to conflicts in party politics that we do not have the time to discuss here47. In addition, as alluded to earlier, the Taiwanese state extended its influence deep into the lives of its citizens, and it is worth comparing this interference with the interference exerted by the Chinese and Indian states. As noted, institutional strength and trust built on transparency were the two defining characteristics that allowed for a more responsible relationship between state Lin, Gang, and Weixu Wu. “The Transition of Party System in Taiwan: Divergence or Convergence?” China Review, vol. 17, no. 3, 2017, pp. 141–166. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44371801. Accessed 9 Jan. 2021. 47

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genetic make-up. Yet, it was also ‘novel’ in Chapter 2: Contemporary Analysis and Comparison

the sense that no modern state’s public health apparatus had ever had to deal with as virulent, as deadly, and as widespread disease as this one.

Digital Technology, Authoritarianism, and Public Health Policy in the Context of SARS

The second reason SARS is noteworthy is that, because of its similarities to COVID-19, it provides a mode of

SARS, or Severe Acute Respiratory

comparison to the developments of the

Syndrome, was, according to the World

current pandemic. Long before the

Health Organization, the first severe

discussions of censorship in relation to

infectious disease to have emerged in the

COVID-19, SARS provided an example of

21st century. After first being discovered in

the Chinese state’s initial inclination to limit

China in November 2002, the epidemic

the spread of information and censor the

eventually spread to Hong Kong and Taiwan

reporting of news related to the virus. For

among other regions, affecting a total of 30

this reason, many commentators have called

countries and territories. The epidemic was

SARS ‘China’s Chernobyl.’ However, when

controlled after 8 months of outbreak,

the Chinese government controlled the

amounting to a total of 8096 cases with a

epidemic, many arguments were made for

fatality rate of 9.6%48. This case is worth

the ‘authoritarian advantage’ of handling

exploring for to two reasons. First, it was

public health crises.

‘novel.’ This means that prior to 2003, no human immune system had ever encountered a virus with this particular

The following section will compare different uses of digital technology in monitoring

WHO Team. “Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003.” WHO, 2 4 July 2015. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/summary -of-probable-sars-cases-with-onset-of-illness-from-1november-2002-to-31-july-2003

patients, lowering infection rates, and building a comprehensive public health policy to combat SARS. We will discuss

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methods taken by Singapore, Hong Kong,

culture, political life, and now in public

and other Asian countries in implementing

health policy. This framework was severely

state apparatus to combat the spread of the

tested by the arrival of SARS, and became a

disease. Then, we will delve into a

structuring ideology that dictated social

comparison of the SARS response, between

organization. Political leaders within the

China, a long-time authoritarian regime, and

People’s Action Party (PAP) made use of

Taiwan, an emerging democracy who just

phrases like ‘the war against SARS’ to

had their first direct presidential election in

create a narrative of solidarity that could

1996, in order to assess the validity of

engender seamless cooperation between

‘authoritarian advantage’ in public health

citizens and the state. Suddenly, open

crisis responses.

borders became recast as an existential danger. This was a widespread occurrence, and not restricted to Singapore. In Malaysia,

In early 2003, 64-year-old Dr. Liu Jianlun

visa freezes were imposed on people from

stayed in Room 911 of the three-star

China, Vietnam, Canada, Hong Kong, and

Metropole Hotel, in the Guangdong

Taiwan. Thailand even threatened to send

province. Dr. Liu came to Hong Kong after

back any passengers who demonstrated

working in a hospital which treated SARS

SARS-like symptoms at Thai airports.

patients in Southern China. Subsequently, several other tenants from Singapore, Canada, and Vietnam were infected by Dr.

Most public health responses across affected

Liu, and SARS went global.

countries were characterized by similar patterns: identification, quarantine, contact tracing, restrictions on ports and airports,

A little after the turn of the millennium,

and local, national, and international

SARS served as an explicit indicator of the

information sharing. The imposition of local

risk that global interconnectivity creates. In

and communal quarantines was the most

Singapore, for example, a certain rhetoric of

critical public health policy that

“social responsibility” and unified “national

characterized the SARS epidemic. After all,

survival” had been built up in military

most affected countries had not experienced

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a quarantine since the Spanish Flu of

cameras and the deployment of government

1918-19. China, for example, established

officials. In a move that brings to mind

mass quarantines in local communities,

Foucault’s idea of the power of governance

temporarily shutting down education

as being physically exerted on the body

programs in schools and universities, while

through surveillance, the Singaporean state

entirely cancelling the Chinese Labor Day in

was built up into the archetypal disciplining

May 200349. Meanwhile, Hong Kong

Big Brother. This aligns itself along a theme

imposed more communal quarantines,

of the varying ways in which democratic or

positioning barricades in tactical locations

authoritarian tendencies in public health

and increasing police forces in order to

policy are conceived and is a trend we will

restrict movement between communities and

explore in the latter stages of this section. In

monitor quarantine compliance.

addition, a new program on a designated SARS channel on television was set up in order to inform Singaporeans to keep basic

In Singapore, quarantines were oftentimes

hygiene and eat foods that strengthen their

imposed on a wider scale than in other

immune system. Singaporean schools also

infected countries, transcending even to city

remained closed for two weeks in order to

or regional scale . Any foreign construction

earn the state time to build a sustainable

worker entering Singapore was mandated to

security and monitoring apparatus.

quarantine for 14 days, while any other type of foreign worker was asked to voluntarily quarantine for 10 days. The compliance of

Elsewhere, in accordance with health

island-wide quarantines was monitored by a

restrictions, travel by air, sea and land

meticulous surveying of individuals through

became restricted in most affected countries.

In Hong Kong, health declaration forms

Katz, Raúl, Juan Jung, and Fernando Callorda. 2020. "Can Digitization Mitigate The Economic Damage Of A Pandemic? Evidence From SARS". Telecommunications Policy 44 (10): 102044. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2020.102044. 50 Curley, Melissa, and Nicholas Thomas. 2004. "Human Security And Public Health In Southeast Asia: The SARS Outbreak". Australian Journal Of International Affairs 58 (1): 17-32. doi:10.1080/1035771032000184737.

became mandatory for incoming and outgoing travelers through ports, land borders and airports, and all passengers had to be tested for their temperature upon travelling. While in Singapore, pricey

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thermal scanners costing SGD90,000 each

problematized further by the struggles of

were installed in airports, ports, roads, and

Hong Kong health officials to officially

railways upon entering the island.

identify Dr. Liu’s case as potentially dangerous. Hong Kong was not alone in experiencing these difficulties, and almost

Moreover, in order to identify and trace

every other country had similar problems in

infected individuals, affected governments

detecting the disease. This initial confusion

often built contact tracing apparatuses in

could be traced back to the fundamental

order to track the spread of the disease. This

differences between authoritarian and

is a theme we will explore more closely with

democratic approaches to public health

regards to COVID-19. During the SARS

crises, which we shall discuss through a

epidemic, however, the Hospital Authority

comparison between China and Taiwan’s

in Hong Kong set up an electronic SARS

developments.

surveillance system using a police database, in order to “detect clusters of SARS cases and their relationships51.” In turn, contact

China’s initial response to the SARS

traces were developed from the computer

outbreak bore many of the characteristics of

system’s identification schematics, and

a conventional authoritarian regime,

individuals suspected of transmission were

allowing a poor response that led to the

forced into quarantine. Up until this point, a

escalation from an outbreak to an epidemic.

public health security apparatus of such a

Initially, the government’s obsession with

scale was unprecedented not only in Hong

‘social stability’ and with keeping continued

Kong, but all across affected countries.

flows of trade and investment open caused

When these surveillance measures went live,

severe problems in responding adequately to

they worked extremely well in responding to

the problems that had been already

and limiting the outbreak of SARS.

presented52. The first response of the

However, there was a notable delay in

government was cover-up. While SARS

getting them up and running that was Fidler, David P. “SARS: Political Pathology of the First Post-Westphalian Pathogen.” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 31, no. 4 (December 2003): 493-4. 52 51

Tsang, Thomas, and Th Lam. 2003. "SARS: Public Health Measures In Hong Kong". Respirology 8 (s1): S46-S48. doi:10.1046/j.1440-1843.2003.00524.x.

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claimed its first victim in November 2002, it

Both narratives have the authoritarian

was not until February 11, 2003 that the

tendency to create external enemies and

Chinese Ministry of Health reported the new

deflect blame in times of crises. The initial

disease to the World Health Organization53.

response is thus consistent with the main

The authoritarian control over the media and

strategies that the party has adopted to

official means of communication made this

maintain the image and legitimacy of

initial cover-up possible. Between

Communist rule since Deng Xiaoping’s

November 2002 and March 2003, there was

Southern tour, managing social dissent and

a period of government silence and little

public opinion while prioritizing economic

official media coverage, causing widespread

prosperity. It is also worth noting that

confusion54. Alternative media, like

Minister of Health Zhang Wenchang told the

independent websites, and word-of-mouth

WHO in March 2003 that SARS was a

speculations dominated public discourse

Chinese, not an international, matter57. The

during this period, with no effort made to

authoritarian prioritization of national

provide official answers or to curb the

interests created a lack of transparency and

spread of false information. The most

communication at an international level that

extensively circulated rhetoric at the time

allowed for the escalation of the outbreak.

was that the disease was a biological attack

Thus, the authoritarian response to SARS

from the United State or Taiwan55. A similar

allowed the outbreak to expand beyond its

strategy was also picked up by the

initial geographic range, and the Communist

provincial government of Guangdong,

party was forced to partially abandon their

blaming Hong Kong for the epidemic56.

incessant project of cementing their legitimacy in order to take the steps

Fewsmith, Joseph. "China and the Politics of SARS." Current History (1941) 102, no. 665 (2003):250. 54 Ding, Huiling. "Rhetorics of Alternative Media in an Emerging Epidemic: SARS, Censorship, and Extra-Institutional Risk Communication." Technical Communication Quarterly 18, no. 4 (2009): 327-328. 55 Ibid, 338. 56 Shen, Simon. "THE "SARS DIPLOMACY" OF BEIJING AND TAIPEI: COMPETITION BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND NON-CHINESE ORBITS." Asian Perspective 28, no. 1 (2004): 46.

necessary to appropriately modify their public health response.

However, despite the failures of authoritarian responses in the initial phase of 57

Ibid 46-7.

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the outbreak, when the Chinese government

On the other hand, Taiwan’s initial response

properly adjusted their policies, the

was much more effective. Between March

authoritarian system allowed for an

10th, when the first case of SARS was

extremely effective deployment of public

identified in Taiwan, and April 20th,

health policies. As the outbreak unfolded,

hospitals sufficiently cared for all SARS

Chines leadership concluded that the SARS

patients, and effective contact tracing

outbreak represented a significant threat, and

allowed 28 probable cases to be reported,

reconcentrated administrative power under

resulting in only 4 secondary transmission

central leadership in order to handle the

cases60. This rapid deployment of

epidemic58. Although the inherent flaws of

surveillance and control measures can be

the system that allowed local government

attributed the to the particular characteristics

deviance occasionally hindered the control

of Taiwan’s democratic system, as per the

policy implementation, a clear control

previous discussion of Taiwan’s recent past

measure was imposed top-down

in Chapter 1. The political competition

effectively59. The centralized

engendered by elections raises the stakes for

decision-making process enabled by the

politicians to respond to the needs of the

organization of power in China allowed for

electorate quickly and effectively in order to

a much more effective handling of the crisis.

secure their future political careers61. In

The surveillance and disease control

response, the public has a certain

measures previously discussed in the context

expectation of the administration to make

of Hong Kong and Singapore were adopted

well-informed decisions on their behalf.

swiftly by the Chinese administration, and deployed at a regional level with guidance from, and clear communication with, central

Throughout the outbreak, Taiwan showed a

leadership.

high degree of transparency and commitment to international cooperation. This is despite the fact Beijing has imposed

Ibid, 315 uger, J. P. "Democracy and Health." QJM : R Monthly Journal of the Association of Physicians 98, no. 4 (2005): 299-300. 61

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a multitude of barriers to Taiwan’s exchange

decision-making power to the WHO and

with the international community, most

adhered to their global epidemiological and

importantly the WHO62. Nevertheless,

policy-based strategies, including travel

during the initial stage of the outbreak, the

advisories and travel restrictions. To contrast

Taiwanese government was eager to share

democratic and authoritarian responses,

their success with the international

Jonathan Schwartz argues that the mass

community.63 This was sustained as its

hysteria seen in Taiwan can be understood

initial success faded, hospital-acquired cases

as part of the disadvantages democracies

surged, as seen in the health authorities’

have in handling crises, as the free media

thorough implementation of WHO and

resort to sensationalistic, competitive

United States’ CDC control

journalism65. Despite having the means,

recommendations64.

China’s authoritarian system did not fair significantly better in framing a rational public discourse. While there was a tight

The Westphalian Model that emphasizes

control of official media, China’s approach

national sovereignty and interests, as well as

to the dissemination of information allowed

internal decision-making processes was

panic, conspiracies, and misinformation to

initially adopted by the Chinese State. In

spread rampantly through alternative media

contrast, Taiwan’s response can be

and unofficial channels, resulting in a

characterized by a post-Westphalian

hysteria similar to Taiwan’s. While

approach that recognizes the importance of

Schwartz argues the authoritarian system

international cooperation, open

was able to issue a unified message

communication, and cross-border assistance.

eventually, it did not come in a

Taiwan transferred much of its national

time-efficient manner. This can be easily

S chwartz, Jonathan. "Compensating for the ‘Authoritarian Advantage’ in Crisis Response: A Comparative Case Study of SARS Pandemic Responses in China and Taiwan." Chinese Journal of Political Science 17, no. 3 (2012): 326–7. 63 Rollet, Vincent. "Framing SARS and H5N1 as an Issue of National Security in Taiwan: Process, Motivations and Consequences." Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident, no. 37 (2014): 150. 64 Ibid, 151. 62

contrasted to the immediate proactive reactions of Taiwan authorities had when the first case was confirmed, despite the S chwartz, Jonathan. "Compensating for the ‘Authoritarian Advantage’ in Crisis Response: A Comparative Case Study of SARS Pandemic Responses in China and Taiwan." Chinese Journal of Political Science 17, no. 3 (2012): 326. 65

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difficulties they faced in relation to public

The technologies we live in makes digital

attitudes and journalism66. The lesson learnt

contact tracing possible. The approaches

from SARS is that while authoritarian

towards digital contact tracing have differed

systems have some advantages, as seen in

according to each country in the context of

the state-control of media that managed the

COVID-19. This section will discuss in

spread of misinformation, and the

depth digital contact tracing systems in both

centralized decision-making power that

autocratic and democratic states. Moreover,

enabled swift roll-out of concerted

we will discuss the debate between

controlling measures, their fundamental

effectiveness and privacy that surrounds

priorities of protecting legitimacy and

these digital contact tracing systems. We

managing dissent delay the utilization of

will notice that some democratic states have

these advantages. The concept of the

adopted rather authoritarian methods and

“authoritarian advantage” in handling crisis

consider possible consequences of these

is thus inherently flawed. The argument can

approaches. Analysts at the MIT Technology

be easily made it was the authoritarian regime that allowed the emergence of a crisis to begin with.

Review have also developed a ‘COVID

tracing tracker’ which compares the systems in different countries based on certain parameters putting into light different practices.67 This tool can be useful for

Digital Technology, Authoritarianism, and

citizens who want to inform themselves on

Public Health Policy in the Context of

the digital contact tracing systems in their

COVID-19

countries.

Track and Trace

As mentioned above the development of digital contact tracing throughout the world due to the COVID-19 pandemic has led to

the emergence of a debate on the ethics of

MIT Technology Review COVID Tracing Tracker

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digital contact tracing. Even though it is

of digital contact tracing with respects to

without doubt an effective means to curb the

privacy.70 According to this report, it is

spread of the virus, there are important

important that digital contact tracing

concerns about civil liberties and patient’s

systems respect people’s privacy to protect

privacy related to the usage of these

them from data collection and possible

systems. It is thus important to ask whether

abuses of power; moreover, once civilian

these digital contact tracing systems are

surveillance measures are put in place, it is

ethically justifiable. In his analysis Mark

hard to scale them back.71 States should also

Ryan uses the European Court of Human

endorse voluntary adoption of these systems.

Rights definition of ethically justifiable; this

This can be achieved by focusing on

is that it has to be necessary, proportionate,

maintaining public trust in public health

scientifically valid and time- bounded.68

authorities and encouraging public

Even though this presents one perspective

cooperation with authorities.72

on whether something is ethically justifiable, it is a useful parameter of analysis.69 In evaluating our different case studies, we notice that there is often a conflict between efficacy and privacy, freedom and health. It is important to take into account that governments and particularly democracies must make hard decisions which might contradict their ethos in the context of public health policy.

South Korea is an interesting example for our discussion on the balance between effectiveness and privacy as it shows us how some solid democracies have adopted slightly autocratic methods to address the pandemic. Despite being exposed to COVID-19 relatively early in January 2020, South Korea has effectively curbed the spread of the virus among the population; This is owed in large part to its digital

Harvard’s Edmond J. Safra Center for

Ethics p ublished a report on the challenges 68

Ryan, Mark, ‘In defence of digital contact-tracing: Human rights, South Korea and Covid-19’, International Journal of Pervasive Computing and Communications, volume 16, issue 4 (2020) 69

Ibid

Hart, Vi, et al., ‘Outpacing the virus: Digital Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 while Mitigating Privacy Risks’, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics (2020) 71 Ibid 72 Ibid

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contact tracing system.73 When an individual

digital contact tracing system meets the

is infected, the authorities use credit and

necessary, proportionate and scientifically

debit card transactions, phone location and

valid requirements. However, it faces

surveillance cameras as well as traditional

considerable issues in relation to the

contact tracing methods.74 Moreover, text

time-bounded requirement.76 The methods

alerts are sent to citizens who may have

put in place in South Korea are possible

been in contact with infected patients with

because their democratic culture draws on

details of their gender, location. Despite its

Confucian values of the sanctity of the

effectiveness there are important concerns

public good. Individual rights and privacy

regarding South Korea’s digital contact

can be easily framed as secondary in

tracing methods. South Korea has

importance.77 In South Korea, nearly 89% of

repurposed techniques traditionally used to

the population supports the government’s

track criminals for their track-and-trace

policies towards curbing the spread of the

system.75 The track-and-trace system

virus.78 However, it is highly possible that

operates with more public transparency than

these models would face intense scrutiny

a criminal system does, however, and even

from Western democracies.

if the name of an individual is not disclosed, there is still the risk that private information about someone will be made public for all

The example of Taiwan seems to contradict

his or her neighbors to see. Moreover, it is

the assumption that effective contact tracing

not known what will happen to this

and the defense of individual rights to

information once the pandemic is over.

privacy cannot coexist. Taiwan’s model of

However, some researchers assert that South

participatory self-surveillance is unique, and

Korea’s methods are ethically justifiable.

has successfully curbed the spread of the

Mark Ryan believes that South Korea’s

McCurry, Justin, ‘Test, trace, contain: How South Korea flattened its coronavirus curve’, The Guardian (2020) 74 Cellan-Jones, Rory, ‘Tech-tent: Can we learn about coronavirus-tracing from South Korea?’, BBC News (2020) 75

Ibid

Ryan, Mark, ‘In defence of digital contact-tracing: Human rights, South Korea and Covid-19’, International Journal of Pervasive Computing and Communications, volume 16, issue 4 (2020) 77 Kluth, Andreas, ‘If we must build a surveillance state, let’s do it properly’, Bloomberg Opinion ( 2020) 78 Ryan, Mark, ‘In defence of digital contact-tracing: Human rights, South Korea and Covid-19’, International Journal of Pervasive Computing and Communications, volume 16, issue 4 (2020)

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virus. According to Andreas Kluth, the

The policies of the countries mentioned

government and its citizens partnered

above show us that digital contact tracing is

together to create a “protean network of

a useful tool to address the challenges posed

databases in which information flows from

by this pandemic, but it is not sufficient.

the bottom up and top down.”79 The

Both of these countries have a robust

vTaiwan platform, which can be considered

healthcare system, their governments benefit

an online town hall, has permitted citizens

from popular support and they reacted to the

and the government to collaborate together.

pandemic situation extremely quickly when

In a recent Time magazine article, the

cases were low. Experience with SARS and

president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-Wen, praised

MERS might also have given a chance for

this approach as a major reason for the

governments to think about ways they could

successful management of the pandemic.80 It

use technology effectively in the context of

is true that the government's use of the

pandemics. Digital contact tracing also

National Health Insurance database to track

raises the issue of privacy which is essential

and trace holds for risks for individual

for democracy. In the following section, we

privacy, especially when it comes to health

will discuss authoritarian approaches to

information.81 However, people’s confidence

digital contact tracing, where the

in their government and the incredibly

infringement of individual rights is framed

strong reputation of the NHI, as well as the

as necessary for the elimination of the virus.

well-publicized and stringent privacy laws,

However, it is worth considering the

mean that the general populace is extremely

example above when evaluating the validity

supportive of these measures.

of this statement. To this day South Korea and Taiwan have shown that digital contact tracing is possible with overall consent and support from their population whilst also

Kluth, Andreas, ‘If we must build a surveillance state, let’s do it properly’, Bloomberg Opinion ( 2020) 80 Ing-Wen, Tsai, ‘President of Taiwan: How my country prevented a major outbreak of COVID-19’, Time Magazine ( 2020) 81 Liu, Catherine, ‘Inequality, Technocracy and National Healthcare: Taiwan and COVID-19’ (February 2021)

trying to protect their citizens privacy.

Taiwan, China, and Digital Authoritarianism

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The use of contact-tracing apps and

in the name of tackling this unprecedented

wearable tech devices to combat the spread

crisis.

of the coronavirus has stirred extensive debates about balancing public health and privacy in democratic nations. While many democratic governments have reiterated their commitment to safeguard personal freedoms, concerns remain over how the use of invasive technologies to tackle the pandemic has normalized the encroachment of state surveillance on the lives of citizens. The COVID-19 outbreak has also sparked authoritarian political behaviors worldwide, not only in regimes such as Russia but also in well-established liberal democracies with robust constitutional protection of rights. On one hand, authoritarian regimes have exploited the public health crisis to further curtail civil liberties through increased surveillance and tracing, resulting in a shift towards paternalistic totalitarianism. China, in particular, has leveraged the COVID-19 pandemic to export its tech-enabled surveillance response and expand its digital authoritarianism82. On the other hand, governments in semi-democratic states are

The COVID-19 pandemic has provided China with an opportunity to expand the use of invasive digital technologies and reinforce authoritarian politics at home. China’s extensive surveillance capabilities is evident from the deployment of advanced facial recognition systems, wearable technologies and AI-powered public security platforms for contact tracing and quarantine enforcement83. Unlike democracies such as South Korea that have similarly harnessed digital technologies for public health, Chinese contact-tracing apps employ an invasive degree of data-mining to extract the identities of its citizens. Massive amounts of personal data collected are subsequently accessed by the authorities to expand its public surveillance efforts. Not only has the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leveraged on the public health crisis to consolidate its authority domestically, it has also seized on the disorderly pandemic responses by Western democracies to promote its

bypassing or suspending democratic control 83 82

Khalil, Lydia. “Digital Authoritarianism, China, and COVID.” Lowy Institute, 2 November 2020. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/digital-a uthoritarianism-china-and-covid

Chaturvedi, Aditya. “The China way: Use of technology to combat Covid-19.” Geospatial World, 5 November 2020. https://www.geospatialworld.net/article/the-sino-a pproach-use-of-technology-to-combat-covid-19/

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authoritarian practices abroad84. China has

Even in democratic nations, there is a

embarked on an extensive propaganda

growing acceptance of intrusive

campaign to shape the pandemic narrative.

technologies used in the name of public

China’s wolf warrior diplomacy has

health and safety. For instance, India has

leveraged social media tools to spread

made the Aarogya Setu app – an Indian

misinformation about the origins of the

government-built contact-tracing app -

coronavirus and discredit the responses of

mandatory for all civil servants, private

democratic governments85. In addition,

employees, and military personnel.87

China has sought to export its information

Personal data collected through Arogya Setu

technology abroad. Beijing launched the

can be shared with Indian government

Digital Silk Road – a component of

ministries, public health institutions and

Beijing’s Belt and Road (BRI) initiative –

universities with little accountability of the

which has seen governments in recipient

misuse of data. The lack of comprehensive

countries adopting surveillance technologies

anti-surveillance and data-protection

developed by Chinese technology

legislations have fueled concerns that the

companies.86 The COVID-19 pandemic has

Indian authorities are using the pandemic as

fueled demand in developing states for

a pretext to erode privacy and freedom of

Chinese surveillance tools as governments

speech. Even before the public health crisis,

sought to control the spread of the

privacy violations and unprecedented

coronavirus by harnessing technology.

surveillance have been rife at the state level. As mentioned in Section 1, India’s cultural

Shahbaz, Adrian. “The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/201 8/rise-digital-authoritarianism 85 Scott, Jason. “Chinese Official Pushes Conspiracy Theory U.S. Spread Virus.” Bloomberg, 13 March 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03 -13/chinese-official-pushes-conspiracy-theory-u-s-ar my-behind-virus 86 Shen, Hong. “Building a Digital Silk Road? Situating the Internet in China's Belt and Road Initiative.” USC Annenberg International Journal of Communication, 2 018. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/8405

and historical dispositions have led to the populace being more willing to accept the trade-off between privacy and public health. Indian political thought suggests that the community prevails over the individual, thereby allowing the state to intrude into the 87

Zargar, Arshad. “Privacy, Security concerns as India forces app on millions.” CBS N ews, 27 May 2020. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-indiacontact-tracing-app-privacy-data-security-concerns-a arogya-setu-forced-on-millions/

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everyday lives of its citizens even though

power of traditional democratic institutions

the right to privacy is guaranteed under the

and undermine constitutional principles

Indian Constitution88. The general

safeguarding personal privacy. The

acceptance of state surveillance in India has

pervasive use of mass surveillance and

facilitated the adoption of China’s digital

censorship in the fight against COVID-19

authoritarianism model by the nationalistic

will erode and weaken widely-established

Modi government. Privacy activists have

democratic norms and practices should

warned that the pandemic will further

governments fail to put in place the

normalize the use of digital surveillance

necessary safeguards.

tools and accelerate the systemic erosion of civil liberties in India. Moreover, the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic has further impeded the ability of traditional democratic institutions – such as the media, courts, and civil society organizations – to serve as effective checks and balances. For instance, online criticism of the Aarogya Setu app by Internet Freedom Foundation – a digital rights and liberties advocacy group in India – was censored by the Indian authorities within days after it was published89. The above example sheds light on how governments have leveraged on the pandemic to curb the “State of Privacy India.” Privacy International, 26 January 2019. https://privacyinternational.org/state-privacy/1002/ state-privacy-india 89 Del Bello, Lou. “’Bridge to Health?’ Why some question India’s contact tracing app.” The Christian Science Monitor, 8 May 2020. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Cent ral/2020/0508/Bridge-to-health-Why-some-question -India-s-contact-tracing-app 88

India and Social and Digital Technologies The Aarogya Setu app also provides an interesting lens into how the nuances of Indian forms of governance and public health policy relate to our two East Asian examples. In section 1 we introduced the foundations of Indian political thought and discussed how they have influenced contemporary political forms. We also identified India as a democracy. However, we have seen that India’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic bears more similarities to authoritarian responses like China’s rather than those of Western liberal democracies. There are some explanations to this situation. Since Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rose to power in 2017, there has been a continued effort to undermine civil liberties and democracy in 41

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India.90 Modi’s pursuit of a Hindu nationalist

place virtual parliament sessions. Modi’s

agenda has already eroded many aspects of

executive has also used institutional powers

Indian secularism and civic discourse which

in courts to suppress the media. There have

has been central to the state since its creation

been several cases of journalists who

in 1947.91

criticized the government’s response to the pandemic being charged with false accusations. In addition, the state tried to get

The COVID-19 pandemic has provided

the Supreme Court to force journalists to get

Modi and the BJP the opportunity to expand

the government’s approval before they

their attacks not only on secularism, but also

would be allowed to release articles related

on democracy, with little opposition or

to Covid-19.94 Even though the Supreme

recourse. For example, the pandemic has

Court denied the government’s request, it

allowed the government to set crucial

issued a warning to the media that they

precedents related to the role of the

should comply with the government.95 This

parliament in government decision-making

suggests that the judicial branch is becoming

processes. The executive branch failed to

increasingly complicit with the central

consult the parliament before it imposed a

government.

national lockdown in March 2020, as should have been the case.92 The last parliamentary session ended on March 25th, and since then has not been reconvened under the pretext that a virtual parliament session would be vulnerable to hacking.93 However, many countries throughout the world have put in 90

Rahul, Mukherji, ‘Covid vs. Democracy: India’s illiberal remedy’, Journal of Democracy, volume 31, issue 4 (2020) 91 Amy, Slipowitz,‘Why we should be worried about India’s response to Coronavirus’, Freedom House (2020) 92 Rahul, Mukherji, ‘Covid vs. Democracy: India’s illiberal remedy’, Journal of Democracy, volume 31, issue 4 (2020) 93 Ibid

These are one of a few examples of the government’s determination to undermine democracy in India. Some people have raised the alarm of the direction the government has taken. Mukherji argues that India is at risk of becoming a competitive autocracy.96 The pandemic has only increased the rate at which this transition is occurring. Many have also compared the Ibid Ibid 96 Ibid 94 95

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current state of the Indian government to the

within castes and classes has proved to be

national emergency of 1975-1977.

more difficult. In July 2020, just six months

Therefore, we can say that India’s

after the first COVID-19 case in India, a

authoritarian turn has been an extremely

study found that 57% of the population in

recent development, and thus not reflected

Mumbai’s slums had contracted

in the polity index of 2017.

COVID-19.99 The study concluded that this was due to shared facilities and the

Another key aspect in the characterization of India’s public health response during the COVID-19 pandemic is the importance of hierarchical values. India has been and remains a country where strong inequalities persist. These inequalities have also, unfortunately, significantly impacted the ability of Indian citizens to social distance. When the government announced national lockdown in March 2020, they also advised all Indians to socially distance as a measure to prevent the spread of the virus among the population.97 In a country where about 35 percent of people living in urban areas live in slums, social distancing is a luxury which only a certain fraction of the population can afford.98 Priyasha argues that there has been

impossibility of practicing proper social distancing in slums.100 This situation with social distancing exemplifies the government’s lack of realism with the measures they implemented to curb the spread of the virus. Asking people to quarantine if they have coronavirus symptoms when these same people live on a day to day income is also simply unrealistic.101 India lacks a financial and social welfare plan to deal with the current pandemic. Without this, it is likely that a huge percentage of the population will be physically unable to adhere to the government’s demands, which, given our previous discussion of the rising autocratic tendencies, may portend a draconian abuse

effective vertical social distancing along caste and class lines but social distancing 99

Priyasha, Kaul, ‘India’s stark inequalities make social distancing much easier for some than others’, The Conversation (2020) 98 The World Bank, ‘Population living in slums (% of urban population) - India(2018)

Shilpa, Jamkhandikar, ‘In Mumbai’s slums, over half of population probably infected with coronavirus, survey says’, Reuters (2020) 100 Ibid 101 Priyasha, Kaul, ‘India’s stark inequalities make social distancing much easier for some than others’, The Conversation (2020)

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of power to ensure obedience.

Remarkably, religious and secular groups partnered together to provide this relief,

An interesting development in India as a result of the pandemic is the intervention of civil society and the private sector to address institutional gaps in Indian society. Whilst the government has primarily considered this pandemic as a law and order issue preventing migrant workers from returning

sending out a message of tolerance even though the government pursues a Hindu-nationalist agenda. According to Vijayan, Humanism has reemerged in Indian society as a result of this pandemic which has also been recognized by the Policy Commission of the Government of India.105

home and forcing people to install the Aarogya Setu app digital contact tracing

The COVID-19 pandemic has also had an

app, the government has failed to address

important effect on developments in Indian

the social aspect of this pandemic.102 This is

society, both in the retraction of democratic

where civil society and the private sector

and secular values and in the reemergence of

have stepped in. In the case of migrant

horizontal solidarity, humanism, and civic

workers, the government theoretically set up

activism. Regardless, we can ask ourselves

a basic necessities provision program for

whether the Indian society and state explain

them. In practice, 96 percent of the migrant

the different outcomes in terms of public

workers did not receive the government's

health compared to China and Taiwan. From

basic necessities.103 In light of the

the examples above, we can clearly see that

government’s failure to support this

political and social factors play an important

vulnerable social group, it is reported that

role in public health outcomes. The law and

organizations of varying sizes rallied to

order approach of the government seems to

provide these migrant workers relief.

suggest that public health outcomes are

Rights-based groups repurposed themselves

secondary priorities of the government. It is

104

to become relief- based groups.

important to highlight the fact that the current Indian context stems from long-term

102

Vijayan, Mj, ‘Dark Clouds and Silver Linings: Authoritarianism and Civic Action in India’, Carnegie Europe ( 2020) 103 Ibid 104 Ibid

developments, and therefore it is difficult to

105

Ibid

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ascribe sole responsibility to the current

of digital surveillance. The willingness of

government and society. However, this

their citizens to forsake individual privacy

pandemic highlights the continued need to

for the sake of public health has contributed

curb authoritarian tendencies and

to the pervasive use of digital technologies

unequivocally pursue an agenda of

by Asian democratic states in their efforts to

substantive social equality.

contain the COVID-19 pandemic. Acknowledging that collectivist cultural features are more apparent in East Asian

Conclusion The use of digital technologies by democratic and authoritarian states alike in their fight against COVID-19 has raised questions about the extent to which constitutional rights of privacy can be

democratic states than in Western liberal democracies, we suggest that the public health responses of Asian countries might not necessarily be adopted by Western states given their individualistic cultures that value personal rights over community well-being.

infringed upon when there are larger public interest considerations. On one hand, authoritarian governments have deployed highly-intrusive digital technologies as part of their control strategy for dealing with crisis, enabled by the lack of privacy protections. On the other hand, democracies have responded by engaging in a more nuanced discussion of privacy, legality, and the public good, and have differing rates of success in producing an effective yet responsible method of surveillance. The discussion on Taiwan’s and India’s COVID-19 response shed light on how collectivist cultural traits present in social democracies have led to a greater acceptance 45

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the politics of how COVID-19 has been handled. Beijing has reacted to these tensions with more of the same authoritarian Chapter 3: What Comes Next

and noncooperative tendencies. In order to gain a more complete picture of how COVID-19 will influence the future of

Nervousness and a Post-COVID World In January 2021, a team of WHO professionals were sent to Wuhan to investigate the origins of the pandemic. On the day of their flight, two team members were informed that their permit to travel to China had not been accepted, and as such, their trip had to be postponed on short notice. China’s decision to snub the WHO was based on a long-established attitude towards international diplomacy that attempted to reject the rules and restrictions put forward by the West. The CCP’s reaction to the initial spread of the COVID-19 pandemic was characterized by a reluctance to communicate on the international stage, as well as to suppress blame for this reluctance.

Asian politics, we consulted with Dr. Therese Hesketh, a professor of Global Health at University College London and a visiting professor at Zhejiang University. In our conversation, we asked questions about the relationship between Chinese political values and public health policies, the strategies and techniques deployed to handle COVID-19 and, most importantly, how a comparative approach to recent Asian health policy developments can serve as a looking glass into the future of the region. In response to the general strategies deployed by the central state to deal with all aspects of this crisis, Dr. Hesketh highlighted the suppressing of whistleblowers, the mandate of compliance with centralized top-down health measures, the early adoption of digital technology, and the ability to activate material and human infrastructures very

More than a year later, signs of diplomatic tensions continue to arise between China

quickly as important techniques that the CCP used to supplement their healthcare

and the West, largely owing to disagreements about discourses related to 46

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systems106. These point to the prominence

It is fair to say that one year after the

and efficiency in the authoritarian

outbreak of COVID-19, China is focused on

capabilities of the Chinese state.

making the best of COVID-19 to bolster their international image and influence. Initially, China’s global export of millions

The initial silencing of Dr. Li Wenliang,

of masks began the type of

who had tried to warn the world of the

coronavirus-related diplomatic quid pro quo

outbreak and the imprisonment of Zhang

that was labelled by media sources as ‘mask

Zhan due to her critique of government

diplomacy’109. Now, China actively plays a

reaction to COVID-19, had both

zero-sum diplomatic game, through publicly

demonstrated China’s reluctance to expose

scorning western vaccines such as Pfizer’s

the reality of life on the ground. Fueled by

and simultaneously promoting China’s

the susceptibility of its citizenry, journalists

Sinovac vaccine. In January 2021, Chinese

like Zhang Zhan and Fang Fang, who simply

propaganda vehicles Xinhua, People’s

documented how they perceived life in

Daily, and China Daily had all criticized

Wuhan to be, were publicly ridiculed and

Western media for downplaying deaths from

mercilessly criticized on Chinese social

Pfizer vaccinated citizens in Norway110. Liu

media107. Memories of the fleeting hope of

Xin, a widely recognized television anchor,

an online resistance - through videos of the

also joined in raising attention over western

“Les Misérables” song “Do You Hear the

deaths from the Pfizer vaccine; similarly

People Sing?” – seem like a distant and

slamming Western media for downplaying

overly idealistic past108.

the 10 deaths of vaccinated people in Germany111. Norway had argued that these deaths were unrelated to the vaccine, and likely to have occurred due to the fact that

106

Hesketh, Therese. Personal interview. 12 January 2021. 107 Yuan, Li. 2021. "How Beijing Turned China’S Covid-19 Tragedy To Its Advantage". The New York Times, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/business/chi na-covid-19-beijing.html. 108 ibid

the oldest citizens, who are also most prone 109

Hui, Mary. 2021. "China’s Vaccine Diplomacy Has An Aggressive Anti-Vax Element". Quartz, 2021. https://qz.com/1959855/chinas-coronavirus-vaccine -diplomacy-is-anti-vax/. 110 ibid 111 ibid

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to die from other causes, were vaccinated

power abroad, with no current need to

first. By demeaning the efficiency of

embark on a costly domestic vaccination

Western vaccines, while promoting the

campaign.

reliability of Chinese vaccines abroad, China managed to expand its vaccine market to a great portion of the developing world.

In keeping with these themes, China’s newest lockdowns, implemented in January 2021, attempted to bolster the image of

By contrast, the United States’ attempts to

Chinese efficiency in responding to recent

politicize their own vaccination rollout

surges in cases through swift and direct

strategy have fallen flat. Hampered by a

action. In the Hebei province, lockdowns

confused and violent administration

were deployed to deal with a few hundred

transition, the echoes of the ‘America First’

cases, whereas in the West, it takes

sentiment, and the polarizing effects of

thousands of daily cases to warrant the same

misinformation, conspiracy theories, and

response. Our interview with Dr. Hesketh

party politics, America seems frozen by a

also pointed to the importance of

rush of conflicting pressures that all threaten

engineering efficient public health

imminent crisis. While Beijing actively

responses, no matter the methods needed to

attempts dictate the distribution of the

get there. Even considering the

Sinovac vaccine both domestically and

disproportionality of a mass lockdown of 11

around the world, Washington is struggling

million people in Shijiazhuang, Chinese

between an attempt to shrink away from

policies resemble authoritarian public health

their self-conferred international

models that focus on banning citizens from

responsibilities and endorse the business

leaving their province by land, air, or sea112.

decisions of private companies like Pfizer

In a further attempt to build its reputation at

and Moderna. China, on the other hand, is

the expense of the West, the outbreak in

focusing on using the vaccine distribution as a bargaining chip for future economic trade. With the pandemic under control at home, China’s objective is to promote its economic

112

Bloomberg News. 2021. "Covid Lockdowns Are Spreading A Year After China Shocked World", , 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02 -02/china-s-top-diplomat-warns-biden-not-to-touchinternal-affairs.

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January 2021 in the Hebei province has been

contain the spread of the virus earlier than

blamed by Chinese officials on frozen food

Western powers, has caused remarkable

imported from Western nations113.

transformations to the global economy. China is now poised to overtake the United States as the world’s leading economy

Another way to interpret these responses,

within five years, doubling the time

however, is that they demonstrate a case of

predicted prior to the pandemic, with its

nerves on the part of CCP officials. The fact

economy projected to grow in 2021 by

that there were so few cases in China, and

8%114. Profiting off mass exports of medical

the risk of an internationally mutated

supplies, an early reaction to the pandemic,

variant, mean that any mistake now could

and repetitive lockdowns in Western

cost the Chinese administration months of

countries, China has reversed the initial

backtracking, not to mention tens of

public health and diplomatic failure to stop

thousands of lives. In addition, given how

the spread of COVID-19. Even considering

quick Western news agencies and

the Trump administration’s tariffs, Chinese

governments are to jump on potential stories

exports to the United States reached record

of Yellow Peril, China Bashing, or the

levels during 2020115. In the period between

inferiority of Chinese governing ideologies,

October 2020 and January 2021, China’s

the disproportionate actions taken now

Foreign Minister Wang Yi had traveled to

speak to a fear that the West will seek to

every country in Southeast Asia, except

capitalize on any potential missteps to gain

Vietnam, in order to promote the Chinese

advantage in the reputation war currently

vaccine and future prospects of the Belt and

being fought.

Road Initiative116. Extending these

114

Yet, China’s diplomacy during the COVID-19 era, as well as its ability to 113

Al Jazeera. 2021. "China Seals Off Two Cities To Contain Coronavirus Outbreak", , 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/8/china-s eals-off-two-cities-to-contain-coronavirus-outbreak.

"World Economy In 2021: Here’s Who Will Win And Who Will Lose". 2021. City, University of London. https://www.city.ac.uk/news/2021/january/world-e conomy-in-2021-heres-who-will-win-and-who-will-lo se. 115 ibid 116 Poling, Gregory B., and Simon Tran Hudes. 2021. "Vaccine Diplomacy Is Biden’s First Test In Southeast Asia". Centre For Strategic And International Studies.

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diplomatic victories to Africa, the

diplomatic success that can thrust its

Caribbean, and Latin America, China is

economy into unprecedented size and global

attempting to become what Foreign Affairs

influence.

magazine labelled “the savior of the developing world”117. Lessons From Trying to Quantify/Determine Success in COVID-19 In attempting to clean its reputation of a delayed cooperation with the WHO, China is continuously embarking on nationalistic

We conclude our policy report on the state

policies that seek to divert blame for

of democracy and authoritarianism in a

COVID-19 and simultaneously foster

COVID and post-COVID world with an

economic cooperation with a wide array of

analysis of poll results conducted by

countries. The international bigotry inspired

think-tanks and interview responses of

by Western attempts to participate in this

government officials. We do this in an

blame game, most strikingly exemplified by

attempt to apply the academic discussions of

Donald Trump’s use of the term “Chinese

our previous sections to the real world, to

Virus,” the inability of Western liberal

engage more fully in contemporary policy

democracies to handle this crisis, and

discourses, and to better understand the

China’s aggressive and unified diplomatic

realities of Indian, Chinese, and Taiwanese

strategies have allowed them to emerge from

COVID-19 responses. This will allow us to

2020 not as an international villain, but as an

provide concrete policy takeaways based on

unlikeable and potentially dangerous

a more unified mode of analysis than we

anti-hero. China has been able, unlike

have previously engaged in.

Macbeth, to wash its hands of blame and guilt, and to turn its initial failure into a Taiwan https://www.csis.org/analysis/vaccine-diplomacy-bi dens-first-test-southeast-asia. 117 Freymann, Eyck, and Justin Stebbing. 2021. "China Is Winning The Vaccine Race". Foreign Affairs, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-stat es/2020-11-05/china-winning-vaccine-race.

The endorsement from the public of the Taiwanese government’s COVID-19 response is evident from both domestic and 50

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international polls. According to a poll

with an average score of 86.4 out of 100120.

conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion

In evaluating the relative performance of

Foundation, Taiwan’s relative success in

countries, fourteen-day rolling averages of

containing the pandemic has led to an

new daily figures were calculated for

improvement in President Tsai Ing-wen’s

confirmed cases, confirmed cases per

approval ratings by 12 percentage points to

million people, confirmed deaths, confirmed

68.5%118. This is the best reading since she

deaths per million people, confirmed cases

took office in May 2016. Of those polled,

as a proportion of tests, and tests per

85.6% said they are "fairly" or "very"

thousand people. The above results highlight

confident that Tsai's government can keep

Taiwan’s success in keeping the rate of

the virus under control. Meanwhile, Taiwan

infection and number of deaths low without

ranked first out of 49 countries for its

having to impose harsh national lockdowns.

COVID-19 pandemic response in a survey

Taiwan’s competent handling of the

conducted by Japanese think-tank NLI

COVID-19 pandemic has led to it being

Research Institute119. The island nation

viewed as a model for nations worldwide

received the maximum of 10 points for its

tackling the public health crisis. This has

infection rate of 0.2 per 10,000 residents, for

boosted its soft power and international

its infection expansion rate, and for its

reputation. According to the annual Asia

ability to limit the impact of the pandemic

Power Index (API) for 2020 released by the

on its Gross Domestic Product. Notably, in a

Australian think tank Lowy Institute,

COVID-19 Performance Index recently

Taiwan’s overall diplomatic influence score

published by the Lowy Institute, Taiwan

increased from 15.9 in 2019 to 16.7 in

ranked third out of 98 countries for its

2020121. The rise in Taiwan’s soft power is

successful containment of the pandemic

mainly attributed to its rapid, highly-coordinated, and democratized public

Ihara, Kensaku. “Support for Taiwan President Tsai surges on virus crackdown.” Nikkei Asia, 26 February 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Support-for-Ta iwan-President-Tsai-surges-on-virus-crackdown 119 Strong, Matthew. “Taiwan best out of 49 countries in dealing with coronavirus pandemic: Japanese survey.” Taiwan News, 22 July 2020. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3971823 118

Leng, Alyssa & Lemahieu, Herve. “Covid Performance Index.” Lowy Institute, 2 7 January 2021. https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features /covid-performance/#rankings 121 Hsu, Elizabeth. “Taiwan's reputation improves due to pandemic response: Survey.” Focus Taiwan, 19 October 2020. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202010190014 120

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health response. In an interview with

element of Taiwan’s remarkable COVID-19

Western media outlet CNN, Taiwanese

response is the high level of transparency in

digital minister Audrey Tang mentioned that

the democratic state123. Notably, Taiwanese

Taiwan’s past experience with the 2003

citizens could communicate directly with the

SARS crisis led to an immediate response

health authorities through online digital

by the authorities when news about

platforms created in collaboration with

COVID-19 first broke out. As soon as

citizen hacktivists to seek medical advice

Taiwanese health official Lo Yi-chun

and provide feedback on the government’s

spotted Chinese reports of mysterious

public health response. Our analysis of

pneumonia on the Reddit-like platform PTT,

interview responses and poll results above

Taiwan tightened its borders and imposed

evince our earlier findings that Taiwan’s

strict quarantine measures on incoming

COVID response is viewed as a success by

travelers122. A digital fence tracking system

both the Taiwanese public and the

that leverages cell phone location data was

international community.

implemented to enforce quarantine measures without violating the privacy of individuals. Tang also noted that Taiwan has adopted a ‘humor before rumor’ approach to minimize panic behaviors. For instance, the authorities responded to the panic buying of toilet paper by featuring a booty-shaking Premier Su Tseng-Chang to remind the public that everyone only has one butt and hoarding is unnecessary. In a separate interview conducted by Think Global Health, Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaushieh Joseph Wu mentioned that a key “ Taiwanese digital minister shares country’s coronavirus response on CNN.” Taiwan News, 3 0 June 2020. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/39 56128 122

India Domestic and international surveys have rated India’s COVID-19 response favorably. According to the Mood of the Nation (MOTN) poll conducted by India Today Group across 19 Indian states, 77% of Indians surveyed were satisfied with PM Modi's handling of the Covid-19 crisis124. Bollyky, Thomas J. & Bardi, Jason Socrates. “Taiwan’s Response to COVID-19 and the WHO.” Think Global Health, 1 5 May 2020. https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/tai wans-response-covid-19-and-who 124 “77% Indians satisfied with PM Modi's handling of Covid-19 crisis, shows MOTN survey.” India Today, 17 August 2020. https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/mood-of 123

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This number includes 29% of respondents

shed light on the relatively high level of

who believed PM Modi's performance has

confidence among the India’s populace in

been 'outstanding' and 48% who felt that his

their government’s handling of the

performance has been 'good'. The interview

COVID-19 pandemic. India’s efforts to deal

responses also revealed that 43% of the

with the public health crisis has been praised

12,021 surveyed respondents believed that

by Dr Poonam Khetrapal Singh, the WHO's

India has responded better to the situation

regional director for Southeast Asia127. In an

than other countries, while the other half felt

interview with Germany's public

that India has been at par with other

international broadcaster Deutsche Welle

countries in handling the public health

(DW), Dr Singh commented on how India

crisis125. Such positive sentiments are

implemented an early nationwide lockdown

similarly reflected in international polls.

that was instrumental in helping the

India ranked 4th out of 19 countries in a

authorities scale up healthcare facilities. She

global survey assessing public perception of

also lauded India’s implementation of core

government responses to the COVID-19

public health measures – test, trace, isolate

pandemic. Conducted by the Barcelona

and treat – in the most densely-populated

Institute for Global Health (ISGlobal), the

places such as Dharavi that have now

survey considered key indicators such as

become examples globally of how

clear communication with the public,

COVID-19 should be tackled.

pandemic preparedness, and access to healthcare services126. The above results While the poll results and the interview with -the-nation/story/20200817-77-per-cent-indians-sati sfied-pm-modi-coronavirus-crisis-motn-survey-1708 927-2020-08-07 125 “Mood of the Nation: 48% feel India's response to Covid at par with other nations.” India Today, 7 August 2020. https://www.indiatoday.in/mood-of-the-natio n/story/mood-of-the-nation-48-feel-india-s-respons e-covid-par-other-nations-1708928-2020-08-07 126 Kaul, Rhythma. “India ranks 4th in global survey assessing public perception of govt response to Covid-19.” Hindustan Time, 6 October 2020. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indiaranks-4th-in-global-survey-assessing-public-percepti

Dr Singh have largely painted a positive light of India’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, human right activists and medical

on-of-government-response-to-covid-19/story-I0gXS GfCs14vru9Sf9ymzO.html 127 Krishnan, Murali. “WHO: 'Impressive' how India implemented COVID-19 measures.” Deutsche Welle, 1 1 August 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/who-impressive-how -india-implemented-covid-19-measures/a-54526786

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professionals have spoken of the need for

that India’s COVID-19 response has been

the India government to ramp up existing

well-received and deemed successful by a

healthcare facilities. Dr Gagandeep Kang, an

majority of its citizens, something its

infectious disease researcher based in India,

Western liberal counterparts have a harder

highlighted that insufficient investment in

time arguing130131132. However, structural

public healthcare has undermined India’s

inequality and vertical tribalism have,

fight against the COVID-19 pandemic128.

obviously, lead to serious problems in the

She also mentioned that the lack of

handling of this public health crisis.

community trust in the public health

Increased investment in healthcare

authorities has led to the under-reporting of

infrastructure and better general disease

COVID-19 cases. This has inevitably

preparedness, while sorely needed, are

hampered the authorities’ ability to detect

simply partial treatments of one symptom of

and isolate emerging clusters of COVID-19

a much larger concern, one that, when

cases. Dr Kang’s sentiments are similarly

taking into consideration our previous

echoed by Indian author and political

findings about the current state of Indian

activist Arundhati Roy. In an interview with FRANCE 24, Roy mentioned that the pandemic has amplified social inequalities, with the poor and migrant worker communities being denied of healthcare services despite being more vulnerable to 129

the virus . Our analysis therefore suggests

Pathak, Sushmita. “A Doctor Reflects On India's Pandemic Response.” National Public Radio News, 30 December 2020. https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/1 2/30/950880445/even-with-10-million-covid-19-case s-a-doctor-says-india-dodged-a-bullet 129 D'souza, Delano. “Author and activist Arundhati Roy on Covid-19 and the Indian response.” France 24, 13 May 2020. https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20 200513-interview-author-and-activist-arundhati-royon-covid-19-and-the-indian-response 128

130

h Bycoffe, Aaron; Groskopf, Christopher & Mehta, Dhrumil. “How Americans View The Coronavirus Crisis And Trump's Response.” FiveThirtyEight, 2 0 January 2021. https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/coronavirus-poll s/ 131 Wike, Richard; Fetterolf, Janell & Mordecai, Mara. “U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say Country Has Handled Coronavirus Badly.” Pew Research Centre, 1 5 September 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/09/15/u s-image-plummets-internationally-as-most-say-coun try-has-handled-coronavirus-badly/ 132 Beaver, Kelly. “Public opinion on the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic.” Ipsos MORI, 2 February 2021. https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/pub lic-opinion-covid-19-coronavirus-pandemic

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politics133, is likely to get much worse in

rating its performance favorably135. In a

coming years.

similar poll conducted by German think tank Dalia Research, 56% of the respondents believed that the central government’s response was the ‘right amount’136. While

China

views are still generally positive, there is a marked difference compared to the

China’s response to COVID-19 has been

overwhelming positivity shown in the

met with mixed opinions, characterized by

Singaporean study. Furthermore, in the

domestic positivity international

beginning of the pandemic, there were

disapproval. Domestically, favorable

concerns and criticisms over the outbreak on

opinions fall in line with the government’s

the Chinese social media Weibo137. Tsinghua

narrative on its response. The Chinese ambassador to Tanzania claims that the government swiftly established epidemic response mechanisms, with President Xi Jinping personally directing and planning

University professor Dr Xu Zhangrun and his article Viral Alarm: When Fury

Overcomes Fear, was the vanguard of some of the strongest criticisms over China’s

response to the pandemic initially138. This

the effort134. According the study conducted by the Singaporean social research agency Blackbox Research, China received an index score of 85 out 100, much higher than the global average of 46, with most citizens

Malji, Andrea. “The Rise of Hindu Nationalism and Its Regional and Global Ramifications.” Association for Asian Studies, M arch 2018. https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/arc hives/the-rise-of-hindu-nationalism-and-its-regionaland-global-ramifications/ 134 Namkwahe, John. “INTERVIEW: China Continues to Shine in Global War Against Covid-19.” Embassy of The People's Republic of China in United Republic of Tanzania, 1 4 May 2020. http://tz.china-embassy.org/eng/sgdt/t1778878.htm 133

135

“Most Countries Covid-19 Responses Rated Poorly By Own Citizens in First-of-its-kind Global Survey.” Blackbox, 6 May 2020. https://blackbox.com.sg/everyone/2020/05/06/mos t-countries-covid-19-responses-rated-poorly-by-own -citizens-in-first-of-its-kind-global-survey/ 136 Dölitzsch, Christoph. “Global research about COVID-19: how do people judge their governments’ response to the pandemic?” Dalia Research, 30 March 2020. https://daliaresearch.com/blog/dalia-assesses-how-t he-world-ranks-their-governments-response-to-covi d-19/ 137 Feng, Emily. “Critics Say China Has Suppressed And Censored Information In Coronavirus Outbreak.” National Public Radio, 8 February 2020. https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/0 2/08/803766743/critics-say-china-has-suppressed-a nd-censored-information-in-coronavirus-outbrea 138 Xu, Zhangrun. “Viral Alarm: When Fury Overcomes Fear.” ChinaFile, 5 February 2020.

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demonstrates that despite the authoritarian

COVID-19140. The findings point to the fact

model and measures adopted by the Chinese

that people questioned the expediency of the

government in general and towards

Chinese government in handling the

COVID-19 specifically, complete control

outbreak, as well as the measures later taken

over public opinion and narrative is still

to contain the spread of the virus. This

impossible, even with the evolution of

particular attitude can be attributed to the

digital surveillance technologies and the

alleged initial cover-up of the virus, as well

spread of censorship previously mentioned.

as the reinforcement of authoritarian politics

The discrepancy in opinion extends beyond domestic stakeholders. While the WHO also holds favorable views on China’s pandemic response, many other international organizations and experts see China’s handling of the crisis negatively. The State-owned news outlet CGTN cites Dr. Bruce Aylward’s interview with the New York Times as evidence as WHO’s generally positive attitude towards COVID-19139. However, this opinion is not necessarily the dominant one in the international community. According to the polls conducted by Pew Research Center in

and behavior control mentioned in the previous sections. The Lowy Institute COVID Performance Index even goes as far as to leave China out of their rankings, under the justification that there was insufficient publicly available data on testing and a general lack of transparency141. Our analysis therefore suggests a fundamental contradiction between how China’s response to the pandemic was viewed domestically and internationally. While discrepancies in opinion exists within the two spheres, it is worth noting that despite effort to frame a positive narrative

October 2020, 61% of the respondents said China did a bad job in handling

https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewp oint/viral-alarm-when-fury-overcomes-fear 139 “WHO deputy chief praises China's COVID-19 strategy in NYT interview.” CGTN, 7 March 2020. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-03-07/WHO-dep uty-chief-praises-China-s-COVID-19-strategy-in-NYT-i nterview-OFtTf2ft7i/index.html

140

Silver, Laura, Devlin, Kat And Huang, Christine. “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries.’ Pew Research Center, 6 October 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/u nfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-ma ny-countries/ 141 Leng, Alyssa and Lemahieu, Hervé. “Covid Performance Index”, Lowy Institute, 27 J anuary 2021. https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covid -performance/#rankings

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on the central government’s behalf,

cover-ups. For many, China’s missteps

domestic dissent still exists and the

between November 2019 and February 2020

international community has not particularly

outweigh any merits the country may have

bought into the official narrative.

had in dealing with this pandemic, and completely undermines their respectability at the international level. In addition, bigotry

Conclusion Overall, we believe that Taiwan’s pandemic response was the most effective, evident from its popular domestic support and international approval. While India’s response was received in a generally positive light, fundamental long-term changes are needed for the country to better tackle similar public health crises in the future. China’s COVID-19 response poses more contradictions than that of Taiwan and India. Being the hardest-hit country during the initial phase of the pandemic, it has also been one of the first countries to recover from the crisis, while other nations are seemingly many years from achieving the same feat.

and “Yellow Peril” sentiment, most obviously observed in the term “Chinese Virus,” have made China an easy target for blame and the projection of Western failures. Nonetheless, they continue to outperform the West in handling this crisis. Despite the incredible numerical discrepancies in cases, cover-ups and human rights violations make it difficult to declare China’s COVID-19 response a humanitarian success. There are a variety of motivating factors at play for the CCP, including a desire to establish an idea of Chinese excellence, to support the Chinese economy, and to gain a larger influence in global politics, that supplement the simple desire to protect the lives and health of the Chinese people. Despite failing to promote their international reputation, Chinese public

However, the apparent success of China’s COVID-19 response is still met with

health policies have been more successful than those of almost any other country.

suspicion by the international community, as it seems that China was responsible for the global scale of the outbreak due to its initial 57

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interpreted with caution and a number of limitations should be borne in mind.

The first and most important limitation is that the COVID-19 pandemic is currently ongoing around the globe. As mentioned in the introduction to the report, the world has never been more volatile. Political conditions and the state of public health Limitations

policy stand to change at any moment. Our analysis of the relationship between digital technologies, public health policy, and

Before we introduce our policy recommendations, the findings of this study need to be seen in light of some limitations. For the most part, our analysis has been qualitative; we have drawn from a variety of academic disciplines, international journalistic sources, and government documents and statements. This means that the traditional limitations of policy reports, like problems with sampling, sample size, and techniques used to collect data do not apply this to project. In addition, the state of authoritarianism and democracy is Asia is not a new topic; we have therefore not suffered from lack of access to previous studies. Nonetheless, our results must be

Asian politics was largely informed by developments that have occurred in the past 12 months. The next 12 months could see the emergence of trends and events that run completely against the results of this paper. It is for this reason that this project attempted to trace long-term trajectories of ideology and policy in order to derive not a day-by-day set of recommendations, but a larger and more complete picture of the state of Asian politics. We hope that by doing so, this report can partially overcome this limitation to produce more generally applicable knowledge that will be relevant for years to come. However, the state of authoritarianism and democracy in Asia deserves a second look very soon; Indian

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Hindu Nationalism, Taiwanese party politics

respect for individual privacy, and a desire

and their relationship to China and the U.S.,

to mask government activities from

and China’s international strategy all need to

whistleblowers and other governments. In

be reevaluated in a post-COVID world.

the opening section of Chapter 1, we provided a set of quantified metrics for measuring democracy and authoritarianism.

The second limitation concerns the lack of

This was done to contextualize the rest of

quantitative data. This limitation is related to

our findings and provided a quantifiable

the first, as no one knows what the final

foundation upon which a set of qualitative

COVID numbers will be; many experts

assumptions could be based. However, these

expect this disease never to be completely

indexes are notoriously incomplete when

142

eradicated from the human population .

measuring something as complicated as

Therefore, any attempt to judge the success

governing ideologies. For the future,

of a country’s ability to deal with

attempts could be made to consult a wider

COVID-19 will not be completely accurate

variety of indexes, to obtain measurements

for years to come. The other two themes

from the governments themselves or civic

covered in this paper, digital technology and

society groups, or to participate in a deeper

the state of democracy and authoritarianism,

qualitative assessment of the intricacies of

are not suffering from a lack of data, they

what makes a state democratic or

are simply inherently difficult to quantify.

authoritarian.

Much of the discussion related to surveillance, privacy, and the digital realm relates to the relationship between the government and the general populace; as a result, much of the raw data and statistics about users of track-and-trace apps is black-boxed for three reasons, security, 142

Zhang, Sarah. “The Coronavirus is Never Going Away.” The Atlantic, 4 August 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/0 8/coronavirus-will-never-go-away/614860/

The third limitation of this project is related to the cultural and political biases of the five authors of this report. In order to combat this, we participated in thorough collaboration to ensure unity of voice, scope, and perspective. However, at the end of the day this report is meant to polemical in nature. Our qualitative analysis means that the objectivity of our data was never held to 59

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be sacrosanct. In addition, the current state

provide a rough starting spot for future

of politics in Asia, and around the globe,

policy reports, and welcome reevaluations of

deserves a critical approach. Simply

our findings.

describing in a mild-mannered way the death of millions, the potential rise of nationalism and populisms around the globe, the abuse of digital technologies, and the growing schism between East and West would be insincere and irresponsible. Thus, we attempt to engage in a critical discussion of certain trends deduced from detailed analysis to provide a productive way of confronting and moving beyond the problems of today and tomorrow. This should be kept in mind when evaluating the subjectivity of this paper.

There are inevitably many other limitations to this report, including our use of primarily anglophone sources. They cannot all be identified in a short section, but we invite critical dialogue with any interested parties. This paper, as well as anything similar published on this topic around this time, cannot claim to paint a complete picture of these themes. The problems identified in this report need continual and thorough reevaluation from a variety of perspectives and fields. Thus, we hope that this report can

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of human ideology, how public health is conceived of by all interested parties, how digital technology will shape and be shaped by politics, and finally how all three of these themes interact and influence one another. The aim of this report is not just to criticize Asian ideologies and policies, but to also provide a way to critically reflect upon ideologies and practices around the globe. We will structure our recommendations by Recommendations

geographic region; however, we hope that the reader is able to see how they are all globally applicable.

Having introduced the limitations of this study, we can conclude with a set of formal policy recommendations that coalesce the

India

findings of all previous sections. It is

Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party have

important to establish an intended audience

had a profound influence on the state of

for the following takeaways. The broad

Indian politics. They have unequivocally

scope of this project both geographically and

challenged both democracy and secularism,

thematically, and our own positionings as

and present the largest threat to the Indian

researchers, mean that this project will not

state since it gained independence in 1947.

produce findings for one department, one

A “law-and-order” approach has dominated

branch of government, or even one nation.

Indian response to COVID-19. In addition, a

We intend the policy recommendations

failure to consider the realities of Indian

outlined below to provide an interpretive

society, including inequality and the decay

framework for understanding certain macro

of urban slums created major problems for

themes concerning the geographic region of

public health policies. Control over the

Asia and its relationship with the rest of the

populace has been prioritized over saving

globe; these themes include the development

lives. However, for the most part, the Indian 61

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populace has accepted the tradeoff between

needs to be combatted by the unification of

individual freedoms and political stability.

the populace in a reform movement that privileges substantive equality, true democracy, and the validity of a plethora of

There is a clear connection between

cultural perspectives.

right-wing nationalism and a desire to create a homogenous, supportive populace by engineering cultural difference and galvanizing unity behind a resistance to this “dangerous other.” The Indian case exemplifies this clearly. This poses serious threats for human health in the case of the spread of a disease like COVID-19.

China

Economically minded mobilization serves

As previously noted, China has emerged

both as a form of resistance to new

from the last 12 months in a precarious spot.

nationalisms and as a framework to conduct

Economically, they are in a place to take a

more ethical public health responses. In

leadership role in Asia and around the globe.

addition, urban decay serves as a serious

However, their reputation in the West has

threat to human well-being and should be

never been more unstable. An unconcealed

treated as one of the most pressing concerns

desire not only to support developing

for countries with rapidly growing

economies but to actively expand their

populations. Indian cultural dispositions also

sphere of influence at the expense of their

need to be taken into consideration when

rivals has weakened the standing of the CCP

making judgements from Western

among Western governments. We also need

perspectives; the concept of the relationship

to take into consideration the growing fear

and the collective are elevated over the

and competitive instincts exhibited by

concept of the individual, and this has

America and its allies towards the meteoric

importance implications for how Indian

rise of China. In a manner like Modi’s

policies will be received by the populace

administration, the CCP is also prioritizing

and by civil society. Hindu nationalism

maintaining their own definition of stability

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and ensuring their political legitimacy in the

sense of collaboration on both sides of this

eyes of the general populace. This poses

equation will ease the tensions and create a

serious problems for the future of Chinese

world where different countries can learn

international diplomatic relations. Openly

from the strengths of the other. Ideology has

liberal values seem to be a requisite for

been harnessed to exacerbate both economic

international collaboration with Western

and cultural difference; this process needs to

governments and NGOs, and it is unlikely

be reversed by accepting the diversity of

that China will make a turn in this direction

forms of human governance and the creation

any time soon.

of positive cultural difference so that health crises are no longer turned into tools of antagonistic international diplomacy.

In addition, many of the policy mistakes China made with SARS were repeated with COVID-19. Without rethinking their attitude towards not only crisis, but all threats, internal and external, China will continue to be hounded by Western critics. It is unclear if a more open, lenient, and collaborative approach will be adopted by China anytime soon, given the open animosity of many Western countries, led by America, towards the CCP.

Taiwan Taiwan is the clear success story in the context of COVID-19. Civic engagement and high levels of social trust between the government and civil society have created an environment where misinformation is rare, where belief in science is upheld, and where government operates in tandem with the needs of the people. General trust in governance, is, as a result, extremely high.

Chinese socialism seems to stand in direct defiance to Western liberal democracy, and whether the differences upon which this defiance is founded are substantive or simply formal is no longer a concern. A clash seems imminent. Only a renewed

This model demonstrates a clear understanding on behalf of the Taiwanese government as how to create a mutually trusting relationship with a populace that understands the precarious international situation in which they find themselves. Their new and incredibly strong democracy 63

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has also proven to demonstrate exceptional

strategies, but it starts with changing the

levels of political accountability. This owes

attitudes of the general populace. Education

to the responsiveness of government

and trust in the logics underlying

officials to the pressures of democratic

governance is crucial to this effort. In

competition and the willingness to accept

addition, the diplomatic influences of China

feedback and checks on powers from civic

and America have severely hampered

organizations.

Taiwan’s ability to be an active player at the international level. Taiwan is eager to contribute to the rest of the globe, and

The Taiwanese model proves that

deserves the ability to do so. This, however,

democracies can effectively deal with the

speaks to much deeper historical and

pressures of a public health crisis in a world

military conflicts that may not be resolved

plagued by declining levels of trust and

any time soon.

internal antagonisms. More typically liberal democracies have much to learn from these

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In a comparative analysis of SARS and COVID-19, we determined that the use of track-and-trace apps and other forms of digital surveillance are deeply shaped by political dispositions and attitudes towards the role of the state, the collective, and the individual. These digital technologies, however, now have an extremely important role in the future of politics. This is most obviously observed in examples of Taiwan’s Conclusion

anti-propaganda strategies, the digital authoritarianism of China, and the reconceptualization of the Indian public

Our report is made up of three parts. In an

sphere.

analysis of the political and institutional histories of India, China, and Taiwan, we determined that understanding the trajectory of development of political thought is crucial to understanding contemporary policy developments. Without this perspective, the influence of Hindu thought and the dismantling of Indian public institutions, Chinese post-1989 reform and opening up movements, and the cultural trends that underpin Taiwanese trust in governance would not be taken into consideration when determining how the present can inform the future of policy.

Our last section grappled with the problem of what these findings mean for the future. Popular perceptions of policies are crucial to look to at what should, and what will, come next. Recent lockdown measures in China, and the continued development of Western anxiety, speaks to a general nervousness that does not appear to be dissipating any time soon. In addition, poll results and government interviews reveal important findings about the interaction between multiple levels of policies and the general experience of civilians on the ground. 65

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by collaboration, the importance of Human ideology will never settle on one universally applicable form of governance. No one way of thinking will bask in its triumph over other forms of thought for long. To think that one will is hubristic and self-centered. A continual process of renewal and reinvention is necessary to deal with the unforeseen contingencies of a complex modern world. Our hope is that in

substantive equality, and the promotion of productive political relations, rather than by selfish competition, contrived conflicts, or fear. Crisis sets the stage for the rethinking of conventional logics, assumptions, and blind spots. This opportunity for change needs to be embraced; holding on to stagnant and flawed ways of viewing the world spells only continual destruction.

the future, this process will be driven more

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EU REFUGEE MIGRATION POLICY: THE CASE OF FRANCE

An analysis of EU refugee migration policy at junctures in recent years: present and future impacts on the French case

Research Lead: Emma Elkaim-Weil Team Members: Kevin Bocaj, Suthida Chang, Benedetta Giocoli, Hilary Lai, Hector McKechnie, Nupur Sharma 67

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cross-historical analysis is also undertaken to compare the current Covid crisis with past crises that affected migration flows and policies and make predictions for the future.

Abstract

The

analyses

put

forward

that

At different points in time, be it wars,

migrant-receiving states are going to impose

epidemics or economic downturns, the flows

considerable constraints on immigrants’

of people travelling from country to country

opportunity to be granted access to national

cyclically

recent

soil, a negative shift in the public response

developments of European politics, asylum

to immigration as well as that migrants’

seekers became the centre stage of a

wellbeing will experience a dramatic hit. On

discussion that overwhelmed democracies

the

and their attempts at liberal cooperation.

recommendations are put forward such as

This paper studies migration patterns and,

the creation of SMART policies to empower

through the case study of France’s policies,

immigrants

highlighting how they both have an effect on

independence.

reoccurred.

basis

these

considerations,

attain

economic

and are influenced by immigration. A

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As a case study, the paper delves into the

Introduction In thousands of years, history has been a common refrain that rhymed with itself over and over. Yet sometimes humanity does not learn from the past, nor does human society apply the lessons of its predecessors.

This

paper

takes

into

consideration a time-lapse in European history, with its centre in 2015, which is short but full of events that fall in a clear pattern - that of migration, and more specifically, of forced displacement. It is not something new: at different points in time, be it wars, epidemics or economic downturns, the flows of people travelling from country to country reoccurred, each time with different scales and shifting purposes. In recent developments of European politics, asylum seekers became the centre stage of a discussion that disturbed democracies and their attempts at liberal cooperation. In this paper, migration plays the key role of driving and analysing into how broader political action unfolded and specifically how France reacted.

dynamics of the political unrest caused by migration and tries to critically extract a pattern to make predictions for the future. Starting from a regional level, the paper reviews the timeline of events that led to the current legal and political framework surrounding immigration into the EU. The paper then narrows its view to the French case, underlying trends and an overall red thread. Lastly, the paper goes back to the past and interprets its impacts on the future by conducting a migration cross-historical analysis that compares past crises to COVID-19 and its ongoing developments. In the end, the discussion highlights takeaways that could help policymakers at a national and international level learn from patterns of migration and react accordingly to turn the immigration crisis into opportunity. Literature review The research begins with a review of literature on migration in the European Union and on the theories of migration. The horizon is broadened by opting the case study of France and how the political,

BBI Research Journal 2021

social

and

economic

factors

have

contributed to the study of migration.

appeal the right-wing voters after facing a

Thriving literature on migration included the

reports,

parliamentary

indicators, documents.

move of the Macron government is to series of electoral losses this year

assessments, But

these

reports, indicators were limited as they did

Methodology

not solve the concern of the individual

In the first half of the paper, primary

member state. We look closely at France,

sources included: reports, research papers,

an EU member state, to understand the

statistical data on refugees’ demographics

tussle in the migration policy of the EU

and domestic politics of the EU member

documents by the French government and

state. After 2015, with a huge influx of

lastly through the UCL e-library service

migrants, France, was ranked second after

policy and discussion papers both from

Germany to accommodate the first-time

governmental

asylum-seekers. France was seeking to

organisations.

Eurostat

and

UNHCR,

and

official

non-governmental

balance the accountability for national security with an increase in the number of terror attacks

with two major attacks

Secondary data were also used to draw

happening in the year 2015 and imbibing

links between the existing literature and

the European liberal values and fulfilling

the

the duty towards the humanitarian cause.

reports were summarised to conduct a

The marginal win of the Emmaunel Macron’s in the year 2017 was a sharp turning point to centre-left policies even after the wave of right-wing parties in the EU. With the recent proposal of the French cabinet to target radical Islamism in the wake of a series of recent terror attacks and beheading of a teacher. The political

research question. Human rights

comparative analysis between migratory fluxes

the 2010s, which

helped

understand reasons for stalls and EU policy shifts. Later parts of the study incorporated newspaper articles and press briefings on migration in the European Union to analyse the French response to the

migration

policy.

Journalistic

commentaries and opinion pieces were 70

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also consulted to gather perspectives on

asylum to European Union member states

policies

within a single year (EC, 2016). National

French

refugee

insecurity and civil wars in the Middle

integration.

East, Africa and Eastern Europe triggered large scale displacements of civilians: the The last section of this paper focuses on a

Syrian Civil War caused 5 million people

cross-historical

make

to flee their country; the Iraq war against

projections on the COVID-19 impact on

the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) forced 3

refugee immigration. Comparative study

million people to leave their home; the

of policy and behavioural response to past

Afghanistan war with the Taliban led 2.7

financial crises were considered as the

million people to reside abroad (UNHCR,

basis for analysis. This includes drawing

2016). In fact, over 75% of the EU

evidence from quantitative reports by

refugees’ origin in 2015 can be traced to

international bodies and studies about

the above three countries (EC, 2016). For

policymaking

attitude.

many, Europe is considered their first

Meanwhile, historical sources were found

destination due to the security guaranteed

to compare the COVID-19 pandemic to

past

(Metcalfe-Hough, 2015).

crises.

analysis

and

voters’

These studies conducted

pre-existing

asylum

policies

qualitative and quantitative research to base their conclusions by analysing census data or surveying different samples around

Common Asylum Policy of the EU

Europe. Newspaper articles have been

before 2015

used as well to gauge the media response to the issues at stake. Migration & the EU Introduction to the Refugee Crisis

The

common

asylum and migration

policies of the EU can be traced back to the 1950s. The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol highlights the basic rights of refugees enjoyed within the EU,

In 2015, Europe faced the largest inflow of

including the right to work, the right to

migrants since World War Two, with a

receive education, the right to receive

record of 1.2 million people applying for

public relief and the right not to be 71

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expelled (UN, 1951; 1967). In 1985, the

had made their application elsewhere in

creation of the borderless Schengen area

other European countries.

marked the first adoption of a common approach to migration policies (EU, 1985). This laid a solid foundation for the

In the 2015 refugee crisis, the Dublin

common asylum policies in later years.

regulations play a significant role since forcing refugees to stay in their first point of entry contributes to the enormous

The EU first agreed on the rules to

socio-economic burden on EU frontline

regulate asylum responsibilities in the

states such as Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and

Dublin Convention 1990. The EURODAC

Greece, which holds EU external land and

Regulation and the Dublin II Regulation

sea borders. By law, they are obligated to

replaced it in 2000 and 2003 respectively,

take care of the refugees, including

and ultimately revised as the 2013 Dublin

processing asylum applications, providing

III Regulation. They aim to curb ‘asylum

international

shopping’,

application is successful, and initiating

the

phenomenon

whereby

asylum seekers apply for asylum in several

protection

when

the

repatriation when the application fails.

states to maximise their chance of success. The Dublin Regulations require refugees to apply for asylum for the first EU

Apart from the Dublin Regulations, other

country they step foot on, and if they were

measures implemented by the EC in the

detained in another EU country, they

2000s include Frontex in 2004 and the

would be sent back to their first point of

European Asylum Support Office in 2010.

entry (EU, 1990; 2003; 2013). The

Frontex is an integrated system to protect

EURODAC Regulation, on the other hand,

external boundaries by coordinating border

facilitates this process by creating a

controls (eg. carrying out standardised

database of refugees’ fingerprints (EC,

refugees risk assessment) and providing

2000). Authorities can then compare

technical aid (eg. assist member states in

fingerprints and determine whether they

training border guards) (EU, 2021). The European Asylum Support Office, on the

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other hand, promotes the application of uniform legislation and refugee policies, as well as provides frameworks for the legal migration and integration in the EU

Indeed, there were attempts to improve

countries (EU, 2021).

current refugee policies to encourage a balanced distribution of refugees among nations and protect refugees’ rights. For

However, the migration policies were

example,

deemed still ineffective due to their “low

Regulations proposal, it was suggested to

harmonisation, weak

monitoring, low

implement a 14-day time limit for the

solidarity and lack of strong institutions”

notification of asylum seekers transfer

(Scipioni, 2018;1365). The framework

decision from the requesting member state

provided by the EU is non-legally binding,

(EC,

and the implementation of related policies

cross-nation communication and enhance

are executed independently in different

efficiency in transferring asylum seekers to

states.

other available members. Yet, in the final

standardised legal definition for ‘refugees’,

paper, the standardised time limit was

and the quota for asylum seekers admitted

scrapped (EC, 2013). Countries would

in each country is entirely a national

apply their own time limits, with the

decision.

longest

For

example,

Refugees

are

there

hence

2008).

the

duration

2008

aims

being

Dublin

III

improve

months

attracted to states that provide favourable

(European Council on Refugees and

welfare and better economic prospects. In

Exiles, 2013). The UK does not even have

fact, in 2014, 72% of first-time asylum

a limit to the detention length (EC, 2014).

applicants went to just three of the EU’s

Hence, asylum seekers could be detained

twenty-eight member states, including

in the same state for a prolonged period,

France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and

delaying the transitioning process.

Hungary (EC, 2015). The result was a stark difference in the number of refugee applications per member states, as well as

The 2015 refugee crisis revealed the

an uneven burden between nations.

Common

European Asylum System’s

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incompetence when it collapsed under the

One of the direct responses to prevent the

overwhelming number of refugees. It is

further loss of lives was introducing

evident that a harmonised implementation

EU-led search and rescue missions in the

and

migration

Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. In

standards and policies, as well as ensuring

2015, over a million refugees arrived in

Europe by sea. More than 4,000 refugees

enforcement fair

share of

institutional

responsibilities and

solidarity

between

drowned. A 31.5 EUR million budget was

member states, are needed to curb the

allocated to Frontex to combat smugglers

situation.

and facilitate search and rescue missions, notably under the operations ‘Triton’ and ‘Poseidon’. Triton tackles the central Mediterranean,

Common Asylum Policy of the EU after 2015

which

covers

routes

originating from Africa. On the other hand,

Poseidon

deals

with

eastern

Mediterranean routes, mainly along Greek

European Agenda on Migration and the

maritime borders with Turkey. The funds

European

are also allocated to set up hotspots in

Commission Implementation

Packages (2015) In April 2015, 800 refugees drowned in the Mediterranean Sea (UNHCR, 2015). This dramatic loss of life urged European leaders to hold a special meeting on the European Agenda on Migration to increase commitments to address the common migratory challenges. The agenda (EC,

areas that face the highest number of refugees. Under the hotspot system, four EU agencies, namely Frontex, Europol, EASO and Eurojust jointly set up the European Union Regional Task Force to support initial reception, identification and registration of asylum seekers in Italy and Greece.

2015) outlined immediate and long term measures to be taken in response to the crisis.

Another visible measure in response to the refugee crisis was the introduction of quotas for resettlement and relocation. To

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relieve the stress from states who have

their obligations. In 2020, 5 years after the

received the majority of refugees, the

relocation programme’s announcement,

European

First

the Czech Republic only relocated 12 out

Implementation Package adopted on May

of the promised 50 migrants, unable to

27th 2015, announced that a total of

commit to the 2,691 refugees initially

40,000 refugees should be relocated from

agreed in 2015. Poland was required to

the EU border states of Italy and Greece to

relocate 7,082 migrants, but later only

other member states over the following

agreed to take in 100 and did not accept a

two

European

single migrant at the end. Hungary showed

Commission implementation package was

no intention to contribute to the system

then introduced on September 9th 2015,

(EC, 2020).

Commission

years.

The

second

which relocated another 120,000 refugees: 54,000 from Hungary, 50,400 from Greece and 15,600 from Italy to other member

Moreover,

states. The destination of relocated asylum

supporting illegal

seekers

a specific

recently (Freudenthal et al., 2020). Instead

distribution key, taking into account the

of following guidelines to facilitate the

population’s

economic

registrations and debriefing of refugees,

conditions, and the mean number of past

Frontex would host operations to drive

asylums. A common list of safe countries

away refugees from entering the EU soil.

was also created to facilitate the return of

For example, officials would purposefully

asylum seekers who had their application

destroy the dinghy engines in the Aegean

rejected. Failed asylum seekers from

Seas and push asylum seekers back to the

countries within the list can return with

Turkish waters. In the case of asylum

fewer repatriation procedures.

seekers who have managed to step on land,

organised size,

by the

they

would

allegations

Frontex

pushbacks surfaced

detained,

physically

assaulted and sexually abused by the However, it is worth noting that common

coastal guards, who are Libyan warlords

asylum policies often failed to serve their

trained and employed by Frontex.

purposes as member states refused to fulfil

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through the Central Mediterranean route

EU-Turkey Statement (2016) On March 18th 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement (EU, 2016) was adopted to end irregular migration from Turkey to EU member states. A 1:1 resettlement scheme was implemented in order to stem the flow of refugees to Europe from Turkey. For every Syrian refugee returned to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian from Turkey

decreased significantly, the Eastern and Western Mediterranean routes (through Turkey and Spain, respectively) saw increases in crossings. Meanwhile, the proposals of reform to EU asylum laws dating back to 2016 were still blocked, as policies

were

limited

preventing

arrivals. (Human Rights Watch, 2019)

would resettle to the EU member states. The deal also pledged 3 billion EUR both to improve the humanitarian conditions for Syrian

refugees

accelerate liberalisation

the

Turkey

processes

and accession

and of

to visa

talks of

Turkey into the EU. Not only does it aim to strengthen border control, but also facilitate a smoother process of returns and readmission of asylum seekers (EC, 2019).

The European Council recognised the migration crisis to Europe as a whole and highlighted each of the Mediterranean routes' specific necessities. The most pressing concerns regarding the Central Mediterranean route included stopping migrant smuggling, supporting the Libyan Coast Guard and other Libyan institutions, and enhancing cooperation with countries of

origin

and

implementation

2018-2019: a stall in reforms

transit. of

the

The

full

EU-Turkey

statement would prevent crossings via the

In 2018, the proportions of the migratory

Eastern

crisis significantly reduced, with arrivals

supporting Morocco would prevent illegal

decreasing

levels.

migration to Spain. Migrants who did

Nonetheless, the death rate per crossing

manage to cross were to be transferred in

increased compared to 2017, with 2,277

controlled facilities set up by Member

people dead or missing and a total of

States on a strictly voluntary basis.

pre-2015

Mediterranean

route,

while

141,472 arrivals. While the immigration

BBI Research Journal 2021

The controversy surrounding these sets of

stalled, Italy and Malta faced numerous

measures was profound, especially in

standoffs with NGOs, refusing to grant

terms of financial support to Libyan

permission

entities, which routinely violated (and still

disembark. The most notable standoff

do) basic human rights. Libyan authorities

happened in Italy in June 2019, when the

have been accused of torture, sexual abuse,

Interior

and even murder of refugees interned in

Sea-Watch 3 the permission to disembark

camps in the Tripoli area (Mannocchi,

its 53 rescued migrants (including children

2019). Partly because of these occurrences,

and ill people), with

Libya has been recognised as an unsafe

Lampedusa having been deemed the safest

country for migrants since 2009 (Howden

harbour.

et al., 2020); however, the European Union

Sea-Watch 3 decided to dock without

has never discontinued funding of the

authorisation

and

Libyan Coast Guard, sparking backlash

arrested

Italian

among

controversial incident sparked opposing

the

world’s

liberals

and

progressives.

reactions

let

Minister

rescued

refused

Eventually,

from

migrants

grant

the port of the

was

captain

subsequently

authorities. progressive

This and

conservative leaders and exposed the profound In

2019,

arrivals

among

European

decreased

countries on migration management, as

(123,663, with 1,319 deaths) due to an

well as the lack (and necessity) of a

increasing

coordinated EU response (Human Rights

number

further

divisions

boats

being

intercepted by the Lybian Coast Guard and

Watch, 2020).

their occupants being sent to the Tripoli detention centres.. While reforms were

BBI Research Journal 2021

Arrivals include arrivals to Italy, Cyprus and Malta, both sea and land arrivals to Greece and Spain

Table 1: migration to Europe from 2014 to 2021, arrivals (UNHCR, 2021)

BBI Research Journal 2021

Table 2: migration to Europe from 2014 to 2021, dead and missing (UNHCR, 2021)

BBI Research Journal 2021

2020: the New Pact of Migration and

This section's key feature consists of a new

Asylum (European Commission, 2020)

integrated

September

2020

the

European

Commission inserted migration among the 2019-2024 priorities in the EU agenda and presented the New Pact of Migration and Asylum, a reform of the EU management system of migratory fluxes. This project is the result of preparatory work that started in December 2019 and included two rounds of consultations with the Member States,

the

Parliament,

national

parliaments, and other concerned parties. This proposal is now set to go through consideration by the European Parliament and Council.

following

dealing with a specific aspect of the reform, which rests on the highlighted

pre-entry

the

border:

screenings

(identification, health and security checks, individual assessment, etc.) that determine the likeliness of a successful claim for international protection, applicants are set on two different routes. For likely negative decisions, the application is assessed under the border asylum procedure. For likely positive decisions, it is assessed under the normal asylum procedure. This new mechanism eases pressure on normal asylum procedures, which in turn will be faster

granting

asylum

unaccompanied children and families. Unsuccessful claims result in return (with offered

The Pact is articulated in six sections, each

procedure

reintegration

support

the

countries of origin), while successful claims lead to integration in the European community.

necessity for modernised procedures and clear mechanisms to ensure solidarity between the EU Member States.

Financial investment allows the adoption of the Asylum law reforms proposed in 2016, the creation of a new EU Agency for

Stronger trust fostered by better and more effective procedures

Asylum, and key improvements to the Eurodac

fingerprinting

database.

Moreover, EU agencies monitor and support

national

systems

ensure

BBI Research Journal 2021

consistency

and

respect

for

legal

guarantees.

the Member States with many arrivals. The EU Commission can determine (also upon request from such states) that a ‘national system is under pressure / at risk’ and

Well-managed Schengen and external

complete an assessment of other Member

borders

States’ ‘fair share’ of asylum seekers to accept

their

territory,

which

calculated 50% based on GDP and 50% A reform of the Schengen Borders Code

based

set to be discussed in early 2021 improves

mechanisms are in place, should this

the Schengen evaluation mechanism and

system fail to ensure fair relocation. The

enhance border management: European

Commission plans to render this process

Border and Coast Guard standing corps are

legally

set to be deployed soon and an enhanced

flexibility in quotas and choice between

IT system will ease monitoring of border

covering relocation or sponsoring returns.

population.

binding,

albeit

Correction

with

limited

crossings. Importantly, this section of the Pact highlights the legal and moral duty of search and rescue operations, which, even when carried out by private vessels (NGOs), entails responsibilities for the Member States. It is also stressed that while frontline coastal states (Italy, Malta, Greece, etc.) are responsible for search and rescue at sea, migration management is the responsibility of the EU as a whole.

Skills and talent Migration is here presented as a resource for attracting talent and fighting an ever-ageing population. In order to achieve these goals, the Commission is going to finalise the EU Blue Card Directive (which gives highly-qualified non-EU workers the right to live and work in an EU

Effective solidarity

country), revise

the Long-Term

Residence Directive and the Single Permit Directive to strengthen rights to move

This section highlights the solidarity

between Schengen countries as well as

provisions in place for crisis scenarios in

simplify

procedures

for 81

BBI Research Journal 2021

low/medium-skilled workers. Moreover, a

The fight against migrant smuggling is

new EU Talent Pool is going to facilitate

discussed in detail as an example of a

matching skilled workers who want to

critical area where the partnership is

enter the EU with EU employers’ needs.

deemed necessary.

These legal pathways are seen as a way of fighting irregular migration. Flexibility and resilience Integration policies are enhanced through an

Action

Plan

integration

for

2021-2014 and renewed cooperation with trade unions, employers’ organisations, and chambers of commerce across Europe. As the challenges of integration are acknowledged, a proposal to include the view of migrants in the development of policies is also mentioned.

This final section highlights general steps to be taken in order to ensure preparedness in crisis scenarios, both in terms of support to the Member States under the solidarity mechanisms mentioned in Section 3 and in terms of clarity for people needing immediate protection,

such as

those

fleeing armed conflict. In situations of crisis such as strain on their national migration management system, Member States can extend relocations to persons in

Acting together to deepen international

border procedures.

partnerships The Commission plans to strengthen

Overall, the New Pact of Migration and

partnerships and offer consistent support to

Asylum is the most recent effort from the

countries of origin and transit. The latter

European Union to establish a clear and

includes supporting non-EU countries

legally binding framework to deal with the

hosting

tail ends of the migratory crisis. If enacted,

refugees,

opportunities

creating

in countries

economic of

origin,

this proposal would finally coordinate the

fighting migrant smuggling, improving

responses of single Member States and

return and readmission processes, and

prevent an eventual future crisis from

developing channels for legal migration.

finding them utterly unprepared. 82

BBI Research Journal 2021

Even after redesigning and harmonising the policies in late 2015, the internal

Analysis

response within the EU to the crisis is still relatively poor. By justifying the shifting

The lack of coordination within the EU was an important source of the crisis: the Dublin Regulations was unfair to border countries, as they are the first point of entry for most asylum seekers. As seen by the concentration of asylum seekers in only five member states, these border countries that were already struggling could

not

accommodate

increasing

arrivals. Conversely, non-border countries refused to address the crisis: conservatives and

progressive

governments

alike

rejected migration as an issue of concern, due

ideological

reasons,

internal

political dynamics, and fears of social backlash.

The

Dublin

Regulation’s

mechanism of assigning a single country to handle each applicant efficiently seemed out of touch with reality and left border countries overwhelmed; in the long term, said countries responded by electing

humanitarian

responsibilities

introducing a refugee allocation and quota system, social discourse begins to consider refugee protection as a zero-sum game. Some bigger states with more economic power should take a larger responsibility, while smaller states do not have the obligation to contribute much to their crisis. This results in the free-riding situations of states as seen by the failure to relocate the 120,000 refugees despite five years

after

the

programme’s

initial

announcement. Externalising the refugee responsibilities to a third country, such as Turkey in the EU- Turkey statement, also gives off the impression that refugees are a burden to states, and should be relocated elsewhere.

This

anti-immigration

sentiment

encourages

the growth

populist parties, which will be discussed in the next section.

conservative governments whose priority was to prevent further arrivals in their territory.

From 2017 to 2019, all the reforms previously proposed were stalled, due to complex

national

dynamics

and

BBI Research Journal 2021

widespread unwillingness of centrist or

governments of border countries try to

right-wing governments to comply with

avoid a disembark.

their expected quotas. In turn, centres in Italy

and

Greece

became

hugely

overcrowded and provoked a backlash

The recurrence of these standoffs is one of

among the local population. This led to a

the possible reasons for the sudden (at

further rise in anti-EU and far-right

least on paper) change in the overall

sentiments, which contributed again to

direction of policy in 2020, with the New

electing conservative governments, which

Pact on Migration and Asylum explicitly

the reforms further.

targeting such occurrences. Another major

However, the picture changed in 2019,

event that affected policy changes was the

when numerous standoffs between NGOs

election of a new European Parliament in

and the Italian and Maltese governments

2019,

sparked indignation across the EU -

prevailed;

national policies that did not permit ships

Commission Ursula von der Leyen pushed

to disembark rescued migrants were often

for the insertion of migration among the

deemed inhumane. The peak of this “crisis

EU priorities and promptly proceeded to

within the crisis” was reached with the

initiate talks with the Parliament and

Sea-Watch 3 and the Italian Minister of the

Council.

Interior, which led to days of tension and

conditions for a strong policy response to

controversial

sparked

migration are now present, it is impossible

international outcry. The hidden face of

to predict whether they will be sufficient in

this problem can be traced back to the

yielding a coordinated response - national

violation of human rights happening on the

states’

coasts

the

regulation in times of crisis still seems a

controversial employment of de facto

likely possibility, especially with the surge

turn stalled

decisions

Libya,

that

well

where

pro-EU forces strongly

president

Even

refusal

though

the

comply

with the

NGOs sustain that for these reasons,

continent. If a common European response

returning migrants to Libya is not a

is to be truly effective, it must be

feasible

accompanied by strong enforcement -

while

national

all

political

warlords in the Libyan Coast Guard;

option,

right-wing forces

across the

BBI Research Journal 2021

single countries must be held responsible

look at the case of France because of the

for breaching agreements and not acting

migrants hesitancy which is linked to the

within the provided framework.

terror attacks in the country and also the

Political Context of Migration in the EU

wave of right-wing extremism hitting the member -states in the EU.

So far the analysis looked at EU asylum policy before and after 2015, a year that was an essential breaking point for EU

In order to discuss the social, political, and

member-states

economic consequences of migration in

due to the influx of shift in the

Europe, it is first necessary to explain the

political landscape of the EU was seen due

theory behind the movement of people. In

to the rise in the number of attacks in the

sum, there are many reasons why people

member-states of the EU with the Paris

migrate: education, work opportunities,

attacks in the year 2015, the attacks in

war are just a few examples. According to

Barcelona in 2017 to recall a few major

Francesco Castelli, an individual's final

terror incidents. Accroding to the EU

decision can be categorised into macro,

Terrorism Situation and Trend Report

micro and meso-elements, hereby defined:

migrants. A significant

(TE-SAT), in the year 2017, 68 people died and over 844 were injured due to terror attacks. (EU TE-SAT, 2017).

● Macro

elements

are

mainly

independent of the individuals who come in the form of inadequate human and economic development,

With few major terror attacks taking place in

France, i.e. the terror attack in

Île-de-France region in January 2015, the

demographic

increase,

and

urbanisation. ● Meso elements are closely related

the

to the individual but not entirely

Truck attack in Nice has instigated a

under the individual's control, such

feeling of doubt and fear among the

as the costs of moving, technology,

citizens

and the diasporic link.

November 2015 Paris attacks and

of the

EU member

states,

especially France towards migrants. We

BBI Research Journal 2021

● Micro-elements dependent

are on

more personal

characteristics like age, sex, marital status etc. (Castelli. 2018, 03).

Figure 1: Complex drivers of migration: macro, meso- and macro- factors (Castelli, 2018, 03)

Having established the theory behind the

to commonly-held values of peace, liberty,

movement of people, this section aims to

economic prosperity, and cooperation. The

provide political context to the issue of

dominance of liberal democracy, economic

migration in Europe.

growth and stability, better healthcare and

Europe

increasingly

popular

welfare provisions has attracted asylum

destination among the asylum seekers due

BBI Research Journal 2021

seekers and refugees. (Puschmann et al.

However, with this large influx of asylum

2019, 23).

seekers, negative backlash has become more popular. One established trend is the ever-rising presence of right-wing political

There exists a multitude of access routes to

parties. (Diez, 2019). In Germany, the

Europe for migrants. As such, the ethnic

far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD)

and national origins of refugees is varied.

entered the federal parliament for the first

Through the Western Mediterranean route,

time in 2017 with 12.6% of votes. Spain

the influx of migrants is principally from

assisted the rise of the Right-Vox Party,

Algeria and Morocco. From the Eastern

and the Freedom Party in Austria came to

Mediterranean route, migrants typically

power.

originate

belonging to the far-right, made a mark in

from

Syria,

Iraq,

and

Afghanistan. The Central Mediterranean

In France, Marine

Pen,

the French elections.

route attracts asylum seekers from Nigeria near Italy and Malta. The origin of asylum-seekers in Europe is an essential

In many contemporary European societies,

aspect of looking at the EU crisis. As

a growing cult of fear has defined political

previously mentioned, in 2015 half of the

preferences. This fear comes in many

refugees' origin was traced to Syria, Iraq

forms. Firstly, there is a fear of being

and Afghanistan. In 2018, Syria topped the

overrun by refugees from Africa, the

list again as the country of origin of

Middle

asylum-seekers,

Iraq,

countries into Europe. Secondly, there is

Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. These

the fear that hosting these large groups will

asylum-seekers

incur costs to the national citizens.

followed take

Mediterranean route.

the

Eastern

East,

and

other

developing

Refugees require clothing, food, shelter, and jobs to sustain their lives and livelihood, further draining the existing

The Growing Cult of Fear

citizens' social welfare funds. Thirdly, there is a fear of terrorism. Fourthly, the fear of an erosion of European values due

BBI Research Journal 2021

to Islamic influences. And lastly, the fear

The reaction of the French body politic to

of 'unassimilable elements' in European

migration has been varied, but passionate.

societies (Puschmann et al. 2019, 24).

Immigration

has sharply divided the

electorate. On the Right, groups such as ‘Les Identitaires’, who were seen as The EU did not initially have any issues

extremist a decade ago, are amassing

with the influx of migrants, due to a united

growing numbers (Mulholland, 2017).

and common approach. However, through

Conservative candidates, like Le Pen,

the unfolding of civil war, particularly in

garner

Syria, migration has become a leading

disseminating anti-immigrant messaging.

issue facing Europe today.

In Le Pen's case, the specific use of

The Influence of Immigration on the French Political Climate

real

populist

political

tactics

has

success

boosted

from

party

supporters (Geva, 2020). These tactics rely on the magnification and exploitation of

The aforementioned fears, such as loss of

national anxieties, using refugees' image as

identity, and the abuse of state welfare, can

the scapegoat. As a result, there is a

be seen across most European societies

general dispersion of the centrist body

today. In this section, we pay particular

politic into opposing ideological camps.

attention to the French Case. First, we

87% of Rassemblement National (RN)

discuss how immigration has influenced

voters consider refugees' arrival as a

the national political climate. Second, we

terrorist risk to French society, compared

examine how French policymakers have

to 35% of Macron’s voter base at Le

tailored their responses to the growing

Republique

angst of voters.

(Fondation Additionally,

Marche

(LREM)

Jean-Jaurès,

2018).

83%

of LREM

voters

consider the hosting of migrants fleeing The Politicisation of Immigration in the

war and poverty as one of France's

French body politic

principal duties, compared to a mere 24% of

the

voter

base

(Fondation

Jean-Jaurès, 2018).

BBI Research Journal 2021

These divisions were exemplified in the

The Legacy of Le Pen and the 2017

2017

Presidential Election

Presidential

debate.

Centrist

candidates and their moderate immigration policies began falling short to more rigid Right-wing messages. In their first round,

In the years since her lost election, Le

RN gained 21.3% of the public vote, the

Pen’s message has formed fissures in

second-highest vote count (Burn-Murdoch,

mainstream

2017). This saw Le Pen through to a

Refugees are now seen as a ‘Dr Jekyll, Mr

contest vis-à-vis the Centrist Macron, who

Hyde’ concept: they are either unwanted

won the election. Whilst this proves

burdens of society or helpless victims in

moderate opinion overcame Right-wing

need of French support (Baumard, 2017).

rhetoric, Macron’s victory was as much

As such, a moderate opinion in the French

due to a large Centrist base rallying for

body politic has become less common:

him instead of switching for Le Pen.

64% of French people see refugees as

French political

thinking.

playing a negative role in their society (Fondation Jean-Jaurès, 2018). Since the European refugee crisis, the issue of immigration has transformed the French political climate. On the Right,

This statistic showcases how immigration

Marine Le Pen centres entire campaigns

serves as the cornerstone of Le Pen’s

on xenophobia and nationalism (Nowak,

legacy. Namely, the issue of immigration

2017). This has caused a political redshift,

has

readjusting French Centrist opinion to fit

protection of the French national identity,

an increasingly conservative frame. In

the existence of a political elite, and the

sum, immigration is heavily politicised,

need to govern France with increased law

with nearly 60% of French nationals

and order.

raised

questions

regarding

the

considering it to be of critical importance (ELABE, 2019).

BBI Research Journal 2021

immigration, debates can descend into a

The French National Identity

battle based on identity, where refugees are exploited as political shuttlecocks. The existence and protection of French

Originally, the traditional French identity

values and norms are directly affected by

harks back to ‘revolutionary’ and liberal

societal

values of fraternity, freedom, and equity

opinion

immigration.

According to an ELABE poll from 2019, a

(Safran,

third of the population overestimates

presence of these values is a point of

refugee presence in France (ELABE). Due

contention in the national polity. Extreme

to the Syrian civil war and large numbers

wings have formed on the notion that these

large

values have been eroded. The previously

percentage of this refugee community is

mentioned ‘Les Identitaires’ exemplify

Muslim

Pen’s

this insecurity amongst extreme French

campaign promotes the notion that i)

nationalists, who seek to protect their

Islamic extremism is a key issue for

vision of their national identity (CBC

French society, and ii) it needs to be

News: The National, 2017). This social

resolved using extreme measures. Through

attitude does not embrace but excludes.

this messaging, statistics regarding refugee

The use of caricature and stereotyping is a

numbers can often be misrepresentative.

method which makes the culprit of this

For example, in 2017 a surveyed group of

identity erosion easily defined. In turn,

French people thought that as many as

nationalism can take on new meanings: a

31% of their population was Muslim, but

wall of defence, guarding celebrated

the reality was 7.5% (CBC News: The

national norms from malicious external

National, 2017). Consequently, societal

influences. One must note that these

debates on immigration policy reform are

extremist tendencies are still by no means

closely tied to questions of identity.

common, but they have found a louder

North

African (Hackett,

arrivals, 2017).

a Le

1991).

The

endurance

and

voice in mainstream public debates, aided in large part by the rise of Due to the heated and passionate nature of political

discourse

‘Le Pen’

politics.

surrounding

BBI Research Journal 2021

would seriously consider the expulsion of foreign

Societal Opinion on Refugees

offenders

reasonable

(Observatoire de l'immigration et de la

Suffice to say, societal opinion on refugees

démographie, 2020), and a substantial

has

number (74%) favour the establishment of

become

polarised.

Recent

poll

statistics reflect national anxieties aroused

immigration

from Le Pen’s legacy: only 18% of French

Crucially, only 36% believe in the current

people consider immigration to contribute

government’s

France’s domestic immigration (IFOP,

l'immigration et de la démographie, 2020).

2018). All this being said, Le Pen’s legacy

Debates on abuses of the French welfare

is that immigration is the key issue facing

system have borne a growing contempt of

the French electorate. Thus, future election

the unintegrated and unemployed nature of

debates will confront it, and candidates

arrivals. The government has a high

will more than likely need to establish a

expenditure on ‘L’aide médicale de l’État’

solid

(AME), costing up to 11.5% of national

policies.

their

society

(Observatoire

quotas

(IFOP,

capability

position

regarding

2018). handling

immigration

GDP in 2015 (Ballas, 2017), and where 63% are in favour of its abolition (Observatoire de l'immigration et de la démographie, expenditure

2020). is

not

Mass just

Effects on Policy

welfare

limited

healthcare. The state housing system is

Le République en Marche

reaching critical strain, to the extent where it is not uncommon for city streets to host thousands of homeless refugees (Oundjian,

As a consequence of Le Pen’s legacy,

2020). This homelessness is also felt at a

Macron’s Centrist government has been

conceptual level: 64% of French people no

left with little option but to take tougher

longer consider themselves ‘at home’ in

policy stances on immigration.

their own society (Teinturier, 2019). As a result, more than 88% of French people

The extent to which immigration is subject to sensationalism in the media and 91

BBI Research Journal 2021

polarises public view drastically affects the

into French society, limited access to

national

These

state-welfare can contribute to a sense of

influences reach all aspects of government:

‘unwantedness’. As previously explained,

Prime

Philippe

whilst this does relieve pressure both on

expressed his angst for the government to

the French welfare budget and from the

regain control over immigration policy

Right, it can widen chasms amongst

(Mallet, 2019).

refugees who feel unwelcome, and thus

government’s Minister

policy.

Édouard

disenfranchised with the French identity, and an increasingly intolerant electorate Macron faces re-election in 2022. He has

(Piser,

tried to take the moderate views which

government has adopted tougher steps to

won him the election in 2017 and adapt

make the country ‘less attractive’ to

them to suit the ‘New Centre’ of French

migrants (Onishi, 2019). For example, as

political thinking (DW, 2020). An example

of 2019, asylum seekers could not access

is the national crackdown on ‘crimes of

non-urgent state healthcare (source), and

solidarity’, a murky legal concept where

increasing numbers of immigrant camps

people can be prosecuted for providing

are

illegal aid to migrants in their pursuit of

government (source). On the flip side,

French citizenship (Brown, 2017). As

Macron has attempted to sell a message of

such, the integration of refugees remains a

compromise, whereby France is pushing

key problem in French society. Whilst

for increased numbers of foreign skilled

Macron’s

workers. This is reflected by the Labour

Right-wing pressure, the realities of these

Ministry's schemes, establishing quotas for

policy reforms are complex, difficult, and

annual skilled workers and inviting French

arduous for refugee arrivals. For example,

business to recruit foreign talents. Whilst

in conjunction with new laws regarding

there are economic reasons that support

‘crimes

Macron’s

this argument (Onishi, 2019), the policy

government has reduced welfare support

flip is a clear attempt to meet the demands

systems for migrants. Besides making it

of both wings of French politics.

government

must cede

solidarity’,

2019). Additionally, Macron’s

being

razed on

behalf of

the

more difficult for refugees to be integrated

BBI Research Journal 2021

increasing anti-immigrationist tendencies

Rassemblement National

in French politics, Macron’s immigration policies are heavily affected by far-Right As

previously

mentioned,

the

pressures. Amnesty International accuses

Rassemblement National is principally

Macron’s

responsible for pushing the majority of

“persecute

these policy reforms. This is because Le

counter-terrorism

Pen’s party is positioned as the effective

International, 2018). All this shows the

representation of the French Opposition.

mounting pressures of the shifting Overton

As a result, a prominent political voice

window

serves to criticise Macron’s government

immigration.

government

not

employing prosecute”

measures

in French

thinking

(Amnesty

towards

for its approach to immigration reform. Le Pen’s leading policies are designed to capitalise on the shift of public opinion to

Summary

the Right, with the ultimate goal of victory in the 2022 Presidential elections. Already, we see a re-adoption and re-promotion of

Immigration policy reform is the central

her

point of contention in the French political

advocacy for a maximum French intake of

climate. The rise of Marine Le Pen has

10,000 immigrants per year (Murphy,

caused a redshift in public opinion towards

2017). Furthermore, Le Pen has pushed for

the Right wing. The erosion of Centrist

tougher

terrorism, whereby

political thinking has forced Macron to

dual-nationality criminals who commit

address immigration issues and adopt

acts of political violence are to be stripped

clarity in his approach to tackling the

of their French identity.

French domestic crisis.

hallmark

This

laws

proposed

international Muslim

policies,

notably

law

has

received

National elections and the political climate

criticism

for

targeting

are entwined in a reciprocal relationship.

due

The presence of extreme views ties the

refugees.

However,

BBI Research Journal 2021

French electorate to opposing ideological

existing literature, an overview of current

camps. However, it is the support of these

French refugee integration policies at the

camps which could win Macron or Le Pen

national, regional and institutional levels is

the Presidency.

provided. The section concludes with a critique

current

schemes

and

recommends policies for increased refugee This 2022 election contest has profound

economic integration in France.

political implications, primarily that the current

trend

polarisation

over

immigration will accelerate as the two

Significance

wings of the French politics clash. The

Integrations

Refugee

Economic

effects of political violence and profiling of Muslim refugees are likely to continue. In sum, in the form of the European

Founded on principles of production and

Refugee Crisis and the French Domestic

consumption,

Crisis,

significant junctures

critical to the stability of domestic growth,

combine to create a problematic political

and contribute to the stability of the

climate that forces French leaders to adopt

interdependent international environment.

increasingly

Focusing

the

two

stringent

measures

incentives

response.

national

the

nexus

economies are

refugee-economic —

beyond

the

humanitarian responsibility of countries providing

aid

for

people of forced

The role of economic integration in the

displacement — refugees possess the skills

French refugee migration policy

and knowledge that may help boost the French economy. However, there is an

Having

examined

the

socio-political

consequences of immigration in France, this paper now turns to the role of economic integration in the French refugee migration policy basket. Drawing from

existing political debate concerning how refugees can be integrated into local societies, and with a focus on the economic costs of doing so (Fasani, Frattini and Minale, 2018; Marbach,

BBI Research Journal 2021

Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2018, p.1).

and thus end up in jobs that are

There are groups of people who continue

mismatched with their existing skills set.

view

refugees as socio-economic

burdens that force the government to redistribute social welfare resources to

Another

provide housing, education, and healthcare

significance of the economic integration

benefits

pillar is related to politics. Access to

(Marbach,

Hainmueller

and

aspect

explaining

the

employment rights in the host country

Hangartner, 2018, p.1).

could act as a ‘pull factor’ to attract increasing numbers of asylum seekers to As a result, despite the now-shortened

France. This becomes undesirable as the

six-month employment ban, refugees —

influx of asylum seekers and refugees is

forcibly displaced persons — continue to

perceived as an economic threat whereby

face difficulties in securing employment in

natives are displaced from the labour

France, especially when compared to

market

migrants in other categories (Fink and

Hangartner, 2018, p.1). Equally, due to the

Kappner 2015, p.25; Fasani, Frattini and

extended timeframe and uncertainty of

Minale 2018). One explanation is that

asylum application

unlike economic migrants who possess

validity of refugee statuses, employers

in-demand skills, refugees may not have

may be reluctant to employ asylum seekers

the necessary skills, including French

to fill permanent positions (Fink and

language (Gineste, 2016, p.4), required by

Kappner,

the host economy (Bevelander, 2016, p.3).

Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2018, p.1;

Expanding

Fine, 2019, p.22), thus marginalising

international

asylum seekers and even refugees from the

standardisation

that, across

the

lack

education credentials also is a challenge for

(Marbach,

2015,

Hainmueller

and

outcomes and the

p.10;

Marbach,

economic centre of French society.

refugees seeking employment in

France. Their previous credentials may not be recognised in the French labour market

However, in recognition of the Geneva Conventions

providing

adequate

BBI Research Journal 2021

humanitarian protection to refugees, the French government needs to uphold its commitments to build an inclusive society

Based on the latest Code de l'entrée et du

séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile, referring to Book VII, Title IV, Chapter

(Marbach, Hainmueller and Hangartner,

IV: Reception conditions for asylum

2018,

p.14). This

seekers (Articles L744-1 to L744-11),

contradicts the strict employment bans that

Section V: Access to the labor market

lead to discrimination in the French labour

(Article L744-11), refugees who have

market. Moreover, the ban produces

submitted their request for asylum in

long-term

the

France for at least six months can now

depreciation of human capital and a larger

legally access the French labour market.

skills gap (Gineste, 2016, p.5), which

Prior to this, refugees in France faced a

increases governments’ burden in terms of

12-months employment ban that was

retraining for refugees to find employment

already shortened to nine-months in 2015.

(Hainmueller, Hangertner and Lawrence,

Regarding the lack of political discussion

2016, p.2). Therefore, to critique the

on refugee-specific laws, it may be

French employment ban, attention needs to

attributed to the French common law —

be redirected at current refugee economic

droit commun — that regards all people

integration policies, which instead of

within the country's borders as equals and

capturing refugee human capital, present

subjected to the same social benefits.

themselves as amplifiers of refugees’

Therefore, there is “little need for specific

initial market disadvantage due to delayed

measures for refugee populations” (Fine,

access to employment (Fasani, Frattini and

2019, p.6).

p.4;

Fine,

2019,

externalities

such

Minale, 2018). At

the

national

level,

flagship

the

French

Current Refugee Economic Integration

government’s

integration

Policies

programme, the Republican Integration Contract (CIR), was revised and entered into force on March 1st 2019 (Duvernoy, no date). Compulsory for all third-national

BBI Research Journal 2021

residents in the country, the CIR comprises

of 400 hours of business French which

a maximum of 400-hour language training

covers topics including job-searching in

for learners to reach CEFR A1 level,

France. This is paired with a professional

double the length of language compared to

training contract that supports refugees to

pre-2019 policy reform. Together with the

pursue accreditation of vocational skills —

24 hours civic orientation courses, this

certificate of professional competence.

combination of modules aims to teach

Through the HOPE project, refugees are

refugees about French social etiquette and

better prepared for economic integration

values.

given the French labour market's required

importantly,

the

CIR

provides information on how refugees can

language skills and knowledge.

access public services such as education, housing and healthcare. Refugees are also given access to public employment support

Extending this to policies at the regional

services following the completion of the

level, the HOPE project is being scaled

CIR.

across most France’s regions to provide a localised support experience for refugees (CEDEFOP, 2019). Through the “regional

Similarly, governmental agencies have

pacts for investment in skills'' — PRIC -

also

rolled out economic integration

Pactes Régionaux d’Investissement dans

schemes, notably the HOPE project —

les compétences — the project is being

Hébergement, Orientation Pour l’Emploi -

funded at the local level, which can be

Accommodation and Job Orientation —

expected provide training and asylum

that provides French-language education

services

and work placement (Mandola, 2019).

demands of refugees in particular cities

HOPE is jointly overseen by the French

(The French Government, 2019). By

Department

decentralising

of Employment and the

that

the

economic

integration

policies,

OPCA organizations, an example of a

contribute

public-private

allocating resources, as well as being more

that

serves

public value. The language phase consists

localised

immediate

Ministry of Housing as well as seven partnership

match

approach

will

to increased efficiency in

responsive to local needs.

BBI Research Journal 2021

to two years to help refugees fully Moreover,

in collaboration with

the

integrate into French society.

five-year skills investment plan — Plan d’investissement dans les compétences — launched in 2017, the HOPE project aims

Critique and Policy Recommendations

to merge market demand for specific skills with innovative training paths to reduce unemployment Equally,

(CEDEFOP,

because

2019). increasing

digitalisation in the era of Industry 4.0, a widening skills gap between refugees will lead

further

discrimination workers.

socio-economic

against

Hence,

under

low-skilled the

Skills

Investment Plan, the HOPE project will continue to receive funding to provide upskilling

training

and

employment

support services to refugees to increase economic integration.

Despite the recent policy reform to the length of the employment ban, six months represents an arbitrary number that could be further shortened to support refugees in gaining economic independence. Initially lasting 12 months, the ban was reduced to nine in 2015 and is now six. A further decreased waiting time would reduce the burden on societies to distribute social benefits to refugees, which could also reduce locals' hostility toward them. In tandem, due to the emphasis on French language skills to gain employment, the 400-hour limit on language training should

Lastly, on the institutional level, forum

be further revised.

réfugiés has been running the Accelair Rhône programme since 2002 to provide resources and support to refugees who are settling in France. Aiming to increase the rate at which refugees are allocated accommodation and receive language and vocational training, the Accelair team provides tailored support for a period of up

Aiming for learners to achieve CEFR A1 level by the end of the programme, an introductory-level knowledge of French is insufficient for “professional integration” (Safi, 2014, p.14; (Lochmann, Rapoport and Speciale, 2018, p.6; Fine, 2019, p.14).

BBI Research Journal 2021

Moreover, there lacks a personalised

France’s 13 regions, city governments are

approach

invited

language

training

that

co-creating

considers students’ literacy levels as well

infrastructures

as knowledge of any related-languages.

socio-economic integration. Furthermore,

Hence, there should be access to further

regional governments should coordinate

French language and civic lessons at

better

national and departmental levels, including

refugees across the country so that

intermediate and Business French to better

resources can be better allocated as other

equip refugees with the essential skills to

regions balance out the strain of increased

participate in French society. It is also to

refugee populations. Such measures also

minimise the time gap between refugees

increase the likelihood of private-public

arriving in France and receiving language

partnerships (Gineste, 2016, p.8) that are

support as earlier training helps refugees

driven by mission-oriented initiatives to

better grasp the language for a smoother

increase refugees’ immediate access to

integration (Lochmann,

resources such as education, welfare and

Speciale,

2018,

affirming

the

Integration

and

Rapoport and

p.18). EU

Additionally,

Action

Plan

that

asylum

dispersal

contribute

policies

relocate

employment services at the city-level.

Inclusion 2021-2027,

recognition of international credentials has

The rising number of asylum-seekers and

to be standardized to validate refugees’

refugees coming in France in recent years

previous learning (Gineste, 2016, p.5)

has contributed to increasing worries

direct them to vocational education.

surrounding employment, housing and redistribution Moreover,

the

regional

welfare

although

the

benefits. current

regional

employment ban has been shortened to six

governments should increase coordination

months, the restriction is still interpreted as

efforts to provide ongoing, localised

a key obstacle to asylum-seekers gaining

support to refugees (Safi, 2014, p.21). For

economic independence. In other words,

example,

because

scaling

level,

the

Accelair

programme and HOPE project across

French

immigration

policies

forbid asylum-seekers and refugees from

BBI Research Journal 2021

accessing the job market for at least six

leveraging refugees' skills, refugees can

months after their arrival in the country,

complement the French labour force's

immigrants depend on French social

existing skills to create more favourable

welfare schemes as their sole source of

socio-economic

livelihoods. Additionally, existing French

country recovers from the crisis. The paper

refugee integration policies fail to respond

now holds these considerations close and

to the evolving market demands for higher

verifies what history can tell us about the

level language and vocational skills.

future: is the nationalist claim going to

Refugees settling in different regions also

prevail or are we going to assist to such a

receive different support schemes, which

positive integration despite the ongoing

highlights the need for better coordination

pandemic?

circumstances

the

across the country to standardise support for refugee resettlement in France. COVID-19

and

Financial

Crises:

Lessons to Learn As France progresses into the post-COVID recovery phase, attention returns to the national economy as the engine of growth. In particular, an inclusive recovery that engages with previously marginalised communities is essential for the country to tap into its residents' full economic potential. Nevertheless, the trend seems to go in the opposite direction. By promoting economic economic

integration

and

independence

hence the of

French

refugees, French society would be able to better allocate social welfare to the most vulnerable groups, which is not exclusive to its refugee population. Additionally,

This section will use cross-historical analysis

compare

the

ongoing

COVID-19 pandemic with past crises that directly

and

considerably

affected

migration flows and policies. In particular, the latest financial crisis (2008-9) mostly fits this comparison's purposes. That said, other crises will be taken into account, of which details will be provided later on. The take-away from this comparison is the following:

the

policy

responses and

behavioural changes after past crises directly correlate to the current situation, increasing the likelihood of recurrence.

100

BBI Research Journal 2021

Because of the vast and large-scale effects

Literature Review

of the pandemic, it is difficult to trace a single historical event. Even similar health Death

In making our case, three papers play a

(1346-1353) or the Spanish Influenza

crucial role in analytically understanding

(1918) do not account for the entirety of

what can be drawn from the past.

downturns COVID-19 triggers. On the

Following an individual examination of

hand, economic interests are at stake: the

each, an assessment of how it can be

enactment

useful will be presented.

crises

such

the

Black

national

lockdowns

dramatically depresses the market and leads

short-term

and

permanent

damages, thus causing stagnation. On the

An international perspective: an overview

other hand, societal issues arise: the enforcement of social-distancing measures are proved to be detrimental to people's

When looking at large-scope phenomena,

wellbeing and mental health. While these

international organisations never fail to

faces of the crisis are carefully and

provide

extensively looked at, asylum seekers

reports on ongoing issues. In this instance,

immigration

becomes

the IOM (International Organisation for

background noise. As a result, little

Migration) fits the role. The "The Impacts

research has been carried out. Using the

comparison aforementioned, this section

Migration: Lessons Learned" report goes

gathers information from past instances

back to the Great Depression to analyse

and attempt to verify if these lessons are

the role of financial crises on international

still valid and sound for the future.

migration. It takes into account the Oil

gradually

comprehensive and

Financial

Crises on

objective

International

Crisis in 1973, and the Asian (1997-99), Russian (1998-9), and Latin American (1998-2002) financial shocks.

101

BBI Research Journal 2021

The proved assumptions it relies on is that a drastic decrease in migration flows is associated

with

multi-lateral

crises.

Because of the exponential damage caused to such countries' systems, economic conditions are neither favourable nor desirable.

Therefore,

migrants

are

discouraged from setting off for a country where they might be, after all, worse off. Looking at the current situation, not only are migrants dissuaded, but also deterred. During the peak of the outbreak, most countries prohibited entry to foreigners or

As can be seen, migrant-receiving states

considerably limited access to national

took actions that go against migrants'

soil. This makes borders inaccessible,

interest. Then, back at the crises under

putting at times asylum seekers' life at risk.

analysis, migrants' willingness to leave

For example, more instances in Europe

decreased,

where migrants were found stranded in the

changed. Some of these policies do not

sea on boats were reported (Di Meo, 2020)

target asylum seekers specifically but

In response to these crises, what measures

enforced return measures and quotas do.

were taken in the past? The following table

Thus, due to the evidence-based present

from the same report summarises them.

perspective we have, it can be concluded

and

countries'

disposition

that both the past and the present share similar traits.

Not only policies but also behaviour

102

BBI Research Journal 2021

Moving onto the second paper, the focus

stands. Given the economic recession, we

shifts toward a behavioural consideration.

find ourselves in, the pandemic fits the

As outlined in "The impact of financial

comparison. Jobs are lost, unemployment

crisis

attitude towards

is soaring: how, if at all, is the current

immigration" by Joachim Vogt Isaksen,

attitude changing? Real-time data are yet

people's immigration attitude fluctuates.

to be released and analysed, but multiple

Specifically, downward economic spirals

past studies confirm Joachim Vogt Isaksen

correlate with more negative attitudes

findings. The figure below shows the

toward immigration. The results vary

causal relationship that might occur.

European

across countries, but generally, this trend

Furthermore, this is what one of the latest

case up, it is worth noting the docking of

OECD reports states: "As unemployment

some boats carrying illegal immigrant into

increases and public finances come under

Italy during the April national lockdown

pressure, it may thus be expected that

(Internazionale, 2020). The event was

public opinion regarding immigration and

negatively welcomed, as people felt all

immigrants

more negative".

efforts and supplies needed to be devoted

(OECD, 2020, pp. 21) Therefore, it is

to nationals' care, not asylum seekers who

reasonable, but not definitive, to assume

were at risk of spreading the viral

that the outlook will be much like the past,

infection.

becomes

with little or no difference. To bring up some factual evidence that might build the

103

BBI Research Journal 2021

overall, closely resemblances our review

Dealing with prospects

and confirms specific patterns. Closer to our aim in this last section of our research, the third and final paper deals

As much as the other papers did, Gamlen

with

links the predicted effects of COVID-19

the

many

issues

pandemic

poses

the ongoing

migration

and

on migration: growing anti-immigrant

international mobility more in general. In

sentiment,

"Migration and Mobility after the 2020

unwillingness to travel. Moreover, he

pandemic: the end of an era?" Alan

argues

Gamlen, from the Centre on Migration,

governments assumed lately could help

Policy and Society of the University of

suppress diversity. This claim could be

Oxford, faces the several questions still

supported by the previously mentioned

open in the table – among which labour

OECD

migration and population movements. His

integration and more division among

analysis is correct in predicting (his

ethnic

articles

August 2020) the

specifically addresses the vulnerability of

disruption the migration flows and the

refugees in Europe. Overall, Gamlen got

implementation of stricter immigration

his predictions right, and we can state it

rules, as here confirmed thanks to the first

confidently due to the literature and

two papers introduced and the statistics

evidence gathered.

dated

stricter that

the

report, groups.

restrictions extreme

which Besides,

reports the

and power

less report

about migration in 2020 (Migration Data Portal 2020) Furthermore, he puts forward another view: high unemployment rates

Having reviewed recent research on the

will depress demand for immigrant labour.

matter, let us now sum up what we have

His point is closely related to what we

found.

have seen so far: due to a general

first two articles has been particularly

depressed demand or people's attitude,

useful in justifying the third one. The

migrants' labour is foreseen to experience

claims presented seem to match historical

diminishing importance. What he asserts,

instances and data evidence. To conclude,

The information built up by the

104

BBI Research Journal 2021

it has been argued and plausibility proved

the pandemic, the impulse was to tap

through cross- historical examples that: (1)

losses

the

COVID-19

post-pandemic era. Times of crises can

disrupted migration patterns; (2) economic

become a source of disruptive and positive

recessions, now and in the past, shape

thinking just if a project of renewal is set.

people's

labour-market

Namely, investments in the securitisation

behaviour; (3) the wellbeing of migrants

of the secondary job market’s instability

gets left aside when crises occur. A clear

could benefit both FDPs and other workers

pattern emerges: in game theory terms,

by rendering the supply-side of the market

migrants are the loser whose payoff is

more solidly reassured . At the outset of

negative.

the pandemic, manual and workers and all

financial

crisis

attitude

and

without

thinking

about

the

those who could not continue virtually experienced Can we disrupt the pattern?

the

severe

economic

implications of the crisis. In fact, by being employed in industry with no supportive benefits in case of disruption, workers

What, then, could be done to end a

faced job loss and no feasible alternative.

repetitive cycle of worsening conditions

If governments invest in making this job

for FDPs? The policies currently pursued

market more resilient to demand shocks,

are

their

everyone benefits both individually and

short-sightedness - instead of digging

collectively because of the more solid

deeper at the root of a problem, they seem

economic structure. In light of this, the

to soothe the situation in the short-term.

improvement of FDPs’ situation provides a

ineffective

due

Firstly, governments could set a clear and

chance to rebuild a firmer economy.

long-term vision. Short-term economic

Secondly, FDPs already in a country

downturns are often overestimated, and

should get proper support. In light of the

strict measures against anything that is

conditions reported, humanitarian and

deemed superfluous could be mitigated if

development aid should be incentivised as

estimates of damages resulting from a

it creates the ground for governments to

crisis are better gauged. In responding to

benefit from the increased human capital 105

BBI Research Journal 2021

brought up by these individuals and the

and political

future

damaging when it leads to social tensions.

decreased

burden

welfare

benefits (which have now skyrocketed because of the recession). By letting FDPs become outcasts, inequality will remain a rooted problem, and social tensions could arise.

More specifically, a timely idea

would be to include them in the shielded proportion of the population which is prioritised in the vaccine rollout. Because of their severed condition, they are more vulnerable and likely to be hospitalised. Thus, prioritising their inoculation would be both a humanitarian decision and a public health smart choice. In addition, focusing

on a forward-looking plan,

increasing their human capital is a policy strategy

that would be multilaterally

beneficial. First, ensuring a homogenous quality education enrollment provides a change to integrate FDPs in society. Second, it bridges the skills gap which was discussed in the previous session. By guaranteeing a ground-level upbringing, FDPs do not face the one-way choice to just enter the secondary job market, but are at least offered a chance to increase their productivity and earn more. As a whole, all these measures target their economic

displacement, which is

Lastly, a lacking broader cooperation will perpetuate the current issues. If, however, governments deal with this crisis in a holistically participated manner, perhaps outstanding outcomes can come out of it. Let us consider the EU during the pandemic. It set up a Recovery Fund, which, despite not addressing migration as its core, tackles some of the endemic problems

in the Union.

This

is a

momentum of unity which should be taken advantage of for its ability to create a cooperative framework of political and economic support in the post-COVID era. For example, fiscal stimuli could include bespoke support for FDPs livelihood, be it economic or medical. Most importantly, cooperation works when all agents have all the relevant information at hand. Creating an effective informational network is essential in that it incentivises countries to act consciously because of the renewed awareness brought up by the shared information. The EU has dozens of agencies, but seldom they act in concert. By joining the dots in this interconnected network, cooperation is facilitated and enforced. 106

BBI Research Journal 2021

worldwide economic

Limitations

COVID-restrictions activity,

policy

lack of agreed consensus of terminology,

integration is scarce.

including ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, and ‘trafficked persons’, creating difficulties when interpreting literature. While the EU and the UN have highlighted the difference between the above terms 2021;

unofficial

literature

studying the impacts of the latest French

The main limitation encountered was the

(EC,

existing

UNCHR,

sources

2021),

most

used

them

have

interchangeably. Therefore, this study had interpreted reports, legal documents, and commentaries cautiously and critically to

reform

refugee

economic

Moreover, due to the existing language barrier, with some official documents and programme websites only available in the French language, research was limited by access to relevant information. In cases where Google Translate was used, there is a liability of translation errors that would affect the credibility of the information retrieved.

account for the diverse definitions. Another limitation encountered was the

Last, previous studies on immigrants’

gaps in existing data related to timing.

influence

EUROSTAT,

development lacks. Apart from results

refugees’

from the 2017 presidential election, it is

demographics, announces their yearly

difficult to surmise prevailing election

migration data in March of the next

trends or predictions on future election

calendar year. As a result, the research

results in the last section of the research.

analysis on EU refugee policy in the first

Likewise, given the low amount of data

parts of the report was limited by the lack

useful to forecast what the near future

of relevant data in recent years, especially

could be like in policymaking and public

those of 2020. Similarly, given the limited

opinion

timeframe between the launch of the latest

prediction's depth is limited. Despite a

policy

shortened

strong link in the correlational pattern

employment ban on refugees as well as

found between the past and the current

primary

the

statistics

regarding

official on

the

source

France’s

regarding

socio-political

refugees,

the

107

BBI Research Journal 2021

situation, there is no clear causal analysis

French politics under Macron’s leadership.

to be supported. The unfolding of events is

Subsequently, it looked at the actual

still most often susceptible to factors that

policymaking process and its relations

are difficult to gauge, especially given the

with ongoing events and EU regulations.

instability of the world stage right now.

Specifically, the paper examined the political-international

mobility

nexus

whereby French policies both have an effect

Conclusion

and

immigration. This paper has conducted a thorough literature and historical review of the main happenings

affecting

Europe

continent, which led to the creation of accords and regulations to provide national states

with

common

binding

non-binding legal framework to work on. Based

on this,

the

paper examines

historical and modern immigration at multiple

locations

borders, and

across

European

of immigration in the

European Union as a supranational state.

The

are

influenced

last

section

by later

abstracted from individual instances and built up a cross-historical analysis of the relations between crises and immigration trends. It is argued and predicted that: (a) migrant-receiving states are going to impose

considerable

constraints

immigrants’ opportunity to be granted access to national soil (b) public response to immigration will negatively shift and (c) migrants’ wellbeing will experience a dramatic hit.

After this broad overview, the focus shifted toward a holistic analysis of a single EU member state’s response — France.

On the basis of these considerations, recommendations are put forward. In order to break the cycle of socioeconomic segregation

that

French

immigrants

experience when they arrive, policymakers Zooming in on the French case, the paper analytically presented a breakdown of the steps that led to the current discourse of

need

to focus on creating SMART

policies.

Particularly,

this

entails

coordinated efforts across the country to

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BBI Research Journal 2021

provide asylum-seekers and refugees with tailored access to language, vocational skills

and

encourage

resettlement services that economic

integration.

particular, there should be a long-term, public value-led mission to empower immigrants

independence.

This directly addresses

local

concerns

attain over

public

economic welfare

allocation to asylum-seekers and refugees that have led to a gradual rise in anti-migrant sentiments across Europe, particularly

considering

the

political-economic climate of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Ultimately, as a nation built on liberty, equality and fraternity, France plays an influential role in upholding international human rights and human dignity. Given further coordination with the EU on regional

immigration

policies,

standardisation and humanised domestic policymaking, there is great potential to create an inclusive French society that acts as a safe haven for people affected by forced displacement.

109

BBI Research Journal 2021

Bevelander, P., 2016. Integrating refugees

References Amnesty

International,

Counterterrorist

2018.

Measures

Unjust

Used

into labor markets. [ Online] Available

at:

Persecute not

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KEEPING OUR FRONTLINE SAFE Linking personal protective equipment policies and healthcare worker mortality in the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, and New Zealand

Research Lead: Yaning Wu Team Members: Irina Breilean, Katerina Downing, Trizzha Feliciano, Zi Tong Lim, Natasha Rewari, Jamie Wong 121

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

ABSTRACT During

the

need to protect them and the general COVID-19

pandemic,

population from adverse outcomes and

healthcare workers around the world have

ensure a more rapid recovery from the

been lauded as a key occupational group at

pandemic. Further research is needed to

the “frontline” of the fight against disease

improve data quality for both healthcare

transmission. However, their roles put

worker

them in danger of infection, psychological

guidelines,

strain, and even mortality as they navigate

alternative PPE solutions such as reusable

increasingly

masks to lessen cost and environmental

burdened

health

infrastructures to provide the highest

deaths as

reporting well

and to

PPE

innovate

burden.

standards of patient care. Motivated by significant numbers of COVID-19-related

INTRODUCTION

deaths in this population during the “first

Ever

wave” of the pandemic in Europe and the

pneumonia in Wuhan, China in late 2019,

Americas, our study investigates the

the COVID-19

relationship between personal protective

progressed, being declared a pandemic by

equipment (PPE) guidance and healthcare

the World Health Organisation (WHO)

worker mortality in the United Kingdom,

roughly 4 months after on the 11th March

United States, Germany, and New Zealand

2020 (World Health Organisation, 2021).

from the beginning of each country’s

From the first confirmed case outside

outbreak until July 1st. We find that more

China on the 13th January in Thailand

stringent guidelines (i.e. those advising

(World Health Organisation, 2021), to

staff to use equipment affording them a

initial cases in the US, Germany, UK and

greater standard of protection) may be

New Zealand on the 21st January, 27th

linked with lower mortality rates in this

January,

small

association

February respectively, this novel virus

possibly strengthened when taking into

managed to spread fast, and cause many

account countries’ overall responses to the

deaths,

pandemic. Our conclusions demonstrate

worldwide by the 8th April 2020, and

the importance of supplying sufficient and

508,055 by the 1st July 2020 (Think

sample,

with

this

since

the

reported

cases

outbreak has rapidly

31st January and the 28th

with

approximately

100,000

high-grade PPE to healthcare workers in 122

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Global

Health,

2021;

World

Health

Organization, 2020a).

One

The virus implicated in the pandemic,

COVID-19 is that the incubation period,

SARS-CoV-2, is very similar to, but more

the number of days from infection to

infectious than, previous coronaviruses

symptom onset, can be up to 14 days

such as SARS-CoV-1 (Harrison et al.,

(Bhole et al., 2020). During this time, an

2020).

enhanced

infected person is still believed to be

transmission may be explained by the

infectious, and thus can unknowingly pass

differences that exist between the spike

it on to others. The large range of

COVID-19’s

glycoproteins

SARS-CoV-1

the

major

challenges with

and

symptom severity is also an issue -

SARS-CoV-2, which mediate entry into

common symptoms include a fever, cough

host cells. For instance, both viruses bind

and shortness of breath, but some develop

to angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE2)

serious respiratory problems such as

receptors on host cells in order to invade

difficulty breathing, while others remain

them (Cevik et al., 2020b), however,

asymptomatic (Esakandari et al., 2020),

SARS-CoV-2’s spike glycoprotein has up

which is a major issue for mitigating

to a 20 times greater affinity for ACE2

transmission (Cevik et al., 2020a).

receptors (Wrapp et al., 2020), and thus forms a stronger bond.

In a hospital setting, airborne transmission via aerosol generating procedures (AGPs)

Nonetheless, the route of transmission for

is most concerning. This is where infected

SARS-CoV-2

other

respiratory droplets <5μm in diameter are

coronavirus. Its primary mechanism is

disseminated and remain suspended in the

through direct (e.g., inhalation) or indirect

air over long distances and time. The exact

(e.g. via contaminated surfaces) contact

nature of these aerosols is still being

with

droplets

debated - which medical procedures

(>5-10μm in diameter), which are released

produce them, and whether transmission

when a person coughs or sneezes, and can

can occur without AGPs in poorly

enter the body through our nasal, oral, and

ventilated areas, for example (World

conjunctival

Health Organisation, 2020b).

infected

any

respiratory

mucosa

(World

Health

Organisation, 2020b, Cevik et al., 2020b). 123

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Burden of disease is defined as the

disproportionate percentage of infections

“cumulative consequences of a disease…

and deaths from COVID-19 around the

includ[ing] health, social aspects and costs

world compared to the general public

to society” (Hessel, 2008). The COVID-19

(Nguyen et al., 2020; Papoutsi et al.,

pandemic has created healthcare needs that

2020). Infection susceptibility and risk of

go beyond the capabilities of healthcare

severe outcomes is further stratified by

systems (Emanuel et al., 2020), hence the

profession

significant

exposure

consequences

for

these

and to

specialty,

patients

and

workers’ aerosols,

systems. The high transmission rate, which

occupational health policies, provision of

has led to a growing number of COVID-19

routine testing, and staff availability and

cases, has made the pandemic a burden to

by demographic characteristics such as

global healthcare infrastructures. It has

gender, age, and race and ethnicity and

been shown that when COVID-19 cases

diagnoses

exceed

capabilities of

(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2020). Adverse

hospitals, the medical system becomes

impacts on workers’ mental health have

overwhelmed with insufficient staff, a

also

shortage of intensive care facilities, and

factors including the traumatic act of

non-COVID-19 cases being deprioritised

making significant moral decisions about

(Miller et al., 2020). Furthermore, the

resource allocation, lack of social support,

rationing of medical equipment and the

a stressful working environment, and a

reduced requirements for protective gear

fear of infecting loved ones with the virus

(Emanuel et al., 2020) demonstrate the

(Moreno et al., 2020).

burden that the COVID-19 also has on

hospital facilities and resources.

COVID-19 risk for healthcare workers is

the

treatment

underlying

conditions

been evident, with contributing

significant

modifiable

factor

their use of and access to protective Healthcare workers (HCWs), especially

equipment. Personal Protective Equipment

those

in patient-facing roles, are a

(‘PPE’) is the term used to describe items

vulnerable group during the pandemic

to be worn or used for protection against

because of their proximity to disease in the

health or safety risks (UK Government,

workplace. There is evidence that HCWs

2020). In the context of the COVID-19

encompass

pandemic, it is primarily required for the

substantial

and

124

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

purposes of guarding against transmission

of healthcare resources and governmental

“between people through close contact and

structures, they had drastically different

droplets” (WHO, 2020). For the purposes

responses to the pandemic and did not

of this paper, PPE includes medical masks,

constitute

gloves, and eye protection – items which

Furthermore,

are distinguished from the face coverings

healthcare worker mortality data was more

that the general public is advised to wear

readily available and was in English or

(WHO,

could be easily translated by the research

2020).

PPE

particularly

important for healthcare workers, whose jobs involve

homogeneous their

PPE

sample.

policy

and

team.

prolonged contact with

patients who have suspected or confirmed

LITERATURE REVIEW

symptoms

We have reviewed the experimental and

COVID-19

(UK

Government, 2020). Sufficient PPE can

observational

prevent transmission between patients and

effectiveness during both the current

HCWs, HCWs to patients, and HCWs to

pandemic

HCWs alike.

infectious disease outbreaks, as well as some

literature

and

qualitative

studies

PPE

respiratory of

HCW

This research investigates the relationship

experiences during the current pandemic.

between PPE guidelines and healthcare

These inform our approaches to classifying

worker mortality from COVID-19 in the

PPE guidelines and analysing our results.

United Kingdom,

the United States,

Germany, and New Zealand from first

PPE

outbreak dates in the respective countries

coronaviruses

until July 1st, hypothesising that stricter

It may be helpful to review the literature

guidelines are correlated with fewer

surrounding evidence on PPE policy

deaths,

effectiveness during outbreaks of previous

and

seeks

highlight

evidence

from

namely

shortcomings in protective equipment

coronaviruses,

Severe

Acute

usage policies and suggest future measures

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle

to prevent loss of life in this crucial

East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS).

occupational group. These nations were chosen because despite their similar levels 125

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

In a 2003 case-control study conducted in

masks alone were inadequate in containing

five

was

and eliminating SARS transmission among

concluded that the use of masks was

healthcare workers (Lau et al., 2004;

effective in protecting hospital staff from

Nishiura et al., 2005). As such, it was

SARS (Seto et al., 2003). The statistical

crucial to consider other potential risk

analysis revealed that while surgical and

factors. The Hong Kong study investigated

N95 masks were “significantly associated

these

with non-infection”, paper masks did not

identified that the likelihood of SARS

demonstrate the same results (Seto et al.,

infection for healthcare workers was

2003). A later study found, however, that

strongly associated with three main issues:

even surgical masks did not provide

first, perceiving the amount of PPE to be

significant protection. The 2004 study

inadequate; second, having less than two

revealed that, as compared to N95 masks,

hours of infection control training; and

surgical

sufficiently

third, inconsistent use of gowns, caps, and

effective in filtering ambient particles –

goggles (Lau et al., 2004). The Vietnam

even when multiple are layered on top of

study affirmed the third risk factor and

each other. Thus, surgical masks should

concluded that the use of other PPE in

only be used when N95 masks are

addition to masks, such as gloves and

unavailable

Gomersall,

gowns, was significant in containing

2003). This conclusion was reflected in the

transmission (Nishiura et al., 2005). The

Centers

results

Hong

Kong

masks

for

hospitals,

are

(Derrick Disease

not

and

Control

and

risk

factors

further

and

subsequently

suggested that

“rapid

Prevention (CDC) and the World Health

improvements in behavior and isolation

Organization (WHO) guidelines, which

would increase the probability of [virus]

stated that healthcare workers should wear

extinction.” (Nishiura et al., 2005).

N95 masks or higher-level protection during all contact with suspected SARS

The academic literature of PPE policy

patients (Derrick and Gomersall, 2003).

effectiveness for the transmission of MERS is accompanied by the general

Nevertheless, the results of two studies –

understanding that, given its phylogenetic

one conducted in Hong Kong and the other

and immunologic similarities to SARS, the

conducted in Vietnam – demonstrated that

infection control guidelines developed 126

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

during the SARS outbreak could also be

coronaviruses. Official UK government

followed for MERS cases (Chung et al.,

guidance previously claimed that surgical

2014). In other words, it was accepted that

and

the PPE precautions used in 2003 could be

protection against SARS-CoV-2 (Public

extrapolated to apply to future coronavirus

Health England, 2021). However, the

outbreaks. According to a 2013 study

claim was based on a systematic review

which conducted a review of those

analysing seasonal influenza and was

guidelines, however, the policies are not as

conducted in 2017 prior to the emergence

straightforward as they may seem, perhaps

of SARS-CoV-2 (Offeddu et al., 2017).

because they come from more than one

Therefore, as SARS-CoV-2 has been found

source. For instance, while the CDC

to be both more transmissible and for fatal

recommends

the

compared to seasonal influenza, there is no

situation is classified as low or high risk,

guarantee of the ability for such masks to

the WHO only recommends them in

protect healthcare workers to the same

high-risk situations, opting instead for the

extent (Petersen et al., 2020).

respirators

whether

use of masks in low-risk situations (Chughtai et al., 2013). It is worth noting here, however, that this inconsistency may be related to the CDC’s position as an agency in the United States, which is a high-income country with more advanced resources. Experimental

Systematic

PPE

evidence

for

Continued research into the effectiveness of PPE provisions on the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been conducted during the pandemic and have supported the same conclusion made by literature surrounding effectiveness

masks

reviews

provide

have

80%

however

continued to justify that previous research regarding PPE precautions for previous coronavirus

pandemics

could

extrapolated and applied to the current situation. Chu et al.’s (2020) systematic review

COVID-19

its

respirator

and

meta-analysis

172

observational studies across 16 countries, with COVID-19, MERS, and SARS being considered, found the use of disposable surgical masks, reusable 12-16 layer cotton face masks, as well as N95 and similar respirators

were

associated

with

significant reduction in risk of infection, with a RR of 0.34. Stronger associations

127

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

were found in healthcare settings, with the

(Douglas et al., 2020), where smoke; with

value decreasing to 0.30. Additionally, eye

a particle size of 0.1 μm was used to

protection was found to be associated with

simulate exposure to SARS-CoV-2; with a

a 16% increase in protection to infection as

particle size of 0.12 μm. A mouthpiece

well, further suggesting the need for

sensor was then placed under the mask to

increased PPE provisions for healthcare

present

workers.

contamination. The study found that fluid

Various case-control studies have been conducted across multiple countries and support the efficacy of facemasks in reducing the rate of infection in healthcare workers.

A retrospective case-control

study based in Thailand using contact tracing records reports that wearing masks all the time during contact, independent of handwashing and social distancing, where COVID-19

patients

were

negatively

associated with the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection with an adjusted odds ratio of 0.23 (Doung-Ngern et al., 2020). Similar findings from a case-control study based in India

analysing

healthcare

the

workers

vulnerability to

acquiring

of a

SARS-CoV-2 infection also found mask use to be associated with a reduced odds of 0.35 of becoming infected (Chatterjee et al., 2020). A simulation of COVID-19 transmission using a smoke chamber model to simulate a hospital environment was conducted by

resistant

the

quantity

surgical

and

of FFP2

smoke masks

provided no protection to respiratory particles, with only FFP3 being effective at providing respiratory protection to the user. An analysis of 119 healthcare worker deaths using NHS workforce statistics supports these findings and found that staff working in the high risk specialties of intensive care and anaesthetics, and were provided with FFP3 masks experienced no mortality compared to specialties that were provided with weaker PPE provisions (Cook, 2020). Similarly in China, an analysis of 493 medical staff from a Wuhan hospital found that 0 of the 278 staff who were prescribed N95 masks were infected by SARS-CoV-2, whereas 10 of 213 of those in the no-mask groups were infected (Wang et al., 2020). However, conflicting evidence has been published, such as a systematic review and meta-analysis of randomised trials by Bartoszko et al. (2020), where for viral

128

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

respiratory infections, the effect of N95

Qualitative studies of HCW experiences

respirators on reducing infection rates

during COVID-19

compared to medical face masks was

All literature concerning the experiences

negligible, with an OR of 1.06 in favour of

of HCWs has highlighted the high levels

N95 respirators, suggesting that both

of stress, anxiety and fear that they

medical

respirators

experience while working during the

provide similar protection against viral

COVID-19 pandemic (Wu et al., 2020).

respiratory infections such as COVID-19.

Many

The limitations of this study must be

including uncertainty over the length of

considered though, as the meta-analysis

the crisis (Wu et al., 2020); misinformation

only

about the disease (Schwartz et al., 2020);

masks

and

N95

includes one trial that studied

coronavirus

infections

causes

have

been

identified

individually

difficulties balancing the need for social

comparing both forms of PPE, with other

distancing and wanting to support families;

sources being based

on other viral

the lack of availability and quality of PPE

respiratory infections that may not be as

gear (Nguyen et al., 2020), coupled with

generalizable to SARS-CoV-2. Moreover,

inadequate training in its use (Hoernke et

aggregate data was used rather than

al., 2020). These stresses on HCWs are not

individual data, meaning accommodating

unique to the COVID-19 pandemic and

for confounders, co-variates, and outcome

have been recorded

definitions were not possible. FFP3 and

pandemics such as during the Ebola crisis

and N95 respirators should therefore

of 2015 (Billings et al., 2020). Of

continue to be prescribed to healthcare

particular importance to this paper are the

workers whenever possible given the

experiences of HCWs concerning PPE.

significant quantity of evidence suggesting

One impact of not prioritizing the safety of

its superior efficacy in protecting the

HCWs is their increasing unwillingness to

transmission of SARS-CoV-2. However,

report to work, in which information

further research should continue to be

regarding and access to PPE plays a

conducted in order to further validate this

significant role (Almaghrabi et al., 2020).

claim.

The particular experiences of HCWs

during previous

surrounding PPE during the COVID-19 pandemic have been highlighted in all the 129

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

literature as causing and exacerbating an

A study (San Juan et al., 2020) based on

already stressful situation. These issues

interviews with UK HCWs highlighted the

range from physical discomfort to distress

following issues with their experiences of

and anxiety caused by issues related to

PPE:

PPE (Billings et al., 2020).

through PPE, 2) a lack of information

The accounts of many HCWs have

compounded by a lack of PPE, and 3)

demonstrated a distinct lack of adequate

physical discomfort such as ill-fitting PPE,

PPE

dehydration

equipment and the inconsistent

difficulties

and

communicating

overheating.

This

guidance that is provided on its use. A

demonstrates that experiences of PPE are

study of Italian physicians demonstrated

multi-faceted

that the perceived risk of contracting

surrounding the use of PPE must consider

COVID-19 was influenced by physicians

a range of issues from communication,

receiving adequate information on PPE use

information, physical comfort and personal

(Savoia et al., 2020), therefore explaining

wellbeing.

the associated decline in mental health

Studies from a teaching hospital during the

experienced by frontline HCWs during the

2003 SARS outbreak demonstrated that

pandemic. Billings and colleagues (2020)

transparency from leadership teams and

demonstrate

PPE

direction regarding hospital processes and

exacerbates the fears of HCWs across

provision of supplies, particularly during

multiple pandemic situations.

shortages, was important in mitigating

Substandard infection controls not only

HCWs reactions based on fear (Wu et al.,

increase the risk of contracting COVID-19

2020).

that

inadequate

and

new

policies

but also have negative effects on the mental health of HCWs. Insufficient PPE

METHODS

increases spread within hospitals and the

We detail below the methods and sources

news of which causes higher levels of fear

used to compile and standardise healthcare

and anxiety in HCWs (Vindrolo-Padros et

worker mortality data, as well as the

al., 2020). This demonstrates the two-fold

process of compiling PPE guidelines for

consequences of inadequate PPE: higher

the four countries.

risk of infection, and the mental health consequences on HCWs.

Collecting total healthcare worker data 130

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

For the purpose of establishing the size of

The survey classified employment as ‘the

the

each

estimated occupational employment (not

States,

including self-employed) for that industry’

healthcare

individual

workforce

country

(United

Germany, New Zealand, and the United

(2019).

Kingdom), the following data sources have

The technical notes state:

been consulted.

‘OES estimates are constructed from a sample

about

1.1

million

For the United States, the U.S. Bureau of

establishments. Each year, two semiannual

Labor

panels

Statistics

Employment

the

Statistics

Occupational (OES)

survey

200,000

approximately

sampled

180,000

establishments

to are

(2019) distinguishes between Healthcare

contacted, one panel in May and the other

Practitioners and Technical Occupations

in November. Responses are obtained by

and Healthcare Support Occupations. An

mail, Internet or other electronic means,

estimated 15.194.930 people work in these

email, telephone, or personal visit. The

two

May

fields.

This

does

not

include

2019

estimates

are

based

ambulance drivers which are categorized

responses from six semiannual panels

as Transportation and Material Moving

collected over a 3-year period: May 2019,

Occupations. If we were to include their

November 2018, May 2018, November

numbers in the healthcare work force the

2017, May 2017, and November 2016. The

estimated total would be 15,209,670.

unweighted sampled employment of 83

Furthermore, there are 70,100 janitors and

million across all six semiannual panels

cleaners working in hospital settings (U.S.

represents approximately 57 percent of

Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019). This

total national employment. The overall

does not include orderlies which are

national response rate for the six panels,

classed

based on the 50 states and the District of

Healthcare

Support

Occupations. The occupational categories

Columbia,

percent

based on

are based on a combination of the Office

establishments and 68 percent based on

of Management and Budget’s 2010 and

weighted sampled employment’ (2019).

2018 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) systems.

The

sampling

method is subject to

sampling and nonsampling errors (inability 131

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

to obtain information for all establishments

23621-0004) (Destatis, 2018). The latest

in the sample, differences in interpretation

data available was from 2018 and data was

selected for full-time as well as part-time

correct

employees, unlike in the United States and

information, errors made in recording,

United Kingdom datasets where the data

coding, or

shown was for full-time equivalents and

survey

questions,

unwillingness

inability

provide

processing

data). Quality

control measures were used such as

headcounts.

checking

data

people work in the German healthcare

consistency, follow-up mailings, emails

system. The dataset provides details for

and

ambulance workers that are not qualified

nonresponding establishments to improve

paramedics (categorized as Helpers in the

survey response rates (U.S. Bureau of

Ambulance Services). No data is provided

Labor Statistics 2019).

on cleaners and domestics or hospital

phone

questionnaires calls

are

for sent

out

estimated

5,651,000

porters. The United Kingdom estimates were based on publicly available survey data

The methodology section of the Federal

accessed through the Nomis database. The

Statistical

latest available data collected by ONS

assurance. Their datasets use the EFQM

(2020) was used covering figures for the

(European

period July 2019- June 2020. The relevant

Management) Excellence Model. Quality

professions were selected from the dataset

reports are also conducted for all federal

and used for the purposes of our research.

statistics (Destatis, 2021).

Office

provides

Foundation

for

quality Quality

The numbers provided by ONS (2020) are estimates and not an exact reflection of the

In the case of New Zealand, 2018

healthcare workforce.

occupational census data was consulted (Stats NZ, 2020). The exact dataset

In the case of Germany, the database of

consulted

was

the Federal Statistical Office was used.

‘Occupation-2018-census-csv’(Stats

NZ,

The table used was ‘Health workers:

2020). The original data was collected as

Germany, years, employment relationship,

part of the 2018 Census for Population and

gender, occupations in Healthcare’ (Code:

Dwelling.

Quality

assessments

were 132

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

conducted and only data that met a certain

The occupations selected were based on

criteria were included in the topic tables of

the ONS estimates of exposure to generic

the New Zealand census. According to the

disease and physical proximity to others.

Data quality ratings for 2018 Census

Their classification was based on the

variables, the occupation variable was

results from the 2019 Annual Population

found to be of moderate quality by Stats

Survey. For the purposes of our research,

NZ and of poor quality by the external

data quality panel (EDQP) (Stats NZ,

average responses of “physical proximity

2020). The end results were based on

to others” question greater than “slightly

census

close”.

response

data

and

statistical

have

included

occupations

with

We have also included the

imputations, but final figures may have

exceptions of hospital cleaners and porters,

been inflated (Stats NZ, 2020). The results

who we hypothesise are at much greater

of this study will be affected by this as

risk from SARS-CoV-2 environmental

well and therefore can only serve as

exposure due to aerosols and fomite

estimates of the New Zealand healthcare

surfaces during the pandemic (ONS,

workforce.

2020).

Figure 1a: Occupations with average responses of “physical proximity to others” question greater than “slightly close” Therapy professionals n.e.c. Pharmacy and other dispensing assistants Pharmacists Occupational therapists Pharmaceutical technicians Physiotherapists Ophthalmic opticians

133

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Nursing auxiliaries and assistants Nurses Midwives Dental practitioners Medical practitioners Ambulance staff (excluding paramedics) Dental nurses

Figure 1b: Other occupations with high risk of exposure to COVID-19 Cleaners and domestics Hospital porters

Collecting healthcare worker deaths

cause of death data given the lack of a

data

single data source for healthcare worker

Medscape:

Data

from

Medscape

deaths from COVID-19.

(timestamp: July 1) was web-scraped using

Kaiser

a data mining tool (data-miner.io) and

memorial:

inputted into an Excel sheet. Deaths were

investigation of healthcare worker deaths

then

in the United States was captured during

categorised

country

(with

subnational categories included for the

Family Data

Foundation/Guardian from

unofficial

the study period.

United Kingdom and United States). Official

sources:

Data

from

United

Standardising healthcare worker deaths

Kingdom and New Zealand government

data

sources respectively were compiled for the

Raw counts of healthcare worker deaths

study period, with the latter examining

during the study period were divided by 134

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

the total number of healthcare workers in

United

States,

Germany,

the respective countries and multiplied by

Zealand. Because changes in guidelines

100,000 for ease of display.

had occurred over time, a web archive tool (https://archive.org/web/)

and

New

was used to

Compiling standardised COVID-19 case

compile website snapshots at or around

and death counts

July 1st, the last day of the study period.

directly

compiled

population

When this was not possible, guidelines that

COVID-19 case and death standardised

were verifiably consistent during and after

counts for the duration of our study period

the study period were taken from more

from Our World in Data.

Category

Factor

Consequence

National politics

Public opinion largely Political support for a

Continuation of

(public opinion)

in favour of

America’s role as the

strong military

Effects

maintaining US

nation with the

military supremacy

largest military and

Low public trust in

Concern over ethics

AI technologies

and accountability of AI, particularly technology with LAWS

military budget Joint Artificial Intelligence Center working to increase civilian confidence in

Public is more willing AI ethics to use AI if other countries have

Difficult for the

developed similar

military to acquire

technology

large amounts of data,

American citizens

Potential conflict in

believe the

domestic politics on

government is

military budget

hindering technology development

overspending on the military

Concern over data

Legal restrictions in

privacy

place governing data privacy. military to acquire large amounts of data

Geopolitics

Desire to preserve the

Gains in AI

US currently leads as

212

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Bureaucracy

post-Cold War world

development so the

the world’s AI

order which views its

US can control ethics

developer

military as supreme

and regulations

Disorganized and

IT infrastructure of

DoD is acquiring AI

outdated bureaucratic

DoD currently using

technologies at a slow

structure of the DoD

outdated hardware

and risk-averse pace

AI projects are

AI is largely

decentralised and

developed by private

dispersed across the

companies rather than

DoD

by the government

Inadequate funding of military AI programs

and military Long waits for AI research clearance

Private companies do not view the

Developers are

government as their

attracted to the

target market

private rather than public sector

HYPOTHESIS AND MAIN

increase the risk of an MID between China

ARGUMENT

and the US. First, the nature of China’s government and military has allowed for the

There are a number of factors which suggest

rapid expansion of AI technology, increasing

that the development of Chinese AI might

US concern over a potential military threat. 213

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Falling under the category of an

has caused increased anxiety in the United

authoritarian regime, China’s governmental

States over prospects of a loss in military

structure has facilitated a number of

supremacy. The US has a long history of

advantages with regard to controlling public

misinterpreting or misconstruing other

opinion and silencing dissenters. This allows

nation’s governmental, economic, or

for advancements to be made with little to

military advancements, often initiating

no opposition. Similarly, the PLA operates

conflict in the name of imperial expansion

as an extension of the CCP, enabling a direct

or military hegemony (Sachs, 2018). With

execution of the government’s agenda. This

Chinese advancement in AI rapidly

has created an environment where stringent

increasing the US may feel pressure to catch

measures have been taken by the CCP to

up or offset China, a process strongly

catch up and eventually surpass military

indicating a future arms race. The US’s

powers such as the US, something the nation

concerns are further exacerbated by the

is set to do in the field of AI by 2030 (Allen,

largely “invisible” threat AI poses, as well

2019).

as the untransparent nature of China’s government and military. Furthermore,

It is not only China’s system of government

distrust already exists between the two

that has enabled AI military advancements,

nations, having risen in the past few years

but also the nation’s recent economic

over trade deals and US elections. This

development. Currently, China has the

combination of factors has led to an

second largest military budget in the world,

uncertain future for the development of

preceded only by the US. The government

American and Chinese relations.

and economy work in tandem to promote a national ideology which has grown

Outside of the relational consequences of AI

increasingly expansionist in the military

development, it is also important to discuss

arena, fueled by a “leap-frogging” strategy

how technological advancements affect

which hopes to see China as the future

military approach. To fully examine this,

leader of AI.

however, a definition must also be given to two levels of warfare: strategic and tactical

China’s quick rise as one of the world’s AI

warfare. Strategic warfare is concerned with

leaders and the expansion of their military

outcomes and inhibiting an opponent’s 214

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

ability to perpetuate hostilities (Air

provoking China into increasing their efforts

University, 2015). Tactical warfare, on the

or inspiring other nations to develop their

other hand, refers to immediate action in

own AI capabilities. Technological

support of the military. Conflict at the

developments such as AI give nations an

tactical level is where engagement occurs

incentive to pursue conflicts by tilting the

(ibid).

balance of power. This idea is further developed by the notion that there is a limit,

Military AI development can enable MIDs

on both a strategic and operational level, to

on both a tactical and strategic level. This

how AI can be integrated into military

may be due, in part, to the role a nation’s AI

technology.

capabilities take in developing information asymmetries, or unobservable factors. These

Hence, after an examination the emerging

asymmetries might also lead states to take

scholarship surrounding the development of

military action where they do not have a

AI in China and the US, as well as the

certain or guaranteed victory (Reed, 2006).

scholarship on the impact of AI-enabled

With the emergence of new AI technologies,

technology and conflict, it seems as though

conflicts that nations wish to pursue but

the US-China race to innovate in AI will

might not necessarily have the best outcome

have potentially destabilising implications

in are more likely to be undertaken. This is

on strategic stability. We propose the

further exacerbated by the issue of security

following hypothesis, which rests on a set of

dilemmas, a concept which proposes that

interlinked assumptions drawn from the

under the threat of another state’s attack, a

literature:

nation will increase its own security, often through military means such as weapon

H: AI advancements in China increase the

expansion (Horowitz, 2019). This then

risk of an MID between China and the US.

causes the other states to increase their security, diminishing the concerned nation’s

The causal mechanism we propose proceeds

efforts. Current US-China relations may

as follows (see figure 1 below). China’s

head in this direction, as the US seeks to

ideological model seems well suited to the

strengthen its own AI military capabilities in

fast adoption of technology compared to the

response to Chinese development,

US. Not only does Chinese military doctrine 215

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

allow more experimentation and autonomy

the US (or vice versa) greater, causing a

than in the US, but the civil-military fusion

potential security dilemma and making an

allows China to leverage civilian resources

arms race more likely. This, in itself,

for military ends. China’s geopolitical aims,

increases the risk of an MID.

its visions for the PLA and its goal to be the centre of AI world innovation have led to

Montgomery (2020, p. 325) highlights that,

China pursuing AI developments at a rapid

“because the effects of many emerging

pace in comparison to the US.

technologies remain uncertain, states may need to rely more on demonstrations to

This exacerbates existing Sino-American

capitalise on any progress they achieve”.

distrust and tensions. China’s pursuit of AI

Due to mutual mistrust, suspicion, and

may fuel the perception in Washington that

limited information about the intentions of

Beijing is intent on exploiting this

the other, any possible signal or

technology to fulfil its broader revisionist

“demonstrations” on the part of the US or

goals (Reed, 2006); while US pursuit of AI

China may also be misinterpreted as an

might fuel the perception in Beijing that the

MID, sparking an equal response on the

US is pushing hard to maintain its relative

opposing side and thus, also increasing the

power vis-a-vis other countries.

risk of an MID.

As military AI capabilities enable both a tactical and strategic advantage, and because AI is based on externally unverifiable software, the pursuit of AI capabilities creates additional uncertainty about one another’s capabilities and intentions (Fearon, 1995; Horowitz, 2019; Johnson, 2019). The US may be prompted to develop AI at a similar pace than China in order to maintain its position of power. China may then respond in kind. This makes the perceived potential threat posed by China to 216

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Figure 1. Causal mechanism

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METHODOLOGY

To begin, we investigated which technologies (e.g., nuclear weapons,

It is difficult to examine the direct impact of

airstrikes) have been used in conflict

AI on MID risk. While autonomous weapon

historically, looking both at historical

capabilities already exist, states have yet to

examples as well as examples that have been

develop fully AI-powered weapons systems.

used in the AI-conflict literature. On this

Given the nascent as secretive character of

basis, we aggregated an initial pool of case

AI weapons development, there is a lack of

studies. To provide an illustration of the

quantitative data on the topic. Additionally,

various circumstances in which an MID,

there is little case study research on AI and

facilitated by advanced weaponry might

its impact on conflict. Existing case studies

arise, we selected five diverse cases that

focus mainly on the Cold War, drawing

demonstrated the application of new

parallels between AI and the proliferation of

technology in conflict. We ensured that each

nuclear weapons. While the Cold War

context was different by providing a

framework is insightful - we, too, examine a

variation of time periods, regions in the

case from the Cold War period - we aim to

world and types of conflict. It is important to

fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating

note, however, that there exists some

the range of cases that can provide

potential selection bias because we did not

informational value on the study of AI and

examine cases where new technology did

international conflict.

not influence conflict.

This paper, therefore, takes an exploratory

Being an era of technological change and

approach. In doing so, we begin to map the

superpower competition, the Cold War is a

possible range of cases and contexts that can

particularly useful period to explore the

be explored with future research. We also

impact of AI on MID risk, as superpower

illustrate the heterogeneity of cases that can

hostilities between the US and the USSR in

be regulated on a policy level. Therefore,

the period 1945-1989 can be directly

our cases encompass a full range of

compared to US-China tensions in the

variation to enhance representativeness.

present. As such, the first case we examine looks at the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane in Soviet airspace and how 218

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

this escalated MID risk. We then assess a

The final case is that of the assassination of

more recent case between the US and

Qassem Soleimani by US drone strike in

Russia, examining Russia’s interference in

early 2020. This was a direct use of an

the 2016 US election, whereby AI-enabled

autonomous technology illustrating how AI

“bots” were used as part of a strategy of

technology enables military attack, thereby

informational warfare. Both of these cases

creating a first-mover advantage such that

allow us to draw predictions for US-China

by attacking first, a state can reduce the

relations and a potential MID as both cases

other’s ability to retaliate, and at

can illuminate conflict dynamics between

significantly lower cost than before.

two hegemons in the context of advanced weapons.

Through the case studies selected, this paper has chosen to address questions concerning

We then turn to two cases which provide

the role AI might play in facilitating MIDs

insight to Chinese strategic thinking and

through a realist framework. Realism here is

military strategy in different regions of the

defined as a structural theory of international

globe. The first Gulf War powerfully

relations in which independent sovereign

illustrates that states exploiting emerging

states struggle for power and dominance in

technologies to shift the balance of power in

an anarchic political environment. Such an

their favour motivates international

analysis will act as a limitation on this

armament, fortifies threat perceptions and

paper’s ability to fully comprehend the

increases uncertainty, all of which induces

dynamics that might be involved in any

an escalatory dynamic. Like many other

future conflict between China and the US.

nations, these observations forced China to

Even scholars of realism in the field of

completely overhaul their defence

international relations accept that the theory

development strategy. In addition, given that

fails to provide a fully comprehensive

China was proven to be directly involved in

understanding of the international political

the Kosovo War, this case study provides

framework (Donnelly, 2000). Nonetheless,

insight into where the Chinese threshold for

realism is of value in unpacking how

an MID between the US and China might

political and military conflict can be driven

lie, and the factors that could provoke one.

by the need to maintain competitiveness in

219

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

the struggle for dominance of the

devote more time to exploring the means in

international stage.

which sovereign states interact with each other in the anarchic system and how such

In the near future, the strategic aims of

an interaction may play out between China

China and the US will not rely on the

and the US in the near future.

possibilities provided by AI alone. However, assuming that the future of military

Case one: The Cold War and Nuclear

technology will be largely directed within

Standoff between the US and the USSR

the realms of AI, it is reasonable to assert that whichever of the two countries is faster

Examples of MIDs between the US and the

to develop and upgrade its military AI

USSR during the Cold War highlight how

capabilities will obtain a significant

suspicion around emerging technologies can

competitive advantage and be able to dictate

create situations in which both parties

the terms by which AI is regulated moving

display and threaten the use of force without

forward (Hartig and Vanhoose, 2019;

resorting to full-scale warfare. On October

Brown, 2020). Both nations are sensitive to

27th, 1962, two such events occurred as

the need to create this advantage with the

crisis talks between Soviet Premier Nikita

Chinese hoping to “leapfrog” and surpass

Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy over the

American R&D. Therefore, in light of the

reduction of nuclear weapons in Cuba and

effect of new technology on states’

Turkey appeared to be reaching a standstill

perception of each other’s intentions and the

and the threat of all-out war was particularly

calculus of offensive strategies, a realist

high.

framework provides an interesting lens to explore the development of military AI.

The first MID occurred when an American U-2 spy plane based in Alaska accidentally

Basing the paper on realism is not meant to

strayed into Soviet airspace. The Soviets,

devalue the role that theories including but

fearing the possibility that the plane had

not limited to constructivism, Marxism and

entered Soviet airspace with the intention of

postmodernism could contribute to the

delivering a pre-emptive nuclear strike on

question at hand. Instead, through a sole

sovereign territory before the start of a

focus on realism, this article is able to

full-scale war, scrambled several fighters to 220

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intercept it. In response, a group of

occurrences can result from the uncertainty

American fighter aircraft, which actually

and increased perception of threat arising

were armed with nuclear weapons, were sent

from new and emerging military

to protect the spy plane (Wilson, 2012).

technologies, in this case nuclear weapons.

Both sides demonstrated and threatened the

In both events the threat of nuclear

capacity to initiate military conflict and the

retaliation was levelled, in the first instance

situation was only diffused as the pilot of

by the US fighter aircraft and by the Soviet

U-2 managed to glide his plane out of Soviet

submarine captain in the second. Both

airspace before it was intercepted.

events occurred at one of the high points of tension between the two superpowers during

On the same night, the USSR submarine

the nuclear standoff, as negotiations between

B-59 was spotted in the Atlantic Ocean by

the two leaders appeared at a standstill and

the US Navy. A US Navy destroyer began

both sides feared the possibility that a

dropping small depth charges in order to

breakdown in talks would result in a

force the submarine to the surface. To the

devastating nuclear war.

B-59 crew this had the effect of feeling like being “inside a metal barrel that someone is

Where this case study has value is in

constantly blasting with a sledgehammer”

illuminating how emergent weaponry can

(Brower, 2018, p. 17) and the confused

heighten the risk of MIDs between two

captain, Valentin Savitsky, fearing that war

superpowers, in accordance with our

had started, ordered the submarine’s nuclear

hypothesis. The tactical placement of

torpedo to be made combat ready. The

nuclear weapons by both superpowers

deployment of this torpedo was only

developed a level of mutual distrust that

prevented by Vasily Arkhipov, a chief of

resulted in both sides fearing the possibility

staff who was temporarily onboard the

of the other initiating an unprompted nuclear

submarine for the specific reconnaissance

assault. It is for this reason that a spy plane

operation (Brower, 2018).

that had drifted off course into Soviet airspace was perceived by the USSR to

Both events are examples of MIDs occurring

potentially be a nuclear assault and that the

between the US and the USSR and both

US dropping small depth charges in order to

demonstrate the possibility that such

force a USSR submarine to surface was 221

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interpreted by captain of the B-59 submarine

was a reckless action spurred by heightened

to be an all-out attack. Nuclear weapons had

mistrust between the two superpowers that

created a situation in which both sides

came as a result of the nuclear standoff. This

attempted to alter the balance of power and

further reinforces the argument that military

gain an advantage over the other, hence the

technologies are best seen as an enabler,

decision to place nuclear weapons in Cuba

rather than a cause, of conflict (Lieber,

and Turkey by the USSR and the US

2000; Talmadge, 2019). Nuclear weapons

respectively. The consequences of these

were just one of myriad reasons that the

provocations were a level of alertness and

USSR and US were at odds with one

suspicion from both sides that made MIDs

another. However, the development of these

possible. Emergent military technologies,

weapons and their strategic placement

therefore, clearly have the possibility to

served to escalate these tensions into a

disrupt the balance of power between two

potential military conflict where displays of

superpowers, which can generate a level of

military force were exhibited in order to

paranoia that could facilitate small interstate

demonstrate strength and superiority.

disputes when one or both sides seek to demonstrate their capacity for action in an

However, it must be accepted that nuclear

increasingly volatile diplomatic situation.

weapons and military AI are not directly comparable. Nuclear weapons exist in a

This case study also highlights that

spatial, geographic framework in a way that

emerging military technologies facilitate

military AI might not. The tense atmosphere

MIDs at a tactical level. The advancement of

of the 1962 crisis arose because these

nuclear weaponry over the course of the

weapons were placed in such a way that

Cold War, and especially during the Missile

their aggressive intent and capacity for an

Crisis of 1962, fostered information

attack on the other party’s territory became

asymmetries that misled both sides into

obvious. Nuclear weapons are visible

taking poorly calculated, impulsive military

displays of force which cannot easily be

actions without any guarantee of victory. For

concealed; attacks involving military AI, on

example, the Soviet decision to scramble

the other hand, are not always so visible.

fighters to intercept a spy plane, which had

Indeed, the capability of military AI to

only drifted into Soviet airspace by accident,

conceal its presence creates difficulties in 222

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understanding which side has an advantage

example of the nuclear missile crisis of 1962

between China and the United States and a

it is apparent that emerging military

level of information asymmetry that is very

technologies can create an increase in

different to the missile crisis between the US

tension between superpowers and a desire to

and the USSR. To Khrushchev and the

display military prowess in such a way that

Politburo, it was obvious that US missiles in

can advance the risk of MIDs occurring. It is

Turkey put their rivals at an advantage and

reasonable, therefore, to speculate that AI

thus retaliatory positioning of missiles close

advancements in China today do indeed

to US home soil was an obvious step to

increase the risk of MIDs occurring between

readdress power balance, as a result

China and the US.

increasing tensions and subsequent chance of MID occurrence. Development of

Case two: Hybrid War: Russia’s

military AI might not create such obvious

interference in the 2016 US Presidential

disparities in the balance of power or

Election

highlight the need for one side or the other to address it. Furthermore, the risk of

Examples highlighting the rising tendency

military conflict between China and the US

towards Hybrid Warfare demonstrate how

currently is not equivalent to the same risk

AI will increase the possibility of an MID by

between the US and Russia in 1962. It may

enhancing this method of warfare. This case

be the case that relations between China and

study examines AI’s ability to enhance the

the US would have to deteriorate

political, informational, and cyber spheres of

significantly further before a MID might

warfare.

occur over information asymmetries regarding the deployment and development

There is no scholarly consensus on the

of new weaponry. Fundamentally, the way in

definition of hybrid war, but scholars have

which China and the US respond to military

agreed that the term is useful in

AI developments might look very different

understanding the future of war/warfare and

to the missile crisis.

security challenges (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen, 2016). In 2007 scholar Dr. Frank

Ultimately, whilst military AI might operate

Hoffman proposed that 21st century conflict

differently to nuclear weapons, from the

would be that of “hybrid wars”: a 223

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combination of conventional military

creation of fake parties and civil society

capabilities and “irregular tactics”

groups, as well as control of the narratives

(Hoffman, 2007). Other scholars have

and discourses (Hosaka, 2019).

attempted to provide greater conceptual clarity defining it as the tailored use of all

Russia had invoked hybrid war in the

instruments of power, military and

Post-Soviet Space, but interference in the

non-military, against the opponent’s

2016 US election showed a more recent

particular vulnerabilities where force or the

trend in launching hybrid warfare on

threat of force has a central role

Western nations. This is evidence of the

(Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen, 2016). It

growing use of AI in conflict and proof of

is synergistic in covering military, political,

its ability to facilitate MIDs on a tactical

civilian, economic, and informational

level. Russia’s intentions in the US were to

spheres and ambiguous in that it seeks to

exploit divisions amongst the American

obscure the identity of the hybrid actor and

population, spread disinformation, confuse

blur the distinctions between peace and war.

fact and fiction, which served to undermine trust and opinions of democratic institutions

Hybrid warfare is most commonly

more generally(Yan, 2020). It was reported

associated with Russia, because of its highly

that the Internet Research Agency (IRA) had

controversial use of information and cyber

been established in 2013 by Russian

operations in the 2014 annexation of Crimea

oligarch Yevgeny Porigozhin in Olgino near

and conflict in Eastern Ukraine, enabling

St. Petersburg. The IRA has been dubbed “a

Russian success on the ground and in the

troll factory” of bloggers using false

informational sphere (Lange-Ionatamišvili,

identities online to push pro-Putin

2015). In launching hybrid wars, Russia

narratives, spread disinformation about

utilises its expanding toolkit of political

Ukraine, and since 2014 engage with Project

technology, defined as the manipulation of

Lakhta: the 2016 US election operation

politics via technology, i.e. the attempt to

(Mejias and Vokuev, 2017).

shape political structures and processes not by open and contested politics but by artifice

The hybrid attack involved hacking

(Wilson, 2012). It allows for manipulation

Democratic National Committee emails to

of electoral systems, public opinion, the

gain information against candidates, 224

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particularly Hillary Clinton. The IRA pursued a Pro-Trump, Anti-Clinton bias

Often, countries that have been subject to

flooding the media with scandals like

hybrid attacks are unsure of how to respond

Wikileaks to drowning out negative stories

to them. This is because by nature hybrid

about Trump such as Access Hollywood.

attacks intend to fall below the threshold of

Bots which are automated accounts that use

provoking a conventional military conflict

software to imitate human behaviours online

(Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen, 2016). In

and Trolls which are false impersonated

an atmosphere where clear procedure for

accounts online sought to amplify

responding to hybrid attacks is frequently

disinformation to sow discord and division

lacking, it is possible that a country may

in America. Bots and Trolls spread

decide to respond with a hybrid attack of

disinformation and confusion regarding the

their own or make some other threat or

election and objective truth. They also

demonstrate force in the political,

created fake grassroots movements meant to

informational, or cyber realm. This threat or

parody genuine people’s movements, a

display of force could increase the

process called astroturfing. The top 6 IRA

possibility of an MID.

astroturf sites such as Blacktivist and Heart of Texas accumulated over 340 million

Additionally, central to hybrid warfare is

views (New Knowledge, 2018). The IRA’s

ambiguity. Actors in cyberspace are able to

operations included micro-targeting specific

obscure their identities. AI could further

individuals especially Black Americans

enhance this ambiguity by increasing the

online to persuade them either not to vote or

speed and scale of attacks across multiple

voter for the Green Party. It is predicted that

domains, making it more difficult for states

there were more than 77 million

who are attacked to identify where or who

engagements with Russian disinformation

has initiated the attack, and what their

on Facebook which affected over 126

intentions are. This difficulty to attribute

million people, 187 million engagements on

responsibility can lead to increased

Instagram, and 73 million on Twitter (ibid).

uncertainty and insecurity, in turn

Following these allegations, US-Russian

exacerbating tensions and causing retaliation

relations continued to deteriorate, and

as some sort of threat or demonstration of

tensions increased.

force. A spiral may ensue, increasing the 225

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risk of MIDs. This demonstrates that in

sophisticated bots, trolls, and hybrid tools

addition to the conventional military sphere,

will allow for quicker and more effective

actions in the cyber realm and their

flooding of the informational sphere making

consequences could also increase the

truth less readily available. There are fears

possibility of an MID.

that human discussion online will be drowned out by computer generated people

Having understood how hybrid tactics have

(Schneier, 2020).

operated in various spheres in the past, discussion of how AI will expand and

This case study allows us to draw

sophisticate the arsenal and reach of such

predictions for US-China relations and a

political technology and hybrid tools by

potential MID. Hybrid Warfare is not

making them more covert and effective

confined to Russia. China has long been

follows (Polyakova and Boyer, 2018; Thiele,

engaging in hybrid warfare with militias in

2020). Currently bots are still identifiable as

the South China Sea, although in the context

they often publish scheduled repetitive

of China scholars generally refer to this as

content at non-human speeds (Mejias and

“gray zone activity” (Morris et al., 2019).

Vokuev, 2017); however, AI allows bots to

Although Russia is the leader in political

better replicate human actions and interact

technology and hybrid warfare in the

more appropriately with genuine users to

political, information, and cyber realms

avoid detection (ibid). AI improves the

(ibid), other countries have observed its

quality of false content such as fake videos

benefits and are easily attracted by the low

and audios. An AI software called Lyrebird

costs and high rewards these methods offer

allows anyone to create digital voices using

(Hanlon, 2018). A 2019 report found that

one minute of audio (ibid). Political leaders

online bots were disseminating

can appear to say anything (Yan, 2020). AI

disinformation and propaganda in over 50

will better predict human emotional

countries (Bradshaw and Howard, 2019) and

reactions to online content and be used to

scholars predict that AI will inevitably

amplify inflammatory content to

proliferate (Thiele, 2020).

micro-targeted groups. Improved astroturf efforts could also create greater division and

Other nations can easily learn from the

civil unrest (ibid). An increased number of

Russian example. China’s ambition to be an 226

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AI leader, coupled with its commitment to

The example of the first Gulf War in 1991

the 3 Warfares Strategy, which uses legal,

demonstrates how emerging technologies

media and psychological manipulation to

cause changes in concepts of operations and

subdue an enemy (Iasiello, 2016),

through raising the cost of defensive error,

suggesting that cyber and informational

confer first-mover advantages.

threats towards the West are coming

Developments in military AI, as the latest

(Polyakova and Boyer, 2018). The suspicion

iteration of such technology, can

that China is acting in ways similar to

subsequently lead to dramatic shifts in the

Russia in the US is already present in

balance of power, increasing the likelihood

American discourse. A US Intelligence

of MIDs.

Chief has warned that China, Russia, and Iran all sought to influence the US 2020

The Persian Gulf War was a major turning

election (BBC News, 2020). Additionally,

point for defence planners in the post-Cold

Robert O’Brien, a Trump Security Advisor,

War period as the first concrete display of

claimed that China launched the biggest

high intensity local warfare waged using

program to influence the US in the 2020

advanced military technology. Following

election including targeting hacks of the US

Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on

election Infrastructure (Mason and

August 2, 1990 and a six-month build up

Psaledakis, 2020). Attorney General

thereafter of US troops and resources along

William Bar claims that in terms of electoral

Saudi Arabia’s border, coalition forces

interference, China is a bigger threat to the

launched Operation Desert Storm on

USA than Russia (ibid). As an AI leader,

January 17, 1991 to push Iraq out of Kuwait.

China has the opportunity to develop

Contrary to fears of a Vietnam-like

sophisticated online hybrid tools to use

protracted war, a ceasefire was reached after

against the US which could deteriorate

only 38 days of aerial bombardment and 100

relations, increase tensions and the

hours of ground combat (Cheung, Mahnken

possibility of an MID.

and Ross, 2011). Given only 148 members of US armed forces were killed in action, an

Case three: The Gulf War

historically low loss rate, policy analysts at the time suggested the first Gulf War marked a technologically-driven revolution in 227

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military affairs (RMA) (Biddle, 1996). For

high-speed anti-radiation missiles

this reason, foreign powers extensively

(HARMs). Both the RC-135V Rivet Joint

studied not only the enabling capabilities of

and the EC-130H Compass Call also helped

new combat systems but the importance of

gather electronic intelligence on Iraqi

joint operations and information

communications (Cordesman and Wagner,

management (Garrity, 1993).

1999).

Operation Desert Storm was the first

By integrating all dimensions of warfare into

integrated and large-scale employment of

a single operational environment, the

the F-117A stealth fighter and Tomahawk

acquisition of information technologies had

cruise missile (Rochlin and Demchak,

fundamentally altered conceptions of both

1991). For battlefield long-range

time and space (Mulvenon, 1999; Godwin,

surveillance and air defence, the Airborne

2000). Attacks on critical information nodes

Warning and Control System (AWCS), joint

proved a force multiplier. A report by the

STARS aircrafts and UAVs were used. In

Centre for National Security Studies (CNSS)

terms of space assets, the operation marked

even indicated the subsequent ability for

the first extensive use of GPS and satellites

coalition forces “to defy standard concepts

for reconnaissance, battle management,

of [attrition coefficients]... permitting deep

meteorological data and damage

strikes” (Garrity, 1993, p. 53). Ultimately

assessments (Garrity, 1993). Yet, most

the Gulf War not only exemplified the

remarkably, US forces were able to disrupt

centrality of C4ISR (Command, Control,

the enemy’s command and control systems

Communications, Computers, Intelligence,

through electronic warfare (EW). The

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) to

Americans flew nearly 200 of their EW

gaining the initiative but also determining

aircrafts: the EF-11A Raven equipped with

the outcome of war. These observations

the AN/ALQ-99E jamming subsystems and

forced the People’s Republic of China

the EA-6B Prowler, that used tactical air

(PRC) to completely overhaul their defence

launched decoys (TALDs); both targeted the

development strategy; “between January and

integrated Iraqi air defence net. In addition

May 1991 at least seven high-level meetings

to this, the F-46 Wild Weasel and F-16C

addressed the Gulf War and its implication

were able to strike Iraqi radars using

for China” (Jencks, 1992, p. 462). Defence 228

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Minister Qi Jiwei and General Nie Li both

Gulf War powerfully illustrates that states

highlighted the urgent need to invest in

exploiting emerging technologies to shift the

military science and technology R&D in

balance of power in their favour motivates

order to catch up with the US and its allies

international armament, fortifies threat

(ibid). These aspirations materialised first in

perceptions and increases uncertainty, all of

the 1993 Military Strategic Guidelines for

which induces an escalatory dynamic. This

the New Period and dramatically propelled

runs parallel to Washington's current

the Chinese procurement of information

perception of Beijing pursuing AI

technologies (Cheung, Mahnken and Ross,

technology in order to fulfill its revisionist

2011). Only eight years after Operation

goals. To this end, in creating an

Desert Storm, the DoD released a report to

environment where the likelihood of MIDs

Congress underlining the possible offensive

is heightened, this case study supports our

capabilities of China in this domain. Such

hypothesis. Evidence indicative of

operations “could include computer warfare,

first-mover advantages further corroborates

electronic warfare, and antisatellite (ASAT)

this finding. Analysing the synergistic

programs” using “ground-based stations” to

interaction of skills and technology, Biddle

“jam and to interfere with satellite

attributes Iraq’s “rapid one-sided defeat” to

communications” (Godwin, 2000, p. 24).

the fact “advanced technology raised the

The report additionally references China’s

cost of defensive error” (Biddle, 1996, p.

newly acquired ability to “track satellites

157, 163). Others have stated by

with accuracy sufficient for targeting”,

demonstrating the speed, accuracy and

ongoing research for “developing lasers as

lethality potential of military operations, the

an ASAT weapon” and the possibility that it

war indicated the necessity of offensive,

had even developed the “capability to

even pre-emptive strikes. Indeed, the PLA

damage a satellite’s optical sensor” (ibid).

have taken note of this, officially enshrining Xianfa Zhiren (“gaining the initiative by

Given that the US were markedly unsure

striking first”) as a new doctrinal concept in

about the extent the Chinese had excelled in

the 1993 modernisation guidelines (Godwin

acquiring new capabilities and additionally

2000, p. 20). General Lu Linzhi expanded

feared its offensive employment to

on the strategic principle in a 1994 paper,

undermine cross-strait relations, the first

framed as a key lesson learnt from the war 229

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arguing the loss of Iraqi Forces was largely

for effective net-assessment, weapon system

due to their “inaction” during “the prelude

cost-effectiveness analysis and force

immediately prior to the Allied offensive”

planning” and subsequently where the Iraqis

(Li, 1996, p. 457). The current integration of

fell short (Biddle, 1996, p. 178). The

AI technology into contemporary military

training of ground forces was markedly poor

operations arguably stimulates similar shifts

- in combination with other factors, the US

in the power calculus, once again increasing

were fighting a weak opponent, therefore

the speed and accuracy of attacks whilst

making it difficult to determine the effects of

effectively targeting the adversary's C4ISR

modern technology when faced with a

through enhanced EW capabilities (Johnson,

skilled adversary (ibid). The strategic value

2020). Therefore, we can reasonably deduce

of AI is therefore dependent on the ability

both China and the US are likely to focus

for the US and China to skillfully integrate

efforts on mounting offensive attacks rather

and manage AI technologies under existing

than defending existing strongholds.

command and control structures.

On the other hand, conclusions should be drawn with caution. The organisation and

Case four: The Kosovo War

co-ordination of military operations played a decisive role in the success of coalition

The example of the Kosovo War helps us to

forces. During war, weapon systems are

understand the prehistory of Chinese AI

employed concurrently, each with distinct

development and build a profile of Chinese

and narrowly defined missions and tasks

military strategy. It also shows that emerging

(Rochlin and Demchak, 1991). Although

technologies are integral to Chinese military

individually, they may confer tactical

strategy, and how their development (to a

advantages, the failure to monitor, evaluate

greater extent than has been previously

and integrate these systems in order to

appreciated) facilitates MIDs on a strategic

achieve the strategic objectives of

level.

campaigns renders technological superiority useless. This is why according to Biddle

China during The Kosovo War

“the global distribution of military skill and organisational performance is a pivotal issue 230

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The 1999 Kosovo War, lasting only 78 days,

almost entirely of a NATO bombing

can provide many insights into Chinese

campaign in Kosovo. The major stated

thinking on AI development. Ventre (2016)

objective was to reverse Serb efforts to

succinctly stated that the concept of

remove (“ethnically cleanse”) Muslims from

asymmetric warfare, arguably the essential

Kosovo (Dreyer, 2000). For the Chinese,

principle guiding recent Chinese military

however, NATO actions were seen in light

strategy on AI, became obvious to the

of decade long hostile behaviour toward

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in this war.

China led by the US, beginning with the US

Indeed, on the first page of Unrestricted

media coverage of the pro-democracy

Warfare, perhaps the key book on Chinese

demonstrations of 1989 (ibid). China argued

military philosophy in recent years, Kosovo

that the treatment of the Muslim “dissident”

is named as one of the “main subjects on

population was a purely internal affair, and

this planet for the past decade” (Liang et al.,

whilst the Serbian treatment of minorities

2018, p. 4). In addition, given the limited

was regrettable, the intervention of a third

amount of information available on current

party would be a greater crime because it

AI development in China, past examples

would violate the sovereignty of the Federal

such as this one that can illuminate Chinese

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (ibid). This

strategic thinking provide a structure within

absolutist interpretation of sovereignty by

which new fragments of information can be

the Chinese was perhaps foreseeable given

placed or tested against. Finally, as China

its own treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang

was directly involved in this conflict (their

and claims to Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Belgrade Embassy was bombed), this case study can give rare insight into China’s

Chinese protestations about foreign

geopolitical strategy as well.

intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign nation is hardly a novel affair, but

The prelude to and beginning of the war

this example remains of great benefit to the

offer the first opportunity for analysis. The

present study because this set of

Kosovo War, in this case, refers to the

circumstances closely relates to

conflict between NATO and the Federal

contemporary debates about Chinese claims

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 24

on Taiwan, Tibet and the province of

March to 11 June 1999, which consisted

Xinjiang. In 1999, China was concerned by 231

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

the precedent that “the Kosovo War could

United States knew its position, despite

set for international and especially US

claims to the contrary (Gregory, 2015).

meddling in such cases” (Kurth, 2001, p.

Steve Lee Myers, who interviewed over 30

92). This is important to note, as it is an

senior defense officials from the US, Europe

example of a set of circumstances that could

and NATO, and whose article ends with a

provoke a MID. Given that China also

quote from the then House Intelligence

subsequently became involved in an MID

Committee Chair suggesting that Pentagon

with the US, this example potentially offers

officials might have lied, also raises

insight into the possible future causality of

concerns (Myers, 2000). Finally, the

an MID in similar circumstances and the

document that profiled the target refers to

dynamics that would be involved.

the likelihood of the impact of the bombs sending shards of glass flying considerable

This MID occurred on May 7th when the

distances. That indicated analysts were able

Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was

to distinguish the embassy's marble and

“accidentally” bombed by the US. The

glass structure. The “intended” target, on the

initial explanation given was that it was an

other hand, was made of white stone

accident, caused by outdated maps that had

(Myers, 2000).

been used to guide the bombing raid. This was later refuted, given that the embassy

An alternative explanation, initially

was listed at the correct location on US

published by the Guardian and a Danish

maps, and that the bombs landed 440m away

newspaper, alleged that the US had launched

from their stated objective, a very unlikely

the attack intentionally because an

“accident” for such precise weapons.

intelligence post had been established within

Indeed, Joint Direct Attack Munition

the embassy grounds. According to the

GPS-guided weapons were used, known as

articles, China had been sharing intelligence

the “weapon of choice for the most sensitive

with FRY forces, transmitting military

of targets”, and carried by the B-2 stealth

communications and monitoring cruise

bomber, which had only been brought into

missile attacks to develop effective

service in 1997 (Vickers, 2001, p. 194).

countermeasures (Sweeney, Holsoe and

Furthermore, American diplomats had

Vulliamy, 1999; Gregory, 2015) ''It is -- or

previously visited the embassy, so the

was -- considered the major collection 232

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

platform for Europe,'' a senior defense

NATO and its procedures,'' (Whitney, 1999,

official said at the time (Myers, 2000, para.

para. 2). Thus, this was a direct attack by the

95). It seems an incredible coincidence that

Americans on the Chinese, but it did not

an error of this magnitude resulted in the

lead to any further escalation beyond the

accurate elimination of a supposedly mahor

realm of diplomacy, even though Chinese

Chinese intelligence collection point.

military officials remained deeply suspicious

Unfortunately, given the lack of information

and unconvinced by the official explanation

and geopolitical sensitivity of the bombing

(Myers, 2000). Although this lack of

that colours the available sources, and the

escalation presumably partly resulted from a

fact that these are mostly newspaper reports,

lack of conclusive evidence, or

no conclusive evidence exists that confirms

circumstantial evidence, which only

or disproves either explanation. However,

appeared later, it seems reasonable to

the circumstantial evidence presented here

suggest that China would have taken into

seems to strongly suggest that the alternative

account American geopolitical dominance

explanation offered by British journalists

and the need to manage diplomatic relations

and some officials is much more likely than

in order to gain accession to the WTO. From

the official US explanation.

an American point of view, the damage was repaired, “in fairly short order” (Smith,

It is also interesting to note that in this case

2009, p. 23). Whilst we cannot say

America acted unilaterally, outside the

definitively that this was an intentional

NATO framework. B-2 bombers from

direct attack, if it had been, it would not be

Whiteman Air Force Base were used, which

unreasonable to argue that the American

America managed itself, independent of

politicians would have sanctioned the strike

NATO’s combined air tasking order

because the likelihood of Chinese escalation

(Gregory, 2015). The suggestion that

was lower, in view of the strike’s location,

America acted outside the NATO framework

timing and American geopolitical

is backed up by a report from the French

dominance. This, albeit “hypothetical”,

Ministry of Defense, which stated that “the

sequence of events is interesting because it

conclusion cannot be avoided that part of the

gives further insight into what conditions

military operations were conducted by the

could facilitate a future MID and highlights

United States outside the strict framework of

the primacy of geopolitical factors. 233

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advancements in China could increase the Additionally, the role of emerging

risk of a militarised interstate dispute

technologies, in this case the JDAM bombs

between the US and China as they improve

and B-2 aircraft, offers another opportunity

weapon precision and efficiency, but only in

to examine other factors that could impact

specific circumstances, when the risk that a

the dynamics of a potential future MID.

strike leads to retaliation or escalation is

Theoretically, as the accuracy of missiles

lower or when circumstances necessitate a

and bombs is expected to improve with

strike.

increased AI integration because simultaneously the possibility of

China after the Kosovo War

“accidental” strikes will decrease and the assumption of intention rise, thus with it the

The value of this case study, however, lies

significance of any strike. On the other

not only in an analysis of the embassy

hand, if strikes become more significant,

bombing, but also in examining China’s own

strategists may use them less regularly, for

intense study of the fighting afterwards. A

fear of the risk of escalation, instead

flurry of articles and books had already

deploying them when the risk of retaliation

appeared by the end of 1999 examining how

seems less likely for other reasons or when

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)

conditions necessitate it. Thus, such a strike

and its military forces were able to survive

would only be desirable if other factors,

78 days of intense bombing by a vastly

primarily geopolitical, ideological and

superior enemy, both in terms of strength

domestic, make it favourable or necessary.

and technology, with minimal casualties and

Therefore, the sequence of events contained

damage to their own equipment. China was

in this case study provides the opportunity to

especially interested in US military

investigate how emerging technologies

weaknesses that the Yugoslavs had

could affect the dynamics of MIDs caused

identified. If the PLA could adapt their

by airborne strikes, and whilst the bombing

tactics and strategy to benefit from this

of the Belgrade Embassy cannot fully

knowledge, they could potentially reach

substantiate the argument presented, it

superiority quicker and create a longer

strongly suggests its accuracy. This then

lasting military hegemony.

helps to refine our hypothesis. AI 234

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It should be stated from the outset, as one

weaponry military success would be

General made clear at the time, that "China

increasingly difficult. The fighters of

is not Yugoslavia" (Dreyer, 2000, p. 10).

Yugoslav Air Force were obviously inferior

However, whilst the nature of this conflict

to US fighters such as F-15 and F-16, so

might have been different, America did play

20% of Yugoslav MiG-21s and 62 % of

a key role, and thus this example gives great

Yugoslav MiG-29s were lost in the first few

insight into the tactics that the PLA could

days (Yoshiaki and Katsuhiko, 2002).

expect US forces to employ in future. This is the framework within which we The main Chinese breakthrough was in

ought to view the development of Chinese

recognising that, “the result of any future

“information” and then “intelligent” military

war would be defined by the tension

technology, the direct antecedents of

between utilizing the latest military

military AI. Chinese strategists knew that

technologies and developing the greatest

they could not achieve military parity in the

combat capability or effectiveness of current

near future because matching the financial

weapons”, as Fu Quanyou, Chief of the

resources that the US had sunk into

General Staff of the PLA wrote in August

researching and developing advanced

1999 (Yoshiaki and Katsuhiko, 2002, p. 6).

weapons would risk financial ruin, as it had

The US had clearly relied on the most

in the USSR. The PLA thus utilised the

advanced weapons to secure victory, but

“experience” of the Kosovo War to construct

asymmetrical countermeasures that

an alternative strategy for the development

maximised the capability of existing

of military technology that would allow it to

technology had proven their ability to bridge

remain effective in battle and move towards

the technological divide. An example is the

parity at a sustainable rate. This strategy

false heat signatures used by the Yugoslavs

would seek to contest American

to confuse guided missiles (Ventre, 2016);

technological superiority in specific areas

this low-cost solution proved to be very

identified by researchers as key. It would

effective (ibid). This allowed FRY forces in

then seek to maximise the combat

this case, but perhaps the PLA in future, to

effectiveness of existing weapons and find

manipulate US tactics. On the other hand, it

lower-cost solutions to curb American

was also clear that without some advanced

superiority in other areas. This was the 235

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genesis of strategies such as “selective

hasty conclusions that underestimate

leapfrogging” and the development of

Chinese military strategy. Whilst

so-called “Assassin’s Mace” weaponry, but

technological advancements, for example

most importantly for this study, the intense

the development of AI, facilitate MIDs on a

investment in AI, as Fu Quanyou, a PLA

tactical level, they have profoundly

general in 1999, had already identified

impacted military strategy as well. This

information and intelligent technology as

technology cannot be viewed in isolation

one such key area that would define future

from wider military strategy because to do

conflict (ibid). In studying this case study,

so would increase the likelihood of

the context within which AI development

misinterpreting its development and usage

began and the reasons for this, become clear.

as some in the US have done. The example

This is helpful firstly because it provides

of the Kosovo War proves not only that,

researchers with a framework with which to

“technology determines tactics” (Kania,

understand recent Chinese uses of military

2017a, p. 15), but also that technology

AI, but also to predict its future uses. As this

determines strategy, and therefore can

example shows, China believes that

facilitate MIDs on a strategic level as well.

information and intelligent technology can be used to directly contest US military

Case five: The assassination of Qassem

superiority, so it would be reasonable to

Soleimani

argue that the development of AI increases the likelihood of a MID with the US, given

This case study once again demonstrates

what the example of the Kosovo War reveals

how new technologies can increase the risk

about Chinese strategy.

of MIDs, though not without an underlying political dispute.

It is also important to understand this prehistory of Chinese AI development,

On 3 January 2020, the US conducted a

highlighted by the example of the Kosovo

targeted drone strike killing Qassem

War, in order to situate it in a longer history

Soleimani, leader of the Quds Force of

of Chinese military strategy and understand

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

how the emergence of new technologies

and widely seen as the second most

influences strategy. In this way we can avoid

powerful person in Iran after the Supreme 236

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Leader Ali Khamenei. An MQ-9 Reaper

technology which presented this opportunity

drone was used to carry out the attack, a

for the US, reshaping the cost-benefit

highly sophisticated airborne technology

calculation. The Reaper drone allowed the

which can identify individuals to target from

possibility of killing Soleimani without

up to a few kilometres away. The

launching a prolonged air campaign or

assassination was carried out near Baghdad

ground invasion, and arguably fell below the

International Airport, in Iraq. In the

threshold of war (Brunstetter, 2020). As

aftermath, Iran conducted a missile strike on

such, a new technology altered the calculus:

an American base in Iraq, though localised

it created a first-mover advantage for the

such that there were no US casualties.

US, offering it the up-side of weakening Iran

Tensions have remained high since, but

without the downside of going to war.

there has been no other military action carried out by Iran, at the time of writing.

Whilst the technology enabled a quick strike, it also carried the threat of many

In this case, advancements in technology

more strikes, and in this sense, it only

appear to have increased the risk of military

reinforced the first-mover advantage by

attack in the US-Iran conflict due to the

further disincentivizing any Iranian

first-mover advantages created by advanced

retaliation. This is what Vilmer (2020) calls

drone technology, which have incentivised

the “compellent” effect of drone strikes,

and enabled Soleimani’s assassination. As

arguing that when they are carried out

such, the emergence of modern military

effectively and credibly, they imply the

drone technology over the last decade or so

potential for further escalation if necessary.

provides past precedent for Payne's (2018)

Indeed, in the aftermath of Soleimani’s

prediction that emerging AI technologies

assassination, President Trump issued a

could overwhelm militaries simply by

threat that the US would target 52 Iranian

attacking first. In this case, the US

cultural sites, presumably using similar

significantly weakened the Iranian military’s

technology, in the event of any retaliation.

ability to retaliate without Soleimani, with his personal networks and contacts widely

At the same time, we should stress caution

seen as crucial to Iran’s operations beyond

regarding any conclusion that an effective

its borders. It is the nature of the new 237

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first-mover strategy has truly been created

to have opted not to retaliate since the

for the US in this case.

largely symbolic strike on the American base in Iraq, on another occasion it might

Firstly, the assassination was relatively

have chosen differently. As Jervis (2020) has

recent, and it is still impossible to say with

pointed out, “Iran may choose acquiescence

certainty whether the US will suffer any

as the path most in its interest, but this

downside as a result of the attack. Militarily,

indeed a choice”. Bold first-movers, then,

it remains to be seen whether Iran will

may never have complete certainty of the

retaliate, which could include acting via any

extent of any advantage they possess.

of its proxies in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in

The assassination of Soleimani also usefully

Yemen. In other spheres, Chiş-Manolache

demonstrates that new technology can

and Chiş (2020) suggest that it is “more than

enable military strikes but does not cause it

likely” that Iran will choose to retaliate in

to occur without an accompanying political

cyberspace, attacking US government sites

cause. The very existence of a first-mover

and conducting misinformation campaigns

advantage does not necessitate it being

on social media. Already prior to the

carried out without an underlying political

assassination, Iran engaged in these

reason to do so. The Reaper drone did not

activities, posing as an independent US

alone cause the US to attack Iran and the

media organisation (“Liberty Free Press”)

conflict has been ongoing for many decades.

and operating hundreds of fake accounts

In this sense, the development of military

(Fire Eye, 2018). It remains to be seen

drone technology alone is not sufficient to

whether there is any effective retaliation in

explain the Soleimani killing.

this or other spheres and therefore whether an effective first-mover advantage really

Still, we might ask: would the US have been

was created.

able to kill Soleimani without the available technology? One might be tempted to think

Secondly, even if an effective first-mover

that, if it were not for the Reaper’s ability to

advantage was created, relying on its logic is

detect Soleimani from range, the US would

to assume the rationality of other actors.

have found another way to assassinate him.

Whilst, at the time of writing, Iran appears

In the case of Soleimani, it is impossible to 238

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say. Nonetheless, in the wider context of the

technologies can shift the balance of power

War on Terror, Banka and Quinn (2018)

between states.

have argued that whilst there would have been targeted killings without drone

In the case of power balance between the US

technology, there would have been fewer of

and China, the supremacy of American

them. This is because more such targeted

military is currently being threatened by

killings can be carried out in more difficult

China’s AI goals. As was seen in the Cold

circumstances, by significantly reducing

War between the Soviet Union and the US,

logistical challenges and associated risk.

developments in nuclear technology led to

This is reflected in the data, which suggests

heightened paranoia and tension,

that a huge number of drone strike

exacerbating the risk of MIDs. Given this

assassinations have been carried out by the

history and applying it to modern

US in the Middle East between 2008 and

technological trends, it is not unreasonable

2015 (The Center for the Study of the

to speculate that a similar relationship may

Drone, 2015).

emerge between the US and China. The 2030 deadline China has set to become the

DISCUSSION AND

world’s leader in AI technology may very

RECOMMENDATIONS

well come to fruition as studies indicate steady increases in the quality of the nation’s

Technological development is an important

AI research (O’Meara, 2019).

driver of change, especially in the arena of international relations and militarization

According to the Information Technology

(Johnson, 2020). This has been

and Innovation Foundation, the US currently

demonstrated through the previously

leads in AI development, however, China is

discussed case studies which illuminate how,

quickly reducing this gap, and could

although AI development at times appears to

potentially surpass the US in the next few

be new territory, in many ways the trends of

years (Castro and McLaughlin, 2021). In

the past can be used to answer the questions

this way, many parallels can be drawn

of the future. In particular, the nuclear arms

between the current AI competition between

race between the US and the USSR presents

these two world powers and the nuclear

valuable insight on how emerging

arms race during the Cold War period. To 239

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

propose that the threat the US perceived the

such as Russia and Iran, raising American

Soviet Union to be has now been replaced

fears of disruptive political technology

by China, would not be unreasonable given

usage (BBC News, 2020).

the fact that China’s military budget and AI development ranks second in the world

The 2020 election in the US is not the only

following the US (Roberts et al., 2020).

recent event raising concerns over AI

American military supremacy is thus in a

potentially catalysing an MID between the

state of fragile transition as AI development

US and China. The US drone strike which

in China disrupts the current balance of

resulted in the assassination of Qassem

powers. However, it should be noted that AI

Soleimani demonstrates American

presents its own unique challenges that

willingness to utilize AI technology in a

cannot fully be explained by the

military capacity (Vick, 2020). The death of

ramifications of nuclear technological

the Iranian general at the hands of the

developments.

American military sent a message to the world detailing what America was capable

Outside of nuclear technology, hybrid

of and willing to do. Of course, it is

warfare presents similar topics of interest

important to note that this drone strike was

that might shed light on how the evolution

carried out under President Trump’s

of AI technology could lead to future

administration. Whether the recently elected

conflict between the US and China.

president, Joe Biden, will adopt a similar

Although it can be said that AI will

policy to the previous administration in

predominantly facilitate MIDs on a tactical

regard to states such as Iran and China are

level, there is also evidence to suggest that

yet to be determined. More time will need to

these new technological developments will

pass in Biden’s administration to

result in the further expansion of political

reconstitute the world’s collective

technology and hybrid warfare. China has

understanding of American military strategy.

already engaged in hybrid warfare in the

It remains, however, that Soleimani’s

South China Sea (Heath, 2019). Similarly,

assassination reveals significant implications

there is evidence to suggest that in the

surrounding AI military usage, namely the

American election of 2020, China attempted

need for a political catalyst before action is

to influence the results along with nations

taken. This is best examined through the 240

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

many similarities between the American and

specifically in regard to the increasing cost

Chinese military, particularly in the realm of

of defense error and changing concepts of

the “War on Terror”. In the US, this has

operation. This illustrates how tactical rather

manifested itself in the establishment of

than strategic warfare will most likely be

Project Maven which is “an

favored in regard to MIDs as a result of AI,

algorithmic-warfare team” designed “to

particularly in any conflict which emerges

examine how AI might support US

between the US and China. The Gulf War of

counterterrorism operations in Syria'', a

1991 also reveals trends surrounding

conflict where US involvement has resulted

Chinese defense planning and strategy,

in the death of hundreds of civilians

which could be seen as a threat to the US,

(Sherlock, Al-Arian and Sadoun, 2018;

exacerbating MIDs between the two nations.

Johnson, 2019, p. 152). In China, this could

Contingent on this, however, is a nation’s

be used to explain the persecution of the

effective employment of AI technology. If a

Uyghur population, as AI surveillance

state has weak strategic and military

technology in the name of antiterrorist

capabilities, AI will be unable to make up

measures has been used to place Uyghur

for this difference. In the case of a conflict

people in concentration camps (Çaksu,

between the US and China, the PLA’s

2020). AI, in these two examples, was used

emphasis on honing their “information

as a tool to achieve a similar political goal:

dominance” in an effort to craft better

combatting what the two nations would

military AI strategy could serve to

describe as terrorism. Given the similar

exacerbate the US’s fears over shifting

nature of the two political agendas, which

power with China (Kania, 2019).

showcase the nations’ AI capabilities, there remains the possibility that this will be

The Kosovo War is another conflict which

viewed as a threat to both the US and China,

highlights how advanced technologies can

further expediting their chances of engaging

serve to further the risk of MIDs. In

in conflict with one another.

particular, this conflict illuminated the PLA’s military strategy which provides

Correspondingly, the Gulf War of 1991

valuable information on how a conflict

exemplifies the shift in the balance of power

could develop between the US and China in

that may result from AI development,

the near future. More importantly, however, 241

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the Kosovo War takes into consideration the

Regulating the military employment of AI

tactical vs strategic nature of what can be

doesn’t necessarily equate to the

expected from the PLA in a conflict that

establishment of an international treaty

may arise between China and the US.

banning fully autonomous weapons, as often

Specifically, this conflict indicated that

discussed. Contemporary operations

developments in military technology, while

typically incorporate technology where only

mainly facilitating more tactical warfare,

partial functions are automated, such as

should not underpin the strategic

target acquisition, and have been conducted

implications that technology such as AI

in violation of existing laws. This is evident

could determine (Webster et al., 2017).

with the case of Soleimani; crucially, it was a targeted killing outside the setting of war

Policy Recommendations Given the heightened risk of MIDs alongside an increasingly uncertain strategic environment, it's crucial for policymakers to

and in the absence of an immediate threat to the US, breaching both international humanitarian law and the prohibition on the use of force under the UN Charter.

mitigate the effects of ongoing

In the longer term, the UNSC must take a

developments in AI and their military

stronger, more consistent commitment to

application. On the basis of our research

international law, charters and conventions

findings, there are four key policy

governing the conduct of armed conflict,

recommendations that follow which are

with the aim to setting good precedent.

specifically directed at the United Nations

Legally, article 36 of protocol one,

Security Council (UNSC), given its role as a

additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention is

key mediator in international conflict and

most relevant: maintaining that the

the involvement of both China and the

acquisition and use of new weapons should

United States as permanent members.

comply with existing international

Strengthening international legal frameworks and norms of compliance, both at an intentional and domestic level

humanitarian law, prohibiting them in cases where attacks are indiscriminate and inflict unnecessary suffering (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of

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Victims of International Armed Conflicts

Intelligence Initiative in order to work

(Protocol 1), n.d.). While China has largely

towards delineating the boundaries and

aligned with these principles, ratifying the

limits of weaponizing AI more clearly.

convention, supporting multilateral talks on

Historically, as exemplified by the Gulf War

autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and

in 1991, emerging technologies have

acknowledging the strategic uncertainty

muddied accepted rules of engagement. The

heightened by non-compliance to IHL, the

lack of established norms, which contribute

Americans have been less willing (Stopping

towards the uncertainty of an adversary’s

Killer Robots: Country Positions on

bargaining leverage, remains a fundamental

Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons and

source of instability.

Retaining Human Control, 2020). Here the debate has largely been limited to keeping humans in the decision-making loop, as outlined in the DOD’s 2012 directive 3000.09, rather than their action’s effects (MacCarthy, 2019). The Soleimani case study also highlights the importance of strengthening legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms protecting the territorial sovereignty of “proxy” states. Soleimani was assassinated on Iraqi, rather than Iranian soil, violating the Iraqi Constitution and US-Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement. The failure of the Iraqi parliament to expel US troops further sets the standard of relative impunity. In addition, the UNSC must work more closely with International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations such as the Ethics and Governance of Artificial

II.

Addressing information asymmetries through mechanisms that encourage transparency over US and Chinese AI capabilities

Information asymmetries have proven an important prelude to MIDs. The costs of misinterpretation and distorted suspicions have already been exemplified by the Cold War; the view of depth charges forcing soviet submarines to the surface as an all-out attack and the accidental movement of a spy plane into Soviet airspace as a preemptive nuclear strike, were both misjudgments triggering militarised clashes between the two superpowers. This is also true for the Gulf War case study; the DoD report to Congress, in reaction to China’s rapid procurement of information technologies, illustrated US uncertainty over the success of China’s military R&D programme and 243

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subsequent intentions to undermine

regulations. Platforms should reinforce

cross-strait relations. The UNSC must work

efforts that identify, challenge, report and

to improve the level of information sharing

remove disinformation spread via bots and

within the military R&D realm between the

trolls.

US and China, two of its permanent members. For example, both countries could be encouraged to allow the UNSC to commission AI and military experts to investigate and publicly report on the developments made by both countries’ militaries and the impact those developments could have on future battlefields. III.

Existing measures illustrate increasing pressure on the commercial policing of the online media space: Facebook’s 2019 memo outlined initiatives to help reduce the spread of fake accounts and misinformation, through updating the policy on user authentication, labelling state-controlled media, investing $2 million to support media literacy projects are just a few examples

Building institutional resilience and

(Guy, 2019). Similarly, tweets deemed

systems of deterrence against

synthetic, manipulated or deceptively

AI-driven Hybrid Warfare

spreading information, have had their

Provided that AI enhanced Hybrid Warfare warfare increases the likelihood of MIDs, it's important that this particular manifestation of the AI threat is countered. Indeed, the US and Western institutions, such as NATO, have been criticised for their ineffective methods of response. Going forward, the UNSC must learn to identify hybrid war tactics in the political and informational realm, quickly and accurately, in order to build a better defence system. Given social media is a popular medium for such activity, one option would be for the government to increase pressure for tighter

visibility restricted and warnings issued over retweets (Roth and Achuthan, 2020). Tension still exists over the extent this kind of censorship impedes on free speech; consistent implementation is also an issue. Supporting good governance practices and institutional resilience also creates an environment resistant to hybrid warfare tactics, much of which can be aided by civil society-military cooperation (Falk, 2020). The EU’s ongoing work with EaPs is a sound example of what this may look like national reports on existing and potential hybrid threats, joint declarations,

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conferences, discussions and roundtables

diplomatic channels would be relevant here,

with the participation of official bodies

but as the Kosovo case study suggests, the

responsible for preventing hybrid warfare

US also needs to operate more responsibly

(Gogolashvili, 2019). The UNSC can head

and multilaterally, sensitive to wider values

similar initiatives which emphasize a

that underpin Chinese foreign policy.

bottom-up approach to capacity building.

Chinese involvement in Kosovo, which

Furthermore, until present, the modus operandi of Hybrid Warfare has relied on circumventing international law by operating under the threshold of war. To undercut plausible deniability, a more concerted effort should be made towards holding those responsible accountable. As the case study on Russia’s interference in 2016 presidential elections shows, the US has thus far failed to clarify how it will respond and challenge Hybrid Warfare threats in the future. This constitutes a huge vulnerability that the US should seek to rectify in earnest. IV.

Targeting political tensions as the root of MIDs

Crucially, AI technology seems to act as an enabler rather than a critical driver of conflict. Therefore, the priority for policymakers should be the direct reduction of underlying political tensions that currently motivate interstate conflict. Concentrating resources and efforts to

ultimately resulted in a MID, was informed by absolutist interpretations of sovereignty. The US choice to operate through NATO, viewed by China as a body created to defend Western political ideology, allowed them to frame the conflict in ideological terms. As its military superiority and geopolitical dominance becomes less assured, US leadership needs to take greater account of how its actions abroad will be understood by China. One way of preventing a MID in similar circumstances would be to operate through the UNSC rather than NATO in order to avoid framing a potential conflict as ideological and in turn reducing the risk of escalation. Limitations The case studies are of great value in exploring how military AI might facilitate MIDs. However, they are susceptible to several limitations that need to be considered to fully understand the extent to which they can be mapped onto any future

245

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

conflict between the United States and

occurring through social

China:

media and information i.

systems rather than

Military AI might

through physical

be different to previous

weaponry.

manifestations of emerging military

ii.

Several case

technology in that it may

studies refer to disputes

not operate in a

that occurred between the

geographic space in the

United States and parties

same way that previous

other than China. The

forms of military

nuclear standoff occurred

technology have. For

between the US and the

example, nuclear

USSR and whilst it is

weapons and military

well acknowledged that

bases are visible

China is as equally

demonstrations of threat

engaged in hybrid

and power whereas AI

warfare as Russia (Morris

might be more subtle.

et al., 2019), most of our

Similarly, it may be

understanding of how

harder to position

hybrid warfare might be

emerging military AI in a

waged against the United

way that is provocative or

States comes from the

with the obvious intention

example of Russia

of attempting to alter the

spreading disinformation

power balance. This

and undermining

limitation is less

democratic systems

applicable to the example

during the 2016

of hybrid warfare, which

Presidential election

amply demonstrates the

through the IRA. The

possibility of conflict

assassination of Qassem

246

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Soleimani highlights a

consider the relationship

conflict between the

between China and the

United States and an

US and how the former’s

obviously inferior

view of the latter’s

military force, Iran.

intervention was based on

Whilst they all provide

political ideology, foreign

valuable frameworks for

ambitions, and an

understanding the means

absolutist interpretation

by which military

of sovereignty, it is

technology can facilitate

important to understand

tactical MIDs, it is not

that the power dynamics

convincing to map the

between the two

actions of Iran, Russia

superpowers have shifted

and the USSR onto 21st

rapidly since; China has

century China and

mostly closed the gap to

suggest they would have

the U.S in terms of

acted identically in each

military technology and

situation. Especially with

capabilities. However, a

regards to the

knowledge of this prior

assassination of a major

development remains of

political and military

use and will be invaluable

leader (Soleimani) where

in helping to narrow

the difference in military

down the future course of

capabilities between the

Chinese policy on AI and

United States and Iran

understand its potential

prevented the latter from

deployment in military

undertaking significant

scenarios.

retaliation. iii.

Whilst the Kosovo case study does directly

247

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

power and utilise it to advance its interests in geopolitically sensitive regions such as the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, or economically lucrative ones as with its “Digital Silk Road” policy. Meanwhile, the US continues to take steps to increase its CONCLUSION

arsenal of new technology and has been deploying drone strikes for over a decade. In

If we assume that, at least in some cases like

light of the effect of new technology on

facial recognition and certain

states’ perception of each other’s intentions

decision-making algorithms, the same AI

and the calculus of offensive strategies, this

technology will have both military and

paper has adopted a realist framework.

commercial applications, then proliferation

Realism provides value in unpacking how

seems to be a given. As such, in this paper,

conflict can be driven by the need to

we have not focused on ways to prevent

maintain competitiveness in the struggle for

actors from acquiring military AI

dominance of the international stage.

applications. Rather, assuming that proliferation will occur, we have considered:

We have argued that the development of AI

(a) the impact this proliferation will have;

increases the risk of an MID between China

and (b) how any negative effects of such

and the US. Through our exploratory

proliferation may be consequently

approach, we provide an illustration of the

prevented.

various circumstances under which an MID, facilitated by advanced weaponry, might

Both the US and China are cognizant of the

arise, and why. Where there is both build-up

comparative advantage linked to being the

of military capabilities and increasing

first to develop military AI capabilities, so it

suspicion as to the other’s intentions, MIDs

appears likely that both actors will continue

can happen even by accident, as

to incorporate AI into their militaries. China

demonstrated by the case study of the Cold

has aggressively pursued the adoption of AI

War. But as shown by the more recent case

into its army, seeing the opportunity to

studies considered in this paper, where

potentially “leapfrog” the US in military

capabilities afford opportunities for bold, 248

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

offensive strategies, they can be readily

of historical case studies. As such, one

exploited by superpowers vying for global

avenue for further research may be to: (a)

influence, leading to MIDs. We have

consider a range of cases within one

identified four clear policy

particular region; or (b) consider one

recommendations on the basis of these case

particular case in a range of different

studies aimed at mitigating the arbitrary or

regions, in each case to generate more

destructive use of AI.

concrete comparisons between case studies. At the same time, these case studies

Notwithstanding, there may be other effects

ultimately relate to different technologies

of new technology which are better

and AI applications may present different

identified by adopting different frameworks.

challenges. Although these largely historical

For example, we have briefly considered

examples are helpful in drawing out certain

potential ideological bases for increased

patterns of behaviour, future research may

China-US competition over AI superiority,

also wish to focus on the new technology’s

which appear to be considerable. Any such

impact on present-day China-US contexts,

competition is also bound to be at least

such as conflict in the South China Sea. In

partly shaped by the two powers’

addition, as we learn more about the nature

conceptions for the international order,

of the emerging technologies themselves,

particularly if China continues to push for

comparative studies on the implications of

greater prominence in a “bipolar” world

China and the US adopting a specific

order alongside the US (Ruizhi, 2020). As a

application, such as deep-sea AI colonies,

result, future research may wish to look into

will prove useful. Our study therefore aims

the country-specific effects of AI

to contribute to the developing debate on AI

advancements on China and/or the US, for

in international relations, and there is much

which other frameworks (notably

more ground to cover for future researchers.

constructivism) may be more helpful.

The sooner that scholarship and policy catch up with the technology’s development, the

There are also many other avenues for

better our chances of understanding the

further research. Since our methodology has

potentially transformative impact AI will

been exploratory in nature, it has taken the

have on international conflicts, and of

first step by analysing a broad cross-section 249

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

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EXPLORING THE LEVEL OF AMBITION IN THE UK’S GREEN RECOVERY PLAN

Research Lead: Harvey Tebay Team Members: Romane Audéoud, Helena Bogner, Charles Cohen, Sam Glendenning, Nicholas Ng, Andrew Simpson 263

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Abstract

was undertaken, as conclusions were built from the data, rather than tested through

This paper aims to evaluate the UK’s ‘10

hypotheses. Results show that the UK’s

Point Plan for a Green Industrial

green recovery plan is significantly more

Revolution’, released in November 2020,

cross-cutting than the rest, including the

side by side with the German

widest range of measures over a number of

‘Konjunkturprogramm für alle in

different sectors. Other countries

Deutschland’, the French ‘Plan de

outperform the UK in specific sectors such

relance’, as well as the Japanese green

as France in the Environment Sector,

recovery strategy. These plans outline the

Germany’s focus on hydrogen as a

measures taken to achieve a green

subcategory in the Renewable Energy

recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic

Sector or Japan’s focus on the research and

respectively, allowing for an archival

development of numerous renewable

research strategy. In accordance with the

energy technologies.

attention given to ambition and nationally determined contribution (NDC’s) of the

1. Introduction

Paris agreement, this paper focuses on the ambition of the recovery plan of each of

In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic

the 4 counties, comparing them through

began to spread at record-breaking levels,

looking at the overall areas of

destabilizing

Transportation, Buildings, Environment,

economies and forcing historical changes

Industry, Green Finance and Renewable

in policy throughout the world. Today, we

Energy. Ambition is assessed through the

find ourselves in a state of recovery and

policy instruments, used in the plans.

with it, new plans emerge in order to bring

Policy instruments were chosen as the unit

much needed change. In November 2020,

of analysis, as a mono-method, as they

one

would allow seeing where the four

influential

countries’ focus of attention lies and to

published by the UK government: The

determine whether countries are being

‘Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial

more ambitious than others, within each of

Revolution’. It hopes to meet previously

the subcategories. An inductive approach

established net zero emission goals, whilst

even the most resilient

the

most

environmentally

post-COVID-19 plans

was

264

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

aiding

the

recovery of

a wounded

post-pandemic economy.

industrial production that resulted in a

The implementation of the Ten Point Plan “ensures

that

our

recovery

from

coronavirus will be green, generate jobs and bolster the economy, whilst continuing to drive down emissions both now and in the future” (BEIS, 2020a). This builds on the UK’s already existing commitment to the Paris Agreement, which includes the recently released Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), committing the UK to

reduce

68%

economy-wide

greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (BEIS, 2020b). 2021 promises to be a year of recovery as the UK takes on the role of President-Designate

investments, private consumption and

the

26th

Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow. The UK government is committed to working together with all countries, alongside civil society and the private sector, to inspire climate action as a mean to recovery (COP26, 2021).

decrease of the global economic growth. The global growth contraction for 2020 was estimated at -3.5 percent by the IMF. The UK’s real GDP has suffered an annual percent change of -10.0 in 2020, based on the

IMF

World

Economic

Outlook

estimate (IMF, 2020: 2-4). UK GDP growth has indeed been severely impacted in 2020, plummeting from £529,031 million in the first quarter of 2020 to £428,307 million in the second quarter of the same year, thus marking the biggest decrease in a quarter over the past ten years. Although economic growth has resumed, the country has not yet returned to the level of the first quarter of 2020, with its GDP reaching £502,253 million at the end of 2020 (Office for National Statistics, 2021). As countries are drafting policy packages to tackle the crisis and revive their economies, an opportunity is presented for states to enter the next decade with a clean slate. They can

The

economic

consequences

the

consider economic recovery in hand with

COVID outbreak are numerous, with

environmental issues: a green recovery,

nations

recession,

which the OECD defines as “potential to

acquisition of significant public debt and

create opportunities for income, jobs and

increasing unemployment. The global

growth, and at the same time accelerate

economy has been struck by a decline in

action

experiencing

deep

medium

and

long-term 265

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

environmental goals, both national and

in the energy sector, with the prospect of

global” (OECD, 6 October 2020).

becoming the world’s leading supplier and has allocated 7 billion euros (£6 billion) to

Other crises have shed light on the

this new industry. France is dedicating

importance of including green stimulus in

almost a third of its 100 billion euros

economic strategies. In the aftermath of

(£85,6

the 2008 financial crisis, it became clear

transitioning to green energy in order to

that combining environmental policies

become the “first great decarbonized

with

economy in Europe” (Dossier de Presse,

traditional

economic

recovery

measures produced a stronger economic

billion)

recovery

budget

France Relance, p 12-14).

recovery, with greater job creation and societal

wellbeing,

traditional

The economic recovery that will follow

recovery measures on their own (OECD,

the pandemic presents an opportunity to

Argawala et al. 2020). It is also an

place greater emphasis on climate change

opportunity for governments to meet their

mitigation.

international environmental targets. As

government’s

shown

Nationally

than

August

2020

OECD

Considering

the

commitment Determined

British to

the

Contribution

preliminary analysis, 30 OECD countries

(NDC), this paper seeks to analyze the

have embraced the idea of a green

UK’s ‘Ten Point Plan for a Green

recovery in their post-COVID recovery

Industrial Revolution’, in comparison with

plans. The focus is mostly on the energy

France’s Plan de Relance, Germany’s

and transport sectors, with measures

‘Konjunkturprogramm

including incentives for green transport

Deutschland’

development,

implementing green recoveries. We assess

households and further development of

the ambition of the British government by

renewable energy installations (OECD, 6

focusing on the policy instruments used in

October 2020).

the recovery strategy. In Section 2, we

energy

efficiency

für

alle

and Japan’s actions in

assess the current debates on green growth For instance, in its Konjunkturprogramm

and green recovery in the academic

für alle in Deutschland, Germany is

literature. In Section 3, we describe the

focusing on the opportunities of hydrogen

methodology used in order to assess the 266

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

ambition of the Ten Point Plan. In Section

grouped in five areas: transportation,

4, we present the results. In Section 5, we

buildings, renewable energy, environment

discuss

and green finance. Finally, we provide a

the four

countries’ recovery

strategies, where the ten points are

conclusion in Section 6.

2. Literature Review

Literature comparing different countries’

mention the OECD report from Agrawal,

recovery plans after the Covid-19 crisis is

Dussaux and Monti (2020) who assesses

currently poor, as the crisis is not yet over,

the different strategies of green stimulus

and the recovery action plans have not yet

packages introduced in response to the

been fully implemented. &

global financial crisis and highlights the importance of integrating public policy

As example of research that has led to

evaluation mechanisms for green stimulus

cross-country comparisons of the green

measures. Another example is the work of

recovery plan after the 2008 crisis, we can

Barbier (2020) who compares the US and

267

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

South Korea after the 2009 crisis and

(Jackson et al. 2019; Peters et al. 2020).

concludes the importance of a long-term

Therefore,

commitment

Covid-19, currently it is crucial to not

public spending and

pricing reform.

despite

the

emphasis

neglect the other crisis, which we are and have been facing for a while, namely

However, we will focus on this section in

Climate Change.

reviewing the numerous studies on the benefits of "greening" recoveries, in order

The developments of green approaches to

to enable us to assess in our research paper

recovery packages have called for a “green

the green recovery strategy of France,

stimulus” or a “green new deal”, efforts

England and Japan with greater accuracy

reminiscent of calls for recovery in the

and relevance.

wake of the global financial crisis 2008 (Strand and Toman, 2010:2). The rationale

This

research

200

for this green approach, holds that the

green

disruption caused by the pandemic offers

recoveries, these were then filtered down

an opportunity to integrate calls for a

further to remove duplicates.

greener economy and politics, for the

relevant

strategy

articles

returned

relating

benefit of current and future generations In October 2018, the Intergovernmental

(Mc Williams, Tagliapietra and Zachmann,

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had

2020:2).

already warned that there was crucial little time left to implement the goals of the

At the centre of the concern on how the

Paris Agreement and migitate the increase

world

in global temperatures to 1.5C. Despite

economies. These countries make up

that fact that global carbon dioxide (CO2)

almost

emissions have fallen sharply during the

population and land area. They also

pandemic, generally, CO2 emissions have

comprise 82% of GDP and 80% of global

risen by 1% every year over the past

CO2

decade as there has been a growth in

Development Indicator). This also means

energy use from fossil fuels, pacing the

that the G20 dominate the “green race” for

rise of low-carbon sources and activities

environmental

should

recover

two-thirds

emissions (World

are the G20 the

world’s

Bank World

competitiveness

and 268

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

innovation in global industries, that are

activities is only temporary (Agrawala,

key for example machinery, engines,

Dussaux and Monti, 2020:3).

motor vehicles, steam generators, iron and steel, batteries, electricity generation and

However, scholars argue that the focus on

distribution,

appliances

the immediate public health crises as well

(Fankhauser et al. 2013). Therefore, for the

as the economic crisis is likely to relegate

G20 to green or to not green the recovery

and has largely relegated concerns about

from this economic crisis will have

the climate and environment to the

implications

just

background (Barbier, 2020:686). As noted

domestically felt but structure the future of

by Helm (2020:25), “In the very short

the world economy as a whole such as the

term, the coronavirus has dominated

generation of employment, the distribution

almost all political and administrative

of wealth and income, and the mitigation

bandwidth, with little time to pursue other

of global climate and other environmental

environmental priorities.” In phase 1,

risks (Barbier, 2020:687).

governments

and

domestic

which

are

not

are concerned with the

instalment of indiscriminate and national As noted by McWilliams et al., the

based measures to keep workers and firms

economic policy response of Covid-19

out of debt or difficulty in the face of

involves three phases: relief, recovery and

near-universal cash shortcomings (Mc

fiscal

Williams, Tagliapietra and Zachmann,

consolidation

(Mc

Williams,

Tagliapietra and Zachmann, 2020:2). A green

emphasis

the

2020:2).

immediate

short-term relief is difficult to achieve.

Some have argued that in the short term

This is why Agrawala et al. suggest the

there are limits to the proportion of

implementation of

a “do no harm”

effective short-term stimulus that can

which would include the

explicitly be greened and looking at the

maintenance of vigilance on any rollback

experience of 2008 about half of the total

of environmental standards or at the very

stimulus comprised cuts to direct and

least

indirect

orientation

ensure that any scale-back or

suspension of environmental management

taxation,

social

security

contributions, or direct income support, meaning

measures

keep

current 269

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

activities going, rather than to give them a

crisis

new green direction. Other measures such

environmentally sustainable investments

as food vouchers or the extension of

for the longer term (Strand and Toman,

unemployment benefits as part of this

2010:2). These ideas include for example a

allow

focus

for

the increased government

and

putting

the

energy

clean

place

efficiency

transport

and

spending to result in the increase of

buildings,

aggregate demand and therefore reliving

clean-energy infrastructure, which create

the economy (Agrawala, Dussaux and

well-paying and local jobs, which allow

Monti, 2020:2).

for ‘win-win’ through economic growth in the short term while supporting long-term

As Bozuwa et al. as well as Hepburn et al.

climate

argue, still, there are increasing calls to

Additionally, investment in hydrogen and

develop a “greener” fiscal response, in

batteries should be boosted so that Europe

order to ensure that climate goals are not

can be at the forefront of those two

sacrificed (Bozuwa et al. 2020; Hepburn et

technologies which are widely expected to

al. 2020). A green stimulus can be defined

be the breakthrough of the next decade

as “the

(Birol and Timmermans, 2020).

application of

policies and

goals

the

same

time.

measures to stimulate short-run economic activity while at the same time preserving,

However, other scholars disagree on the

protecting and enhancing environmental

likelihood of a ‘win-win’ scenario and

and natural resource quality both near-term

instead emphasise the difficulties of the

and

and Toman,

trade-offs at play. Stimulus measures

2010:10). This idea has also been termed a

should focus on economic action in the

“win-win” situation (Strand and Toman,

short

2010:2). Win-win in this case applies to

short-term measures in terms of economic

the argument that green stimulus activities

recovery often have no environmental

can have greater or equal effects on job

aspects (Agrawala, Dussaux and Monti,

creation and near-term economic activity

2020), competing with the green objective,

compared to other stimulus activities. In

as the pre-Covid-19 economic and supply

other words, the activities are seen to be

situation limits the proportion of public

“win-win” in terms of recovery from the

investment that can be explicitly and

long-term” (Strand

term,

but

the

most

effective

270

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

exclusively green, i.e. the degree to which the necessary green skills and businesses

The

importance

currently are in place to bring green

approaches becomes all the more apparent

infrastructure programmes to a significant

when looking back to the global financial

scale quickly (Mc Williams, Tagliapietra

crisis

and Zachmann, 2020:4). The enhanced

Commission published its Recovery Plan

visibility of insufficiency in the health care

aimed at accelerating the transition to a

infrastructure or in education during the

low-carbon

crisis may furthermore provide some

Commission, 2008). A focus on energy

competition for investment at the moment

efficiency and clean infrastructure was

(Mc Williams, Tagliapietra and Zachmann,

emphasised but retrospectively the results

2020).

of these initiatives have arguably been

2008,

these

long-term

when the European

economy

(European

unconvincing, with limits made in the This

why

emphasized

other

implicit

scholars greening,

have

progress in terms of housing renovation

where

and clean cars since then (Tagliapietra et

explicit greening in the short term, sees

al, 2019).

limitations. As Mc Williams argues, while the first step toward a green recovery is to

This is why Barbier argues that in addition

promote green policies that conform to

to a stimulus that can and should contain

necessary stimulus criteria, the greatest

green

emphasis should be placed on altering

economy

market

Williams,

sustainable and low carbon economy,

2020;7).

means there is a need to adopt other

While the goal of fiscal incentives or green

policies which can set in place a transition

stimulus is to encourage consumption and

(Barbier, 2020). To ensure a sustained

investment now, the overarching goal in

economic recovery, a short-term fiscal

terms of greening incentives should be to

stimulus, while there may be some

show market actors that low-carbon

long-term effects connected, is not enough

investments will yield pay-off returns in

and structural transformations require long

the future (Mc Williams, Tagliapietra and

term commitments of perhaps 5-10 years,

Zachmann, 2020:4).

including public spending as well as

expectations

Tagliapietra

and

(Mc

Zachmann,

elements, that

a transition to the we

want,

namely

271

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

pricing reforms (Barbier, 2020:686). Just as the Great Depression accelerated a

Evaluating the Korean Green New Deal, as

major structural shift in US automobile

well as the American green recovery

production (Bresnahan and Raff, 1992), it

approach after the 2008 crisis, Barbier

is likely that the current economic crisis

especially notes the importance of pricing

provides an opportunity for structural

reforms and he attributes the slow pace of

shifts on the supply side (Mc Williams,

adoption of renewables as well as the slow

Tagliapietra and Zachmann, 2020).

de-carbonisation and slow reduction in energy intensity to the failure of phasing

Equally it has been noted that the demand

out

side might see change too, as longer-term

ambitious carbon tax implementations

impacts of Covid-19 could result in altered

(Barbier, 2020). The US plan followed the

societal preferences such as lower public

recommendation for all stimulus packages

acceptability of some green measures such

that they should be “timely, targeted and

as mass transit, while increasing the

temporary” (Aldy 2013) and while this

demand for other measures, such as soft

focus on investing in energy efficiency and

mobility (Agrawala, Dussaux and Monti,

"shovel ready" clean energy projects

202:7). Scholars have also noted that

influenced job creation and renewable

people have developed new skills, which

energy expansion for a few years, it

have reduced the use of energy-intensive

offered

forms

decarbonising the US economy (Barbier,

transportation,

virtual

meetings and telecommuting which will in

fossil

fuel

little

subsidies and

long-term

support

for

2020: 693).

turn result in decreased demand for energy-intensive forms of transportation

In Korea, while there has been a more

(Sharifi and Khavarian-Garmsir, 2020).

sustained effort in the form of a 5-year

This poses the question whether a different

plan, spending on large-scale infrastructure

"policy mix" is needed for short-term (1-2

projects seems to be less important for

years) fiscal measures than for a medium-

sustainable growth in renewable energy,

to long-term (5-10 years) strategy for a

green

recovery leading to a green economic shift

development and decarbonisation than

(Barbier, 2020:686).

more targeted policies, such as public

industrial

innovation

and

272

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

support

for

green

R&D

decoupling from resource use and carbon

2020:693).

emissions (Hickel and Kallis, 2019:469).

Proposing pricing reforms such as fossil

Scholars have argued that there is little

fuel subsidy removal and carbon taxation

evidence to actually support this in

could furthermore be part of the solution

practice. Arguably, unlimited growth will

of the third phase of economic recovery, in

sooner or later lead to an increase in

which

resource

investment

business

(Barbier,

growth

has

picked

up,

and

energy

consumption.

governments need to evaluate measures in

Therefore questioning a priori concepts of

order to ensure that strained public

green growth is essential to also think

finances from the crisis will be back on a

about

healthier footing as well as to generate

compatible with environmental objectives.

economic

system

most

revenues for public support for green innovation

the

(Barbier,

Schulz and Bailey put it this way: “In

2020:697). Furthermore, these revenues

essence, to what extent are continued

could also be efficiently used in order to

commitments to existing or modified

ensure just distributional consequences of

growth

measures of fiscal consolidation and

green economy

therefore

questioning of traditional growth concepts

offset

future

the

distributional

consequences of the transition.

orientations

reconcilable with

ideals or is deeper

required?” (Schulz and Bailey, 2014:277) Discussions on alternative development

These debates on green recovery and green

scenarios and economic models are often

growth can also be placed into a broader

side-tracked (Lovelock, 1979). Concepts

academic discourse, which questions the

such as de-growth and post-growth have

sustainability

growth-oriented

therefore been discussed by scholars and

economy in which we find ourselves. The

have rejected the maxim that societal and

argument

growth puts

private prosperity are only ensured through

forward the idea that continued economic

continuous growth in materially and

expansion (as measured by GDP) is

monetarily

measurable

compatible

performance

(Schulz

the

behind green

with the earth’s ecology,

arguing that technological change and

economic and

Bailey,

2014:280).

substitutions can allow for an absolute 273

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

Tim Jackson in his report to the UK

economic system in which material as well

government in 2009 has captured this idea

as energy and consumption are in balance

with

transition

towards

sustainable

recycling and energy recovery)

lifestyles and economic systems through

(Schulz and Bailey, 2014:280). These

the formulation of ‘prosperity without

ideas are important to keep in mind when

growth’

Ecological

looking at green recovery and green

aimed to

growth plans as they allow questioning

dissociate themselves from neoclassical

some a priori assumptions that come with

economics and have not followed a

them.

(Jackson

economists

2009).

therefore have

categorical separation between human and natural capital and instead are regarding

3. Methodology

the economy as a subsystem of the global ecological system (Schulz and Bailey,

3.1 Research Aims

2014:277:282). The key here is then that

The aim of this paper is to assess the level

ecological economics presumes a factual

of ambition in the UK’s green recovery

finiteness

plan by comparing the policy instruments

material

and

energy

availability. Instead, they call for a, a

used.

steady-state

economy

(meaning

274

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

To answer this research question, this

different countries. The countries chosen

paper analyses governmental documents

for comparison alongside the UK are

relating to green recovery plans in 4

France, Germany and Japan.

3.2 Research Strategy

policy evaluation as it gives us a good

In order to design an appropriate research

indication

method, this research paper uses the six

mechanisms but also because they are

stages of research design developed in

‘part

Saunders et al. (2009). Firstly, this paper

(Saunders et al., 2009). In this context we

adopts a pragmatic philosophy to fulfil this

are also evaluating the ambition of the

research paper’s aim, as this paper does

policy aims and instruments outlined in

not aim to describe or represent reality,

each of the green recovery plans.

therefore this is the best suited method

available to answer the research question

Finally, a cross-sectional approach was

(Saunders et al., 2009).

Secondly, an

taken meaning that policy reports for green

inductive approach was undertaken, as

recovery plans were analysed across

conclusions were built from the data,

multiple geographical locations, rather

rather than tested through hypotheses. This

than over a period of time. These countries

approach has been chosen as it is best

were chosen as they are at similar stages of

suited to a document analysis which is

economic

exploratory by nature.

published accessible green recovery plans.

For the third layer in Saunders el al.

of the

policy reality

development

impacts being

and

studied’

and have all

3.3 Data

(2009) framework this paper undertook an

A quick scoping review was used across

archival research strategy. This is because

governmental databases to gain a broad

this paper uses ‘administrative records and

sense of the evidence base available.

documents as the principal source of data’.

Archival research is an important part of 275

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

The broad search terms “Government

3.4 Method

Green Recovery” and “Government Green

Given the time and resource constraints of

Industrial

used to

this paper, a mono-method was chosen as

capture as many relevant results as

the most appropriate research method

possible for each of the countries that have

using a quantitative content analysis. This

green recovery plans. Search results from

method was chosen as it allowed for a

Google were then limited to government

systematic method which enabled this

documentation

report to deal with large quantities of

Revolution” were

specifically

involving

green recovery plans, that were freely

communicative

available online, that were in English,

documents (Burnham et al. 2004).

French or German and were published

after the year 2019 when the Corona Virus

The quantitative content analysis method

pandemic hit.

outlined by Halperin and Heath (2017)

was then used to determine the recording

Documents were then assessed according

unit, coding protocol and manual coding

to their reliability, clarity, high reporting

method. Data was unitised where the

quality and relevance to the research

recording unit consisted of a figure, word,

question. In accordance with the Warren

sentence or string of sentences found in

scale (2014), points were attributed for

government and industry documents. A

verification (2 points), expression of

coding protocol was established so that

compliance and conflicts of interest (2

recording units would be recorded under

points), authorial legitimacy (1 point),

subcategories for each of the different

transparent figures (1 point) and explicit

sectors, which appear in each of the

mechanisms of policy evaluation and

governments recovery plans. Furthermore,

implementation

points).

policy instruments were identified as the

Documents had to score a minimum of 8/

unit of analysis, in total there was 7

14 points to be considered high enough

different policy instruments used across

quality for research. In total 26 documents

the different sectors and countries. Policy

passed the filtering process and were used

instruments were chosen as the unit of

in the content analysis.

analysis as they would give an indication

total

and

governmental

for each different country about where 276

BBI Research Journal 2020-21

they were focusing their attention. This

types of policy instruments used were

paper looks as both the frequency of policy

noted. These were used to generate

instruments used and also the policy type

sub-categories for each of the different

to determine whether countries are being

sectors. Documents were then re-read and

more ambitious than the others, within

tagged

each of the subcategories. Only the policy

sub-categories.

instruments that were explicitly mentioned

collated into a document featuring the

in the key documents relating to green

different category and sub-category labels

recoveries were noted, this meant that any

and

recommended by Easterby-Smith et al.

instruments

that

had

been

intruded were not in the scope. If previous

with

their

these