Bentham Brooks Institute Research Journal 2023-2024

November 2024

BENTHAM BROOKS INSTITUTE RESEARCH PAPER Edited by the BBI Committee

Bentham Brooks Institute Research Journal 2024-2025

ABOUT THE BBI The Bentham Brooks Institute (BBI) is a student-led think tank based at University College London. Its mission is to inspire talented students to pursue careers in academia, think tanks and the public sector. Through a yearly research programme, the BBI brings students together to produce high quality, peer-reviewed research papers providing concrete policy recommendations and pragmatic solutions to some of the world’s most pressing issues.

The BBI proposes a yearly research agenda to encourage students to delve into an area about which they are passionate. The research agenda for the academic year 2023-2024 consisted of the following areas: • • •

Conflict and Statebuilding Refugees and Migration Democratic Deficit and Authoritarianism

The Bentham Brooks Institute Committee would like to thank all the advisors and peerreviewers, without whom this publication would have never been possible. The time they set aside to guide and support researchers along the way has been invaluable.

A special thank you to all members of the 2023-2024 committee: • • • • •

Carolina De la Rosa – President Lincoln Cheng – Vice President Valentine Sender – Treasurer Ingrid Wittendorff Humblen – Head of Research and Welfare Ella Remande-Guyard – Head of Research and Welfare

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Conflict and Statebuilding Team I: How have political and economic reforms impacted the advancement of democratic governance in post-Arab Spring societies? A comparative analysis of Egypt and Tunisia………………………………………………………………….3 Refugees and Migration: Analysing Climate Mobility Frameworks in Response to Somalia’s Climate Migrant Crisis: Lessons Learned from the Falepili Union………………23 Democratic Deficit and Authoritarianism Team I: Portrait of a Movement: Reconstructing the Trajectory of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement……………………………..41 Conflict and Statebuilding Team II: Treading a Tightrope: ‘Good Coups’ and Democratic Resilience in Western Africa…………………………………………………………………67 Democratic Deficit and Authoritarianism Team II: Free but not Fair? Elections in Backsliding Democracies……………………………………………………………….……95

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Conflict and Statebuilding Team I

How have political and economic reforms impacted the advancement of democratic governance in postArab Spring societies? A comparative analysis of Egypt and Tunisia Kemal Mohamedou1, Ghalia Burgan, Ben Clark, Emily Chen, Jesmean Kaur and Lily Donahue 1 Team Leader, Conflict and Statebuilding I

Received 31st June 2024 Published 5th January 2025

Abstract This paper presents a comparative analysis of the political and economic reforms in Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab Spring, exploring how these reforms have impacted the advancement of democratic governance in both countries. Initiated by similar demands for political change and social justice, Egypt and Tunisia have since followed divergent paths that offer valuable insights into the complexities of democratization in the post-revolutionary Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) context. Through a detailed examination of the role of the military, the strength of civil society, the application of transitional justice mechanisms, and the influence of international actors, this study elucidates the factors contributing to the varied outcomes observed in the two countries. Tunisia's relative success in transitioning towards a democratic system is attributed to its inclusive constitutional process, the professional restraint of its military, and a vibrant civil society that has actively participated in the governance process. Conversely, Egypt's journey reflects a reconsolidation of authoritarian governance, where the military has reasserted its dominance and stifled democratic progress, exacerbated by economic reforms that have not addressed the foundational issues of inequality and public dissatisfaction. The findings of this paper highlight the critical importance of inclusive political processes and broad-based economic reforms in achieving sustainable democratic governance.

The lessons drawn from the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences provide actionable policy recommendations for both domestic policymakers and international actors engaged in supporting democratic transitions in similar geopolitical contexts and seeks to contribute to the scholarly discourse on post-Arab Spring transitions.

Keywords: democratic governance, post-Arab Spring, political reforms, economic reforms

1. Introduction The Arab Spring marks a pivotal chapter in the history of the Middle East and North Africa, initiated by a cascade of pro-democracy protests starting in late 2010. This movement emerged against a backdrop of deep-seated authoritarianism, social inequality, and political stagnation, fundamentally challenging the existing order with calls for substantial reforms1.

The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 in Tunisia ignited this wave of protests, fuelled by a myriad of grievances including political repression, corruption, economic disparity, and high youth unemployment. This act led to the rapid overthrow of Tunisia’s President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011 and catalysed similar uprisings across the Arab world2. Egypt followed suit with the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 after mass protests cantered in Cairo's Tahrir Square, marking a significant shift in its political landscape3.

1

3

Brown, 2011

Kirkpatrick, 2012

2 Nassar, 2016.

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The reverberations of these events shook the region, sparking further protests in countries like Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, and raised hopes for a democratic and social transformation. However, the aftermath of the Arab Spring has led to varying outcomes across the Arab world, highlighting the intricate dynamics and enduring significance of this period.

celebrates successes or decries failures. This is particularly evident in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, which are often cited as exemplars of this paradigm: Egypt as a case of democratic backsliding, and Tunisia as a frequently celebrated success story.

Indeed, much of previous focus on the Arab Spring has considered the sustainability of democracy for the region: whether democracy coheres for the Arab world, or whether it is even possible. Such questions are often barely disguised orientalist qualms, ascribing to a falsity that “the West [is] the only measure of ‘modernity’ and progress.”5 While recent efforts have been made at integrating postcolonial narratives into Arab Spring discourse, there remains a tendency to fixate on perceived “dominant anti-liberal traits in Muslim cultures.”6 Shihade agrees, arguing that orientalist and eurocentric mentalities have made an accurate analysis of the Arab Spring difficult7. Others, such as Gani, have pointed to an international tendency to paint the Arab Spring as something that devolved into an “Islamist Winter.”8

This paper concentrates on Tunisia and Egypt, two nations that were at the epicentre of the Arab Spring and have since charted divergent courses in their pursuit of democratic governance4. The contrast between these countries offers a rich framework for analysing the impact of political and economic reforms in the post-revolutionary setting. Our study employs a comparative "small-N" approach, focusing on these two case studies to unravel the nuances of their democratic transitions, despite their similar starting conditions in 2010 as lower middle-income countries with similar socio-economic and political landscapes.

Both nations were typified by autocratic leadership postindependence, with a mix of strong Islamist movements and secular-liberal societal segments. This analysis draws on a wealth of primary and secondary sources to explore the specific political and economic reforms that have shaped their trajectories towards or away from democratic governance.

Further, debate exists over whether inequality was even rife in the region at all, concerns that delegitimize the protests and the support they engendered. In the foreword of a World Bank-commissioned report, which cavalierly states, “Inequality is more fashionable than it used to be,” Chief Economist Francisco H. G. Ferreira asserts that “Income inequality, as conventionally measured, was not high in the region.”9 In particular, Egypt did not exhibit high levels of inequality, with the report noting, “Egyptian inequality has remained low by international standards and is comparable to that of other Middle Eastern and North African countries.”10 However, the report, which relies heavily on household surveys, fails to address potential data inaccuracies, such as the tendency of higher-income households to underreport their incomes. Moreover, it overlooks socio-cultural factors, notably Egypt’s strong legacy of 'Arab socialism,' and the role of social justice norms in shaping perceptions of inequality11.

By delving deep into the political and economic upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, this study aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the Arab Spring's implications. The comparative insights from these case studies not only enrich academic discourse but also offer practical lessons and challenges that can inform policy interventions and future research in political science, international relations, and development studies.

By exploring a range of scholarly publications and empirical data, this paper seeks to deliver a comprehensive examination of the dynamics involved. Our goal is to contribute theoretically informed and empirically grounded insights to the ongoing discussions about democratization, political reform, and state-building in the MENA region. The paper concludes with targeted recommendations for future academic studies and policy initiatives that can support effective democratic transitions.

Other researchers have made strides in analyzing the levels of authoritarianism and have acknowledged the challenges faced by Arab countries in adopting democracy, concluding that “Arab countries find it difficult to install democracy.”12 To these observers, such authoritarianism appears entrenched.

Despite pro-democracy protests, there persists a widespread sentiment that “corruption persists and has even intensified.”13

2. Literature review

Autocratic leaders have worked – both prior to and after the Arab Spring – on consolidating power under the justification that they work as “guarantors of stability against

Although the Arab Spring has concluded, its legacies persist, creating ripples throughout the region and influencing the associated academic discourse. Much of this analysis, however, is limited by a binary 'win-lose' narrative that either 4 Hess, 2013

9 Ferreire, in Verne et al., 2014, p. xii

5 Ventura, 2017, p. 283

10 Verne et al., 2014, p. 4

6 Salamey, 2015, p. 112

11 Achcar, 2020, p. 758

7 Shihade, 2012

12 Trabelsi, 2013, p. 255

8

13

Gani, 2022

4

Ibid.

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extremism and chaos.”14 Such assertions, however, exacerbated contention between privileged elites and a populace that felt inundated by such chaos. Though the protests hoped to reduce this disparity, it has largely remained.

Much of the authoritarian elite continues to rely on narratives emphasizing the necessity of a securitized state. Indeed these “coercive security apparatuses [have] strategic significance” for Arab states15.

economy—a sentiment that surged by twenty-eight percent in the five years following the Arab Spring21. Unlike in Egypt, frustration with the government in Tunisia is widespread, with ninety percent of the population citing rampant corruption and expressing concerns about educational opportunities and the risk of increased terrorism. In stark contrast to Egypt, trust in the Tunisian government remains remarkably low22.

Tunisians appear to have been better prepared than their revolutionary neighbours for the task of democratic transition.

Stepan highlights that, “as early as 2003, secular and religious opposition activists were agreeing on a common programme for “the day after Ben Ali.”23 Angrist concurs, drawing attention to the fact that activists had come “to share a very generally democratic orientation and advocated a shared common aspiration for basic political liberties [...] rather than any specific political agenda.”24 Such widespread support for a democratic future, overcoming religious and class boundaries, can be seen as a consequence of political and economic exclusion, in which the Ben Ali regime increasingly marginalised broad swathes of the population. For El-Haddad, the population’s "economic and social rights” were continually diminished and redirected towards the elites, ultimately rendering the social contract redundant. By the time of the uprisings, Ayeb describes “two Tunisias”: “one, the Tunisia of power, money, comfort, and ‘development’ [...] and, second, the marginalised, poor, submissive and dependent Tunisia.”25 Revolution was not only ripe; the seeds of democracy had also been sown.

Furthermore, authoritarian elites continue to propagate the narrative that a heavily securitized state is necessary. Indeed, these 'coercive security apparatuses' hold strategic significance for Arab states. This focus on security often extends to the military, which is praised as a driver of modernization in engineering and inventions. However, this prioritization results in a skewed allocation of resources, often at the expense of health, education, and welfare services16.

The Arab Spring's limited impact can also be attributed to a lack of prerequisites for democratic development, such as a substantial middle class and a robust economy. This absence has hindered the emergence of democracy and “undermined the ability of mass mobilization efforts to establish accountable governments.”17 Economic challenges are further exacerbated by 'closed and centralized economies' struggling in a global economy increasingly characterized by deregulation18.

This deregulation challenges traditional economic structures, complicating efforts by institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to integrate these nations into the global market19.

The existing literature regarding democratisation, as Paris draws notes, traditionally follows a liberal model, with Western powers assuming a supervisory role, steering postconflict societies towards enlightenment and democracy26.

More recent criticisms of this model abound. Belloni’s concept of “hybridity” suggests that we supplant “patronizing, top-down, state-centric, technocratic, and assimilative” notions of post-conflict state-building with “a locally rooted understanding.”27 Rather than a reductive focus on formal institutions, scholars should consider “the hidden, localized, and diffused capacities of local actors to operate outside the liberal peace framework or to adopt it to meet local needs, particularly economic ones.”28 These sentiments are echoed in the work of Paffenholz, who places emphasis on the “everpresent need to re-negotiate the social contract’ by grappling “with societal and political tensions.”29 In its attempt to transcend the dichotomy that traditionally characterises postArab Spring democratisation efforts, this paper embraces her

In some respects, however, citizens in Egypt appear buoyed by government attempts, reporting surprisingly high levels of trust in the government. Pertinently, however, much of this was to do with state security, pointing to a reality that authoritarian efforts to prioritize security has rubbed off on the population. In a survey conducted by two Egyptian academics in 2018, “Around 75.85 per cent of participants agreed that (The Egyptian Government succeeded in defeating the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt),” and further, 69.96 per cent of participants agreed that (The Egyptian Government is combating terrorism and extremists very well).” 20 Conversely, Tunisian citizens broadly support democracy despite recognizing its shortcomings. From 2011 to 2016, the proportion of Tunisians who view democracy as the best form of governance rose by sixteen percent, from seventy to eightysix percent. This increase occurred even though there is a growing perception that democracy negatively affects the 14 Salamey, 2015, p. 112

22 Ibid., p. 2

15 Ibid.

23 Stepan, 2012, p. 101

16 Ali, 2020, p. 3

24 Angrist, 2013, p. 559

17 Salamey, 2015, p. 112

25 Ayeb, 2011, p. 470

18 Ibid., p. 112

26 Paris, 2004

19 Ibid.

27 Belloni, 2012, p. 34

20 Abdou & Zaazou, 2018, p. 65

28 Ibid., p. 31

21

29

Robbins, 2016, p. 1

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Paffenholz, 2021, p. 378

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assertion that “concrete ideas of success and failure should be discarded” for language that better reflects “the perpetual nature of peacebuilding” as a guiding principle30.

Political transitions Although there is no uniform approach to democratic transition, the process in the context of the MENA region typically involves the dismantling of repressive authoritarian regimes and a move towards the prospect of democratic leadership. However, viewing the uprisings from this simplistic lens can be reductive. The transitions occur through political interactions in periods of tumultuous political disorder and high uncertainty, as seen through the circumstances of the uprisings38. The structuralist approach within the broader literature encapsulating explanations regarding the democratic deficits in the MENA, draws particular attention towards the absence of various cultural, social, and economic factors that are crucial towards achieving democracy, often producing an image of “marked regional exceptionalism.” Although this exceptionalism served as a crucial paradigm for conceptualising the nuances of MENA politics, omitting the aforementioned features essentially falls short of encapsulating the holistic process of democratisation within the MENA, as well as the mechanisms inspiring the Arab Spring at large. The intricacies of the socio-cultural grievances within this process are principally materialised through the cultural norms and values, that often conflicted with the conventional democratic values, namely the importance placed on ethnic, and sectarian identities, and the role it plays in shifting and reconfiguring socio-political dynamics39. Subsequently, economic factors influencing the process of democratisation, as well as the motivations of the revolutions, are interconnected with the aforementioned socio-cultural factors, as within the MENA, there is an inextricable link between patronage, clientelism, and economic security. This link is often overshadowed when examining the Arab Spring’s motivations, as a broad, and unform structural approach is employed, disregarding the intricacies of such socio-political links40.

3. Theoretical framework The expectations of the Arab Spring were centred around ushering in “well-functioning” democratic systems to the region31. National strife, mass censorship, socio-economic and political dislocation were the norms perpetuated by the leaders at the time, amalgamating to civil rights and liberties being unattainable. Charles Tripp conceptualises this strife as “enormous economic, political, and social grievances imposed by the state.”32 As a result of the wave of political and social change within the MENA region, scholars have sought to deduce and theorise the topic at hand in an effort to understand the process of democratisation within the context of the region. Recent scholarship unpacking the Arab Spring’s theoretical basis deconstructs the insights focusing on the politics of institutional and democratic change, as well as the role that “structural constellations” play in the political exchange that facilitate the “creation or reform of democratic or proto-democratic institutions.”33

Democratic governance and democratization: the transition paradigm ‘Democratisation’ is a pronounced theory applied to the nuances of the Arab Spring. Democratisation examines the processes, factors, and dynamics that overlap in the transition from non-democratic forms of governance, namely authoritarian regimes, to democratic forms of governance34.

Thomas Carothers characterises the processes of democratisation as a “simultaneous movement” where several countries within a region stray away from a ‘dictatorial rule’ towards ‘democratic governance.”35 Under this theorisation, democracy is endogenous to predetermined sets of social conditions, namely “economic development […] and economic inequality”, which intersect to facilitate “class alliances”, as well as distinct paths of political development, regardless of if it favours a democratic outcome36. A subsect of theorising the topic at hand from the democratisation is by drawing attention towards ‘democratic transition’, whereby democracy is seen as the result of “strategic interactions between key actors” following the demise of an authoritarian regime37.

Ultimately, in order to gain a socio-culturally and politically accurate understanding of the intricacies of MENA politics and their role in fuelling the Arab Spring, it is crucial to direct critical attention towards these fundamental factors.

4. Methodology Tunisia and Egypt are chosen as comparative case studies because, although both countries embarked on paths toward democratic transition from similar starting points, they have arrived at markedly different states of democracy today. In

30 Ibid.

36 Ahmed, 2014

31 Khashan, 2012, p. 132

37 Ibid.

32 Tripp, 2013

38 Capoccia, 2014

33 Capoccia, 2014

39 Valbjørn, 2019

34 Remmer, 1996

40 Iliskisi, 2023

35

Carothers, 2005

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2010, both were lower middle-income countries with moderate general unemployment rates of 8.76% in Egypt and 13.05% in Tunisia. However, youth unemployment exceeded 20% in Egypt and approached 30% in Tunisia. Income inequality was relatively low, with Gini coefficients of 0.302 in Egypt and 0.358 in Tunisia 41. Politically, each was governed by autocratic leaders post-independence, and despite the presence of strong Islamist movements—Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Ennahda—significant segments of both societies remained secular and liberal.

While it is accurate that Egypt was beginning to enjoy better economic growth (from a five percent increase in the mid 1990s to a seven percent one a few years before the protests), such benefits did not translate to the wider population, who suffered from high inflation and generally poor living conditions; near twenty percent of the population lived under the poverty level, and an estimated 2.5 million were unemployed43.

Arguably, the positive impact of the Arab Spring has been hindered by a relative lack of democratic prerequisites, deemed necessary for propelling a state into democratic environs. Certainly, a weakened middle class, fractured civil society, and stagnant economy did not help to incubate democracy. A highly repressive security sector that facilitated arbitrary violence against civilians furthered the lack of egalitarian culture.

The transitions unfolded differently: Egypt’s democratic experiment was abruptly halted by a military takeover, whereas Tunisia not only approved a consensual constitution but also achieved other democratic milestones, positioning it as a success story at the surface level42.

This paper employs a comparative "small-N" methodology, which involves a systematic analysis of a limited number of cases. This approach is favoured over broader statistical analyses across all Arab Spring states, which can be too superficial to uncover the deeper political and economic motivations. While focusing exclusively on Egypt and Tunisia introduces the challenge of "many variables, few cases," potentially weakening the capacity to eliminate competing explanations, it also significantly reduces irrelevant variables, allowing for a focused comparison.

Indeed, prior literature has posited that pushes towards neoliberalism have actually entrenched authoritarian regimes, namely through “enriching politically-connected cronies […] via rounds of privatization of public assets and the creation of private monopolies.”44 Though Egypt’s Spring was certainly motored by the people, opposition parties were notably absent, as were a large swath of religious institutions. The Coptic Church publicly opposed the protests, and the Salafi wing “went so far as to condemn the protests as haram.”45 However, the military, threatened by the potential for further privatization, “saw an opportunity to settle scores in a long-festering intra-regime feud.”46 Privatization, which the Mubarak regime heavily relied on, would impact Egypt’s economic future. Egypt, functioned on a closed economy with “accompanying privatization of the public sector.”47

Primarily utilizing primary sources such as Tunisia’s constitution and secondary scholarly interpretations, this paper adopts the case study method to collect relevant qualitative data. The objective is explanatory, identifying the political and economic reforms that have most significantly influenced the democratic trajectories of these two countries.

President Mubarak, the autocrat ruling Egypt at the time of the Arab Spring, had previously followed an economic plan which revolved heavily on attracting foreign investors; subsequent investment was largely funnelled to the elites 48.

Mohamed Morsi, who replaced Mubarak after his ousting, was unable to cultivate a more stable economic environment, especially as global confidence in Egyptian markets began to fluctuate. Heavy borrowing from the IMF and WB was “conditioned by greater liberalisation reforms.”49 Appeals to Qatar and Turkey for aid strengthened ties with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), strengthening their influence within the country. Haphazard tax packages and over-fixation on preventing black market flour smuggling were unable to prevent country-wide fuel shortages.

5. Contextual background To understand the dynamics of the Arab Spring and its consequences, the following section will highlight the contextual background for the cases of Egypt and Tunisia; such a background is crucial for understanding both the immediate impacts of the Arab Spring, and the associated political and economic reforms implemented after its conclusion.

Egypt Though hopes abounded for a democratic shift post Arab Spring, the Egyptian populace did not feel much of the expected benefits.

41 Sahin, 2022, p. 2

46 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

47 Salamey, 2015, p. 113

43 Saidin, 2018, p. 75-76

48 Salamey, 2015

44 Adly, 2021, p. 291

49 Ibid., p. 117

45

Stein, 2012, p. 24

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Further, Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood was highly unsavoury for the country’s liberal-secular wing.

His tendency to fill government spots with Brotherhood members spurred distrust in the organization, as did his interest in shari’a law, seen as anathema by several other political movements involved in the Arab Spring50. Although the constitution under Mubarak was discarded following his ousting, Morsi’s reconfiguration of the constitution heavily favored policies aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, which lacked unanimous support.

Macron, claimed that human rights were “inapplicable” to Egypt59. He justified this by nodding to Egypt’s cultural heritage, claiming that certain desired human rights were Western impositions. Instead, al-Sisi stressed, economic progress was more pertinent, and a “more pressing matter that would substitute for the former or at least justify its suspension.”60 Indeed, Egypt’s reforms have been considered a “national variant of a distressed neoliberal global order.”61 This neoliberal push has been deemed a, perhaps unintentional, pathway for the military to expand. Against typical neoliberal values, this militarization actually created “a bigger role for the state than for the market.”62 Still, there existed a “strong commitment to the precepts of neoliberal economics like austerity and a floated exchange rate system under the aegis of IFI conditionality and amid a deepening dependency on foreign borrowing."63 Under this haphazard approach, Egypt effective produced a state-led neoliberalism. Certainly, it was not alone in this. States which relied on oil rents were highly impacted by unprecedentedly high oil prices, a reality that allowed “GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] oil-rich monarchies to impact the outcome of the post- revolutionary process in Egypt and beyond.”64 This had consequences beyond economics. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, for example, both concerned about Arab Spring potential in their own countries, backed the 2013 military coup, hoping to cement power in the hands of the military, and weaken the Muslim Brotherhood.

In 2012, Morsi passed a constitutional declaration increasing his powers, primarily by “making presidential decrees immune to judicial oversight.”51 Though the declaration would be rescinded due to its unpopularity, Morsi went ahead with a referendum on the constitution, deemed inappropriate by opposition members. The constitution, which passed—though with very low voter turnout—was thought a step backwards for “guaranteeing human rights and women’s rights.”52 Morsi’s decreasing popularity plummeted, especially as he was thought to be “selling out” to foreign states.

Morsi, the once democratic beacon of Egypt’s Spring, was removed in a 2013 military coup53. An interim government was established by the military, who aimed to stress that they were not simply Egypt’s new authoritarian face. Positioning themselves as a voice of the people, General and current President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced he would not “turn a deaf ear or a blind eye to the calls of the masses.” 54 Since, the military has positioned itself as protector of the people, a harbinger of democracy; it enjoyed – at least initially - broad public support55. However, tensions between the military and Brotherhood have crystallized into terrorism discourse, with the military “denouncing members as 'terrorists’ and accusing them of perpetrating violence and attacks throughout the country.”56 This rhetoric would have a literal impact: members were imprisoned, and all activity made illegal. While this served to muffle the Brotherhood, it also blacklisted other opposition movements, sparking a reality where “opponents are automatically rejected as traitors or terrorists.”57 This suppression of dissent created a “hybrid situation” in Egypt, in which there existed “strong admixture of authoritarian and democratic components.”58

Tunisia Under the autocratic grip of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia endured decades marked by political repression and economic stagnation. Ben Ali’s regime was characterized by a tightly controlled political space and a state-driven economy that increasingly failed to meet the needs of its populace. The national discontent reached a critical point with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010. Bouazizi, a young street vendor, set himself ablaze in protest against police harassment and economic despair, sparking a series of protests that resonated across the country. These protests, driven by widespread unemployment, rampant inflation, and a profound lack of political freedoms, quickly escalated into a mass movement that sought the end of Ben Ali’s rule. By January 2011, the intensity of the protests had compelled Ben Ali to flee Tunisia,

Further, human rights – never championed by Mubarak, but sometimes acknowledged – became increasingly ignored. al-Sisi, in a conference with French President Emmanuel 50 Salamey, 2015

58 Lavie, 2021, p. 457

51 Prat & Rezk, 2019, p. 245

59 Adly, 2021, p. 293

52 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

53 Grimm & Harder, 2018

61 Ibid., p. 291

54 Quoted in van de Bildt, 2015, p. 255

62 Ibid.

55 Grimm & Harder, 2018, p. 1

63 Ibid.

56 Van de Bildt, 2015, p. 256

64 Ibid., p. 293

57

Ibid., p. 258

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seeking asylum in Saudi Arabia. His departure signified the collapse of a long-standing authoritarian order and marked the beginning of a complex period of political transition.

such as bureaucratic inefficiency, endemic corruption, and a lack of transparency remain entrenched, hindering the development of effective, accountable governance structures.

These institutional weaknesses have perpetuated a culture of mistrust among the populace, complicating efforts to solidify the foundations of a democratic society.

The abrupt power vacuum left by Ben Ali's exile presented Tunisia with the daunting challenge of redefining its political landscape. In the immediate aftermath, the country embarked on a path to rebuild its political institutions and redefine its national identity. The transitional period was characterized by intense public and political engagement, as Tunisians from all walks of life grappled with their country's future direction. In October 2011, this culminated in the election of a constituent assembly charged with drafting a new constitution. This process was not merely administrative but represented a profound cultural shift towards participatory governance. The debates and negotiations among diverse political parties and civil society groups during the drafting process served as a reflection of the diverse aspects of Tunisian society.

Additionally, despite the vibrancy of youth participation in the initial protests that marked the Arab Spring in Tunisia, the transition from street protests to sustained political involvement was notably weak65. Young leaders, who were at the forefront of mobilization efforts, largely failed to transition into lasting political roles. This gap between protest and participation highlights a critical challenge: while the youth were effective in catalysing change, their absence in the aftermath led to a vacuum that older, more established political forces filled. This shift had profound implications on the evolution of Tunisia’s political landscape, where the enthusiasm and revolutionary zeal of young activists gradually gave way to the pragmatism and strategic manoeuvring of traditional political entities66.

The new constitution, formally adopted in January 2014, sought to lay the groundwork for a new democratic order. It enshrined key civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, and established a governmental structure predicated on the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances. This was a foundational step intended to prevent the resurgence of authoritarian rule and to foster a pluralistic political environment.

The initial failure to effectively address security sector reform during Tunisia's revolutionary period also set a challenging precedent for subsequent governance. In the early days of the transition, there was no concrete strategy for reforming the security apparatus, which had long been a tool of repression under the previous regime. This oversight meant that the security sector remained largely intact and unreformed, which later contributed to tensions and mistrust between the state and its citizens. The lack of meaningful engagement with security reform not only hindered the establishment of a fully democratic governance structure but also left lingering issues of accountability and human rights abuses unaddressed.

Parallel to these political developments, Tunisia confronted significant economic challenges that had been exacerbated by years of mismanagement and corruption under the former regime. The transitional government, supported by international institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), initiated a series of economic reforms aimed at stabilizing the economy and addressing the socio-economic inequalities that had fuelled the revolution. These reforms targeted structural issues such as high unemployment rates, especially among the youth, and regional disparities between the affluent coastal areas and the impoverished inland regions. Efforts to revitalize the economy included measures to improve the business climate, attract foreign investment, and stimulate job creation in key sectors such as manufacturing, tourism, and technology.

The Tunisian journey sheds light on the nuanced challenges of institutional reform and the critical role of an engaged civil society in sustaining democracy. This background sets the stage for a deeper examination of the political reforms that were enacted following the revolution.

The next section will explore these reforms and assess their effectiveness and impact on Tunisia's ongoing quest for stable democratic governance.

Despite these efforts, Tunisia’s journey toward democracy has been fraught with challenges. The security landscape, particularly, has been a significant concern, with emerging extremist groups exploiting the regional instability.

These security issues have periodically undermined the public’s confidence in the transitional government’s ability to maintain order and safeguard the gains of the revolution.

6. Political reforms analysis Laying the groundwork Prior to the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia was gripped by the authoritarian regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. His rule was marked by the suppression of dissent, systematic human rights abuses, and severe restrictions on freedom of speech. The revolution, sparked by

Moreover, the legacy of authoritarianism has continued to cast a long shadow over Tunisia’s institutional reforms. Issues

65

66

Al-Muslimi et al., 2024

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Ibid.

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deep-rooted discontent, led to escalating protests that ultimately forced Ben Ali to flee the country. This marked the commencement of Tunisia's path toward democratic governance. Today, Tunisia is sometimes heralded as a successful democracy that has emerged from the Arab Spring, distinguished by its robust democratization process, which includes the holding of free and fair elections and the establishment of a clear separation of powers67.

Nonetheless, this prospect was elusive as Mubarak’s overthrow “ushered in more of the same in Egypt – an authoritarian political process”, whereby the SCAF upheld utmost authority, embodying a continuation of despotism72.

Ashraf El-Sherif meticulously argues that with Mubarak’s overthrow, the ‘new’ Egyptian political process was dominated “first by the military” and then by a new actor, the Muslim Brotherhood73. El-Sherif’s sentiment echoes the confusion and disturbances facing the state, as the SCAF demonstrated the power they possessed, ousting Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi (July 2013)74. Rhetorical discourses of “revolution” and “democracy” continued to echo Egypt’s government, however, the aforementioned incoherence proved that tangible reforms were undeliverable75. The mounting societal and political power vacuum was exacerbated as a popular, and democratic governing body was absent from Egypt. The political landscape structured by the SCAF’s announcement of a supposed ‘political roadmap’ following Morsi’s overthrow, continues to embody the same authoritarian elements led by the SCAF76.

Inspired by the Tunisian example, millions of Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square (Liberation Square), clearly articulating their demand for freedom from Hosni Mubarak’s oppressive regime68. his critical juncture, known as the "25 January Revolution," symbolized a decisive break from the decades of social, economic, and political injustices perpetuated by successive regimes69.

The mass protests aimed to forge new patterns of identity, socio-political organization, and reforms, striving for a transition to democracy that could overcome the intense ideological polarization of the past. This was a revolutionary moment unseen since Egypt’s independence from colonial rule in 1922. The demonstrations amplified calls for social justice, demanding immediate changes in public policies concerning resource allocation and income equality. However, Egypt's attempt at democratic transition faced significant challenges, primarily due to a lack of cohesion among various political forces over the vision of an 'ideal' political model. Crucially, the pervasive influence of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in socio-political affairs continued to hinder political reforms. The prospect of political reforms within Egypt, or rather, the lack thereof, is ultimately conveyed through the interference of the SCAF, the continuation of political suppression, as well as the elusive ideal of political pluralism and participation.

Attached to this roadmap, was ultimately an “unbalanced state-society relationship”, whereby opposing political factions, classes, and groups were prohibited from “competing for power” or essentially representing the interests of their respective communities77. The January Revolution’s core demand was the termination of military rule, which was paradoxically exacerbated following Mubarak’s fall from power78. The protesters who called for immediate change, were ultimately enraged when they were met with the opposite result – “undemocratic constitutional” and “supraconstitutional provisions”, designating utmost power to the SCAF. This was materialised through permitting the SCAF to appoint “80% of the members of the assembly” that are in control of writing the constitution, the SCAF’s military budget to be kept secret, and SCAF’s ability to veto any constitutional articles prior to a national referendum79.

Role of the military and other state institutions The military plays a key role in facilitating or hindering democratic transitions. In order to critically conceptualise the prospect of political reform in post-Arab Spring Egypt, the influence of SCAF cannot be understated. One of the most prominent actors within Egypt’s political landscape prior to, and following the Egyptian uprisings, has been the SCAF 70.

Following the fall of Mubarak, the Egyptian people sought to see the power within government essentially transferred to a combination of citizen political participation, as well as a leader who was democratically elected, representing the supposed “new and improved” Egypt71.

Hence, in Egypt, the military was powerful enough to influence key political decisions according to its vested interests and differing ideologies (nationalism vs the Brotherhood’s perceived pan-Islamism), thus spurring it to actively manage and interfere in the democratic transition, ousting the Muslim Brotherhood eventually in 201380.

In Tunisia, by contrast, the military supported a democratic transition due to its converse corporate interests, professional norms and political preferences. Firstly, since independence,

67 Anderson, 2011, p. 2

74 Chulov, 2013

68 Kirkpatrick, 2011

75 Tetti, 2012

69 Ezbawy, 2011

76 Awad, 2022

70 Berlin, 2016

77 El-Sherif, 2013

71 El-Sherif, 2014

78 Aly, 2011

72 Ibid.

79 Selim, 2015

73

80

Ibid.

10

Laub, 2019; Grewal, 2015

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the Tunisian military had been marginalised and counterbalanced under President Ben Ali’s police state; it was underfunded, underequipped and sidelined from both economic and political power. Hence, it never developed deep vested interests that would inextricably link itself to the fate of Tunisia’s dictators. Democratisation, however, offered the new regime to invest into the neglected military and grant it minimally advisory roles in security decisions, generating support within the military for the transition.

Amr Adly suggests that political reform from authoritarian consolidation “does not appear to be possible” in Egypt88.

Following the previously discussed role of the SCAF within the state’s political affairs, the government proceeded to expand both formal and informal control over the media, calling upon media outlets to echo a “pro-regime” discourse, as well as reignited a new wave of extreme state-backed and self-censorship89. The El-Sisi government’s main objective to survive within the political turbulence, was to avoid a repeat of the uprising that toppled Mubarak from power. In an effort to pursue this objective, his administration demonstrated little to no tolerance for dissent and has sustained a brutal crackdown “more brutal than his predecessors”, ultimately reenergising the machine of oppression90.

Furthermore, previous dictators practiced regional discrimination of military officials to ensure there exists internal counterbalancing in the military81. Ben Ali and Bourguiba privileged a small minority from coastal regions comprising the national guard, presidential guard and coastal military officers within the army to protect themselves from a coup82. Since the new democratic regime offered equality for discriminated officials who make up the majority of the military, they now counterbalanced against the antidemocratic military minority previously prioritised by the dictators.

The structural features of authoritarian Egypt persisted post-revolution, ultimately ratified within the constitution, as well as enshrined within the political imagination of the states’ elites. El-Sherif critically considers the notion that the authoritarianism practice could have been considered justified if such measures managed to introduce notable achievements and reforms, namely, democratic development. However, ElSherif argues that neither was achieved, as there was a symbolic monopoly regarding key policy decision-making processes coupled with arbitrary law enforcement91. This emblemised the continuation of the pre-revolution civic and political structure.

The prospect of political change and political pluralism Chaos and confusion ensued within Egypt, as tensions increased over the brazen inability of civilian elites, Islamist, as well as secular parties to reach common ground regarding the framework of a ‘post-revolutionary order’. This discord and dislocation within the state was exacerbated with the passage of the 2012 ‘controversial’ constitution, endorsed by the then president, Morsi83. The instability that followed due to the distorted power distribution led to the previously discussed ousting of Morsi by the SCAF84. The elusive desire of ensuring political change, coupled with the prospect of increased political participation remained elusive as El-Sisi, from the beginning of his reign, promoted an official campaign, shaping Egyptian national identity, as the “new Egyptian”85. This identity is essentially conceptualised as the antithesis to what El-Sisi perceives to be “the Islamist other”86.

The confounding identities sewed divisions amongst Egyptian civil society, as the state blocked effective and inclusive political competition, participation, and pluralism, denying independent political thought and expression. The state ultimately upheld an “unbalanced state-society relationship”, whereby opposing political factions, classes, and groups were prohibited from “competing for power”, or to essentially represent the interests and demands of their respective communities87.

The January uprisings were concerned less with the implementation of a legitimate electoral system, and more engulfed in the desire to re-structure and reform Egyptian politics with an ideology that represented the majority. This prospect of political reconfiguration was in an effort to stray away from the old state, that ultimately excluded the majority of the civil society from crucial socio-economic decisionmaking processes, and was under the domination of the SCAF, economic oligarchs, and bureaucratic elites92. However, as this paper hypothesises the old regime’s strategy prevailed within the post-revolutionary political landscape, whereby the labour demands were treated as matters of security that ought to be controlled and contained, rather than as “social grievances” that required socio-political reforms to be resolved93.

Tunisia’s political fault lines are instead driven by religion.

Ennahda is Tunisia’s ruling party, inspired by and yet ideologically different from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.

Crucially, it differs from its Egyptian counterpart by how it reformed itself from a fundamentally Islamist party, to one

81 Omar, 2024, p. 47

88 Adly, 2016

82 Ibid., p. 57

89 Ibid.

83 Dunne, 2013

90 Gounden, 2015

84 Brown, 2013

91 El-Sherif, 2014

85 Winter, 2019, p. 65

92 El-Sherif, 2013

86 Shiloah, 2019, p. 65

93 Abdalla, 2012

87

El-Sherif, 2013

11

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compromising and advocating for Muslim democrats. This transition mirrored that of Tunisia’s broader social and political reformations. On 23 October 2011, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) was elected to draft the new constitution. This new constitution declares Tunisia a “civil state” (dawla al-madaniya) diction that denounces religious interference in the national laws. There is also no inference to Islamic law (shari’a), only referencing the “teachings of Islam), hence excluding any imperative legal role for the Islamic religious canon.

religious freedoms and the unavailability of robust guarantees against individual choice. In other words, Ghannouchi sought for a compromise by appealing to the shari’a as a matter of values, rather than legal norms; teachings, not laws. This allowed the country to bridge the gap between secular liberalists and Islamists, forming a sustainable consensus that facilitated its democratic transition.

7. Economic reforms analysis

The constitution also grants the right to freedom of conscience, defined as the freedom of every individual to freely choose their own faith, entailing the right to apostasy or to change one’s religious affiliation. This is usually contrasted against freedom of worship, which is the collective right of groups to practise their respective faiths. This is an imperative shift from Ennahda’s original ideologies; both Islamist ideologies and traditional Islamic authorities strictly condemn the idea of any Muslim leaving Islam, whether for another religion or for atheism. Hence, the new constitution stands in stark contrast with Ennahda’s original Islamist ideology, even though the Islamists were in the majority in the assembly.

Initial steps The institutional frameworks that evolved in Tunisia and Egypt following the Arab Spring reflect starkly different trajectories – Tunisia characterized by political pluralism and inclusivity, and Egypt by a consolidation of militarized power and ongoing political suppression. These differences are mirrored in their respective economic policies.

In 2013, the Tunisian parliament passed the Transitional Justice Law, an ambitious initiative to address past human rights violations by providing reparations for victims and facilitating the transition from an authoritarian state to a democratic system that protects human rights95. This law led to the establishment of the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC), a truth-seeking body that laid the groundwork for Tunisia's recovery of sovereignty and control over its future96.

During its four-year mandate, the TDC processed over 60,000 submissions and held nearly 50,000 private hearings, although political disputes prematurely ended its operation in 201897.

While primarily focused on documenting and acknowledging historical injustices, the TDC also made several recommendations for economic reforms aimed at rectifying the long-standing economic marginalization of many Tunisians. Before assessing the impact of these economic reforms on Tunisia's democratic consolidation and governance, it is essential to consider the immediate aftermath in the Egyptian context.

The reason for Ennahda’s ideological shift can be analysed through the inclusion-moderation paradigm94, which argues that inclusion in the political process will make Islamist parties more moderate. It differentiates between two means of moderation, the first being tactical moderation, where moderation is a means to an end of gaining political power e.g. only changing policies but where underlying ideology remains intact. The second form is ideological moderation, where a party genuinely changes its fundamental ideologies.

In Tunisia, it is arguable that ideological moderation has occurred. To illustrate the argument, Ennahda’s characteristics have to be first analysed. Ennahda is known for its strong internal discipline, where members have strong internal pride and conviction, serving as advocates for the party’s ideologies to its grassroots. With members personally resonating with the party’s ideologies, fundamental change in party ideology is difficult without sowing internal discord.

Hence, Ennahda found itself fighting a two-front battle: not only do they have change ideologically to align itself with growing public demands for secularism, they have to convince their own members to accept the new principles. Hence, Rached Ghannouchi’s – leader of the party – solution was to introduce new and more liberal interpretations of Islamism and Islam itself. For instance, on freedom of conscience, he argued that it is not suitable that Islamists and Muslims in general fear that freedom of individual choice would harm Islam, because Islam’s greatest threat is the absence of

Contrasting with Tunisia's prompt reformative response to the Arab Spring, Egypt's reaction was more cumbersome. The revolution had a significant and largely detrimental economic impact on Egypt, particularly affecting sectors like tourism, travel rents, and foreign investment98. Over a seven-year period, the growth rate of per capita real GDP was estimated to have lost 12.04%, equivalent to an annual loss of 1.56%99.

This downturn was intensified by the military's efforts to consolidate control over both political and economic spheres, contributing to a heightened sense of authoritarianism reminiscent of the nationalist/socialist era under Gamal Abdel

94 Schwedler, 2011, p. 347

97 Saheli, 2022, p. 105

95 Republic of Tunisia, 2013, Part 1

98 Echevarria & Garcia-Enriquez, 2020, p. 1475

96

99

TDC, 2019, p. 4

12

Ibid., p. 1456

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Nasser100. Despite a desire during the Arab Spring to shift away from neoliberal policies—commonly associated with crony capitalism and persistent inequality—Egypt's economic strategies remain deeply rooted in these principles. This is partly due to Egypt's dependence on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Consequently, most reforms have adhered to a neoliberal framework, with financial and policy decisions heavily influenced by international lenders and offering little benefit to the general population. These relationships have also strengthened regional ties, particularly with Gulf countries that supported Egypt's applications for funding101. International institutions viewed the Arab Spring as an opportunity to deepen neoliberal policies under the guise of promoting good governance102.

However, the resulting reforms aimed at expanding the private sector often unfolded in an unsystematic manner, undermining any potential benefits. The Egyptian experience underscores the complexities of implementing internationally endorsed neoliberal reforms in a country lacking the necessary democratic foundations.

12 for the State to “provide immediate care and temporary compensation” to all victims in conjunction with and irrespective of any final judgements made at a later date107.

The subsequent TDC mandate included the implementation of “a Comprehensive Reparation Program” tasked with “identifying the victims’ needs and vertically preparing the reparation program”108. Reparations were distributed during the initial phase of the transitional justice project, primarily focused on financial compensation, healthcare and social services, and work and professional support109.

While Tunisia focused on a system of reparations, Egypt’s economic policies – perhaps inadvertently – cemented elite control. Much of this stemmed from a muddled implementation of Western-backed neoliberal policies, which neglected poorer rungs of society.

One of the most significant pushes for neoliberal reform came with the European Union’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA), which aimed to increase foreign investment within the MENA region. Though these were economic policies, they effectively sheltered foreign investors from Egyptian law110. This created a lawlessness within the economic sphere, with foreign companies becoming virtually untouchable. This further increased disparity amongst the Egyptian populace, and so entrenched social inequalities.

Reforms: elites and the public For Ben Ali’s narrow elite to thrive under crony capitalism during his twenty-three-year rule, an increasingly broad section of society had to be excluded from the economic benefits of that system. Although cronyism created economic barriers to several groups in society, regional wealth disparities were perhaps most entrenched. As Yousfi notes, “regions in the south and central-west have suffered from unequal regional development, which has been reflected in massive unemployment, precarious work conditions, and lack of infrastructure.”103 At the time of the uprisings, the highest rates of unemployment were concentrated in the interior areas of Tunisia, reaching 22%, compared with 11% in the more affluent coastal cities104. A central objective of socioeconomic reform in post-Arab spring Tunisia, therefore, was to prioritise the inclusion of previously marginalised groups.

In its final report, the TDC makes repeated recommendations for the state to “improve the means of access to employment [...] at a national, regional and local level.” 105

At the same time, international actors sought to limit the state’s role in the provision of public goods, assuming these would be taken over by a robust private sector. No longer was the state meant to provide “privileges such as public employment [and] subsidies”111 Instead, the state was to provide only “basic economic services [and] adequate social protection.”112 At the same time, IMF lenders expected the state to be responsible for “better governance, [the creation of] a level playing field for all economic actors, and a competitive environment for the private sector,”113 goals which were unrealistic for a state that was simultaneously having its capacity reduced. In a country lacking democratic fundamentals, this conflicting guidance likely impeded effective reforms. The state was paradoxically expected to both withdraw from and deeply engage in economic regulation, an untenable position for a government beset by chaos and weakness.

Reparations, “considered the centralised pillar of the transitional justice process,”106 have been lauded as one of the most significant socio-economic reforms to arise from the TDC. Article 11 of the 2013 Transitional Justice Law states that reparations for “victims of violations constitutes a right guaranteed by law”, followed by the prescription under Article

One notable reform involved cutting public expenditure, including reductions in food and gas subsidies and public

100 Joya, 2017, p. 340

107 Republic of Tunisia, 2013, Part 4

101 Zambakari & Kang, 2016

108 TDC, 2019, pp. 421-2

102 Joya, 2017, p. 344

109 El Gantri, 2015, p. 9

103 Yousfi, 2014, 322-3

110 Joya, 2017, p. 344

104 World Bank, 2014, p. 284

111 Ibid.

105 Ibid., p. 291

112 Ibid.

106

113

Andrieu, 2016 in Gready, 2022, p. 189

13

Ibid.

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sector salaries, which were deemed to "distort the market.”114 The subsidiaries and salaries, however, were deemed necessary to “establish political peace in the postrevolutionary context.”115 This led to a shift in foreign investment, with a renewed focus on the energy sector, which made up “almost half” of new World Bank-funded initiatives116. Energy subsidies were again ill-considered, both in terms of economic growth and social equalities. With a focus on energy investment, the population continued to suffer; improving livelihoods would likely have required direct cash transfers and other immediate subsidies, which the government had neither the capacity nor will to accomplish.

return for allegiances and introducing transparency in the management of the public sector.”122 This aim followed reports made by the World Bank in 2014 which found that “the system of laws and regulations that allowed the [Ben Ali] family to capture such a large share of the country’s wealth remains largely in place and prone to abuse.”123 Egypt, likewise, experienced a similar continuation of cronyism. Economic initiatives had unexpected impact on protest behaviour, arguably dampening some of the longevity of Egypt’s Spring. The military-run interim government postMubarak, keen to curry international favour and spark investment, criminalised strikes or work-related protests.

Finance ministers became de facto harbingers of coming World Bank reforms: by suppressing government spending they ignored “public demands for food, shelter and living wages to keep the budget deficit under control.”124

Tunisia, similarly, was not exempt from these issues. The Dignity and Rehabilitation Fund for the Victims of Totalitarianism, or Dignity Fund, established alongside the TDC and “tasked with delivering reparations to victims” has yet to be activated117. The current status of this fund appears ambiguous. Whilst some scholars speculate its existence118, the International Center for Transitional Justice presents a new government agenda against the Dignity Fund: “its head was dismissed, and no official information has since been available about its work.”119 This analysis suggests that whilst reparations were intended “to achieve human dignity” through compensation of those who experienced egregious human rights violations, the effectiveness of this mechanism has recently been stifled. The inaccessibility of the Dignity Fund, the circumstances of which are mired in ambiguity, in effect reduce the TDC’s findings to a largely symbolic sphere.

Though important, this symbolic value alone can neither repair the political trust between the State and the People, nor stimulate the inclusion of previously marginalised economic actors, that is required for effective democratic governance.

Furthermore, a military-enacted law aimed at enticing IMF investment established a committee purportedly to combat embezzlement. In reality, this hindered “the ability of Egypt’s courts to hold investors accountable.”125 This lawlessness again hindered sustainable governance by allowing corrupt elites to remain largely untouchable, thereby further undermining democratic governance. Thus, reforms meant to court international lenders and bolster economic growth inadvertently spurred greater inequalities.

Aftermath Despite recommendations from both the TDC and World Bank for the Tunisian government to “pursue reforms aimed at reducing the scope for regulatory capture”126, significant progress has yet to be made. In fact, excessive regulation of economic activity remains persistent. A concentration of markets has led to higher entry barriers, whilst cumbersome investment rules have created a high cost of business across sectors. Primarily due to this expanding role of the state, public debt has risen from 40.7 percent of GDP in 2010 to 79.8 percent in 2022127. This analysis cannot determine a direct causal link between Tunisia’s poor economic performance and cronyism; indeed, recent droughts, the COVID-19 crisis, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have undoubtedly contributed to the country’s economic woes in recent years. Nevertheless, it is evident that the TDC’s recommendations have not yet been implemented, and while the exclusionary networks of rents and privileges remain in place, the consolidation of Tunisia’s democratic governance systems will always be limited.

Persistent problems: cronyism Tunisia’s economy under authoritarianism relied on a system of “crony capitalism”, defined by El-Haddad as “a union between capitalists and politicians enabling the former to acquire wealth and the latter to seek and retain power.” 120 Cronyism thus constitutes a specific form of political corruption, though indeed autocratic systems are themselves inherently corrupt, involving the “distortion or subversion of the exercise of public office so as to meet private, partisan or sectorial rather than properly public interests.”121 In 2019, the TDC published the Final and Comprehensive Report which prioritised “efforts at dismantling the system of corruption and despotism, cutting ties with the system of permits granted in 114 Joya, 2017, p. 346

121 Philip, 2015, p. 23

115 Ibid.

122 TDC, 2019, p. 4

116 Ibid.

123 World Bank, 2014, p. 126

117 ICTJ, 2024

124 Joya, 2017, p. 347

118 Saheli, 2022, p. 108

125 Ibid.

119 ICTJ, 2024

126 World Bank, 2014, p. 127

120

127

El-Haddad, 2020, p. 2

14

World Bank, 2023

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Within Egypt, economic reforms were partnered with political action. Though certain reforms were internationally lauded, several neoliberal attempts went together with repressive policies; such politicking was indeed bolstered by austere financial measures. Such measures included consecutive austerity measures and a “massive devaluation of the Egyptian pound,” all of which was overseen by “international private funds […] financing the country’s external sovereign debt.”128 Indeed, the two fed into each other: further political repression was needed to quell protest and dissent over unpopular austerity measures. Such reforms, rather than propel any equitable economy, were disastrous for most citizens.

the adoption of social and transitional justice models, and the impact of international interventions.

The strength of the military in Egypt has proved to be a key determinant in the trajectory of the country’s democratic governance. Following the uprisings, the structural features of authoritarianism remained intact, allowing a well-positioned military to assume power. The SCAF used its prominent position to dominate the political sphere and exert full control over the establishment of the new constitution. Inclusive political participation was effectively blocked as opponents, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were forcibly ousted from the political process. As the consolidation of power has continued, independent political expression has increasingly been denied whilst the media has faced pressure to conform to pro-regime discourse. In short, the El-Sisi government has sought conformity through measures that parallel the oppression of the pre-Arab spring regime.

The Arab Spring had come as a shock to much of the international community, including its financial sectors. In analysing economic relations between the European Union (EU) and Egypt, the EU apparently settled on the notion that it was “not that economic reforms had been socially counterproductive, but rather that they had not gone far enough.”129 Many of these EU efforts, which centred around the “security-stability nexus,”130 were not subject to massive reform. Instead, they were entrenched, and even expanded.

The Tunisian context provided the backdrop for an alternative outcome. Here, the infantilisation of the military rendered the prospect of a similar power grab unrealistic, especially against a broad and organised civil society coalition. As discussed, by 2011, civil society networks were far more sophisticated and entrenched in Tunisia than in Egypt, having led a sustained and collaborative opposition to the Ben Ali regime for more than a decade. This opposition contained secular and religious groups alike. As Stepan outlines, “with secularists agreeing that Islamists could participate fully in democratic politics, and Islamists agreeing that popular sovereignty is the only source of legitimacy,” Tunisia was well-situated to begin the process of democratic transition133. Tunisia managed to create embedded and sustainable democratic institutions due to its ability to bind traditionally disparate groups under a unified banner, sensitively navigating the delicate fractures along the fault lines of religious and political ideology.

The ousting of Mubarak shook EU-Egypt economic foundations, as there was no longer a president likely to concede to European interests. The subsequent military leadership spurred liberal economists to harken a “resurgence of the ‘statism’ that was characteristic of the post-colonial era.”131 Though classic neoliberal thought would assert that the state remain largely “hands-off” the economy, Egypt’s military has a history of “collaborative and evolving economic ties with the private sector.”132 However, these connections have not promoted equitable growth; much of Egypt’s populace, initially energized by democratic activism, has yet to see the changes they had hoped for.

For Egypt, democratic governance has been somewhat undermined by an economic policy heavily reliant upon international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Neoliberal reforms have been attached to loans, promoting an expansion of the private sector at the expense of public expenditure and subsidiaries. An unforeseen consequence of this process has seen heightened military repression, in which force has been used to silence protests and minimise dissent over austerity measures. As with political reform, military control has been the key determinant of Egypt’s economic policy, producing unequitable and exclusionary outcomes.

8. Lessons learned The MENA region witnessed profound changes in the wake of the Arab Spring, particularly in terms of political and economic reforms. The divergent paths of Egypt and Tunisia post-revolution illustrate that despite a common goal of overthrowing authoritarian regimes, the road to democratic consolidation is intricate and multifaceted. By examining the factors influencing each country's trajectory, we can extract crucial lessons for the region’s ongoing transition. This analysis highlights four key elements that have significantly influenced the advancement of democratic governance in both countries: the role of the military, the vigor of civil society,

In Tunisia, the approach to economic reform has been spearheaded by initiatives like the Truth and Dignity

128 Adly, 2021, p. 292

131 Joya, 2020, p. 683

129 Roccu, 2018, p. 49

132 Ibid., pp. 683-4

130

133

Ibid.

15

Stepan, 2012, p. 101

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Commission, which aimed to rectify the wrongs of the former regime through recommendations focused on reparations and tackling corruption. Recommendations regarding reparations and corruption reveal genuine intent to establish a democratic governance built upon inclusive economic institutions. This analysis shows, however, that despite sincere efforts, an implementation gap persists. Tunisia's democratic journey underscores the need for ongoing dialogue, adaptation, and concerted efforts to address systemic challenges. While progress may be incremental, acknowledging the nuances of this process is essential for fostering a more inclusive and sustainable democratic governance framework in Tunisia.

9. Policy recommendations

Understanding the intricacies of democratic transitions and the difficulties of democratic governance in the MENA area can be gained from studying the experiences of Egypt and Tunisia. Above all, it is imperative to recognise the significance of inclusive democratic processes and respect for human rights. Egypt's reversal highlights the perils of authoritarianism and political exclusion, while Tunisia's more consolidated transition highlights the value of establishing consensus and encouraging political pluralism. Further, the contribution that independent media and civil society make to upholding democratic principles and holding governments responsible should not be undervalued. The dynamic civil society in Tunisia has been vital in defending democratic victories and pushing for change, emphasising the value of preserving free speech and public space. In contrast, the suppression of civil society in Egypt has weakened the case for democratic government and repressed criticism.

Conditional aid and loans:

The analysis of Egypt and Tunisia's post-Arab Spring trajectories provides a robust foundation for developing targeted policy recommendations to support democratic governance in these and other post-Arab Spring societies. The following recommendations are actor- or institution-specific, aiming to address the distinct challenges identified in the preceding comparative analysis.

For international actors and organizations •

•

Promoting economic reforms that foster inclusivity: •

In summary, this paper’s analysis both departs and reinforces the aforementioned theory of democratisation. The findings’ main deviation from the theory is found in the fact that the political landscape of the post-Arab spring MENA region has not witnessed the “simultaneous movement” that Carothers proposed, in which an authoritarian cluster of countries transitions in unison to democracy. On the other hand, the analysis does suggest that democratic transition is determined to a large degree by the social conditions that underpin the political and economic context of the polity in question. In Egypt as in Tunisia, a plethora of interests have competed to shape the social contract in a continual process of “negotiation and renegotiation.”134 Ultimately, the dynamic push-and-pull over political and economic reform in both countries reinforces the fact that transition is not a single event, but a continuous and ongoing process. Rather than producing a linear transition, the effects of the Arab Spring have been “muffled, dispersed, delayed, and often unexpected,” and yet, as Sadiki insightfully comments, “once spring has been experienced, it will be experienced again.” 135 The findings of this paper reveal that, years after the uprisings, the effects of the Arab spring are still in flux today.

134

International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and World Bank should attach more stringent conditions related to democratic reforms and human rights improvements to their financial aid and loans.

This could include clearer stipulations for transparency, accountability, and inclusive policymaking processes in recipient governments.

Example: Loans could be contingent on the recipient country implementing specific policies and measures that ensure the protection of human rights, support for democratic institutions, and the inclusion of marginalized groups in the political process.

•

Encourage economic reforms that not only foster economic growth but also ensure that the benefits of growth are widely shared among the population. This includes supporting policies that promote job creation in diverse sectors and regions, reduce income inequality, and eliminate crony capitalism.

Example: Technical assistance and funding for SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) that are outside the traditional crony networks, particularly in underdeveloped regions.

Economic policies addressing day-to-day concerns: •

•

135

Paffenholz, 2021, p. 377

16

Encourage reforms that address immediate economic concerns of citizens, such as job creation and inflation control. Support should be geared towards programs that directly impact the daily lives of individuals, ensuring that economic benefits of growth are tangibly felt by the population.

Example: Funding initiatives that enhance local industries which employ large segments of the population, such as agriculture and manufacturing, ensuring these sectors are capable of providing sustainable employment.

Sadiki, 2015, p. 26

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For national governments

Transparent and inclusive governance: •

Strengthening institutions: •

•

Governments in post-Arab Spring countries should focus on building robust democratic institutions that are capable of resisting authoritarian tendencies. This includes reforming the judiciary to ensure its independence, professionalizing the military to safeguard it from political interference, and creating mechanisms for regular and fair elections.

Example: Tunisia and Egypt can collaborate with regional and international bodies to establish a judicial and military exchange program. This initiative could include workshops, seminars, and joint training sessions that focus on best practices in judicial independence and military neutrality, drawing on diverse global examples. These programs would be designed with input from local legal and military experts to ensure they are culturally and contextually appropriate, fostering a dialogue that respects and incorporates local legal traditions and governance structures

•

Robust security sector reforms: •

•

Economic policies focused on social equity: •

•

Ensure that all segments of society, including political minorities and traditionally marginalized groups, have a say in the governance process. This could be facilitated through inclusive dialogues and consultations on national policies.

Example: Establish a 'Regional Dialogues Council' with quarterly meetings held in different parts of the country, each focusing on specific local issues that feed into national policy-making. This council would include local community leaders, representatives from minority groups, women's rights organizations, and youth advocates, ensuring a diverse range of perspectives and empowering regional voices in national discussions.

Implement economic policies that address the root causes of discontent such as unemployment, poverty, and regional disparities. This includes investing in education, healthcare, and infrastructure, particularly in marginalized regions, to ensure equal opportunities for all citizens.

Example: The government could implement a targeted initiative to revitalize the interior regions, where economic development has traditionally lagged behind the coastal areas. This focus of this initiative could be on developing an agricultural reform program aimed at modernizing the sector, which is a major employer in rural areas in both nations. Such a program could include investments in irrigation technologies, sustainable farming practices, and direct marketing channels that connect farmers directly to consumers and retailers, reducing the layers of middlemen. Furthermore, a publicprivate partnership model could be promoted to improve healthcare facilities and educational institutions in underserved areas, ensuring that these essential services contribute to a more equitable socioeconomic development. Partnerships with private sector entities could be incentivized to invest in these regions through tax breaks and infrastructure support, aimed at creating jobs and enhancing local economies.

Both countries should prioritize comprehensive security sector reforms to rebuild trust between security institutions and the public. This involves not only restructuring and training but also establishing oversight mechanisms that ensure security forces are held accountable for human rights abuses.

Example: Implementation of community policing models that involve local, regional and international stakeholders in the planning and execution of security measures, which could help mend the relationship between the public and the police.

For the military Clear separation from civilian governance: •

•

In cases where the military has a significant influence on governance, the military should progressively disengage from roles in governance and business, focusing instead on national defence and security.

International partners can support this transition through security sector reform programs that emphasize the apolitical nature of the military.

Example: Legislation that limits the military’s ability to own or operate commercial enterprises and ensures its budget and activities are subject to civilian oversight can be introduced.

Enhanced civil-military oversight mechanisms: •

•

17

relations

through

structured

To establish effective civilian control over the military, ensuring that military operations and strategies are aligned with the democratic objectives and security needs of the nation, without overstepping into political arenas.

Example: Developing a comprehensive oversight framework that should include the creation of a bipartisan parliamentary committee dedicated to

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military affairs. The committee would have the authority to review and approve military budgets, oversee military operations and appointments, and ensure that military actions are in line with national laws and international human rights standards.

Comprising respected civilian leaders, legal experts, and former military officers, this board would have the mandate to investigate complaints against military personnel and operations. Its findings would be public, ensuring transparency and accountability.

This policy could involve regular audits, annual reports to the parliament, and mandatory hearings for high-ranking military appointments.

reliance primarily on Western academic sources introduces a significant limitation due to the potential neutrality issues in the data and analysis. Western perspectives have historically exerted a disproportionate influence over the narrative surrounding politics in the Arab world. The very term "Arab Spring," coined by Western commentators rather than the protestors themselves, exemplifies this bias. The protestors called for dignity and revolution, using phrases like "al-marar al-Arabi" (the Arab bitterness), underscoring a disconnect between the Western characterization of these events and the local sentiments driving them136. This divergence highlights the challenge of viewing the Arab region through a lens that is not reflective of its people’s perspectives.

Furthermore, the homogenizing term "Arab" overlooks the significant cultural, historical, religious, and linguistic diversities within the MENA region. While the paper focuses on Tunisia and Egypt, the Arab Spring was a complex series of revolutions and protests that affected various countries across the Middle East and North Africa, each with unique outcomes influenced by distinct local conditions. A deeper analysis could therefore benefit from a broader inclusion of regional first-hand perspectives, particularly from local scholars and experts who could provide deeper insights that challenge or complement the existing narrative on the very question this paper seeks to shed light on.

Additionally, the paper does not sufficiently analyse how the Arab Spring was portrayed in both Western and regional media, missing an opportunity to explore how media coverage may have influenced public perception and policy decisions internationally and within the MENA region. Media narratives play a crucial role in shaping the global understanding of political events, and an examination of these narratives could reveal potential biases or discrepancies in the reporting of the Arab Spring.

The paper also faces limitations in its socioeconomic data, which may be incomplete or skewed due to the tumultuous nature of the events and the varying capacities of national statistical offices during times of crisis. This gap affects the reliability of economic analyses and may lead to conclusions that do not fully reflect the realities experienced by the populations during and after the uprisings.

Finally, the analysis primarily focuses on national developments and tends to overlook the sub-national variations within Tunisia and Egypt. Local dynamics, such as regional differences in political engagement, economic opportunities, and the strength of social movements, can significantly influence the outcomes of national reforms and revolutions. Future academic research addressing these subnational differences would offer a more nuanced view of how localized factors interact with broader national and

For judicial systems: Judicial reforms to ensure independence and integrity: •

•

•

Strengthening the judicial system to act as an independent arbiter in political matters, ensuring that the rule of law is maintained, and that there is accountability for abuses of power.

Example: Establishing a Judicial Oversight Commission, an independent body tasked with overseeing the appointment, promotion, and disciplinary processes of judges. This Commission could consist of members from the judiciary, legal academia, and civil society communities, ensuring a broad representation. Additionally, the Commission could develop and enforce clear, merit-based criteria for all judicial appointments, alongside regular public reporting on its activities to ensure transparency and build public trust.

Another example could be introducing a 'Judicial Performance Evaluation' program managed by a mix of senior retired judges, respected legal scholars, and representatives from international legal bodies. This program would regularly assess the effectiveness, fairness, and integrity of judicial proceedings and publish findings. The evaluations would be used not only to ensure accountability but also to inform training programs that help judges deal with complex legal issues, particularly those involving government accountability and human rights.

10. Limitations and recommendations for future academic research To deepen the discussion of the paper's limitations, several content-related constraints must be acknowledged to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the Arab Spring. The 136

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international influences to shape the post-Arab Spring landscape.

By expanding the scope to address these limitations, future scholarly work on this topic would not only recognize the complexity of the Arab Spring but also highlight the importance of incorporating more nuanced and regionally informed perspectives.

This comparative analysis underscores several broader implications for democratic transitions in similar contexts.

First, the strength and role of the military in politics are decisive. Where the military retains substantial control over the state apparatus, as in Egypt, democratic reforms face significant obstacles.

In contrast, a military that remains in the barracks, as in Tunisia, tends to facilitate more successful democratic governance. Second, the importance of inclusive political processes cannot be overstated. Tunisia’s approach to crafting a democratic constitution, characterized by extensive public consultation and the inclusion of a broad range of political actors, starkly contrasts with Egypt’s top-down approach, where public participation in governance reforms was minimal.

Moreover, economic reforms must be attuned to the socioeconomic realities of post-revolution societies. Policies that do not directly address the economic grievances that often underpin calls for democratic change are likely to falter.

Tunisia’s ongoing struggles with economic reform highlight the difficulties of achieving substantive economic change, even in a relatively more democratic context. The need for economic policies that are both inclusive and participatory is clear; reforms must be designed to benefit the broader populace, not just the elite or foreign investors.

Looking ahead, the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt offer valuable lessons for other countries in the MENA region and beyond. Supporting the development of independent institutions, ensuring the neutrality of the military, fostering inclusive political dialogue, and implementing economic reforms that prioritize social equity are pivotal. International actors play a crucial role in this context. They must ensure that their engagement and the conditions attached to financial aid genuinely support these objectives rather than inadvertently entrenching existing power structures.

Ultimately, the journeys of Tunisia and Egypt in the years following the Arab Spring illustrate that the path to democratic governance is neither linear nor assured. It is fraught with challenges and setbacks that require persistent effort and adaptation to overcome. The international community, alongside domestic actors, must remain committed to supporting these transitions, bearing in mind that genuine democracy is not merely about conducting elections but about creating a system of governance that is truly representative, accountable, and inclusive. As this paper has shown, while the Arab Spring may not have delivered immediate transformations, it has certainly set the stage for a continued struggle for democracy, which, as history often shows, may take different forms and timelines to fully materialize.

11. Conclusion The Arab Spring was a watershed moment for North Africa and the Middle East, symbolizing a profound demand for change in a region long marked by authoritarian governance. This comparative analysis of Egypt and Tunisia has sought to uncover how political and economic reforms post-Arab Spring have influenced the trajectory of democratic governance in these countries. Both nations paths have diverged significantly since 2011, offering critical insights into the complex nature of democratization in postrevolutionary societies.

Tunisia, hailed as the success story of the Arab Spring, has demonstrated that effective democratic transition is possible in the region. The key to its relative success lies in a combination of factors that fostered a conducive environment for democratic norms to take root. Firstly, the role of a relatively apolitical military that stepped back from the political arena was crucial. Unlike Egypt, where the military entrenched its power post-revolution, Tunisia’s military did not interfere significantly in politics, allowing civilian government to lead the transition. Moreover, Tunisia's vibrant civil society and the successful negotiation and inclusion of various political and social groups, including Islamists, into the democratic process were pivotal. The establishment of the Truth and Dignity Commission, despite its challenges, symbolizes a sincere attempt to reconcile with the past and build a governance model based on transparency, accountability, and inclusivity.

On the other hand, Egypt’s trajectory post-Arab Spring presents a cautionary tale of how easily democratic aspirations can be derailed when reform processes are hijacked by entrenched powers. The Egyptian military's takeover following a brief experiment with democracy demonstrates the difficulties of dislodging military influence from politics in a country where it has long been a dominant force. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces effectively managed the transition period to its advantage, ensuring the continuation of authoritarian governance structures under a new guise. Economic reforms in Egypt, often guided by neoliberal principles tied to international loans, failed to address the underlying socio-economic grievances that fuelled the 2011 uprisings. Instead, these reforms have often exacerbated inequalities, reduced public expenditure on essential services, and failed to generate inclusive growth.

Acknowledgements The Conflict & Statebuilding I team would like to express their gratitude to the advisers and peer-reviewers for their

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expert guidance and insightful reviews which have enriched the research and writing, and without whom this publication would have not been possible.

[5] Al-Muslimi, F., Mahmoud, B., & Al-Shakeri, Hayder.

(2024). Beyond the uprisings: Pragmatic lessons from the Arab Spring. Kalam – Chatham House. https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/beyond-the-uprisingspragmatic-lessons-from-the-arab-spring/ [6] Aly, A. (2011). The Paradox of the Egyptian Revolution. https://www.academia.edu/41758249/The_Paradox_of_the_Egyptia n_Revolution [7] Anderson, Lisa. (2011). Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.

Foreign Affairs. 90. 2-7.

[8] Ayeb, H. (2011). Social and political geography of the Tunisian revolution: the alfa grass revolution. Review of African Political Economy, 38(129), 467–479. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2011.604250 [9] Belloni, R. (2012). Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Significance. Global Governance, 18(1), 21–38. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01801004 [10] Berlin, D. (2016). Armies and Insurgencies in The Arab Spring. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv2t4dk8 [11] Brown, N. (2011). The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

[12] Brown, N., & Halawi, L. (2017). Economic Reform and Democratization in Tunisia: Lessons from the Post-Revolution Experience. In The Political Economy of Reform in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 89-109). Springer.

[13] Capoccia, G. (2014). The Study of Democratisation and The Arab Spring. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274986343_The_Study_o f_Democratization_and_the_Arab_Spring [14] Carothers, T. (2005). The End of The Transition Paradigm. https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/17173/pdf?casa_token=qhEnvHqgfsAAAAA:USnWUKJZbJTBm_LIdh4nkayIOWpZtrS09Oi SY1-0vjS3sv9DW75eh7Q0apFDhZ5cvRS1c4Svfg [15] Cavatora, F. (2015). No Democratic Change […] and Yet No Authoritarian Community: The Inter-Paradigm Debate and North Africa after The Uprisings. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13530194.2015.9732 00 [16] Chulov, M. (2013). Egypt: President Morsi Defiant As Army Deadline Runs Out. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/egypt-morsi-armydeadline-expires [17] Country Nutrition Profiles: Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(2022). Global Nutrition Report. https://globalnutritionreport.org/resources/nutritionprofiles/europe/southern-europe/bosnia-and-herzegovina/ [18] Dunne, M. (2013). Egypt’s Draft Constitution Rewards The Military and Judiciary. https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/04/egypt-s-draftconstitution-rewards-military-and-judiciary-pub-53806 [19] Echevarría, C., & García-Enríquez, J. (2020). The economic cost of the Arab Spring: the case of the Egyptian revolution. Empirical Economics, 20, 1453–1477. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-019-01684-7 [20] El Gantri, R. (2015). Briefing: Tunisia in Transition, International Center for Transitional Justice

About the authors Ben Clark is a graduate student at University College London studying MSc Public Policy. He obtained his undergraduate BA degree from Cardiff University in English Literature.

Emily Chen Xinyu is pursuing a BSc (Honours) in Philosophy, Politics and Economics with Social Data Science at University College London and plans to join the public service after her studies.

Ghalia Burgan holds a BSc in Politics and International Relations from the University of Bristol and is currently pursuing an MSc in International Public Policy at University College London. She is also Deputy Policy Editor of The Diplomacy Review.

Jesmean Kaur is pursuing a BSc in Politics and International Relations at University College London.

Kemal Mohamedou holds a BA in International Relations from King’s College London’s Department of War Studies and is currently pursuing an MSc in International Public Policy at University College London. He is also a Team Lead at the Bentham Brooks Institute as well as a Chatham House Common Futures Conversations member.

Lily Donahue holds an MSc (Distinction) in Global Affairs from King’s College London and is currently pursuing a second MSc in Security Studies at University College London.

She holds a Bachelor of Science from Skidmore College. She also works as a conflict assessor for a civilian harm watchdog organisation.

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Refugees and Migration Team

Analysing Climate Mobility Frameworks in Response to Somalia’s Climate Migrant Crisis: Lesson Learned from the Falepili Union Haoxi Li1, Deirdre Walsh, Tea Zyberaj, Zoya Hibbert and Chiara De Vita 1

Team Leader, Refugees and Migration Team

Received 29th May 2024 Published 5th January 2025

Abstract This Policy Paper explores the complex interplay between climate change, climate mobility and bilateral frameworks with a specific focus on Somalia's climate migrant crisis. Drawing insights from the Falepili Union agreement between Australia and Tuvalu, the paper provides policy recommendations which address the challenges faced by climate-affected populations in Somalia. It advocates for the creation of strong, legally binding frameworks and partnerships between nations which are equipped to address the challenges of climate-induced migration in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, this paper advances the necessity of the inclusion of the term ‘climate mobility’ in policy frameworks, in order to ensure targeted and effective bilateral responses to climate change which are grounded in the protection of this distinct category of peoples. We present, here, a discussion of the relevance of such terminology, and why the term is preferable to others, such as ‘climate migrants’.

The research reveals a significant gap in existing frameworks and identifies deficiencies in both domestic and international policies concerning groups who have been displaced as a result of climate change. The Falepili Union stands as a pioneering framework, primarily based on the establishment of an immediate and guaranteed mobility pathway for climate-vulnerable communities. Following our analysis, we suggest that a such a framework, which prioritises the value of mutual respect and recognises the immediate risks that climate change is posing to vulnerable peoples and their environments, is essential for safeguarding the fundamental rights of communities in Somalia. Since the Falepili framework is one of the first to draw an explicit connection between climate change and migration and was implemented primarily with the aim to establish a guaranteed climate mobility pathway, it serves as a leading example of what bilateral mobility frameworks between the EU and Somalia may look like in the future.

Keywords: Climate mobility, bilateral frameworks, Somalia, climate migrants, policy recommendations, Falepili Union

1. Introduction

As such, climate-induced migration has emerged as a pressing global issue. The World Bank's updated Groundswell report (2021) projects that by 2050, climate change could compel a staggering 216 million people across six major world regions to relocate within their own countries. These migration patterns are spurred primarily by the profound impacts of climate change on people's livelihoods and the increasing unsuitability of living conditions in highly exposed areas. The urgency of this issue is underscored by the prediction that hotspots of internal climate migration could appear as early as 2030 and will likely intensify by 2050. The regions likely to

The Earth’s climate is undergoing rapid and unprecedented changes, primarily driven by human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and changing land uses.

Scientific consensus warns that unchecked carbon emission (CO₂) “will lead to significant global warming by 2100, posing high-impact risks to human society and ecosystems worldwide” (Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 2021). One of these associated high-impact risks is the large-scale migration of people as climate change renders parts of the world entirely uninhabitable.

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be most affected include Sub-Saharan Africa, with a predicted 86 million migrants by 2050, East Asia and the Pacific with 49 million, South Asia with 40 million, North Africa with 19 million, Latin America with 17 million, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia with 5 million. However, the report also offers slight reason for optimism, suggesting that proactive measures to reduce global emissions and promote green, inclusive, and resilient development could potentially mitigate the scale of climate-induced migration by as much as 80 percent (World Bank, 2021).

Tuvalu, an island nation comprising nine small islands in the South Pacific Ocean with a population of approximately 11,000 (World Bank, 2022), exemplifies the profound impact of climate change on vulnerable regions. Rising sea levels have brought two of Tuvalu's islands to the brink of submersion. According to Tuvalu’s Bureau of Meteorology, the most devastating impacts include rising air temperatures, more intense and frequent storm surges, decreasing rainfall, and the total inundation of low-lying coastal areas of Funafuti, including its connection to the outside world; its airport runway (The Guardian, 2019). The unfortunate reality is that Tuvalu’s residents, like many communities within Somalia, face forced migration as their homeland becomes uninhabitable due to climate change. Therefore, the Australian government's partnership with Tuvalu through the Falepili Union is crucial, as it fundamentally addresses the needs and human rights of the Tuvaluan people.

Research concerning climate change and migration began to emerge in the 1980s (Klep, 2017), and has since witnessed major expansion, driven majorly by increasing media coverage of the topic (Kazcan & Orgill-Meyer, 2020).

Addressing climate-induced migration and devising effective policies in response to climate change is an evolving challenge for governments and international organisations alike. This complexity arises in part because the impacts of climate change are not evenly distributed across countries. Moreover, when discussing climate change, it is important to acknowledge that the countries least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions often face the most severe consequences, such as Somalia in the Horn of Africa or the island nation of Tuvalu located in the South Pacific Ocean.

In particular, the continent of Africa shoulders a disproportionate share of climate change impacts, with 17 of the 20 most severely affected countries globally located there (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2023).

Somalia emerges as particularly vulnerable, ranking as the second-most climate-vulnerable nation worldwide (World Resources Institute, 2023). Researchers at the University of Oxford (2023) report that in Somalia, the effects of climate change are increasingly manifesting in heightened and unpredictable precipitation patterns, there has been a 10% rise in sea levels, and escalating droughts are resulting in famine.

Additionally, they also reported that a 1°C temperature increase can lead to a tenfold increase in displaced people in Somalia. Similarly, a reduction in rainfall from 100mm to 50mm per month can double the displacement (The University of Oxford, 2023). The reality of the situation in Somalia is that even a slight temperature rise can cause pastures to dry up and crop yields to change, forcing communities to leave their homes. These changes present significant challenges and deeply affect the safety and well-being of Somalia's population, violating their human rights. Moreover, climateinduced migration creates a vacuum that fosters human trafficking, smuggling, and crime, exacerbating the region’s vulnerabilities. Despite domestic climate policies in Somalia and EU-led initiatives in the region, the situation continues to deteriorate.

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The intricate interplay between climate change and climate mobility presents a multifaceted challenge that demands urgent attention and innovative policy responses. As Somalia grapples with the devastating impacts of climate change, the urgency to address its climate migrant crisis cannot be overstated. Effective policy frameworks must not only address immediate humanitarian and environmental needs, but they must also ensure legal recognition and future care and protection for climate migrants, safeguarding their rights and dignity. The lessons learned from initiatives like the Falepili Union between Australia and Tuvalu underscore the importance of international cooperation and solidarity in addressing climate-induced migration as, climate change threatens basic human rights, such as the right to life, water, sanitation, food, health, housing, self-determination, culture, and development (OHCHR, 2021). Furthermore, there is a pressing need for comprehensive research, robust data collection, and knowledge-sharing platforms to inform evidence-based policymaking and foster global collaboration.

Policymakers, international organizations, and civil society must collaborate to devise holistic and adaptive strategies that address the root causes and consequences of climate-induced migration, ensuring a resilient and equitable future for all.

Hence, the aim of this policy report is to firstly highlight the urgency with which climate-induced migration, specifically in Somalia, needs to be addressed. We then divert our focus to the comparable case of Tuvalu’s climate vulnerability.

Subsequently, we explore how Tuvalu, along with the invaluable help, support and respect it has received from Australia, has managed to create a framework which both attempts to improve existing safeguards and ensures a future for its people, even if these efforts fall victim to the omnipotent effects of climate change. In exploring the framework implemented between Tuvalu and Australia, we

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present an original perspective whereby policy action can ensure security, mobility and a future for victims of climate change and climate-induced migration. Hence, in this policy report, we argue that the Falepili Union presents a great starting point, not only with regards to the fact that it provides a long-term mobility pathway for Tuvaluans subjected to the effects of climate change, but also in that it openly incorporates the term ‘mobility’ into its language. The adoption of a similar framework, we believe, is something that Somalia, and potentially many other climate-vulnerable countries, would greatly benefit from.

consequence of the effects that climate change is having on various socio-economic aspects of Somalian individuals’ livelihoods. Reportedly, Africa is experiencing the highest urbanization rate globally. By 2030, half of Africa's population is expected to reside in urban areas. This is extremely worrying as these changing urban centres will foster a whole host of challenges from ethnic tensions to food production shocks, leaving the urban poor particularly vulnerable. Perhaps, the most pressing climate-induced challenge facing Somalia is drought. This is emphasised by the UN who state that, “access to water and sanitation are recognized by the United Nations as human rights fundamental to everyone’s health, dignity and prosperity” (OHCHR, 2022). In fact, water insecurity in Somalia is fuelling conflicts between herders and farmers as resources become scarcer, as highlighted in the 2013 NAPA report.

Predicting these seasonal weather phenomena is increasingly challenging due to a rise in dust storms, droughts, stronger winds, and notably higher temperatures over the past four decades. The 2011 drought in Somalia directly contributed to a famine, claiming nearly 260,000 lives, including 133,000 children under five years old (Burns, 2017). Empirical data as shown below, underscores the escalating frequency of storms, floods, and droughts impacting Somalia's population, as illustrated in the graph below (2017-2021), which is driving internal displacement.

2. Somalia’s Climate Change-Induced Migration and Mobility 2.1 Climate Change in Somalia: Climate-Related Illness, Food Insecurity and Conflict Climate change's impact on Somalia is profound, driving forced migration to explode due to a range of immediate health risks that it contributes towards, as outlined by McMichael and Lindgren (2011). To illustrate this, it is obvious that when natural disasters occur, they bring with them immediate health threats such as fatalities, injuries and heat exhaustion.

Moreover, extreme weather events like floods can even trigger cholera outbreaks and heighten malaria risks. Issues with water quality or shortages of the necessity can lead to health issues, such as scabies and trachoma.

The Horn of Africa (HoA), particularly Somalia, grapples with significant food insecurity. Labelled the “most food insecure region globally” (WHO, 2024), and the region is heavily dependent on food imports due to shortages thanks to climate change. In late 2019 and 2020, Cyclone Pawan and severe floods facilitated ideal conditions for desert locust breeding.

This led to two locust infestations in 2020, resulting in the loss of approximately 20% of Somalia's national crop yields (FAO Somalia, 2020). The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has further exacerbated Somalia's food security challenges as Somalia relied on wheat from Ukraine and Russia. Thus Somalia has seen a significant surge in the cost of local food items, making it unattainable for local Somali’s. This situation is further compounded by the lack of a stable government due to decades of civil unrest since 1991 (Lords Library, 2023).

The 2023 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) highlighted the dire situation of food insecurity in the region which appears to be correlated with outbreaks of violence.

Furthermore, the climate crisis severely affects the region's economy, with climate shocks estimated to have wiped out a fifth of the GDP of the most vulnerable countries. Thus, the forced displacement of the Somalian people emerges as a

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Although the graph shows variability in the numbers being displaced, this trend will only continue to flux as the unpredictability of climate change worsens. These climatic challenges underscore the urgent need for adaptive strategies and international cooperation to address the interconnected issues of climate change, migration, conflict, and food insecurity in Somalia.

2.1 Climate Change in Somalia: Climate-Related Illness, Food Insecurity and Conflict One of the fundamental issues with climate change, aside from the displacement and dispossession of people in Somalia, is that climate crises create a vacuum for criminal organisations and terrorist networks to profiteer off, thereby further exacerbating the risks that vulnerable Somalis may fall victim to. According to the 2021 report by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Somalia, there are “four interrelated pathways to illustrate the relationship between climate change, peace and security: (1) livelihood deterioration, (2) migration and mobility, (3) military and armed actors, and (4) political and economic exploitation.”

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Figure 1: Food Insecurity and Health Support, Somalia (World Health Organization, 2024)

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Figure 2: IDPs in Somalia (2017-2021) due to Extreme Weather (IMF, 2022)

Livelihood Deterioration As NUPI and SIPRI (2021) note “more frequent and intense droughts and floods undermine food security and worsen livelihood conditions in Somalia, adversely affecting marginalized groups, fuelling grievances, increasing competition over scarce resources and exacerbating existing community tensions and vulnerabilities”. Consequently, climate-related displacement and migration are expected to rise, especially among those whose livelihoods depend on agriculture and livestock. This influx of displaced populations can further strain community and national tensions and disrupt ongoing conflict resolution efforts. In Somalia, labour demands peak twice a year during the Gu and Deyr off-season harvests, which are crucial for land preparation and planting.

Additionally, camel and cattle calving synchronised with specific months, as nomads and their livestock migrate to greener pastures during wet seasons. However, heatwaves and droughts have disrupted these traditional patterns, leading to increased livestock raiding and recruitment into armed groups.

This occurs when herders sell more livestock than usual due to drought-induced losses, resulting in an oversupply of lowquality animals and triggering local price shocks.

Migration and Mobility Climate change can influence both forced and voluntary migration, threatening the livelihoods and physical safety of persons. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) face heightened vulnerability to identity-related conflicts and recruitment by armed groups. There are even reports of al-Shabaab in

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Somalia purposely restricting the movement of citizens living within their territory, making the search for water that much more difficult. This coercive control of people directly violates their human right to live and work. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the lack of a gendered perspective in climate policy, where women are disproportionately affected. This is particularly evident in regions such as Kenya, where approximately 80% of climate refugees from Somalia are women and children. Furthermore, the loss of income resulting from disruptions in agriculture and pastoralism can escalate the risk of violent conflict. When individuals perceive that their livelihoods are threatened, they may feel they have less to lose by resorting to violence or joining armed factions, like al-Shabaab (Burns, 2022).

Military and Armed Actors Presently, one of the biggest threats to Somalia is the terrorist organisation al-Shabaab, who take advantage of the climate crisis by positioning themselves as service and relief providers following droughts and floods. Yet, the principal goal of the violent group is to transform Somalia into a fundamentalist Islamic state. Through leading food aid initiatives in the country, they increase their own legitimacy and capitalise from desperate Somalians. The truth is the unrelenting drought has supported al-Shabaab’s control of food access because it has severely restricted crop. The group is also notorious for recruiting in refugee camps. For example, at the height of the humanitarian crisis in 2011, the number of Somali refugees in neighbouring Kenya was 519,411. These refugee camps in Kenya were ideal grounds for radical Islamic extremists to look for new recruits. One such camp, was Dabaab near Kenya’s border, is said to be the recruiting centre for alShabaab and a base for launching attacks. The government of

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Kenya even labelled the camp as “a nursery for al-Shabaab” (Burns, 2022).

cycles to prevent further displacement in the future.

Addressing drought-induced displacement is also a significant focus, particularly given the humanitarian crisis exacerbated by consecutive seasons of below-average rains since early 2015. The National Drought Response Strategy (NDSS) recognizes the importance of the Drought Impact Needs Assessment (DINA) and the accompanying action plan.

Initiatives around data and analysis, coordination, early response and prevention, and collaboration between development and humanitarian actors have been ongoing since 2016. The NDSS aims to align these initiatives with the medium and long-term goals outlined in the DINA and the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) to promote multistakeholder responses and improve self-reliance, resilience, and socio-economic integration of vulnerable populations, with a particular focus on urban recovery and urban planning in secondary towns (Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2022). However, “the humanitarian system continues to be strained by new displacement and overstretched services in the limited number of managed IDP sites” (NUPI and SIPRI, 2023).

Political and Economic Exploitation Droughts and floods can link local resource conflicts to broader insecurity, as elites may exploit the impacts to advance their influence over communities and resources.

Also, climate-related migration in Somalia, and into neighbouring countries, has fuelled tensions between communities. Violent outcomes are equally affected by the context of the long civil war, the erosion or replacement of customary mechanisms for dispute resolution, and the loss or displacement of traditional mediators, elders, and local exports in the customary law. This makes it especially important for the Somali government, at federal and member state level, to take anticipatory preventive response measures in reducing the risk of climate-related migration triggering violent conflict.

2.2 Climate Initiatives in Somalia The National Durable Solutions Strategy 2020-2024 (NDSS)

The National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change (NAPA) 2013

The Somalian government have made some efforts to address the pressing issue of displaced people, as is evident from the National Durable Solutions Strategy 2020–2024. The NDSS report was produced by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), with support from the Norwegian Refugee Council and other key donors. The FGS realised that broad coalitions among humanitarian, development, peace, and state building actors, under the leadership of local authorities and informed by communities affected by displacement, were instrumental in holistically addressing the root causes of displacement and its consequences. The proposed government priorities outlined in the document emphasize preparedness and awareness, response, resilience and recovery, and long-term solutions to address flood emergencies in Somalia. In terms of preparedness and awareness, the focus is on evaluating preflood measures to ensure timely response through early warning systems, temporary evacuation plans, public education, and disaster management preparedness. The response phase aims to minimize adverse impacts on population, infrastructure, and material values at risk during flooding by implementing pre-planned activities and testing institutional efficiency in disaster management. Furthermore, the document stresses resilience and recovery efforts postflooding, viewing this period as an opportunity to rebuild improved basic lifeline services and develop long-term sustainable solutions. Lessons learned from previous disasters are highlighted as essential in reducing vulnerability and preventing future loss. Additionally, there is an emphasis on assessing both early and long-term solutions to recurrent flood

The present Somalian government is acutely aware of the challenges that climate change poses to the people of Somalia and are not passive bystanders in terms of doing something to address the situation. Hence, the introduction of Somalia’s National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change (NAPA) in 2013, aiming to;

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“reduce vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change and build the resilience of the country and its communities.

Specifically, the NAP process aims to define medium- and long-term climate adaptation actions and initiatives for implementation by state and non-state actors; facilitate the integration of climate change adaptation, in a coherent manner, into development planning processes and strategies, within all relevant sectors and at different levels; enhance the coordination of climate change adaptation in the country; and promote the mobilization of resources to respond to Somalia’s climate change adaptation needs” (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2021).

Although Somalia’s government and political institutions remain fragile since their establishment in 2013, commitment to implementing the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) remains strong which champions the long-term goals to enhance resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change.

Promisingly, despite limited resources and funding, Somalia is utilising all available avenues, partnering with three universities; Moud University, Puntland State University

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(PSU), and SIMAD University for guidance on how best to implement their NAP. Academic actors sit on the project’s steering committee, initially as observers and later transferring to advisory roles, to strengthen governance and coordination.

Leveraging the expertise of academic institutions provides Somalia with access to cutting-edge research and methodologies, enhancing the effectiveness of climate strategies (Minority Rights Group, 2019). However, tackling and mitigating the effects of climate change in Somalia remains a steep up-hill battle, constrained by a lack of financing, institutional coordination, and on-going conflicts with groups like Al-Shabaab.

where nomadic pastoralists use seasonal migration to cope with adverse weather conditions,” exemplify this relationship between climate, conflict, and migration. Thus, the ‘Breaking the Climate-Conflict Cycle in Galmudug’ initiative which is funded by the European Union aims to address the socioenvironmental challenges exacerbated by climate change in the state of Galmudug in Somalia (European Commission, 2023). Although this initiative was funded by the EU, it is worth noting that it was implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The project focuses on reducing environmentally induced displacement and conflict while promoting climate-conscious conflict mitigation strategies. Some of the key accomplishments include, (UN Network on Migration, 2023):

The Team Europe Initiative Green Deal 2023 The European Union (EU) projects in Somalia aim to promote reconciliation, conflict resolution, and human rights protection through three main areas: 1.

Inclusive governance.

2.

Reconciliation and justice.

3.

Security.

Yet, despite the reality that the EU has primarily focused on providing humanitarian aid and development assistance to Somalia, efforts are steadily increasing to address the impacts of climate change in the region too. Nonetheless, the climate emergency in Somalia indicates that specifically tailored policies are urgently needed to address the rapidly detonating situation ahead of broader EU initiatives like that of The Team Europe Initiative Green Deal. This initiative aims to strengthen energy systems, enhance economic and financial governance, and to support education accessibility and quality through e-learning and vocational training. In addition to this, the EU promotes green economic development by supporting sustainable agri-food systems and selected value chains, as well as facilitating private sector dialogue. In terms of resilience and social inclusion, the EU works to boost Somalia’s climate resilience, promote clean energy and circular economy initiatives. It also addresses migration, displacement, and urban poverty by striving to ensure equal access to essential services and providing livelihood opportunities. However, it must be noted that the EU does need to do more as a third actor, potentially through its External Action Service, by introducing (in consultation with Somalia) more nuanced climate policy frameworks, such as the recent Galmudug initiative (EU Commission, 2023).

The Galmudug initiative 2023 Climate-related migration in Somalia can accentuate local tensions, including conflicts over animals”. (NUPI, 2023) For example, areas such as “Galmudug State’s Abudwaaq district,

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1.

Establishing structures.

natural

resource

management

2.

The construction of boreholes and shallow wells equipped with solar-powered systems.

3.

Supporting entrepreneurship and herd re-stocking.

4.

Implementing agricultural initiatives, such as communal drip irrigation farms.

Moreover, the initiative aims to bolster resilience and economic recovery while addressing environmental hazards like gulley erosion through infrastructure and community development.

It is worth noting that while the above Somalian initiatives demonstrate an active effort to implement adaptive climate policies, the policies lack a specific focus on climate mobility and accessibility. While adaptive responses, such as flood preparedness and increased cooperation, for example, are valuable, the risks posed by climate change require more robust action in the form of guaranteed mobility pathways, which are the only way to ensure that populations are protected.

3. Examination of Tuvalu & the Falepili Union Policy 3.1 Setting the Scene: Climate Change in Tuvalu Tuvalu is a small nation in the south pacific comprised of 7 islands. It operates as a constitutional monarchy with King Charles III as the head of state. The National (2024) reported in March that island fish, which constitute an important source of protein in the Tuvaluan diet, “are becoming inedible due to poisoning”. Eating fish that have been exposed to these toxins poses serious health risks to humans, who will inevitably fall

Bentham Brooks Institute Research Journal 2024-2025 ill. In fact, reports from the island highlight that as many as “10 Tuvaluans present with ciguatera poisoning every week”.

This is no coincidence as, “information on public health, says that cases of fish poisoning began to increase a decade ago; around the same time the bad weather patterns kicked in” (The National, 2024). Moreover, other climate-related illnesses, such as influenza, fungal diseases, conjunctivitis, and dengue fever have also risen steadily since these ‘bad weather patterns’, to put it mildly, have started to manifest more consistently. To compound problems, the land on Tuvalu that was used to plant trees and grow crops are increasingly inhospitable and no longer arable. Thus, because locally grown foods fail to ripen, importing groceries, which is of paramount importance to the people of Tuvalu, is becoming that much harder. With, the average family spending around Au$200 every two weeks on groceries, the current local food situation is something of concern and this is expected to increase steadily due to inflation (The National, 2024).

Thus, in terms of the primary climate challenges that Tuvalu is facing, rising sea levels, increasing tropical storms and high temperatures causing drought are on the top of the list. It is worth noting that these features make Tuvalu vulnerable even without the presence of extreme weather events. However, in addition to this constant vulnerability, when Tuvalu is affected by an extreme weather event such as cyclone Pam in 2015, it has adverse effects on Tuvalu’s people, its socio-economic security and geographical environment. To expand, cyclone Pam damaged more than 25% of national GDP and affected 40% of national residents in just three days (The World Bank, 2016). This highlights the mere extent to which Tuvalu is exposed to the damaging effects of climate change.

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Te Kakeega II National Strategy for Sustainable Development (2005): National sustainable plan with eight strategic areas including environmental sustainability and climate change adaptation.

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National Action Plan to Combat Land Degradation and Drought (2006): Addresses land degradation causes and specifies projects.

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National Disaster Management Act (2007): Defines disaster, establishes disaster management committees, and outlines emergency procedures.

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Environmental Protection Act (2008): Framework for environmental protection, waste management, and climate change responses.

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National Energy Policy (2009): Aims for 100% renewable energy by 2020 and outlines energy conservation measures.

Despite ongoing efforts, Tuvalu has been largely unable to independently mitigate the severe impacts of global warming and climate change on its homeland. Consequently, Australia's recent intervention in forming the Falepili Union 2023 aims to help Tuvalu and safeguard its citizens and their land before it is too late.

An Overview of The Australia- Tuvalu; Falepili Union (2023)

Tuvalu’s Climate Policies Now, regarding Tuvalu’s approach to climate policy, significant advances have been made. Yet, due to its low-lying nature of around one meter of elevation, Tuvalu remains highly vulnerable to rising sea levels and tsunamis. Tuvalu, unlike major world superpowers, ratified the UNFCCC in 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. In addition to this, they actively participate in climate-related initiatives like the Alliance of Small Island States and the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change project. However, in terms of domestic frameworks, two key policy documents from 2012 guide Tuvalu’s climate policies. These are the ‘Te Kaniva’ and the ‘National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (NSAP). These concern the strategic policies for climate change impacts and disaster risks and its implementation concerning 141 specific actions across seven thematic goals. (LSE Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 2015). Previous domestic policies include;

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The bilateral treaty, coined as the Falepili Union, concerns the climate mobility of Tuvaluan citizens. The official agreement was signed on November 9th of 2023 by both the Australian and the Tuvalu Government (Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union, 2023). This historic bilateral treaty recognises that Tuvalu’s long-term future is endangered by climate change and ensures that 280 Tuvaluans secure permanent residency in Australia each year. There are three pillars underpinning this treaty.

Namely, climate cooperation, climate mobility, and climate security, and combined they offer a sustainable and trailblazing example of what a comprehensive framework for climate migrant support and relocation can look like (Center for Global Development, 2023). In the Joint Statement a clear effort and sensitivity focused on upholding and respecting the rights of the displaced Tuvaluan’s and their State’s sovereignty is evident. We can see evidence of this in the following statements; “We know there is no prosperity without security and that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of Tuvalu.

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Australia will support Tuvalu’s efforts to enable its people to continue to live and thrive in their territory and retain Tuvalu’s deep, ancestral connections to land and sea …. We believe the people of Tuvalu deserve the choice to live, study and work elsewhere, as climate change impacts worsen.

Australia has committed to provide a special pathway for citizens of Tuvalu to come to Australia, with access to Australian services that will enable human mobility with dignity” (Joint Statement on the Falepili Union Between Tuvalu and Australia, 2024).

Tuvalu’s who are having to move away due to climate change’s destructive impacts. Moreover, an especially promising aspect of the Union is its commitment to the longterm safety of Tuvalu and its people. An example where we can see this happening is the Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project (TCAP) into which Australia will invest $16.9 million.

This investment will help to further strengthen Tuvalu’s coastal adaptation strategy and to ensure that the nation has the domestic capacity to better protect itself from what the changing climate brings. The money that the Union has invested into this project will educate the younger generations on how to ensure the future of their “resilient nation” (TCAP, 2018).

3.2 Analysis An Initial Analysis of the Falepili Union On analysing the Falepili Union more acutely, its spearheading nature stands out. Indisputably, the union is leading the way for a global recognition of climate mobility as an increasingly critical issue. This first-of-its-kind bilateral treaty has created a binding agreement between the two countries which provides a valuable safety infrastructure for

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Figure 3: Brief Summary of the Key Points of the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union (Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2023)

Figure 4: The Signing of the Australia-Tuvalu Deal: The Falepili Union (National Indigenous Times, 2023)

However, aside from these attractive aspects of the Falepili Union, critics have addressed some potentially worrying downsides of the treaty. The main concern is that the Falepili Union has the potential to become neo-colonial in its nature.

That is, there are genuine concerns that this “comprehensive partnership” respecting Tuvalu's sovereignty actually has ulterior motives such as the desire to control more of Tuvalu's, and the wider Indo-Pacific’s, security arrangements, the desire for more Australian money and investment and the strategic Australian use of Tuvalu as a pawn in their game against the rising global power that is China (The Conversation, 2024).

Accordingly, these worries have led many, including Tuvalu’s ex-Prime Minister, Enele Sopoaga who finished his service in 2015, to doubt the climate justice sentiments underpinning the Falepili Union. More pressing are the concerns of Tuvalu’s newly elected prime minister - Feleti Teo (a former judge) who has publicly stated that his government will engage in a review of the details of the Treaty (The Guardian, 2024).

An In-Depth Analysis of the Falepili Union The Treaty (2024) starts by underlining the ten crucial motivations behind the creation of the Union. Of the ten, one is of particular importance. That is, that the Treaty “recognises the special and unique circumstances faced by Tuvalu and that climate change is Tuvalu’s greatest national security concern”. The specific language, evident in this statement, has been carefully selected for use in this official document as it emphasises the main purpose underlining this union. The name ‘Falepili,’ meaning caring for others as if they were family, further emphasises the good-natured motivations that has driven the creation of this union. This is stated in Article 1 of the Treaty alongside a reiteration of the respect for the sovereignty of both nations. Moving on, Article 2 – titled Climate Cooperation - recognises that Tuvalu has a rich culture, and that Tuvalu’s citizens want to ensure protection and respect for their land, cultural traditions, identity, and sovereignty. This, in conjunction with Article 3 – titled Human Mobility with Dignity – underscores the way both parties are committed to ensuring a sustainable climate mobility pathway which works for both and does not compromise the safety of Tuvalu citizens or the respect for Tuvalu sovereignty. Article 3 of the Treaty states, “Australia shall arrange for a special human mobility pathway for citizens of Tuvalu to access Australia which shall enable citizens of Tuvalu to live, study and work in Australia, and access Australian education, health, and key income and family support on arrival”.

The Treaty then goes on to state that this will be implemented sustainably and effectively, as special Australian assistance will be provided to the Tuvalu citizens coming to Australia as part of this Union. Hence, from this Treaty document, we can

observe a concerted Australian effort to protect and safeguard Tuvalu from the severe climate challenges that it currently faces and will continue to face in the future. Worries regarding a potentially ‘neo-colonial’ attempt by Australia to control Tuvalu do not appear to manifest explicitly in this Treaty. This rings true in Article 7 which states that the agreement may only be amended by the mutual consent of both parties, and since the Union is especially beneficial to the survival of Tuvalu, this clause hinders any Australian desires more than those of Tuvalu.

The Joint Statement Reiterating what was made clear by the Treaty, the Joint Statement puts any ‘neo-colonial’ speculation to bed. That is, since it was the Tuvalu government who approached the Australian government requesting a stronger bilateral agreement, that would more rigorously safeguard Tuvalu against increasing climate threats, it would be wrong to categorise the Union as an Australian attempt to gradually strip away at Tuvalu’s sovereignty. The statement goes on to say, “Tuvalu faces special and unique challenges which are already exacerbated by the effects of climate change” and “respect and support for each other's sovereignty lies at the heart of our Falepili Union”. This demonstrates the high level of awareness and respect that both countries have regarding the threatening situation that Tuvalu is undergoing.

Moreover, Australia has made clear that it will primarily aid Tuvalu with its attempts to address and ameliorate the domestic situation. This is evident through, for example, the Australian investment in the Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project which, as one of its aims, hopes to expand Funafuti’s (the capital) land by 6% to mitigate the impact of sea-level rise on housing. Also, the Australian commitment to welcome Tuvalu people who now must live in Australia whether that be for work or study reasons demonstrates the extent to which respect for Tuvalu’s sovereign future lies at the heart of this partnership.

Lessons Learnt from the Falepili Union The Falepili Union delivers on various fronts in which Somalia is identifiably struggling. Therefore, the lessons learnt from the successful Falepili Union that could be implemented in the current case of Somalia and potential third parties are as follows: 1.

Any bilateral treaty should be underpinned by a comprehensive understanding from the domestic government and partner governments/supranational organisations regarding how climate change is affecting the country and its future implications.

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A demonstration of awareness and respect for the safety of citizens, culture, identity, land, and sovereignty of the threatened nation/area.

3.

An explicit statement of an equal commitment between parties working together to sustainably address the threats of climate change.

4.

Ensuring the focus of any treaty agreement respects the imminent need for freedom of human mobility under specific circumstances whereby climate change is threatening the land, culture, identity, and establishment of a society.

Walsh et al. attributing migration solely to climate change oversimplifies the complex factors influencing human mobility, making it difficult to distinguish between climate refugees and economic migrants. Furthermore, there is no consensus as to the extent to which climate is a decisive factor in migration decisions (Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008) and the immediate links between climate change and migration are yet to be clarified (IOM, 2014). In a similar vein, establishing the conditions under which climate migration occurs is particularly challenging (see Piguet, 2010; Obokata et al., 2014; Warner and Afifi, 2014; Hunter et al., 2015; Cattaneo et al, 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020). McLeman (2018) reiterates the complexities here, noting that climate-induced migration encompasses a range of population movements, from minor shifts in existing trends to significant and unexpected displacements. All the above factors contribute to the ongoing debate and challenges in defining the term “climate migrant” and suggest that the term is perhaps not the most appropriate to incorporate into policy initiatives concerning climateinduced migration, at least for the time being.

4. Policy Analysis and Recommendations 4.1 A Note on the Legal Recognition of “Climate Migrants” While there is an abundance of literature on the debate surrounding the term “climate migrants”, there is a lack of recognition for this distinct category in legal frameworks, and the term is rarely adopted by international actors. For example, the Refugee Convention (1951) does not cover climate refugees and applies only to those fleeing persecution based on specific grounds. The absence of legal recognition has led to several detrimental consequences. Climate migrants often find themselves in 'legal limbo,' lacking status recognition, as highlighted by the European Parliament in 2023. This lack of recognition in climate and human rights discourses has resulted in a data void, which has hindered efforts to identify the scale of internally displaced and cross-border climate migrants.

The legal recognition of 'climate migrants' provides several advantages, such as the fact that it can bolster the protection of vulnerable populations and provide expanded protections, as well as its potential to strengthen regional and international collaboration and even contribute to the identification of the root causes of climate migration. As such, at a time when people are twice as likely to be displaced because of climate change than in the 1970s, the legal recognition of 'climate migration' is considered by some to be an issue which demands urgent attention (Ginnetti, 2015).

However, securing the legal recognition of “climate migrants” encounters several challenges, stemming largely from definitional complexities. For example, Dina Ionesco, head of the Migration Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division at the IOM, has expressed concerns that legal recognition could weaken the Refugee Convention (1952) and exclude climate-displaced persons without suitable proof of climate-induced displacement. Other critics have argued that

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4.2 “Climate Mobility” While there is certainly reason to believe that the recognition of ‘climate migrants’ is steadily increasing, illustrated, for example, by the fact the European Commission's European Green Deal initiative (2019) recognised climate change as a trigger for migration and other sources of instability, the significant challenges discussed above must not be ignored.

The immediacy of the climate issues faced in the Horn of Africa require swift and targeted action, which may be delivered more effectively if policy responses are premised based on “climate mobility", rather than “climate migration”.

The term “climate mobility” is defined by Ingrid Boas (2021) as ‘”the movement of people because of sea-level rise, storms, droughts, and other impacts related to environmental and climate change”. Boas (2021) argues that climate mobility is a real and observable phenomenon encompassing various forms of movement, including immobility or the decision to stay despite pressures to move. While the notion of climate mobility, like climate migration, has faced criticism by the likes of Nicholson (2021) for example, who maintains that social scientists are not currently equipped in their approaches to harness issues as complex as climate mobility, and so it cannot constitute an area of research, its inclusion in policy initiatives such as the Falepili Union indicates that “mobility” terminology has already gained more traction in terms of practical application to policy. Terminology related to climate mobility, then, is recommended for a new policy framework in response to Somalia’s climate issues.

Bentham Brooks Institute Research Journal 2024-2025 4.3 Mapping Successes from the Falepili Union onto a New EU-Somalia Climate Partnership Our analysis of Somalia’s existing climate policies has revealed that, while there are frameworks in place to provide both preventative and adaptive measures, there is little emphasis on mobility.

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4.

Outline specific details in relation to the number of Somalis who will be granted access to the mobility pathway, and the duration of the partnership.

5.

Elaborate government and partner relations to assess the obligations of each party, respectively.

Importantly, when considering climate policy, it is important to not lose sight of the fact that climate change is inherently a human rights issue. As illustrated repeatedly throughout this paper, since climate change is expected to, and has increasingly been seen to affect human security, this unquestionably foregrounds the human component in climate change, and thus in climate policy. According to the OHCHR (2015, p.6), climate change directly impacts a range of human rights, including the rights to life, self-determination, food, health, and water.

Somalia’s climate policies do not include a fixed-term or permanent mobility pathway for those at risk of climate changes, as is the case in the Falepili partnership. One of the most pertinent aspects of the Falepili Union is that it recognises the immediate need to directly assist a particularly vulnerable community, and it does so by providing a durable solution. While other aspects of the Union, such as the coastal adaptation strategy, are not to be overlooked, the commitment to ensuring guaranteed and indefinite mobility of 280 Tuvaluans annually is especially valuable considering the current climate crisis in Tuvalu, as well as that of Somalia.

Only recently, however, has climate change been recognised as a human rights issue in the literature (Atapattu, 2016, p.5), with inconsistent and varied rights-based approaches to climate mobility appearing only in the last twenty years (Knox, 2019, p.165). This general silence on human rights in the climate sector has been attributed to a variety of factors, ranging from path-dependence due to the perceived disciplinary boundaries between the studies of climate change and human rights, by scientists and lawyers respectively, to the idea that invoking human rights may conflict with climate policy (Humphreys, 2008, pp.3-5). However, there is reason to believe that climate issues and human rights are increasingly being considered in conjunction, as a considerable amount of research now points both towards the necessity of this integration (Caney, 2008; Jegede, 2020), as well as to the tangible efforts by states, such as the Maldives (Bell, 2013), to advance a human rights-centred approach to climate change.

Furthermore, on a normative note, it is worth reinforcing the obligations of the EU to Somalia. We recommend the EU given some of its own Member States' questionable involvement in Somalia, even in more recent history, as well as exploitative actions directed towards the country, its physical proximity, financial means, and global positioning – ought to employ a framework similar to the Falepili Union, in response to the forced movement that Somalian climate migrants increasingly find themselves facing. Hence, although the framework refers to ‘mobility’ rather than ‘climate mobility’, it explicitly emphasises nonetheless ‘climate cooperation’ and ‘climate change’, and was created in acknowledgment of the extreme climate effects currently being faced by Tuvalu.

A new EU-Somalia policy framework for climate mobility must: 1.

Be based exclusively on a climate mobility solution and explicitly incorporate the term ‘climate mobility.’

2.

Emphasise the importance of climate mobility as a durable solution to climate change.

3.

Demonstrate commitment to providing a long-term solution by investing funding into the implementation of a permanent, mobility pathway for climate-vulnerable populations. This pathway could be internally within Somalia or could be coordinated to provide relocation within the EU, inspired by the partnership between Australia and Tuvalu.

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Given the growing consensus that climate change and human rights are intrinsically linked, increasing efforts have been made to incorporate rights-based language in climate issues (Jodoin et al, 2021). In terms of climate mobility, however, not only are such frameworks scarce, but even among the more recent, trailblazing mobility initiatives such as the Falepili Union, human rights tend not to be explicitly mentioned. It is not just climate frameworks like the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that suffer from a lack of rights-focused language, (Bell, 2013), but also international climate negotiations (Beck et al., 2015). While such a discussion inevitably opens a wider normative debate on the importance and feasibility of integrating rights-based language, the scope of which is beyond this paper, it remains apparent that human rights principles must, at the very least, be alluded to in the reconfiguration and formulation of policies concerning

Bentham Brooks Institute Research Journal 2024-2025 climate mobility. This view is reinforced by the UNHCR (United Nations General Assembly, 2011), which asserts that the inclusion of human rights commitments and obligations is likely to strengthen the international climate policy agenda.

Furthermore, not only is there an absence of human rights language, but there appears to be limited reference to human rights frameworks within both climate and climate mobility policy initiatives. This illustrates a blatant inconsistency with the guidance provided by OHCHR (2015, p.6), which explicitly notes that since climate change directly concerns human rights, the ‘human rights framework must be part of the solution’. While the UNHCR has not explicitly announced the obligations of states in relation to human rights and climate change, a UNEP (2015) report suggests that the multitude of statements, mechanisms and instruments implies such obligations nonetheless.

What we are left with is the pressing need to integrate core human rights frameworks within climate mobility initiatives to make the link between climate change and human rights more explicit, and to serve as a reminder to states of their duties towards climate-vulnerable populations. Although the Falepili Union prioritises the need to ensure stability, respect, health, and safety, the rights of individual citizens are not accounted for, which is a significant oversight, given that a human rights approach to climate change necessitates a focus on the individual (Bell, 2013). While the Falepili Union represents a significant breakthrough in terms of climate mobility, it is worth acknowledging that even such a pioneering framework would further benefit from the consolidation and integration of rights-based language. This is particularly important, given that we are attempting to outline a new direction for climate policy in Somalia based on the Falepili Union. The integration of, or to begin with, simply just reference to, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) appears to be a good starting point, on the basis that it is considered by many to be a core instrument in the human rights apparatus.

Make explicit reference to the impact of climate change on human rights.

•

Discuss individual rights in the context of climate change.

•

Refer to broader frameworks, such as the UDHR, to reinforce the importance of considering human rights and climate change in conjunction.

5. Conclusion Addressing the nexus between climate change, migration, and legal recognition is crucial to mitigating the impact of climateinduced migration on vulnerable communities like those in Somalia. The ongoing debate over the terminology used to describe those displaced due to climate change reflects the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the issue. Various definitions have emerged, each capturing various aspects of the phenomenon but also highlighting the lack of consensus in the field. Berchin et al. (2017) define a 'climate change refugee' as "any person who has been forced to leave their home, or their country, due to the effects of severe climate events, being forced to rebuild their lives in other places, despite the conditions to which they are subjected." This definition emphasizes the involuntary nature of displacement due to climate impacts. In contrast, 'climate migrant' is defined

by Kniveton et al. (2008) as "persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment as a result of climate change that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad." This definition is broader, encompassing both forced and voluntary movements, and includes both internal and cross-border migration.

Despite these attempts to define the terms, reaching a consensus remains elusive. Farbotko (2017) suggests that any agreed-upon definition will likely "reject a strict notion of causality linking climate to migration events." Currently, climate-migration largely exists as a conceptual notion rather than a universally accepted definition.

Moreover, the term 'climate refugee' has faced considerable opposition, particularly from international bodies like the UNHCR and the IOM. The UNHCR has argued that the term "blurs the boundaries" and could potentially undermine the impact of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Similarly, and the IOM contends that since climate migration primarily consists of internal movements that are not always forced, labelling individuals as 'refugees' may be inappropriate. Thus, while various definitions exist, the lack of consensus underscores the challenges in categorizing and understanding the complex nature of climate-induced migration. The terminology used to describe this phenomenon not only reflects the nuances of displacement but also carries significant legal and policy implications.

Moving forward, climate mobility frameworks such as that which we propose in the case of Somalia, must attempt to do the following: •

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Considering these challenges then, it serves, for now at least, to refer more broadly to issues surrounding climate and migration as ‘climate mobility.’ While there is no doubt that such terminology attracts similar definitional problems, we have highlighted that such questions are not only beyond the

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Beck, G. et al. (2015). ‘Mind the Gap: The Discrepancy Between the Normative Debate and Actual Use of Human Rights Language in International Climate Negotiations,’ Consilience, 14(2), pp. 25–45.

[5] Bell, D. (2013). ‘Climate Change and Human Rights,’ Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate change, 4(3), pp. 159–170.

[6] Berchin, I. I., et al. (2017). 'Climate change and forced migrations: An effort towards recognizing climate refugees', Geoforum, 84, pp. 147-150. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.06.022 [Accessed: 28 May 2024].

[7] Boas, I. J. C. (2021). ‘“Climate mobility” is a proper subject of research and governance’, in Mayer, B. & Zahar , A.(eds) Debating Climate Law. Cambridge University Press, pp. 206214.

[8] Burns, J.J., 2022. Preventing the world’s next refugee crisis: Famine, conflict, and climate change in Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen.

[9] Caney, S. (2008). ‘Human rights, climate change, and discounting,’ Environmental Politics, 17 (4), pp. 536–555.

[10] Cattaneo, C., et al. (2019). 'Human migration in the era of climate change', Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 13(2), pp. 189-206.

[11] Center for Global Development (2023). Available at: https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/Note-AustraliaTuvalu%20agreement%20note%20v2-LJ-2a.pdf (Accessed 18 April 2024) [12] Climate Change Knowledge Portal. (2021). Overview.

Available at: https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/overview (Accessed 18 April 2024).

[13] European Commission. (2019). 'The European Green Deal', available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2019%3A640%3AFIN [Accessed: 28 May 2024].

[14] European Commission. (2023). Breaking the ClimateConflict Cycle: EU-backed Initiative Revitalises Galmudug, Somalia. Available at: https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/breaking-climateconflict-cycle-eu-backed-initiative-revitalises-galmudugsomalia_en (Accessed 15 April 2024).

[15] European Commission. (2023). EU-Somalia partnership.

Available at: https://internationalpartnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6bbd8f6c-aa7d48ca-9539-5a00add8e5d1_en?filename=EU-Somaliapartnership.pdf (Accessed 15 April 2024).

[16] FAO Somalia. (2020). FAO Somalia Desert Locust Crisis Action Plan April Update. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Available at: https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/fao_somalia_a ction_plan_desert_locust_crisis_appeal_april_update_.pdf (Accessed 15 April 2024).

[17] Farbotko, C. (2017). 'Representation and misrepresentation of climate migrants', in McAdam, J. (ed.)

Research Handbook on Climate Change, Migration and the Law. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

[18] Ginnetti, J. (2015). 'Disasters and displacement in a changing climate', Forced Migration Review, available at: https://www.fmreview.org/climatechange-disasters/ginnetti [Accessed: 28 May 2024].

[4]

reach of this paper, but also that the delivery of policy frameworks targeted at responding to the effects of the climate crisis in vulnerable communities is more urgent. What remains clear is that policy and research should instead focus on explicitly incorporating the term ‘climate mobility,’ and on implementing tangible mobility pathways that will directly aid those whose livelihoods are at risk due to climate change, such as the Falepili Union.

In terms of specific policy recommendations for Somalia, we have suggested that the new EU-Somali framework ought to explicitly include the term ‘climate mobility’ and must directly incorporate human–rights language to both confirm the understanding that climate change is a human rights issue and reiterate state obligations to individual citizens in response to climate changes. Inspired by the Falepili Union, we have proposed that the new framework adopts a long-term mobility pathway, either facilitating movement within Somalia, or between Somalia and the EU, to demonstrate a real commitment to assisting populations at risk.

While we recognise that there are a variety of factors which may complicate the application of the Falepili framework to Somalia, ranging from contrasting relations between nations, differences in physical climate effects, sizes of territory and corresponding populations, among many others, we have drawn from the Falepili Union based on its success and innovative nature. The union represents a new direction for policy in response to climate change, which can feasibly be applied to other contexts. The framework, while potentially too aspirational, has shown that durable solutions can be achieved if states recognise the immediate danger communities, such as the Tuvaluans, face. Given the strong pre-existing partnerships between the EU and Somalia, there is reason to believe that such a partnership has grounds to succeed. To make progress towards the implementation of such a partnership however, states, policymakers and thirdparty organisations alike must demonstrate a commitment to human rights to ensure that climate mobility becomes an international priority in view of the deteriorating climate crisis.

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List of Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

DINA: EU: FAO:

We would like to express our gratitude to the Bentham Brooks Institute at University College London. This student-led think tank has remained steadfast in their commitment to fostering innovative research and solutions since their establishment in 2020. Their dedication to addressing pressing global challenges, has been instrumental in shaping this policy paper on climate change-induced migration in Somalia. We are thankful for their support, encouragement, and invaluable contributions to our work. Special thanks to the members, mentors, and collaborators of the Bentham Brooks Institute for their insights, feedback, and ongoing commitment to advancing knowledge in this critical field, and most importantly, for giving students the space to drive their own research.

FGS: GDP: IDMC: IDP: IOM: MECC: NAP: NAPA: NCCC: NDC: NDP: NDSS: NSAP: OHCHR: RRF: SIPRI: UDHR: UN: UNEP: UNFCCC: UNHCR: WHO:

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Warm regards, The Refugee and Migration Team, 2024

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Democratic Deficit and Authoritarianism Team II

Portrait of a Movement: Reconstructing the Trajectory of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement Ted Yip1, Rabiyah Daulatzai, Jiarui Zhou, Kamal Shashwat Munda, Madelyn Grace Mullen 1

Team Leader, Democratic Deficit and Authoritarianism Team II

Received 2nd September 2024 Published 5th January 2025

Abstract This paper examines the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement, focusing on its sudden rise and abrupt decline within a short timeframe. This study investigates the causes of the movement's sudden rise and fall through a mixed-methods approach, focusing on the interplay between mobilising grievances, political opportunities, and ecological factors. A key contribution of this paper is its unique hypothesis that the closing of political opportunities played a dual role in both stimulating the movement's upspring and causing its abeyance. This challenges existing theories that suggest a positive relationship between political opportunities and mobilisation. Specifically, this paper posits that the perceived and effectuated closing of political opportunities can act as a mobilising grievance. Yet, the complete shutdown of political opportunities can override the galvanising effect of such grievances. This is demonstrated through probing how the Hong Kong government's increasing repression, including the introduction of the National Security Law and the implementation of the Prohibition on Gathering Regulation, ultimately led to the movement's decline despite the persistence of mobilising grievances. This paper also explores the role of social media as a free space for protesters to assemble and disseminate movement-related information, as well as the movement's international advocacy and the limitations of its effectiveness in garnering global support. The findings of this paper offer valuable insights into our understanding of social movement dynamics and the complex interplay between internal and external factors that shape the trajectory of social movements.

Keywords: Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement, political opportunities, social movement dynamics, social media, grievances precipitous decline after a year or two, marked by the introduction of the National Security Law (NSL) that led to the arrests of protesters and activists (BBC, 2024) and induced a chilling effect across Hong Kong, effectively shunning opposition (Amnesty International, 2020). Thus, the puzzle I aim to address in this research paper is: what catalysed the movement’s sudden upspring, and what caused the movement to experience an abrupt decline. Consequently, the research question of this paper is “Why did the 2019 Hong Kong AntiELAB Movement experience a sudden rise and an abrupt downfall in such a short timeframe?”

1. Introduction The 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) movement was unprecedented - in such a tiny area, the movement mobilised a record high of more than 2 million people (Lee et al., 2019b) for the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 (Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, n.d.), commonly referred to as the extradition bill.

Nonetheless, it was remarkably short - it experienced a

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The significance of comprehending this question lies in the Anti-ELAB Movement’s consequential value in comprehending Hong Kong’s sudden setback in democratisation, as the movement is a critical juncture in the process. Nevertheless, there have been relatively fewer studies on the decline of the movement compared to its rise, and none have simultaneously studied both the rise and decline of the movement through the same set of theoretical lenses. Hence, this paper, which uniquely hypothesises that closing political opportunities plays a role in stimulating the upspring and causing the abeyance of the Anti-ELAB Movement, would complement existing studies by introducing a fresh perspective. This hypothesis holds consequential literary value, for it challenges existing political opportunity theories that suggest a positive relationship between political opportunities and mobilisation by theorising a decline in political opportunities can also stimulate social movements. It also examines the relationship between mobilising grievances and political opportunities by hypothesising the perceived and effectuated closing of political opportunities can act as a mobilising grievance, yet the shutdown of political opportunities trumps the galvanising effect of mobilising grievances. Thus, a thorough inspection of the causes contributing to the rise and decline of the Anti-ELAB Movement is necessary for understanding how mobilising grievances, political opportunities and ecological factors transformed throughout the movement. In addition, the AntiELAB Movement presents a unique case where resources were predominantly constant throughout the movement as there were negligible fluctuations in the population and GDP throughout the movement (Macrotrends, n.d.).

causes are explained in the context of social movement theories, including mobilising grievances, political opportunities, and ecological factors, and will be complemented by existing studies of the 2014 Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong to contextualise the study of the Anti-ELAB Movement.

Given the precipitous nature of both the rise and decline of the Anti-ELAB Movement, it is necessary to define the timeframe of the movement for this paper’s analysis, emphasising two critical points in time: the starting point, when the movement gained large-scale momentum, and the ending point, when the movement sustained this momentum until, for the purposes of precisely identifying the factors contributing to the sudden movement buildup and abeyance. For this purpose, I borrow Tilly & Schweitzer’s (1977) notion of “contentious gathering”, which refers to the assembly of a group of extragovernmental individuals in the same space making a claim/ claims that affect(s) the interests of a third party. This definition helps define the movement’s rise and fall as “it focuses on the larger events that require prior coordination” (Ho, 2023, p.246). Since movement momentum is directly correlated to the scale of participation and frequency of protest events (Chenoweth & Belgioioso, 2019), it would be logical to define the starting point with a contentious gathering that arose in response to the introduction of the extradition bill and gathered substantially more participants than preceding demonstrations, and succeeded by a number of protests also of mass participation; and the ending point with the last contentious gathering in the movement that gathered mass participation.

With the metrics of defining the above two points set, I proceed with selecting two demonstrations that satisfy the conditions above to define the timeframe of this paper’s analysis, which is from the June 9th demonstration in 2019 to the July 1st demonstration in 2020. The June 9th demonstration, with the aim of protesting against the extradition bill, garnered more than one million participants according to organiser figures (BBC, 2019a), and is often seen as the commencement of the Anti-ELAB Movement (Lee, 2022). The demonstration broke the record of the largest demonstration in Hong Kong since the 1997 handover, which was broken again shortly after by the June 16th demonstration that had a record high of around 2 million participants according to organiser statistics (Griffiths et al., 2019). The July 1st demonstration, on the other hand, although assembled a lesser number of protesters at around 380,000 (The Epoch Times, 2020), was the last large-scale demonstration in Hong Kong calling for the Five Demands1 originated from the Anti-

This paper will be structured as follows. I commence with an overview of existing social movement theories, including theories of mobilising grievances, political opportunities, and ecological factors, in explaining the sudden rise and abrupt decline of the Anti-ELAB Movement. I then outline my hypotheses in answering the research question. I proceed by giving a brief description and justification of the process tracing methodology and comparative case study of the Arab Spring I employ, followed by testing the hypotheses using this methodology. Subsequently, I acknowledge the limitations of the methodology this paper adopts. I conclude with the implications of this paper.

2. Literature review The literature review is structured in two sections, where I present the causes of the sudden rise and abrupt decline of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement respectively. The 1 The Five Demands include: the withdrawal of the extradition bill,

authority into alleged police brutality, and the implementation of universal suffrage (BBC, 2019g).

amnesty for arrested protesters, retracting the classification of protests as “riots”, establishment of an independent investigative

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ELAB Movement to date. As such, these two demonstrations fit the criteria set for the two critical points of the movement.

closed factors” (p.1) where the political opportunity structure, defined as “the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (p.25). Thus, Eisinger suggests a curvilinear relationship between political opportunities and the level of protests, where the incidence of protest is highest when the political opportunity is “neither fully open nor closed” (Snow and Soule, 2010, p.69), as visualised below in Figure 1.

2.1 Causes of the sudden rise of the movement The causes of the sudden rise of this movement can be categorised into “immediate causes” and “underlying causes”.

I define immediate causes as the conspicuous factors that occurred shortly prior to or during the first critical point and directly led to the social movement, and underlying causes as long-term social conditions, precipitated to resurface by the immediate causes, which catalysed the movement.

The emergence of the Anti-ELAB Movement agrees with thesis 2, as the extradition bill and police brutality curtailed, but did not completely deprive, the guaranteed freedoms of press, expression, and assembly under the Basic Law (Maizland and Lindsay, 2022). Thus, being situated in the middle of the political opportunity curve, the movement garnered high levels of mobilisation. However, it runs contrary to thesis 1, as both causes signified an increase in the government’s repressive inclination (Snow and Soule, 2010), which indicates a decrease in political opportunities. Even so, the protests flourished afterwards, with the June 9th protest, marking the starting point, triggered directly by the introduction of the extradition bill as evidenced by the protest’s call for its withdrawal (Christian Times, 2019).

The first immediate cause is the introduction of the extradition bill. This can be explained by the quotidian disruption thesis, which theorises that “the actual or threatened disruption of the taken-for-granted routines and attitudes of everyday life, referred to as ‘the quotidian’, is especially generative of mobilising grievances” (Snow and Soule, 2010, p.36). The extradition bill was seen as a sudden blow to Hong Kong’s judicial independence, as the amendment would enable the extradition of prisoners to mainland China, which “[generated] huge concern among the Hong Kong public because of Hong Kong people’s deep distrust toward the legal system in China and worry about the possibility of political prosecution” (Lee et al., 2019b, p.7-8). As such, the bill provoked Hongkongers’ fear towards the erasure of barriers between democratic-leaning Hong Kong and authoritarian China, and thus the bill can be perceived as an unsettlement to Hongkongers’ “quotidian” of living with relative autonomy from Chinese interference (Chernin, 2019).

Secondly, the movement serves as a counterexample to McAdam’s (1982) thesis on the repressive capacity of authorities. In researching the civil rights movement, he observed that the movement arose in response to a decrease in repressive measures, namely lynching, used against African Americans. Hence, he correlates a decline in repressive inclination with the rise of the civil rights movement.

However, the Anti-ELAB Movement conflicts with his findings since the aforementioned increases in state repression in the form of police brutality and the introduction of the extradition bill stimulated, rather than stifled, the protests.

The second immediate cause is the police brutality protesters faced. The theory of grievances can explain this as a function of social psychological factors, which state that heightened frustration over certain situations or events provokes grievance (Snow and Soule, 2010). For example, the police indiscriminately fired “volleys of tear gas” at a legitimate peaceful demonstration around the CITIC tower on 12 June 2019 (Levy and Wilcken, 2020). Consequently, protesters were aggrieved and viewed “the police… as political actors using violence to impose an unpopular law by an unrepresentative government” (Stott et al., 2020, p.824). This psychological change fits under the theory.

Thirdly, the movement contradicts Amenta et al.’s (1992, 1994) political mediation thesis, which holds that a movement can only be successful if it has influential allies in political institutions. As Soule & King (2006) elucidate, this is because “[elite allies] may facilitate movements through sponsorship of legislation or because they may signal that repression of the movement is less likely or simply because sympathetic elites may provide the requisite number of votes needed to pass desired legislation” (p.1882).

However, such causes are less compatible with existing political opportunity theories. Firstly, both causes agree partially with the system accessibility theory by Eisinger (1973). Having studied protest activities in 43 US cities, he postulated the following: 1, protests occur as “a political system begins to open up” (p.15), and 2, protests are most prevalent in systems “characterized by a mix of open and

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Figure 1: The political opportunity curve (Snow and Soule, 2010, p. 69)

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Not all scholars see allyship as a prerequisite for successful movement impact. Soule & Olzak (2004) note that elite allies made social movement organisations’ efforts to push for statelevel ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the US more effective, yet “was not a necessary condition for [social movement organisations] to have an influence” (p.492). Yet, the importance of allies has generally been acknowledged in existing literature. Gamson (1990), through his research of fifty-three challenging groups in the US between 1800 and 1945, concluded that groups that were supported by political allies tended to be more successful; Soule & King (2006), in studying both pro-ERA movements and anti-ERA movements, found that the support of elite allies contributed to the influence of movements in moving bills to the voting stage; Jenkins & Perrow (1977) have noted that the American farm workers’ movement was more successful in the 1960s than the 1940s because of the formation a reform coalition between established liberal pressure groups such as “National Council of Churches, National Advisory Committee of Farm Labor and NAACP” (p.262) and labour organisations, which provided the 1960s movement with “massive contributions [and] sustained support for its boycotts” (p.266).

various forms of government repression paradoxically stimulated reactionary movements, a key difference lies in the fact that while the military violence in Central America or the police brutality in Hong Kong represents materialised repression, the extradition bill, at the time where protests flourished, albeit poses a threat to Hong Kong’s autonomy by potentially allowing prisoners to be extradited to mainland China, has yet to be translated into reality. In other words, the latter did not constitute effectuated repression, but rather anticipated repression in the future. Given an increase in government repression could be equated to a decrease in political opportunities, with reference to the two immediate causes I identified in the Anti-ELAB Movement, I coin police brutality as an “effectuated”, and the introduction of the extradition bill as a “projected”, closing of political opportunities.

Almeida (2003) adds to this discussion by further evidencing the role of “threats”, including human rights violations, economic problems and state repression in the form of arresting organisational leaders and violent dispersion of demonstrations, in mobilising protests and motivating resistance groups such as the FAPU in El Salvador. Applying the quotidian disruption thesis, state repression propagates a “threat of loss in terms of rights [and] freedoms” (Snow & Soule, 2010, p.80), which disrupts the quotidian by worsening the status quo. Snow & Soule (2010) speculate that this catalyses mobilisation as “the actual or threatened loss of what people already have and believe is rightfully theirs reaches a threshold in which the prospect of taking action to curtail the loss, and perhaps recapture something of what was lost, is less costly than doing nothing” (p.80-81). Therefore, by comprehending state repression not only as a decline in political opportunities but also as a disruption to the quotidian, the seemingly paradoxical relationship between increasing government repression and increasing mobilisation in the Anti-ELAB Movement can be understood. On this premise, the following testable hypothesis is generated:

However, according to Lee et al. (2019b), as “the rules regarding democratisation in Hong Kong are essentially determined by the Chinese government” (p.4-5), prodemocracy movements in Hong Kong “[do] not have elite allies who can influence politics at the national level” (p.5).

Thus, under the political mediation thesis, the Anti-ELAB Movement lacks a fundamental factor contributing to the movement’s success in influencing policy, in this case, “the outcome of democratic reform” (Lee et al., 2019b, p.4).

Nevertheless, as evidenced by the mass participation in the June 9th protest, the lack of elite allies did not hinder the buildup of the movement. Thus, the Anti-ELAB Movement serves as a counterexample of the political mediation thesis.

In view of such contradictions with literature, I find that the Anti-ELAB Movement most aligns with Goodwin’s (2012) findings in Central America, where he found the trigger to “revolutionary mobilisation” to be “the contraction of political opportunities” (p.177). He discovered that while “the exclusionary and violently repressive character of the Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan states unintentionally recruited new members and supporters for the revolutionary movements” (p.163), “revolutionaries in Honduras found it impossible to win mass support due to the comparatively more open political regimes in that country during the same period” (p.176). Hence, government repression played an instrumental role in tilting public support in favour of these movements.

H1: The effectuated and projected closing of political opportunities mobilised protesters in fear of future repression.

On the other hand, the underlying cause of the movement can be attributed to public dissatisfaction over stagnant democratisation. The calls for democratic reform can be traced back to the 2014 Umbrella Revolution, where protesters demanded universal suffrage in the 2017 Chief Executive elections (“【佔領中環】信念書全文,” 2013) but ultimately failed (Lee et al., 2019b). The Umbrella Movement, whose name nods to the infamous yellow umbrellas used by protesters to ward off pepper spray and teargas used as crowd dispersion tools by the police, is crucial to understanding the context of the Anti-ELAB Movement, as it signified a remarkable setback in Hong Kong’s democratisation progress:

Yet, despite the similarities in Goodwin’s (2012) findings in Central America and the Anti-ELAB Movement, where

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the government refused to listen to protesters’ demands of having free and fair elections, which subsequently led to heightened dissatisfaction over the government’s unresponsiveness to public opinion (Hui, 2015).

Aside from the aforementioned causes, social media, as suggested by Dong (2023), “played a critical role in facilitating political mobilisation by providing a platform for communication and organisation among protesters” (p.1) in the Anti-ELAB Movement, which fits Snow & Soule’s (2010) definition of free spaces as “movement settings beyond the surveillance and control of institutionalised authorities” (pp.101-102). As Snow & Soule elucidate, free spaces, owing to their nature of being controlled by movement organisers and protesters, and being under the radar from authorities, act as a protective shield from government authorities and provide “organisational infrastructure [and] associational connections” (p.102) where protesters can anchor to “organise, strategise, and aggregate” (p.102) the movement.

In addition, the 2014 Umbrella Revolution evidences that the extradition bill that provoked the Anti-ELAB Movement was not the first time the people of Hong Kong feared encroachment from China. Indeed, the initial trigger for the umbrella movement was the decision by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China to intervene in Hong Kong’s elections for the Chief Executive (Flowerdew, 2017). Thus, the fear among Hongkongers in the 2019 Anti-ELAB Movement regarding Chinese influence over Hong Kong can be seen as a continuation of the unresolved grievances in the 2014 Umbrella Revolution.

The effect of free spaces can be seen in other movements as well. Morris (1981) finds the free spaces in the Civil Rights movement to be black colleges and churches, where students and activists utilised prior ties “formed through church affiliations and youth wings of Civil Rights organisations” (p.764) to swiftly coordinate sit-ins. For example, he discovered that the 1960 Greensboro sit-in presupposed “the existence of well-developed and widespread internal organization” (p.764) that allowed the sit-ins to be rapidly initiated. These colleges and churches, although “not immune from state monitoring and intrusion” (Snow & Soule, 2010, p.103), are able to function as free spaces as “[states] in nonauthoritarian regimes [appear] reluctant to inject its control agents and forces into [these] settings” (Snow & Soule, 2010, p.103).

Moreover, in 2016, 6 members of the Legislative Council (LegCo) of the opposition party were disqualified through China’s “reinterpretation” of the Basic Law, which was seen as further constriction of Hong Kong’s democracy (Haas, 2017). Hongkongers have since been disillusioned with the promise that China “would eventually fulfil its pledge to give them more democracy” (Economist, 2019), which contributed to the accumulation of discontent about the multiple setbacks in the democratisation of Hong Kong.

This cause aligns with Gurr’s (2010) relative deprivation thesis, which states that the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the perceived discrepancy between the expectations and attainments of goods and conditions of life.

Under this theory, the underlying cause fits as a mobilising grievance, since the Anti-ELAB protests were in part materialised by the widening gap between people’s expectation of democratisation and the actual level of democracy: the previous attempts of the government to constrict oppositional voices coalesced a dormant disappointment of the seemingly unreachable goal of democratisation. This underlying grievance resurfaced when the government was unwilling to acknowledge heightened levels of public opposition while forcibly pushing forward the extradition bill (Master, 2019), which catalysed widespread grievances as the public had lost faith in the government’s guarantee of granting the people of Hong Kong with democracy. As such, the following testable hypothesis can be generated:

However, in the Anti-ELAB Movement, while the popularised and widely adopted platform Telegram was also relatively less prone to government surveillance, what differentiates it from the example above is that this relative immunity from government control does not stem from authorities’ unwillingness to monitor social media platforms, but rather the intentional design of the platform itself. Created by two Russian entrepreneurs to “skirt political oppression and provide a more privatized, open speech environment”, its functions, including public and private channels/groups, encryption algorithms, secret chats, unsending, and anonymous forwarding, “enhance privacy and anonymity, provide opportunities to gain publicity, and reduce the cost of coordination and mobilization” (Su et al., 2022, p.434-435).

These features make it “more difficult for authoritative states to spam and hijack conversations” and “protect messages from being spied on by authorities and government” (Su et al., 2022, p.435), even though the “[Hong Kong government] has taken measures to limit the safety net technology provides to [Anti-ELAB] protesters” such as taking down platforms that share real-time information about ongoing demonstrations (Wong, 2020, p.6). Hence, what facilitated social media platforms like Telegram in becoming a free space was their

H2: Dormant disappointment with the lack of progress in democratisation within the public coalesced as a driving force in catalysing widespread discontent over the introduction of the extradition bill.

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secure design that allowed protesters and online participants to “disseminate information and mobilize people” (Su et al., 2022, p.434).

they were able to express “privately held values and opinions that are incongruent with those of the regime or state” (p.105) while “evading the gaze and tentacles of the regime” (p.105).

Apart from churches, its sister institutions in other religions, such as mosques in Islam, have also functioned as “relatively free [spaces] for movement mobilisation” (Snow & Soule, 2010, p.103). Snow & Marshall (1984) have determined mosques to be the free spaces that bred anti-Shah sentiments and frames, and generated plans for mobilisation in the 1970s Iranian Revolution. Additionally, mosques and madrasas (Islamic schools), especially those in Pakistan and Afghanistan, are believed to propagate Islamic militancy by governmental and local officials as they “served as free spaces [...] for learning, discussing, and spreading militant, Islamic fundamentalism” (Snow & Soule, 2010, p.103).

Therefore, although social media differs from traditional understandings of free spaces as a physical setting where protesters assemble, given it satisfies Snow & Soule’s (2010) definition of free spaces, the similar role it plays in galvanising the ANTIEALB movement, and the historical legacy of free spaces as the seedbed of mobilisation, there is strong theoretical foundation for the significance of social media acting as free spaces in stimulating the Anti-ELAB Movement. On this premise, the following testable hypothesis can be generated: H3: Social media catalysed the Anti-ELAB Movement’s rapid growth by providing a free space for protesters to assemble and disseminate movement-related information.

Similarly, social media platforms were used in the Anti-ELAB Movement to legitimise and coordinate the movement. As Wong (2020) noted, “[Anti-ELAB] protesters have taken to technology to publicise, lead the conversation, and legitimise the movement domestically and internationally” (p.4) through the creation of movement-specific hashtags to promote protest news on platforms like Twitter and sharing “arts of resistance” that depicted conventional elements of the Anti-ELAB Movement through anonymous Twitter accounts. Moreover, “protestors [used] Telegram to arrange safe transportation for people to leave demonstration sites if no public transport is available” (Wong, 2020, p.5). Furthermore, Liang & Lee (2021) noted that LIHKG, “the central communication platform for movement participants and supporters” (p.672), played a significant role in consolidating “feelings of solidarity, agreement with emerging movement discourses and tactics, and support for radical actions among protesters” (p.672) aside from being a crucial information source. This signifies that social media platforms serve a similar purpose to traditionally understood free spaces even though they differ in physical form.

2.2 Causes of the abrupt decline of the movement The movement declined in tandem with increasing government repression. Circulating back to the curvilinear political opportunity curve model, a decrease in political opportunities available, materialised in the form of increasing government repression, represents a rightward movement along the curve - that is, a decrease in the incidence of protest.

This aligns with the trajectory of the Anti-ELAB Movement: although the mobilising grievances were still present, they were overcome by the cessation of political opportunities.

The first instance of government repression was the introduction of repressive laws, most notably the National Security Law (NSL). Not only were more than 200 people prosecuted under the NSL (Initium Media, 2023), which indicated a decrease in political opportunities under McAdam’s (1982) thesis as such laws indicated an increase in state repressive behaviour, but the law also involved policing of the internet and social media platforms. Anyone suspected of “endangering national security” would be persecuted, even if they are overseas, as evidenced by the recent arrest of a student who allegedly posted about “Hong Kong independence” while studying in Japan (Lee, 2023).

As Snow and Soule (2010) note, the understanding of free spaces should extend beyond “organisationally formalised or institutionalised” (p.104) spaces including “schools, colleges and places of worship” (p.104), because common settings such as “coffee-houses and bars or pubs that are appropriated at particular times” (p.104) can also be occupied by “dissident groups and their gatherings” (p.104) for movement purposes.

For example, in studying radical activists in the US, Remy Cross notes that “many of his contacts and observations have occurred in a coffee shop where they meet regularly” (Snow & Soule, 2010, p.104). Even in autocratic contexts such as Estonia during Soviet rule, as Snow & Soule (2010) note, dissidents expressed their oppositional sentiments towards the regime in free spaces such as coffeehouses, small groups, university student organisations and classrooms etc., where

Moreover, the untimely arrival of COVID-19 aggravated government repression. The implementation of Prohibition on Gathering Regulation (599G) in March 2020 effectively eliminated any possibility of demonstrations, as the gathering of more than 4 people in public spaces was criminalised (The Government of the Hong Kong SAR, 2020) under the guise of infection control. Again, this signifies a decline in political opportunities under McAdam’s (1982) thesis, as the

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government is increasingly willing to utilise the legal system to suppress the movement. The government disallowed the annual Tiananmen Massacre candlelight vigil for the first time in 2020, citing epidemic prevention as the reason (Wong, 2020).

Kong protest slogans during NBA games in the US, and so on” (Lee, 2022, p.241). In addition, owing to the fact that mass rallies could not be convened due to the pandemic, more than 50 organisations petitioned the US to sanction Hong Kong to push for democratic change (HK01a, 2020).

As such, with insufficient political opportunities and contracting free spaces, the movement discontinued even though the mobilising grievances were still present. This claim is supported by Kobayashi et al.’s (2021) findings that support for the Five Demands did not alter significantly after the introduction of the NSL, indicating that repression, despite constricting political opportunities, did not eliminate the mobilising grievances and public support for protest demands.

On this premise, the following testable hypothesis can be generated.

The wealth of examples above demonstrating the Anti-ELAB Movement’s transnational advocacy aligns with Keck & Sikkink’s (1998) boomerang theory, which hypothesises that “when channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked”, the latter may “bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside” (p.12). The effectiveness of such actions, as Keck & Sikkink (1999) detail, is that “where governments are unresponsive to groups whose claims may nonetheless resonate elsewhere, international contacts can ‘amplify’ the demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo these demands back into the domestic arena” (p.93).

H4: The eventual intensification of government repression represented the closure of political opportunities and free spaces, ultimately leading to an abrupt decline in the movement even though the mobilising grievances were left unaddressed.

This phenomenon can be understood through the political opportunity theory. As political opportunities are defined by “the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (Eisinger, 1973, p.25), the failure of domestic actors to gain access to state actors can be understood as a lack of political opportunities. And since the purpose of seeking international allies is to pressurise state actors to consider their demands, the purpose of such actions is to open up political opportunities for their demands to be heard. In other words, the lack of domestic political opportunities prompts actors to seek them from abroad instead.

Seeing the ever-contracting domestic political opportunities, some movement participants shifted their focus to the “international front” (gwok-jai-sin or gwok-jai-jin-sin in Cantonese), a term used by movement participants to refer to a combination of “protests for an international audience, activities conducted overseas that targeted foreign publics, and lobbying of foreign governments” (Lee, 2022, p.232). Lee (2022) noted, “one important feature of the [Anti-ELAB] movement is an emphasis on proactively appealing to the international community for support” (Lee, 2022, p.232). This measure was identified as a key tactic by movement participants: as Ho’s (2023) observed, “[from] the beginning, Hongkonger activists, domestically and abroad, knew that they had to leverage international attention to counter the extradition bill” (p.247).

Applied to the Anti-ELAB movement, opportunities arose in the Western world for Hong Kong activists to pressurise the government into listening to their demands for the following reasons: Specifically, the worsening relationship between China and the Western world, especially the US, in the immediate years before the Anti-ELAB Movement made it more likely for Hong Kong activists to find sympathetic ears in those countries. Changing international relations contributed to strategic convergence between the Hong Kong protesters and specific foreign countries. Meanwhile, various academics have propagated the view that China’s economy still relies on Hong Kong for currency exchange and foreign capital (Fong, 2019; Hung, 2019), and Hong Kong can play this role only if the international community continues to see it as an autonomous financial centre. Therefore, China might be forced to concede on Hong Kong if

Examples of such transnational advocacy were welldocumented. As Ho (2023) details, In 2019 alone, three well-coordinated global rallies were held that connected Hong Kong with 22 cities (June 12), 36 cities (August 17–18), and 65 cities (September 29). In the same year, there were also three waves of crowd-funding campaigns to place advertisements in international newspapers on June 28, August 19, and October 1 (p.247) Other tactics include “[campaigns] for Hong Kong migrants to send letters to their elected representatives, exhibitions about the Hong Kong protests, the showcasing of pro-Hong

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foreign countries pressure China to do so (Lee, 2022, p.237).

Thus, there were abundant incentives for these activists to leverage the hostile relations between China and the West and Hong Kong’s special economic status (or in other words, utilise the political opportunities that surfaced abroad) in advancing the Anti-ELAB movement’s objectives.

The nationalist pursuit of safeguarding Korean national identities and interests in response to perceived harmful changes by foreign and external influences in South Korean social movements (Glassman et al., 2008) is substantially similar to the ideology of localism in Hong Kong. Localism refers to “a loosely organized set of themes about the necessity to defend local interests and the uniqueness of Hong Kong” (Lee, 2022, p.237). Lee (2022) documents that “[in] the protest onsite survey conducted [...] on 1 October (N = 640), on a 0-to-10 scale, the protesters scored only 2.29 on average for identification as Chinese; yet they scored 9.76 on average for identification as Hongkongers” (p.237). The emphasis on a Hongkonger identity distinct from a Chinese identity, as indicated by most participants in the survey, demonstrates how the Anti-ELAB movement is deeply rooted in localism.

This ideological alignment, in turn, influences the “international front” of the movement. Shum (2023), in surveying 1149 Hong Kong Americans, discovered that “attachment to Hong Kong culture and localist values are the strongest drivers for transnational engagement” (p.143).

Although her findings are limited to a small group within the Hong Kong diaspora community, it evidences that similar to the South Korean and Thai movements, quasi-nationalist values have been a driving force behind the Anti-ELAB Movement’s international advocacy. Hence, with reference to Glassman et al.’s (2008) findings, there is a theoretical foundation in the postulation that strong localist identification within the Anti-ELAB Movement contributed to its limited successes in securing transnational support.

Nonetheless, the effectiveness of Hongkongers’ transnational advocacy in garnering international support was limited. As shown in Figure. 2 below, Ho (2023) observed that “[with] the noticeable exception of Taiwan, rallies and demonstrations in the USA, UK, Canada, and Australia were mostly Hongkongers-only affairs.” (p.253) Furthermore, he noted that “although there have been individual and scattered efforts to reach out to human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, labour unions, political parties, churches, and political organisations like the Democratic Socialists of America, local embedding remains limited” (p.254).

Therefore, it is clear that Hongkonger activists have had limited success in consolidating global support for their causes.

The failure to garner international support, in turn, could be one of the factors contributing to the Anti-ELAB Movement’s abeyance. As Glassman et al. (2008) conclude in their research of South Korean and Thai social movements, “one contributing factor in the devolution of [these] movements has been the failure of these movements to more successfully internationalize their struggles” (p.342). In other words, similar to the Anti-ELAB Movement, the South Korean and Thai movements have failed to connect their movements with broader, international forces in support of the same goals, ultimately leading to their demise.

Glassman et al. (2008) associated this failure with three factors: the strong nationalist orientation of these social movements, the lack of English or European languages as a developed means of communication, and the absence of connections to a broader regional language block. Regarding the first factor, they pointed out that the conservative nationalist orientation prevalent among middle-class groups in South Korea and Thailand significantly contributed to the challenges in internationalisation faced by social movements in these nations. For example, in the case of South Korea, “efforts to develop international networks of social movements have been initiated out of nationalist motivations, attempting to place more pressure on the Korean state by generating external support for local or national campaigns” (p.349). While international activism could be traced back to as early as the 1970s, the aim of such activities “was simply to attract international support for the Korean democratization movement and to draw international attention to human rights

As for the latter two factors, Glassman et al. (2008) noted that language barriers were a great hindrance to the internationalisation of the South Korean and Thai movements: on one hand, as international NGOs and labour groups mainly use English for communication, the lack of proficiency in English inhibited communications between the movements and these organisations; on the other hand, unlike Latin America, as neither South Korea nor Thailand was situated in a regional language block (meaning they share same/ similar languages), these activists could not “easily forge regional alliances in their native tongues” (p.347) while Latin American could “more easily engage in regional activities even without the benefit of English” (p.347).

However, these characteristics seem less applicable to Hong Kong. Firstly, contrary to South Korea and Thailand, English

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is an official language of Hong Kong in addition to Chinese (The Government of the Hong Kong SAR, 2024). According to the 2021 Population Census, 58.7% of the population aged 5 and over are able to speak English (The Government of the Hong Kong SAR, 2022). English education is mandatory since Grade 1, and English teaching and learning activities are introduced in almost all kindergartens (Lau, 2020). As such, the development of English as a second language in Hong Kong is robust. This is reflected in the fact that English was widely used to publicise the Anti-ELAB Movement on social media platforms. As Wong (2020) noted, protesters took to platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram to facilitate international coverage of local news and events, where hashtags such as #HongKongProtests, #anti-ELAB, #StandWithHK and #FollowBackHongKong were widely used in an attempt to share protest news more widely.

Moreover, LIHKG, a Reddit-like platform widely used by protesters, set up Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

percentage of the population able to speak English. Therefore, in contrast to the South Korean and Thai movements, it is unlikely that language barriers contributed to the difficulty in forming international alliances for the Anti-ELAB Movement.

The relative successes of forming cross-regional alliances and localising Hong Kong issues Hongkonger activists found in Taiwan may provide some perspective on why similar successes were not found elsewhere. Ho (2023) explains this is due to a shared perceived threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Given that the PRC sought to use the Hong Kong "model" as a potential framework for the island's future, it logically follows that the Taiwanese were deeply concerned about developments in Hong Kong. As such, as the popular slogan “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” highlights, the significant threat posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) motivated Taiwanese support for the Hongkongers' campaign. In contrast, the less pronounced or absent manifestations of this threat in other regions provide an explanation for the challenges Hongkongers have faced in securing local partnerships. Therefore, it can be speculated that the lack of shared threats with host countries contributed to the failure of internationalising the Anti-ELAB Movement.

Accounts to translate posts and videos from traditional Chinese to English (Wong, 2020). As such, the use of English to publicise the Anti-ELAB Movement was ubiquitous at the time.

Taipei Sydney Toronto London

New York

Los Angeles

Only 12 Hongkongers

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Furthermore, Lee (2022) presented transnational repression as yet another hurdle for the transnational advocacy of Hongkongers. He noted that the enactment of the NSL could diminish overseas Hongkongers’ inclination towards participating in transnational activism as “such participation could prevent them from returning to the city in the future” (p.243), which is evidenced by “[declining] participation in overseas rallies after the NSL’s passing and the apparent decrease in willingness of rally participants to talk to the media” (p.243). This is because the stipulations of the NSL, by imposing harsh penalties on “collusion with foreign forces” (Ho, 2023, p.248), effectively render a wide array of activities undertaken by activists on the international front as criminal (Lee, 2022). This increased the costs of movement participation and maintenance of global networks (Lee, 2022) and consequently proscribed the influence that diaspora activists could exert on Hong Kong's political landscape externally (Ho, 2023).

Figure 2: Contentious gatherings with and without local collaboartors in six cities (June 2019-January 2020) (Ho, 2023, p.

254)

Secondly, even though the native tongue of Hongkongers, Cantonese, is not widely used in neighbouring countries, forming regional alliances was not a major issue for the AntiELAB Movement. As per Ho’s (2023) findings, Hongkongers have had the most success finding sympathetic ears in Taiwan when compared to other regions. As shown in Figure 2, 33 out of 45 contentious gatherings in Taiwan have garnered support from local collaborators, in contrast to little to none in other cities in Europe, North America and Australia. This could be because Putonghua, the de facto official language of Taiwan (Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2018), is also generally spoken by a majority of Hongkongers. As the 2021 Population Census documents, 54.2% of the population aged 5 and over are able to speak Putonghua (The Government of the Hong Kong SAR, 2022), at a similar level to the

Aside from legal repercussions, other forms of transnational repression have been documented in literature. Shum (2023) notes that coercion-by-proxy tactics, such as family intimidation, are used to pressure diaspora communities, preventing them from voicing their opposition and protesting against the regime back home. Moreover, Hongkongers’ transnational advocacy efforts were met with countermobilisation by pro-PRC Chinese individuals, who according to Ho (2023), “shouted ‘patriotic’ slogans, sang China’s national anthem, and sometimes destroyed Hongkongers’ placards and posters, or forcefully silenced speakers” (p.251).

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At times, such conflicts would escalate into physical altercations (Ho, 2023). He noted that “even academic forums held in universities saw the swarming of so-called Little Pink students who made ultra-nationalistic remarks to disrupt the events and sought to discredit the solidarity events” (p.251).

These disruptions and opposing mobilisations were widely suspected to be orchestrated by Chinese embassies and consulates as a part of the PRC's global strategy to counter the Anti-ELAB Movement (Ho, 2023).

phenomena, enabling researchers to make strong inferences about how a cause (or set of causes) contributes to producing a result (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Unlike traditional correlational methods, it focuses on understanding the causal processes that link observed events to outcomes.

The process tracing methodology entails in-depth qualitative analysis, often making use of diverse sources of evidence like archival documents, interviews, and historical records to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to specific outcomes (Charbonneau et al., 2017). To do this, researchers establish a clear time frame and pinpoint key indicators to effectively map the decision-making process, ensuring a thorough examination of the underlying causal mechanisms (Jaramillo, 2020). It holds particular significance in the study of social movements due to the intricate interplay of multiple factors that influence the trajectory of events. Therefore, the utilisation of this methodology is justified in this paper to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the complex dynamics at play within social movements. The following three steps will be followed.

As Glassman et al. (2008) emphasise, “in the process of defending themselves against repression and attempting to institutionalize gains of struggle social movements must perforce deal with the power of the nation state” (p.347). This sentiment is echoed by Ho (2023), who observes that “Hong Kong cannot be fully democratised as long as the city remains an administrative unit within the PRC and the PRC remains committed to autocratic rule” (p.257). Hence, although the international front of the movement originated to evade domestic repression and seek political opportunities from abroad, it failed to counteract transnational repression from the PRC and consequently could not provide sustenance to the domestic foreground of the movement.

Identification of the key events and turning points. First, I identify key events and turning points that marked significant shifts in the trajectory of the movement, which may include the initial introduction of the extradition bill, various documented incidents of police brutality, and crucial shifts in public sentiments. A nuanced analysis of the causal pathways that contributed to the movement's swift momentum and subsequent decline can be discerned by closely scrutinising these pivotal instances.

To conclude, as the international front of the Anti-ELAB movement fails to garner transnational support and overcome repression from the PRC, the movement is unable to sustain itself as the intensification of domestic and transnational repression limited political opportunities on both fronts. On this premise, the following testable hypothesis is generated.

H5: The failure of the Anti-ELAB Movement to garner sustained support from the international community and the limited effectiveness of transnational advocacy contributed to its decline.

Causal mechanism analysis. Once the key events have been identified, I comprehensively analyse the underlying causal mechanisms. This involves a meticulous examination of the factors that contributed to each event and a detailed exploration of their complex interactions, ultimately revealing the intricate dynamics driving the movement's trajectory. The fundamental dynamics shaping the movement's trajectory can be uncovered and comprehensively understood through a systematic tracing of these causal pathways.

3. Methodology In this paper, I employ a mixed-method approach, comprising the process tracing methodology to systematically trace the causal mechanisms behind critical events and turning points in the trajectory of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement, and a comparative case study between the Arab Spring and the Anti-ELAB Movement to probe the effectiveness of social media in stimulating mobilisation. As such, the data collection and analysis section is to be separated into these two sections.

Data collection and analysis. Data will be collected from diverse sources, comprising news articles, peer-reviewed academic studies, and official government reports. A comprehensive examination using qualitative research methods, including content analysis and thematic coding, will be conducted to discern underlying causal mechanisms and trace their impact on the movement.

3.1 Process tracing

3.2 Comparative case study

Process tracing is a qualitative research method for identifying and analysing causal mechanisms underlying complex social

The Arab Spring is especially useful in probing the role of social media in stimulating protests, as it is a movement

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catalysed by widespread social media coverage. I explore the instrumental role of social media in the Arab Spring and the Anti-ELAB Movement in Hong Kong through a comparative case study of the two movements, highlighting the dynamics between digital platforms and political activism. Through a comparative analysis, I draw parallels and distinctions in utilising social media in both contexts, providing insights into its capabilities and limitations as a tool for social change (Howard et al., 2011; Tufekci, 2017).

However, despite the initial momentum and widespread public support, the movement eventually faced an abrupt decline, as outlined in hypothesis H4. The intensification of government repression represented the closure of political opportunities and free spaces, ultimately leading to a decline in the movement's visibility and impact. Despite the persistence of mobilising grievances, increased repression effectively closed off avenues for protest and activism, limiting the movement's capacity to sustain momentum. Furthermore, the presence of a localist identity and transnational repression has impeded the concerted efforts of transnational advocacy, in accordance with the boomerang theory, aimed at overcoming contracting domestic opportunities as established by H5. As a result, the movement experienced a rapid decline, highlighting the challenges posed by authoritarian control and the resilience required to sustain grassroots movements in the face of repression.

4. Data collection and analysis As outlined in the methodology section, this section comprises the process tracing methodology and the comparative case study of the Arab Spring.

4.1 Process tracing

This analysis aims to shed light on the complex dynamics that shaped the rise and fall of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement by comprehensively examining these hypotheses and the underlying processes they elucidate. By delving into the interplay of political, social, and external factors, the forces at play and the lessons to be learned from this transformative moment in Hong Kong's history can be better understood.

The 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement witnessed a sudden rise, followed by an abrupt fall, marking a pivotal moment in the city's history and reflecting complex interplays of political, social, and economic dynamics. This analysis seeks to unravel the intricate web of events and processes that shaped the movement's trajectory through process tracing.

The sudden rise of the Anti-ELAB Movement can be attributed to several key factors, as elucidated by hypotheses formulated in the literature review to explain its emergence.

Hypothesis H1 posits that the effectuated and projected closing of political opportunities mobilised protesters in fear of future repression. The looming threat of tighter control and restrictions on political freedoms catalyzed mass mobilisation, galvanising public opposition to perceived threats to Hong Kong's autonomy. Moreover, hypothesis H2 suggests that dormant disappointment with the lack of progress in democratisation within the public coalesced as a driving force in catalysing widespread discontent over the introduction of the extradition bill. This deep-seated frustration with the pace of democratic reforms intersected with immediate grievances, such as the proposed extradition bill, triggering widespread protests and demonstrations.

Therefore, to fully comprehend the evolution of the movement, the process tracing analysis will be divided into different sections comprising notable incidents during the movement, namely the introduction of the extradition bill, mass protests, violent clashes, airport sit-ins, passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, withdrawal of the bill, continued protests and demands, increased repression, COVID-19, and finally the introduction of the National Security Law (NSL), which marked the end of the Anti-ELAB Movement. As such, the factors at play during these snapshots of the movement and their respective effects can be analysed.

The introduction of the extradition bill The introduction of the extradition bill in March 2019 stands as a seminal moment in the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement, catalysing widespread mobilisation and resistance among Hong Kong residents. This pivotal event underscores the intersection of legal, political, and societal forces that underpin Hong Kong's unique status and its relationship with mainland China (Wasserstrom, 2020, pp. 57-71).

Wasserstrom's (2020) analysis provides a critical lens through which to understand the profound implications of the extradition bill, as it threatened to undermine Hong Kong's cherished autonomy and subject its residents to the opaque legal system of mainland China.

Furthermore, social media played a crucial role in catalysing the rapid growth of the movement, as proposed by hypothesis H3. Platforms like Twitter, Telegram, and LIHKG provided protesters a free space to assemble and disseminate movement-related information, facilitating swift organisation and coordination of actions. The transformative power of social media amplified protest movements, enabling protesters to mobilise support and disseminate their message to a global audience.

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Furthermore, the proposal of the bill tapped into deeply rooted fears and anxieties among Hong Kong residents regarding Beijing's encroachment on their freedoms and way of life.

Drawing upon theoretical frameworks such as Tarrow's (1996) theory of contentious politics, the introduction of the extradition bill can be analysed as a catalyst for mass mobilisation within the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement. By examining how grievances are mobilised into collective action, Tarrow's framework sheds light on the mechanisms through which the bill triggered widespread protests and demonstrations throughout the city. The bill not only galvanised public opposition but also laid the groundwork for broader demands for democratic reform and accountability, as evidenced by the diffusion of the protests’ demands from calling for the withdrawal of the bill in the initial protests (Ming Pao, 2019b) to the proposal of the Five Demands (Ming Pao, 2019a). For example, the call to end police brutality eventually surpassed the call for withdrawal of the extradition bill in popularity (Ming Pao, 2019b). This underscores the intricate interplay between legal and political processes in shaping societal movements.

fueled public outrage and mobilised support for the movement (Lee, 2022). On June 9, 2019, an estimated one million people participated in a peaceful march against the bill, according to official estimates (Creery, 2019).

Subsequent demonstrations drew even larger crowds, with organisers claiming that nearly two million people joined the protests on June 16, 2019, making it one of the largest protests ever seen in Hong Kong (Amnesty International, 2019a). These figures underscore the magnitude of public discontent and the widespread opposition to the bill. As such, the scale and peaceful nature of these protests underscored the depth of public opposition to the extradition bill and served as a powerful assertion of Hong Kong's distinct identity and values.

Furthermore, H2 resonates deeply with the broader societal grievances related to democratic deficits and political disillusionment. The introduction of the extradition bill served as a trigger event that brought latent discontent to the forefront and galvanised public opposition. This hypothesis underscores the complexity of the social and political landscape in Hong Kong, where long-standing frustrations with the pace of democratisation intersected with the immediate threat posed by the extradition bill, creating a potent catalyst for mass mobilisation and collective action.

The salience of the introduction of the extradition bill is evidenced by Lee et al.’s (2019a) findings in the Onsite Survey Findings in Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protests: Calling for the withdrawal of the extradition bill” has always been one of the most important motivations for protesters to participate in the concerned protest. The percentage of respondents who saw it as “quite important” and “very important” remained at a high-level ranging from 97.0% to 98.8% in June and July. It only decreased to about 95% in August.

Violent clashes The escalation of protests into violent clashes with police during the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement represents a critical juncture marked by a breakdown in dialogue and an intensification of conflict.

These clashes highlight how state repression and resistance play a role in shaping the trajectory of social movements, underscoring how the use of force by authorities can fuel radicalisation and erode public trust in the government’s legitimacy (Earl, 2022). Moreover, the escalation of violence during these clashes, characterised by the use of tear gas, rubber bullets, and baton charges, underscores the fraught nature of the relationship between the state and society in Hong Kong. According to official figures, between June 9 and August 5, 2019, the Hong Kong police fired approximately 1,000 rounds of tear gas, 160 rubber bullets, and 150 sponge grenades (Hong Kong Watch, 2019). These violent confrontations served to heighten public anger and reinforce the determination of protesters to continue their resistance.

As per Figure 3 shown below, the percentage of protesters selecting “Calling for the withdrawal of the extradition bill” as a “most important” motivation remained very high throughout the protests, steadily fluctuating from 85.1% to 94.8%. This demonstrates that the introduction of the extradition bill remained a strong mobilising grievance for protesters throughout the protests.

Hence, these sources of evidence substantiate H1’s claim that the projected closing of political opportunities brought forth by the extradition bill stimulated protests.

Mass protests The mass protests that swept across Hong Kong in response to the extradition bill represent a profound expression of public dissent and collective action, as evidenced by empirical data. The role of media and public opinion in shaping protest movements illuminates how the widespread dissemination of information and images of the protests

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Figure 3: Motivation of protesters (only shows the percentage of respondents who chose "most important" (Lee et al., 2019a)

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The impact of these clashes reverberated beyond the immediate physical injuries, amplifying grievances and deepening divisions within Hong Kong society. This underscores the complex interplay between repression, resistance, and mobilisation in shaping the trajectory of social movements and highlights the enduring quest for justice and democratic rights among the populace. As Lee et al. (2019a) discover,

protesters in the Prince Edward MTR station on August 31st, 2019 (Stand News, 2019b), in which rumours about protesters being beaten to death arose but were negated by the police (The Standard, 2019).

The occurrence of both violent incidents spurred reactionary protests and demonstrations afterwards. On July 28th, 2019, one week after the 721 incident, around 288,000 protesters gathered in Yuen Long in the name of “Liberating Yuen Long”, protesting against the alleged collusion between police forces and attackers in the 721 incident in spite of police disapproval (BBC, 2019b; The Reporter, 2019a). Similarly, the 831 incident spurred reactionary sit-ins and gatherings around the Prince Edward MTR station since the day after the incident to offer their condolences, protest against excessive use of force by the police and demand the release of CCTV footage in the station, after which the gatherings evolved into violent clashes with the police on September 7th around the nearby Mongkok Police Station (Initium Media, 2019b; The Epoch Times, 2019; Radio France Internationale, 2019).

Expressing dissatisfaction with the police’s handling of the protesters” was another key reason of why the participants joined the protests.

The percentage of respondents who regarded it as “important” or “very important” ranged from 97.2% to 99.1%. Since mid-July, it had actually become the most important motivation for people to participate in the protests. Over time the survey also included options related to more specific actions of the police. Proportions of respondents who chose “important” and “very important” in the following options were: “protesting against arbitrary arrest by the police” (June 16, 97.8%) and “expressing the dissatisfaction with the riot charges imposed by the police against the 7.28 protesters” (August 4 TKO, 97.1%; SW, 96.5%).

The high percentages reflected the concerns of respondents over police abuse of power.

Put into perspective, it can be observed that many other demonstrations were also organised in response to instances of police brutality throughout the Anti-ELAB Movement. For example, the demonstration on July 28th, 2019, in Chater Garden, Central called for members of the police force to be held accountable for firing bullets during the demonstration in Sheung Wan a week ago (The Reporter, 2019b). Other demonstrations, such as the one in Victoria Park, Causeway Bay on August 18, 2019, where many protesters held signs saying “investigate gangster police, prosecute police brutality” 2 (BBC, 2019d), were held to call for thorough investigations into police brutality.

As per Figure 3, similar to “calling for the withdrawal of the extradition bill”, the percentage of protesters selecting “expressing dissatisfaction with the police’s handling of the protesters” as a “most important” motivation also remained very high throughout the protests, steadily fluctuating from 84.6% to 98.3%. This evidences that police brutality during protests was also a significant driving force for protesters throughout the protests.

Thus, in response to H1, it is clear that repression, in the form of police brutality, throughout the movement served as a mobilising factor for the occurrence of demonstrations.

Furthermore, the galvanising effect of violent clashes can be seen through two notable violent incidents, namely the 2019 Yuen Long attack (721 incident) and the 2019 Prince Edward station attack (831 incident). The 721 incident refers to the occurrence of mob violence by hundreds of masked assailants dressed in white at the Yuen Long MTR station against protesters and passengers on July 21st, 2019 (Cheng, 2019; Leung & Ting, 2019), where the Hong Kong Police Force was criticised for arriving at the scene 39 minutes after the initial report and accused by some of colluding with the attackers who had alleged links to organised crime (Independent Police Complaints Council, 2019; Hong Kong Free Press, 2022). The 831 incident, on the other hand, refers to the indiscriminate attack of passengers by the Hong Kong police while arresting

Airport sit-ins The airport sit-ins staged by protesters in August 2019 marked a significant turning point in the Anti-ELAB Movement, with far-reaching implications both domestically and internationally. The airport sit-ins were organised by protesters to garner global attention towards the movement’s objectives, amplifying the voices of Hong Kong protesters and increasing pressure on the Hong Kong government to address their demands (Lee et al, 2019a; Lee et al., 2022).

One of the first instances of demonstrations in the Hong Kong International Airport was the “walk, sit and pickup at the airport”3 movement on June 15th, 2019, where demonstrators

Translated by author (original in Cantonese: 徹查警黑，追 究警暴)

Translated by author (original in Cantonese: 行下坐下接下 機)

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stood and read Anti-ELAB Movement-related news reports in the arrivals hall of the airport in an effort to inform visitors of the political situation in Hong Kong (Stand News, 2019a). The same cause propelled the airport assembly on July 26th, 2019, where “protesters carried signs warning tourists not to trust the police or the government” (Ramzy, 2019) and “[educated] visitors about the unprecedented demonstrations” in the city through “chanting anti-government slogans, holding banners and handing out flyers” as well as creative tactics such as televising a satirical version of an airline safety announcement video detailing protester demands and warnings about protests in the city (The Peninsula, 2019).

government. One instance of such activities is the demonstration on September 8th, 2019, at the US Consulate General in Hong Kong, where protesters petitioned the US Congress to pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (Initium Media, 2019c). The act in question requires the US Government to sanction individuals responsible for “the extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong; or [...] other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong” (Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, 2019, p.8) and assess whether Hong Kong “remains sufficiently autonomous from the People’s Republic of China to ‘‘justify treatment under a particular law of the United States, or any provision thereof, different from that accorded the People’s Republic of China’” (Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, 2019, p.2).

These previous demonstrations culminated in the airport sitins from August 8th to 13th, 2019, where around 10,000 protesters gathered each day in the airport to promote the movement’s demands to international visitors. Protesters adopted similar tactics to the previous airport demonstrations, chanting movement slogans such as “Free Hong Kong” and “Hong Kong add oil”4, distributing leaflets to visitors to brief them on recent developments in Hong Kong, holding signs translated into multiple languages to convey movement messages to visitors, and covering their right eye with gauze to pay tribute to a female protester who was shot in the eye by the police (BBC, 2019c; Initium Media, 2019a; Oriental Daily News, 2019). These tactics were effective in promoting the movement to the international community: various media outlets have documented that tourists from various countries have expressed support for such demonstrations of freedom (BBC, 2019c; Initium Media, 2019a), and “images of mostly young people bringing the airport to a standstill brought a global spotlight on the events in Hong Kong” (Stokols, 2022, p.1167).

The protesters eventually had their way - the bill was passed with an overwhelming majority in Congress and Senate and was signed into law by then-President Trump into law on November 27th, 2019 (The White House, 2019), giving way to the sanctioning of 11 individuals, including the Chief Executive, Director of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government (LOCPG), and other key governmental officials (BBC, 2020). The passage of the bill was seen as a major victory by most protesters, which is evident in over a hundred thousand participants in the Thanksgiving Assembly held on November 28th, 2019, a day after the bill was passed, in Edinburgh Place, Central, expressing their gratitude towards the US Congress for the passage (The Epoch Times, 2019; RTHK, 2019).

However, the bill seemed to be ineffective in pressuring the Hong Kong government due to China’s powerful status.

Immediately after the passage of the bill, it received backlash from the Hong Kong Government, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO), and the LOCPG (BBC, 2019f), revealing their staunch stance in steering Hong Kong’s policy. Additionally, then-Commissioner of Police Chris Tang, who was on the sanction list, asserted that the bill had no effect on himself and even the Hong Kong Police Force (Ming Pao, 2019c), which exemplifies the limited effectiveness the bill had on sanctioned individuals and the government in general.

The global spotlight on the movement facilitated by the airport sit-ins served to underscore the importance of respecting human rights and democratic principles, further isolating the Hong Kong government diplomatically and raising questions about its commitment to upholding its international obligations. The airport sit-ins facilitated connections between local and global actors, amplifying the impact of the movement and increasing the costs of government repression.

Importantly, the sit-ins represented the movement’s concerted effort to reach for the international community’s support, aligning with H5’s findings that the movement consistently employed transnational advocacy as a tactic.

Thus, in response to H5, it is apparent that the concerted efforts of transnational advocacy in the Anti-ELAB Movement had limited effectiveness in influencing the Hong Kong government’s political decisions, thereby failing to prevent increasing government repression from diminishing the movement.

Passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act Hongkongers’ efforts of transnational advocacy also involved lobbying foreign governments to pressure the Hong Kong

4

Translated by author (original in Cantonese: 香港加油)

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Withdrawal of the extradition bill Chief Executive Carrie Lam's announcement of the formal withdrawal of the extradition bill in September 2019 marked a critical moment in the trajectory of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement, emblematic of the government's response to mounting public pressure and escalating protests (Lee et al., 2019b, p. 2). This underscores how Lam's decision to withdraw the bill was a calculated attempt to quell public unrest and restore stability, as protesters’ demand for the complete withdrawal of the bill remained strong despite her efforts to state that the bill is “suspended” or “dead” previously (Lee et al., 2019a). The precise changes in her use of diction in referring to the status of the bill, from “suspended” in June 2019 (Graham, 2019) to “dead” in July (Rosenfeld, 2019) to “formally withdrawn” in September (Kuo, 2019) reflects the government's recognition of the strength of public sentiment and the need to appease protesters.

The persistence of protests and the expansion of demands signify a crisis of legitimacy for the Hong Kong government.

The government's inability to address these grievances effectively has deepened public distrust and exacerbated social divisions, highlighting the challenges facing Hong Kong's quest for genuine autonomy and democratic rights.

However, the withdrawal of the bill, while perceived as a partial victory for the protesters, fell short of addressing broader grievances related to democratic reform and police accountability (BBC, 2019e). This failure underscored the entrenched nature of societal divisions and the challenges facing Hong Kong's quest for genuine autonomy. The withdrawal of the bill represented a tactical concession by the government to preserve its legitimacy and authority in the face of widespread dissent. The continuation of protests following the withdrawal of the bill highlights the enduring quest for justice and democratic rights among the populace, underscoring the complexities of governance and resistance in Hong Kong's political landscape.

Moreover, the continuation of protests underscores the resilience of the movement and its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, further complicating the government's efforts to quell dissent. In this context, the persistence of protests and demands serves as a potent reminder of the enduring quest for justice and democracy among the Hong Kong populace, underscoring the complexities of governance and resistance in the region. It reveals a society grappling with fundamental questions of identity, governance, and political representation, with implications that extend far beyond the immediate demands of the protest movement.

Increased repression

Continued protests and demands

The escalation of repression by the Hong Kong government, supported by Beijing, in response to the ongoing protests represents a critical juncture in the trajectory of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement. These include more pronounced forms of police brutality, such as the indiscriminate attacks in the 831 incident as mentioned above, as well as other documented instances of violence, including sexual violence against protesters, such as assaults in police stations, exposing women’s underwear during arrest, and humiliating and unnecessary strip searches (Amnesty International, 2019b), and other forms of maltreatment, such as bending the wrists of an activist by 180 degrees and kicking another activist in the mouth (Chan, 2019). As repression became more pronounced, it served not only to suppress dissent but also to amplify social tensions and deepen political polarisation.

The persistence of protests and the emergence of broader demands despite the withdrawal of the extradition bill underscore the deep-rooted societal discontent and unresolved grievances within Hong Kong's political landscape. The protests served as a manifestation of broader societal frustrations with issues such as political representation and police accountability. For instance, according to a survey conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (2021, p. 46), approximately 73% of respondents supported the demand for the complete withdrawal of the extradition bill, highlighting the resonance of this demand within Hong Kong. The overwhelming support for this demand indicates a profound disillusionment with the government's policies and decision-making processes, reflecting a fundamental lack of trust in Hong Kong's institutions.

This, in turn, had significant implications for the legitimacy of the government, as the crackdown fueled public anger and reinforced perceptions of authoritarianism (Tung et al., 2021).

Despite the withdrawal of the bill, protesters continued to demand genuine universal suffrage, an independent inquiry

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The arrests of activists and censorship of pro-democracy media further exacerbated the situation, contributing to the radicalisation of protesters and the escalation of confrontations with authorities.

Notwithstanding, the pandemic-induced constraints on public gatherings provided authorities with an opportunity to justify heightened control measures under the guise of safeguarding public health and safety. The enforcement of stringent lockdowns and restrictions effectively curtailed protest activities, limiting the mobilisation and organisation of activists. However, this approach also subjected the government's pandemic response to intensified scrutiny, exacerbating existing grievances and further eroding public trust and legitimacy. The perceived mishandling of the pandemic, coupled with ongoing concerns over democratic rights and freedoms, contributed to a deepening sense of discontent and reignited calls for political reform.

Furthermore, hypothesis H4 posits that the eventual intensification of government repression represented the closure of political opportunities and free spaces, ultimately leading to an abrupt decline in the movement, even though the mobilising grievances were left unaddressed. This hypothesis reflects the reality that increased repression effectively closed off avenues for protest and activism, limiting the movement's capacity to mobilise and organise. As the government tightened its grip on dissent, it became increasingly difficult for protesters to sustain momentum, leading to a decline in the movement's visibility and impact.

In alignment with hypothesis H3, the critical role of social media in facilitating the movement's growth and dissemination of information is underscored. Digital communication technologies provided a platform for protesters to assemble and share movement-related information swiftly, enabling the coordination of actions and amplifying the reach of the movement (Chan, 2022). The transformative influence of platforms like Twitter, Telegram, and LIHKG in mobilising collective action and amplifying protest movements highlights the indispensable role of social media in shaping contemporary social movements.

Moreover, the escalation of repression underscores deeper dynamics within Hong Kong's political landscape, highlighting the complex interplay between state power and popular resistance. It reveals the lengths to which authorities are willing to go to maintain control and suppress dissent, despite the enduring quest for genuine autonomy and democratic rights among the Hong Kong populace (Lee, 2021). The crackdown also sheds light on the resilience of the protest movement, which persists despite the formidable challenges posed by authoritarian control.

The introduction of the NSL The implementation of the NSL in June 2020 represents a watershed moment in the trajectory of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement, reflecting Beijing's determination to assert control and quash dissent in the region. The imposition of the law severely curtailed civil liberties and effectively brought an end to the protest movement, marking a significant setback for Hong Kong's democratic aspirations (Tung et al., 2021). The causal mechanism behind the implementation of the NSL lies in Beijing's broader strategy to consolidate its authority and suppress perceived threats to its rule, as the NSL served as a tool for Beijing to assert control over Hong Kong and maintain stability in the region.

COVID-19 The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic brought forth a new set of challenges to the ongoing 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement, fundamentally altering the dynamics for both activists and government authorities. With the escalation of confirmed COVID-19 cases, authorities swiftly implemented stringent social distancing measures and restrictions on public gatherings to curb the spread of the virus. These measures had profound implications for the protest movement, rendering traditional large-scale gatherings impractical due to the associated health risks.

In response to these challenges, activists demonstrated remarkable resilience by swiftly adapting their strategies to the evolving circumstances. Faced with restrictions on physical assemblies, protesters turned to digital platforms and innovative forms of protest, such as online rallies and virtual campaigns, to sustain momentum and ensure the issue remained prominent in public discourse (Whitworth and Li, 2020). These digital initiatives not only enabled continued engagement among supporters but also leveraged social media platforms to amplify the voices of protesters, reaching a broader audience beyond the limitations of physical protests (Su, 2022).

The implementation of the NSL marked a pivotal moment in the intensification of repression, representing a closing of political opportunities for dissent. This aligns with hypothesis H1, which suggests that the looming threat of tighter control and restrictions on political freedoms mobilised protesters in fear of future repression. Indeed, the impact of the NSL on the Anti-ELAB Movement was profound and far-reaching. The law signalled a significant tightening of control by Beijing and the Hong Kong government, marking the culmination of Beijing's efforts to quash dissent and solidify control over Hong Kong, which effectively brought an end to the protest movement that had roiled the city for over a year. The law was seen by some as a fundamental breach of the "one country, two systems" principle and signals the end of Hong Kong's

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unique status as a semi-autonomous region within China (Wang, 2023). The magnitude of the NSL’s impact on the Anti-ELAB Movement can be best evidenced by its proximity to the ending point of this paper’s timeframe: having been introduced a day before, on the 30th of June, 2020 (Curtis, 2021), the police immediately prosecuted 10 protesters for violation of the NSL in the July 1st protests in 2020 (HK01b, 2020), which, as explained previously, could bring harsh penalties to those prosecuted.

digital solidarity in challenging governmental authority (Howard et al., 2011). A similar dynamic unfolded in Hong Kong's Anti-ELAB Movement with platforms under the radar of government surveillance. There is no doubt that social media played a decisive role in the Anti-ELAB Movement, as Urman et al. (2021) have conducted network and computational text analysis on Telegram API data, and discovered “Telegram-based network was cohesive ensuring efficient spread of protest-related information” (p.1) in the Anti-ELAB Movement. This strongly evidences social media’s vital role in the movement, which answers hypothesis H3 postulating the role social media plays as a catalyst throughout the movement.

The chilling effect of the NSL diffused from offline forms of participation to online activism. As Urman et al. (2021) have found, there has been a significant decline in Telegram activity after the introduction of the NSL, notably in the discussion of current affairs and protest strategies. With even platforms like Telegram that are already “somewhat immune to online censorship” (Urman et al., 2021, p.18) succumbing to the tight grip of China, it is evident that the NSL was effective in quashing free spaces that nurtured protest mobilisation, which ultimately led to the demise of the movement, as outlined in H4.

While it's tempting to attribute the success of these movements solely to social media, Aouragh and Alexander (2011) remind us of the importance of underlying socio-political contexts: social media, despite being a powerful tool for mobilization, works within a broader ecosystem of communication channels and is influenced by the foundational issues driving unrest. In addition, as argued by Pérez-Altable & Blanco (2016), the Arab Spring was successful because the activism and support over Twitter and Facebook had a base on the ground springing up the protest, evidencing the importance of pre-existing networks and linkages in complementing online activism.

Furthermore, the enactment of the NSL sent shockwaves through the international community, raising concerns about the erosion of human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong.

The aforementioned sanctions imposed on Hong Kong governmental officials were in part motivated by the erosion of democracy and human rights the NSL represented (BBC, 2019f). The law has heightened geopolitical tensions and exacerbated divisions between China and Western democracies, which nevertheless did not translate into betterment of the level of repression China exercises on Hong Kong.

In response to the mobilisation efforts, governments in both contexts deployed various strategies to control or disrupt the use of social media by protesters. The utilisation of social media as a tool for political mobilisation has prompted varied governmental responses, highlighted by the contrasting approaches observed during the Arab Spring and the AntiELAB Movement. During the Arab Spring, regimes in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Syria resorted to drastic measures such as internet shutdowns in an attempt to curb the spread of mobilisation efforts (Storck, 2011; Howard et al., 2011). These actions, intended to disrupt the organisation and communication of protesters, not only failed to achieve their desired effect but also led to heightened international scrutiny and criticism. The shutdowns drew widespread condemnation from global human rights organisations and foreign governments, further isolating these regimes on the international stage (Dainotti et al., 2011; Khondker, 2011).

Therefore, the implementation of the NSL represents a critical juncture in the trajectory of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement, reflecting Beijing's determination to assert control and suppress dissent in the region. The law's repressive capacities severely curtailed civil liberties and effectively brought an end to the protest movement, marking a significant setback for Hong Kong's democratic aspirations and raising concerns about the erosion of human rights and the rule of law in the region.

In contrast, the Hong Kong government's strategy during the Anti-ELAB Movement showcased a more sophisticated understanding of the digital landscape. Instead of opting for internet shutdowns, which might have been impractical and counterproductive in a highly connected city like Hong Kong, the authorities employed advanced surveillance and monitoring techniques. This included the use of facial recognition technology and monitoring social media platforms to track protesters' activities and communications. Such tactics reflect a different approach that seeks to leverage technology

4.2 Comparative case study The advent of social media has significantly altered the landscape of political mobilisation and activism. Social media's impact was starkly evident during the Arab Spring when platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube became essential for coordinating protests and spreading awareness.

The Egyptian movement, catalysed by the "We are all Khaled Said" Facebook page, stands as a testament to the power of

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to undermine protest movements subtly, without the overt display of authoritarianism that might attract international condemnation.

driving them, leading to potential biases in the analysis.

Moreover, the complexity of social phenomena means that causal mechanisms are often multifaceted and interconnected, making it challenging to isolate and analyse individual factors in isolation.

This divergence in strategies underscores the evolution of governmental approaches to handling social media-fueled protests, adapting to the technological and geopolitical context of their times. While the immediate efficacy of internet shutdowns in the Arab Spring was questionable at best, it highlighted the regimes' lack of sophistication and understanding of digital mobilisation. Conversely, the Hong Kong government's tactics represent a more calculated, albeit ethically contentious, use of technology to suppress dissent without drawing the same level of direct international ire.

Nevertheless, the tactics employed by the Hong Kong government answer to H4 in how government repression has suppressed social media’s role as a free space for cultivating the movement.

Furthermore, process tracing may be limited by the scope of analysis, particularly in capturing the broader societal context and structural factors that shape the trajectory of social movements. While it provides insights into specific events and turning points, it may overlook broader trends and dynamics that influenced the movement's dynamics.

Comparative case study Although the two movements were similar in their nature of being driven by social media, certain differences cannot be overlooked.

Firstly, the two movements were different in terms of scale.

While the Arab Spring echoed widely across the Arab world and evolved into a transnational movement (Safi et al., 2021), the Anti-ELAB Movement was restricted to Hong Kong and did not diffuse to other regions/ countries. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring still provides useful insight into the role of social media as a free space for protesters to assemble and as a driving force for the Anti-ELAB Movement.

The Arab Spring and the Anti-ELAB Movement illustrate the critical role of social media in modern social movements, offering invaluable lessons on the dynamics of digital mobilisation. While these platforms have empowered activists to organise and communicate beyond the reach of traditional media and state control, they have also presented new challenges in the face of government surveillance and censorship efforts. This case study underscores the importance of understanding the interplay between technology, society, and politics to appreciate the full impact of social media on political activism. By examining the similarities and differences in the use of digital platforms across these movements, we gain insights into the evolving landscape of social mobilisation and the continuing struggle for political change in the digital age.

Secondly, the outcomes of each movement were vastly different. As the Arab Spring was a transnational movement, its effects varied across countries: some countries attained short-term democratisation by toppling the incumbent regime and replacing it with a new one through free and fair elections (Haseeb, 2012), while others experienced a period of civil wars and instability coined the “Arab winter” (Spencer et al., 2012). On the other hand, as the introduction of the NSL marked the fateful end of the Anti-ELAB Movement, the outcome of the movement could be said to be an increased government clampdown on oppositional voices and the freedoms of the general public. Nevertheless, the comparative case study still provides useful insights into the role of a free space social media throughout the movement.

5. Limitations Despite the effectiveness and suitability of process tracing and the comparative case study, there are several limitations to this methodology.

Process tracing

6. Conclusion

The first limitation lies in the reliance on available data, which may be incomplete or biased. Despite efforts to collect data from diverse sources, there may be gaps in the information, leading to potential inaccuracies or oversights in tracing causal pathways. Additionally, the quality and reliability of the data sources may vary, impacting the validity of the findings.

The rise and fall of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement represent a watershed moment in the city's history, reflecting a complex interplay of political, social, and external factors. Through process tracing and comparative case study analysis, I have explored the causes behind the movement's sudden emergence and abrupt decline, shedding light on the intricate dynamics that shaped its trajectory.

Another limitation is the subjective interpretation involved in identifying key events and causal mechanisms. Researchers may differ in their interpretations of events and the factors

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The movement's rapid rise was fuelled by a convergence of factors, including the effectuated and projected closing of political opportunities, dormant disappointment with the lack of progress in democratisation, and the catalytic role of social media. The looming threat of tighter control and restrictions on political freedoms mobilised protesters in fear of future repression, galvanising widespread opposition to perceived threats to Hong Kong's autonomy. Simultaneously, deepseated frustrations with the slow pace of democratic reforms intersected with immediate grievances, such as the proposed extradition bill, triggering mass mobilisation and demonstrations. The transformative power of social media further amplified the movement, enabling protesters to mobilise support and disseminate their message globally.

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kongprotests-explained/ [6] Amnesty International. (2019b, December 20). Sexual violence against Hong Kong protesters – what’s going on?

Retrieved September 3, 2024, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/12/sexual-violenceagainst-hong-kong-protesters/ [7] Amnesty International. (2020, July 17). Hong Kong's national security law: 10 things you need to know. Retrieved June 11, 2024, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kongnational-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/ [8] Aouragh, M., & Alexander, A. (2011). The Egyptian experience: sense and nonsense of the Internet revolution.

International Journal of Communication, 5, 1344-1358. http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1191 [9] BBC. (2019a, June 9). 逃犯條例爭議：香港爆百萬大遊 行 後爆衝突. Retrieved June 14, 2024, from https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-48571676 [10] BBC. (2019b, July 27). 香港元朗示威：抗議者與警方 衝突再起，遊行申請人被拘，24 傷. Retrieved August 31, 2024, from https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-49137877 [11] BBC. (2019c, August 12). 香港抗議：「百萬人塞爆機 場」集會致大批航班取消. Retrieved September 1, 2024, from https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-49317370 [12] BBC. (2019d, August 18). 香港再現大規模「反送中」 集會，民陣稱不滿港警「中國式鎮壓」. Retrieved August 31, 2024, from https://web.archive.org/web/20190821114132/https://www.bbc.com /zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-49386725 [13] BBC. (2019e, September 5). 林鄭月娥撤回《逃犯條例 》修例：眾口難調之舉. Retrieved September 1, 2024, from https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-49591650 [14] BBC. (2019f, November 28). 特朗普簽署《香港人權與 民主法案》 中國抨擊美國企圖「搞亂香港」. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://web.archive.org/web/20200411232653/https://www.bbc.com /zhongwen/trad/world-50582258 [15] BBC. (2019g, November 28). The Hong Kong protests explained in 100 and 500 words. Retrieved June 14, 2024, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-49317695 [16] BBC. (2020, August 7). 美國宣佈制裁 11 名中港官員， 林鄭月娥首當其衝. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://web.archive.org/web/20201109011449/https://www.bbc.com /zhongwen/trad/world-53700444 [17] BBC. (2024, March 19). Hong Kong national security law: What is it and is it worrying? Retrieved June 11, 2024, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52765838 [18] Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. University of Michigan Press. DOI:10.3998/mpub.10072208 [19] Chan, H. (2019, July 15). Over 40 arrests, 22 hospitalised in Sha Tin clashes, as police chief condemns ‘thugs’ and defends decision to storm mall. Hong Kong Free Press. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://hongkongfp.com/2019/07/15/40arrests-22-hospitalised-sha-tin-clashes-police-chief-condemnsthugs-defends-decision-storm-mall/

However, despite the initial momentum and widespread public support, the movement eventually faced an abrupt decline.

The intensification of government repression, coupled with increased restrictions on political freedoms, served as a turning point, leading to a decline in the movement's visibility and impact. Despite persistent mobilising grievances, the closure of political opportunities and free spaces and the limited effectiveness of transnational advocacy limited the movement's capacity to sustain momentum, resulting in a rapid decline.

Nevertheless, the legacy of the Anti-ELAB Movement endures, underscoring the enduring quest for justice, autonomy, and democratic rights among the Hong Kong populace. The movement has left an indelible mark on Hong Kong's political landscape, highlighting the challenges posed by authoritarian control and the resilience required to sustain grassroots movements in the face of repression.

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Conflict and Statebuilding Team II

Treading a Tightrope: ‘Good Coups’ and Democratic Resilience in Western Africa Aryaman Srivastava1 and Ozan Anday Koyaş Selçuk 1

Team Leader, Conflict and Statebuilding II

Received 31st June 2024 Published 5th January 2025

Abstract This paper aims to build on existing coup literature by evaluating the resilience of democracy induced as a result of good coups in Western Africa through a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). Through a case study analysis, we primarily evaluate the 1991 Malian coup and the 1981 Ghanaian coup, both of which cultivated fundamental democratic principles in Mali and Ghana, respectively. By applying an MSSD, we identify and comparatively evaluate the critical factors influencing fragile post-coup democracy in Mali vis-a-vis the resilient post-coup democracy observed in Ghana. We attribute Ghana’s long-term democratic resilience to the reinforcement of three key factors: the alleviation of corruption, ethnic cohesion, and external assistance by state and non-state actors (NSAs). We also find abstract factors, mainly the intentions of coup leaders, to be vital in determining a state’s long-term democratic resilience or democratic regression in the aftermath of a good coup.

Keywords: coup d'état, democratic resilience, Western Africa, corruption, ethnic cohesion, Mali, Ghana acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 269).

Conversely, the maximalist conception offers a broader definition, represented by Dahl’s conception of ‘polyarchy’, emphasising two crucial components: public contestation and inclusive participation (Dahl, 1971, p. 4). These two components of a maximalist conception of democracy form the basis of liberal democracy, which stresses the importance of “transparency, civil liberty, rule of law, horizontal accountability (effective checks on rulers), and minority rights” (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253).

1. Introduction Coup d’états, or coups, have been a dominant political occurrence since the 20th century, particularly in Africa and Latin America. Even so, coups are not a novel phenomenon.

While individuals and states have resorted to mutations of political rebellion and violence over centuries, the modern conception of coups did not formally manifest until the 17th century (Harvey, 1994). Even today, coups remain prevalent, caused by long-term structural factors such as economic inequality, poverty, and political fragmentation (Hiroi & Omori, 2013). With an emerging third wave of coups, it is compelling to evaluate how coups have fundamentally evolved in the way they impact political regimes and build on existing literature by examining how ‘good coups’ impact democratic resilience in the long run. In this paper, good coups are used interchangeably with democratic coups.

In this paper, we will consider a maximalist conception of democracy due to its explanation of the myriad facets of democracy that coups may either negatively erode or positively supplement. Using a maximalist definition, we can better understand the extent to which democracy is sustained in the years after a good coup and more effectively identify the missing components of democracy that may cause weakened democratic resilience in a given state.

To examine the conceptual interaction between coups and democracies, we must first disentangle the two concepts in isolation. Coups are efforts “by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive using unconstitutional means” (Powell & Thyne, 2011, p.

252). Democracy is a highly contested concept which has no single agreed-upon definition. The minimalist school of thought considers democracy an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals

2. Literature review To establish a fundamental basis concerning the coups analysed in this paper, we must distinguish between different

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manifestations of coups. Not all coups are necessarily military interventions, while military interventions themselves are a type of coup. Military interventions occur when the armed forces of a state threaten to stage a coup unless their demands are met (Matei, 2021). The nature of and the intentions behind their demands play a pivotal role in determining whether these coups aim to facilitate democratisation. Democratisation refers to the “initial transition from an authoritarian to a democratic state” (Thyne & Powell, 2016, p. 194). Indeed, some coups have not been entirely military-led but instead facilitated by foreign intervention, such as the 1953 Iranian coup, which saw the involvement of the CIA and British Intelligence operations to overthrow Mohammad Mosaddeq, Iran’s last democraticallyelected Prime Minister (Gasiorowski, 1987). This paper will focus on successful military coups that have encouraged democratisation.

altruistic intentions of coup leaders may facilitate the onset of a democratic transition through a coup but cannot suffice to ensure democratic resilience, for which various other factors and conditions must be satisfied.

2.1 Coups and democracy The prevailing literature on coups and democracy is extensive, with scholars from different schools of thought devising noteworthy explanations concerning the impact of coups on democracy. For the purposes of this paper, we will analyse the resilience of democracy induced in the aftermath of a good coup. However, before addressing the underlying objective of this paper, it is vital to outline the contested perspectives within the extant literature.

Existing scholarship on the relationship between coups and democracies can be categorised into two distinct schools of thought: one argues that coups inevitably lead to a decline in democracy as military leaders misuse their ascendancy to power and establish themselves as permanent regime leaders, while the other, gaining prominence more recently, suggests that coups can facilitate democratisation and cannot solely be viewed as detriments to democracy (Thyne & Powell, 2016).

Before understanding the relationship between coups and democracy, we must address the potential triggers for military coups. The motivation of state armed forces, or the military, to stage a coup might itself stem from the mistreatment of military personnel by political elites through the establishment of competing security institutions and apparatus within the state that counters the power of the military (Matei, 2021). In ethnically divided societies, ethnic conflicts and the struggle for power within military factions can also lead to reduced institutional cohesiveness among military personnel and potentially cause coups by positioning certain segments of the military against other segments of the military or government (ibid.).

Recent scholarship has increasingly correlated the frequency of coups with the genuine intentions of coup instigators to establish economic prosperity and political legitimacy (Thyne & Powell, 2016). This view has also been categorised as the ‘democratic coup’ theory, which postulates coups as “catalysts for democratisation” (Powell, 2014, p.

213). For instance, economic prosperity induces an increase in foreign trade and investment, components that are often associated with democracy. Similarly, specific scholars also perceive coups as pathways to political legitimacy by overthrowing existing, illegitimate regimes and fostering democracy (ibid.).

Therefore, the underlying causes of coups can be associated with the underlying intentions of coup leaders and the military regime in a given state. Whilst it is difficult to quantify and measure the intentions of coup leaders, the eventual causes of a coup can indicate the intentions of its coup leader, either to indefinitely hold onto power or facilitate democratic transition in response to popular opposition to the incumbent regime. The aforementioned factors of dissatisfaction within the military regime of a state due to mistreatment by the government or the imposition of restraint on its powers can influence the intentions of coup leaders to wrestle power away from the incumbent regime for their benefit.

Importantly, scholars have increasingly noted the prevalence of democratic coups, or coups inducing democratisation, in authoritarian regimes and emphasised the importance of coups as key instruments in achieving democratic transition. This perspective has been endorsed by scholars such as Collier (2009), who argues that a coup can eliminate an entrenched dictator, creating an opportunity window for democratisation and reform. On this basis, he further argues that coups are vital in ending anti-democratic policies in a state.

Similarly, in countries with widespread opposition and protests against the incumbent regime, the intentions of coup leaders may be more altruistic, aiming to fulfil the will of the people by removing the incumbent regime from power and facilitating free and fair elections to democratically elect a civilian government. In short, the intentions and motivations of coup leaders may be influenced by their levels of satisfaction with the incumbent regime and the level of satisfaction of the people. Importantly, we must note that the

Intriguingly, other strands of the extant literature on coups and democracy specifically emphasise the importance of international support and Western aid in ensuring post-coup democratisation. In the post-Cold War era, states dependent on Western aid have been considered more likely to hold competitive elections in the aftermath of a coup (Marinov & Goemans, 2013).

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Srivastava et al. span of time” (Varol, 2012, p. 299). Cumulatively, Varol (2012) classifies democratic coups based on seven key attributes stipulated in Figure 1 below.

2.2 Democratic coups and democratic resilience Traditionally, coups have been seen as threats to democracy, prompting democratic backsliding through the erosion of key democratic institutions and structures.

However, these traditional perspectives towards coups have gradually faded, with an increasing proportion of scholars affirmative about the democratising effects of coups, also known as good coups. While the extant literature does recognise the shortcomings of good coups, denoting that they do not fully democratise the state in question, there is little emphasis on the long-term resilience of democracy in the aftermath of good coups, particularly in the West African context.

Seven Key Attributes of a Democratic Coup

1. The coup is staged against a pre-existing authoritarian or totalitarian regime

2. The military is attentive and responds to popular protests and opposition to the incumbent regime

3. The incumbent authoritarian or totalitarian regime refuses to cede power and accept transition in response to popular opposition

In this paper, the vital aspect of democracy that will be considered is democratic resilience. Democratic resilience concerns the “persistence of democratic institutions and practices” (Boese et al., 2021, p. 887), measured by the continued existence of democracy without any substantial decline in the level of democracy itself or stagnation to authoritarian rule. Similarly, other scholars present democratic resilience to be achieved “where an attachment to democratic ideals persists, and such ideals continue to be canvassed in some quarters, despite hostility from the officially prescribed values and norms and apparent indifference from many elements in society” (Burnell & Calvert, 1999, p. 4). In short, democratic resilience refers to a regime’s ability to resist shocks and crises that may undermine democracy through autocratisation. A state’s democratic resilience can be measured qualitatively through visible evidence illustrating attempts to re-democratise and quantitatively through a sustained, high liberal democracy score.

4. The coup is initiated by a highly respected military within the state

5. The purpose of the military staging the coup is to remove the authoritarian or totalitarian regime

6. The military facilitates the onset of free and fair democratic elections within a short time span

7. The coup culminates with the transfer of power to a democratically-elected civilian government and leader Figure 1: Seven Key Attributes of a Democratic Coup (Varol, 2012)

Moving on, we must establish how coup leaders can create democratic resilience and strengthen the survival chances of newly established democracies, making them less susceptible to democratic regression. One of the critical factors in establishing democratic resilience is the maintenance of the people’s trust in public institutions. Crises and external shocks significantly weaken people’s trust in public institutions and undermine the values of public institutions, including “consultation, transparency, oversight, and even civil liberties” (OECD, 2023, p. 18).

To begin with, we must establish what it is about a coup that might make it democratising in the first place. Coups can be classified into two categories to consider whether they cause democratic regime change: non-democratic and democratic coups (Varol, 2012). In non-democratic coups, existing political leaders are overthrown and replaced by military officers, keeping the political system and governance style unchanged, vesting complete power within the military regime.

In this case, a coup may be considered a crisis or external shock, creating conditions that self-interested coup leaders can exploit to engage in corrupt practices and consolidate unchecked power. Therefore, the establishment of democratic resilience involves the preservation of maximum trust in public institutions, particularly during times of crises, through the prevention of corruption and the exploitation of power.

This paper will examine corruption as the primary factor eroding trust in public institutions, thus evaluating how it has reduced democratic resilience. Corruption is the “abuse of public office for private benefit” (Liu, 2016). Existing research establishes a negative correlation between democracy and corruption, with higher democracy causing reduced levels of corruption due to greater transparency and accountability of public institutions. Beyond institutional accountability, Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) argue that

Conversely, a range of attributes must be met for a coup to be classified as democratic. The overarching element to consider is the shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one through military intervention. Additionally, one must note that the military’s decision to overthrow the incumbent regime should be in direct response to persistent popular mobilisation and protests against the authoritarian regime in power. Most importantly, once the military has gained power in responding to the people’s will for change, it must be willing to “effectuate structural regime change by facilitating free and fair democratic elections within a short

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democratisation induces the ethic of corruption aversion within states. These institutional and normative factors of democratisation suppress corruption (ibid.).

the coup. Therefore, while democratisation entails transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democracy through a democratic coup, democratic resilience entails a state’s maintenance of democratic standards over the long term, resisting any shocks or threats to the status quo.

Furthermore, social cohesion is a vital factor influencing a state’s transition to democracy and its ability to maintain democratic resilience in the long run. Within existing scholarship, Stewart (2002) broadly encapsulates the lack of social cohesion through the term horizontal inequalities, referring to the prevalence of social, economic, and political inequalities along with ethnic differences leading to conflict in a given state. The prevalence of ethnic conflict due to communal divisions and social cleavages can make democratisation and the preservation of democratic standards problematic (Burnell & Calvert, 1999). Fostering democratic resilience can be problematic in deeply divided societies due to the exacerbation of social divisions through pluralism and institutionalised political competition (ibid.). Coup leaders can exploit deeply rooted divisions for political gain and the consolidation of their power indefinitely (ibid.). However, even in exceptional cases where coups may foster democratisation, the sustenance of democracy may be jeopardised by the underlying tension and dissatisfaction caused by ethnic conflict, challenging democratic political institutions and disrupting civil order.

2.3 The African context of coups Africa has long been associated with a wave of coups, mainly concentrated in the immediate aftermath of the postindependence era. On a global scale, 492 coups have been attempted since 1950, whether successful or unsuccessful (Duzor & Williamson, 2023). A total of 220 coups have been attempted in Africa between January 1950 and July 2023, including both successful and unsuccessful ones, out of which 109 were successful (ibid.). As of July 2023, this statistical figure depicts nearly 44% of coups attempted globally to have occurred in Africa, the most in any region (ibid.), illustrating the region’s fragile democracy and susceptibility to repeated coup attempts since the beginning of decolonisation in the 1950s.

Region

Coup attempts 220

Successful

Failed

109

111

Latin America

146

70

76

East Asia

49

70

76

Middle East

44

21

23

Europe

17

8

9

South Asia

16

10

6

Global

492

245

247

Africa

More importantly, economic development is crucial in establishing and preserving democratic resilience. As Lipset argues, “the more the well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset, 1959, p. 75).

Lipset’s claim has been echoed by other scholars, who have similarly concluded that a higher level of economic development correlates with higher democratic resilience when a democracy is exposed to external shocks of autocratisation. As such, foreign intervention, constituting “the transgression of a unit's realm of jurisdiction, conducted by other units in an order, acting singly or collectively” (ReusSmit, 2013, p. 1058), is one of the mechanisms through which coups can be initiated and resolved. However, foreign intervention can also be carried out by NSAs such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to provide economic and developmental assistance to jumpstart the economies of affected countries during crises like coups.

Figure 2: Global coup attempts since 1950 (Duzor & Williamson, 2023)

Ultimately, we must reinforce a clear distinction between the factors triggering democratisation through democratic coups and the attainment of democratic resilience. Democratic resilience refers to the ability of a democracy to resist stagnation into authoritarian rule. In this paper, a state’s ability to resist external shocks undermining its democracy will be evaluated based on three crucial factors: the level of trust in public institutions as measured through the extent of corruption, the prevalence of ethnic conflict within a given state, and whether the given state has experienced either statesponsored or non-state foreign intervention in the aftermath of

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Figure 3: Coup success trends between 1950 and 2010 (Powell & Thyne, 2011)

Figure 4: Military coups in different African sub-regions (Barka & Ncube, 2012)

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Furthermore, while there is existing quantitative data analysing the success of coups worldwide, there is little to no data on the frequency of good and bad coups, which denote the relative level of democratisation induced after a coup. As such, we can firmly report that successful military coups have gradually declined over the years. An attempted coup is successful “if the perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days” (Powell & Thyne, 2011, p. 252). A quantitative study by Powell and Thyne (2011) deciphering global instances of coups between 1950 and 2010 showcases a gradual decline in successful coups over time, as represented

by Figure 2, wherein successful coups peaked during the mid1960s and saw a slight upturn in the mid-1970s. However, since the mid to late-1970s, the frequency of successful coups has reduced significantly.

These coups occurred during decolonisation and postindependence due to numerous political and economic issues facing newly independent West African states. In the early 2020s, Africa experienced another wave of coups involving a significant number of West African countries such as Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso (Vines, 2024). These coups have consisted of coup leaders manipulating existing constitutions to centralise power around the military. In our study, we will specifically focus on the second and third wave of coups in relation to the democratic resilience of West African states.

3. Hypothesis and methodological approach This paper uses a Most Similar System Design (MSSD) to analyse the post-coup resilience of democracy in West Africa through a comparative case study analysis of Mali and Ghana.

By applying the MSSD, we consider “objects of research that are as similar as possible” (Anckar, 2008, p. 389) except for the eventual outcome we are interested in assessing. Coups in both cases facilitated democratisation but differed in their sustenance of democracy in the long run due to the aforementioned factors: prevalence of ethnic conflict, foreign intervention, and corruption. On this premise, the following testable hypotheses are generated.

These trends apply to all regions around the world, specifically Africa. Historically, Africa has been fraught with coups since the dawn of the post-colonial era, beginning in 1960 when most African countries achieved independence from colonial rule after the retreat of major colonial powers and post-colonial independence leaders were unable to meet the economic and developmental expectations of citizens (PSC Report, 2023). This paper focuses explicitly on West Africa, which has “developed a reputation as the coup d’état belt of the African continent” (Olukoshi, 2001, p. 1), given all countries in the region apart from the Ivory Coast and Senegal have experienced coups.

(H1): If a state experiences foreign intervention by states or non-state entities after a democratic coup, the state will become less democratically resilient in the long run.

As observed in Figure 3, West Africa has seen the highest number of coups relative to other African sub-regions, accounting for nearly half of all African coups on average between 1960 and 2012 (Barka & Ncube, 2012). The volatility of the West African region can be attributed to factors such as high levels of ethnic conflict stemming from the co-existence of diverse ethnic groups and its entrenched history of French colonial rule, a form of continued foreign intervention. It has been widely argued that French colonialism has informally continued with the prevalence of pro-France leaders and the usage of the CFA franc currency, which represents the preservation of neo-colonial ties to France and acts as a barrier to West Africa’s monetary policy autonomy, given it is overseen by the French Treasury (Signé, 2019).

(H2): If a state undergoes high levels of ethnic conflict after a democratic coup, it will have less resilient democracy in the long run.

(H3): If a state maintains high levels of corruption after a democratic coup, it is more susceptible to democratic regression in the long run.

The above-mentioned hypotheses test the core factors associated with democratic resilience, as outlined in the literature review. H1 seeks to test the impact of foreign intervention on a given state’s democratic resilience in the long run. In this paper, foreign intervention encapsulates intervention by other states and NSAs, including intergovernmental organisations and bodies such as the IMF and World Bank, that have provided extensive economic assistance to a given state, thus generating a higher possibility of resilient and consolidated democracy in the long run.

Therefore, the extreme vulnerability and political volatility of West Africa make it a suitable point of focus to examine the underlying impact of coups on the sustenance of democracy.

In the West African context, cases of good coups have been few and far between, with notable examples including the Malian coup of 1991, the Ghanaian coup of 1981, and GuineaBissau’s coup in 2003 (Derpanopoulos et al., 2016). Good coups have been rare occurrences in West Africa due to the underlying motives of coup leaders to consolidate military rule to serve their interests.

Furthermore, H2 tests and evaluates the second factor of ethnic conflict in a given state. West African states comprise a high level of ethnic diversity, which has often opened up possibilities of ethnic conflict and division, especially in terms of a state’s political structure and representation. High levels

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of ethnic conflict inevitably create greater instability and a higher possibility of coups due to discontent with the incumbent regime, thus significantly reducing the institution of democratic resilience in the long run. Finally, H3 evaluates trust in public institutions based on a state’s level of corruption after its democratic coup. Higher levels of corruption would denote reduced trust in the incumbent regime and a higher chance of public revolt against it, thereby threatening the possibility of a resilient democracy in the long run.

but has since maintained a resilient level of democracy, before pivoting to the case of Mali, which achieved successful shortterm sustenance of a high level of democracy after undergoing a good coup but subsequently failed to maintain democratic resilience in the long run.

3.1 Case selection As previously established, Africa has been prone to coups since the dawn of the post-colonial era. Specifically, West Africa has witnessed a large concentration of coups due to its high levels of ethnic division, history of foreign intervention, and underlying corruption. As a result, numerous West African states have been subject to constant political instability and a lack of democratisation. However, the case of Ghana is deviant in that it not only illustrates the process of democratisation as a result of a coup but also demonstrates a sustained level of democracy in the long run, along with little political upheaval, given it has experienced no coups since 1981. These preliminary observations are undoubtedly thought-provoking and provide sufficient reason for the further exploration of these deviant trends.

To quantitatively examine democratic resilience in the aftermath of a democratic coup, we will draw on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. As a legitimate political database, V-Dem publishes annual reports classifying the level of democracy in states worldwide and visually represents the change in the level of democracy over a period of time. In testing these three hypotheses, we will employ two indices from the V-Dem measure of democracy: the electoral democracy index and the liberal democracy index.

The rationale behind using these two indices lies in their ability to provide a holistic overview of democracy in a given state from an electoral and liberal standpoint. The electoral democracy index primarily considers the prevalence of defacto multiparty elections and evaluates the presence of free and fair elections. The liberal democracy index measures the less institutionalised side of democracy, necessitating the satisfaction of liberal principles such as personal liberties and the rule of law in addition to judicial and legislative constraints on the executive branch of government, presupposing horizontal accountability.

In building on the Ghanaian case, we pivot to the case of Mali, which reflects similar short-term effects after its 1991 coup but significantly different long-term effects in subsequent years. In short, the Malian case depicts how not all democratising coups necessarily lead to long-term democracy.

Instead, these coups may establish fragile democratic foundations highly susceptible to erosion. Hence, the MSSD is applicable to conducting a comparative analysis of these two West African countries, highlighting the missing links in the Malian case that have caused it to regress into autocratic rule and fail to sustain democracy. In this sense, the Malian case requires deep examination and is a crucial cog in uncovering the conclusive findings of this paper. However, we begin by uncovering the hallmarks of the Ghanaian case to determine the vital elements that have facilitated its resilient democracy, unlike many other West African states.

V-Dem functions on a spectrum of 0 to 1, with 0 representing a ‘highly undemocratic’ regime and 1 representing a ‘highly democratic’ regime (Herre, 2022). The rationale for using V-Dem exists in relation to its ‘omnibus’ nature, meaning that it seeks to capture all defining features of democracy. Unlike democracy measures such as the ‘Regimes of the World’ project, which categorises democracy as a binary concept, either democratic or not democratic, V-Dem not only combines a variety of democracy measures but also operates on a continuous scale, classifying the specific degree of democracy in a given state (ibid.). Moreover, as per V-Dem, a given state can be classified as an electoral democracy if it achieves a score of at least 0.5 on the electoral democracy index. To be classified as a liberal democracy, a given state must score at least 0.8 on the liberal democracy index (Lührmann et al., 2018).

4. The Ghanaian case: a hallmark of democratic resilience Ghana, like most West African states, has been a victim of numerous coups in the post-colonial era. Since achieving independence from British colonial rule in 1957, Ghana has witnessed nine significant changes in government, four of which have been coups (Guseh & Oritsejafor, 2005). Much of the post-colonial political unrest in Ghana has resulted from economic stagnation and economic crises, which led to its first coup in 1966, overthrowing the regime of Kwame Nkrumah (ibid.). Subsequently, persistently high rates of unemployment, slow economic growth, and government corruption resulted in additional military coups in 1972, 1979,

Using the MSSD and quantitative data from V-Dem, we will specifically focus on analysing and comparing the cases of Mali and Ghana. Through our investigation, we aim to gain insight into the level of democratic resilience of West African countries that have undergone good coups and the underlying factors influencing this democratic resilience. We begin by evaluating the case of Ghana, which underwent a coup in 1981

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and 1981, which saw Jerry John (J.J.) Rawlings and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) gain power (ibid.).

argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2014, p. 543).

The Ghanaian case illustrates the individuality of post-coup political developments witnessed across various African states. Unlike other states that also saw the rise of revolutionary populists, Ghana is one of the few cases that led to the consolidation of democracy, which has remarkably sustained and deepened over the past three decades. However, the aforementioned developments in the aftermath of Ghana’s last successful coup in 1981 present a dilemma: how did Ghanaian democracy proliferate under an authoritarian regime and leader?

4.1 The 1981 coup: a turning point The 1981 coup in Ghana was a crucial turning point in its transition to democracy. Rawlings had initiated the coup as part of the PNDC, leading to nearly a decade of authoritarian rule. However, the Ghanaian case provides a unique insight into how coups might not always directly induce democracy but instead can eradicate rigid authoritarian structures and overthrow existing regimes unfavoured by the people. As we will analyse further, Rawlings’ 1981 coup was a significant turning point on the path to democratic transition in Ghana, even though it established authoritarian rule, as the eventual mobilisation of public sentiment and international pressure from Western donors compelled Rawlings to amend his ideological objectives and adopt multi-party elections through a new constitution in 1992 (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017). In this sense, Ghana’s coup can be categorised as indirect and deviant, wherein the removal of the existing regime may have not eradicated withstanding authoritarianism but enabled the creation of malleable political structures and liberal policies that gradually forced the introduction of democracy, with multi-party elections held for the first time in 1992.

4.2 Popular mobilisation and international pressure: Ghana’s transition to democracy One of the significant reasons for discontent among the Ghanaian people was their relative inability to dissent against the government’s policies. Rawlings’ decision to tightly regulate dissent stemmed from repeated coup attempts in the 1980s and the nature of political instability in Ghana under previous regimes (Federal Research Division, 1995).

However, the PNDC regime under Rawlings was cognisant of the need to establish democratic institutions that allowed workers, students, and other non-governmental bodies to express their discontent with the government’s policies and hold it accountable—a fundamental tenet of liberal democracy.

To better understand how the Ghanaian coup indirectly created the conditions for democratic transition, we must understand the backdrop of the 1981 coup and the underlying motives of its instigator, J.J. Rawlings, who was a widely polarising figure in Ghanaian politics but one who indirectly and unintentionally expedited the advancement of Ghanaian democracy through his fulfilment of the Ghanaian peoples’ needs and wants.

To facilitate a shift towards democracy, Rawlings implemented a government decentralisation program, introducing district assemblies (DAs) (Federal Research Division, 1995). These measures were enacted in 1988–1989 through elections for DAs, meaning people now had greater autonomy to elect local leaders they could hold accountable for policymaking and policy implementation in their respective districts (ibid.). Once again, the mobilisation of broad sections of Ghanaian society after the 1981 coup saw more pressure on the incumbent military leadership to achieve true democracy.

Rawlings first initiated a coup in 1979 in retaliation to Ghana’s high level of corruption and economic stagnation caused by the military elite in power at the time (Haynes, 2022). After briefly holding power, he transferred power to an elected civilian government in September 1979 led by Hila Limann as part of the People’s National Party (PNP).

However, at the end of 1981, Rawlings reclaimed power through another coup against the PNP government, which he had transferred power to nearly two years prior, and established the PNDC (ibid.). Even though the 1981 coup overthrew a democratically elected government, it was facilitated due to public unrest and discontent with the democratic regime (Federal Research Division, 1995), a vital attribute of a democratic coup.

As a result, public pressure on Rawlings’ government eventually resulted in multi-party elections in 1992. Rawlings participated as one of four candidates in these elections as part of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), viewed as an off-shoot of the PNDC. The NDC proposed continuing the status quo in Ghana through its fight against corruption and drive for economic development and growth. With a large voter turnout, Rawlings emerged triumphant in the elections, winning a majority and officially becoming the democratically favoured leader of Ghanaians (Oquaye, 1995). In the next election in 1996, he was re-elected as the leader of the NDC.

Rawlings’ primary objective was to further his vision of popular democracy, or revolutionary populism (Haynes, 2022). Populism is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ vs ‘the corrupt elite’, and which

Evidently, Ghana’s coup of 1981 produced an indirect ripple effect on the state’s eventual transition to democracy.

Unlike in the cases of what scholars have increasingly coined

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as good coups, Ghana’s case did not induce democracy or competitive elections in the immediate aftermath of its coup.

Instead, it removed the existing corrupt government from power in favour of a populist and authoritarian revolution under Rawlings. Even though Ghana remained under military rule for nearly another decade, corruption was reduced, and economic reforms, although not entirely successful, were initiated through foreign aid from the IMF, among other economic, global governance institutions.

under Rawlings (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017). The phenomenon encompasses a contagion effect wherein the fall of authoritarian regimes across Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 before the eventual fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to large-scale political liberalisation and democratisation (ibid.). These events impacted political proceedings in Africa, where the rationale for banning multi-party competition no longer seemed acceptable. In essence, it was the cumulative build-up of external pressure, through the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the spread of democracy in Europe, and the internal mobilisation of civil society that pushed the PNDC and Rawlings to transition to democracy in 1992.

Importantly, unlike the traditionally conceivable scenario of coups, wherein military takeover is often misused and converted into permanent authoritarian rule, Ghana stands out as a deviant case through Rawlings’ decision to uphold the needs and wants of the Ghanaian people for true democracy, which crucially involves holding the executive branch of government accountable for its actions and decisions. A vital step to true democracy was achieved by instating the 1992 constitution that formally laid out democratic principles and restrained the government’s power, enshrining fundamental, inviolable rights and the independence of the media (Federal Research Division, 1995), among other changes.

Ultimately, Rawlings’ decision to conform to the expectations and demands of the Ghanaian people for true democracy is reflected in a public opinion poll conducted after his victory in the multi-party elections of 1991. The poll results reveal that Rawlings’ PNDC party was popular, even more than expected, in urban areas despite its authoritarian tendencies. Its popularity stemmed from its progress in improving Ghana’s infrastructure, rejuvenating lost national pride, and efficiently using government funds through the reduction of corruption (Federal Research Division, 1995).

Cumulatively, the prevalence of public demands and international pressure due to Ghana’s dependence on foreign economic aid facilitated its transition to democracy and its initiation of multi-party elections in 1992.

Furthermore, scholars have argued that Rawlings’ desire to maintain his international reputation and the influx of foreign aid to Ghana forced him to initiate a transition to democracy. Ghana’s increased dependence on aid from the IMF and World Bank forced Rawlings to adopt a model of good governance, which refers to inclusive and consultative economic development functioning under the rule of law, efficiently using resources and minimising corruption (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017). Moreover, while the World Bank did not explicitly outline any political conditionalities to be eligible to receive its aid, the fear of political conditionality and the termination of aid from these economic global governance institutions created internal pressure within the PNDC to transition to a multi-party democracy, the predominant system under which the aforementioned aspects of good governance could be realised (ibid.).

4.3 How has Ghana achieved long-term democratic resilience?

The Ghanaian case showcases unique tendencies, with the state facing no coups since 1981 and conducting smooth transitions of power through free and fair elections since its initiation of multiparty elections in 1992. These results are inconceivable for most West African states, which have consistently been victims of political instability and an underlying susceptibility to authoritarianism. Hence, it is crucial to uncover the reasons behind Ghana’s remarkable sustenance of democratic resilience and its resistance to autocratic regression after 1992.

Moreover, the effectiveness of ERPs under a democratic system would also enable the better use of resources and lower corruption due to higher levels of executive accountability. In a 1989 study by the World Bank, Africa’s developmental problems were primarily attributed to a lack of good governance and the high risk of resources, including those provided by external donors, being misguided to serve the personal interests of state actors (World Bank, 1989). Hence, the implicit fear of political conditionality mobilised Ghana’s transition to democracy after nearly a decade of military rule (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017). As stated by Nugent (1995), the costs of a crackdown seemed higher than those of implementing multi-party democracy for Rawlings.

External assistance Under Rawlings's reign, another central focus point was the resolution of Ghana’s dire economic state. To resolve this crisis, Rawlings relied heavily on external aid and assistance, presenting Ghana’s economic struggles to be a result of the exploitation caused by economic elites, referring to previous regimes. Much like other populists, Rawlings vilified the elite and presented himself as the saviour of ordinary citizens affected by the ruins of financial hardship. His vision sought to hand over power to the people previously vested in the hands of government elites, whom he viewed as torchbearers

Additionally, the demonstration effect, also called snowballing, contributed to Ghana’s transition to democracy

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of corruption and the reason for the state’s economic problems (Oquaye, 1995).

external donors. The external assistance it received facilitated the state’s success in conducting two smooth electoral turnovers of power in the 2000 and 2008 elections. For example, extensive aid from USAID and the US and UK governments helped provide technical support to the Ghanaian Electoral Commission in training voter registration officials and expanding voter education (Gyimah-Boadi & Yakah, 2013). Between 1993 and 1996, electoral transparency was also increased through external funding, which fostered the change of opaque ballot boxes for transparent ones and enabled the counting of ballots at polling stations (ibid.).

These adjustments in the electoral process were minor yet significant, cultivating greater transparency in the 1996 and subsequent elections.

Economic assistance and external intervention were crucial factors in Ghana’s transition to democracy in 1992 and its eventual sustenance of democracy. In 1983, an expulsion of nearly 1 million Ghanaians from Nigeria and a severe drought overwhelmingly strained the Ghanaian economy (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017). Consequently, Rawlings was compelled to initiate an economic recovery program (ERP) in collaboration with the IMF. Between 1983 and 1992, the IMF launched six programs in Ghana to restore Ghana’s industrial output and rectify its declining commodity exports, mainly its export of cocoa (Resnick, 2019). The ERPs aimed to remove subsidies and price controls, increase the producer price of cocoa, and liberalise trade (ibid.).

Furthermore, since 1996, external donors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), among others, have contributed to levelling the electoral playing field in Ghana through the introduction of photo identification in the electoral process, preventing the impersonation of voters (GyimahBoadi & Yakah, 2013). Moreover, funding through USAID has enabled Ghana to conduct parallel vote counts during its elections, a previously unseen occurrence in Ghanaian democracy (ibid.). Once again, H1 is disproven as foreign state and non-state intervention only strengthened Ghana’s electoral system, making it less susceptible to manipulation and thus preserving the fundamental functioning of democracy in the long run.

Additionally, the World Bank also intervened to improve the Ghanaian agricultural ministry’s ability to design and implement agricultural projects by establishing institutions such as the Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (Resnick, 2019). It also introduced the Public Investment Program in 1984, which improved road infrastructure and access to basic necessities such as water and electricity, specifically in export-producing regions (ibid.).

These instances of external assistance through the IMF and World Bank were vital in establishing the groundwork needed to establish and preserve democratic resilience after Ghana’s eventual transition to democracy, enabling the state to maximise its industrial output to foster domestic development along with maintain the livelihood of a growing Ghanaian population, under the extreme economic strain caused by the 1984 drought. In this regard, H1 is invalidated, given the intervention of non-state foreign entities in the IMF and World Bank benefited Ghana’s socio-economic stagnation, thus establishing firm conditions to maintain democratic resilience after the onset of its democracy a few years later.

Aside from achieving greater electoral transparency, external democratic assistance by partners such as Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) has contributed to developing a more robust, independent media through technical assistance. This assistance has been observed through training journalists on the processes of electoral reporting and the basis of economic journalism, along with the provision of resources to develop and support independent national media publications (Gyimah-Boadi & Yakah, 2013). For example, the National Media Commission (NMC) has received extensive external funding from FES to help train its journalists, while external bodies such as UNESCO have contributed to the establishment of community radio stations in the state (ibid.).

Cumulatively, external donor support has been crucial in strengthening free media in Ghana and enabling it to act as a vital democratic component, relaying unbiased coverage to the Ghanaian people, acting as a source of accountability towards Ghanaian political parties to restrict election fraud, and providing a platform for communication between the public and political candidates.

Notably, while many African countries such as Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia prioritised the implementation of such ERPs, their attempts to do so were at most half-hearted (Resnick, 2019). Instead, Ghana under Rawlings committed to economic reform through technocratic and authoritarian measures. These measures prevented interest groups from seizing the government’s reform agenda, while opponents of the reforms within the PNDC, those who advocated for antiausterity, were expelled by Rawlings (ibid). Hence, H1 is disproven, given economic assistance from international actors such as the IMF and World Bank not only improved Ghana’s dire economic situation but also mobilised international pressure on Rawlings to initiate multi-party elections in 1992, a critical factor in the state’s transition to democracy and its ability to sustain democracy in the long run.

Ultimately, the role of direct external assistance from state and non-state donors has played a significant role in facilitating Ghana’s transition to democracy and establishing

More importantly, Ghana’s sustenance of democracy in the aftermath of 1992 was also influenced by the role of

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democratic resilience in the period after 1992. External aid has promoted human rights, a more effective civil society, and free media. Crucially, it has contributed to smooth electoral turnovers in power by making the electoral process more transparent, reducing the scope of electoral fraud and conflict between transitions of electoral power. As quantitatively represented in Figure 5 below, the reinforcement of the core facets of democracy in Ghana, including horizontal accountability, a vibrant civil society, an independent media, and uninterrupted electoral transitions of power, is observed through a rise in its liberal democracy score from a mere 0.12 in 1992 to a high of 0.63 by the turn of the century.

highlight numerous Ghanaian governments' steadfast and proactive behaviour in preventing the conflation of ethnicity with politics. In doing so, Ghana has ensured long-term democratic resilience by conducting free and fair elections devoid of ethnic tensions, thus facilitating the smooth transition of power from one government to another.

Hence, Ghana’s introduction of legislation preventing the potential outburst of ethnic conflict validates H2, which postulates that high levels of ethnic conflict are correlated with less resilient democracy in the long run, as by curbing the possibility of ethnic conflict it has observed fewer threats to its democracy with no further coups after 1981 and thus a higher propensity to resist autocratic regression, denoting higher democratic resilience. This trend is also represented in Figure 6 below through the V-Dem electoral democracy index, which saw a significant increase from a score of 0.17 to 0.44 after the initiation of multiparty elections in 1992.

Regulated ethnic disparities As a multi-ethnic state spanning diverse ethnic groups, Ghana has regulated ethnic conflict and tensions between its myriad ethnic groups, preventing large-scale ethnic upheaval on a national level and cementing its democratic resilience.

Four main ethnic groups comprise nearly 86% of the Ghanaian population: the Akan, Mole-Dagbani, Ewe, and Ga-Dangme (Langer, 2009). Of these four, the Akans are the largest ethnic group, comprising nearly 49% of the Ghanaian population, predominantly in the Southern regions. The Akans also comprise a range of sub-groups with whom they share cultural and linguistic characteristics but ultimately do not act as cohesive units (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Similarly, the Mole-Dagbani, a Northern dominant ethnic group, constitutes nearly 23% of the population (Langer, 2009) and consists of numerous subgroups that differ in their customs and traditions.

These differences in Northern ethnic sub-groups have previously resulted in ethnic conflict and tension, albeit restricted to the local level, with little national impact (Agyeman, 1998).

However, ethnic tensions in Ghana have not been entirely absent. Despite enacting informal and formal agreements, ethnicity has still played a significant role in determining election outcomes. As per a 2005 survey, Ghanaians in three different urban areas of the state believed that one’s ethnicity influenced the possibility of attaining government jobs and contracts (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007). Even so, under the regime of Nkrumah, the promotion of national unity and the demolition of tribal and ethnic differences was prioritised.

Nkrumah advocated the creation of a Ghanaian identity by uniting the state’s diversity of ethnic groups and cultures as one, establishing what Young (1976) terms as a ‘culturally neutral state’, where no one ethnic group or culture is given higher status by the state.

Ghana’s preventive measures towards potential ethnic conflict were installed after its independence, particularly given the significant developmental divide between the Northern and Southern regions. Under the Nkrumah regime, Ghana introduced the ‘Avoidance of Discrimination Act’ in December 1957, effectively prohibiting the formation of ethnic-religious political parties seeking to stoke divisions between ethnic groups (Langer, 2009). While the ‘Avoidance of Discrimination Act’ was scrutinised at the time it was passed, it has since been recognised as a core pillar of Ghana’s subsequent constitutions of 1969, 1979, and 1992 as a means to curb political exploitation of ethnic divisions and ensure that all political parties act in favour of the national good rather than the ethnic good (ibid.).

Furthermore, within the Ghanaian political sphere, political parties informally agreed to prohibit using ethnicity in their political campaigns as part of the 2004 Political Parties Code of Conduct, a legally non-binding agreement (Langer, 2009). These political developments and preventive measures

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Figure 5: V-Dem, 2024

Figure 6: V-Dem, 2024

Figure 7: V-Dem, 2024

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Importantly, Nkrumah’s desire to instil national unity and cultural neutrality in Ghana has been effectively carried forward by his successors in subsequent Ghanaian republics.

In particular, subsequent Ghanaian governments have adopted culturally inclusive practices and symbolic gestures, such as the refusal to adopt a single local language as the state’s national language, a high emphasis on the study of its 15 major local languages, and the encouraged attendance of government representatives at significant ethnic festivals across the state (Langer, 2009). Crucially, Ghanaian governments have established an informal policy of maintaining an ethnoreligious political balance. Under the reign of Rawlings, the Northerners were over-represented relative to their demographic size. Conversely, under the regime of John Kufuor, which began in 2001, Northern ethnic groups became under-represented. This discrepancy was tackled by appointing more deputy ministers of Northern ethnic origin (ibid.). Once again, the active efforts of Ghanaian leaders, starting with Nkrumah, to achieve cultural neutrality supports H2, as by proofing itself of ethnic conflict, Ghana has seen little to no ethnic upheaval on a national level, thus preserving existing institutions and state stability. Therefore, greater social stability has resulted in greater democratic resilience.

in the resources available to ethnic groups in different parts of the state. Therefore, this higher social harmony has reduced the likelihood of ethnic conflict and consolidated higher democratic resilience through lower chances of civil disruption, thus validating H2.

Additionally, Ghana’s seamless transitions of power align with Huntington’s (1993) Two-Turnover Test (TTT), which measures the strength of a state’s democracy on the premise that it has successfully alternated power twice through free and fair elections, wherein the defeated party has solemnly accepted defeat and handed over power to the winning party.

Since 1992, Ghana has had three democratic changes in the ruling party: 2000, 2009, and 2017, where power was handed over to the winning party peacefully and without contestation (Akin & Ade, 2018). As a result, in line with H2, Ghana’s regulation of ethnic conflict has facilitated unperturbed transitions of power and created conditions for greater social cohesion, thus solidifying its democratic resilience over the long term by eliminating the possibility of fragmentation between ethnic groups despite their differences. This trend is encapsulated quantitatively by the V-Dem electoral democracy index in Figure 7, which reflects an improved electoral democracy score in 2000 and 2009 and an unchanged score in 2017, demonstrating the robustness of the Ghanaian electoral system and the prevalence of free and fair multiparty elections.

Furthermore, Ghana has successfully curbed ethnic conflict through active governmental efforts to alleviate the developmental divide between the Northern and Southern regions. As previously established, these regions constitute different ethnic groups and sub-groups but have observed starkly different levels of development. This developmental discrepancy stems from the concentration of Ghana’s essential crop resource, cocoa, and natural resources, including minerals in Southern regions (Langer, 2009). Secondly, under British colonial rule, the colonialists induced greater investment in cocoa-heavy regions in the South and gold-rich regions in Western Ghana, meaning the North was heavily neglected of significant investment and development, instead used to recruit cheap labour and workforce for the police and armed forces (ibid.).

Consequently, political transitions in Ghana have inevitably led to the over-representation or underrepresentation of certain ethnic groups. Yet, the conscious efforts of each incumbent regime to compensate for this ethnic imbalance and prevent it from impacting political decisions made for national benefit has inevitably prolonged Ghana’s democratic resilience despite its ethnic diversity, leading to ordered transitions of power during elections. The prevalence of ethnic sub-groups has also prevented the formation of a true Northern or Southern Ghanaian identity, thereby forestalling any possibility of North-South ethnic conflict, while the active efforts of subsequent Ghanaian governments to bridge the historic developmental divide between the Northern and Southern regions have also curbed any risks of ethnic conflict, thereby establishing a firm basis for resilient democracy.

To overcome this deepening developmental gap between the Northern and Southern regions, Rawlings increased government expenditure on education in the north, established better infrastructure transport links between the North and South, and initiated an “extension of the national electricity grid” (Langer, 2009, p. 538). Under the following government of Kufuor in 2001, more developmental disparities were bridged with funds from projects such as the ‘Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ (HIPC) initiative (International Monetary Fund, 2023), launched by the IMF and World Bank to support debt-ridden poor countries, redirected in more significant amounts to the Northern regions relative to the Southern ones. These initiatives have facilitated greater social harmony among Ghana’s myriad ethnic groups and subgroups by actively trying to remedy underlying discrepancies

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Figure 8: Ghana's political corruption index from 1981 to 2023 (OurWorldInData, 2024)

Figure 9: V-Dem, 2024

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Countering corruption Trust in public institutions is one of the critical indicators of democratic resilience. In the aftermath of a democratic coup, a given state must maintain trust in public institutions to ensure the people’s trust in the incumbent regime and its political decisions. However, corrupt practices by those in power, especially after an external shock such as a coup, often erode the public’s trust in the incumbent regime and may cause popular mobilisation against it. Corruption was widespread in Ghana before Rawlings ascended to power through the 1981 coup. With democratisation and the initiation of multi-party elections in 1992, Ghana established anti-corruption agencies such as the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice in 1993, the Serious Fraud Office in 1998, and the Economic and Organised Crime Office as its successor in 2010 (Nsia-Pepra, 2017).

Furthermore, while Ghanaian elections have observed seamless transitions of power, as noted by Nugent (2001), the 2000 elections were subject to corruption allegations against the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Therefore, while Ghana has democratised and, more crucially, established itself as a resilient democracy, it continues to struggle with endemic corruption. In this regard, Ghana may be classified as a resilient yet flawed democracy, evidently due to Africa’s differing conception of democracy as compared to Western liberal democracy, with elections and electoral victory based on the incentives of wealth and power rather than the notion of temporary governance and accountability to the national community (Frahm, 2018). Theoretically, the prevalence of corruption in a resilient democracy can be explained through neo-patrimonialism, which explains the use of formal state structures and institutions for private motives through clientelist networks and the overarching aim of maintaining power (ibid.).

Furthermore, Rawlings introduced crucial socio-political measures to fulfil, at least in part, his objective of leading a democratic revolution. His vision to rid Ghana of its deeprooted corruption and hand power back to the people manifested itself through the formation of People’s Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers’ Defence Committees (WDC), which were later renamed as Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) (Haynes, 2022). Unlike previously, establishing CDRs ensured that the Ghanaian people were democratically involved and had the autonomy to influence governmental decision-making processes.

Importantly, CDRs also aimed to take strict action against any form of social injustice and foster more private economic activity, which the initially established defence committees could not achieve due to a lack of clarity in their operational objectives and functioning (ibid.). These components reflect Rawlings’ progressive vision for Ghana and, more importantly, the democratic framework he sought to implement. Crucially, beyond military takeover, coups such as the 1981 Ghanaian coup depict the widespread discontentment of the people and their irrepressible power to force change Although Rawlings’ progressive policies and vision benefited Ghanaian society in the 1980s, Ghanaians demanded a transition from existing military rule to democracy.

Moreover, as represented in Figure 9 above, Ghana has failed to achieve a liberal democracy score higher than 0.64 on V-Dem, placing it below the 0.80 threshold needed to be categorised as a liberal democracy. Therefore, H3 is disproven as, despite endemic corruption in the state, Ghana has still strengthened its electoral process to an extent wherein its political system is robust, if not entirely transparent, given it has been classified as an electoral democracy by V-Dem since 1995. Once again, although corruption is a vital factor in evaluating that may dictate a state’s status as a liberal democracy, it cannot solely determine a state’s ability to sustain the fundamental components of democracy itself.

5. The Malian case: a democracy made fragile

However, it is essential to note that Ghana's political corruption levels, hovering between 0.60 and 0.63, remain relatively high in isolation. As per the National AntiCorruption Action Plan (NACAP) report, the root causes of persisting corruption in Ghana include but are not limited to institutional weaknesses, the inadequate enforcement of laws, and limited ethical commitment to values such as selfdiscipline and integrity. In encapsulating Ghana’s polar nature of deeply entrenched democracy and systemic corruption, Sandbrook (2000) aptly describes how in Ghana, “under the democratic façade the old neo-patrimonial rules of the game came to the fore. Centralization of power in the hands of the

Mali’s three decades as a democracy is an exception to the general trend of frail democracy in West Africa. Despite being situated in an economically underdeveloped, politically unstable, and impoverished region of West Africa, Mali has achieved democratisation since 1991 through the prevalence of good coups. However, the Malian case depicts how not all democratic coups necessarily lead to long-term democratic resilience, establishing fragile democratic foundations susceptible to erosion.

To understand the reasons behind Mali’s shortcomings in achieving long-term democratic resilience, we consider three factors: the levels of government corruption, the prevalence of

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ethnic conflict, and the impact of foreign intervention. Using quantitative data from V-Dem, we will observe how these factors have invariably plagued Mali’s ability to establish itself as a resilient democracy after 1991 and resist autocratisation during subsequent coups in 2012 and 2021.

established a semi-presidential system of government alongside a system of checks and balances to ensure that the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive were separated and were equally accountable to one another (UN, 1992).

Alongside a new democratic constitution, Malian democracy demonstrated its first notable sign of resilience in 1992: free and fair elections (Pringle, 2006). The prevalence of free and fair elections facilitates a state’s democratic resilience since proper elections ensure the approval of public opinion and the elite regarding how their interests are represented in political decision-making. With more faith in the democratic system, democratic institutions and norms can survive obstacles such as economic crises and political violence against the state and civilians. Alongside this democratic institution, establishing judicial courts and institutional democratic accountability provided Malians hope to prevent the abuse of power seen by the previous regime.

5.1 Malian coups (1991-2021) To trace the origins of Mali’s democratic resilience, we need to comprehend the pre-1991 context before Mali’s first democratising coup and how the events of the 1991 coup established Malian democracy. Under a socialist authoritarian regime ruled by President Moussa Traoré since 1968, social and economic problems plagued the lives of Malians and the state’s ability to fulfil their needs and demands (Matei, 2021).

Many famines occurred due to Traroé’s centralisation policies, and violence with the Tuaregs in Northern Mali was omnipresent.

With all of these institutional elements establishing democracy in Mali, we can interpret the 1991 coup as democratic, given the military initiated it against an authoritarian government and held democratic elections within a short timeframe. The aftermath of the coup was peaceful due to the cooperation between the military and the members of the new civilian government. Overall, the 1991 coup marked a democratic transition, but this transition would never fully solidify into a resilient democracy, with subsequent decades observing repeated coups and fragile governance.

With such impoverished and unstable conditions, Traroé’s regime treated any opposition with violence to maintain his rule. However, this method fueled more dissatisfaction with his regime, particularly by civil society. Labour unions, opposition groups, and student protestors, united under the ‘Alliance for Democracy in Mali’ (ADEMA), actively worked to remove Traroé from power (Passanante & Rennebohm, 2011), and soon, the military apparatus that Traroé employed to keep order began to oppose his rule.

The military was not only dissatisfied with how Traroé neglected the state’s security against separatist Tuareg and Islamist groups in the North but also with his mismanagement of the economy under failed socialist policies (Pringle, 2006).

Any further attempts to convince Traroé to adopt democratic reforms without an internal military intervention were in vain, and the democratic protests against him since mid-March 1991 did little to change his political mindset (Nesbitt & Zunes, 2009). Hence, on March 26, 1991, the Malian army, led by Colonel Touré, staged a coup against the Traroé government to induce a democratic shift (The New York Times, 1991). In the coup's immediate aftermath, Touré led Mali towards democracy as many Malians had hoped, working with opposition groups, labour unions, and other actors who contributed to establishing a democracy in favour of all Malians.

Konaré’s two presidencies (1992-2002) did effectuate a series of democratic reforms with the Tuaregs (UNHCR, 2023) and economic growth (World Bank, 2024) with the help of direct foreign investments (Bourdet, 2002). Even so, the management of his regime, much like Traroé’s, was plagued by government corruption. This corruption would weaken Mali’s democratic resilience by stoking public and military discontent with Malian democracy. Even for Konaré’s successes, many Malians were riddled with problems, such as Konaré’s reelection in 1997, which saw a lack of ballot boxes and the arrest of oppositional leaders (UNHCR, 2023).

The next president, coup hero Touré, was complacent in preventing similar levels of government corruption, instead further weakening the judiciary by allowing the bribery of judges (Chauzal & van Damme, 2015). He also issued many government policies that would disadvantage the Tuareg minority and heighten economic inequality between the Bamako elites and the Malian people (ibid.). These failures weakened Mali’s democratic resilience as the Tuareg separatist movement, excluded from the benefits of democracy, began to rise further against the Malian state. The movement believed that violent action, not political discourse, was the only way to deal with economic inequality and the lack of accountability of the Malian government.

Such a successful democratic transition occurred through the collective effort of Touré and Malian civil society to set up the provisional government (CRN) and the transitional government (CTSP). Subsequently, their interests were represented by the new constitution, implemented on January 12, 1992 (Matei, 2021). The Malian constitution established civil and political liberties, such as the freedom of thought and the freedom of the press, to enable Malians to hold the government accountable and express discontent towards any unfavourable actions. More importantly, the constitution

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The 2012 coup was initiated by the lower and middle ranks of the Malian military, who began to lose trust in the Malian government due to Touré's many policy failings (Matei, 2021). They believed democracy to be the solution, but not how the current regime imbibed it. On March 21, 2012, a group of low and middle-ranked military officers outside of Bamako mutinied, pressuring the Malian government to provide them with better resources to fight the rebels.

Subsequently, the community matured entirely into a coup, with Army Captain Sanogo overthrowing Touré and suspending the constitution (ibid.).

near Bamako against the CNSP. The May 2021 coup was organised from the inside out by the Vice President of the transitory government, Goita, who captured the heads of government using military force.

This new coup took a new turn on the state of Malian democracy. Unlike previous coups, the 2021 coup saw the military fail to transfer power to a civilian government immediately. President Goita began to pass a new constitution, shifting Mali towards a heavily authoritarian and presidential system rather than a democratic semi-presidential system (France 24, 2023). This authoritarian turn was unprecedented, and Malians' initial enthusiasm for the 2020 coup had been silenced. The 2021 coup marked the end of Mali’s hopes of democratic resilience and demonstrated its inability to sustain democracy for more than 30 years.

Despite the coup reversing an unsustainable government, the situation in the North became intolerable as Mali’s sovereignty was threatened, with Tuareg separatist and Islamic groups taking advantage of the 2012 coup. Therefore, French foreign intervention, backed by the UN, was imperative in dealing with the Northern insurgency (BBC, 2013), even after democratic rule was reinstated in 2014.

Mali’s democratic resilience was at an all-time low since the fate of its democracy was held by foreign forces, not by the forces of its democracy. The rebellions and terrorists in the North had drastically damaged its democratic resilience. Such state failure and the impact of heavy military intervention only further plunged Mali into a heavy economic crisis and compromised its capacity to satisfy the needs of Malian citizens.

The three coups in 1991, 2012, and 2021 demonstrate how Malian democracy ultimately was unable to overcome the socio-economic and political challenges and the political demands of the Malian people and the military, impeding the attainment of democratic resilience. These challenges, which the 1990 coup vowed to resolve, persisted for over two decades, destabilising Malian democracy because they weakened the Malian state’s capacity to deliver for its people’s needs. Examining the prevalence of specific factors is vital to understanding the distortions that prevented Mali's failure to achieve long-term democratic resilience.

Under pretexts similar to those of the previous two coups, Malians demanded President Keita's resignation in 2020. His government had failed to resolve Mali’s corruption issues, conflict with the Tuaregs, and the overarching inability of Malian democracy to conform to its judicial and political norms in addition to carrying out essential state functions (Fornof & Cole, 2020). Hence, another coup loomed over Mali, intending to consolidate complete military rule rather than induce democracy like the previous two coups. Colonels Konaré and Camara, among other military officers, organised a military coup in August 2020 against President Keita, who was captured and later compelled to resign from office (BBC, 2020). The constitution was suspended, and the National Assembly was dismissed. Like the military coups preceding them, the 2020 coup promised revitalised democratic institutions, a strong judicial system to prosecute corruption, and an end to decades of ineffective government (ibid.).

5.2 Mali’s three obstacles to democratic resilience As previously noted, Mali observed three common factors challenging its democratic resilience across its coups: ethnic conflict, government corruption, and foreign intervention.

This section analyses how these factors damaged Mali’s democratic resilience between 1991 and 2021 using quantitative data from V-Dem. These factors will be considered in relation to the previously posited hypotheses, based on which we will ultimately draw conclusions regarding the Malian and Ghanaian cases.

Ethnic conflict The first factor which gridlocked Mali’s democratic resilience was ethnic conflict in the form of terrorist movements, specifically the Tuareg separatists and Islamist organisations operating in the Sahel. Achieving democratic resilience in Mali required such movements to be dealt with by offering its marginalised ethnic groups and disadvantaged communities access to more resources, economic development, and integration into Malian society. It is a crucial democratic objective to equally represent and provide for all citizens, regardless of ethnicity. However, as the H2 hypothesis observes, the high level of violence precipitated by the Tuaregs and other terrorist organisations since

Yet, unlike the previous two coups, there was disagreement on how the transitory government should be implemented. The military wanted to take the transitory government into its own hands and thus reject the rule of the original coup organisers in the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), the body charged with transferring power to a new civilian government (ICG, 2021).

Consequently, even before the new civilian government could attain power, another coup was organised by a military faction

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independence primarily persisted due to the lack of negotiations between the Malian government and these organisations.

Similarly, the 1995 decentralisation policy proved equally weak in lowering ethnic conflict and establishing democratic resilience during Mali’s first decades as a democracy. The decentralisation policy aimed to afford more local autonomy to Tuareg towns in the North to meet their political demands and reverse centralised Traroé economic policies to develop the region further. Unfortunately, the decentralisation law gave the elites in Bamako the power to exploit the locally elected communes in the North (Wing, 2013). These elites prioritised themselves, stealing tax revenue from the local communes, thus depleting their resource capacity and the ability of the communes to deliver policies for their people.

This deprivation of resources was a further problem as Mali also had a weak state capacity to deliver the economic reform needed by local communes. The effect of decentralisation was significant democratic weakening as Mali could not fulfil its people's public demands.

Before outlining the ethnic tension with the Tuaregs, we must first understand how Mali is quite diversely populated, with no clear ethnic majority (MRG, 2023). There are numerous ethnic groups, notably the Tuaregs in the North, who wish to secede from the Malian Republic to establish an independent nation-state, unrestricted by the post-colonial borders of the French (Ananyev & Poyker, 2023). Mali’s ethnic diversity is seen through its high score of 84 per cent on ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (Dunning & Harrison, 2010).

Due to its diversity of ethnic groups and their often conflicting political demands with the Malian state, Mali has encountered numerous separatist groups, which have weakened its regime resilience.

Despite the origins of ethnic conflict from the colonial era, this paper will specifically consider the Tuareg problem to illustrate how Malian democracy attempted to resist ethnic conflict in the North. Leading up to the 1991 coup and the establishment of democracy in Mali, the Tuareg separatist movements sought a democratic regime to fulfil their demands for greater local autonomy, improved farming practices, and better living standards in underdeveloped Northern territories (UNHCR, 2023). Instead, the Tuaregs encountered severe repression, thus fuelling rebellion against Traoré’s regime. By failing to deliver for the Tuareg minority politically and severely repressing them, Mali’s regime resilience was destabilised. When an ethnic group is excluded from political discussion, fuelling ethnic separatist groups to gain traction, a state’s regime resilience is compromised as increasing rebellion weakens state capacity and legitimacy.

The failure of the 1995 decentralisation policy is observed through Mali’s electoral and liberal democracy indices, both of which receded in 1996 by 0.35, as seen in Figure 10 below.

The liberal democracy index dropped slightly as the minority Tuareg ethnic minority could not democratically have its demands materialise through the Malian state due to the government corruption of self-interested politicians. There was also a decrease in the electoral democracy score due to democratic deficiencies during Konaré’s reelection (UNHCR, 2023). The election was fraught with an undersupply of ballot boxes, especially in the Northern, Tuareg-populated region.

As indicated by these two indices, Mali’s democracy was hindered due to the failures of the 1995 decentralisation policy.

This hindrance of democracy also came at a further cost: the loss of state trust by the Malian people and the Tuareg ethnicity. When Malians lost trust in their state as a result of low transparency and abuse of power, this ideological shift motivated many ethnic separatists and civil society to oppose the status quo and the existing state of democracy.

After Traroé was removed from power, Konaré signed multiple peace deals with the Tuareg separatist movements in 1992 and 1995. The 1992 National Pact enabled the Tuaregs to integrate into the Malian military and guaranteed economic reforms after years of failed socialist policies under Traoré’s regime (Lecocq & Klute, 2013). In theory, if the Tuaregs’ demands were met, there would be a lower likelihood of continued violence, thus strengthening democratic resilience and reversing the assumptions of H2. Unfortunately, the 1992 National Pact was only valuable in theory since, in practice, it lacked commitment from the Konaré government (UNHCR, 2023). For this reason, the Tuareg conflict persisted into the 21st century. The lack of governmental commitment originated from societal suspicion of the Tuaregs, especially after years of conflict with the Malian state. As for the failed economic policies, the Malian government could not deliver on the economic reforms it promised, irrespective of its intention, given it lacked the fundamental resources to fulfil its promises as an impoverished state.

With such policy failures lingering into subsequent decades, the Tuareg separatist movements continued their onslaught over Northern Mali with waves of rebellions in the late 1990s and 2000s. These rebellions significantly weakened the Malian military and demonstrated the Malian regime's inability to spread democratic values to the Tuareg people.

The Malian government and the Tuareg separatist movements could not agree on granting the Tuaregs more autonomy.

Thus, future attempts at a peace deal also failed, such as in the 2006 Algerian Accords (Chauzal & van Damme, 2015). A consensus could not be reached in the Algerian Accords because certain political parties of the Malian Assembly and Touré’s government were suspicious of specific Tuareg separatist movements, as they had initiated increased insurgency in the North. As the negotiations broke down,

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Figure 10: V-dem, 2024

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Lyad ad Ghali, one of the leaders of the Tuareg separatist movement, commenced a third wave of the Tuareg insurgency in 2006.

In subsequent decades, Mali failed to control the Tuareg separatist movements’ violence despite reaching another agreement in 2015. Due to the failure of the peace deal, the 2021 coup fostered yet another opportunity for the Tuareg separatist organisations to take over Northern Mali (Al Jazeera, 2023). The Tuaregs justified this takeover through the Malian government’s previous affiliation and collaboration with the Wagner group to protect the state by counteracting the Tuaregs’ control of Northern Mali (ibid.). Cooperating with the Wagner group, a known para-military and criminal organisation, could be widely interpreted by the Tuaregs and the Malian people to violate democratic values, demonstrating a weak democracy forced to resort to undemocratic means to preserve itself.

Additionally, it is imperative to mention that not all Tuareg separatist movements acted in unison against the Malian government. Northern Mali is a mosaic of different terrorist and separatist organisations with their respective political agendas (Yusuf, 2024). Therefore, it was an added challenge for Malian democracy to negotiate with and cater to the demands of all these organisations to bring peace and stability.

Yet, due to the sheer number of interests and the inability to fundamentally fulfil them all, Tuareg rebellions up to 2012 significantly depleted Mali’s resources and military. As a result, the 2012 coup was instigated by the military due to the damaging effects of persistent rebellions on Mali’s state capacity and the ability to use its resources for the security of its people. The Tuareg rebellions further conditioned coups to occur and destabilise Malian democracy politically, reducing its democratic resilience.

Consequently, Malians again lost trust in the government, but this time due to increased military presence and the government’s failure in dealing with the gradual Tuareg takeover of Northern towns towards the 2020s (Al Jazeera, 2023). Such a loss in credence fueled the conditions for yet another coup by the military against Malian democracy.

However, unlike previously, the coup eradicated democratic resilience by passing a new military-influenced constitution to keep order in an autocratic manner.

Leading up to the 2012 coup, the Libyan crisis in January 2012 allowed Tuareg rebels to return to Northern Mali and aid the MNLA separatist movement in establishing the Azawad nation, a state created initially for the Tuareg ethnic minority, and break away from the Malian republic for a year. Even so, the MNLA was quickly overrun by jihadists operating in the Sahara, and such a change of power prompted foreign intervention and caused ethnic tensions between Malians and the Tuaregs to escalate during the Mali War (Ananyev & Poyker, 2023). This Azawadian secession was the ultimate demonstration of how ethnic conflict could eventually escalate so much as to destroy the democratic resilience of a state.

Since negotiations had not worked in previous decades, organisations like the MNLA decided to secede from the Malian Republic as Touré no longer met their demands. The influence of Islamic and ethnic separatist groups from the Sahara aided in destabilising the Malian state to the point of collapse as its military was overwhelmed and its democracy was halted for the security of the nation.

Government corruption The second factor posing a threat to Malian democratic resilience is government corruption. Government corruption has been a recurring trend during Mali’s time as a democracy since Traroé’s autocratic regime. Surprisingly, despite the initiation of democratic rule after 1991, the level of government corruption, which the 1991 coup aimed to lower, increased under Konaré’s and Touré’s presidencies.

Mali has and continues to experience government corruption, hindering its ability to sustain democracy.

Government corruption misallocates government resources necessary to initiate and maintain welfare and development programs, which form the backbone of state capacity and democracy. Numerous governmental projects, such as infrastructure projects for building roads, to counter Mali’s economic inequality and development problems were rarely completed due to government corruption (Pringle, 2006).

With a corrupt government supporting the elite at the expense of the mass public, the Malian people and the military lost trust in the incumbent regime due to their inability to hold it accountable for its actions. This sentiment would later trigger coups to amend this internal systemic issue of an untrustworthy regime.

The impact of ethnic violence on democratic resilience is represented through a decline in the electoral and liberal democracy scores as ethnic violence surged in 2012. The 2012 crisis damaged Mali’s democratic resilience much like the failed 1995 decentralisation policy, with political opposition groups like the Tuareg separatist movements posing a threat to Malian democracy due to the Malian government’s failure to accommodate their socio-economic interests. With ethnic violence instigated upon a democratic state, this exogenous shock destabilised the natural functioning of democratic institutions as the military was compelled to reduce Malians' liberties to protect them against the jihadist and Tuareg insurgency in the North.

Mali’s problem with government corruption originates from its time as a socialist autocratic regime since 1968 under President Moussa Traoré. Traoré and his party, the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UPDM), had done little to aid Mali’s development and engaged in corrupt

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practices that disproportionately benefited the living standards of the political elite at the expense of Malians’ livelihoods.

This corruption was manifested by stealing government funds initially allocated to implementing policies to solve economic inequality and national poverty (Matei, 2021). Despite retrieving aid from the IMF, Mali failed to deal with its austerity measures. With the high level of government corruption in Traoré’s government, Mali’s resources were not optimised to deal with its agricultural production, economic crisis, and political violence. This continuation of government corruption exacerbated Mali’s problems and led to a further loss of credence in the government. Thus, government corruption severely hindered Mali’s regime resilience as the people and the military started to mobilise against Traroé’s regime, aligning with H3.

manipulating the French colonial code to give themselves the power to avoid prosecution (van Veen et al., 2015).

Yet the most notable downfall of Mali’s judicial system was not institutional but informal, as politicians and judges at all levels of government received bribes to deliver political favours (Bak, 2020). Mali’s major economic industries, such as mining and agriculture, were subject to government corruption, with legal cases over land disputes offering politicians and businesses the opportunity to collude and prevent humanitarian issues in mining and agriculture from being resolved (ibid.). Due to government corruption, Mali’s ability to enforce laws and allocate resources to its communities was severely hindered (Chikwanha, 2008). With the Malian state witnessing high levels of government corruption, the democratic elements of the state were increasingly questioned by the public due to its judicial system’s inability to focus on what mattered to most Malians: alleviating economic inequality and poverty.

While Malian democracy established robust mechanisms to compel the government to uphold the values of the constitution and democracy (UN, 1992), there were no specific mentions of government corruption in the constitution. The lack of an explicit mechanism within Mali’s 1991 constitution to prohibit corruption and prosecute its culprits hurt governmental accountability and credibility.

Corruption not only restricts the ability of governments to enact policies due to a lack of funds but also creates mistrust towards the government amongst the public. The result of government corruption hurting state legitimacy can motivate counterinsurgency (Partaw, 2024) and thus weaken a democratic regime’s ability to resist political attacks.

Therefore, Mali’s lack of necessary democratic functions to counter government corruption hindered its democratic resilience.

Malian governments engaged in different forms of government corruption practices, reducing democratic resilience by causing greater discontent and public upheaval against the government’s practices. While corruption ranged from bureaucratic, public financial, and organised crime corruption, one of the major types of government corruption was grand corruption (Shipley, 2017). Grand corruption involves systemic government corruption from top to bottom, undermining government institutions, government effectiveness and the military. Most notably, under Touré’s presidential terms (2002-2012), The New York Times estimated that around 5% of the national budget was lost to government corruption.

Before analysing how government corruption lessened democratic resilience with empirical examples, we must understand the context in which Mali’s judicial system failed to prosecute government corruption effectively. Firstly, the judiciary was not centralised, constituting two separate judicial systems: the institutional legal system of the Malian state and the customary judiciary in Malian culture (van Veen et al., 2015). This lack of unison often gave the Malian people the sentiment of the institutional judiciary’s illegitimacy. Its rulings often contradicted their customary justice systems, such as the ones run by the jeliw (Chikwanha, 2008).

Under Touré’s governance, government corruption in Mali was exacerbated. High levels of corruption hindered democratic resilience by lowering people’s trust in democracy, as seen through frequent rebellions and protests led by civil society and the Malian military. The government’s lack of transparency in its actions and the state’s inability to deal with it also made people lose trust. Malian democracy allowed few to be above the law, especially regarding funding and economic policies, while international and elite funds continued to fuel Mali’s governing class, leading to increased economic inequality between the Southern and Northern provinces (Wing, 2013). Although economic inequality was considerably lowered (OXFAM, 2019) with the arrival of democratic rule, the governmental elite in Bamako still diverted some funds away from democratic functioning towards their coffers. Hence, ensuring the implementation of infrastructural developments in the state was challenging, with projects often relying on the elite's goodwill (Pringle, 2006).

This ill-governance was unsustainable for infrastructure development, and such a lack of development convinced the

This institutional judiciary was further delegitimised by its structural failings. The executive-heavy model of the Malian constitution allowed the judicial branch to be more easily influenced by partisan elites. Even if the 1992 Malian constitution made the judicial branch independent of others, the constitution also vested the President with the power to appoint judges through the high judicial council (Shipley, 2017). Such powers enabled the President and his close elite to escape conviction of government corruption by

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Malian people of the incompetence and untrustworthy character of their democracy.

2013), never intended to weaken the Malian state, their funds to strengthen the democracy were misused by the Malian government in the long run. Yet, we must note that foreign aid in the 1990s partially bolstered a period of economic growth from 1993 onwards (ibid.). For instance, Konaré’s presidency required assistance from foreign donors and partners to increase Mali’s domestic humanitarian efforts and help integrate it into the global economy.

Furthermore, through Figure 12, we can quantitatively trace how government corruption impacted democratic resilience in Mali. We can explain the minor increase in political corruption in 2016 to the disclosure of mass financial and public corruption under Keita’s government (2013-2020).

Hundreds of millions of dollars were diverted from public funds to the hands of Keita’s associates. This government corruption damaged the development of education and the economy (Al Jazeera, 2020). Such cases of government corruption also occurred under Konaré’s and Touré’s presidencies, especially during their second terms.

After the 1990s, however, the impact of economic foreign aid started to weaken Mali’s national image. When a state depends on external assistance, its legitimacy can be further questioned by other political actors who might be motivated to challenge state rule (Bergamaschi, 2014). In Mali’s case, its democracy was threatened for this exact reason: the impression that foreign actors contributed to a corrupt and illgoverning Touréan regime. The Malian regime pre-2012, under numerous corruption scandals and a lack of increased humanitarian effort, was under public scrutiny, and the adverse impact of foreign aid did not ameliorate Mali’s situation.

Throughout the three decades of Malian democracy, government corruption not only diverted funds away from implementing Mali’s national policies, especially concerning economic development, but, coupled with ineffective governance, corruption enabled the creation of an elite in Bamako. This elite centralised government funds and created a widening economic disparity between itself and the rest of the Malian public. The existence of this political elite only further angered the Malian people and caused the military to revolt (Matei, 2021). Therefore, government corruption fueled new coups, eroding any possibilities of resilient democracy in Mali.

The aid for humanitarian efforts from the West and NGOs would temporarily try to deal with Mali’s malnourished children or economically develop the North. Still, they would not advise the Malian government to reform to increase its state capacity (Bergamaschi, 2014). With a lack of commitment to structurally change the faults of Malian democracy, economic foreign aid fueled further public aggression against a state they perceived to be corrupt from external influences.

External assistance The third factor adversely affecting Mali’s democratic resilience is the overbearingness of external assistance, which will be evaluated under two key dimensions: economic aid and military intervention. Foreign intervention can occur through direct military intervention by another state or the hiring of foreign para-military groups for defence, such as the Wagner Group. Alternatively, it can manifest economically through loans and foreign aid from international organisations and donor nations.

However, foreign aid did not lead to the ultimate downfall of Mali’s democratic resilience. In fact, it was not as significant as ethnic conflict and government corruption for democratic weakening. Simply, it was a secondary aspect that fed into a crisis and instability system. Such foreign aid fed into Touré’s weak government pre-2012, and the lack of a stronger, more capable Malian state resulted in the Northern Islamist and Tuareg insurgency in 2012, bringing the Malian state close to its knees (Bergamaschi, 2014).

However, we must state that foreign aid and foreign intervention have not entirely been a net negative for Malian democracy. In 2012, foreign intervention in Mali was crucial in dealing with the Islamist takeover of towns and restoring the Malian Republic’s legitimacy in the North. Foreign aid was also essential during Mali’s health, agricultural, and social crises, enabling civil and non-governmental organisations to combat Mali’s disease outbreaks, foster agricultural innovation and tools, and lower extreme poverty rates in the North.

The same government, which could not deal with Mali’s humanitarian problems, also could not democratically integrate the demands of Tuaregs and eliminate Islamist threats in the Northern provinces pre-2012 (Chauzal & van Damme, 2015). This mismanagement of the Northern provinces would later threaten Mali’s democratic resilience, weakening the state to a point wherein it required foreign military intervention.

While the French and allied forces partook in Operation ‘Serval’ (Pech, 2023), conducting necessary military efforts and reconstruction efforts after the Northern insurgency, foreign military interventions ironically damaged Mali’s ability to defend itself and sustain itself as a democracy.

The impact of external economic assistance bore heavily on the Malian state, creating a foreign dependency to fund state activities, exacerbating government corruption and weakening state legitimacy. While Mali’s foreign donors, France, the EU, the US, and the World Bank (van de Walle,

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Figure 11: V-dem, 2024

Figure 12: OurWorldInData, 2024

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Ultimately, the reason for a failed military intervention was the emphasis on military strengthening rather than a democratic redevelopment of Mali to independently deal with political and social crises regarding economic hardship and the Tuareg question (Chauzal & van Damme, 2015).

Finally, foreign intervention also came in the form of NSAs, such as Islamist groups and international organised crime organisations destabilising Mali’s Northern region.

These NSAs posed a direct political threat to Malian democracy by operating in Mali’s Northern region to terrorise civilians and exploit the weaknesses of the Malian state. These organisations operate in many Northern towns in Mali and make up a part of the Sahara’s crime and terrorist network (Briscoe, 2014). Through this network, crime organisations and Islamic terrorist organisations could collude in illicit activities such as human and drug trafficking and the trade of weapons, all while violating human rights (ibid.). These illicit violations naturally weaken the democratic resilience of a state as they not only go against the democratic values of human rights in democracies but also undermine a state’s legitimacy and ability to protect its citizens and territory from threats to its sovereignty.

The failure of military intervention can be explained by its lack of post-conflict reconstruction of the Malian state and democracy. Foreign military intervention attempted to deal with the rebellion through military force but was unable to aid the Malian civil government’s capacity to solve its underlying problems, including economic inequality and government corruption (Gazeley, 2022). The intervening French military forces believed that Mali’s inability to deal with separatist and Islamic groups in the North stemmed from a weak military (Chauzal & van Damme, 2015). The French army considerably funded and trained the Malian army to restore the status quo. Yet this restoration eventually proved fatal for Mali’s democratic resilience as the French military simply restored the existing mal-functioning Malian state without any substantial reforms.

Therefore, in line with H1, we can postulate that external assistance and foreign military intervention weakened Mali’s democratic resilience. Its democracy could not deliver economic equality to the North and fair and equal political treatment of the Tuaregs. With such failings, Malian democracy was destined to be destabilised by rebel groups in the North and the mass mobilisation against the government’s inability to reform Malian society and constructively contribute to its development.

Amplifying the impact of the Northern insurgency, the Libyan crisis in 2012 further damaged Malian democracy.

When Gadhafi’s regime in Libya collapsed as part of the Arab Spring, numerous Northern Tuareg separatist groups who were working for him returned to Mali (DW, 2012). These additional insurgents provided benefits for the Tuaregs and other separatist groups in the North who were battling the Malian junta to cripple the government. With these insurgents from Libya, the Northern separatist and Islamist groups ravaged Northern Mali, not only destroying infrastructure in an already underdeveloped region but also damaging UNESCO-protected World Heritage tombs and artefacts. This destruction and conflict demonstrated the failure of Malian democracy in dealing with its national security issues caused by underlying ethnic negligence.

6. Key findings and comparative analysis In analysing the cases of Ghana and Mali, both states have observed divergent trends in their transition to democracy and the long-term sustenance of democracy. Their difference lies in the intentions of their coup leaders and the observed levels of government corruption, ethnic violence, and foreign intervention.

In the aftermath of the 2012 crisis, the French military’s emphasis on strengthening the military influenced the subsequent Malian government to revitalise its military operations further. President Keita’s government employed the Wagner group and a more formidable military stance against the Tuaregs. Instead of trying to use political solutions to democratically cater to the demands of the Tuaregs regarding poverty and underdevelopment, the Malian state continued to use the military to repress the Tuaregs. This was the status quo that the foreign intervention restored. The French military left the Malian state unchanged politically from previous decades, thus fostering the conditions for Mali’s democratic resilience to further deteriorate in the following years, most notably in its treatment of the Tuaregs and its ability to deliver democratic policies to combat economic equality and pursue further development.

The Ghanaian case explains how coups might not always explicitly induce democracy but instead may overthrow existing regimes unfavoured by the people, even if they are not authoritarian. Although Ghana’s case did not induce democracy in the immediate aftermath of its coup, its transition to democracy in 1992 resulted from Rawlings’ intention to abide by the people's will to contest elections, the cost of which would be lower than being forcibly removed from power. Rawlings’ re-election as a democratic leader represents the public’s contentment with his policies even under his decade-long military regime, which saw reduced corruption and the initiation of economic reforms through foreign aid from external actors. Fundamentally, Rawlings’ intention to uphold democracy in Ghana and facilitate the smooth transition of power illustrates how abstract factors such as the intentions of coup leaders are vital in determining the democratic nature of a coup. Therefore, the definition of

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democratic coups in the extant literature is insufficient and must be widened by accounting for non-measurable components.

a more robust electoral system less susceptible to political manipulation. By satisfying these two factors, Ghana has established itself as a resilient electoral democracy, witnessing seamless transitions of power in subsequent elections.

As for Mali’s democratic transition, Colonel Touré’s intentions were similar to Rawlings’ in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 coup, setting up democratic institutions and promising to deal with Mali’s economic inequality and the inefficiencies of the previous regime. Yet what led Mali to a weaker democratic resilience after the transition was the inability of Konaré, Touré and Keita to fulfil the promises of democracy. They all had a hands-off strategy in running Mali with promises to deal with economic inequality between the North and the South, and the lack of humanitarian development for agriculture and infrastructure never materialised. Furthermore, regarding upholding democratic institutions, these presidencies would often bypass the rule of law by granting their political elite access to the law and conducting elections under a lack of ballot boxes. Therefore, instead of giving the Malin people and military more pride with democracy, they viewed it through an eye of illegitimacy, fueling more protests and insurgencies against the state.

However, while Ghana’s maintenance of democratic resilience over more than four decades is an unforeseen trend, it would be imprecise to classify it as a perfectly resilient state.

Although it has successfully established mechanisms to resist external shocks through a durable electoral process and the effective regulation of ethnic divisions, it remains a flawed democracy, plagued with endemic corruption and a lack of complete transparency. Nevertheless, scholars, policymakers, and actors in the international system seeking to effectuate sustained democracy in Africa, whether internally or externally, should devise policy solutions inspired by the Ghanaian model of democracy.

7. Limitations and discussion By analysing the cases of Mali and Ghana, we deduce that not all West African countries that have undergone democratising coups have achieved sustained levels of democracy or democratic resilience. This observation uncovers the importance of considering the impact of democratic coups on a case-by-case, as although many democratising coups share mutual similarities in ridding states of authoritarian regimes, the long-term effect of this democratisation is influenced by individual features differing across countries. Therefore, H1 is proven, given that Ghana’s low levels of ethnic conflicts can be correlated with its ability to maintain democratic resilience over the years, enabling a smoother transition of power in each election cycle in addition to preventing civil unrest through the eruption of civil conflict or ethnic hierarchy in the political system itself.

More broadly, Mali’s failure to sustain democracy stemmed from structural elements. The image of an illegitimate government was generated as a result of Mali’s inability to reduce corruption below 1991 levels through a reformed judiciary, its futile efforts to resolve ethnic conflict and tension caused by the unfulfilled demands of the Tuaregs in Northern Mali through the decentralisation policy in 1995 and the Algerian accords in 2006, and the advent of foreign intervention by external actors, which invariably exacerbated its corrupt practices and deepened ethnic tension by ignoring that Mali’s problems stemmed from a lack of good governance, not strengthened military and elite. Looking at government corruption more closely, as seen in Figure 13 below, while both Ghana and Mali continue to experience high levels of political corruption, Ghana did see a marked decline in political corruption in the aftermath of democratisation in 1992, causing a widening gap in their levels of political corruption.

Similarly, H2 is validated, as, despite high levels of corruption in Ghana, the absence of ethnic conflicts and high levels of international support fostered democratic resilience.

Hence, we understand that it is not the prevalence of a single factor but rather the combination of multiple factors that is essential in eroding a state’s democratic resilience, particularly in the case of West Africa. It would be inaccurate and imprecise to claim that one particular factor is a driving force behind a state’s democratic resilience or its lack thereof.

Alternatively, our case study analysis of Ghana revealed divergent findings concerning the aforementioned factors. In contrast to Mali, ethnic tension and conflict in Ghana was regulated under subsequent Ghanaian governments through the enactment of legislation early into its post-colonial era, thus averting the conflation of ethnicity with the political process and preventing disparities in developmental efforts toward ethnic groups in different parts of the state. Secondly, unlike Mali, foreign intervention in Ghana occurred primarily to reverse economic stagnation and foster economic prosperity. As such, Rawlings’ commitment to the IMF’s ERPs and aid from other international donors played a vital role in raising funds for developmental efforts and reinforcing

However, our research has its limitations, which must be acknowledged. It is important to note that while the intentions of coup leaders are a significant factor influencing democratisation, such an abstract concept cannot be measured quantitatively, unlike factors such as corruption, which can be quantitatively measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). More importantly, the abstractness of measuring the intentions of coup leaders also means that we cannot firmly ascertain who will come to power in the case of a coup, thus making it quite difficult to predict whether a future coup

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would be democratising in nature and whether the coup leaders themselves would be willing to advance the sustenance of democracy. In this sense, the altruistic nature of coup leaders in the aftermath of a coup may ultimately determine if democratic resilience is achieved.

Design in Comparative Research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 11(5), pp. 389–401.

[7] Asante, R., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004, July). Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana.

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. https://www.unrisd.org/en/library/publications/ethnic-structureinequality-and-governance-of-the-public-sector-in-ghana [8] Bak, M. (2020). Overview of corruption and anticorruption in Mali. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

[9] Barka, H. B., & Ncube, M. (2012, September). Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d’Etat a Never-Ending Phenomenon? African Development Bank (AfDB), pp. 1–15.

[10] BBC (2013, January). Mali Conflict: UN backs France’s military intervention, World Africa, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21021132 [11] BBC (2020, August). Mali coup: President quits after soldiers mutiny. BBC. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa53830348 [12] Bergamaschi, I. (2014). The fall of a donor darling: the role of aid in Mali’s crisis. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 52(3), pp. 347–378.

[13] Boese, V. A., Edgell, A. B., Hellmeier, S., Maerz, S. F., & Lindberg, S. I. (2021, April). How democracies prevail: democratic resilience as a two-stage process. Democratization, 28(5), pp. 885– 907.

[14] Bourdet, Y. (2002). Economic Reforms and the Malian Economy. Africa Development / Afrique et Développement, 27(1/2), pp. 25–61.

[15] Briscoe, I. (2014, May). Crime After Jihad: armed groups, the state, and illicit business in post-conflict Mali, Clingendel, CRU division, pp. 1–63, https://globalinitiative.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Clingendael_Crime-after-Jihad.pdf [16] Chauzal, T. & van Damme, T. (2015, March). The roots of Mali’s conflict, Clingendel, CRU division, Sections 1-3, pp. (n. d.), https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/the_roots_of_malis_conflict/ colophon/ [17] Chikwanha, A. (2008, November). Issue Paper – Mali’s Criminal Justice System, Dulla Homar Institute.

[18] Collier, P. (2009, January). A coup for democracy. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jan/15/africaregimes-ghana-guinea [19] Coppedge, M. et al. (2011). ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach’, Perspectives on Politics, 9(2), pp. 247–267.

[20] Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press.

[21] Derpanopoulos, G., Frantz, E., Geddes, B., & Wright, J. (2016, February). Are coups good for democracy? Research & Politics, 3(1), pp. 1–7.

[22] Dunning, T., & Harrison, L. (2010). Cross-cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali. American Political Science Review, 104(1), pp. 21–39.

[23] Duzor, M., & Williamson, B. (2023, October). By The Numbers: Coups in Africa — VOA Special Report. VOA Special Reports. Retrieved May 13, 2024, from https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/

Furthermore, considering a wider array of countries within West Africa or outside of Africa altogether may have allowed for a more comprehensive discussion of how coups and democratic resilience are causally related. It may prove interesting research to perform a comparative analysis, through a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), of countries that have established democratic resilience in the aftermath of a good coup, such as Portugal. A comparative analysis of Ghana and Portugal, or any set of countries from different regions that have established democratic resilience in the aftermath of a democratic coup, would enrich this paper and its key findings. It may have also proved beneficial to consider a greater number of countries within West Africa that showed differing trends from those seen in Ghana and Mali, given that democratisation post a good coup is not binary but relatively continuous.

More importantly, Ghana’s high democratic resilience since its last coup in 1981 positions it as a deviant case, representing an unforeseen trend in West Africa. As a consequence of its deviance, while we can identify and attribute particular reasons for Ghana’s success vis-a-vis other West African states, it is unreasonable to expect these factors to be replicated in other states due to reasons specific to each state, including the nature and motivation of their coup leaders and the impact of popular mobilisation within the state to pressure an incumbent military regime to transition to democratic government. Therefore, few future implications can be drawn, based on which we can propose the replication of specific factors to achieve sustained democracy.

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[6] Anckar, C. (2008, November). On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems

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[32] Gyekye-Jandoh, M. A. (2017). The Role of the International Community in Ghana’s Democratic Transition in the 1990s. Legon Journal of the Humanities, 28(1), pp. 46–61.

[33] Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Yakah, T. (2013). Ghana: The Limits of External Democracy Assistance. In D. Resnick & N. van de Walle (Eds.), Democratic Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact of Foreign Aid (pp. 256–280). Oxford Academic.

[34] Harvey, A.D. (1994). Research note: The pre‐history of the coup d'etat. Terrorism and Political Violence, 6(2), pp. 235– 243.

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[36] Herre, B. (2022, November). The 'Varieties of Democracy' data: how do researchers measure democracy? Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/vdem-electoraldemocracy-data [37] Hiroi, T., & Omori, S. (2013, March). Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Event History Analysis. Politics and Policy, 41(1).

[38] Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Third Wave: Democratization in The Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press.

[39] International Crisis Group (ICG). (2021, May). Mali, a Coup within a Coup. Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-lecoup [40] International Monetary Fund. (2023, February). Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

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[41] Langer, A. (2009, March). Living with diversity: The peaceful management of horizontal inequalities in Ghana. Journal of International Development, 21(4), pp. 534–546.

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Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes. Politics and Governance, 6(1), pp. 60–77.

[47] Marinov, N., & Goemans, H. (2013, August). Coups and Democracy. British Journal of Political Science, 44(4), pp. 799– 825.

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[49] Minority Rights Group (MRG). (2023, October). Mali.

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Government and Opposition, 39(4), pp. 541–563.

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[64] Pringle, R. (2006, October). Democratization in Mali: Putting History to Work. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/PWOct2006.pdf [65] PSC Report. (2023, October). The evolution of coups in Africa | PSC Report. ISS Africa. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/pscinsights/the-evolution-of-coups-in-africa [66] Resnick, D. (2019). Strong Democracy, Weak State: The Political Economy of Ghana’s Stalled Structural Transformation. In X. Diao, P. Hazell, & S. Kolavalli (Eds.), Ghana's Economic and Agricultural Transformation: Past Performance and Future Prospects Ghana's Economic and Agricultural Transformation: Past Performance and Future Prospects, (pp. 49–94). Oxford Academic.

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[77] UNHCR (2023). Chronology for Tuareg in Mali, Refworld, Available at: https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230521141434/https://www .refworld.org/docid/469f38bb2.html [78] van de Walle, N. (2013, October). Foreign Aid in Dangerous Places: The Donors and Mali’s Democracy', in Danielle Resnick, and Nicolas van de Walle (eds), Democratic Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact of Foreign Aid, pp. 87–109, WIDER Studies in Development Economics, Oxford.

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Retrieved June 15, 2024, from https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/04/13/understanding-africascoups/ [83] Wing, S. (2013). Mali’s Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, pp. 1–16, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/164172/SR331_Malis_Precarious_De mocracy_and_the_Causes_of_Conflict.pdf [84] World Bank (2024). GDP growth (annual %) – Mali (1991-2002), Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end= 2002&locations=ML&start=1991 [85] World Bank. (1989). Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/49824146874284613 8/pdf/multi0page.pdf [86] Yusuf, M. (2024, February 14). Violent Extremism in the Sahel | Global Conflict Tracker. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violentextremism-sahel

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Democratic Deficit and Authoritarianism Team I

Free but not Fair? Elections in Backsliding Democracies Dániel Kovács1, Mia Zawicka, Kaya Demirolcen and Anais Vouin 1

Team Leader, Democratic Deficit and Authoritarianism I

Received 9th July 2024 Published 5th January 2025

Keywords: democratic backsliding, illiberal populism, free and fair elections, authoritarianism, civil society activism, media freedom erosion, judicial capture illiberal forces. It will then make recommendations for further, more detailed research to establish clear causal links between the identified potential factors, and the possibility of electoral success.

1. Introduction 2023 saw global freedom decline for the 18th consecutive year1. The deterioration of democracy in nations across the world has been a focus of much attention in recent years, as its presence appears to be confuting the consensus of the postCold War era and the victory of liberal democracy and its inevitable eventual universal spread. This present report focuses on a specific phenomenon contained within the global decline in freedoms: the erosion of democratic principles in established democracies courtesy of populist, illiberal incumbents. In these instances, while free and competitive elections often remain, the principle of fair competition is gradually chipped away as the ruling party develops advantages for contesting them. The report seeks to ask how parties and candidates in opposition may successfully combat such cases of democratic backsliding in the electoral arena. To that end, it will investigate electoral conditions and results in various countries that had been or are currently in a stage of democratic backsliding. It seeks to identify potential factors that have helped or hindered opposition work at electorally unseating leaders and parties who have facilitated the erosion of democracy within a nation. The report will connect existing literature and research to political developments and present country-by-country the electoral environment within the setting of a backsliding democracy. The areas covered are as follows: the electoral system, the appeal of the incumbent and the opposition to voters, the status of the judiciary, the media landscape, and the conditions for civil society. Evaluating the similarities and differences in the national contexts, the report will consequently suggest the possible factors that have enabled or hindered the electoral defeat of the incumbent,

1.1 Note on terminology Capturing the phenomenon described is not as straightforward as it may first appear: the terminology to describe instances where free, competitive elections remain in place, while at the same time democratic principles and arrangements are eroded, is not uniform and subject to considerable debate. Hybrid regimes is a frequently used designation, it has however been used varyingly as an ‘umbrella category for both democracies and autocracies with adjectives’2. Certain definitions imply that hybrid regimes cannot be classified to have either fair or free elections3; as a consequence, it is not an apt term for the report’s purposes. Flawed or defective democracy is another designation that appears in literature: coined by Lauth, it describes a concept to capture differences among states across the multiple dimensions and norms on which democracy is based4. While a valuable concept, it proves rather broad for the purposes of this report, since the continuum it places democracy on makes it harder to find a commonality by which to select case studies. Some have suggested electoral autocracy as a description. This has been defined as ‘competition […] systematically tilted in favour of the incumbent to an extent that violates even minimally democratic standards’ 5 , or as instances in which ‘electoral contests are subject to state manipulation so severe, widespread, and systematic that they do not qualify as democratic’6. While tending closer towards the phenomenon

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the report aims to capture, it still implies a nature of outright authoritarianism which would make it unreasonable to suppose free, competitive elections may take place.

Consequently, backsliding democracy, proves the most apt term for the report. As presented by Nancy Bermeo, it refers to ‘the state-led debilitation or elimination of the political institutions sustaining an existing democracy’7. It captures the notion that the decline in democratic standards in taking place in an established democracy, which makes it possible for free and competitive elections to continue even as democratic principles are weakened. Furthermore, it makes it clear that the developments are attributable to a specific party or political actor leading the government.

Hungarian PM has become a poster boy for what he styles as ‘illiberal democracy’ 12 , and Hungary has become perhaps the most commonly cited example of the erosion of rule of law 13 in a previously fully democratic country.

ISRAEL (a ‘mixed’ case) o Benjamin Netanyahu returned to the premiership after the 2009 elections in Israel and remained in power after the 2013, 2015 and 2019 elections. His coalition was defeated in 2021 but would return a year later. The ‘Bibi’ premiership has been ragged with allegations of democratic backsliding 14 , earning comparisons with the developments in Hungary and Poland15.

A specific national feature in Israel is that while in the other countries of this report, the backsliding occurs under a specific party, in Israel Netanyahu heads a coalition of numerous parties, including his own Likud.

POLAND (a ‘positive’ case) o The Law and Justice Party (PiS) came to power in 2015 and won re-election in 2019 but was voted out of power in the 2023 elections. Actions taken by PiS during its time in power were widely covered as attacks against democracy 16 and the country became a go-to example of democratic backsliding, particularly poignant due to its membership of the European Union.

•

1.2 Case selection The report investigates four frequently cited examples of illiberal populist incumbents facilitating the erosion of democratic principles. All the chosen nations have been seen a demonstrable democratic decline in democratic standards according Freedom House 8 , V-Dem 9 , and IDEA 10 , all of whose annual reports have shown worsening scores for the countries since the election of a party or leader in question.

The cases chosen illustrate a variety of electoral outcomes, with two ‘negative’ cases of an inability of the opposition to unseat the undemocratic government, one ‘positive’ case of a defeat of the facilitating party of backsliding and one ‘mixed’ case where the ruling illiberal incumbent was unseated but returned to power at the subsequent election. Beyond their variety in election outcomes, the cases also show a geographical variety as well as differing national conditions, while at the same time remaining showcasing sufficient institutional and temporal similarities to allow for reasonable comparisons and contrasts.

•

•

•

TURKEY (a ‘negative’ case) o Recep Tayyip Erdogan had been in power since 2002 in Turkey, but it was has been since his election as President in 2014 that Turkey has come to the forefront of coverage regarding heavy rule of law and democratic violations under his rule11. He has won re-election in 2018 and 2023.

HUNGARY (a ‘negative’ case) o Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party won a large majority at the 2010 elections, and have since comfortably remained in power through 2014, 2018 and 2022. The

2. Report 2.1 Electoral system • •

•

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9 Democracy Reports, n.d.

10 Global State of Democracy Reports, n.d.

11 Mai, 2023

what does the electoral system look like? are the laws and regulations characterizing the setup of elections democratic and equitable to those contesting it? does the opposition have a fair opportunity to increase its support or gain power through the electoral arena?

Amnesty International, 2018 Camut & Moens, 2023 14 Oren, 2023 15 Walker, 2023 16 The Economist, 2017

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are electoral authorities impartial with respect to parties and candidates?

Poland has a bicameral national

2.1.1

Poland.

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assembly, consisting of the lower house, the Sejm, and the less-powerful upper house, the Senate. While in the Senate a first-past-the-post system is used, for Sejm elections, which determine the upcoming government’s composition, a party-list proportional representation method is used. For a party to enter parliament it must receive 5% of the vote, while coalitions must receive 8% 17 . The most recent election in 2023 was characterised by observers as ‘competitive’, and contestants were able to campaign freely18. The electoral laws and framework in Poland provide for democratic elections, however it has been noted that the ruling PiS party did enjoy advantages due to the misuse of state resources. Changes in election administration, such as the Central Register of Voters, have been criticised for potentially skewing the electoral process. 2018 changes to the National Electoral Commission meant that employees of the body are now chosen by parliament, constituting a deliberate attempt by the then-ruling PiS to be able to install their own people in the Commission. Votes from abroad, who in 2023 mobilised to vote PiS out, were counted in a way where they only elect a candidate in a single district19.

Hungary. Hungary’s Parliament is unicameral

2.1.3

that have been taken with the clear intention of favouring the incumbent party. Fidesz-KDNP was able to make these changes unilaterally and behind closed doors, due to the two-thirds majority it attained in the 2010 election. In 2011, the size of parliament was halved, which required redistricting across the country. The resulting law created districts varying greatly in size, with larger ones tending to be opposition strongholds and the smallest in regions with greater support for Fidesz. Disparities have not been fixed over time despite it being a requirement, and by the 2022 election 25 of the 106 exceeded the standard theoretically allowed. Moreover, the 2011 changes included the abolishment of two-round elections in the constituencies, clearly favouring the largest party. Prior to the 2014 election, FideszKDNP also passed a law offering citizenship and the right to vote for ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring states. This created a new electorate numbering in the hundreds of thousands, with the ruling coalition receiving over 90% of the votes from this group in the past three elections. In addition, while these voters may use postal votes, the government has at the same time made it harder for other Hungarians abroad (who largely favour the opposition) to vote, requiring in-person voting at embassies and consulates22.

Israel. The Israeli Knesset is a unicameral body elected through a rather extreme version of PR, whereby the only limitation is that parties must pass a 1.5% threshold to receive seats. The system means that there are an unusually high number of parties represented in parliament and coalition politics is the order of the day. In general majorities can be difficult to maintain; the ruling Netanyahu government of the past decade has been a varying combination of a number of parties and the withdrawal of just one can result in the triggering of new elections of which there have been 8 in the last 15 years23. Elections have been generally perceived as free and largely fair, with a competitive political environment. The Supreme Court holds the final say in the prohibition of certain candidates and parties from running, which can be done by the Central Elections Committee if those running incite racism or support terrorism for example; within the Israeli political landscape these can be contentious judgements. A 2023 bill has attempted to nullify the Court’s authority over the

consisting only of a single house of 199 members, elected using a mixed-member majoritarian system.

Voters cast two ballots, one for their constituency (of which there are 106), and one for a party list (from which the remaining 93 seats are decided). While the party list operates on a PR system, the constituencies are first-past-the-post. For party list seats, parties must reach a 5% threshold, rising to 10% for a coalition of two, and 15% for a coalition of three or more parties 20 .

International observers have characterised elections in Hungary as ‘competitive’, with contestants ‘largely able to campaign freely’, however they also noted the ‘absence of a clear level playing field’, with a ‘pervasive overlap between the ruling coalition and the government’ 21 . While the electoral system is a capable basis for democratic elections, its current iteration is a result of changes

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CEC, but as of writing it had not yet passed. While the right to vote extends to all citizens of Israel, discriminatory provisions have been introduced towards Arab citizens, such as a new ‘basic law’ in 2018 which stated that self-determination in the State of Israel belongs uniquely to the Jewish people24.

Turkey uses a party-list proportional Turkey.

closely fought 2017 constitutional referendum itself.

Among others there has been complaints of unstamped ballot papers being counted, and opposition parties and supporters facing intimidation during the campaign and on election day32.

2.1.4

Evaluating the electoral setups of the cases in question, the characters of the Turkish and Hungarian systems appear most suited to benefit the incumbent party/president and as such the harder systems for oppositional electoral success. The lesser degree of proportionality and the higher threshold for parties to enter parliament all favour the incumbent, largest party.

Certain aspects of these systems are specifically by design through reforms, attributed to the ruling parties in question.

Uniquely from the other cases, in Turkey the presidential elections are the most impactful in determining the leadership of the country, and the necessity of a simple majority in a tworound system does issue a reasonable opportunity for the opposition to unseat Erdogan, provided it can unite behind a candidate for the run-off. On the other hand, it is also in Turkey that the most widespread accusations of malpractice at elections were reported, as well as instances of politically motivated outright bans. The Polish and Hungarian elections also faced some questions of partiality from electoral authorities, but not of the same severity, and the legitimacy of the results was not questioned. The Israeli electoral procedure has faced perhaps the least criticisms of the countries above, with little to no indication of undue bias or advantages towards parties and candidates in the campaign. On the other hand, it has faced questions over the determination of candidate eligibilities (albeit of a different nature and application compared to Turkey) and over voting rights, which were not issues in the other cases.

representation system to elect its unicameral parliament. There is an unusually high statutory threshold for parties to enter parliament at 7%, which itself was only lowered from 10% in 202225. These high thresholds have been criticised for preventing many parties from entering parliament, leading to a majoritarian system 26 . Nevertheless, the most influential elections with regards to the political leadership of the nation are not the parliamentary, but the presidential contests, which consist of two rounds in which a candidate must obtain a simple majority to be elected. This came about as a result of a 2017 Constitutional change and accompanying referendum, which transitioned the country from a parliamentary to a presidential system, with the abolishment of the prime ministerial office, and a reduction of the role of the Parliament. As a result of the reforms, the president could be openly aligned with a party, and was granted much greater powers, including the authority to issue executive decrees, appoint ministers and judges, and more control over the judiciary 27 . While the OSCE observation mission’s report from the 2023 elections characterised them as ‘competitive and largely free for most contestants’, it also noted that the incumbent president and ruling parties faced ‘an unjustified advantage’. It was further stated that the legal framework did not provide a full basis for democratic elections, containing ‘undue limitations on key rights and freedoms’ 28 . There have been instances of candidates and parties being barred from contesting elections, with clear political motivations fuelling the decisions 2930 . The administration of elections is conducted by the Supreme Election Council (YSK).

This body has faced accusations of partiality, especially following the controversial decision to annul and redo the Istanbul mayoral election in 2019, a move seen by many as politically motivated to favour the ruling party of Erdogan31. Allegations of voting irregularities and undemocratic conditions have been common at elections, including at the

2.2 Incumbents and opposition • • •

2.2.1

How popular is the incumbent government in voters’ eyes and what are the sources of this popularity?

How appealing is the opposition alternative for voters?

How fractured is the opposition, does this matter in the electoral system?

Poland.

The popularity of PiS in Poland emerged

and was sustained through a combination of cultural and economic appeals, catering to conservative, eurosceptic, religious and interventionist sentiments.

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Michaelson & Saracoglu, 2022 Euractiy, 2023 31 Gumuscu, 2024 32 Fella, 2023

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Contributing to its initial rise in the mid-2000s was the cultural insecurity post-1989 and the EU accession in 2004 which constituted a critical juncture whereby the traditionally culturally and ethnically defined ‘Polishness’ was increasingly blurring with increased secularisation and globalisation. In response, the party pursued a specific brand of populism based on identity politics, which seeks to cultivate a specific brand of acceptable ‘Polishness’, excluding those who do not conform to it; notably, on the basis of religion, sexuality, ethnicity33. The party has positioned itself as the defender of the traditional family and Christian values and culture from various threats, among them the EU, LGBTQ people, and migrants. These polarising topics struck a chord with the rather conservative Polish electorate, as they involved a clash of moral-cultural values, mapping on to some of the particularly deep division in society34. Beyond this the party had also amassed support through its economic messaging, which in some cases was even more emphasised during campaigns35. Many voters trusted PiS on socio-economic issues because it was able to deliver on some key pledges it made during the 2015 election, most notably the ‘500 plus’ child subsidy programme. In the late 2010s economic growth was strong and unemployment reduced in Poland, which increased the appeal for those voters concerned with stability and prosperity 36 . By the latest elections however, PiS had lost support in its heartlands which was ultimately key in its defeat.

High inflation, controversies over Ukrainian grain and local corruption all drove former PiS voters to move away from the party37. On top of this a number of political decisions taken by the government since 2020 further contributed to dissatisfaction with the ruling party, most notably the further tightening of an already strict abortion law, an animal protection law that many farmers saw as a threat to their livelihoods, and a general perceived mishandling of the COVID pandemic38.

The opposition's appeal varies, with the Civic Coalition generally offering a more liberal, European-oriented platform, although the party’s credibility has been damaged by its time in government. The Civic Coalition is also considered a catch-all party, which damages its standing vis-a-vis

the PiS party, which has a clear ideological position39. The opposition faces fragmentation, with new parties emerging every couple election cycles as splinters of the Civic Coalition and competing for votes. In the 2023 election cycle, it was Poland2050, started by anti-establishment TV personality Szymon Holownia, which performed well in the election but was criticised for fragmenting the opposition vote40.

Despite differences in opposition platforms, due to unprecedented social polarisation and mobilisation of civil society against the incumbents, opposition parties the Polish People’s Party, the Left, the Civic Coalition, and Poland2050 entered into an electoral agreement for the 2023 election whereby they consolidated their candidacy into one person per electoral district for the senate and agreed to govern together in a coalition in the Sejm. This was the first instance of this happening in the recent election cycles and without this agreement the opposition would not be able to govern.

In Hungary, successive Orbán Hungary.

2.2.2

governments have been successful in enacting economic reforms benefitting certain strata in society, which has been rewarded at the ballot box.

Economic recovery in the decade after the 2008 crash aided the perception of the Fidesz-KDNP government in economic matters; initially the parties had campaigned successfully at the 2010 election on a platform of ‘economic self-rule’, and they had been able to enact these promises to a certain degree, reducing external economic dependency 41 . Since coming to power, the reduction of corporate and income taxes, as well as a controversial “community work” system were also introduced, which has driven votes from certain sections of the poorest and of the middle classes42. Some economic benefits have also been timed to coincide with election seasons, such as the payment of a “thirteenth-month” pension to seniors, and the exemption of people under 25 years of age from income tax just prior to the 2022 elections43. Nevertheless, the key to the continued and stable popularity of Viktor Orbán and his FideszKDNP coalition lies beyond its economic policy. The defining aspect is the appeal of protection: building upon ultraconservative rhetoric, Orbán pushes the argument that the nation, its citizens, and its children must be protected from external evil influences such

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Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016 Szczerbiak, 2019 35 Chryssogelos, 2019 36 Szczerbiak, 2019 37 Bill, 2023 38 Szczerbiak, 2023

Putinstey, 2023 Szczerbiak, 2023 41 Pearce, 2022 42 Koenen, 2023 43 Scheppele, 2022

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as LGBTQ people and other ‘Western’, liberal influences 44 . This paternalist message purports to look out for the interests of Hungarians, which is claimed to be antithetical to the interests of liberals, greens, socialists, etc. who are claimed by FideszKDNP to answer to foreign masters45. As Hendrik Hansen summarises it “the defining feature of Orban's career has been a zeal to defend Hungary's sovereignty against foreign encroachment” 46 . The ruling party has been extremely effective at tapping into the feelings of a large section of the electorate who have felt threats to their national identity and has been able to rely on this for over a decade, as a result of smart reinventions in messaging on who the main external threats are at any given time; while a decade ago it was the migrants, by the late 2010s the messaging focused on LGBTQ issues, and most recently on the War in Ukraine. This culture war messaging resonates strongly with voters, specifically in rural areas which are overwhelmingly traditional-minded 47 , especially as the message of protection is coupled with a nostalgic, promising, and patriotic tone, using a language of national pride: ‘we are the most beautiful country, with the most beautiful language and the greatest heroes, etc.’48. To this end, another major advantage of Fidesz-KDNP is the exceptional personal charisma of Orbán himself49, who has become almost synonymous with the party and is a great political communicator.

Opposition politics in Hungary is highly fractured, with socialist, green, and conservative nationalist parties all represented, as well as the newly emerged Our Homeland Movement, which outflanks Fidesz from the right. Perhaps the strongest force is the Democratic Coalition (DK), led by former PM Gyurcsány. Due to the nature of the electoral system the opposition (except the far right) had been forced to unite and run a single candidate in constituencies if they sought any chance to defeat Fidesz. The opposition alliance often lacks credibility however, both due to the large ideological divisions among the members, as well as its leadership50. The presence of Gyurcsány is often a deterrent for anti-Fidesz but still conservative voters, while the inclusion of Jobbik, a formerly far right party, turns away some of the more

progressive voters 51 .

In short, although the opposition is in many ways forced to contest elections through an alliance, they are also unable to amalgamate their voting base and as such find it difficult to win national-level elections. In addition, they are lack the resources and network that Fidesz possesses, especially in rural areas, which vote overwhelmingly for the current party of government52.

2.2.3

Israel.

The nature of the Israeli political system

has meant that for Likud it is not only the popularity of the party which is important but also that of its allies, which over the past 15 years have been various secular and religious parties on the right-wing and far-right end of the country’s political spectrum. The main appeal of Benjamin Netanyahu has been presenting himself as the most prepared and able leader on issues of national security, an issue that trumps all other in the eyes of Israeli voters, who consistently rate it as their number one concern53. As for his coalition partners, they have benefitted from a steady shift in Israeli society over the past two decades towards more religiosity and conservatism, which has come as a result of an aggressive pursuing of the settlement enterprise in the Palestinian Territories, and the persisting Israeli-Palestinian conflict 54 . Furthermore, the Netanyahu coalitions after 2009 had achieved certain results in the economic and diplomatic sphere which provided stability, valued by voters 55 . Over the past few elections however, the personal appeal of Netanyahu as a leader has slowly been eroding – the qualities that made him charismatic to some also made him extremely divisive for others56. He has been able to turn Likud (a longstanding and successful party even before his arrival on the political scene), into a personal party through informal developments 57 .

However his egocentrism and a number of associated scandals have also driven voters away and meant an increased reliance on other parties to be able to form a government, which carries with it the danger of losing power as happened briefly in 2021-2022 58 .

The opposition, especially the left has been marginalized in recent years, partly as a result of a campaign of ‘otherization’, whereby the progressive

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Tóth-Czifra, 2024 Hockenos, 2022 46 Szakacs & Than, 2018 47 Lorman, 2022 48 Hockenos, 2022 49 Kirby & Thorpe, 2024 50 Koenen, 2023 51 Scheppele, 2022

Hockenos, 2022 Rosner, 2019 54 International Crisis Group, 2022 55 Knell, 2021 56 Moisi, 2021 57 Kenig & Rahat, 2023 58 Holmes, 2021

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camp was accused of pathological self-hatred and ‘auto-antisemitism’ 59 . Many parties within Israeli politics cater to specific social and religious groups and as such their support is tied to demographics60.

The coalition-based functioning of the system also means that just like Netanyahu, any opposition prime ministerial hopeful must also acquire a coalition behind them, and these can be just as fragile as the one led by Likud. Case in point, the last coalition that formed without Netanyahu in 2021 ended just a year later due to internal disagreements.

Turkey. In Turkey, stability in the economic and

mosque in July 2020, is a clear example of the AKP’s strategic use of Islamic symbolism. This decision reverberated strongly among conservative supporters, symbolizing a reclaiming of Turkey's Ottoman past and Islamic heritage. The reopening was not just a religious event but a powerful political statement, underscored by Erdoğan's personal involvement in the prayers, which were broadcast across the country and enhanced his image as a custodian of Islamic values. Other historically or religiously important sites were also used by Erdoğan: public rallies at the Sultanahmet Mosque have been utilized to blend religious solemnity with political rhetoric, emphasizing the unity of the nation under Islamic values. These rallies serve as grandiose spectacles that underscore the AKP's role as the defender of Islam in Turkey, directly appealing to the electorate that prioritizes religious identity.

Erdogan’s strategy’s effectiveness is amplified by the AKP’s alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which enhances the AKP’s ability to project a unified front on issues of national importance and populist policies65.

The leader of the main opposition party CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, was deeply unpopular among conservative segments of the Turkish publici and CHP was proportionaly unpopular among these segments as well. He struggled significantly due to the anti-Kurdish sentiment fostered by Erdoğan's administration, which was used to undermine his credibility by painting him as aligned with Kurdish nationalism, thus alienating nationalist voters.

Additionally, Kılıçdaroğlu's vision of a more inclusive, democratic Turkey was at odds with the prevailing authoritarian and nationalist political climate, which made it difficult for his policies to resonate with the electorate.The political landscape prior to the 2023 elections saw repeated failures by Kılıçdaroğlu and his party, the CHP, primarily due to a perceived disconnect from broader societal needs and a failure to extend beyond the traditional, secular, and nationalist base. The party was criticized for not adequately addressing the needs of the middle and lower classes, and for being too closely tied to secular elitism, which did not appeal to the more conservative or religious segments of the population.

In the 2023 elections, while Kılıçdaroğlu had the support of notable figures like Mansur Yavaş and Ekrem İmamoğlu, the broader appeal necessary for a

2.2.4

political sphere has been the selling point for Erdogan and the AKP61. Economically, the AKP has initiated substantial reforms and infrastructure projects that have directly impacted the daily lives of its constituents. The Healthcare Transformation Program revamped the Turkish health system, greatly improving the accessibility and quality of healthcare services across the nation. Similarly, large-scale infrastructure projects such as the construction of the Istanbul Airport, one of the largest in the world, and the expansion of transportation networks across the country have not only bolstered Turkey's international stature but also demonstrated the AKP's capability to modernize and develop Turkey’s infrastructure. On the educational front, the AKP has significantly increased the number of Imam Hatip schools, which specialize in religious education alongside secular curricula. This expansion caters to conservative families and embeds Islamic values in the education system, aligning with the AKP’s broader agenda of raising a "pious generation." Furthermore, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has seen its role and budget expand under AKP governance, allowing it to exert greater influence over religious life in Turkey, including the content of sermons and the administration of religious institutions62. Secondly, an emphasis on a stronger Turkey on the global stage has been an optimal course to pursue for Erdogan and the AKP in a country where national pride is felt especially strongly by citizens 63 . This has further been accompanied by the elevation of Islamic values (after almost a century of state secularism), cultivating strong support for Erdogan from conservative and religious voters64. The conversion of the Hagia Sophia from a museum back to a

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Levi & Agmon, 2021 Dolinsky, 2021 61 Kabuche, 2018 62 Gumuscu, 2024

Balci, 2023 Fraser, 2023 65 Oktay, 2020

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substantial electoral victory remained elusive. These leaders, despite their popularity in their respective roles, could not entirely compensate for the broader challenges facing the CHP, including overcoming the deep-seated mistrust among Kurdish and conservative voters. Furthermore, the party's past alignment with military and strict secular policies had historically alienated it from a significant portion of the electorate who favored a more conservative and religious approach66. Other opposition parties include IYI, a nationalist and centrist alternative to the AKP. HDP predominantly represents the Kurdish minority and has faced severe repression, with its leaders and members subject to legal challenges and accusations of terrorism. This has not only weakened the party but has also polarized its voter base, as some view the crackdown as justified security measures while others see it as political suppression. The association of HDP with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), viewed as a terrorist organization by Turkey and other countries, further complicates the party's position. The alleged connections have led to significant electoral disadvantages, as mainstream Turkish voters and other opposition parties often distance themselves from HDP to avoid the stigma of aligning with terrorism. SAADET partisi is a continuation of an older Islamist movement. There are also some smaller parties founded by defectors from AKP but they carry the baggage of their old association in the eyes of reformist voters. In the broader context of the Turkish electoral system, the fragmentation of these opposition parties matters significantly, as the system favors larger parties and cohesive alliances due to the high electoral threshold of 10% for entering the parliament. Fragmented opposition fails to present a unified front against the AKP, thereby diluting their overall impact in elections. This threshold changed for 2023 general elections, to 7%, but the problems of the opposition mentioned previously have sustained67.

following economic dissatisfaction may indicate that these material considerations are in fact the crucial elements to keeping these parties/leaders in power. In all surveyed countries the opposition was divided, although the electoral setup of Poland and especially Israel means that there this was not such a disadvantage, whereas in Hungary the quasi-forced opposition alliance has in fact damaged the appeal of the parties involved.

2.3 Judiciary

•

Is the judicial system impartial, does it play a role in elections?

The Polish judiciary suffered from its

2.3.1

Poland.

2.3.2

erosion as a democratic institution during PiS rule, with the party passing new, lower retirement ages for the Supreme Court, effectively forcing judges to step down and be replaced by party loyalists. The reforms have faced criticism from both domestic and international observers and the European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Poland68. The constitutionality of PiS’ move was questioned by judges on the Constitutional Tribunal. In 2017 a disciplinary chamber was created to handle the disciplinary sanction of judges. This chamber was led by members appointed by the Minister of Justice, who was a PiS member. Polish judges have spoken out against what they describe as the repressive activities of the chamber69. Due to the heavy resistance PiS faced in its attempt to capture the judiciary, the effects it has had on elections is difficult to assess.

Hungary. Immediately upon coming to power in 2010, the Fidesz government brought reforms in the sphere of the courts. The procedure and delegation of judges, as well as the powers of the Constitutional Court were changed, and the number of judges was increased, new ones being appointed by government.

After a short transitory period, the Court was adopted to the new rules and has since served an important role in legitimating the Fidesz regime70. These early instances of judicial capture were met with minimal protests domestically and although at the EU level concerns were raised, little to no action was taken against the Orbán government71. It is likely that its

The common thread in the appeal of the illiberal populist leaders has been their messaging revolving around the notion of ‘protection’ and ‘defense’ of the ordinary citizens from perceived external threats. In addition, the electorate of the countries in question tended to be more socially conservative which was more receptive to the traditionalist, conservative, nationalist character of the policies of these parties. It can be seen that economic stability also played a role in the incumbents’ popularities, and the loss of PiS in the elections 66

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Yavus & Öztürk, 2023 Fella, 2023 68 Freedom House, 2023

Duncan & Macy, 2020 Nóra et al., 2022 71 Than & Dunai, 2013

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2.3.3

two-thirds majority in parliament which allowed it to unilaterally push these reforms through helped in creating a perception that the reforms were legal and permissible. Moves for a wider judicial capture came after the 2018 elections (where Fidesz once again won a 2/3 majority), as the Kúria, the Supreme Court was targeted. Once again the number of judges was increased and the laws of appointment changed to ensure that the court could be packed with loyalists.

By the time of the most recent elections, Fidesz has ensured that almost all politically sensitive cases end up at a court loyal to it72.

Israel. The Polish and Hungarian cases were an

2.3.4

example for Netanyahu and upon his return to power in 2022, attempts were made within Israel to undertake a level of judicial capture. Reforms proposed at the start of 2023 included the enabling of parliament to overrule the decisions of the country’s top court 73 . The proposal of the government indicated that it sought to achieve total control over the judiciary, by selecting judges and leaders in court positions loyal to Likud. In addition, further proposals sought to reduce the power of the courts altogether, making it unable to act as a check to government power74. In response, a major string of protests erupted in Israel 75 , and as of the time of writing the institutions have been able to hold firm and strike down the reform76.

Turkey. AKP has successfully packed the Turkish

2.4 Civil society

• •

Civil society is active and strong in

2.4.1

Poland.

2.4.2

Poland, with demonstrations and other forms of engagement common. In the 2023 election cycle this was especially important as there was a massive civil society effort to consolidate the opposition into an anti-PiS social movement, led by the Civic Coalition 79 . There had been some efforts to put stricter regulation on the operation of NGOs by the PiS government, and grant money to social organisations was subject to misuse due to nontransparent procedures and manual control over state subsidies. This had meant that the governmental agency responsible for allocating funding to civil society usually gave the largest grants to organisations associated with the ruling party 80 .

Nevertheless, civil society remains a key part of the Polish political scene, with the 2016-2021 proabortion protests, being a key event in mobilising a substantial part of the population and cultivating organised protest movements as well as setting a precedent for the ineffectiveness of repression. The large voter turnout at the most recent elections (which contributed to PiS’ defeat) was in part due to the many pro-voting campaigns81.

Hungarian civil society has been Hungary.

Constitutional Court through the 2017 constitutional amendments which increased the number of judges, with the new positions filled by Erdogan appointments77. In addition, the Erdogan regime has also engaged in the outright sacking or imprisonment of judges and prosecutors, who are then swiftly replaced by loyal newcomers. It has been widely alleged that the Turkish government is using the judiciary for its own political purposes and that the decision and actions of the courts are politically motivated, among others the mass targeting of members and supporters of HDP, one of the major opposition parties78.

While attempts have been made in all four countries at capturing the judiciary the success from the ruling party has varied greatly. While in Hungary and Turkey the courts have largely been brought under the heavy influence of the government and the ruling parties, in Israel the institutional

How active is civil society in the political sphere?

Is civil society action effective and impactful?

frequently targeted by Fidesz-KDNP. The judicial capture has allowed Fidesz to take legal action through which NGOs could be attacked. For example, in 2022 more than a dozen civil society

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Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2022 Berg, 2023 74 Lurie, 2023 75 Lubell, 2023 76 Gross, 2024

Tecimer, 2019 Reuters Investigates, 2020 79 Walker, 2023 80 Civic Space Watch, 2023 81 Civic Space Watch, 2024

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organizations were fined for ‘illegally interfering with a referendum’ 82 , which in essence was these organisations encouraging voters to cast an invalid ballot in response to what they deemed an invalid question asked in the referendum. These fines and continual attacks make it more difficult for NGOs to operate in Hungary, costing them valuable time and money. The laws introduced around civil society appear to be politically motivated, such as a legislation which deemed that organisations who ‘support’ immigration should face a 25% punitive tax on donations. In recent years, legislation has targeted NGOs advocating for LGBTQ+ rights83. The most recent bill, submitted last year purports itself as a ‘defence of sovereignty’ bill, which establish an office with the powers to conduct investigations into any organization or person it deems or suspects to pose a threat, and could force them to reveal sensitive data84. In addition to legislation, the pro-government media has also routinely targeted NGOs, slandering them as ‘agents of foreign interests’ 85. The resultant environment is one in which civil society is partially muzzled and as such cannot carry out completely its role within the democratic life of the country.

Civil society in Israel has been Israel.

direction, despite the increasing social fragmentation 88 , albeit the response to the judicial reforms (large, well-organised protests) could be an indication of an emerging civil society which is now more willing and able to stand against the ruling coalition89.

Turkey. The Gezi Park protests of 2013, when

2.4.3

2.4.4

citizen groups advocating for human rights and environmental justice challenged the AKP’s agenda was a watershed moment for Turkish civil society.

The government cracked down hard on not only the CSOs involved but others as well with a series of laws that strengthened the state’s ability to suppress and prevent mass movements and protests 90 .

Another law from 2020, entitled the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism, allows the suspension of employees and halting of operations for organizations investigated for terrorism; this law has been used for political ends 91 . The political atmosphere for civil society in Turkey is best described as uncertain and fearful. Those involved described an inhibitive legal, financial, cultural and political environment, but also said that the impact of civil society is limited not only by the government but by society itself; as one interviewee put it: ‘the concept of the public interest is not fully developed in Turkey’92. Despite this there have been persistent activities carried out by CSOs in Turkey and some impacts can be observed. Debates around women’s rights in the 2023 elections arose from the efforts of NGOs, which suggests some degree of agendasetting power93.

experiencing a conflict mirroring broader trends in the country, namely tensions between a weakening liberal-humanist camp and rising conservative nationalist forces. Human rights organisations and other NGOs have routinely been attacked by the conservative forces, including some members of government. A legislative process has been undertaken which establishes differences between legitimate and illegitimate civic activism, and this has been used by the Netanyahu coalition to place pressure and restrictions on certain civil society organisations, usually those it deems critical of its policies. On the other hand, new civil society organisations are also being established which are directly friendly to the ruling parties 86. It is those NGOs associated with Palestinian rights that are the most heavily targeted, with routine harassment from the social-conservative elements of society87. What had been absent for much of the past decades from the country’s civil society has been a concrete challenge to the political authorities from this

The strength, impact, and scope of maneuverability for civil society does vary among the countries, both due to national traditions, but also deliberate interference and muzzling from the government in certain cases. Poland clearly stands out as possessing the most effective and impactful civil society despite attempts by PiS to weaken it. Widespread societal protest as a result of the anti-abortion bill were especially helpful in laying groundworks of organization that would become an effective mobiliser in the 2023 election. Similarly the large-scale protests in Israel against the proposed judicial reforms may prove to have a similar effect, but the prior existing civil society here was much less directly involved in politics as compared to Poland. Hungarian CSOs have also

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Uitz, 2022 Civic Space Watch, 2023 84 Gall, 2023 85 Civic Space Watch, 2023 86 Jamal, 2018 87 Civicus and Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations Network, 2017 88 Yishai, 2018

CBS News, 2023 Center for American Progress, Istituto Affari Internazionali and Istanbul Policy Center, 2017 91 Can, 2022 92 Center for American Progress, 2017 93 Yürekli, 2023

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been active politically, but the environment under which they operate is rather more stifling than their Polish counterparts, with Fidesz heavily and consistently targeting civil society. It is in Turkey that civil society faces the greatest repression, and perhaps consequently appears only minimally impactful in political developments, although some suggest that the weakness of civil society has more to do with the societal traditions of Turkey (in which this form of civil society plays less of a role) than the Erdogan regime itself.

2010 elections, with the incoming government passing a law that established a new National Media and Telecommunications Authority (NMHH), whose goal it was to supervise private radio, television, press and the internet. The organisation was headed up by a former Fidesz member and MP, and its council members too were all nominated and appointed by the ruling party. The NMHH is in control of frequency distribution for radios, and immediately showed bias in its deliberations, with clear preference in licencing for pro-government, right-conservative stations over left-liberal ones.

Additionally, the authority oversaw the monitoring of content, with the ability to impose large fines on breaches of the law; as the relevant regulation is deliberately fuzzy and open to interpretation, breaches became a matter of the judgement of the authority under the direction of clear Fidesz loyalists 98 . Public media institutions (seven TV channels, radio stations, and the national news agency) became managed by a newly created Public Service Foundation, under heavy influence from the ruling party. New heads and leading figures at the public broadcaster after 2010 frequently had backgrounds at openly pro-Fidesz, conservative media outlets. While in its regulations the public service broadcaster is required to have a pluralism of voice, this has not been the case in reality: after the reform, over 550 employees were dismissed and most were replaces with Fidesz loyalists 99 . Staff working at public media organisations are under political supervision, and non-compliance is punished: one journalist at the public MR1-Kossuth Radio who spoke out against the media reform in 2010 was promptly suspended100. Over the past 14 years, the political coverage of the public broadcaster has been completely disproportional, with opposition figures receiving minimal if any opportunity to appear, and the overwhelming majority of analysts and experts on programmes affiliated with conservative and pro-government organisations.

There is clear bias in the tone and extent of political coverage at the public broadcaster, with one source claiming it to be ‘nine to one in the government’s favour’. In addition, sources have said that the MTI operates a blacklist of organisations which should not be reported on, mostly NGOs and other organisations which are actively critical of the Orbán government101.

2.5 Civil society

• •

How free and independent is the media landscape?

Is there balance in the political media coverage accessible to voters?

The media landscape in Poland is diverse

2.5.1

Poland.

2.5.2

and freedom of speech provisions are generally adhered to. Citizens have access to both state owned and private news outlets, with state-owned entities and government-friendly outlets dominating coverage. While public television provides airtime to all contestants, its outright bias towards the ruling party undermines fair media representation. In the 2023 election especially, coverage of the opposition was aggressively negative, contributing to a polarised media atmosphere whereby most outlets have a clear partisan line, be it pro-incumbent or opposition94. PiS did succeed in turning TVP (the public broadcaster) into a government mouthpiece, and does have strong presence in some other media, especially in the more rural areas. However, independent media is still has strong influence and reach – the most watched news program was from the commercial TVN which is not afraid to be critical of the government95. A large factor behind the inability of PiS to achieve greater dominance in the media sphere is the continued presence of foreign owners in the market, which gives resilience to political interference96.

Hungary has plummeted down the Hungary. rankings of the World Press Freedom Index since Orbán and Fidesz-KDNP have come to power, with its scores especially poor in political indicators 97 .

The erosion of media freedom began shortly after the

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OSCE, 2023 Czuchnowski & Korzeniowska, 2022 96 Media Freedom Rapid Response, 2023 97 Reporters Without Borders, n.d.

Bajomi-Lázár, 2013 Bajomi-Lázár, 2017 100 Follath & Schult, 2010 101 Rankin & Garamvölgyi, 2022

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The conversion of the public broadcaster into a government mouthpiece was only the first step.

Subsequently, the Orbán government initiated and financed the capture of a large portion of the private media landscape too, through purchases, creations, and closures of outlets by oligarchs and elites close to the party. Media of all scale and sectors were gradually consolidated under large consortiums like Mediaworks or TV2 group, owned by figures with ties to Fidesz or Orbán himself102. Today, the proOrbán media empire exists under the umbrella of the KESMA Foundation; after its creation in 2018, most Fidesz-affiliated media owners transferred ownership to the foundation, which now consists of over 470 media outlets, including TV channels, radio stations, online sites, newspapers and magazines103.

Beyond simply having a pro-Fidesz editorial bias, at these outlets the government reportedly has direct influence, with one former CEO of HírTV having said that “the communications officers of the government told us what the party message of the week was going to be, what we should prepare for, what should be behind the programmes, whom we should interview, who should speak about what, where and what we should stress...The truth is, we were serving the regime”104. Friendly outlets have also been boosted through public money, with research from Atlatszo showing that almost 80% of revenue from state advertisements in 2019 went to pro-government media105. Through its oligarchs and business contacts, the Orbán government also sought to rein in some of the country’s most popular independent outlets. Amongst these was the transformation of origo.hu into a quasi-party newspaper, the shutdown of the long-running Népszabadság, the country’s largest newspaper 106 , and the takeover of the most widely read online news site, index107.

The impact of the Orbán government on the Hungarian media landscape has been a concerning disappearance of plurality. While independent media continues to exist and is in some sectors able to compete, in certain crucial sectors a complete proFidesz dominance has emerged, such as among regional newspapers, where all have come under the control of the KESMA affiliated Mediaworks, and often print the same headlines and stories regarding

2.5.3

national stories 108 . Fidesz media has its greatest hegemony in rural areas, where fewer channels outside of the public broadcaster (pro-government) are available and where fewer use the internet.

Surveys have shown that 70% of Hungarians still rely on TV as their leading source of news, and this number is even greater among rural citizens. The explosion of anti-immigrant sentiment in the mid2010s was likely attributable to a government campaign which was disseminated through the media109. We also see a correlation that areas with the strongest support for Fidesz-KDNP are also those where the Orbán government has achieved the strongest media dominance. While the exact impact of development of the Hungarian media landscape on voting is not straightforward to assess, what can be stated is that the Orbán government has successfully created a wide-reaching, media network through which it can disseminate information and party messaging to a huge audience, many of whom (especially in rural areas) have few other sources of information to turn to.

Israel. Freedom House’s 2024 report states that

2.5.4

the media sector in Israel is ‘vibrant and free to criticize government policy’. Although there has been some attempts by the government to support the right-wing Channel 14, in general, media outlets’ coverage depends on the commercial and political interests of their owners110. The public broadcaster (KAN) is independent and has in fact been attacked by the current government over coverage 111 .

Although media is still pluralistic, reports of increased political involvement in the workings of the media has raised questions112.

Turkey. Media and journalistic independence is limited in Turkey. The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) plays a pivotal role in shaping media content by enforcing strict regulations that often targeted media outlets critical of the government. For instance, RTÜK imposed fines and temporary broadcasting bans on independent channels like Halk TV and Tele1, particularly for their coverage of sensitive political topics or government handling of public crises. These channels were accused of spreading "fear and panic" with their coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, which RTÜK claimed could potentially destabilize

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Bátorfy, 2019 Human Rights Watch, 2024 104 Médiapiac, 2016 105 Bátorfy, & Szabó, 2020 106 BBC News, 2016 107 Szalai, 2021

Bátorfy, 2020 Bajomi-Lázár, 2017 110 Freedom House, 2024 111 EBU, 2023 112 Center for Media, Data, and Society, 2021

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•

public order. This selective enforcement of broadcasting rules demonstrates RTÜK's role in curbing dissent and maintaining a media narrative favorable to the government. The government's strategy to control the narrative extended beyond regulatory measures to include financial and ownership control over media outlets. Many of these media companies were either directly owned by government-affiliated corporations or dependent on government advertising spending, which served as a financial lifeline. This economic leverage was effectively used to ensure media compliance with government directives, promoting favorable coverage of government actions and policies while marginalizing or silencing critical voices. This form of control was particularly evident in the coverage of economic policies and governmental achievements, where media outlets disproportionately highlighted positive outcomes without offering critical scrutiny113. Over the past decade journalists critical of the government have been arrested on multiple occasions. The government has also expanded its ability to control and censor online discourse. The most impactful reforms have been timed with events to justify their introduction, such as the Gezi Park protests in 2013 or the 2016 Coup Attempt114.

•

•

•

It is this topic on which the countries investigated perhaps vary the most. While the Turkish, Polish, and Hungarian regimes all succeeded in turning the public broadcaster into a government mouthpiece media, major similarities end there.

Threat of arrest and imprisonment for journalists is not the case in Hungary and Poland. Similarly Poland and Hungary also have significant differences. While in Hungary the party colonization of the media has largely been completed and Fidesz-friendly media dominates much of the landscape, in Poland this outcome has been prevented by the continual presence of foreign owners in the media market, whose outlets are in fact the most widely watched sources of information.

Israel is a relative outlier as the public broadcaster remains independent, and prior to 2023 the government had only made faint attempts at influencing the media landscape, which continues to be pluralistic.

•

All investigated populist parties or leaders appealed to nationalist, conservative sentiments, but also built on economic stability o Positioned themselves as a defender against external threats, specified to the country (e.g. immigrants for Orbán, Palestinians for Netanyahu) The opposition is divided in all cases; this is a greater problem in Hungary than other countries however as the electoral system necessitates greater cooperation The major difference between Poland (the ‘positive’ case) and Turkey + Hungary (the ‘negative’ cases), has been the depth of entrenchment of the ruling party. Fidesz and AKP had more, and better legitimacy to enact the reforms which eventually consolidated their power. The level of entrenchment interlinks the structures prone to democratic erosion like the judiciary, media, and civil society. The more one of them can be taken under the ruling party’s control, the easier it is to subdue the others. o Summarized one-sentence statement of findings: the greater the entrenchment of the ruling party in state and societal institutions, the harder and less likely it is that the opposition can succeed in unseating it through electoral means Turkey differs from the other cases in being the only one with widespread allegations of electoral malpractice and the manipulation of results. In addition, arrest, imprisonment, and physical harm to opposition politicians, activists, and journalists has not happened in the other countries observed o Implication being that Turkey is much further along the democratic backsliding path than the other nations Israel provides certain interesting comparisons, but as a whole is a misfit in this group – much of the backsliding is not regarding institutions and elections, but with regards to the rights of Palestinians and those who advocate for them

3.2 Recommendations for future possible research •

3. Summary and recommendations 3.1 Main observations

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A deeper look into the manners in which civil society can play a role in electoral outcomes: our only positive case was also the country with the most vibrant and active civil society in the political sphere how specifically could/did CSOs influence the voting decisions in the 2023 Polish elections?

Yesil, 2014

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[11] Bill, S. (2023). How PiS lost power in its heartland. Notes from Poland. [online] 30 Oct. Available at: https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/10/30/how-pis-lost-powerin-its-heartland/.

Precise impacts of state media colonization on voters – how much do they register a shifting media landscape and to what extent does the media one consumes influence vote choice, or do viewers of pro-populist channels watch precisely because it aligns with their pre-existing views?

Should, and if so how can, outside actors aid in combating democratic backsliding in cases where domestic attempts have proved unsuccessful?

[12] Bogaards, M. (2009). How to classify hybrid regimes?

Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism.

Democratization, 16(2), pp.399–423.

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