and the Build-up of the Egyptian Navy Jordan: In between the Gulf

STEP BY STEP: CAIRO’S MARITIME AMBITIONS AND THE BUILD-UP OF THE EGYPTIAN NAVY

Lukács Krajcsír

It has been well known for years that the Levant Basin—the waters of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey—contains circa 122.4 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas.1 Cairo has worked with other regional players to create a new multilateral framework and to promote a new regional pattern for economic cooperation, informal dialogue, and political interdependence to overcome the existing fault lines in the wider Mediterranean facing quite a few power struggles.2 In recent years, several cooperation agreements among Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and Israel, e.g., on the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones, have been signed. One of the biggest achievements was the establishment of the international body of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMFG) in January 2020, headquartered in Cairo. The members of the so-called “OPEC of Mediterranean gas” are Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, while the EU, the US, and the United Arab Emirates are its permanent observers and France has also applied for membership. As the Egyptian diplomacy described, the EMFG is an international organisation that respects its member states’ rights to resource extraction, declares common war against “illegal drillings and mining” by other countries (e.g., Turkey), and strengthens energy cooperation (for instance, by building gas pipelines) among its members.3

Cairo’s strong commitment to protecting—by legal and military means alike—its undersea resources stems from the fact that Egypt also has a lot of gas within its maritime borders. Foreign energy companies, such as British Petrol (BP), Deutsche Erdoel AG (DEA AG), Ente Nazionali Idrocarburi (ENI), Russian Rosneft, and Emirati Mubadala, have discovered six large fields so far.

With the windfall gas wealth of Zohr and the country’s latest discoveries (e.g., the Nour gas field), 58% of Egypt’s gas production comes from deep-water reservoirs in the Eastern Mediterranean.4 President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi claimed in 2019 that Egypt has achieved natural gas self-sufficiency thanks to its new findings. Moreover, the Arab country could become a regional hub for energy trade and the main distributor of liquefied natural gas.5

Atoll Nooros

2015 2015 West Nile Delta 2015 Zohr 2015 West Baltim 2016 Nour 2019 15 BP (100) 20 ENI (75), BP (25) 50 BP (83), DE AG (17) 850 ENI (50), Rosneft (30), BP (10), Mubadala (10) 10 ENI (50), BP (50) 20 ENI (40), BP (25), Mubadala (20), others (15)

Consequently, it is not groundless to assume that these resources could be the cure for Egypt’s economy, which suffered heavily from the COVID-19 pandemic economically and socially alike in 2020. International monetary organisations predicted only 2% economic growth for the country in 2020. Due to the slowdown in global trade, revenues from the Suez Canal have been falling with transit fees having been reduced by 35–75% for some ships, depending on their type and destination. As all international flights have been suspended, tourism has suffered the most since the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. Economists and experts expect that, despite the government’s USD 6.1 billion rescue package, Egypt’s unemployment rate and inflation will rise, while the exchange reserves and the state subsidies will decrease. The latter could severely hit the poor and the members of the lower class, who became highly dependent on subventions. The proportion of those who live under or around the poverty line has already increased significantly in Egypt: according to World Bank estimates, 60% of Egypt’s population has been either poor or in the vulnerable category since 2019.6

Therefore, the stakes are too high for Egypt: The leadership is fully aware of the fact that the country which controls the gas fields and makes sure their production is smooth could become the dominant maritime power in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. Besides, the gas could be a boon for a country’s economy. Both regional power status and solving economic troubles are goals Cairo works towards; however, it also needs a strong and effective naval fleet to achieve them.

After President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi had taken office in 2014, Cairo submitted an extensive plan to modernise the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF). Unlike the county’s former military development programmes, this one focussed on not only Egypt’s air and land capabilities but also the improvement of its naval skills because, albeit established in 1928, the Egyptian Navy (EN) still lagged behind the Egyptian Ground Forces and the Egyptian Air Force. During the Cold War, Egypt’s naval forces were mainly tasked with protecting the more than 2,000-kilometre coastline and the Red Sea, defending the Suez Canal, counterbalancing the Western (first the British and, later the US) naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and, preferably with the help of other Arab states, maintaining an efficient blockade against Israel. Although the EN could not achieve lasting success in any of these objectives, Egyptian warships and submarines remained a force to be reckoned with. After President Anwar al-Sadat had made a peace agreement with Israel in 1979, thus making Cairo Washington’s main Arab ally, and after the Cold War had ended, the EN was gradually pushed into the background. The Egyptian leadership in the so-called War on Terror declared by President George W. Bush in response to 9/11 mostly relied on its ground and air forces, and not on its fleet (for example, when it fought against radical Islamist groups in the Sinai-peninsula). Today Egypt maintains two main fleets: the Mediterranean (the Northern Command) and the Red Sea (the Southern Command), but, in recent years, it has also formed the 2nd Navy Special Forces Brigade to counter terrorism. The EN has 18,000 officers and sailors in active military service and 14,000 in reserve. Until 2014, it mainly fought against human trafficking, illegal migration, arms smuggling, and piracy in the Red Sea. Thwarting terrorist attacks against essential maritime

The two Mistral-class ships of the Egyptian Navy: the Anwar al-Sadat in the foreground and the Gamal Abdel Nasser in the background

Egyptian Navy Frigate transits the Istanbul strait towards the Black Sea for a joint exercise with the Russian Navy.

infrastructures—for instance, oil and gas rigs— was also one of its main duties.7 In recent years, the country’s comprehensive strategy aimed at reinforcing Egypt’s naval power, focussing on rather its offensive than defensive capabilities, because the Arab country wants to set up an efficient blue-water navy.8

To make this dream come true, Egypt needs to purchase new weapons and military systems. Consequently, the government has spent tens of billions of dollars to get the latest naval equipment since 2014. Most of the new ships have been bought from Western states (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States), and even its old, Soviet-made boats were equipped with the latest US-supplied missiles and targeting defence systems. The Egyptian Navy also operates a large number of aircraft, including twenty SH-2G helicopters, Gazelle naval helicopters, and F-16 fighters equipped with 100-kilometre-range anti-ship missiles. Other important purchases include four Gowind 2500 corvettes and an Aquitaineclass FREMM multipurpose frigate from France, four Type-209/1400mod German-made dieselelectric attack submarines, and an Ambassador MK III fast missile craft and coastal patrol boats from the United States. Despite stillexisting tensions between Cairo and Rome, Italy delivered the first Bergamini-class FREMM to Egypt at the end of 2020—and the second one will probably be sent during the first half of 2021.9 The navy’s crown jewels are two French-made Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, which had been organically built for Russia but Egypt could buy them for EUR 950 million in 2016 because the Russian sale had been put on hold due to the annexation of Crimea. The two helicopter and troop carriers, named after former Egyptian presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat, provide the Egyptians with the capability to transport up to twenty helicopters, multiple landing barges, and dozens of armoured vehicles.10

Buying new weapons for the EN is one thing, but increasing the navy’s efficiency is a horse of a different colour. Gaining proper naval skills and handling the new equipment adequately, training

and doing military exercises are all indispensable. For Cairo, it is important to organise its drills with other maritime powers: helped by its closest allies, the EN can test and improve its strategy and doctrine while developing operational experience as well as learning and adopting military tactics other than its own.

In 2020, the number of naval exercises greatly increased and they also differed from the previous ones. As defence expert Ahmad Eliba aptly noted, “Earlier drills concentrated on unifying military concepts and joint cooperation, but 2020 drills are more advanced in terms of training programs with more interactive exercises to counter threats and risks.”11 Many examples prove this point. In October, French and Egyptian warships and aeroplanes conducted joint military drills in the northern Mediterranean. Ten days later, Egyptian and Spanish naval forces performed a passing exercise in the area of responsibility of the Northern Fleet. In November, Egypt joined its Arab allies (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan) in a naval drill dubbed Saif al-Arab (Sword of Arabs) at the Mohamed Naguib Military Base in northwest Egypt. In the same month, the British Royal Navy also held a military exercise with the Egyptian Navy. Despite the conflicts between Moscow and the West, Egypt conducted the so-called Bridge of Friendship–2020 joint exercise with Russia, which did not take place in the Mediterranean but on the waters of the Black Sea. The parties not only concentrated on launching missiles and artillery training but also performed manœuvres to practice deploying troops on land and return supplies to the sea. However, the biggest and most important among all naval drills in 2020 was Medusa 10. The multi-day training in December included air and naval forces from Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, but, later, Emirati and French units also joined in. Moreover, other Arab countries (Jordan and Saudi Arabia) and Western states (Germany, Italy, and the US) also participated as observers. Egyptian Navy sent multi-mission guided-missile frigates, one submarine, two fast patrol boats, several multirole aircraft, and helicopters.12

The weapon-modernisation programme also included the development of military infrastructure and naval ports. Until 2014, Egypt had two main naval bases: the Ras Banas Naval Base in the south-eastern part of the Red Sea, which secured the Red Sea and the Gulf of Bab el-Mandeb and the eastern Port Said Navy Base. However, challenges from Egypt’s neighbourhood led to the creation of new bases, too. Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi inaugurated the new headquarters of Egypt’s Southern Command at the Safaga naval base in 2017, as the EAF increased its activity in the Red Sea area to support the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen. The EN reinforced it with a naval commando force and by stationing submarines and other vessels in port.13

Moreover, the civil war in Libya, which started in May 2014, demanded greater attention from Cairo and required steps to prevent any negative consequences for Egypt’s security and territorial integrity. For this reason, the Egyptian leadership constructed a completely new base in Matrouh Governorate. In summer 2017, the so-called Mohammed Naguib Military Base— which comprises 1,155 vital facilities and 72 training areas—became the biggest one of its kind in the Middle East and Africa. The Gargoub naval base (opened during summer 2020 and located west of the city of Marsa Matrouh) has an equal strategic value and plays a central role in counterterrorism operations as well as in the defence of both the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant (which is still under construction) and the oil and gas fields in the Mediterranean.14

Clearly, Cairo is not half-hearted when it comes to the development of the Egyptian Armed Forces, especially to building up the Egyptian Navy. It seems, however, that its intense, multi-annual programme started to pay off: by the beginning of 2021, Egypt had already operated eight submarines, forty-seven different missile-carrying warships (corvettes, frigates, and missile boats), more than twenty mine-sweepers, and numerous auxiliary vessels. This also means that, today, the Arab country’s navy is the largest in North Africa and, slowly but surely, it is taking its place among the blue-water navy powers.

1 Rasha Mahmoud: Egypt and Turkey’s energy face-off in the Mediterranean. Al-Monitor. 27 March 2020. <http://bitly. ws/bFL6 > 2 Giuseppe Dentice: Matrouh: Egypt’s Linchpin in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Italian Institute for International Political Studies. 6 December 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bFLd > 3 Khalid Hassan: Egypt leads international coalition to confront Turkey in eastern Mediterranean. Al-Monitor. 30 September 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bFLm > 4 Mohamed Adel: Eni to start gas production of Zohr’s last well next week. Daily News. 15 January 2020 <http://bitly.ws/ bFLv > 5 Alessia Melcangi: Eastern Mediterranean: Testing Egypt’s Geopolitical Ambitions? Italian Institute for International Political Studies. 17 July 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bFLy > 6 Hussein Mohammed Suleiman: Economic Impact of COVID-19: Powerful Shock to Post-Reform Egypt. EuroMeSCo. June 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bFMh >; Timothy E. Kaldas: The Road to (In)stability: The Impact of Covid-19 on the Egyptian Economy. Italian Institute for International Political Studies. 24 September 2020. <http://bitly.ws/ bFMp > 7 Cdr. (Retd.) Eyal Pinko, Strategic, Business Intelligence and Cyber Consulting: Force Buildup of the Egyptian Navy. Sea and Coast. 27 July 2019. <http://bitly.ws/bFMv > 8 Blue-water navy is a term describing maritime forces in contrast with brown-water navy (operating in river, lake, and littoral environments) and green-water navy (operating near to the shore). Blue-water navy is a maritime force capable of operating globally across the deep waters of open oceans. Today, the following countries have a blue-water navy status (in rank order): United States, France, United Kingdom, China, India, Italy, Russia, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey. 9 The main reason behind the tense relations between Egypt and Italy is the so-called Regeni case. Giulio Regeni was a student of 28 who disappeared from the streets of the Egyptian capital in January 2016. His brutalised body bearing signs of extensive torture was found by the side of the road in the outskirts of Cairo on 3 February. However, over the last four years, no one has been arrested for or charged with the student’s murder. Many newspapers and Egyptian opposition figures suggest that Egyptian authorities may be involved in the murder. 10 Agnes Helou: Why is Egypt intensifying its military drills? Defense News. 30 November 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bFNg >; Hi Sutton: New Submarines Spearhead The Egyptian Navy’s Expanding Capabilities. Forbes. 9 May 2020. <http://bitly.ws/ bFNk >; Luca Peruzzi: First Italian-Built FREMM Delivered To Egypt Reaches Alexandria. Naval News. 31 December 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bFNo > 11 Helou, 2020. 12 Alex Kassidiaris: Medusa-10’s Geopolitical Implications in the Eastern Mediterranean. Inside Over. 11 December 2020. <https://bit.ly/3kwaWEC >; Robert Tollast: Egypt–Russia naval exercises highlight Cairo’s defence ambitions. The National News. 17 November 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bFNu > 13 Sabat Khan: Key naval bases near completion as Cairo eyes wider maritime influence in the region. The Arab Weekly. 24 October 2019. <http://bitly.ws/bFNz > 14 Giuseppe. See also Ahmed Morsy: Matrouh: Egypt’s army is one of the strongest in the region; wise army that protects, doesn’t threaten: El-Sisi. Al-Ahram Online. 20 June 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bFNC >