Influencing the Eastern Mediterranean: Where Do the US, Russian, and Chinese Interests Collide?

Simon Szilvási–Laura Szilágyi–Norbert Miklós

Events taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean do not only involve littoral states but are also of key interest for geographically distant powers. Therefore, non-regional actors, including major powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China, turn towards this region with great ambitions. This article has a threefold aim: firstly, to shed light on the US involvement in the region; secondly, to examine Russian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, mainly from geopolitical and military aspects; thirdly, to explore China’s growing influence in the Eastern Mediterranean through its bilateral relations with two of the most important regional countries.

Regarding the interests of the United States, this study limits its focus to two critically important countries: the State of Israel and the Republic of Turkey. The Russian Federation is primarily engaged in Syria and Libya, but it also maintains relations of specific importance with other Eastern Mediterranean states: Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. Therefore, the second part of the article aims to shed light on these ties. Finally, the third part will mainly discuss Egyptian–Chinese and Turkish–Chinese relations, since these countries have specific importance for Beijing’s foreign policy and its grandiose project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Some of the core interests of the US are to secure the freedom of navigation, to maintain free trade, and, especially, to ensure the availability of unrestricted access to naval straits.1 The Eastern Mediterranean holds two significant choke points, namely, the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles, connecting vital geographical areas and trade routes. Since 1956, Cairo has since 1956 owned the rights to operate the Suez Canal, where roughly 13% of the global trade passed through in 2019 according to Mohab Mamish, Head of the General Authority for Suez Canal Economic Zone.2 Recently, increasing Chinese investment in the canal and the surrounding infrastructure have also captured the United States’ attention.3 Another inescapable regional actor is the Russian Federation with its longestablished historical and cultural influence on many Eastern Mediterranean countries. Ever since Moscow increased its presence in the Syrian Arab Republic and the neighbouring countries because of its participation in the civil war, the United States must have sharpened the State Department’s focus to monitor its strategic competitor’s activities. The resolution of the Syrian conflict is still a primary goal of the US, which was also reaffirmed by the new Democrat president in 2020.4 Examining all of the potential actors in the region is beyond this paper’s scope; therefore, it will only concentrate on the relations of the US with two countries: the State of Israel and the Republic of Turkey.

The United States of America has had historical relations with the Jewish state since the latter was founded in 1948. Protecting Israel and maintaining its qualitative military edge (i.e., its military superiority) among its neighbours became a cornerstone of US diplomatic efforts. This special bond was renewed throughout the decades of the 20th century regardless of the political changes in Washington. Under the Trump administration, former secretary of defense Mark Esper reassured Israel that the

Vice President Joe Biden meets Prime Minsiter Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Israel in 2016.

US would continue to keep its military-edge promise.5 A security statement towards Israel by President-elect Biden during his election campaign called it ironclad, which the US is legally obligated to honour as it was enacted in 2008.

Former president Donald J. Trump delivered a decades-long promise to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by moving the US Embassy to the city. Several presidents before him, including Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and even Bill Clinton used the possibility to postpone the execution of the act on an already passed bill, which became law in 1995, called the Jerusalem Embassy Act6, but the recognition finally happened at Trump’s behest. Although the decision met several objections from regional states around Israel, it seemed that Israel could benefit from Trump’s erratic diplomatic moves. Despite the anticipated mayhem, the project was successful, lacking confrontation according to the former US ambassador to Israel.7

Biden’s presidency has, however, raised concerns in Jerusalem when the Democrat politician gained more electoral votes on Election Day on 3 November 2020. During his campaign, President Biden claimed that he did not have the intention to remove the embassy from Jerusalem although he intended to reopen a consulate in East Jerusalem as a sign of a two-state solution.

Having been the vice president of the Obama administration, Joe Biden could experience how complicated the relations between the US and Israel were. Despite the tensions between Barack Obama and Netanyahu, Biden’s relationship with the Israeli prime minister was balanced, and they even addressed each other as friends who had long-standing and tried bonds.8 Nevertheless, the new president had concerns over the annexation of the West Bank, and he expressed his firm disagreement on the matter.9 From a US point of view, the contractions of Israel on that territory is against the principles of international law.10 Because of the 2021 spring Israeli elections, Prime Minister Netanyahu might have been non-submissive in the question of these settlements. It is plausible that, as an unresolved issue, this enduring disagreement between the United States and Israel will outlive the present and future administrations. Nonetheless, the former friendly relationship between the two leaders suggests that understanding could be achieved between the two states.

Besides the relocation of the embassy, Tel Aviv’s other milestone achievement was the creation of the Abraham Accords Declaration, a document of historical importance signed by the State of Israel, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of Sudan to encourage peace and collaboration in the region. The different

Mediterranean Sea West Bank

Gaza Dead Sea

The signing of the Abraham Accords in Septermber 2020 (from left to right: Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump, and Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan)

individual agreements among the participating states enhance cooperation in a broad range of issues, e.g., in economy, science, technology, and trade—not to mention investments and the energy sector. Signatory countries are all committed to having a full normalisation in their relations and cooperating alongside their mutual interests.

The new Biden administration in Washington is expected to support other regional countries in joining the Abraham Accords so that they can build trust and mutual understanding, promoting peaceful cooperation and economic entanglement, as these serve core US interests in the region.

Mediated by the US, several major countries concluded a significant deal in order to limit the civilian nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2015. However, President Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the agreement in 2018. He claimed that the agreement failed to contain restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme and the country’s proxy warfare activities.11 Israel and the US may shortly discuss the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, as President Biden would sign an executive order to rejoin it. Presumably, Israel has new conditions to add to the deal. Israel’s withdrawal from the deal was equally supported and opposed as Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose a grave danger upon Israel’s existence. However, the uncontrolled situation is certainly a risk for Jerusalem. According to a report by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Iran would only need approximately three months to produce enough enriched uranium for military purposes.12 President Biden needs to have surgical precision moves in diplomacy to assure the Jewish state of its security upon the US’s rejoining the nuclear deal with Iran. Having served many decades in foreign policy and having dealt with Iran earlier, he might have the seasoned experience to prove equal to the task.

The Republic of Turkey holds strategic positions connecting the Eurasian landmass and owns the Dardanelles that connect the Black Sea through the Sea of Marmara with the warmwater Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. Gaining access to that strategic position was a centurylong goal of Russian imperial forces, too, and later, the Soviet Union also pursued this aim. Turkey, however, joined NATO in 1952 and remained its member even after the end of the Cold War.13

Nevertheless, relations between Washington and Ankara were not without conflict in the last four years. Turkey’s most criticised step by its NATO allies has been the acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defence missile system.14 An analysis of the events leading to Ankara’s choice shows that it was not a result of a sudden decision. From the 1990s, Turkish military decision makers realised that the systems available on the market, including those of the NATO members, could not completely meet Ankara’s security requirements. There were many occasions when the US and Israel were offered an opportunity to improve their systems to meet Turkey’s needs so that these could later be deployed to protect the Anatolian peninsula. However, these efforts to cooperate were denied, and Turkey had to select from four major providers.

The contenders were European and US systems within the NATO framework and Chinese

and Russian systems outside it. Unexpectedly, for the US it first seemed that the final victor of the tender would be Beijing and its FD-2000 system which was considerably cheaper than the others. The United States warned Turkey against contracting with the chosen Chinese firm, as their system would not fit into NATO’s weapon systems and Chinese access to the NATO infrastructure would seriously endanger the organisation’s security. After that, Turkey decided to accept the second-best offer made by Moscow, eliciting an even harsher reaction from Washington, which raised the same concerns over choosing an inoperable system.15

According to former vice president Mike Pence, there were several warnings from the United States repeating that, if Ankara continued to conclude the deal, it would endanger its participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme.16 Losing access to the most advanced technology in military aviation—despite the programme’s well-known issues—could be a significant disadvantage for the Turkish Air Force and the industries connected to it. Mention must also be made of US sanctions against Ankara which include a ban on US export licenses, asset freezing, and visa restrictions. The sanctions embodied Washington’s disapproval and diplomatic pressure on the Turkish leadership due to its decision on the Russian weapon system. Should Turkey proceed with the USD 2.5 billion military acquisition of Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missile system instead of the US Patriot systems, it would be a cause for concern for the United States. Russian operating personnel in Turkey’s airbases, and, therefore, on NATO territory, would have an excellent occasion for military espionage.

The new secretary of state, Antony Blinken, stressed that further sanctions are expected on Turkey, and he even referred to Ankara a “so-called” strategic partner. The new leader of the US foreign relations is not the only one having a poor opinion on Turkish actions. Brett McGurk’s appointment as the Middle East and North Africa coordinator at the National Security Council can also be detrimental to Turkey–US relations, as he is known for his sharp criticism towards Turkey.17

Seemingly, there was a change in Turkish foreign policy towards its neighbours and the region; Ankara is cherishing regional leadership ambitions while trying to find its place in the multipolar world order. And that will place Ankara on a collision course with US interests.18

As a result of the Arab Spring, bloody revolutions broke out and conflicts arose in the Middle East and Northern Africa. In Syria, a civil war started in 2011, attracting the attention of the international community. For Russia, there was no question that it would play a role in the conflict. It had supported the Assad regime diplomatically, militarily, and financially since 2011, but it did not directly intervene with its forces before September 2015. Russia finally carried out its first air strikes against terrorist groups in Syria on 30 September 2015, after obtaining authorisation from the Russian Federal Council,19 in order to prevent the collapse of the Syrian state—as the Russian foreign minister stated.20

There are several reasons behind Russia’s intervention in Syria and the country’s relevance to Moscow. First of all, there is a geopolitical and geostrategic reason the most important element of which is the Russian naval facility at the Syrian port of Tartus. Tartus is strategically and symbolically important to Moscow and forms a gateway between regional and international power projection. Warm-water ports have always been essential for the geographically locked

Russia to promote its geopolitical, military, and economic interests. Russia, however, does not aim at establishing maritime control over the Mediterranean Sea—it rather intends to have a naval presence and to establish a foothold in the region.21 Syria also forms a bridge between Moscow and its other allies, for example, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. Therefore, influence over Syria helps promote Russian geopolitical interests and create a Russian geopolitical stronghold in the region.22

Secondly, the vacuum caused by Syria’s destroyed statehood was started to be filled by terrorist groups. The fight against terrorism is a vital interest of many countries—including Russia— which decided to annihilate extremist Islamic cells.23 This step also helped Moscow improve its global image and present itself as a saviour who fights against terrorism and assists in stabilising and rebuilding the country. The significance of its role as a saviour in Russian terminology is clearly outlined in Vladimir Putin’s historic speech at the UN General Assembly in 2015, in which he blamed the Western powers for the “exportation of revolutions” to the Middle East and Northern Africa and called on the international community to develop a comprehensive strategy for political stabilisation as well as social and economic recovery.24 He added that Russia would desire to have a leading role in this process by fixing everything that had been destroyed by the West. By reaching a political settlement in Syria, Russia would have the opportunity to assert its status as a global power, to fill a power vacuum, and to become not only a saviour but an indispensable actor, too.25

Thirdly, the coup against Assad backed by the US-led rebel coalition was seen as a threat in Moscow. The Kremlin believed that the Syrian events would serve as an example and further legitimise the practice of regime changes also known as “colour revolutions.” Russia considers this type of Western intervention and Westernbacked regime changes as a significant threat to

Aegean Sea

Istanbul Black Sea

Mediterranean Sea Tartus

500 m

its national interests. The Kremlin is convinced that the West, especially the United States, tends to use similar tactics to undermine the Russian government and/or the governments of Russia-allied countries.26

The Kremlin’s position on settling the Syrian civil war has been unchanged for years—it expects to solve the crisis by political means.27 Moreover, Russia needs a friendly government in Damascus and does not want Assad to leave, as currently there is no alternative for the Syrian leader who could be suitable for the Russian interests. However, Moscow will not be able to stop an eventual Syrian national effort that aims to replace Assad.28

Syria offers economic advantages and concessions to Russian economic actors in rebuilding, and, for instance, in the oil and gas industry.29 Moreover, it was a perfect training field for the Russian army, which could test its weaponry in conflict and gain experience in conducting modern warfare.

Libya’s case is very similar to that of Syria. Historically, the country has been a partner of the Soviet Union and, then, Russia. In 2008, Moscow wrote off most of Libya’s USD 5 billion debt in exchange for contracts on oil, gas, weaponry, and railways, and access to the Port of Benghazi. In 2011, Qadhafi’s overthrow and the NATO-led campaign cost Russia its contracts and access to Libya,30 and Moscow now seeks to retrieve it all. Just as in Syria, Russia is interested in a political settlement of the Libyan conflict. It does not seek either the collapse or the total victory of any warring parties (i.e., the Libyan National Army or the Government of National Accord). For Moscow, the perfect scenario would be to make the Libyan National Army strong enough with Russian help by which it would be taken so seriously by the Government of National Accord that it could begin diplomatic negotiations with the latter.31

Another thing that Russia’s Syrian and Libyan interests have in common is that Moscow wants to play the role of a saviour in Libya, too, and to “fix” the unstable situation which arose after the NATO- and US-led interventions. As stated above, in its own eyes, “Moscow fixes what the US destroys.”32 Furthermore, the peaceful diplomatic settlement of the conflict with Russian help would reaffirm Moscow’s role in global affairs and within the international community. Russia wants to have a seat at the table when great powers adopt a resolution to any major global issues and also aspires to ensure that its interests be considered.33 Its geopolitical objectives are the same as in Syria: using the Port of Benghazi helps Russia enhance its presence in the Mediterranean.

However, unlike in Syria, Russia has avoided direct military presence in Libya and deployed mercenaries instead. The Wagner Group has actively been engaged in Libyan operations since 2018. However, Vladimir Putin stressed that the Wagner Group did not represent Russian interests, since it was a private military company which could be hired by anyone.34

Besides Syria and Libya, Russia also has ties with several countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. It signed billions of dollars’ worth of weapon-sale contracts with Turkey and Egypt. Turkey bought S-400 missile systems from Moscow.35 Egypt, among others, has signed deals for Su-35 fighters, Ka-52 helicopters, and Mig-29 and Mig-35 fighters.36, 37, 38, 39 This equipment gives superiority to the Egyptian army in the regional airspace.

Russia has good relations with Israel, as well. About 15% of Israel’s population are Russianspeaking Israelis, and the country is home to the world’s largest Russian Jew population. Most of them emigrated there from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.40 “We consider Israel a Russian-speaking country,” said Putin. Netanyahu and Putin meet on a regular basis and the Russian president strives to build constructive, mutually beneficial relations with the Jewish state.41

To sum up, Russia’s threefold interest in the region translates to geopolitical supremacy, as it strengthens the country’s diplomatic, economic, and military relations with the Mediterranean states, helps exercise control over natural resources and secure extraction concessions and reaffirms Moscow’s great power status by presenting it as a saviour.42

Bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of China and Egypt started in 1956: this was the first diplomatic relation that China established with an Arab nation situated in Africa.43 This certainly gave great momentum for the further development of relations, which led to the establishment of a strategic partnership between the two nations as they drew even closer during the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, who was called as an “old friend of China” in 2009. 44 Then came the Arab Spring and, with it, some disturbances, but the Sino–Egyptian relations survived.

When Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi became the president of Egypt, he also inherited serious economic and social problems. In an attempt to rescue his country’s economy, he visited Xi Jinping in 2014 to enhance bilateral ties with China and managed to sign a document on “comprehensive strategic partnership” during the visit.45 In recent years, after the partnership had taken effect and Egypt had become a focal point of the BRI and investments arriving within the framework of the project, it seemed that Sisi had made the right choice when he started to deepen its relations with China, since the cooperation between the two nations expanded gradually.

Mediterranean Sea

Cairo Airport

Nile Suez Canal

Suez

TEDA Suez *

* Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA) Red Sea

Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has become a critical partner for the African nation in achieving economic revitalisation. The mutual self-interest that bonded these two nations together has been stimulated by the partnership, and, before COVID-19 arrived, Egypt had become one of the fastest-growing emerging markets, mostly as a result of the Chinese capital inflow.46 Besides the so-called “Egypt’s Vision 2030” was announced in 2016 as the new national development strategy, which elevated the SinoEgyptian partnership to a whole new level, since the two sides started to plan their cooperation with each other’s strategic needs in mind.47 Today, infrastructure construction and the enhancement of manufacturing production capacity have become the most fundamental aspects of the Sino-Egyptian economic cooperation,48 raising Egypt’s GDP growth to a stable 5.6% in 2019.49

Chinese presence in Egypt is concentrated in industrial zones, free trade zones, and financial centres. Since the Suez Canal is the most important part of Egypt for China because it gives access to Europe, the main project of the BRI in the country is the Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (SETC), where most of the Chinese investment flows to.50 Therefore, Chinese capital and firms arrive in the African country to establish production bases for African and European markets. There is also a subtle risk of the Suez Canal’s basket of currencies being filled with Chinese yuan. This action is supposed to create a more balanced international currency market in the region, which so far has not seemed problematic but can turn into an issue in a matter of years if the Chinese currency floods the Suez Canal’s area. Because of this, Egypt’s thirst for hard currency could cloud its vision for the future. The 13.5 square kilometres that the Chinese industrial city received in 2015 south of the canal is another important aspect of Egypt’s core position in the BRI. The infrastructure, the logistic and the industrial entities that arrived brought USD 1 billion Chinese investment with them and a new factory deal worth USD 800 million in 2019.51

While the pandemic has slowed down Chinese investments, it did not halt the evolution of bilateral relations between the two countries, since Egypt has truly become a more promising business environment for Chinese companies. The economic stability created a more stable political environment, which can only partly be attributed to improving relations with China. Since Egypt’s trade and investment partnerships are still quite diverse,52 the quickly growing Chinese presence does not mean an overpowering economic dependence yet. However, if Chinese capital and investments manage to gain a firmer foothold, it can force other foreign actors out of Egypt in the long run—even if it leads to growing competition and surging investment rates in the short run. Nevertheless, Cairo must tread carefully, since these high-risk manœuvres can turn into disasters if not managed correctly.

All in all, Egypt has managed to boost its prospects by joining the BRI.53 For the African country, the initiative provided various opportunities ranging from decreasing its trade deficit and increasing its foreign exchange reserves to developing the infrastructure and the Suez Canal Economic Zone. The comprehensive strategic partnership gave the cooperation a new boost, as major projects started to be implemented gradually. The high-level exchanges provided a platform for both sides to support each other’s core interests, ultimately turning Egypt into a “pillar country along the BRI route.”54 Growing numbers in bilateral trade also became a factor to consider while taking a closer look at the cooperation. For these reasons, it may come as no surprise that the most important part of the Egypt–China cooperation is the Chinese industrial zone in the Gulf of the Suez region, where Chinese investments have started to create a brand new administrative capital for Chinese firms and investments.55 As Egypt becomes an increasingly important focal point for the BRI, the news of Chinese capital influx in the coming years is certainly a delightful outcome of the cooperation for the African nation. The megaprojects are supposed to boost Chinese investments all around Egypt; therefore, the promotion of industrial investment from China might not come as a surprise, either.56

The best summary of both sides’ reasons for the enhanced level of cooperation can be found

in an interview with Mahfouz Marzouk, the vice chairman of the SCzone, who said: “There is a pan-African road that is being constructed extending from northern Egypt to Cape town. We finalized our part until Ethiopia. . . . The rest will be finished through the help of Chinese companies, Chinese know-how, and investments.” He also mentioned that Egypt would be “a focal point because of its location, industrial cities, 100 million population, purchasing power of $370 billion, well trained labour, free trade agreements covering 1.3 billion people, and because of the cost of production, which is 30 percent cheaper.”57 The other side of the coin is, however, that, with Egypt’s increasing reliance on Chinese capital to finance its projects, to improve its capacities, and to fund its development, a dangerous gamble may occur in the future for President Sisi’s nation. Based on all developments made by China and the financing of such infrastructural projects, it is possible that Egypt is just the beginning of China’s Africa strategy.58

Relations between Turkey and China are often described as a “strategic partnership” which deepens slowly but surely. The main areas of cooperation are on economic and security fronts, while there is also a shared interest in achieving Asian dominance in the region.59

When observing the basis for relations between Turkey and China, it becomes evident that the interests of these nations align in many areas. The most important links between them include the BRI which offers a solution for Turkey’s investment and financial problems, their shared mistrust for the West, and the opportunity for realising strong economic cooperation that stretches across the Asian continent.60 One example of the tendency for leaning towards each other and against the Western pressure in the past could be the proposed air defence–missile deal between China and Turkey.61 While it was not realised in the end,62 the intention of closer cooperation was made evident. However, the partnership did not reach its full potential in the last couple of years, mainly because of the long-standing disagreement between the two parties on the Uyghur question.63 This was at least so until the end of 2020, when an extradition treaty that could mean a breakthrough in the problem was announced.64 This might solve the last years’ political differences and elevate the cooperation to a higher level. Of course, Turkey needs to ratify the treaty first, and its government might face vehement opposition domestically if it does so. The possible ratification of the extradition law and, earlier, Ankara’s decision to recognise the East Turkistan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organisation show an increasing Chinese influence that is capable of brokering a deal about Uyghur rights with Turkey.

Turkey is a regional power in the Middle East but partly also belongs to Europe. These feats by themselves make the country an interesting nation to observe, but, with the announcement of China’s BRI, Turkey has become an even more important player in the region. The win-win nature of the initiative, constantly being stressed by China, might be even more relevant between these two nations with the potential in their relations. Xi Jinping’s more proactive foreign policy, based on China’s major economic successes and the country’s growing influence around the world, plus the Western world’s newfound opposition to traditional cooperation with China, is a possible complement of the slightly biased foreign policy conducted by Erdoğan in opposition to its traditional Western allies. Thus, the aligned interests make both sides appreciate each other, especially when talking about economic cooperation.

The economic aspect of the Sino-Turkish relations had become the most important factor of their cooperation during the past decade, as China became one of Turkey’s largest trading partners.65 Although Turkey may not seem the most important priority for Chinese foreign policy, its location, market, and connections definitely make it a major player for the Chinese foreign policy. This statement has only become truer since the BRI was launched because the Silk Road Economic Belt is supposed to connect China to Europe through, among other cities, Ankara and Istanbul.

The growth of bilateral trade prompted Turkey to align its Middle Corridor initiative with China’s

London

Madrid

Moscow

Venice

Istanbul

Athens

Ankara

Suez

Yekaterinburg KrasnoyarskRUSSIA

Nur-Sultan

Baku

Tehran

Tashkent

Kashgar

Karachi

Urumqi

Ulaanbatar

Beijing Vladivostok

Shanghai

Kolkata Kunming

Black Sea

Akhalkalaki Tbilisi

Rustavi

Kars

Silk Road Economic Belt

21st-century Maritime Silk Road Other economic corridors

Existing railroads Planned railroads Cities Capitals

Ganja

Baku

Shirvan

Caspian Sea

BRI for attracting more Chinese capital. In 2016, a memorandum was also signed, the goal of which was to harmonise the two projects and to enhance further cooperation on key projects, which could ultimately make Turkey a key hub of BRI operations in the future.66 These ambitions are based on the possibility of close cooperation, since China’s infrastructural investment projects in the BRI framework can certainly be aligned with each other. With Xi ensuring to help develop Turkey’s relevant railway construction projects, other possible areas of cooperation have emerged, too, namely in the energy, aerospace, and finance sectors.67 One example of the ambitious plans stands out: energy cooperation, where China is supposed to help Turkey develop its new nuclear power plant. The support aims at assisting Ankara to have more clean energy sources,68 also leading to a stronger Sino-Turkish partnership.

However, the growing volume of bilateral trade and closer economic cooperation made Turkey’s trade deficit with China widen, and, therefore, Turkish academics claim that the “win-win” cooperation has not materialised and that Turkey should adopt stronger measures for decreasing Chinese imports.69 It is true that Chinese FDI has increased in Turkey since the BRI was launched, but only modestly. The investment from China focussed mostly on the financial, logistics, energy, and telecommunications sectors, increasing slowly but gradually in the past years but still being overshadowed by investments from the West, mostly the EU member states.70 The slow rise of investment can be explained by many factors, among which the uncertainties of the Turkish political situation, especially after the July 2015 coup attempt, could be the most important. Additionally, there have also been political and geopolitical risks and friction between China and Turkey over the above-mentioned Uyghur question.

As Turkey announced its readiness to expand cooperation within the BRI framework in mid2020,71 more Chinese investment is expected to arrive in Turkey for the coming years. While, in the past, there was a question of compatibility between Turkey’s Middle Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the two grandiose projects have both set transcontinental integration as their goal.72 Turkey’s main objective with its new region-wide railroad network–based economic corridor is to create a belt of prosperity in its neighbourhood and to connect Europe to Asia while expanding its markets and contributing to the development of regional cooperation in Eurasia.73

Even though Ankara needs Chinese investments in Turkish transportation for developing its infrastructure, the country does not seem to offer lucrative tenders to Beijing yet. Turkey’s historical partnerships, its NATO membership, and its deep economic integration with the EU made China hesitant to inform Turkey more deeply about the planned outcome of the Chinese strategies. On the one hand, it is understandable from the Turkish perspective that, without concretely laid out plans, their devotion will not be total. On the other hand, however, the Chinese must maintain their strategic secrecy to keep them ahead of the game. So far, Beijing has seemed to follow a wait-and-see policy to avoid political uncertainties, but this strategy will, in the future, reduce engagement and influence in Turkey.74

All in all, Sino-Turkish relations are certainly improving. The “reorientation” of the Turkish foreign policy, aiming to achieve the diversification of its international relations and to decrease its dependence on Western countries, met China’s interests in many aspects. The BRI, as one of the foundations of modern Chinese foreign policy, presents an enhanced strategic partnership for both parties. Nevertheless, Chinese and Turkish economic and geopolitical interests still differ, and, therefore, it is hard for the two countries to build up real trust, which could call the whole cooperation into question in the future.75

1 Till Geoffrey: The Freedom of the Seas: Why it matters. GOV. UK. 30 November 2011. <https://bit.ly/3sFlSTE > 2 SCZone head: 13% of world trade passes through Suez Canal. Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide. 24 June 2019. <https://bit.ly/2PajA0c>

3 Suez Canal: China’s Trade Flows Via The Suez. HSBC. <https://bit.ly/3u9wHh8 > Accessed: 26 January 2021. 4 Jon B. Alterman [et al.]: Restoring the Eastern Mediterranean as a U.S. Strategic Anchor. Center for Strategic & International Studies–Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham–Boulder–New York–London, 2018. 5 Judah Ari Gross: Gantz touts ‘major leap’ for Israeli Security as US re-ups military edge promise. The Times of Israel. 22 October 2020. <https://bit.ly/31uwYP5 > 6 Philip Bump: In 1995, Congress reached a compromise on the issue of Jerusalem. Trump is poised to end it. The Washington Post. 6 December 2017. <https://wapo.st/32AC7Wp > 7 David M. Friedman: A year after opening the Jerusalem embassy: On the right side of history. Israel Hayom. 12 May 2019. <https://bit.ly/39q4D0I > 8 President-Elect Biden on Foreign Policy. Council on Foreign Relations. 7 November 2020. <https://on.cfr.org/3czDElu > See also Jennifer Epstein: Biden Says He Wouldn’t Move U.S. Embassy from Jerusalem. Bloomberg. 29 April 2020. <https:// bloom.bg/3ry3L0l > 9 Ibid. 10 As Biden takes office, Israel should refrain from aggravating tension. The Jerusalem Post. 21 January 2021. <https://bit. ly/39stzF1 > 11 Kali Robinson: What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal? Council on Foreign Relations. Last updated: 25 February 2021. <https:// on.cfr.org/3ubLyYn > 12 Robin Wright: Biden Faces a Minefield in New Diplomacy with Iran. The New Yorker. 4 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3fm1B1w > 13 Ahmet Davutoğlu: Stratégiai Mélység. Törökország Nemzetközi Helyzete. Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2016. 14 Peter A. Wilson–John V. Parachini: Russian S-400 Surfaceto-Air Missile System: Is It Worth the Sticker Price? RAND. 6 2020 May <https://bit.ly/3sziYPf > 15 Mustafa Kibaroğlu: On Turkey’s Missile Defense Strategy: The Four Faces of the S-400 Deal Between Turkey and Russia. SAM Papers, No. 16. April 2019. 8. <https://bit.ly/3wawLyT > 16 Vice President Pence Speaks at NATO Engages. C-SPAN. 3 April 2019. <https://bit.ly/3rCA3r2 > 17 US’ incoming top diplomat Blinken targets Turkey with sanctions. Daily Sabah. 20 January 2021. <https://bit. ly/3rElmng > 18 Didem Buhari Gulmez: The resilience of the US–Turkey alliance: divergent threat perceptions and worldviews. Contemporary Politics. 2020/4. 475–492. <https://doi. org/10.1080/13569775.2020.1777038 > 19 В Совет Федерации внесено предложение об использовании Вооружённых Сил за пределами территории России. Президента России. 30 September 2015. <https://bit. ly/3sEDuiq > 20 Russia carries out first air strikes in Syria. Al Jazeera. 30 September 2015. <https://bit.ly/39pzCu3 > 21 Tanvi Chauhan: Why Are Warm-Water Ports Important to Russian Security? The Cases of Sevastopol and Tartus Compared. JEMEAA, The Air Force Journal of European, Middle Eastern & African Affairs. 2020/1. 66–67. 22 Дмитрий Тренин: Россия на Ближнем Востоке: задачи, приоритеты, политические стимулы. Московский Центр Карнеги. 5 April 2016. <https://bit.ly/3rHCEzT > 23 Заседание Международного дискуссионного клуба «Валдай». Президента России. 27 October 2016. <https://bit. ly/3cH9dtT > 24 70-я сессия Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН. Президента России. 28 September 2015. <https://bit.ly/3m5mZcJ > 25 Dmitriy Frolovskiy: What Putin Really Wants in Syria. Foreign Policy. 1 February 2019. <https://bit.ly/2PkJYEF > 26 Samuel Charap–Elina Treyger–Edward Geist: Understanding Russia’s Intervention in Syria. RAND Corporation Research Report, RR-3180-AF. 2019. 5–6. <https://bit.ly/2Pnkh6f > 27 Пленарное заседание Петербургского международного экономического форума. Президента России. 2 June 2017. <https://bit.ly/3m8ZD68 > 28 Dimitrii Brigea: What are Russia’s interests in Syria leading to? Middle East Monitor. 20 July 2020. <https://bit.ly/3udXF7h > 29 Arany Anett: A lezárás felé? A szíriai polgárháború megoldásának lehetséges körvonali (8.) – A rezsim túlélésének kihívásai. KKI-elemzések, E-2020/66. 9. <https://bit. ly/3u6DJ64 > 30 Anna Borshchevskaya: Russia’s Growing Interests in Libya. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 24 January 2020. <https://bit.ly/3rARU1K > 31 Saurabh Kumar Shahi: Understanding the Russian roulette in Libya. National Herald. 25 June 2020. <https://bit. ly/3sDyTg9 > 32 Molnár Anna [et al.]: A nemzetközi jelenlét Líbiában 2011-től napjainkig. NKE Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatkóközpont Elemzések, 2019/11. 11 July 2019. 7–8. <https://bit.ly/3cA9OgO > 33 Samuel Ramani: Russia’s Strategy in Libya. Royal United Services Institute. 7 April 2020. <https://bityl.co/6CyA > 34 Robyn Dixon: Russia’s ally in Libya is battered by defeats. But Moscow has wider goals to expand its influence. The Washington Post. 6 June 2020. <https://bityl.co/6CyE > 35 Amanda Macias: Turkey’s multibillion-dollar arms deal with Russia casts a shadow over NATO summit. CNBC. 2 December 2019. <https://bityl.co/6CyG > 36 Антон Валагин: Россия начала сборку истребителей Су-

35 для Египта. Российской газеты. 17 May 2020. <https:// bityl.co/6CyO > 37 Валагин. 38 Олег Корякин: Вертолеты Ка-52 и Apache встретились “лицом к лицу” в Египте. Российской газеты. 5 January 2020. <https://bityl.co/6CyU > 39 Egypt signs $2bn deal for 50 fighter jets from Russia. Middle East Monitor. 17 August 2019. <https://bityl.co/6CzW > 40 Izabella Tabarovsky: Russian-Speaking Israelis Go to the Polls. Wilson Center. 4 April 2019. <https://bityl.co/6Czc > 41 Конгресс фонда «Керен ха-Йесод». Президента России. 17 September 2020. <https://bityl.co/6Czf > 42 Bassam Barabandi: Understanding the Russian Position in Syria. Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy. 23 July 2020. <https://bityl.co/6Czk > 43 Krajcsír Lukács: Sárkány a piramisoknál. In: Traumák és tanulságok, edited by Salát Gergely–Szilágyi Zsolt. Budapest, Typotex Kiadó, 2016. 182–208. 44 Krajcsír. 45 Juan Chen: Strategic Synergy between Egypt “Vision 2030” and China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law. 2018/5. 219–235. 46 Hisham AbuBakr Metwally: Egypt boosts its prospects by joining Belt and Road. China Daily. 19 December 2019. <https:// bityl.co/6D13 > 47 Chen. 48 Mahmoud Ahmed Mohamed Mohamed Soliman–Jun Zhao: The Multiple Roles of Egypt in China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. 2019/3. 428–444. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1630580 > 49 John Calabrese: Towering Ambitions: Egypt and China Building for the Future. Middle East Institute. 6 October 2020. <https://bityl.co/6D18 > 50 Ivan Bocharov: Egypt–China Relations at the Present Stage. Russian International Affairs Council. 3 March 2020. <https:// bityl.co/6D1H > 51 Noha El Tawil: Why Egypt is significant to Belt and Road Initiative. Egypt Today. 27 April 2019. <https://bit.ly/39PeeyF > 52 Haisam Hassanein: Egypt Takes Another Step Toward China. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 19 August 2019. <https://bityl.co/6D41 > 53 Metwally. 54 Calabrese. 55 Calabrese. 56 Calabrese. 57 El Tawil. 58 Emma Scott: China Goes Global in Egypt: A Special Economic Zone in Suez. Stellenbosch University, Centre for Chinese Studies, Discussion Paper, 2/2013. August 2013. 36 <http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/86133 > 59 Eszterhai Viktor–Simigh Fruzsina: Kína és Törökország – Stratégiai partnerség és geopolitikai realitások. In: Újhold. A török külpolitika útkeresése a 21. század elején, edited by Baranyi Tamás Péter–Szálkai Kinga. Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2016. 238–249. 60 Tolga Bilener: Relations Turquie-Chine Ambitions et limites de la coopération économique. Notes de l’Ifri, Asie.Visions, 116. October 2020. <https://bityl.co/6D4P > 61 Mustafa Kibaroglu–Selim C. Sazak: Why Turkey Chose, and Then Rejected, a Chinese Air-Defense Missile. Defense One. 3 February 2016. <https://bityl.co/6D4b > 62 Turkey scraps Chinese air defense system. DW. 18 November 2015. <https://p.dw.com/p/1H7cU > 63 Fatih Furtun: Turkish–Chinese Relations in the Shadow of the Uyghur Problem. İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi, Global Political Trends Center, Policy Brief. January 2010. <https://bityl. co/6D4k > 64 Helen Davidson–Bethan McKernan: Pressure on Turkey to protect Uighurs as China ratifies extradition treaty. The Guardian. 29 December 2020. <https://bityl.co/6D4m > 65 Turkey–People’s Republic of China Economic and Trade Relations. The Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <https://bityl.co/6D4p > Accessed: 26 January 2021. 66 Xiaoli Guo–Giray Fidan: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Turkey’s Middle Corridor: “Win-Win Cooperation”? Middle East Institute. 26 June 2018. <https://bityl.co/6D4v > 67 Guo–Fidan. 68 Guo Yawen: China’s nuclear power technology assists Turkey in developing clean energy. People’s Daily. 17 December 2019. <https://bityl.co/6D52 > 69 Guo–Fidan. 70 Guo–Fidan. 71 Turkey ready to expand cooperation under BRI framework: minister. XinhuaNet. 13 June 2020. <https://bityl.co/6D56 > 72 Selçuk Colakoğlu: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Turkey’s Middle Corridor: A Question of Compatibility. Middle East Institute. 29 January 2019. <https://bityl.co/6D5E > 73 Selçuk Colakoğlu: Turkey’s Perspective on Enhancing Connectivity in Eurasia: Searching for Compatibility between Turkey’s Middle Corridor and Korea’s Eurasia Initiative. In: Studies in Comprehensive Regional Strategies Collected Papers. Korea Insitute for International Economic Policy, Sejong, 2016. 543–634. 74 Colakoğlu (2019). 75 Eszterhai–Simigh Fruzsina.