French Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean

Fanni Korpics

France has long been interested in the Mediterranean, and it is one of the most powerful regional actors in the Mediterranean Basin today. Thanks to its mandates established after World War I, it managed to expand its zone of influence into territories today known as Syria and Lebanon. The country’s foreign policy is based on the principles of the so-called “grandeur” and “gloire,” two concepts that were vividly represented during the first half of French president Emmanuel Macron’s tenure, as he is quite ambitious when it comes to diplomacy.

When examining France’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the first country worth looking at is Lebanon, as, having been a former French mandate along with Syria, it keeps maintaining close ties with Paris. France, however, is also working on deepening its relations with the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly Libya. On the other hand, France’s dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean is challenged by several other actors, such as Italy, Turkey, or Russia—today, the country’s role seems to decline in the Middle East with the latter two emerging as new regional powers. Overall, Macron’s France has two main goals to achieve in the region. First, to strengthen its geopolitical positions, and, second, to involve regional actors in the fight against terrorism. The latter objective prompted France to support the eastern-based military commander Khalifa Haftar in the Second Libyan Civil War instead of the internationally recognised Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj as Paris believes general Haftar can contribute to the fight against terrorism in the civil war-torn country.1

France’s main adversary in its fight for geopolitical leadership and natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean is the Erdoğan-led Turkey. In reality, there are several issues over which these two countries quarrel. They both want to be the leading power of the Eastern Mediterranean region besides winning the right to exploit oil and gas reserves discovered there. Further tensions unfolded between the two countries when Turkey attacked the Kurds that had fought alongside France in the fight against the Islamic State in the Middle East or when Turkey started a military intervention in Libya despite France’s intentions of leading the international coalition there. Albeit not in the region proper, Macron and Erdoğan also disagreed on whom to support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; while Macron picked the Armenians, Turkey militarily supported the Azerbaijani forces. Furthermore, President Erdoğan openly criticised President Macron for taking a stance against radical Islamist separatism and championing freedom of speech, and, as a consequence, he also called for a boycott against French products, which several other Muslim states joined.2 Last summer, prior to the boycott, new tensions over the dispute between Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey about the exploitation rights of the maritime resources discovered in the Aegean also built up between France and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. France immediately took the side of Greece and Cyprus, trying to convince its fellow EU member states to do the same. President Macron clearly saw the opportunity to take the lead within the EU, as Germany is reluctant to damage EU–Turkey relations for fear of another migration crisis or the further destabilisation of the entire Middle East.

The current Eastern Mediterranean situation offers Paris a chance to show that it is a real stakeholder in the region and has an essential role in the security of the Mediterranean in

Macron visiting Beirut after the explosion in summer 2020

general. Therefore, President Macron took a slightly more aggressive approach, reinforcing the French naval and aerial military assets based in the Eastern Mediterranean and describing his actions as a “red line policy.” The military escalation was, however, merely symbolic; it only served to show that the country still has an interest in what happens in the Eastern Mediterranean.3 Indicatively, it was France to chair the 7th MED7 summit this year, an informal international forum for the leaders of the EU’s seven southern member states. At the summit, France had dual ambitions: the French president aimed to promote European independence in the Mediterranean while he also argued for resuming German mediation between Turkey and Greece. As for the wider Mediterranean region, France’s main objective is to avoid the eruption of another Libyan conflict and to install more effective migration management within the EU in cooperation with its partners on the African continent and in the Middle East. This is important not only because France is one of the main destinations for migrants arriving in Europe, but also because it has been the main target for terrorist attacks carried out on European soil during the last decade.4 France often engages in preventing its former colonies or mandates from falling into chaos partly because it has a significant population of Arab and African descent many of whom have joined terrorist groups and international terrorist networks—a problem that Paris prefers to solve beyond its borders, as it does not have the appropriate constitutional means for solving it at home. Besides, it also has the means to intervene, as it is the bestequipped country for military operations within the European Union.

In order to establish a closer and more institutionalised relationship with its Mediterranean neighbours, the EU launched the Barcelona Process in 1995. Then French president Jacques Chirac claimed that the Mediterranean must remain a strategic priority for Europe, as it was a strategic priority for France. The Fifth Republic has always wanted to remain a key actor within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as France has always considered the EU to be a tool for successfully projecting French interests. Following that, the new president, Nicholas Sarkozy proposed a plan called Union for the Mediterranean, by which he wanted to unite Mediterranean countries under French leadership. The first reason why Sarkozy suggested the formation of this union was to advance the Gaullist notions of international rank and grandeur, while the second reason was to enhance French national security unilaterally. The way President Macron now emerged as Turkey’s main nemesis from EU heads of states or governments could remind us of President Sarkozy’s—one of the fiercest opponents of the Turkish accession to the European Union—conduct. It is important to note that, in numerous questions, France’s own geopolitical and strategic interests do not collide entirely with those of the whole of the European Union. There are member states, however, that fear France’s increasing influence over the EU’s common strategic decisions. Although President Macron is showing willingness to become the leading figure of a common European foreign policy, we should also notice the renationalisation of foreign policies in many EU countries hidden behind the active promotion of the EU’s common interests.5

After Sarkozy, François Hollande took a completely different approach to the Mediterranean region from that of his

predecessor. In his foreign policy vision, European issues were pre-eminent, while he seemed to ignore issues beyond the EU except for Operation Barkhane, a military intervention launched in the Sahel belt receiving logistical and diplomatic support from the United States. Despite President Holland’s different approach, the Mediterranean region gradually became the focal point of French foreign policy during the last few decades, even if different presidents incorporated this shift in various measures. The Mediterranean as a whole has been a key to advance French interests, to preserve France’s domestic stability, and to maintain the country’s international influence.6 The 2011 Arab Spring, however, has completely redefined the political, societal, and economic landscape on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. New extra-regional actors entered the region’s political, economic, and military scene, and, therefore, France finds it important to assume protagonism in this new environment. At first, Paris might have been optimistic about the Arab Spring, but it soon had to realise all the downsides of a destabilised Arab world. As a result, France has become a main target for terrorism and emerged as a leading power in the war against it throughout the world. Even more so in the light of the 2015 migration crisis, which was deepened by the fact that Libya had given up border control, which resulted in an immense flow of people towards the frontline member states, and, then, in many cases towards France as a result of secondary movement. France considers the Mediterranean cooperation to be a key factor in tackling migration—that is why the Holland presidency improved relations with Ankara. France has also built up many economic interests across the Mediterranean, most importantly in its former colonies and mandates. Despite all that, French diplomacy was devastated by the failure of not being able to substantially influence the course of events in Syria.7

France has always had a premier role within the EU in forming strong relations with the MENA region. It was also competing with Italy, the other main European stakeholder in the Mediterranean, in the Libyan conflict instead of cooperating with it to resolve international issues affecting both of them, such as migration and terrorism. Obviously, Libya is highly important for both countries, as their economic objective is to support the activities of their respective giant oil companies, ENI and Total. This geopolitical–economic competition might result in a longterm conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well, since the two oil giants are both aiming at gas and oil exploitation rights in disputed maritime territories. On the other hand, France is still one of the most active international actors in the Libyan conflict promoting stability. The Libyan Civil War was the first conflict where French diplomacy applied the “security first” strategy, an approach it is currently using in the Eastern Mediterranean. This relatively new attitude can be justified by the prospects of financial and economic gains besides longpending hegemonic ambitions, although, to realise all that, France will need the support of its fellow EU member countries. France’s new attitude might start, however, a geopolitical race for supremacy over Mare Nostrum.8

Besides Libya, there is also another theatre of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, notably Syria. France has taken significant interests in crisis settlement there after French diplomacy supported the Assad regime for forty years to ensure its influence in the Middle East, partaking in the attempts to solve situations such as the Lebanese Civil War or the Arab–Israeli

EU member states Other members Suspended members Observers

conflicts. In this regard, French diplomacy has to compete with Turkey’s increasing activism in the Middle East and the growing presence of Russia. The question is, therefore, still open: will France remain relevant in the Middle East in the end? The answer to this question starts in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There is a new geopolitical front forming on the doorstep of Europe, in the Eastern Mediterranean, meaning that whatever happens there is not a peripheral issue for the European Union any more. There is an anti-Turkey front emerging in the region, led mostly by EU member states, namely, Cyprus, Greece, and France, cooperating with actors from afield, for instance, the United Arab Emirates, as a result of Turkey’s growing activism in search for gas in the foregoing disputed maritime areas between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Cooperation has recently also increased between Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt, as well as key energy companies from Italy and France. This group was completed by Jordan and Palestine, resulting in the formulation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2019, which lacked Turkey despite, or because of, its claims over maritime territory. As a result, Cyprus, France, Greece, Egypt, and the UAE published a joint declaration in May 2020 that urged Turkey to respect the maritime boundaries and condemned the country’s military interference in Libya.9 French interests in the Eastern Mediterranean could grow in this new geopolitical situation where Washington is absent and Berlin is indifferent. In this environment Macron can prepare to replace the US as a security provider for the Middle East and the Mediterranean.10 Accordingly, France was the first foreign country to provide support in the rescue operation in Lebanon in the aftermath of the explosion that destroyed the port of Beirut last August, and French president Emmanuel Macron was the first foreign leader to visit the country after the tragedy, triggering political change by prompting the Lebanese political elite to collect the pieces of the fragmented political responsibility. Moreover, France also called upon the international community to offer

Macron visiting Beirut after the explosion in summer 2020 (from left to right: Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president of Turkey, Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, and Emmanuel Macron, president of France)

Lebanon, through the UN (UN Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL)

Kuwait and Iraq, through a US-led coalition (Operation Desert Storm)

United Arab Emirates, through two permanent military bases (navy and air force)

Iraq, through the US-led coalition against IS

Syria, through the US-led coalition against IS

Lebanon, through the ad hoc Multinational Force (MNF)

Iraq, through an ad hoc US–FR–UK coalition Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch)

Libya, through NATO (Operation Unified Protector)

Libya, through special forces

Mediterranean Sea, through the EU (EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia)

help at a United Nations aid conference and provided a remarkable amount of financial and material assistance.

In the debate evolving between Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey about the oil and gas exploitation rights, France prominently took the side of the first two countries. The Turkish research ship Oruç Reis that caused tensions between EU countries and Turkey was only one factor setting Macron against Erdoğan. Emmanuel Macron did not hesitate to deploy French military vessels near Cyprus to protect France’s interests and to make sure Total can profit from the exploitation rights that Cyprus and Greece would be happy to provide France with in exchange for its protection against the Turkish aggressor. President Macron sees this international tension as an opportunity rather than an inconvenience, as his country can, at last, have a chance to assume a leading role within the European Union. It is questionable, however, why France decided to take its course rather than align its position with its greatest ally, Germany. One of the explanations is that France aims to make use of Brexit to take the lead in the European project.11 Besides, Europe could witness the most severe Turkish–Greek escalation in years. The core of the conflict is, indeed, the fact that Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries are disputed between two NATO allies, prompting other NATO members to choose between the two opposing sides. France’s choice was rather simple for the above reasons: for the ex-colonial empire, the Mediterranean is a bridge to Africa and its former colonies, and Turkey gaining influence there would disrupt existing maritime routes. This situation is also a perfect opportunity for Macron to showcase that France is a key regional player. Germany’s indecisiveness can further contribute to assuming this role, as Greece runs for help to Paris rather than hiding behind its main financial protector.

When the president of the French Republic was invited to give an opening speech on the 2020 Middle East Mediterranean Summer Summit in Lugano, President Macron emphasised France’s connection to the Mediterranean and implied that his country was willing to assume its leading role in the area justified by its geographic position and its economic size. Aspiring to this task, President Macron has never hidden his feelings about NATO: he considers it to be a weakening organisation because its main patron, the United States, has decided to withdraw from its commitments in the Mediterranean. Therefore, France has decided to take its role, even if it means a clash with other NATO allies, notably the Erdoğan-led Turkey. Last but not least, Macron emphasised the delicate issue of the tension evolving between Greece and Turkey, recommending that the Mediterranean should form an energy union to make sure conflicts in transit countries would not threaten energy supply.12

Over the question of Turkey’s strengthening influence, the two traditional competitors in the Mediterranean, France and Italy, decided to join forces. If they could persuade other EU members, real sanctions could be imposed against Turkey—just like in 2018, when the EU froze accession negotiations with Ankara after its gunboat diplomacy had started. It is very hard to identify the rule maker in the Mediterranean great game, as, for instance, France, Italy, Turkey, and Egypt have all been competing in Libya to assume a leading role. In order for Macron to be able to realise his Pax Mediterranea, a Franco–Italian energy cooperation based on the often-mentioned EU solidarity would be needed.13

Recently, a Turkish warship illuminated a French frigate with a targeting radar, upsetting the French administration that accused NATO of failing to condemn the incident. As a result, France pulled out of NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean, organising joint military exercises with Greece, Italy, and Cyprus instead. Unfortunately from France’s perspective, Europe is divided over Turkey’s expansionism: while France, Greece, and Cyprus belong to the tough camp, Italy, Spain, and Germany have a more conciliatory approach. It would without doubt be in France’s interest to unite leading EU member states on its

side.14 Otherwise, the French aspiration to build hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean might be undermined by Turkey. The two powers have always found themselves on opposing sides in conflicts emerging in the Mediterranean since the Libyan Civil War. Both have supporters, but Turkey’s aggressive behaviour might push most Arab states towards France. However, Macron’s posture adopted towards Islamism and the way how Erdoğan capitalises on that might break this trend.

Méditerranée de Lugano. Élysée.fr. 29 August 2020 <http:// bitly.ws/bNUo > 13 Michaël Tanchum: Turkish Military Maneuvering Pushed Italy and France to Join Forces in the Mediterranean. Now What? Foreign Policy. 23 September 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bNUr > 14 Jana Puglierin [et al.]: Views from the capitals: Gas conflict in the eastern Mediterranean. European Council on Foreign Relations. 16 September 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bNUu >

1 Remi Daniel: France in the Eastern Mediterranean: Rushing to save Beirut, Losing in Libya, and Standing Alone against Erdogan. The Institute for National Security Studies. 19 August 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bNU6 >. 2 Christophe Ayad: La diplomatie d’Emmanuel Macron à usage interne montre ses limites. Le Monde. 10 November 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bNU7 > 3 Iyad Dakka: Will Either Macron or Erdogan Back Down in the Eastern Mediterranean. World Politics Review. 9 September 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bNUb > 4 Update on the Mediterranean at the Med7 Summit. Gouvernement.fr. 10 September 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bNUf > 5 Jakub Wodka: Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership geopolitical Interests or Complementary concepts? Turkish Policy Quarterly. 2010/3. 147–156. 6 Sébastien Abis–Jean-François Coustillière: François Hollande and the Mediterranean Region. IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook. 2013. 159–162. 7 Ibid. 8 Matteo Ilardo: The Rivalry between France and Italy over Libya and its Southwest Theatre. AIES Fokus, 2018/5. 9 August 2018. <https://bit.ly/3m2W8xX > 9 Asli Aydıntaşbaşv [et al.]: Overview: Fear and loathing in the eastern Mediterranean. European Council on Foreign Relations. 21 May 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bNUh > 10 Henri J. Barkey: France vs. Turkey: A Showdown in the Mediterranean Is Brewing. The National Interest. 16 September 2020. <http://bitly.ws/bNUi > 11 Jean-Loup Bonnamy: «Le couple franco-allemand n’existe plus: le refus de Merkel de soutenir la Grèce et la France face à Erdogan le prouve.» Le Figaro. 19 August 2020. <http://bitly. ws/bNUk > 12 Notre Méditerranée gronde. Écoutez le message du Président Emmanuel Macron au Forum Moyen-Orient