and the Eastern Mediterranean

József Kádár

The Emirate of Transjordan, today known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, was established by Great Britain after World War I in 1921. Its territory was part of the Ottoman Empire before World War I and was mainly inhabited by Arab tribes. Abdullah I bin al-Hussein was appointed the head (emir) of the new state. He was the second son of Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi, the sharif and emir of Mecca and the leader of the anti-Ottoman Arab Revolt that broke out in 1916. As a member of the Hashemite family, he was a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, so he—just as the Hashemites—always played an essential role in Middle Eastern politics. Transjordan itself “was an artificial product of a series of major political accidents during the implementation of the peace settlement”1 after World War I. Like the state itself, the name Transjordan was also artificial; the word means “the territory beyond the River Jordan,” in other words, the east bank of Jordan.

During the first twenty-five years of its history, the new state was part of the British mandate system. The country was considered a military base and a buffer zone between the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, and the Saudi territories, its role being to protect British strategic interests in the Middle East. Britain established an army, called the Arab Legion, which was led and trained by British military officers and consisted of Arab (mostly Transjordanian) soldiers. Emir Abdullah’s first task as head of state was to create all necessary state institutions and to deal with the Bedouin tribes, especially those who were not satisfied with the new central government. During the Ottoman era, the Bedouin tribes that lived in the Transjordanian desert had a relatively undisturbed life, as they lived far enough from the Ottoman administration. After World War I, the new situation made some tribes dissatisfied because the government threatened the tribal chiefs’ traditional political role and, in some cases, their frustration turned into riots. The largest tribal rebellion against the new Transjordanian regime was the Balqa Revolt in 1923. Finally, the emir succeeded in being reconciled with the tribes and in stabilising the state.

In 1928, the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty was signed, and the so-called Organic Law was also adopted. The latter functioned as the first constitution of Transjordan. Both documents laid down the principles of relations between Britain and Transjordan and the emir’s rights and obligations. The agreement confirmed the ultimate authority of Britain, and its articles “reflected the British preoccupations with Transjordan hitherto, with strategic issues [. . .] and Britain’s relentless pursuit of efficient and effective governance [. . .] to the fore.”2

In the meanwhile, the development of the Transjordanian national identity began. John

Abdullah I bin Al-Hussein the emir of Transjordan (1921–1946) and the king of Jordan (1946–1951) arriving at Amman in 1920

Glubb,3 who served in the Arab Legion from 1930 and took over the army’s leadership in 1939, actively took part in this process. Glubb tried to transform the traditional tribal identity into a Transjordanian national identity, but he did not achieve the desired result.4 The process was prolonged, but the roots of Transjordanian nationalism can be traced back to the 1930s.

During the Mandate era, the relation between the emir and the tribes, just as between the emir and the legion, became closer, resulting in stable governance in Transjordan. This special triangle of political power (the monarchy, the army, and the tribes) seems to be the reason why Jordan could always get over its crises.

Jordan finally gained independence from Britain in 1946, and Abdullah became the king of the new state, so he could continue his policy towards Palestine. The primary goal of his Greater Syria5 scheme was to annex Palestine to his kingdom, and, for this purpose, he had secret negotiations with Palestinian Arabs and Zionists, too. Before the First Arab–Israeli War broke out, Abdullah and the Zionists had concluded a secret agreement on the Arab Legion’s commitment to limiting its military operations only to the Arab territories of Palestine.6 During the war, this unofficial cooperation between Abdullah and Israel was maintained until the armistice agreement was signed in 1949, which finally led to the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan in 1950, when the Jordanian Parliament announced the unification of both banks of the River Jordan. To solve the Palestinian refugee question, the Arabs of the West Bank were granted Jordanian citizenship (none of the other Arab states had given citizenship to Palestinian refugees).7 However, Palestinians were frustrated by the king’s territorial ambitions, a policy that led to the assassination of Abdullah by a Palestinian in 1951.8

After King Abdullah had died, his son, Talal, came to the throne. However, he was not eligible to be the head of the monarchy because he had a mental illness. In summer 1952, King Talal was deposed in favour of his son, Hussein. King Talal’s major project was the reform of Jordan’s constitution, which was adopted in 1952 and provides the legal basis for Jordan even to this day.9 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is, therefore, a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral system of representation. The National Assembly consists of two houses: the Chamber of Deputies with forty seats and the Senate with twenty seats.10

The young Hussein, who was only seventeen years old when his father was deposed, had to face several challenges in the first two decades of his reign. He inherited the Palestine refugee problem, and he suddenly fell into the struggle of Middle Eastern politics and the Cold War. Moreover, he had to deal with his grandfather’s elderly politicians and followers. The early 1950s was the era when radical Arab nationalism (i.e., pan-Arabism) was on the rise and the Palestinian nationalism began. Meanwhile, Jordan had its own unofficial ideology, the pan-Jordanism, which stated that the residents of both banks of the River Jordan are Jordanians. The struggle between these three ideologies determined two decades of the history of Jordan.11

The rise of pan-Arabism affected Jordan’s internal politics. Its first two significant consequences in the country were the dismissal of John Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion and the Arabisation of the army. It was renamed as the Jordanian Arab Army (today known as the Jordanian Armed Forces), and all of its British officers and intelligence agents were fired. King Hussein had two fundamental reasons to make this move. The first was personal, since there was a generational gap between Glubb and him, so they had not found a common language. The

King Abdullah I of Jordan and John Glubb, leader of the Arab Legion, the day before the King was assassinated

second reason was political, as he was trying to gain the trust of the political left by loosening the Anglo-Jordanian relations.12 However, this move made only a little impact on internal politics. In 1956, a parliamentary election was held, and the radical, revolutionary parties won several seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The communist National Front received three seats, the Ba’ath Party two, while eleven seats went to the National Socialist Party.13 The latter was the most successful party in this election, led by Suleiman al-Nabulsi, a radical leftist politician, who was asked to form a government.

Nabulsi, whose service as prime minister coincided with the Suez Crisis, began to break off Jordan’s relations with Britain. In early 1957, Jordan cancelled the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (signed in 1948) and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The transition from the British alliance brought an end to British financial aid. Since Jordan had always been dependent on this support, the financial situation of the country turned bad. Although Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia had signed the Arab Solidarity Agreement in January 1957, which would have substituted the British aid, only Saudi Arabia made its first payment. Moreover, the possibility of Jordan joining the future United Arab Republic threatened the position of the Hashemite monarchy. After the Eisenhower Doctrine had been announced, the US president could assist any state threatened by communism through financial and military support. The doctrine also aimed at limiting the expansion of Nasser’s influence in the region and encouraged King Hussein to change Jordan’s policy. Assisted by the army, he discarded Prime Minister Suleiman Nabulsi and imposed martial law in April 1957 to protect and stabilise the monarchy. All political parties were banned, and, for the next three decades, political and parliamentary life was severely restricted.14 The Anglo-Jordanian relations were restored but, from then on, the United States became Jordan’s most important political ally and financial supporter.

In the 1960s, Jordan had to face the Palestinian problem and the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) founded in 1964. The Palestinians, especially those who lived in the West Bank, opposed the Hashemite monarchy. As a consequence of the Six-Day War in 1967, when the West Bank was lost to Israel, some 300,000 Palestinian refugees crossed the River Jordan and settled in East Bank camps. Thus, the loss of the West Bank was not only a political defeat but also caused a social crisis. Meanwhile, the PLO had more and more political power, especially after Jasser Arafat had seized power within the organisation. Some armed Palestinian fedayeen groups took control over Jordanian regions. Finally, King Hussein decided to expel all PLO forces from Jordan. The special triangle of the monarchy, the tribes, and the army came together again against the common enemy, just like in 1957. In September 1970, a civil war broke out (the event is also called Black September from the Palestinians’ perspective) and, following that, the expulsion of the PLO was concluded within a year. The conflict meant an end to panJordanism and the return to Transjordanianism. In the 1970s, residents of Palestinian origin were considered strangers, not part of the nation. However, they still held Jordanian citizenship.15 In 1974, at the Rabat Arab League summit, Jordan agreed, along with the other member states,

King Abdullah II during his first visit to the United States in 1999

that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinians.16 Then, in 1988, Jordan renounced its claims to the West Bank.

In 1989, King Hussein had to face many political challenges. Jordan is a country lacking any natural resources or advanced industry; that is the reason why it depends on external financial aid. Since the end of the 1950s, the United States, oil-producing Arab countries in the Gulf, and international institutions such as the IMF have been Jordan’s prominent supporters.17 In 1988, Jordan’s budget deficit was JOD 388 million, double of the previous year’s. The economic crisis led to political demonstrations demanding not only economic but also political reforms.18 Moreover, changes in the international political scene, e.g., the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, encouraged the king to announce political reforms in his country. He launched his liberalisation programme in 1989, when general elections were also held. These were the first elections since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967. The adoption of the National Charter in 1990 was part of the king’s response to the riots. “The original aim of the charter was to provide a political framework to regulate the transition towards a more liberal form of politics in the kingdom[. . . .] [i]ts greatest importance was in the reassurance that it offered the King about the moves taking place in the direction of greater political liberalisation. The basic contract at the heart of the charter was that the King would allow complete restoration of pluralist, democratic, participatory politics.”19 In 1990, the martial law was lifted, and in 1992, political parties were legalised again.20

In the 1990s and 2000s, Jordan did not participate directly in any conflicts in the Middle East. However, Hussein supported Saddam in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, which led to the temporary suspension of US financial aid, causing damage to Jordan’s international positions.21 In 1994, Jordan was open to conduct peace negotiations with Israel, which ended with the conclusion of the Israel–Jordan peace treaty. Despite the treaty, Israeli–Jordanian relations remained cold, even in 2000, when an Israeli–Palestinian conflict began and Jordan withdrew its ambassador from Israel for years. Meanwhile, in 1999, King Hussein passed away after forty-seven years on the throne, and he was succeeded by his son, Abdullah II bin al-Hussein.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, King Abdullah also had to face terrorism in his country. On a November evening in 2005, a series of coordinated bomb attacks occurred in three hotels in Amman and killed fifty-seven people. Right after the attack, the al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the acts. The government, later, decided to implement anti-terror measures.

In 2011, civil revolts demanding political and economic reforms broke out in various Arab states. This series of events, called the Arab Spring, also reached Jordan, where political

A map from 1955 showing Jordan and the West Bank, which was annexed in 1950 and held until the 1967 Six-

Day War

1-1,000 1,001-10,000 10,001-50,000 50,001-100,000

unrest began well before the outbreak of the revolts. The demonstrations were led by the Muslim Brotherhood, and, in their early phase, they protested at unemployment and corruption and demanded constitutional and electoral law reforms. The very “surprising [thing] about the visible manifestations of the unrest in Jordan [was] the involvement of the non-Palestinian elements of the population.”22 King Abdullah II, responding to the demonstrations, deposed his prime minister, which he did again two more times during the year. In summer, he promised that more reforms would be announced in the future, including new election and political party laws. After the government had announced the new electoral law in 2015, the 2016 parliamentary elections were the first since 1989 to be held by proportional representation.

Jordan has kept its role as a key buffer between the Gulf and the Levant. The position of the Hashemite monarchy is stable, in spite of the past and present political demonstrations. The conflicts in Syria and Iraq during the 2010s did not pose a military threat to the country’s internal stability. Jordan, however, must face the presence of Syrian and Iraqi refugees. Its economy is still dependent on external financial aid. The United States and the Arab Gulf states see Jordan as a key security partner against terrorism or radical ideologies in the region, and that is the reason why they still support the country. “Jordan actively participated in Global Coalition to Counter ISIL

military efforts and amended key counterterrorism legislation. Jordan continued to provide diplomatic and political support to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in addition to its support for a political resolution to conflicts in Syria and Iraq.”23

Finally, mention must be made of the COVID-19 pandemic which Jordan has been seriously hit by. Although it impacted all of the world’s countries, “its effect in Jordan has taken a particular toll.”24 Due to the lack of national resources, the economy of the country can only count on tourism and money transfers from Jordanian employees working abroad. However, these two sources of income are still restricted by the global economic impact of the pandemic.

1 Ma’an Abu Nowar: The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Creation and Development of Transjordan, 1920-29. Vol. 1. Ithaca Press, Oxford, 1989. 1. 2 Philip Robins: A History of Jordan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 36. 3 John Bagot Glubb (1897–1986), known as Glubb Pasha, was a British army officer. After World War I, he served in Iraq and, from 1930, in Transjordan. He led the Arab Legion from 1939 to 1956. He was one of the main political advisors and best friends of Emir/King Abdullah. 4 Yoav Alon: The Tribal System in the Face of the StateFormation Process: Mandatory Transjordan, 1921–46. International Journal of Middle East Studies. 2005/2. 215–216. See also Joseph A. Massad: Colonial Effects. The Making of National Identity in Jordan. Columbia University Press, New York, 2001. 144, 148–162. 5 Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham) was a former province of the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Fatimid Caliphate. The Arab name of this region, Bilad al-Sham means the “left-hand region” from the perspective of Hijaz, a region in west Saudi Arabia. From the 19th century, most of the Arab leaders’ dream was to recreate Greater Syria and the Caliphate. In the 20th century, most of the Arab statesmen had their own Greater Syria plan: they all wanted to reunify the Middle East. Greater Syria involves the territories of contemporary Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine/Israel, but, according to some politicians, Egypt, Iraq, or Cyprus can be part of the region, as well. 6 Rostoványi Zsolt: Együttélésre ítélve. Zsidók és palesztinok harca a Szentföldért. Corvina Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 104.; Avi Shlaim: Collusion across the Jordan. King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988. 115.; Kádár József: Abdalláh király és Izrael. Transzjordániai–izraeli kapcsolatok az első arab–izraeli háború idején (1947–1951). Iskolakultúra. 2016/12. 46–57. 7 Robins, 73. 8 László Csicsmann: Responsible Freedom and National Security: Liberalisation and De-liberalisation in Jordan under King Abdullah II. Society and Economy. 2007/1. 99. 9 Robins, 81.; Csicsmann, 99–100. 10 The number of deputies in the Chamber was raised several times during the history of Jordan. Today, there are 130 members in the Chamber of Deputies. The number of seats in the Senate is always half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (it is 65 today). Renate Dieterich: Jordan. In: Elections in Asia and the Pacific. A Data Handbook. Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, edited by Dieter Nohlen–Florian Grotz–Christof Hartmann. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 141–154. 11 This era, the 1950s and 1960s, is also called the Arab Cold War by Malcolm H. Kerr in his book The Arab Cold War. Gamal ’Abd al-Nasir and Rivals, 1958–1970. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971. 12 Robins, 93–94. 13 Dieterich, 151. 14 Robins, 97–102. 15 József Kádár: The Jordanian Nationalism. Mediterrán Tanulmányok. Études sur la Région Méditerranéenne. 2019/1. 91–100. 16 Közlemény az Arab Liga csúcskonferenciájáról. Rabat, 1974. október 29. In: Dokumentumok a Közel-Kelet XX. századi történetéhez, edited by Lugosi Győző. L’Harmattan Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2006. 440–441. 17 Oded Eran: Demonstrations in Jordan: A Bona Fide Threat to the Regime? Institute for National Security Studies. 7 June 2018. <https://bit.ly/2NShG3D > 18 Robins, 166–167. 19 Robins, 174. 20 Csicsmann, 100–101.; Dieterich, 142. 21 Nigel Ashton: King Hussein of Jordan. A Political Life. Yale University Press, New Haven–London, 2008. 258–283. 22 Oded Eran: Jordan. Demonstrations and Reforms on the Back Burner. In: One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, edited by Yoel Guzansky–Mark A. Heller. Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, 2017. 49. 23 Country Reports on Terrorism 2014. United States Department of State. June 2015. 182. <https://bit.ly/3rVoA61 > 24 Oded Eran: Jordan. A New Political System Faces Longstanding Problems. Institute for National Security Studies. 20 October 2020. <https://bit.ly/38jHEUT >