of Reconstruction

László Csicsmann

The military scene in Syria witnessed a radical change with the recent defeat of the Islamic State (IS) near the city of Baghouz in 2019. Despite the military setback of the terrorist organisation, Jihadism still poses a significant risk to the country. After the elimination of the former rebel strongholds in southern Syria, Idlib province became the main military challenge for the Assad regime. This article analyses the recent political and economic developments of the Syrian conflict on a local, regional, and global level. It argues that, with the US’s disengagement from Syria under the Trump administration, Russia has become the main policymaker in the conflict. This interpretation echoes Assad’s narrative, who portrays himself as the winner of the civil war. The goal of the regime is to re-establish the pre–Arab Spring political structures, returning to the pre-2011 political settings. However, the recent shift in the local, regional, and global geopolitical context does not promote this objective. The author would argue that the Assad regime has not won but survived the civil war, and its existence is not taken for granted in the long run.1

With the defeat of the Islamic State in Syria, the military phase of the conflict seems to be in its final phase. After the military combat, the country has been divided into four parts, three of which are not under the sovereignty of the Assad regime today: 1) The territory controlled by the Assad regime. Since reoccupying the southern part of the country from the rebel groups, the Assad regime has sovereignty over the most densely populated cities in Syria except for Idlib province. The Assad regime claims that the country has returned to its normal life since the defeat of the Islamic State and the regime provides all the necessities for the citizens. The administration in Damascus follows Bashar al-Assad, who perceives himself as a politically legitimate president due to the “successful” 2014 election. According to the amended constitution, the next presidential elections will take place in 2021 in which Assad could be nominated as a presidential candidate. This narrative also has an effect on the refugee situation. Currently, six or seven million Syrian citizens get asylum in one of the neighbouring countries or elsewhere. This situation satisfies the regime, as most of the refugees are the main opponents of Assad’s rule in Syria. The Assad regime does not have the intention to resettle the refugees in Syria after terminating the civil war, as the current population of 16 million serves the interests of those who are ruling Damascus.

The regime has already started the reconstruction process since 2017. According to a recent estimate, the reconstruction in Syria would cost USD 250 billion, which raises several questions.2 After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the regime transformed itself into a typical war economy. During the flowering of Assad’s rule, the regime was based on the support of the Alawite minority and the Sunni trading class in important cities such as Damascus and Aleppo. This unwritten social contract was breached after the unfolding of the popular uprising which turned into a civil war in July 2012. A new kind of balance has emerged since then, reinforcing the Assad regime which builds on new types of warlords and businessmen controlling Syria. To strengthen this new type of bargain, the regime has adopted several laws and legal measures which also serve as a means of confiscating the lands and property of the old guard and those who left

the country.3 The presidential decree number 10 of the year 2018 stipulates that all properties can be confiscated, which serves the interest of those twenty to thirty warlords in Syria who fight for the survival of the Assad regime.4

The political part of the reconstruction, better to be called reconciliation, has started under the auspices of the Astana process which has been launched by Russia, Iran, and Turkey. A Constitutional Committee was established in September 2019, aimed at adopting a new constitution in the foreseeable future. The committee consists of three political blocs: the Syrian Negotiations Committee (basically the opposition to the Assad regime), the so-called Middle Third (the members of the civil society), and the representatives of the Assad regime.5 It has two different bodies; the first is aimed at preparing the new constitution, while the second is responsible for approving the draft text. The political process is limited due to the lack of consensus among the parties involved in it. The Assad regime does not show any interest in advancing the political process, as it tries to sell the idea that the state of normalcy has returned. As it was mentioned earlier, the next presidential elections are supposed to take place in 2021, which can help boost the legitimacy of the existing regime. However, the regime very much depends on the regional and global players’ interests both politically and economically. 2) The rebel stronghold Idlib province, the last territory under the control of the rebels, has a population of around three million. Currently, it is dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a radical jihadist–Salafist organisation close to al-Qaeda. In 2017, the HTS established the

Controlled by the Syrian Arab Republic (Syrian Armed Forces [SAA] and allies) Controlled by the Syrian Salvation Government: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham [HTS] and allies) Controlled by the Syrian Interim Government (Syrian National Army [SNA] and allies) and Turkish Armed Forces Controlled by Rojava (Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF]) Controlled by Revolutionary Commando Army (MaT) and United States Armed Forces Joint control between SAA and SDF

SAA and opposition faction stable truce area

Government of National Salvation, calling for a genuine Syrian-led political transition. The HTS has been regarded as a terrorist organisation by both Russia and the United States; however, it shares pragmatic relations with Turkey.6 After reoccupying the southern parts of the country with Russian support, the regime launched a military offensive in December 2019 against the HTS based in Idlib. The HTS has frequently attacked military bases belonging to Russia (for instance, the Hmeimim Air Base). Political tension escalated during spring 2020 due to the Turkish cooperation with the HTS, which was heavily criticised by Moscow. 3) The Kurdish quasi-autonomous territory (Rojava) has been under the de facto control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) since 2012. In March 2016, the Rojava Democratic Federation was established by the dominant political party of the region, the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, Democratic Union Party). The PYD as a political force has been neglected in the political negotiations on the future of Syria. It proposes an ideology which is based on Murray Bookchin’s democratic confederalism and democratic autonomy.7 4) The north-western and north-central part of Syria has been under the occupation of Turkish forces since 2016, when Ankara intervened to prevent the Kurdish minority from forming a united autonomous territory from the areas east and west to the Euphrates. Turkey has launched three military offensives against the Islamic State forces and the Kurdish peshmergas. The latest military incursion took place in October 2019, and it aimed at establishing a security buffer zone at the Turkish–Syrian border. The Assad regime criticises the role of Turkey in Syria and claims that the country breached its sovereignty.

The Middle East has been trapped in the new Cold War of the 21st century, the rift between

Crimea

Syria Countries that give official military support for the Syrian government Factions/groups that support the opposition with military forces that are located in the coloured country Countries that support the Syrian rebels

Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Syrian conflict is a mirror of regional developments in which two regional actors, namely, Iran and Turkey, have been playing the most active role. Both regional players act under the guidance of Russia, which has initiated the Astana process, aimed at establishing a political framework for a lasting solution to the civil war, in January 2017. Iran’s and Turkey’s perception of the Syrian conflict differ fundamentally, as Tehran has an interest in maintaining and strengthening the ruling Assad regime, while Ankara’s goal is to support the anti-Assad rebel groups in Idlib. There are other important regional actors shaping the dynamics of the Syrian crisis, namely, Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains a physical presence in the country, as it has the intention to connect the so-called Shia Crescent, Iran’s zone of influence comprising the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shia communities, and the Alawites living in Syria. The so-called Shia militias, the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU, al-Hashd al-Shaabi), together with the Hezbollah forces, have been actively fighting on the ground in Syria to preserve the Assad regime. Iran is interested not only militarily or politically in the Syrian reconstruction programme, initiated by the ruling regime in Damascus, but also economically. Having signed the nuclear deal with the major powers, Iran became a legitimate regional player in the Middle East. As the sanctions against it are lifted only gradually, Iran has limited financial assets to support the reconstruction process in Syria. The IRGC has invested in electricity production, telecommunication, and the phosphate-mining industry.8

However, Trump’s decision in the summer of 2018 to withdraw from the nuclear deal further reduced opportunities for Iran to invest in the Syrian economy. Iran’s limited ability to advance its interests in Syria was aggravated by the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the al-Quds forces, and Abu Mahdi alMuhandis, the former head of Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and the deputy leader of the PMU, in January 2020.

The Syrian conflict is held hostage to the rift between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The GCC countries have generally supported the antiAssad rebel groups since 2011. Some countries participated in the aerial bombings of the Islamic State launched by the United States in September 2014. However, the GCC countries have kept a low profile in Syria in recent years. The main goal of the GCC countries is to contain the Iranian expansion in the conflictdriven country. It means that the oil monarchies are not interested in reconstruction which would serve Iran’s interest. The United Arab Emirates has recently shown a more pragmatic approach to the recognition of the Assad regime, as Abu Dhabi reopened its embassy in Damascus in 2018.9

It is important for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to marginalise the role of the Turkish–Qatari alliance in Syria’s reconstruction. Syria is only a minor part of a larger geopolitical competition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Qatar would like to build a gas pipeline from the Gulf to Syria; therefore, the Turkish occupation of Northern Syria serves its interest. At the same time, Israel, together with Greece and Cyprus have signed an agreement to lay the EastMed pipeline with the political and financial support of the GCC countries and the EU. The establishment of this new infrastructure will evade the members of the Astana process, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Despite the fact that there is a certain kind of cooperation between Russia and the GCC countries, the oil monarchies have no interest in covering the bill of the reconstruction.

Israel has an ambiguous position on the Syrian crisis. While the Assad regime has been considered as the “known devil” by the country,

Estimated percentage range of Shia by country in 2009

LEBANON 45-55%

SYRIA 15-20%

IRAQ 45-55%

IRAN 90-95%

KUWAIT 20-25%

SAUDI ARABIA 10-15%

BAHRAIN 65-75%

QATAR 10%

UAE 10%

OMAN 5-10%

YEMEN 35-40%

Israel also has an interest in keeping the Islamic State-style radicalism out of the Middle Eastern country’s territory. The increased presence of the Iranian soldiers and the Shia militias posed a security threat to it; therefore, the Jewish State not only attacked the infrastructure of Hezbollah but also directly clashed with the Iranian forces in Syria. In the last two years, Syria witnessed a more direct confrontation between the regional powers. After the Iranian forces had moved closer to the Israeli border in 2019, Russia’s mediation between the two countries resulted in the quasi-withdrawal of the Iranian soldiers from the neighbourhood of Israel. By signing the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrein and normalising its relations with other Arab countries, Israel is now formally part of an anti-Iranian alliance. Thus, Prime Minister Netanyahu could reverse the marginalisation of the Jewish State in the MENA region.

Turkey has been playing the most active role among the regional players since the outbreak of the conflict. As it was mentioned earlier, Turkey is an occupying force in the north-western part of Syria. Turkey runs its own reconstruction, building on the local groups in the rebel-held territories of Idlib province. The country’s longterm goal is to prevent any kind of separatism among the Kurds and, at the same time, to establish a security zone between Turkey and Syria. Turkey’s policy on the Syrian crisis has profoundly changed from the total denial of the Assad regime to a more pragmatic approach. Today, Turkey’s Syria policy is not necessarily aimed at ousting the ruling regime from power. However, Turkey has no interest in advancing Russia’s or Iran’s position in Syria. The abovementioned regional transformation—namely, the EastMed and the Abraham Accords—has direct consequences on Turkey’s regional position. Maintaining influence in Syria and taking part in the reconstruction are key interests for Turkey.10

Three global players could shape the political and economic reconstruction project from outside: Russia, the United States, and the European Union. With the gradual US disengagement from the Syrian conflict, Russia has the upper hand to decide about the future of the Assad regime and the Syrian state. Russia’s active role in the Syrian conflict is not entirely new, but, with the country’s military intervention in 2015, it rose to a higher level. The Syrian conflict is an important “power projection” for Russia to demonstrate its global power status to the world. The country’s goal in the Syrian conflict is to balance among different actors and to try to manage the conflict through a power-sharing agreement. It does not mean that Moscow insists on maintaining the Assad regime in power forever.

Russia has a strong economic presence in the country, as it has invested USD 20 billion in the Middle Eastern country since 2008. Russia has a profound interest in the energy sector, and Russian companies have conducted negotiations on the development of the Syrian railway system. In 2019, the Russian Stroytransgaz won the reconstruction project of the Tartus port facilities valued at USD 500 million.11

As Raymond Hinnebusch points out, Russia has a larger geopolitical role in the Syrian conflict than other global actors; however, its financial capability to support the reconstruction is remarkably limited.12 This thesis has been proved by Russia’s inability to finance the reconstruction in southern Syria after it had been re-occupied by the Assad regime. Russia again acted as a mediator between the socalled rebel groups and the regime, which led to the reconciliation agreement signed in the city of Bosra in July 2018.13 They promised to resettle the internally displaced people, to create functioning state organs, and to provide an economic perspective. Neither Russia nor the Assad regime has fulfilled this promise in Southern Syria. It means that it is not possible to discuss the reconstruction in Syria without the role of Western powers.

Western powers, Washington and Brussels, have not been interested in a Russian-led Syrian reconstruction. They have a limited geopolitical role; however, their geo-economic potential is elevated. Both the US and the EU stick to the

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire and eighteen-month negotiated political transition. This conditionality prevents any real EU or US contribution to the Syrian reconstruction, which helps the Assad regime to survive. The Syria policy of the United States is a complex phenomenon including the maximum pressure policy on Iran, the protection of Israel’s safety, the fight against terrorism, and the containment of the Assad regime.14 The Trump administration announced the US military disengagement from Syria in 2018 rearranging the soldiers mainly to the Persian Gulf. Syria is still under a series of US sanctions imposed in or after 2011, which prevents any potential contribution to the reconstruction process. For Washington, it is important to monitor the role of Turkey and its deepening cooperation with Russia. Ankara’s purchase of the S-400 defence system has been heavily criticised by the White House. The United States gives the Syrian conflict over to Russia; it does not mean, however, that Washington left the Kurdish minority altogether alone.

The European Union is not the most important strategic player on the ground; however, it is committed to contributing to the reconstruction. The precondition of any significant EU investment in Syria is based on progress in the political transition laid down by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. At the same time, the EU maintains a system of sanctions against Syria and some targeted Syrian citizens. The EU adopted a Syria strategy in 2017 which echoes the principles of the above-mentioned United Nations resolution: protecting the civilians, promoting democracy and human rights, and facilitating the political transition. The EU’s perception of the Syrian crisis does not entirely meet realities. The gradual disengagement of the United States from Middle Eastern affairs, as well as

the Russian power projection and Russia’s increased influence, has been weakening the European positions in the Middle East. Brussels lacks any pragmatic approach to the eventuality of a strengthening Assad regime. Its most important commitment is the humanitarian aid valued at more than EUR 17 billion since 2011.15 There is no consent on extending the sanctions regime among the member states, as it has contributed to reduceing the EU’s already weakening position in the region.

The Syrian civil war has entered a new phase with the recent military victories of the Assad regime. The Western media have often claimed that the Assad regime in Damascus is close to its end; however, with continued support from Russia, the strategic power relations shifted. It is not possible to turn the clock back, as the damages made by the civil war have had irreversible consequences since 2011. The attention of the international community has recently turned towards political and economic reconstruction. This paper has shown how perceptions differ from country to country. There is no consent about how to deal with the current Syrian situation neither on a regional nor on a global level. Reconstruction has a different meaning in Moscow, Washington, and Brussels. What is strikingly new is how the European and American perceptions of the Middle Eastern issues have started to diverge. From a European point of view, the Syrian reconstruction offers the member states a new opportunity to reengage with Middle Eastern countries. However, the EU’s Syria policy should be reformulated with a more pragmatic approach, allowing more opportunities for the member states. If the EU continues to adopt its value-based policy on the Syrian civil war, it will be left out of the reconstruction process. However, without the financial help of the Western countries or the GCC bloc, a realistic reconstruction process is not possible in Syria.

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