The Russian-Kazakh Encounter: A History of Misunderstandings Yaroslav Gouzenko
D
uring the gradual disintegration of the Golden Horde, the eastern remnant of the once-feared Mongol empire, regional powers across the Eurasian steppe sought to appropriate the legitimacy of the former khanate. As its northwestern heirs, Muscovy and the successive Russian empire subjugated and incorporated its rivals; in the southeast, the Kazakh steppe and Transoxiana were the last to be drawn into the ‘blood feud.’ Both had inherited the political culture of the steppe, but their relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth century were marked by estrangement. The Russian empire styled itself as a European imperial power, while the Kazakhs organized themselves as a nomadic confederation of three loosely organized hordes: the Smaller, Middle, and Great. Rapidly, a colonial relationship filled the cultural gulf separating both peoples: Central Asia was to be Russified. Throughout the Romanov period (1613-1917), the Russian bureaucracy implemented various policies to achieve this goal, but on the eve of the revolution, Russification was far from achieved. Imperial doctrine, formed in the capital’s ministerial cabinets for the Kazakh steppe, was differently formulated overtime, encompassing ideologies of expansion, civilization, and nationalism. Russia had already developed proto-colonial policies prior to its eastward expansion across Eurasia into Kazakh lands, dealing with its more immediate neighbors first: the Tatars, Nogays, and Kalmyks. Like the Kazakhs, these peoples were “non-Christian societies with kinship based social organization and static, overwhelmingly nomadic pastoral economies,” whereas Russia stood out as a “Christian…military-bureaucratic state, with urban centers and a dynamic agricultural-industrial economy.” These dis-
tinct cultures did not share clearly defined borders—instead, they were separated by the dikoe pole, the wild field, “which implied both open, untamed expanses of land and a perilous frontier.” This contested area was full of opportunities for both types of societies, although they each held different visions of it. Ivan IV’s coronation as Tsar made Russia’s intentions for the steppe clear. He claimed the mantle of “the Third Rome, the New Jerusalem, and the New Saray, all at the same time.” By anchoring the legitimacy of the Golden Horde capital Saray to the Muscovite state, Ivan the Terrible asserted himself as its heir. Although foremost a symbolic gesture, it was indicative of the relations Russia wished to pursue with its steppe neighbors: they were now Moscow’s subordinates, which required the transformation of steppe political practices of alliance to formalized allegiance. These changes were ineffective, however, as steppe people continued to traditionally interpret diplomatic strategy, leading to misunderstandings between Muscovy and its neighbors. Moscow thus had to assert itself to dictate steppe politics, and with its monopoly over firepower, extensive fortification belts, the regional economy, and clan politics, it ultimately achieved its goal in creating a frontier hierarchy. Tevkelev, the Tatar imperial agent who had brokered negotiations between the Russian crown and Abulkhair, Khan of the Smaller Horde, formulated Russia’s first policy towards the Kazakhs. He noted that the Smaller Horde was politically divided, as Abulkhair was not trusted and his power was nominal. To maintain and extend Russian authority in the region, Tevkelev suggested techniques used in the western steppe. Gifts were strategically distributed to cultivate and reward
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