The Russian-Kazakh Encounter: A History of Misunderstandings

During the gradual disintegration of the Golden Horde, the eastern remnant of the once-feared Mongol empire, regional powers across the Eurasian steppe sought to appropriate the legitimacy of the former khanate. As its northwestern heirs, Muscovy and the successive Russian empire subjugated and incorporated its rivals; in the southeast, the Kazakh steppe and Transoxiana were the last to be drawn into the ‘blood feud.’ Both had inherited the political culture of the steppe, but their relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth century were marked by estrangement. The Russian empire styled itself as a European imperial power, while the Kazakhs organized themselves as a nomadic confederation of three loosely organized hordes: the Smaller, Middle, and Great. Rapidly, a colonial relationship filled the cultural gulf separating both peoples: Central Asia was to be Russified. Throughout the Romanov period (1613-1917), the Russian bureaucracy implemented various policies to achieve this goal, but on the eve of the revolution, Russification was far from achieved. Imperial doctrine, formed in the capital’s ministerial cabinets for the Kazakh steppe, was differently formulated overtime, encompassing ideologies of expansion, civilization, and nationalism. Russia had already developed proto-colonial policies prior to its eastward expansion across Eurasia into Kazakh lands, dealing with its more immediate neighbors first: the Tatars, Nogays, and Kalmyks. Like the Kazakhs, these peoples were “non-Christian societies with kinship based social organization and static, overwhelmingly nomadic pastoral economies,” whereas Russia stood out as a “Christian…military-bureaucratic state, with urban centers and a dynamic agricultural-industrial economy.” These distinct cultures did not share clearly defined borders—instead, they were separated by the dikoe pole, the wild field, “which implied both open, untamed expanses of land and a perilous frontier.” This contested area was full of opportunities for both types of societies, although they each held different visions of it. Ivan IV’s coronation as Tsar made Russia’s intentions for the steppe clear. He claimed the mantle of “the Third Rome, the New Jerusalem, and the New Saray, all at the same time.” By anchoring the legitimacy of the Golden Horde capital Saray to the Muscovite state, Ivan the Terrible asserted himself as its heir. Although foremost a symbolic gesture, it was indicative of the relations Russia wished to pursue with its steppe neighbors: they were now Moscow’s subordinates, which required the transformation of steppe political practices of alliance to formalized allegiance. These changes were ineffective, however, as steppe people continued to traditionally interpret diplomatic strategy, leading to misunderstandings between Muscovy and its neighbors. Moscow thus had to assert itself to dictate steppe politics, and with its monopoly over firepower, extensive fortification belts, the regional economy, and clan politics, it ultimately achieved its goal in creating a frontier hierarchy. Tevkelev, the Tatar imperial agent who had brokered negotiations between the Russian crown and Abulkhair, Khan of the Smaller Horde, formulated Russia’s first policy towards the Kazakhs. He noted that the Smaller Horde was politically divided, as Abulkhair was not trusted and his power was nominal. To maintain and extend Russian authority in the region, Tevkelev suggested techniques used in the western steppe. Gifts were strategically distributed to cultivate and reward

loyalty among Kazakh notables and a fort was built to supervise the region. In the first half of the eighteenth century, Russia still followed its proto-colonial practices in the Kazakh steppe; nevertheless, these practices became increasingly colonial throughout the century as Russia started to look westward in search of its own identity. Beginning with the reign of Peter I, Russia began to style itself in European terms. It belonged to the realm of civilized nations, and thus superior to those who did not. Since Russia had only recently joined this elite group, it recognized the potential for enlightenment in every nation: any Russian subject, regardless of his ethnic and religious affiliations, could be civilized. Control over the steppe was now subsumed by a mission civilizatrice of “deliberate aggrandizement and conscious transformation of the new territories and subjects.” The period of mere expansion had lost its significance in the Kazakh lands and was drawing to an end. Civilizing ideas had to be modified in the context of the Kazakh steppe due to its ongoing status as frontier and distance from the Russian political core. Catherine II’s “Measures to Increase Russian Influence in the Kirgiz Steppe” were representative of imperial pragmatism in civilizing Central Asia. Baron Igel’strom was instructed to send loyal Tatar mullahs to the Kazakh steppe, where their influence was to discourage any indigenous desire to violate Russian interests. This development was possible under her reign as the state bureaucracy associated Islam with civility. However, Kazakhs were more nominal than devout Muslims. Tatar intermediaries were thus tasked with bringing an orthodox version of Islam to the Kazakh steppe while extoling the virtues of tsarist protection. This process yielded mixed results. Tatars provided the Russian colonial apparatus with useful knowledge of the steppe—while in service, they kept travel logs which were important sources of ethnographic information and valuable accounts of Kazakh leadership. Kazakh leaders themselves sought the presence of Tatars among them because they recognized them as tokens of power, and mediators bestowed by Russia. Simultaneously, these intermediaries also conveyed “the image of a non-Russian official who was working in Russian service and who enjoyed influence and respect among his fellow people and the authorities.” Russia nevertheless failed to capitalize on Tatar efforts. Russian civilizing ideals entailed permanent settlement and agriculture, but Kazakh “cultural attachments to nomadism proved to have stronger allure.” Colonial authorities mismanaged the land despite the data accumulated by Tatars in their attempt to settle the region. In result, Kazakhs rose in revolt in 1776, joining the Pugachev Rebellion, and led sporadic raids under Srym Batyr from 1783 until his death in 1797. Russia needed to develop a new approach, beyond its expansive and civilizing measures. In 1822, as governor general of Siberia, Speransky, incorporated the Middle Horde under his mandate, and enacted the “Rules of the Siberian Kirghiz” which abolished the title of khan and established a civil administration in the region consisting of clans, volost, and okrugs. Each clan consisted of fifteen families with an elected elder at its head. The volost were composed of ten to twelve clans, and was administered by a sultan or member of the Kazakh aristocracy chosen by the elders. Finally, the whole region was divided into seven okrugs each led by a prikaz which was a committee chaired by a sultan, two Russian representatives, and two elected Kazakhs. It was tasked with judicial and policing functions, and land grants were also distributed to those Kazakhs willing to settle. The Smaller Horde was divided in 1831 into 54 distantsii, each controlled by an elected local and approved by Orenburg. Overall, although locals were incorporated within the new administrative structure, it proved to be a complete failure because bureaucratic demarcations “not only obstructed nomadic movement but cut

across historic emblems of identity such as [the Horde], which were connected to genealogy and territory.” Additionally, the problem was accentuated by Russian migration into the region. For example, 600 000 desiatin of land were taken over by Cossacks and Russian peasants from the Middle Horde, while seven million desiatin of land were expropriated for Russian use in The Ural region which encompassed lands traditionally belonging to the Smaller Horde. Inevitably, the situation led to new uprisings, including an attempted revolt led by Kenesary Kasymov of the Middle Horde, who managed to assemble 20 000 Kazakhs under his command in the 1830s. The next piece of legislation in the Kazakh steppe resulted from the incorporation of Turkestan into the empire. Between the 1830s and 1860s, the Great Horde and Kokand fell under Russian control, while Khiva and Bukhara fell in the 1870s and became protectorates. Plots of land were offered once again to those willing to farm. However, colonial authorities disregarded the needs of nomadic economy with “all land…declared to be property of the Russian state.” In other words, Russia was ‘leasing’ lands to the Kazakhs and regulating its distribution which impeded on “traditional migratory patterns.” Just like with its precedent, the Provisional Statute sparked turmoil, leading to further rebellions in the Middle and Smaller Hordes. Russian colonial authorities proved themselves inflexible, with increasingly aggressive civilizing policies in their pursuit of Kazakh settlement. The massive surge in Russian migration was the pivotal point in subduing the steppe. The land was Russified, while Kazakhs were forced into agriculture by the deterioration of their traditional economy. In 1889, the Resettlement Act allowed peasants from the Russian core to migrate to the Kazakh steppe and settle on ‘excessive lands,’ always ill-defined, and two years later, the Steppe Code granted them even more rights and privileges. However, the government was unable to contain the wave of peasants which surged past the Ural Mountains. In compensation however, fifteen desiatin of land was distributed to Kazakhs, no matter their lifestyle. Unfortunately, these were either inadequate for farming or simply not enough for grazing, and ultimately forced the nomad to settle down in order to survive. By the 20th century, the expansion of borders further south and the uncontrolled presence of Russian peasants had Russified the steppe. To completely dismiss Russian civilizing efforts would also be wrong, as they had an impact on a minority which would come to play a fundamental role in the first decades of the 20th century in the steppe: the Kazakh intelligentsia. Tatar intermediaries were eventually replaced by indigenous talent, as imperial schools were established in the area. Despite the subsequent loyalty of its graduates to the empire, men such Chokan Valikhanov, Ibrahim Altynsarin, and Abai Kunanbaev contributed to Kazakh self-consciousness through their ethno-cultural gathering endeavors as examples of Kazakh intellectual work in the first half of the nineteenth century. The following generations, however, were more critical of the regime and took interest in Islam, as “Kazakh [became] a literary language,” to which Islamic institutions provided an audience. Indeed, Russian authorities authorized the publication of newspapers in the steppe to increase literacy. In short, the Kazakh had a new elite “capable of communicating their grievances to one another and to the Russian government.” Overall, Russia was never consistent in its steppe policies, jumping from one the another without ever establishing the goals of the previous ones. It tried to civilize a people who neither saw themselves as subjects of the Russian empire, nor of its suzerain. Then, once the Kazakh steppe finally became a borderland with a civilized elite whose cooperation could have favored Russian rule, Russia shifted to an exclusive policy which favored the Russian center. It mattered little if the Kazakhs were civilized or not as waves of Russian migrants

swept East. The Russian peasant was the new civil element of the steppe, while the Kazakh nomad was regulated to the margins. Misunderstandings plagued the steppe throughout the imperial era. Despite hundreds of years of attempts, the dikoe pole never ceased to exist, remaining elusive even to the most powerful and ambitious steppe power of the modern era.