VI. 1960–1972 From bad to worse – the final chapter for ACSM

1960–1972 From bad to worse – the final chapter for ACSM

“If the shipping industry is experiencing difficulties, shipbuilding is suffering a tragedy”

ChrisTian bonneT, Journal oFFiciel, dÉbats parleMentaires, 19 november 1959

ACSM had gone through critical periods (the 1930s, the Second World War) since its establishment, but the extent of the looming crisis was unprecedented. Although the company was still making profits in 1959, the White Paper published in December of that year left it with little hope: Le Trait was evidently not going to be among the four or five shipyards (of the fourteen operating in France) “named by the Merveilleux du Vignaux Commission to form ‘the powerful and economically sound backbone of French shipbuilding.’”698

The unprecedented boom of the 1950s

Between 1950 and 1960, shipbuilding went through an unprecedented boom: worldwide production grew by 139%, with gross tonnage climbing from 3,489,000 to 8,359,000 tons and its annual growth rate reaching 12.3%. In France, 443,000 gross tons were launched in 1958 while 217,000 tons of new ships were produced in 1951. This boom can be traced back to a combination of several factors. ► More efficient production techniques Technological innovations – oxy-cutting of steel plates, prefabrication of a ship’s various sections in workshops, welding instead of riveting – shortened the occupancy time of slipways and helped rationalise

µ The Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat: launch of the oil tanker “Béarn” on 23 April 1960, for the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers (SFTP)

698 Report issued by the Merveilleux du Vignaux Commission, Chief Counsellor at the Court of Auditors, p. 5, quoted by Jean Domenichino, in “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière; les Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence de Port-de-Bouc (1950–1965),” in Le mouvement social : bulletin trimestriel de l’Institut français d’histoire sociale, No. 156, July–September 1991, Éditions Ouvrières, p. 56. methods and construction processes;699 this rationalisation, particularly in the best-equipped yards, spurred the shift from custom-built vessels to standard ships produced in series.700 Another notable transformation was the construction of vessels capable of carrying increasingly heavy loads. The average unit tonnage for oil tankers doubled between 1945 (16,000 dwt)701 and 1960 (30,000 dwt). When the Suez Canal closed during the first Suez Crisis (October 1956 to March 1957), this trend intensified: freed from the constraints on the ship’s draught imposed by the Canal, builders increased the deadweight of oil tankers and other ore-bulk carriers to satisfy the demands of shipping companies keen to offset the additional costs caused by the obligation imposed to ships to sail round Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. Increased transport capacity led to savings in financing (the higher the ship’s tonnage, the lower the investment cost in relation to deadweight tonnage), in payroll (a 30,000-ton ship required fewer crew members than two 15,000-ton ships), fuel consumption, duties and taxes, etc.

699 See Pierre Léonard, “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” in Revue économique, vol. 12, No. 4, 1961, p. 568: “By way of example, in just six years a French shipyard, through the use of prefabrication and a systematic policy of series production, has managed to reduce the time needed to construct the metal hull of an average-sized freighter from 110 to 60–65 hours per ton, or a saving of over 40% for a series-produced ship. Between the first ship and the fifth, the impact alone of series production makes it possible to save, for the entire freighter, 20% of shipyard hours, [item] corresponding to approximately one-third of the vessel’s production cost. At the end of the day, shipyards will be producing more and larger ships using fewer slipways, with less and less shipyard work per unit of gross tonnage.” 700 Ibid. Pierre Léonard emphasised that standardisation was suitable for certain classes of ships: oil tankers and bulk carriers. 701 Deadweight tonnage (dwt): the maximum load that a ship is able to transport.

In “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” Pierre Léonard stated that “between 16,000 dwt and 30,000 dwt […] the cost to transport one ton of crude oil from the Middle East to the English Channel [is] reduced by one quarter.” This same search for productivity prompted an increase in the speed of passenger liners and line freighters (20 knots in 1960 versus 10 knots in 1945, with average tonnage transported increasing from 4,650 gt702 in 1950 to 7,400 gt in 1960). ► More and more shipyards and an increasingly competitive world market World supply was marked by the rise of Japan to become the world’s leading shipbuilding nation in 1956 (its 24 main shipyards produced 1,340,000 tons in 1960–1961); and by the market entry of a new generation of builders (Spain, Poland, Yugoslavia), followed by several emerging countries (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ireland, Israel).703 This surge in production capacity occurred at the expense of Great Britain (16% of world production in 1960, versus 38% in 1950, and 51% in 1930). It also affected the six other members of the European Free Trade Association704 as well as the six members of the European Economic Community,705 which, despite an increase in their respective production (production in EFTA countries more than doubled and that of the EEC quadrupled between 1950 and 1960) declined. In 1950, these thirteen countries accounted for 74.1% or 2,586,000 gross tonnage of worldwide production; in 1960, the 5,276,000 gross tonnage launched by their shipyards accounted for no more than 63% of the total. Other countries now produced 37% (3,800,000 tons out of a total of 8,356,000 tons in 1960).706 ► Exceptional growth in trade Backed by “the surge of industrial production worldwide and the exceptional growth of trade”707 (the amount of freight transported doubled in ten to eleven years), maritime transport posted a growth rate of around 7%, while the tonnage of the world fleet increased by 4 to 4.5% on average per year. “The share carried under the French flag also increased,” wrote Bernard Cassagnou in Les mutations de la marine marchande française de 1945 à nos jours. “French imports carried by French vessels surged from 40% in 1938 to 58% in 1955 and to 68% in 1960. […] As regarded French exports, the share moved from 55% in 1938, to 47% in 1953 and 58% in 1960. At the time, these percentages were higher than those of Great Britain, West Germany and Italy.” These growth phases alternated with sharp downturns on shipping markets (cyclical by nature). For example, 1952–1954 and 1957–1961 were marked by decreases, while the Korean War (June 1950 to July 1953) and the Suez Crisis threw international trade into a panic, causing demand for transport to explode: the former, to develop safety stocks of raw materials; and the latter, to compensate for the extended sailing times caused by the Canal’s closure. 15 million gross tons were on order at the end of 1951, against 7 million at the end of 1950 – and 30 million in 1956–1957, or one-third of the world fleet.708

702 Gross tonnage or gross registered tonnage (grt): total inner capacity of a ship. 703 See Pierre Léonard, op. cit., p. 572: “Typically, developing countries are benefiting from the depressed state of shipping markets not only to build up merchant fleets under relatively cheap conditions, but also to get the shipbuilders, with whom they have placed their orders, to set up shipbuilding companies in their countries. To fill their threatened order books, many large shipyards, by providing technical and financial support, have readily contributed to setting the conditions for a future increase in market competition.” 704 The EFTA was established by the Convention of 4 January 1960 between Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 705 The EEC covered France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy, signatories to the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957. 706 In 1950, these countries’ share was 26%, with 903,000 gt, out of a total of 3,489,000 gt; in 1930, their share was 16.5%, with 477,000 gt out of a total of 2,889,000 gt. 707 Bernard Cassagnou, “Les mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995)”,ˮ Recherches contemporaines, No. 6, 2000–2001, p. 38. 708 See Pierre Léonard, “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?”ˮ, op. cit., and Bernard Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (19451995), vol. 1, IGPDE – Comité pour l’Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 2002.

► State incentives: the case of France More or less in line with the majority of producing countries,709 French shipbuilding had benefited from subsidies ever since the adoption of the Defferre Law710 of 24 May 1951. This post-war legislation sought to encourage shipping companies to place their orders in France, thereby neutralising French shipyards’ lack of competitiveness (due to the burdens of the French tax system, customs protection, the rationing of materials, etc.) on the international market and compensating for the (fluctuating) gaps between their production costs and the prices offered abroad (20–30% lower in England, for example). In return for this financial aid, builders undertook to enhance their productivity and participate to the fullest possible extent in the effort to reconstruct the Merchant Navy. The goals of this policy were to: - stabilise the balance of payments by avoiding a flight of capital spent on purchasing or (above all) chartering ships abroad;711 - stimulate foreign trade by encouraging the export of a portion of production; this export drive also benefited from the devaluations of the franc in August 1957 and December 1958;712 - safeguard the safety of the country’s supplies, and thus, its independence;

709 For example, in Italy, the Tambroni Law of 17 July 1954, offset “the inferiorities of the regulatory system (fiscal and customs) for the Italian shipbuilding” by keeping on “unemployed workers in the company, even if this meant receiving government funds to pay for this particular subjection (system of the disoccupati)” – Ref. Pierre Léonard, op. cit. 710 Gaston Defferre, Minister for the Merchant Navy (12 July 1950–11 August 1951). The Law of 24 May 1951 was revoked in 2001 on the order of the European Commission. 711 In fact, even subsidised, shipbuilding created value: a ship was used for 20 years on average, and even at a high price, it was always more cost-effective to purchase than to charter. Cf. B. Cassagnou, in Recherches contemporaines, op. cit.: “In 1952, the Merchant Navy is still using 1.5 million gross tons of ships chartered abroad. This is one reason why shipping is a main contributor (200 million dollars) to the balance of payments deficit totalling 1,060 million. The shipping industry – i.e. the sum total of all shipping companies – plays a key role in the French economy, with its turnover reaching 261 billion old francs [equivalent to 4.2 billion Euros in 2016] in 1959. The industry employs 60,000 seafaring and sedentary staff and accounts for 4% of world tonnage.” Total = 130 million grt in 1960. 712 The franc was devalued by 20% in 1957 and by 17.55% in 1958. The “heavy franc” came into effect on 1 January 1960. - protect employment in areas or regions where shipbuilding was the only – or almost the only – economic activity (as was the case with eleven of France’s fourteen main shipyards),713 and in the companies which, little integrated into diversified groups,714 were unable to offer their workforces redeployment opportunities.

“Beyond the needs of the national and international market”715 – market saturation and the collapse of demand

Although intimately bound to one another, shipping companies and shipbuilders nevertheless had differing interests (the one sought to buy at the lowest price what the other sought to sell at the highest price), especially as they were part of discordant economic cycles. In an increasingly uncertain economic climate, the lag between the circumstances (most often exacerbated by international tensions) under which orders were placed, the time required to build a ship and the context in which it was delivered (as shipping market circumstances have changed) was one reason for market saturation: for example, the surge in ships ordered during the Suez Crisis but delivered long after the turmoil had subsided flooded the market and led to a drop in demand, a decline in freight rates and massive decommissioning. Beyond this hiatus aggravated by the worldwide economic slowdown in 1958 and 1959, the dynamism of the shipbuilding industry itself was at issue. “The balance,” wrote Pierre Léonard in 1961, “between the rapidly growing supply of new ships [nearing 10% per year] and the equally growing – albeit to a lesser extent [it varied between 6.5% and 8.5% per year] – demand no longer existed.”716 Worldwide merchant tonnage hovered

713 Pierre Léonard, “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” op. cit., pp. 585–586. “Of the fourteen main French shipyards, eleven were located in cities with no other dominant industrial activity or in weakly developed regions: Le Havre (two companies), Le Trait, Saint-Nazaire, Nantes (three companies), La Pallice, Bordeaux, La Ciotat, Toulon. The exceptions to this rule were the shipyards of Dunkerque, Rouen and Marseilles.” 714 Ibid., p. 592: The shipyard in Le Trait belonged to the Worms group (shipping), while the Bordeaux shipyard belonged to the Schneider group (metallurgical industry). 715 Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit., pp. 54–55. 716 Pierre Léonard, op. cit.

around 110 million tons,717 while maximum shipbuilding capacity was 11 million tons per year. This meant that the shipyards were capable of replacing every ton in service within ten years. Yet, ships were operated for twenty years on average, and the fleet doubled every seventeen years. This distortion reduced to nothing 15–35% of production, “or 1.7 to 3.9 million grt, a gap that could only increase over the medium term, in the absence of a political crisis generating exceptional and unforeseeable demand.”718 The collapse of demand also stemmed from technical innovations and the “race for high tonnage” unleashed by technical progress. While still far from the supertankers displacing several hundreds of thousands of tons (such as the 555,000-dwt “Prairial” capable of transporting 667,380-m3 of crude oil), the trend started in the 1950s was proving irreversible: the commissioning of the first 50,000-dwt oil tankers whetted the appetite of shipping companies, with mid-tonnage ships being gradually supplanted by these “giants of the seas.” In the same vein, large bulk carriers of 30,000 or more deadweight tonnage increasingly made inroads.719 Allowing a reduction in the number of vessels needed, the cost-effectiveness of these ships resulted in the growth rate of the merchant fleet (approximately 3.5% per year) falling behind that of seaborne trade, causing orders for new vessels to dwindle. “For this reason,” noted Pierre Léonard, “while world traffic in dry goods increased by 42% between 1951 and 1957, the corresponding fleet in service only grew by 22%.” Competition from rail (proven effective in the transport of goods) and civil aviation (emerging in the transport of passengers) also influenced shipbuilding insofar as it increasingly put pressure on maneuver margins (above all on freight rates) and growth potential of shipping companies. For example, the passenger liner “France,” “the jewel of French shipbuilding and shipping built with public money,” was already doomed on decommissioning in 1962 by the “entry of the Boeing 707–120 B into the transatlantic passenger market, and

717 Bernard Cassagnou, in Recherches contemporaines, op. cit., reported (p. 29) that on 1 January 1962, the French fleet totalled 4.8 million grt: passenger ships: 12%; freighters: 43.5% and oil tankers: 44.5%. 718 Pierre Léonard, op. cit., p. 581. 719 Their introduction went hand in hand with the construction of major international port complexes, linked by sea to the production centres of raw materials. the advent of mass air transit.”720 These problems were compounded in France by: ► The adverse effects of State aid “The subsidies received under the Law of 1951,” wrote Jean Domenichino, “did not all lead to the intended results. Designed to promote a certain conversion of shipyard activity in the long term, they achieved the opposite, causing an increase in shipbuilding capacity and reflecting the classic phenomenon whereby any product benefiting from State aid is favoured by the producers.”721 The paradox here was that “the more the shipyards produced, the dearer they became” for public finances. Unable to rival international prices, French shipyards failed to prevent shipping companies placing orders elsewhere in the world or to develop a foreign clientele. ► Decolonisation and its impact on the French flag Between 1956 and 1960, twenty-two African countries were granted independence; seventeen722 were former French colonies or protectorates (Madagascar). However shipping services with these territories were the monopoly of the French fleet. “Sheltered from foreign competition, French shipping companies, both large or small, defend[ed] valuable – even marginal – market shares in a private and protected area, which assure[d] the viability of their activities.”723

720 Bernard Jardin, Un demi-siècle de pavillon français (1960-2010), June 2011; on the website of the French Institute of the Sea. 721 Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit., p. 55. The following quote, by the same author, comes from La construction navale en Provence : essor et déclin d’une industrie, text posted on https://fresques.ina.fr. 722 Having joined Liberia (26 July 1847), South Africa (31 May 1910), Egypt (28 February 1922), and Libya (24 December 1951), were the following countries: in 1956, Sudan (1 January), Tunisia (20 March), Morocco (7 April); in 1957, Ghana (6 March); in 1958, Guinea (2 October); in 1960, Cameroon (1 January), Senegal (4 April), Togo (27 April), Madagascar (26 June), Democratic Republic of Congo (30 June), Somalia (1 July), Benin (1 August), Niger (3 August), Burkina Faso (5 August), Ivory Coast (7 August), Chad (11 August), Central African Republic (13 August), Congo (15 August), Gabon (17 August), Mali (22 September), Nigeria (1 October), Mauritania (28 November). 723 Antoine Frémont, “De la Compagnie générale transatlantique à la CMA-CGM,” in Revue d’histoire maritime - histoire maritime, outre-mer, relations internationales, La marine marchande française de 1850 à 2000, Pups, 2006.

“In the years 1945–1962,” wrote Bernard Dujardin, “marked by the colonial conflicts at the end of the French empire, the French flag experienced an ephemeral apogee, climbing to fourth place in the world. Booked cargoes and military freight between French ports and those of its overseas colonies filled French ships’ holds. Decolonisation signalled the end for this monopoly. […] When André Malraux stated: ‘Every colony is born with a sign of death on its forehead,’ he might as well have said: ‘Every colonial flag is born with a sign of death on its forehead.’”724 Bernard Cassagnou provides the

724 Bernard Dujardin, “Le pavillon français, une compétitivité à conquérir,” L’Ena hors les murs, No. 428, 2013, pp. 31–32. meaning of this expression: “Decolonisation forced French shipping companies to redeploy their fleets,”725 revealing their lack of competitiveness. “In 1961 […] the French Government became aware of the precarious means of the French fleet to fend off competition in the context created by the onset of the international shipping crisis in 1957 and the impact of French decolonisation on the use of ships. […] For shipping companies operating the lines to French overseas territories, this meant the collapse of de facto or de jure protections and consequently, under the new shipping relations established between these countries and France, the definition of new statutes, sometimes completely different. […] The new, independent governments could finally realise their ambitions to trade with countries other than France and to operate several ships under their national flags. […] In Algeria, French shipping experienced the scheduled end to its decadesold monopoly on seagoing traffic with France in 1961. ‘On top of this inevitable upheaval’726 came the prospect of increasing foreign competition when the Treaty of Rome came into effect in 1958. Its anti-protectionist clauses allowed the new Common Market countries not only to invest in African fleets, but also to divert shipments intended for France to Northern European ports.”727 ► The discovery of oil in Algeria The discovery of natural gas deposits in Algeria in 1954 (we shall return to this topic later) was followed by that of two oil fields in January and June 1956.728 The nationalisation of the Suez Canal, which threatened supplies of Middle Eastern oil to France, hastened the implementation of a proper infrastructure to exploit these resources. In 1960, Algerian crude oil accounted for more than 20% of liquid hydrocarbon imports into France and more than 32% in 1962.

725 Bernard Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), vol. 1, op. cit. 726 Lucien Poirier, Économie maritime, course given at the ENSTA (French Graduate School of Engineering), 1977, p. 102, quoted by Bernard Cassagnou. 727 Bernard Cassagnou, op. cit. 728 Research and exploitation licences had been granted to four French companies: Société Nationale de Recherche et d’Exploitation des Pétroles en Algérie (SN Repal); Compagnie Française des Pétroles – Algérie (CFPA); Compagnie de Recherche et d’Exploitation Pétrolières au Sahara (Creps); and Compagnie des Pétroles d’Algérie (CPA).

Aerial view – at the fitting-out quay, the tank-landing ship (LST) “Dives” launched on 28 June 1960; in slip No. 1 the self-unloading bulk carrier “Gypsum Countess” and in slip No. 2 the ore carrier “Penchâteau”

Saharan deposits, the strategic importance of which influenced the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) – at least in its duration, had an impact on shipbuilding: as they were closer to France than those in the Persian Gulf, fewer tankers were needed to transport the extracted oil. “The experts at the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation,” wrote Pierre Léonard, “calculated that Europe’s supply of crude oil from North Africa instead of from the Middle East, for each 5-million-ton tranche, resulted in a savings in ships equal to 21 T2 oil tankers729 (considered as a unit of measure).”730 ► French Navy programmes entrusted solely to Navy arsenals In 1962, the government decided to entrust all French Navy shipbuilding to the Navy arsenals. This made a big gap in shipyard order books, since “traditionally 30 to 50% of new warships were dedicated to

729 Ship with deadweight tonnage of 16,500 tons and a speed of 15 knots. 730 Pierre Léonard, “Y a-t-il une crise de structure de la construction navale ?,” op. cit., p. 574. private shipyards.”731 This change doomed some of them to disappear (notably Augustin Normand, in 1964). The late 1950s and the ensuing years were marked by considerable overcapacities in the world shipbuilding market, which Great Britain and Japan estimated at one-third of their capacities.732 As for seagoing oil transport, “endogenous fluctuations of the market, independent of any specific catastrophic situation, resulted in surplus (decommissioned) tonnage in 1959 equal to 10% of the fleet in service.”733 The consequence: “Prices of new ships [in 1961] for the most current types of ship hovered in the area of 60% of 1957 prices.”734

731 See Rapport au Sénat sur la loi de finances 1962 – session du 14 novembre 1961. “The decision to create the Directorate General of Armaments in 1963 leads to defence being turned in on itself and military shipbuilding being reduced to arsenals alone,” cf. Alain Merckelbagh, Et si le littoral allait jusqu’à la mer : la politique du littoral sous la Ve République, Éditions Quæ, 2009. 732 See Pierre Léonard, op. cit., p. 583. 733 Ibid., p. 574. 734 Ibid., p. 587.

And the report published by the Merveilleux du Vignaux Commission estimated “that the imbalance between supply and demand was not cyclical and indeed had a strong chance [or risk] of increasing in 1963.”735

Downsizing production

The crisis was thus structural in nature, forcing governments to make decisions. In France, a lot was at stake: 39,500 people were employed in the sector,736 or 60,000 if subcontractors were added. Unlike 1951, it was no longer a question of stimulating productivity, but rather of downsizing production, especially since the Treaty of Rome imposed a reduction in subsidies, which had reached 131 billion francs between 1954 and 1958. The 30 July 1959 meeting of the Council of Ministers set the ceiling for subsidies at 97.2 billion until 1963,737 an amount that dropped to 19 billion during the following period. The workforce was to drop to 27,000 persons between then and 1965, and to 17,000 in 1970. Ideally, the number of shipyards was to drop to three, or one per maritime facade. Rumours circulated that the three would be Dunkerque, Saint-Nazaire and La Ciotat. “It was an obvious break with the practices of 1951,” wrote Jean Domenichino. From that point onwards, State aid became one of the primary means used by the government to intervene in an industrial sector [financed by private capital] and to impose its assessment of future developments through “a policy oriented not towards maintaining an increasingly uneasy and unpredictable and artificial situation, but toward the realistic choice of true remedies.”738 Since the “realistic choice” meant adapting French shipbuilding to the needs of the market, estimated at 400,000 grt per year – in contrast to the total shipyards’ capacity of 700,000 grt – in plain language this involved eliminating sizeable production capacities. Subsidies were assigned a double task: to help those shipyards “the situation of which remains sufficiently healthy, allowing them to face international competition”739 and to contribute to the necessary reconversion of shipyards who needed to “work on creating new non-shipbuilding activities […]” in order “to reclassify the highly skilled workforces and assign them to other tasks.”740 In the context of this struggle among French shipyards and in the face of international competition, ACSM suffered from three major handicaps impeding its ability to overcome these threats: - its production capacity (estimated at three 20,000-grt oil tankers per year on the basis of a 48-hour working week) did not put it in the leading bunch of companies within the sector; - its location on the banks of the Seine made it impossible for the shipyard to build vessels in excess of 24,000; 26,000; 27,000; or 30,000 tons,741 at a time when the “race for high tonnage” was dominating the market; - its location in a region suffering from an “industrial monoculture” to use the expression of Pierre Léonard, while the specific nature of its industry did not allow it to redeploy all or part of its workforce in the other subsidiaries belonging to the Worms group. If solutions were to be found, it was up to ACSM to create them. To do so, they had to innovate in cuttingedge techniques, intensify their reconversion efforts, and create partnerships.

735 Cf. Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit., p. 55. 736 Ibid. The average workforce evolved as follows – 1953: 39,464 people – 1954: 39,208 people – 1955: 39,917 people – 1956: 39,674 people – 1957: 39,876 people – 1958: 39,447 people. 737 Ibid. In 1960: 28.2 billion; in 1961: 25.5 billion; in 1962: 24.3 billion; in 1963, 19.2 billion. 738 Footnote (p. 56) in the document by Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit.: “Livre blanc, p. 16 : excerpt from a letter from the Prime Minister, Michel Debré, to the Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, Abel Durand, dated 17 August 1959.” 739 Ibid.: “Livre blanc, p. 17.” 740 Ibid.: “Livre blanc, p. 13 and p. 18.” 741 The maximum production capacity was estimated in various ways, depending on the documents (advertisements, loan requests, annual reports, etc.).

The battle for survival

“With more than 2,000 blue- and white-collar workers, technicians and engineers, [and a] very large industrial complex spread over 26 hectares of land, of which 50,000 m2 were under cover,”742 the Le Trait shipyard was ready to fight. It enjoyed a sound financial structure and highly efficient production facilities.

Ready for the fight

A sound financial structure

Since being incorporated as a public limited company in July 1945, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime’s share capital, initially 10 million old francs,743 had been increased on three occasions. On 3 August 1949, in an Extraordinary General Meeting, it was increased to 50 million old francs, by drawing on the special revaluation reserve (the par value of the shares went up from 1,000 to 5,000 francs). On 15 June 1951, in application of the provisions approved by the Ordinary and Extraordinary General Meeting, share capital was raised to 100 million old francs by incorporating 50 million francs, 25 million of which were taken from the special revaluation reserve and the other 25 million from the general reserve (par value of the shares: 10,000 francs). On 29 September 1952, the shareholders increased share capital to 350 million old francs by issuing 25 thousand shares with a par value of 10,000 francs each, created as payment for the contribution in kind by Worms & Cie of tangible and intangible assets valued at 821 million francs,744 encompassing the main part of its industrial site and production assets in Le Trait. At the end of 1959, a further capital increase was scheduled. “In 1952,” stipulated a memo of 19 November 1959, “Worms & Cie made a contribution in kind to the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime SA, in the form of its fixed assets which had already been reconstructed. The contribution of the remaining fixed assets was postponed until these had been fully replenished. Now that said reconstruction has been completed, the contribution in kind of the remaining land, buildings and equipment shall be finalised, so that Worms & Cie, while retaining only its banking activity, will no longer own the shipyard, but only a share [100%] in said shipyard. Since the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime SA does not own the aforementioned fixed assets, it could not benefit from depreciations in their value. […] Going ahead with consolidating the ACSM balance sheet, it seems justifiable to incorporate into the company’s share capital, in parallel with the contribution of the remaining fixed assets, the sum of 210 million francs resulting from the accumulation of aforementioned depreciations not booked as such by the company, but which it would have been entitled to do, had the fixed assets been fully contributed sooner. In our opinion, this retroceding seems to be the only possible solution.” The contribution was to lead to the ACSM clearance of accounts from the Worms & Cie books, in particular settling the war damage accounts, the total amount of which was over 337 million francs.745 Above all, the aim of the transaction was to bolster the company’s financial stability vis-à-vis its competitors. A memo of 17 November 1959 assessed “the optimal level of ACSM capital” in comparison to six companies (see table on next page746) and concluded: “We can justifiably consider an amount of 600 million.”

742 Undated document on ACSM, filed in 1961. 743 On 1 January 1960, the new franc replaced the old franc: each new franc (NF) being worth one hundred old francs. 744 Cf. memo from Robert Malingre, head of financial and administrative services at Maison Worms, to Robert Labbé, dated 11 January 1960. 745 Cf. memo from Robert Malingre to Robert Labbé, dated 9 October 1959. 746 The memo specified that Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée was highly involved in activities other than shipbuilding.

- Chantiers de l’Atlantique

Share capital (in old francs) 2,000,000,000 - Ateliers et Chantiers de France 765,000,000 - Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde 540,000,000 - Chantiers navals de La Ciotat 720,000,000 - Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée 2,279,440,000 - Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence 525,000,000

The Extraordinary General Meeting of shareholders was convened747 on 12 December 1959, first, “for the purpose of deliberating the capital increase and the subsequent amendment of the articles of association,” and second, of appointing “auditors in charge of the report required by law.” The contribution agreement was signed on 30 November 1959 by Raymond Meynial on behalf of Worms & Cie, in his capacity as its General Partner, and Robert Labbé, on behalf of ACSM, in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer. The agreement covered: - total land of 12 hectares 48.6 ares,748 valued at 10 million francs; - the industrial complex (building for sharpening saws, acetylene plant, launch slips, infirmary, a wharf, administrative building housing the executive offices), valued in excess of 97 million francs (97,190,684 F); - housing (the Georges Leygues Pavilion, a villa located at 3, Rue du Maréchal Foch, a house on Rue Denis

Papin 6/8, four 2-apartment houses located on the

Rue de Dunkerque) with a total value of more than 24.5 million francs (24,563,632 F); - various utilities (fencing, pits, pipelines, drinking water facilities, and changing rooms) valued at more than 25 million francs (25,680,588 F); - equipment and tools (presses, forge and electric ovens, tools for fitting, woodworking, electrical maintenance, sheet metal and welding); all valued at 25 million F;

747 Convening notice signed by Henri Nitot, Board Secretary, and proxies of 26 November 1959. 748 A memo of 16 November 1959 listed the parcels that were not transferred to ACSM in September 1952, based on the land registry of Le Trait; stating that several lots had been “corroded by the Seine” or exchanged for plots of land within Le Trait. - various furniture and furnishings, for the most part located in the office building, all estimated at more than 8.4 million F (8,416,355 F). In addition to these assets, ownership of which was scheduled to be transferred on 31 December 1959 for a total price of 190,851,259 F, Worms & Cie undertook to transfer a receivable amounting of 209.209,148,741 F to ACSM.749 As a result, total contributions reached 400 million francs, to be paid for via a capital increase of 250 million francs.750 Said capital increase was ultimately approved by the Extraordinary General Meeting of 28 December 1959, which subsequently modified Article 6 of the articles of association: “share capital is now 600 million francs (6 million new francs); divided into 60,000 shares with a par value of 10,000 francs each, all of the same class and fully paid up, numbered from 1 to 60,000.” The size of ACSM’s share capital was now higher than that of the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence and the Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde. In addition to its permanent capital (paid up share capital + earnings retained in reserves and depreciation), ACSM (particularly to pre-fund ship construction; i.e. to purchase materials and supplies while waiting for payment of the amounts owed by public and private clients) had the following financial means at its disposal:751 1) Loan from the Consortium of Shipbuilding Companies (4%, 1946), repayable at constant annual instalments until 8 October 1970, inclusive. On 30 September 1958, the outstanding balance was 118,365,000 F.

749 The contribution agreement of 30 November 1959 stipulated: “The sum of two hundred and nine million one hundred and forty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-one francs, representing a portion of the open creditor account itemised in the accounts of ACSM SA as ‘Worms & Cie – Le Trait’ in the name of the limited partnership of Worms & Cie and amounting to two hundred and fifty-four million two hundred and eighty-two thousand three hundred and thirtyfour francs on 30 November 1959.” 750 See the memo from Robert Malingre to Robert Labbé dated 11 January 1960. All the deeds: contribution agreement and the minutes to the general meetings of 12 and 28 December 1959, along with their appendices, were received by Mr Chalain, notary, on 4 and 6 January 1960; they were registered on 8 January 1960 and filed with the Commercial Court Registry at the Seine Tribunal on 15 January 1960. 751 Cf. the ACSM memo of 19 May 1959. An annual cash position was presented by ACSM to the Banque de France starting in 1959.

2) Long-term loan from the credit institution, Crédit National of 50 million old francs, granted on 11 October 1950 and to be repaid in ten annual instalments of 5 million francs, payable on 15 October, 1956 through 1965, inclusive. On 30 September 1958, the outstanding balance was 40,000,000 F. 3) Medium-term credit of 100,000,000 F granted by the Crédit National on 19 June 1957, useable up to: - 100,000,000 F, until 21 June 1959; - 80,000,000 F, until 21 June 1960; - 60,000,000 F, until 21 June 1961; - 30,000,000 F, until 21 June 1962. On 30 September 1958, this credit was valued at 100,000,000 F. 4) Long-term loan from the Crédit National of 205 million francs, granted on 12 September 1957 and to be repaid: - in four instalments of 5,000,000 F, payable annually on 30 June, 1959 to 1962, inclusive; - in ten instalments of 18,500,000 F, payable annually on 30 June, 1963 to 1972, inclusive. As of 30 September 1958, the outstanding balance was 205,000,000 F. These last two credits were obtained to partially finance the construction and equipping of a fitting-out quay on the Seine. A second long-term loan for 3 million francs was taken out on 23 November 1960 with the Normandy Regional Development Company; along with a third for 5 million francs in December 1963, again with the Crédit National. The increase in equity resulting from the capital increase served as a guarantee of financial solvency, as did the backing of Maison Worms.

The backing of Worms & Cie: the men of Maison Worms

Meeting at the company headquarters at 45, Boulevard Haussmann in Paris, the ACSM Board of Directors was chaired by Robert Labbé, General Partner of Maison Worms since 1944 and Honorary Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders. Board members were: - Hypolite Worms, General Partner of Worms & Cie since 1911; - Raymond Meynial, who becamed General Partner of

Worms & Cie in 1949; as well as three legal entities: - Worms & Cie, represented by Jacques Barnaud752

752 Jacques Barnaud was a General Partner of Worms & Cie from 1930 to 1944, and from 1949 to 1962.

(nominated on 23 December 1949, approved on 12 July 1950); - the Union Immobilière pour la France et l’Étranger (Unife), a company founded by Maison Worms in 1929, and fully owned by it; - and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, represented by Pierre Chevalier; in 1956, FCM became a

Board member of ACSM (appointment ratified at the

General Assembly of 31 August 1956), as a result of a technical and commercial cooperation agreement between the two companies which gave ACSM access to FCM know-how in ship engine construction. Board Meetings, with Henri Nitot, Executive Director of the company, as Secretary, were held in the presence of two representatives of the Works Council, René Biville and Raymond Brétéché. On 26 January 1960, the Board welcomed two new members (subject to approval at the future General Meeting): - Henri Nitot; - and Pierre-Ernest Herrenschmidt753 (1906–1999), who had been named General Partner of Worms & Cie six days earlier. On that same day (26 January 1960), the Board members set forth in a circular: “As Henri Nitot, Executive Director of our company, has expressed his wish to retire, we have decided to appoint him as Honorary Executive Director, in acknowledgment of the eminent services rendered to our Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime for nearly forty years. We have appointed Joseph Brocard, previously Deputy Director General, to replace him as Executive Director of our company. He will assume his duties effective Tuesday, 26 January.”

753 See Roger Mennevée, Les Documents de l’Alll of March 1963 (changes to Worms & Cie deed of incorporation since 20 January 1960): “Born in Paris on 15 February 1906, and a graduate of the Free School of Political Science (section: public finance) in 1926, Pierre-Ernest Herrenschmidt, after performing his military service (November 1928 to October 1929), entered the Inspectorate of Finance on 15 May 1931. Named Inspector, 1st-class, on 1 January 1942, he became Director of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Finance on 4 January 1946, and was assigned as Director of the Crédit National, by Decree of 15 May 1946. He was promoted to Commander of the Legion of Honor, and Honorary Inspector General of Finance on leaving the public administration to become a General Partner of Worms & Cie on 20 January 1960.”

The appointment of Pierre Herrenschmidt was mentioned in a short article published in Carrefour on 18 October 1961, penned by Gilles Roches: “Pierre Herrenschmidt (55 years of age), Honorary Inspector of Finances left the management of the Crédit National in January 1960 to become General Partner of Worms & Cie. He serves as Director for the following companies: Antar Pétroles de l’Atlantique, Pechelbronn, Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, Société d’Investissements Vendôme, Société d’Assurances pour le Commerce Extérieur, Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire,” all companies belonging to the Worms group.

The impact of the Worms group on the ACSM’s reputation

As at the time as when the shipyard had formed one of its four divisions, Maison Worms made every effort to promote ACSM in the documents presenting the group’s activities, or in inserts published in newspapers and specialist magazines. The Worms group’s maritime subsidiaries did the same in their presentation brochures: Worms Compagnie Maritime et Charbonnière (Worms CMC),754 Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire, Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, all three of which were clients of the shipyard and promoted the vessels built for them by ACSM. ACSM thus benefited from this support from Maison Worms which, as often as it could, directed orders to its shipyard from companies within its maritime group.

Impact on the order book

For example, in December 1959, Worms Compagnie Maritime et Charbonnière (Worms CMC) signed a contract for the construction of the 3,600-dwt collier-bulk carrier “Yainville,” to be delivered in 1961. The keel was laid on 14 April 1960 in slipway No. 6. In addition to this vessel, ACSM started construction on: - in slip No. 1 – the 18,410-dwt ore carrier “Pentellina” for the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest, a Worms & Cie affiliate (absorbed by Worms in 1968); the order was co-signed by the Union Navale, and the vessel was on the ways in July–August 1960; - and in slip No. 2 – the 12,302-dwt cargo ship “Ville du Havre” for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire. This vessel, the keel of which was laid on 16 November 1960, was the first in a series of four vessels ordered from Le Trait;755 - the “Mostaganem” and “Bidassoa” completed the order book. The former was a 5,500-dwt cargo liner for the SA Les Cargos Algériens – its keel was laid in slipway No. 8 on 10 August 1960 – while the latter was a 2,235-dwt landing ship tank (LST) for the Navy: it occupied slip No. 7 between 30 January 1960, the date on which its keel was laid, and 29 December 1960, its launch date. Its specifications were identical in every detail to the LST “Dives” (keel laid on 7 August 1959) launched from slipway No. 8 on 28 June 1960. More than 40,000 tons were thus under construction. 1960 was also marked by the end of construction and launch of: - the 3,700-dwt bulk carrier “Eldonia” on 31 March 1960 – shipping company: Union Navale - the 2,235-dwt LST “Dives” (see above) - the 10,720-dwt self-unloading bulk carrier “Gypsum Countess” on 5 August 1960 – shipping company: Panama Gypsum Co., Inc. - the 8,432-dwt ore carrier “Penchâteau” on 5 November 1960; shipping company: Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest. On top of these were two barges built between 28 October 1959 and 18 January 1960 for the Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin, for a price of approximately 300 million francs, according to a contract signed on 27 July 1959. All these contracts ensured that slipways Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8 were occupied throughout 1960.

754 In an undated document summarising the activities of Worms CMC, filed in 1961, it is noted: “Worms & Cie, formerly shipbuilders, entrusted this branch of its business activity to its subsidiary, the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, in Le Trait (headquartered in Paris, at 47, Boulevard Haussmann) in 1945.” In a brochure published on 20 February 1961, Worms CMC wrote: “This yard is completely equipped to build vessels of any specification up to 24,000 tons dead-weight.” 755 The book, Les 100 ans de la Havraise péninsulaire (Charles Limonier, 1992), states that these were “freighters with two decks, ‘full scantling’ vessels with poop deck and long – forecastle, fully welded.” They were baptised “Ville du Havre,” “Ville de Brest,” “Ville de Bordeaux” and “Ville de Lyon” (see next paragraph).

28 June and 29 December 1960: launch of the landing ship tanks (LST) “Dives” and “Bidassoa”

Specifications

Length

Width

Height

Gross Tonnage

Deadweight

Full load

Propulsion

Speed 102.1 metres overall (96.6 pp) 15.5 metres 3.2 metres 1,750 tons 1 400 tonnes 4,225 tonnes 2 Pielstick diesel engines 2,000-HP 11.5 knots

1961: the last year of normal activity

On 13 February 1961, the collier-bulk carrier “Yainville” was launched in the presence of Robert Labbé, Hypolite Worms, ACSM Director Marcel Lamoureux, André Marie,756 Mr Brétéché, General Councillor and Mayor of Le Trait, and Mr Passerel, Mayor of Yainville, as well as numerous guests, including several reporters who covered the launch in the local press.757 Worms CMC took charge of the ship on 7 April 1961. At that time, the newspaper Paris-Normandie published an article entitled, “Navire au port, le cargo neuf ‘Yainville.’” According to the article, this vessel, “intended to transport bulk goods and timber, can also be used to transport cars, as a removable intermediate deck can be installed in each of its four holds.” The same newspaper again referred to the “Yainville” on 5 November 1963, citing its specifications: “This ship, a regular sight in Normandy ports, has a gross tonnage of 2,662 tons and net tonnage of 1,537 tons. Length: 97 m; width: 13.50 m; speed of 13.5 knots.” This was the last vessel bearing the Worms colours (blue flag adorned with a white disk) built in Le Trait. The ore carrier “Pentellina” left slipway No. 1 on 6 April 1961. The cargo ship “Ville du Havre” left slipway No. 2 on 10 August 1961 and was delivered to NCHP on 25 January 1962. “Mostaganem” was launched on 14 September 1961. Only two of the vacated slipways of the five operated were immediately reoccupied. Slip No. 1 was used as of 12 April 1961 for the construction of the “Ville de Brest,” the second 12,264dwt freighter ordered by the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire; while on 10 August 1961, slip

The collier-bulk carrier “Yainville” in slip No. 6

756 MP for the Seine-Maritime department, André Marie was Minister for Justice (1947–1948 and 1948–1949), President of the Council (26 July to 5 September 1948), and Minister for National Education (1951–1954). In addition, he served as Chairman of the Fédération Française des Universités Populaires. 757 See the article of 14 February 1961 entitled “Le ‘Yainville’ a été lancé au Trait pour la Cie Worms” in Le Havre libre. Moreover, in an interview granted to Francis Ley in 1977 for the purposes of the book Cent ans boulevard Haussmann, Pierre Darredeau, Director of the Shipping branches first in Le Havre, then in Algiers, as well as coordinator of Shipping Services in North Africa in 1950–1960, said the following about the freighter: “As for our bulk carriers in 1961, we had the ‘Yainville,’ which we operated in conjunction with the Union Navale, and the ‘Château-Margaux.’” On 3 April 1964, the loan department of Crédit National wrote: “In a letter of 24 March 1964, Crédit Naval has requested on behalf of its client [Worms & Cie, or Worms CMC?] that we release the mortgage registration taken out on ‘Château-Yquem,’ with the balance of the loan being guaranteed by the 3,000,000 F mortgage taken out on the ‘Yainville.’”

No. 2 welcomed the “Stylehurst,” a 21,700-dwt ore carrier intended for the English shipping company, Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd. While slip No. 8 was vacant for just four months (until construction started on 15 January 1962 on the cargo ship “Saint François”), slip No. 7 remained empty from 29 December 1960 to 25 November 1962, i.e. for 24 months. Slip No. 6 remained vacant from 13 February 1961 to 1 December 1964, or for more than 45 months. This vacancy was a sign of a recession that was going to worsen. The worrisome situation was aggravated by the deaths, a few weeks apart, of Hypolite Worms and Jacques Barnaud.

10 August 1961: launch of the cargo ship “Ville du Havre,” the first in a series of four vessels ordered by NCHP

6 April 1961: launch of the ore carrier “Pentellina” for the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest and the Union Navale

1962: the grief-stricken Maison Worms

Hypolite Worms died suddenly on 28 January 1962 at the age of 72. Considering his lifetime activities from 1914 to 1962, it is striking that, over the course of the years and with the assistance of expert partners, he transformed the Maison Worms he had inherited into a powerful group open to shipbuilding, shipping, trade, banking and financial services, and industrial activities. In a speech given in Port Said in January 1950, he himself described the development of the bank and the group to their present proportions: “In 1928, we created the Banking Services of Maison Worms. […] Thanks to the men at its helm, this division has since become one of the most active private banks in France, perhaps one of the largest business or commercial banks in France. […] This is why Maison Worms, originally a Fuel Merchanting and Shipping company, has now become a multi-faceted company, because being a business bank implies its interest in the commercial and industrial affairs under its umbrella, and which, thanks to its involvement and its resources, it has helped develop, and is now involved in a whole new range of activities.” Twelve years later, upon the death of the leader of Maison Worms, these words assumed even greater truth and depth. At the time of Hypolite Worms’ death, Jacques Barnaud himself was seriously ill. The fellowship and trust between these two men had been as indestructible as they were fruitful. For over thirty years, the Banking Services had benefited from the skills and financial talent of Jacques Barnaud. During his last few months at the helm of Maison Worms, before passing away on 15 April 1962, he provided one last service by redefining the tasks of the partners. Despite these deaths, Worms & Cie had to move forward, while its company name had to live on. Thus, in March 1962, Hypolite Worms’ widow was named a General Partner, but without managerial duties, while two new Board members were appointed: Guy Brocard758 and the son of Jacques Barnaud, Jean Barnaud (a former Navy officer who joined NCHP in 1948 and was serving as its Executive Director at the time). Upon his father’s death, a new partnership deed

Hypolite Worms (1950s)

was signed (July 1962), under which Jean Barnaud was appointed a General Partner, joining Raymond Meynial, Robert Labbé and Pierre Herrenschmidt. The positions formerly occupied by Hypolite Worms were distributed among the latter two: Robert Labbé assumed the chairmanship of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, while at the same time, since he was already serving as Chairman of Worms CMC, resigning as ACSM Chairman. Pierre Herrenschmidt became Chairman of ACSM, at the same time replacing Hypolite Worms as head of the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers and as a Board member of the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest. At the beginning of March 1963, Robert Labbé assumed the chairmanship of the Central Committee of French Shipowners.

758 Joining Worms & Cie Banking Services in 1937, Guy Brocard became a member of its management team in 1944, before becoming its Director General in 1951.

In his memoirs, Henri Nitot established a causal link between the deaths of Hypolite Worms and Jacques Barnaud and the demise of ACSM four years later: “I believe,” he wrote, “that even in the face of difficult industrial circumstances, neither would ever have abandoned the shipyard which they considered their life’s work; they felt responsible for its survival, for a place where, through their efforts, two successive generations of workers had been employed in full job security, where many families had gone through great pains to build their small houses, sheltered in their minds from any incident; and as great patrons, they certainly would have considered that their honour required them to spare so many honest workers and employees the concerns, indeed the deficiencies, of any resettlement.”

Ω The ore carrier “Stylehurst” at the fitting-out quay, after its launch on 4 May 1962 for Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd

The cargo liner “Mostaganem” launched on 14 September 1961 for the Cargos Algériens

Innovating for survival

In the face of the crisis, the main priority of ACSM was to stay at the forefront of progress and attempt to make up for its infrastructural handicap (slipways unsuitable for constructing giant ships) by building ‘high-tech’ vessels. Along with its partner, the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, ACSM launched into cryogenic techniques, building liquefied petroleum gas (methane) carriers. The two companies were not however the sole builders in contention, facing competition from the Chantiers de l’Atlantique and the Chantiers de France et de Dunkerque.

The epic story of transporting liquefied natural gas – LNG

Ever since the discovery of gas deposits in Hassi R’mel in the Algerian Sahara (reserve estimated in 1965 at 1,000 billion cubic meters) in 1956, the logistics of importing this fuel to France had been under study. “In the face of the events in Algeria, the idea of building a gas pipeline linking Northern Africa and Europe has been abandoned, with thoughts instead turning to LNG tankers to deliver the fuel by sea. Naval architects are stepping up their research into transporting liquified gas, as the distinctive feature of methane is that it reduces its volume 600 times at cryogenic temperatures.”759

“In June 1959,” reported Niko Wijnolst and Tor

Wergeland, in Shipping Innovation,760 “the Chairman [sic] of Worms & Cie, Mr Labbé, visited the United

States to attend the 5th World Petroleum Congress

Conference in New York.” He was accompanied by “a brilliant engineer-consultant in Marine Engineering,”761

Audy Gilles, who at the time was Managing Director of the Société de Mécanographie Japy (an important subsidiary of Worms & Cie) and who “through his highly valued technical knowledge, [had already] been providing invaluable services to Le Trait for years.” He was set to play a leading role there. “By that time,” continued the authors of Shipping Innovation, “it was clear to him [Robert Labbé] that although considerable progress has been made in France, economies could well be achieved by taking a licence from the

US group, which by now had successfully shipped several cargoes of LNG [liquefied natural gas] across the

Atlantic in the prototype ship ‘Methane Pioneer.’ The

Americans, however, felt so sure about themselves that they refused to grant him a licence. Therefore, the French decided to continue with their own studies.” To do so, Robert Labbé brought together engineers, naval architects, shipping companies and financial partners in a structure set up in (April?) 1960762 under the name of Méthane Transport and sponsored by Gaz de France (future Engie). The number and names of the partners making up this research company, with capital of 2,600,000 NF, varied according to the sources: a pool of banks including Worms & Cie, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the Banque Industrielle de l’Afrique du Nord, Vernes & Cie;763 five shipping companies and even “a group of the main shipyards,”764 to

759 Cf. www.gtt.fr/fr/qui-sommes-nous/histoire. 760 IOS Press BV, The Netherlands, 2009. 761 This and subsequent quotations are taken from the memoirs of Henri Nitot. 762 La Correspondance économique devoted an article to the creation of Méthane Transport in its issue of 16 April 1960. 763 See Roger Mennevée, Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, published in March 1963, and “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie en 1964,” published in Les Documents de l’Alll, in April 1965. 764 See the article published in Paris Normandie on 18 October 1963, penned by André Renaudin.

which Bernard Cassagnou765 added Gaz de France (on its own), Air Liquide, and the Société d’Exploitation du Gaz d’Afrique du Nord. The goal of Méthane Transport was to finance the testing of transporting liquefied gas by sea; Robert Labbé served as its Chief Executive Officer.766

Trials on the Liberty ship “Beauvais”

The available information on the origin and development of this activity is very fragmented and often contradictory. However, we can piece together that: - in the very early 1960s, the Ministry of the Merchant Navy, “under the guidance of Jean Morin, at that time its Secretary General,” was interested in the “behaviour at sea of tank prototypes in a variety of shapes and materials, separated from the ship’s hull by a ‘secondary barrier,’ itself protected from the cold by balsa wood or perlite,”767 together forming a system capable of transporting LNG. The Ministry called upon Méthane Transport to test its effectiveness. “Objective: to test the lab theories in practice and to compare the solutions implemented onboard. The tanks, their insulation, their anchoring, as well as all accessories (pumps, piping, valves and safety devices) [must be] observed in minute detail.”768 Méthane Transport worked with four (or rather, three) shipyards:769 the shipyard in Le Trait in partnership with the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, the Chantiers de l’Atlantique in Saint-Nazaire, the Chantiers de France770 et de Dunkerque, - to conduct the trials, Méthane Transport made available the Liberty ship “Beauvais” (formerly, “JohnLowson”), a Second World War supply ship which the State (according to some) or Méthane Transport (according to others) acquired in July 1959; according to Ludovic Dupin, the shipping group included Gaz de France, Air Liquide, Technip and CMP,771 - the ship was decommissioned in Dunkerque, and its management entrusted to the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest772 “on behalf of Méthane Transport,”773 - in February 1961, the “Beauvais” was in Nantes and in March the transformation of the ship into an experimental gas carrier began at the Chantiers de l’Atlantique774 (in Saint-Nazaire?). The companies participating in the trials installed on board three self-supporting tanks of their own invention (Ludovic Dupin mentioned only a single “small 500-m3 tank”), whereby the main difficulty had been to achieve welds of sufficient quality to satisfy the demands of the classification companies: • one of the three tanks, “prismatically shaped (and) constructed of aluminium alloy,” was built by the Chantiers de l’Atlantique, • the second, this time “a multi-lobed tank,” was “constructed of 9% nickel steel and built by the Chantiers de Dunkerque-Bordeaux,” • the third was “cylindrical, and constructed of 9% nickel steel, built by the Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée.”775 In addition, “a large variety of handling equipment, control systems, valves and pumps, insulation materials will be tested and evaluated during the trials.”776

765 See Bernard Cassagnou, Les grandes mutations de la marine marchande française (1945-1995), op. cit. 766 See Roger Mennevée, op. cit. 767 In Le magazine des ingénieurs de l’armement, Caia No. 97, March 2012, see Alain Grill’s account: “Profession ? Ingénieur du génie maritime.” 768 Cf. “GDF Suez, 50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL” on http://pelhammedia.fr. 769 Bernard Cassagnou, op. cit. 770 This company name was only used from 1967 (after the Bordeaux shipyard had closed) to designate the company created in 1960 through the merger of the Bordeaux and Dunkerque shipyards; between 1960 and 1967, the company was known as the Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux (France-Gironde); which may explain why some authors erred on the number of (four) companies involved in the research: the Chantiers de France et de Dunkerque were in fact one and the same company. 771 Cf. Ludovic Dupin, “Il y a 50 ans, quand les Français étaient les rois du gaz,” in L’Usine nouvelle, June 2015. 772 Some sources refer to this company as Société Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest, although it had not been established before 1968. 773 “GDF Suez, 50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL,” op. cit. 774 The fact that the latter firm resulted from the merger in 1955 of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire, based in Nantes and Saint-Nazaire, and the Chantiers de Penhoët, based in Saint-Nazaire, undoubtedly explains why some mistakenly reported that the conversion took place in Saint-Nazaire. 775 Cf. Commandant Boudjerra, “Rétrospective du transport de gaz naturel liquéfié (1910-2010),” for master’s degree, 2008–2009. 776 Ibid.

The website of the International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL) states that “James Coolidge Carter of Costa Mesa, California, provided a submerged electric-motor pump (SEMP) for use on one of the three tanks on the ship.”777 The reconversion was completed in February–March 1962 and trials began in March; they were to last six months.778 According to an anonymous account found on the Internet, “the manoeuvres with gas on board were performed by the shipyards that designed each tank. Inside the Roche Maurice gas plant in Nantes, Gaz de France had installed a pilot station for the liquefaction and storage of liquid methane. The nearby wharf was equipped with marine loading articulated arms connecting the storage tanks to the ship. Gaz de France personnel oversaw the loading and unloading operations at the Roche Maurice wharf, thus enabling the staff and crew of the ship, and the shipyard personnel performing the onboard manoeuvres, to be trained in handling LNG. Their training specifically included lessons on how to fight methane fires. As a result, no incidents of note ever occurred during the loading and

777 Cf. “LNG Shipping at 50” on https://giignl.org. 778 Ibid. “In July 1962 members of the Methane Transport research group, along with several others, were invited to a tank test in Oslo. The invitation was from shipowner Øivind Lorentzen and Texas-based investor Carol Bennett who wanted to demonstrate the viability of a membrane tank system based on an idea developed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) engineer Bo Bengtsson. Attending, and impressed with the tests carried out using liquid nitrogen, were Pierre Verret from Gaz de France, Audy Gilles from the Worms group and Jean Alleaume and Gilbert Massac from Gazocéan. Following these observations, Gazocéan acquired the Norwegian patents and set about making substantial changes to the original design and registering new patents. In time, and through cooperation with Conch Océan, the Gazocéan membrane concept was to become the basis for the Technigaz Mark I containment system. Conch Océan was established as a 60/40 Conch/Gazocéan joint venture in 1967.” unloading operations.”779 Simultaneously, in May 1962, the economic viability of the project took a decisive step forward with the creation of Gaz Marine, a company devoted to transporting liquefied methane.780 Its share capital of 5 million NF, divided into 50,000 shares of 100 NF, was subscribed by Gaz de France (50%); Gazocéan (17.50%) – a shipping company founded in 1957 by Gaz de France and NYK Line, and specialised in the transport of LNG; the American company, Bennett (10%)781 in the name of a Texas investor; the remaining 22.50% were distributed in equal parts between Worms & Cie, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, and the Union Européenne Industrielle et Financière.

ACSM wins the contract

On 26 June 1962,782 thanks to qualities of the experienced process, ACSM won the call for tenders recently pitting them against their colleagues:783 Gaz Marine

779 Cf. “1950-1961, Beauvais entre à Shimazu 2” on https:// www.flickr.com – the author of this account described the six phases of the trials: 1. At the Saint-Nazaire quay: key [sic] chilling of liquid nitrogen 2. At the Roche Maurice quay: alongside the Gaz de France methane liquefaction station: filling the LNG into each tank and empting; checking the related equipment 3. At sea: series of voyages with tanks 2 and 3 full, and tank 4. in travel position on ballast At sea: series of trials with tank 1 full, and tanks 2 and 3 in travel position on ballast 5. At sea: succession of transfers between tanks, with intermittent reheating of tanks to check resistance to repeated thermal shocks 6. At sea: emptying the gas tanks and reheating. The “Beauvais” returned to Roche Maurice between each phase to adapt its cargo to the requirements of the subsequent phase. The results for all tanks proved satisfactory, as did the pumps; only the electric submersible pump experienced a blockage, but this was easily fixed.The results for all tanks proved satisfactory, as did the pumps; only the electric submersible pump experienced a blockage, but this was easily fixed. 780 The sources refer to an article on Gaz Marine, published by La Correspondance économique on 12 May 1962, which could not be found. 781 See footnote 778. 782 See protocol of 20 July 1962. The order is dated 27 June 1962 according to “GDF Suez, 50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL,” op. cit. 783 See “Vingt mille lieues sur les mers” on http://www. paris-normandie.fr.

placed an order with ACSM for one 25,000-cubic metre methane carrier.784 The tested and approved technique was “self-supporting,” involving the use of cylindrical tanks made of a material recently developed by the Aciéries Françaises: steel with a 9% nickel and very low carbon content. The cylindrical shape of the tanks made it possible to obtain the highest possible reduction in their weight and in the cost of the components keeping them in place. Insulation – of primary concern, since methane is transported at a temperature of minus 161 degrees below zero centigrade and under pressure of one bar – was guaranteed either by modern materials such as Klegecell, applied using special arrangements devised by ACSM, or by perlite, a powdery insulant. “The trials on the ‘Beauvais,’” wrote Audy Gilles in 1963 in Nouveautés techniques maritimes, “confirmed what several technicians had already been thinking; namely, that it was likely that several different processes could be used successfully to construct tanks for methane carriers, along with the tank insulation. In sum, one could say, a bit schematically, that the construction of a methane carrier requires more technological ‘knowhow’ than patented ideas. Performing the experiments on ‘Beauvais’ has been costly, but it has put the group of shipyards involved in the tests in a position to accept orders for methane carriers.”785 Alain Grill wrote in Le magazine des ingénieurs de l’armement: “Never again in my career was I to find such synergy meticulously orchestrated by the Secretary General himself, Jean Morin. […] Nor will I ever forget this maritime venture, when, as General Manager of Chargeurs Réunis, we took a stake in Gazocéan; nor when, in Malaysia, having become the Chief Executive Officer of the Chantiers de l’Atlantique, I signed the largest contract of my career: five 130,000-m3 methane carriers.”786 Gaz Marine and ACSM signed a protocol, under which Gaz Marine demanded from ACSM that FCM “be involved in the execution of the construction contract so as to ensure that under all circumstances, the construction and completion of this ship will be brought to a successful conclusion.” Although both shipyards had participated in the technical tests and although ACSM was committed to building the hull of the future methane carrier while its engines were to be constructed by FCM, this latter firm had not agreed to be named in the contract as a builder with “joint and several” liability. On the other hand, FCM agreed to sign an agreement on 20 July 1962 as the primary sub-contractor, and to perform the obligations set forth in Article 1 of the contract under the following terms: “In addition to the contractual obligations as principal sub-contractor; and in the event that the shipbuilder fails to perform its obligations, FCM agrees to assume full responsibility for the commitments agreed to by the shipbuilder. […] Formal notice shall be served by the shipowner on the shipbuilder demanding the execution of said obligations by a specified deadline. In the event that the shipbuilder fails to react to said notice, and one month after expiry of said deadline, the shipping company may, at its own risk, proceed to substitute the principal subcontractor for the shipbuilder, notwithstanding any possible recourse by either party to arbitrage, subject to all rights and means of the parties. In the event that the substitution is enacted, Gaz Marine will make any payments owed following said substitution in execution of the present contract, directly to FCM. […] Worms & Cie, on behalf of ACSM, will provide surety to FCM for any commitment hereinabove entered into by ACSM.” It seems that the contract signed between Gaz Marine and the Le Trait shipyard had no impact on the trials that continued throughout July: “On 2 July,” reported an article from GDF-Suez, “the ‘Beauvais’ sailed up the Loire to unload its cargo at the Roche-Maurice facility, using the marine loading arms [MLA].”787 And OuestFrance reported that, that same month “in the vicinity of Belle-Île, the sea trials of the ‘Beauvais’ are being conducted with twenty-six sailors and about fifteen engineers and technicians from several shipyards on board […] all of them volunteers, given the dangerous nature of its cargo of 100 tons of methane. […] Each evening, the inhabitants of Belle-Île, mingling curiosity with concern, observe this black and red hull moored

784 See the article in La Correspondance économique of 29 June 1962. 785 Words quoted in “1950-1961, Beauvais […],” article published on https://www.flickr.com. 786 Cf. “Profession ? Ingénieur du génie maritime,” op. cit.

The methane carrier “Jules Verne” under construction Ω

one nautical mile from Le Palais. Converted into a laboratory ship in Penhoët, this former Liberty ship, with one of its masts serving as a gas exhaust pipe, has something worrying about it.”788

The Hassi R’Mel and Arzew gas complex

Once the Evian Accords (18 March 1962) had ended the Algerian War, Gaz de France intensified its relations with the former colony. In May 1962, GDF and SEHR789 signed “the first major gas contract between France and Algeria.” The agreement provided for the construction of a plant (operated by the Compagnie Algérienne de Méthane Liquide) in Arzew, a port located 40 km from Oran, for the purpose of liquefying the natural gas transported from the Hassi R’mel gas field via a 510km pipeline with an annual capacity of 3 billion-m3. In addition to GDF, British Methane / British Gas Council participated in the venture. The foundation stone was laid on 15 September 1962,790 in the presence of the newly elected President of Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, the French Ambassador and other officials. At the same time, work began on a methane terminal in Le Havre. This future Gaz de France plant, with a total storage capacity of 36,000-m3, received around half a billion-m3 of natural gas every year and covered 40% of the Paris region’s annual gas consumption via gas pipelines laid specifically for this purpose.791

The “Jules Verne,” the first French methane carrier, is built in Le Trait

In Le Trait, the keel of the methane carrier, soon to be known as the “Jules Verne,” was laid on 17 April 1963 in slipway No. 2 under construction No. 171. Six days earlier (11 April), ACSM had launched two ships: the butane carrier “Copernico” (freeing up slipway No. 2) for the Chilean shipping company, Naviera Interoceangas SA; and the hydrographic survey vessel

788 Cf. “1962 : Un inquiétant prototype méthanier,” on https://www.ouest-france.fr. 789 SEHR: Société d’Exploitation des Hydrocarbures d’Hassi R’Mel. See “50 ans d’innovation dans le GNL,” at http://www.engie.com. 790 See L’Algérie indépendante (1962-1963) : L’ambassade de Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, by Anne Liskenne, Jean-Noël Jeanneney, Maurice Vaïsse, Armand Colin, 2015. 791 Cf. “50 ans du GNL - 1962-1965 : construction du premier terminal”; this article on http://Ing.gdfsuez.com is no longer available. “Astrolabe”792 for the French Navy. This dual launch provided an occasion for Pierre Herrenschmidt to deliver a speech, during which he announced “the conclusion of a technical cooperation agreement between ACSM and FCM. The latter company,” he stated, “owns shipyards in La Seyne (Var department) and in Le Havre-Graville which employ a total of 3,500 people. The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime in Le Trait, downstream from Rouen, has a workforce of 2,000. The two shipyards have already established a research company for the seagoing transport of liquefied gas. In this respect, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime will soon be starting construction on the first French methane carrier.” Published in Le Monde on 13 April, this information was reproduced in Agence économique et financière on 16 April 1963, under the heading: “Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée. An agreement has been reached with the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime which seeks to strengthen the ties that the two companies have forged within the technical and commercial field over the past years. We should recall, first, that the two companies share boards members, and second, that they have adopted a joint policy to construct ships designed to transport liquefied gas.” The attention accorded by the Worms shipping group to the innovations led Robert Labbé, in May 1963, to establish Techni-Marine, a limited liability company,

792 Along with the “Boussole” this ship was listed as a hydrographic auxiliary vessel in the ACSM’s General Meeting report of 29 June 1965.

The “Jules Verne” in slip No. 2; the “Ville de Bordeaux” in slip No. 1 and the “Ville d’Anvers” at the fitting-out quay

for the purpose of “undertaking technical studies and research on seagoing transport; these studies shall focus primarily on the design and operation of specialised ships, as well as on ways of reducing their production costs and operating expenses; to provide advice [… and…] to undertake, on behalf of third parties, any study or project related thereto. The share capital of 100,000 F is fully paid up by the various partners: Worms CMC,793 Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest, Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, Société Maritime des Transports Pétroliers, all companies affiliated directly or indirectly with Worms & Cie; Audy Gilles served as one of the managers of TechniMarine, together with Mr Neufville, Technical Director of NCHP.”794 In October 1963, an article written by André Renaudin appeared in Paris Normandie:795 “Le Havre, methane port – The model for the first methane ship under construction at ACSM in Le Trait was presented in Paris yesterday evening. […] Numerous VIPs from the world of shipping, LNG and banking, were welcomed by the representatives of Gaz de France and

Inside the tanks of the “Jules Verne” 793 The minutes of the Worms CMC Board Meeting on 24 May 1963 show that the level of the company’s participation in SARL Technimarine was 20%. 794 Cf. Roger Mennevée, Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, published in March 1965. This article refers to a press conference given on 15 May 1963, by Robert Labbé, in his capacity as Chairman of the Central Committee of French Shipowners, regarding the programme to redeploy the French merchant fleet. Mennevée summarised Labbé’s words as follows: “The government must provide subsidies to shipping companies to help them demolish their old ships; additional subsidies to help them order new ships; and further subsidies to make them easier to operate.” 795 Paris Normandie on 18 October 1963.

its affiliated companies, Méthane Transport and Gaz Marine. The ACSM management team – its Chairman, Mr Herrenschmidt; Managing Director, Mr Lamoureux (he was to retire shortly thereafter), and the current Deputy Director, Mr Grillat – were present. Mr Grillat has been given the special assignment of overseeing ACSM activities next year. […] The first French methane carrier will thus succeed the ‘Beauvais’ in 1964. On each trip between Arzew and Le Havre, [the ship] will transport the equivalent of 13.8 million-m3 of gas, the annual gas consumption of a conurbation like Rouen or Rennes. It is scheduled to be commissioned in the fourth quarter of 1964. We know that an agreement was concluded in 1962 with the Société d’Exploitation des Hydrocarbures in Hassi R’Mel (Sahara). As a result of this contract, Gaz de France will receive 420 million-m3 of gas, which will then be sent to the Paris region.”

The “Jules Verne” is launched on 8 September 1964

The first methane carrier built in France was also the largest ship ever launched in Le Trait. The launch marked the shipyard’s technical apogee, but also sounded its death knell, as we shall soon see. Measuring 201 metres in length, 24.70 metres in width and 16.50 metres in depth, the ship was designed to transport 25,500-m3 of LNG (equivalent to 15,300,000-m3 of gas) per voyage in its seven separate tanks. The FCM propulsion unit develops 13,000-HP (maximum 15,000-HP) from eleven Turbo-Reducers, allowing a speed of 17 knots. “The liquid gas unloaded in Le Havre is regasified at the port and piped to the Paris region, where it is stored in natural underground reservoirs in Beynes, in the Yvelines department.”796 In the sixteen months (and one week) of its construction, most of the shipyard’s workforce were assigned to the “Jules Verne.” “1964,” stated the annual report to the General Meeting of 29 June 1965, “was dominated, as in the previous year, by the construction of the methane carrier.” Nevertheless, other ships were also built during this period.

The “Jules Verne” at the Le Havre gas terminal Ω

796 Account of Charles Duguet, Secretary General of ACSM, of 23 January 1978.

Other ship orders

Three ships were launched in 1962: - the ore carrier “Stylehurst” was launched on 4 May for Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd. - the cargo ship “Ville de Brest” left slipway No. 1 on 19 June, with the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire taking delivery on 18 August; - the 7,350-dwt (maximum) cargo ship “Saint François,” on which construction started in slipway No. 8 on 15 January 1962, was launched on 17 October; she left the fitting-out quay a month later to become part of the fleet of the Compagnie de Navigation Denis Frères, – operating in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) and Haiphong, then on the west coast of Africa as of 1955. Four vessels were launched in 1963, construction on three of which had started in 1962: - the 7,870-dwt cargo ship “N.O. Røgenæs,” occupying slipway No. 1 between 25 July 1962 and 27 May 1963, was delivered on 18 November 1963 to the Norwegian shipowner, Niels Røgenæs (ACSM built a total of eight ships for Norwegian shipping companies); - the two hydrographic survey vessels “Astrolabe” (previously mentioned) and “Boussole,” under construction in slipway No. 7 on 25 and 26 November 1962 (or 5 February 1963) respectively, were launched on 11 April and 27 May 1963 and delivered to the French Navy on 5 and 27 February 1964; - the 3,400-m3 butane carrier “Copernico” (previously mentioned), the keel of which was laid on 15 November 1962 in slipway No. 2, was launched on 11 April 1963; the Chilean company, Naviera Interoceangas SA, took delivery on 2 September. Work undertaken in 1963 also included the conversion (engines, holds, etc.) of the “Ville de Tananarive” and the “Ville de Tamatave,” delivered to the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire on 26 March and 25 May 1963. On 1 March of that same year, construction started on a 14,597-dwt freighter under the name of “Mont Aigoual” in slipway No. 8: in anticipation of operating difficulties, the owner, the Société Générale des Transports Maritimes (SGTM), sold it to NCHP; the ship was launched as the “Ville d’Anvers” on 2 March 1964 and delivered on 12 May 1964. Still in 1963, construction on the third of four freighters ordered by NCHP in 1959 began in slipway No. 1: the “Ville de Bordeaux,” (12,304-dwt) which was launched on 11 April 1964, and delivered on 6 August. On 15 April 1964, slipway No. 1 was occupied once more, this time by the “Ville de Lyon,” the fourth cargo ship for NCHP. Turning to the 1964 ship orders, the shipyard went ahead with the conversion of the 13,000-ton oil tanker “Betty Maersk” into a molten sulphur carrier for the Société Nouvelle des Pétroles d’Aquitaine (in which Maison Worms had an interest). Re-named the “Président André Blanchard,”797 the tanker was delivered on 23 May 1964. On 15 July 1964, construction began in workshop on the first in a series of five pushers ordered by the Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine; named the “Dauphin,” the vessel was equipped with two 152-HP engines. 1 and 15 December 1964 marked the start of construction on two other pushers, the “Montcalm” and the “Dupleix” fitted with two 540-HP engines each. Between 3 September and 20 October 1964, ACSM set about lengthening seven barges for Union Normande, Soflumar, Citherna, and the Société de Transports par Automoteurs-Citernes. On 14 and 23 September 1964, the keels were laid in slipway No. 2 for two ferry boats, the “Stena Danica” and “Stena Nordica” for Stena AB, the Swedish shipping company founded by Sten A. Olsson.

797 See a press clipping from an unspecified newspaper of 12 April 1964: “The ‘Président André Blanchard.’ On 10 June, this molten sulphur carrier will be placed in service on behalf of the SNPA [Société Navale des Pétroles d’Aquitaine]. This date coincides with the inauguration of the sulphur loading facilities in Bayonne, the future home port of this ship.”

In the foreground, the hydrographic survey vessel “Boussole” and, floating on the Seine, the two tanks for butane carrier “Copernico”

The butane carrier “Copernico” launched on 11 April 1963 for the Chilean company, Naviera Interoceangas SA

As reported in the annual report of 29 June 1965, just one order was placed in fiscal year 1964 for 1965: for “one reefer (3,400-grt) intended for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, [and which was] awarded to [the] company under the terms of a contract signed on 19 June 1964.” The ship was the “Ivolina,” a reefer on which construction started on 15 January 1965 in slipway No. 8. Although a few other contracts had been signed, management undoubtedly considered them less important than the contracts for oil tankers or large freighters.

An overly diversified order book

The order book for 1962–1964 was characterised by diversity: first and foremost, a diversity of clients, a number of whom came from abroad: Panama Gypsum Co., Inc., Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin, Grenehurst Shipping Co. Ltd., Niels Røgenæs, Naviera Interoceangas – Chile, Stena AB, Lignes Maritimes du Détroit – Morocco, among others. Had ACSM benefited from Worms’ list of customers? The fact remains that ACSM seemed to succeed where its competitors struggled: opening up to international markets and exporting. Diversity also characterised production: freighter, oil tanker, ore carrier, methane carrier, butane carrier, liquide sulphur tanker, reefer, ferry boat, freezer trawler, pusher, etc. While this range bore witness to the shipyard’s wide-ranging know-how, it played against the company insofar as “made to measure” made it impossible to save on manufacturing costs as achieved through series production. Quite the contrary, “made to measure,” because of the supplement overtime required, caused price estimates to skyrocket, with the shipyard unable to pass on these extra costs to its clients. In this regard, it should be mentioned that the launch deadlines, as reported in memos, Board Meeting minutes and loan requests issued by the company, etc. were systematically exceeded (often by several months). For instance, a report of 18 May 1965 mentioned about the “Jules Verne” whose technological success was unfortunately not matched by financial success: “Part of productive hours are accounted for by overtime (needed in particular for the completion of the ‘Jules Verne’), and many production workers had to exceed the weekly schedule of 46.15 hours.” After experiencing its first losses in 1962 (3.4 million francs), operations continued to be in the red, with deficits mounting from year to year: 5.6 million francs in 1963, 7.6 million francs in 1964. This imbalance was attributable to pure shipbuilding activity which was less and less profitable. That is why ACSM decided to reposition itself, focusing on the reconversion of its activities while in 1963 the municipality of Le Trait launched into the creation of a 26-hectares industrial zone.

Final launches for the French Navy 11 April and 27 May 1963: the hydrographic survey vessels “Astrolabe” and “Boussole”

Specifications

Length overall

Beam

Draught

Mean displacement

Maximum speed

Crew 42.70 meters 8.20 meters 2.40 meters 350-dwt 12.5 knots 36 (including 3 hydrographic officers)

Towards “despecialisation”ˮ “Diversifying and intensifying its reconversion activities”

aCsm 29 june 1965798

The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime was one of the first shipbuilding companies to complement its core business by developing its boilermaking operations, then to compensate for the weakening of its main business by directing its activities toward mechanical construction, bundling for the steel industry, prefabrication, etc. – sectors likely to ensure job security for a portion of its workforce, and to lift the shipyard out of its geo-economic isolation.

Floating roofs and boilermaking activities

For decades, ACSM developed hydrocarbon storage facilities under various American licences (in particular, floating roofs under licence from Chicago Bridge): in 1962, it obtained an exceptional order for a refinery in the Philippines, and in 1964, for another one in Thailand. It then became involved in the construction of metal water towers, tubular structures intended for oil drilling, and rotary filters. ACSM also used Foster Wheeler licences to build boilers, and a Sigma licence for certain components used in free-piston generators. The company manufactured conventional boilers for industrial facilities, orders procured by the company as a result of its relationships with engineering companies. ACSM undertook maintenance and servicing work. A Crédit National report of 10 December 1963 described the facilities dedicated to this industrial activity. “Two ‘naves’ have been reserved exclusively for reconversion to other activities, and during our visit,” remarked the author of the report. “We saw boilers being constructed for a refinery in Thailand; - a 3,800 m2 mechanical workshop, leased to Constructions Mécaniques of Le Trait [discussed later in this chapter]. This workshop is beginning to be equipped with large-size machine tools, though it seemed to lack several precision machines, such as jig boring machines.

Drawing and photo of a floating roof published in Le Calfat du Trait

In addition to these two main workshops, others included: - a workshop under construction, to where the manufacture of floating roofs is to be transferred; - a slipway (No. 6) covered several years ago at the request of the French Navy and now converted into a workshop through the construction of a cement floor(see page 354); - a well-equipped woodworking and cabinetmaking workshop;

798 Annual report to the Ordinary General Meeting of 29 June 1965.

Grain silo and water tower built by ACSM in the Nancy region

- a small workshop specially developed in 1960 for the series production of prefabricated building components,799 [discussed later in this chapter]; - a 750o stress-relief furnace, measuring 12 metres long. The shipyard thus has a range of high-value facilities, all making an excellent impression,” concluded the inspector.

New industrial specialties

To develop its traditional boilermaking activities, ACSM lacked an appropriate salesforce. The head office in Paris handled shipbuilding contracts and large orders regarding the reconversion activities (those dealing with large assemblies, for example). The shipyard itself enjoyed great autonomy. But there was a service missing between the two, a dedicated and specialised salesforce. For this reason, the Crédit National report

799 These components were intended for schools, laboratories and engineering offices. They were mounted by a construction company in Le Havre. recommended that a “sales department be set up and that, in addition to the chairman, one or more members of senior management be made personally responsible for conversion and full employment of the workforce in the coming years.” This gap was partially filled by closer or strengthened ties with industrial companies via shared subsidiaries: - Wean Damiron engineering office (share capital of 2,520,000 F), specialised in steelmaking facilities and equipment for metalworking industries; founded in 1956 as a joint venture between the American group Wean-McKay and the French Damiron & Cie; - Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM), an established partner since 1956. ACSM and FCM

In the foreground, the two barges ordered by the Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin and delivered in 1960 – in the background, slip No. 6 (covered)

together established an office dedicated to seeking new outlets in expanding sectors, which employed a director, two engineers, an executive assistant, three parttime employees and four secretaries.800 This move to set up specialised companies resembled the way the shipyard’s LNG operations had been structured.

Les Constructions Mécaniques du Trait

In March 1962, ACSM partnered with Wean Damiron to create Les Constructions Mécaniques du Trait (CMT), an SARL company co-managed by Pierre Herrenschmidt and Paul Damiron. Its goal was to increase the shipyard’s production capacity within the mechanical engineering sector (manufacture of large industrial equipment intended in particular for the steel industry) and machine welding. Headquartered in Le Trait, CMT had a share capital of 4 million francs. According to the Crédit National report of 10 December 1963, ACSM “brought in its mechanical workshops valued at 2 million francs, while Wean Damiron made a cash contribution of the same amount,” but curiously a few pages later, the 3,800 m2 workshop in question is presented as “leased by ACSM to CMT.” Moreover, the 90 employees listed as belonging to CMT continued to be on the ACSM payroll – as if the company were merely an extension of ACSM, without actual content. In its first full year of operations, CMT achieved a turnover of approximately 4 million francs, a portion of which (500,000 F) was work invoiced to ACSM. The other sales were secured through the intermediary of Wean Damiron. A 50% increase in growth (from 4 to 6 million francs) was expected for the second year, it being understood that “CMT has no other client than its two shareholders [who] have agreed that all work will be performed at cost price, so as not to make either profit or loss.” In 1963, “the shipyard […] employed 1,985 persons, of whom 1,837 worked for ACSM and 148 for CMT.”801

Botalam

Still in the steel industry, ACSM, in an attempt to maintain manufacturing activity at a certain level, acquired patents in 1963 to manufacture bundling machines initially exploited by the mechanisation department of the company, ABG.802 An agreement was concluded

801 Crédit National report of 10 December 1963 regarding ACSM. 802 See the memo of 20 January 1964; in a memo of 9–11 June 1964, these investments are indicated as 3,080,000 F.

with ABG, following which ACSM founded Botalam SARL on 22 June 1963 with share capital of 2.3 million francs (quickly increased to 3 million). ACSM held 70% of the shares, while the remaining 30% were held by ABG, Wean Damiron and FCM. The owner of the patents, Botalam sold the bundling machines constructed by ACSM to its clientele within the steel industry. This subsidiary was headquartered at 9, Rue Tronchet, to where the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime had recently relocated its general management. “With an eye to transforming its Banking Services, Worms & Cie had [indeed] asked [its subsidiary] to return the premises it occupied at 47, Boulevard Haussmann, and 14, Rue Auber. ACSM thus moved its general management to 9, Rue Tronchet, in a building belonging to the insurance company, the Mutuelle Générale Française-Vie, while its headquarters remained at 45, Boulevard Haussmann.”803 Valued at approximately 8 million francs in June 1964, the Botalam order book listed solely export contracts (to the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium).804 The ACSM annual report dated 29 June 1965 stated that “Botalam devoted the bulk of its activities in 1964 to manufacturing equipment for automatic bundling machines used in the rolling mill at the Ijmuiden steel plant in the Netherlands. While the first financial year of operations ended with a loss, completing the first installation of this size suggests that interesting sales prospects to arise for the company.”

Euro Moteurs

At nearly the same time as Botalam was set up, ACSM helped found a European engine company – Euro Moteurs – an SARL company with its headquarters in Paris at 45 (or 53) Avenue d’Iéna. Its share capital of 50 thousand francs (divided into 500 shares valued at 100 francs each)805 was shared among the Ateliers et

803 At that time, the ACSM Board was made up of Pierre Herrenschmidt, Chairman; Joseph Brocard, Vice Chairman; Raymond Meynial; Guy Brocard; Worms & Cie (represented by one of its General Partners, Robert Labbé); and Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Pierre Chevalier). 804 See the Crédit National report of 10 December 1963; memo from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime to the Worms & Cie Banking Services dated 9–11 June 1964; ACSM memo of 1 October 1964. 805 See the merger agreement of 5 April 1966, received by Mr Chalain, notary, on 3 May 1966. Chantiers de La Rochelle-La Pallice, the Établissements Brissonneau et Lotz, and the Matériel Électrique SW. Paul Bastide, Executive Manager of the Ateliers et Chantiers de La Rochelle-La Pallice, along with Pierre Herrenschmidt, co-managed Euro Moteurs, the goal of which “in France, its overseas territories, and abroad, was to study, research and technically upgrade all original processes or resources potentially applicable to all types of engines, particularly a prototype barrel-type diesel engine, known as a Girodin Moteur, as well as all mechanical, electrical or electronic machinery and parts.”806

Praia

In the course of 1963, ACSM, in partnership with FCM and the Ateliers de Menpenti, contributed to the formation of the Société de Prospection des Activités Industrielles d’Avenir (Praia), an SARL company with a share capital of 200,000 F. Its purpose was to engage in prospective studies and business development. In 1964, ACSM participated in this subsidiary’s share capital increase of 250,000 F, at the conclusion of which ACSM and FCM each owned 50% of the company.807

From one investment programme to another

With a view to financing its “despecialisation,” ACSM drafted an investment programme targeting the redeployment of approximately 20% of its workforce in 1960. This plan, estimated to require the expenditure of 4,780 million francs, was approved by the public authorities in February 1961. In addition, in November 1960, the company received an equipment grant of 576,000 F, at an interest rate of 12%. ACSM was also authorised to participate for 3 million francs in a group loan issued by the Normandy Regional Development Company.808 The 1963 annual statement valued the total investments committed to reconversion since 1960 at 7.9 million francs (out of

806 Cf. Roger Mennevée, Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, March 1965. 807 Cf. Roger Mennevée, “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie en 1964,” published in Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, in April 1964. Among the financial transactions in which Worms & Cie participated or lent its assistance, the capital increase for the Regional Agency for the Economic Development of Normandy was mentioned. 808 See Crédit National report of 10 December 1963.

total fixed assets of 48.6 million francs). Although the initial financing programme had been fully achieved, ACSM could be proud to have met its targets: - turnover from activities other than shipbuilding had grown continually over the last three fiscal years: 7,860,000 F in 1961, 15,810,000 F in 1962 and 21,314,000 F (or 21.5% of the total results of 91,973,000 F) in 1963.809 Nonetheless, changes in the economic climate forced the company to consider a second phase, which necessitated the redeployment of 40% of its workforce within the boilermaking sector in 1965, to the benefit of approximately 200 people. With that goal in mind, a second financing plan was submitted to the public authorities in May 1963 which amounted to 9,526,000 F,810 of which 3,080,000 F for acquiring patents for the bundling machines – patents on the basis of which Botalam was established – and for covering the development expenses for a new diesel engine manufactured by Euro Moteurs. In addition, the firm sought financial assistance from a) the Economic and Social Development Fund (FDES): a loan of 5 million francs; and b) Crédit National: a long-term loan of 1.7 million francs and a medium-term loan of 2 million francs. On 17 December 1963, a request to mobilise funds for this latter financing was sent to six banking institutions (including Worms & Cie) to cover said loan with Crédit National for a five-year period (20 December 1963 to 19 December 1968). In the letter sent to the banks, ACSM referred to an important point: “Crédit National will terminate its commitment to mobilise funds in full at the end of the first year, if [the] company has not gone ahead with a capital increase through fully paid-up cash subscriptions, securing for the company, including share premium accounts, at least 2 million francs.” This condition was fulfilled in November 1964.

Fifth and final capital increase

On 12 November 1964, the shareholders were informed that, in execution of the decisions taken by the Board of Directors811 that same day under the powers conferred on it by the Extraordinary General Meeting of 29 July 1964, the company’s share capital would be increased from 6 to 8 million francs through the issuance of 20 thousand new shares with a par value of 100 francs, to be subscribed in cash, at par, and fully funded through either cash or compensation. The rights associated with said 20 thousand new shares were exercisable as of 1 January 1964.812 The notice published in Les Petites Affiches indicated that the company headquarters was located at 9, Rue Tronchet, Paris.813 The capital increase was achieved on 30 November 1964. It was realised in full by Worms & Cie, “which offset a portion of ACSM’s outstanding debt to it, which amounted to 4,751,912 F at 26 November 1964. This still left ACSM in debt to Worms & Cie to the tune of 2,750,000 F in round figures.”814 This operation can be partially explained by the commitment made to the lending institutions (Crédit National) to improve the company’s financial situation; an additional goal was to strengthen ACSM’s weight in the perspective of a merger with one or several of its competitors – such a project was already under consideration – and to counter the threat of closure arising from such an eventuality. The more financial weight the company had, the less risk it ran of being the one absorbed and disappearing.

809 In a memo of 2 July 1965, it was indicated that “turnover, excluding taxes, earned by the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, as a result of all of their reconversion activities, including sub-contractor contracts, reached 27,134,000 F in 1964, representing a 40% increase over the corresponding figure in 1963: 19,090,000 F. This figure now constitutes 34% of total turnover for the company.” 810 See the memo sent by ACSM to the Worms & Cie Banking Services on 9–11 June 1964: the second investment programme amounted to 12,306,000 F – out of this total, 2,780,000 F were earmarked for the shipbuilding division for the purpose of renewing old facilities and improving productivity. 811 See its composition in footnote 803, page 355. 812 Insert in Les Petites Affiches of 12–13 November 1964. See the memo from Pierre Herrenschmidt to Robert Labbé on 13 November 1964. 813 From the archives, it is not possible to establish the precise date on which the headquarters moved from Boulevard Haussmann to this address; the move occurred between June 1963, the date on which the general management moved there, and November 1964, the date on which the insert was published in Les Petites Affiches. 814 “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie in 1964,” published in Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, in April 1965.

“The government’s pressing demand”

le Figaro, 29 january 1965

From several potential mergers to a two way-merger

Three potential mergers were studied between July 1962 and April 1966, the date on which the last of the three was realised: - first, with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat (CNC) and the Chantiers & Ateliers de Provence (CAP); - second, with those same companies plus the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée; - and finally, with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat alone. The intention was the same each time: to meet the requirements of the public authorities. Each of the potential mergers was based on a letter sent by the government on 7 April 1962. Although this letter unfortunately could not be found in the ACSM archives and in the available bibliographic or digital sources, it is referenced in several memos, thus making it possible to reconstruct its content: sent by Prime Minister Michel Debré (8 January 1959 to 14 April 1962) to the Minister for Transport and Public Works, the government, using the 1959 White Paper as its basis, expressed its desire to reduce the number of shipyards in operation. To that end, the government made the payment of public subsidies conditional on a concentration of the shipbuilding sector. This basically meant that several companies would have to give up shipbuilding, merge with other shipbuilders or, at worst, cease to exist. On this point, a CNC memo of 20 September 1965, was particularly telling: “It is important that the managing directors of both companies [ACSM and CNC, in this instance] present a programme […] to the public authorities that achieves the goals set forth in the letter from Mr Debré; namely, proposing that two shipbuilding companies [of the three involved in the merger] stop making use of the State Aid Law.” “In a social climate fully mindful of the threat of closure,”815 the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime was to attempt to negotiate its future in the best possible way. It should be noted in this regard that during the period when closer ties were being forged with CNC, the latter was engaged in a project to build a “great form,” in other words a giant slipway allowing the construction of 350,000-dwt ships. This project was conceived by CNC at the end of the 1950s, taken over in 1962, financed from 1965 onwards via a specially dedicated company, and completed on 8 February 1969, the day of the inauguration of the 360-meter long and 60-meter wide slipway.

Proposed merger with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and the Chantiers & Ateliers de Provence

The Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat was one of the four largest shipyards in France. Its roots went back to the company formed in the mid-1830s by Louis Benet (the son of a shipowner based in La Ciotat) from a shipyard for sailing boats established by master carpenter Joseph Vence. The 1848–1851 crisis forced Louis Benet to sell his shipyard to the Messageries Maritimes, which in turn sold it in 1916 to the Société Provençale de Constructions Navales (created for this purpose); following its bankruptcy, the Société Provençale was purchased in January 1940 by the Terrin group (Société des Ateliers Terrin, created in 1891) and renamed Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat. The Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence (CAP) was established in 1899 in Port-de-Bouc by Alfred Fraissinet, manager of the Compagnie Française de Navigation (also known as the Compagnie Fraissinet) of which he was one of the heirs, and by Jules Charles-Roux, a shipowner, industrialist and politician. At the end of the 1950s, the Fraissinet group, expecting that the new criteria for allocating public subsidies imposed by the White Paper would hinder the company’s ability to grow, decided to withdraw from shipbuilding. Fraissinet group sold 80% of its shares to a group of financiers made up of the descendants of the Marseilles banker, Périclès Zarifi, himself one of the founding shareholders of CAP. Jean Domenichino816 was to remark: “This transaction was

816 “Construction navale, politique étatique, stratégies patronale et ouvrière,” op. cit., p. 58.

The Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat (Bouches-du-Rhône department)

hard to explain at the time. Indeed, if the shipyard was still profitable, people did not understand why the Fraissinet family wished to part with it. […] Nor did people understand the Zarifi decision – assuming CAP was doomed in the short term – except to acknowledge that there had been an error in judgment. The purpose of the transaction was clarified the following year. Upon the death of François Charles-Roux, Board member of the company and a descendant of the first Chairman of CAP, the Board of Directors named as his replacement Jean-Marie Terrin, a shareholder of Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, and Chairman of the Société Provençale des Ateliers Terrin in Marseilles. Not only was Zarifi the son-in-law of Terrin, but he himself was a shareholder in Chantiers de La Ciotat. Thus, Zarifi’s purchase of the Fraissinet shares made complete sense: it disguised how the Chantiers de La Ciotat had taken control of the shipyard in Port-de-Bouc.” Thus, when ACSM started talks with CNC and CAP, it was not with two partners, but with CNC alone. On 24 July 1962, ACSM, CNC and CAP drafted a protocol for the purpose of “engaging in joint policies within technical and commercial fields [and of] studying a total or partial merger of their assets.”817 The underlying reasons for this – and subsequent – initiatives were set forth in the memorandum of understanding (MoU): “- the difficult situation of shipbuilding; - the position of the public authorities vis-à-vis the sector, as set forth in the letter dated 7 April 1962; - the de facto solidarity among the shipyards as a result of the government’s position; - the extent of the potential for ship and industrial construction within the three companies, as well as the growth potential; - the efforts made, as well as the results already achieved, in reconversion; - the importance of CNC in the shipbuilding field; - the position of CAP in the field of mechanical engineering; - the importance of the shipping activities associated with the Worms group, and the commercial potential of this group.” Indeed, the intrinsic value of ACSM was far less interesting for its partners than its links to the Worms shipping group, which was the real target. In fact, “ACSM gave the assurance on behalf of the Worms group that the Worms shipping companies would try

817 Protocol agreement of 24 July 1962; the following quotations were taken from this document.

their utmost to place their orders with ACSM/CNC/ CAP grouping at a price and quality comparable to those of the competition.” Backed by these commitments, the three shipyards decided to do everything possible, both technically and commercially to: “- no longer compete for projects or orders, but combine their efforts to make best use of the respective strengths of each company, and thus to be in a position to offer more competitive bids; - concentrate on activities best reflecting each company’s technical experience and potential; - streamline and concentrate their shipbuilding activities pursuant to the commitments made to the public authorities; - continue to develop their non-shipbuilding activities, with a view to their various establishments or subsidiaries becoming increasingly complementary; - finally, complete the planned mergers within twelve months.” In this spirit, the three companies agreed to “take into account the vital interests of the shipyards’ workforces which, in all three cases, are located too far away from regional industrial centres for them to find work easily. It is further specified that the Chantiers de La Ciotat will maintain its shipbuilding activities, but that both CNC and the newly formed company will take all steps to maintain shipbuilding and reconversion activities of the two other shipyards so that their combined workforce will not risk more than a 20% decline; all measures are to be studied in conjunction with the public authorities (labour services, land use planning agencies and industrial expansion services) with a view to retaining the staff. […] It is also agreed that the Société de Constructions Mécaniques du Trait will be given every possible means to develop its manufacture of large industrial equipment, particularly that used in the steel industry. To achieve these objectives, the three companies agree to establish […]: - a management committee tasked with defining a joint technical, commercial, financial and social policy, and with overseeing its enforcement. - a coordination committee entrusted with implementing the policy defined by the management committee […]; - and a study committee tasked with preparing the merger.” This initial agreement was not pursued for reasons that cannot be determined from the archives. The fact remains that the previously described policy of “despecialisation” followed by ACSM was largely inspired by the objectives expressed in this memorandum of understanding. In April 1964, a second project was launched, this time including ACSM’s official partner, Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée. It is interesting to note that the MoU, conceived without FCM, was drafted four days after Gaz Marine forced ACSM to include FCM in the contract to construct the methane carrier “Jules Verne,” for which FCM had refused to serve as co-builder.

A four-way merger

Towards the end of January 1965, ACSM announced that its sales related to its reconversion activities had increased by 5% over 1964 and now represented 28% of total turnover.818 At the same time, the press announced that ACSM, along with the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat819 and Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence, had just signed a protocol “in application of the merger agreement agreed last April, with a view to concentrating their business activities.” “This concentration, long demanded by the public authorities and one of the conditions for granting financial aid to the shipyards,”820 stated Le Monde on 29 January, was the response “to the growing competition from Japanese shipyards in particular,” expressed Le Figaro the same day, adding that “these companies have just decided, effective immediately, to start pooling their assets for the purpose of making better use of their resources. The gradual specialisation of their establishments, the pooling of their design departments and facilities, is expected to enable them, through

818 Cf. memo from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime of 20 January 1965. 819 See the memo of 13 January 1965 from Banque Worms: On this date, an overdraft facility of 225,000 francs was granted by Banque Worms to the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence. This credit, which was scheduled to end on 30 June 1965, corresponded to Banque Worms’ share in a 6 million syndicated loan. Approved by the Banque de France, this agreement cancelled and replaced an authorisation granted on 16 December 1964 and amounting to 168,750 F. 820 Cf. letter sent on 7 April 1962, by the Prime Minister to the Minister for Transport and Public Works.

increased productivity, to reduce their cost prices and simultaneously develop their reconversion to new business activities.” For its part, Le Monde inferred that “a new company will be established between now and next autumn, led by Mr Herrenschmidt [and for which] several coordination committees will now set about the preparatory work.” The newspaper added “that it has taken several months of discussions and the resolution of difficult personal issues to arrive at the merger, [which] is set to lead in the short run to the closure of one of the four shipyards involved (Port-de-Bouc), and in the long run to the closure of two of them.” The protocol defining the method for assessing the respective contributions was signed on 8 February 1965; one month later (3 March 1965), Cabinet Roux, specialising in business valuation, was tasked “with estimating the market value of the various land and residential buildings; determining the replacement value of the industrial or office buildings, as well as the equipment, large tools, facilities, fixtures and fittings (excluding standard small tools) comprising the industrial and real estate complexes, defined as: 1- for FCM: the Mazeline workshops in Le Havre and the shipyard in La Seyne near Toulon. 2- for CNC: the shipyard of La Ciotat; 3- for CAP: the shipyard of Port-de-Bouc; 4- for ACSM: the shipyard in Le Trait and adjoining properties.” CNC alone was valued at 189,286,080 F (May 1965), while Le Trait was valued at 148,602,730 F (1 June 1965).

Economic goals of the project

The four companies held a meeting on 10 February, the minutes of which were written up by ACSM three days later (13 February 1965); ACSM used the occasion to review the directions it had followed over the course of the three previous years and its solutions for the future. “Between 1962 and February 1965, ACSM has had to follow a very prudent and rather conservative policy, since the company needed to focus all its efforts on the construction of the ‘Jules Verne.’ […] This policy resulted in high turnover and work levels, but also to heavy losses,821 particularly on the methane carrier, because of the sacrifices made on orders taken to ‘cover’ the

821 Memo from Audy Gilles to Guy Brocard, on 29 April 1965. This document contains a large amount of information on operating costs, salaries, etc. construction of the ship and to reassure personnel.” A memo of 2 July 1965 explained these losses as being the result of the innovative techniques employed in the construction of the “Jules Verne” and the ferry boats “Stena Danica” and “Stena Nordica,” innovations that had distorted cost estimates and forced the shipyard – unplanned – to turn to external specialists, within a highly competitive environment where prices were trending downwards. These losses had been compounded by additional expenses generated by the pace of work, quite intense at times, and overtime. Nonetheless, efforts were ongoing in three directions:  Reduction in production costs It should be noted that the gap between ACSM quotes and those of French or foreign shipyards has narrowed markedly since September 1964: these savings were the result of the in-depth restructuring of certain departments and from the implementation of a methods Department. They should continue to grow due to a workforce reduction of 200 people, 150 of whom should have been made redundant.  Improved technical and commercial bases of reconversion While 75% of ACSM investments have been earmarked for reconversion since 1962, and while fullest autonomy has been granted to the Industrial and Technical Equipment Department (SEIT for short), the foundations for reconversion (GEM columns, Saviem, silos, etc.) have been laid, paving the way for future development (slaughterhouses, the treatment of dairy waste water, prefabricated constructions, close relations established with Procofrance, Hydrocarbon, Didier Werke, etc.). Reconversion accounted for more than 30% of turnover (two points higher than at the end of January) and of the workforce (250 men in SEIT, 90 at Constructions Mécaniques du Trait); the figures for SEIT had consistently improved from 1962, while those of the Société de Constructions Mécaniques remained poor.  The search for solutions allowing the shipyard to end its isolation Now that “the methane carrier is on the verge of setting sail,” two solutions were considered, “both of which result from certain basic observations.” The shipyard has been designed for an annual minimum of 2.5 million hours, mainly used in the construction of oil tankers. This was to a certain extent repetitive work involving fairly simple ships and a minimum of

finishing work. However, oil tankers were no longer being built at a size compatible with the dimensions of the slipways in Le Trait; and the evolution of shipping was such that series production was very rare for ships other than oil tankers. While a certain repetition was noticeable over the past few months in the “ferry boat” category, these boats featured significant passenger facilities, for which Le Trait is not specially equipped. Despite its efforts to mitigate these issues, the shipyard continued to be burdened excessively because of: - its distance from any industrial centre, which did not make it possible to eliminate or reduce corporations and secondary services as it was the case elsewhere; - the scope and quality of the work demanded by the construction of submarines a few years previously and of the “Jules Verne” more recently and the search, over the past two years, for new boats which, in response to the new needs of shipping companies, were becoming increasingly varied. Taking into consideration the know-how of the teams and the quality of manufacturing at ACSM, the first solution ruled out the ceasing of shipbuilding in Le Trait “as resquested by the government.” It proposed instead to transform ACSM into a yard building ships of 3,000 to 8,000 dwt which did not require a lot of armament works. The shipyard, of which the centralisation of its commercial prospecting, projects, design, execution and supply departments was to relieve a significant part of its overheads, would operate with a much reduced team of engineers and would perform, in line with the quotas now limiting its potential, between 2 million and 2.5 million productive hours per year. This solution, with its limited social repercussions, involved tough negotiations with the public authorities and could be considered only within the framework of a four-way merger. The only other solution was to give up shipbuilding and focuse on the company’s reconversion activities. However, the limitations of such a scenario seemed to lie in the impossibility of adapting the entire site (buildings and means of production) to new areas of specialisation. Moreover, this second option would apply to only 800 workers, 600 of whom were blue-collar workers, out of the total workforce of 1,800; these 800 workers would produce 1.4 million hours of work per year, for revenues of around 50–60 million francs. But the feasibility of this second option was impossible to assess other than through in-depth studies, a source of concern and demoralisation for the workforce, at least for the thousand workers who would interpret the audit as a redundancy plan, without hope of finding new work in the region. And the public authorities would have to be convinced of the solid economic grounds for such a wide-ranging redundancy plan, just as Maison Worms itself would have to agree to bear such social responsibilities “without denying its past or breaking with its reputation.” And what about all the investments devoted to shipbuilding for which depreciation was still running? No, in reality, this second option was no solution at all. Those who drew up the plan decided “to consider the four-way merger as a key goal, to begin immediately with centralising the sales, design and procurement departments, and to do nothing that might compromise the implementation of the collective redundancies.” Nonetheless, they agreed to study whether the company could break even by limiting its operation to the reconversion activities, to inform the public authorities of the social limitations of this reconversion, and to form a consultative committee with Pierre Herrenschmidt, Guy Brocard and Audy Gilles for the purpose of “handling all important questions that will undoubtedly arise in the upcoming months.”

Time for evaluation

The more the shipyard works, the more money it loses

As part of its action plan, the shipyard was subjected to a thorough examination, with attention focused on the workforce and its evolution over the course of the last three years. The annual average workforce had declined slightly: 1,803 in 1962; 1,796 in 1963; and 1,770 in 1964. While figures for while-collar staff workers (540–550) and management staff (44–47) remained fairly constant, there was a jump in the external labour force: from 71 people in 1962, the number had shot up to 294 in 1963 and 260 in 1964. This trend was confirmed by the variations in the number of hours worked by the permanent workforce, a total of around 2.7–2.8 million hours, while the hours worked by temporary workers increased more than fivefold: from 136,831 hours in 1962 to more than 600,000 in 1963 and 650,000 in 1964. This jump correlated with the rise in the tonnage produced: 12,900 tons in 1962; 20,922 tons in 1963 and 18,500 tons in 1964, explained primarily by the highly techni-

cal nature of the work undertaken (on the methane carrier and ferry boats). Indeed, the increased workload did not translate into hiring, but into the increasingly massive recourse to specialist labour from outside, which aggravated the rise in overheads: from nearly 19.5 million in 1962 to more than 21.3 million in 1963 and 23.6 million in 1964, in turn leading inexorably to a drop in turnover: 93.7 million in 1962, 92.5 million in 1963 and 90.3 in 1964. In fact, the more the shipyard worked, the more money it lost.

The coffers are emptying while the loans are increasing

Up until 28 February 1965, the company had at its disposal a 16-million-franc bank credit line, but this was no longer sufficient: in March, the overdraft for the year was estimated at 25 million, then 30 million. ACSM solicited its bankers – starting with Banque Worms, which had already committed 15 million: in its argument, ACSM asserted that “the scheduled capital increase would lower its debt by 5 million francs” (since that operation had taken place a few months earlier – in November 1964 – this information leads one to believe that another increase was possibly planned). The BNCI, Sofibanque and BIFC were willing to put up funds, but Crédit Lyonnais refused and the Société Générale procrastinated. Mobilisable credits amounted to 32.3 million, middle-term credits to 38.6 million and long-term credits to 10.5 million. “Under the assumption that ACSM gradually ceases its operations – only fulfilling current orders – and without taking into account the latest order for a ferry boat for Morocco,” stipulated a memo of 15 March 1965, “the company is set to post a loss of 38 million francs, without counting the direct and indirect implications associated with the shutdown of operations. This figure is higher than the company estimated (32.5 million). […] This would result in a residual overdraft of 34.7 million, offset by fixed assets and participations. Realisation of the merger currently under consideration, by way of bringing in fixed assets as well as medium- and long-term investment credits, would, over time, reduce the cash position by 12.5 million plus the costs of business interruption.”

First wave of dismissals (March 1965) and deterioration of the social climate

On 25 September 1964, less than fifteen days after the launch of the “Jules Verne,” the construction of which confirmed the excellence of the shipyard’s technical know-how, the uncertainties which hampered the future of shipbuilding in Le Trait and weighed heavily on the reconversion of the activity, sparked a two-hour strike in which workers, engineers and managers participated. In the following days, trade unions, elected representatives (including the Mayor of the town) and the population mobilised to support the action plan: on 4 December, the staff stopped working; a protest march through the town and a meeting were organised. On the 7th, the massive unemployment that the merger could cause (10,000 shipbuilding workers have lost their jobs since 1960) and its impact on the local economy were discussed by the Haute-Normandie Regional Council. On the 10th, work in the shipyard was stopped again. On the 22nd, a delegation was received by Jean Morin, Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, who, in response to questions about the government policy directions, declared: “There will be no more orders or subsidies for naval construction in Le Trait.” The brutality of this declaration was softened by the UDR MP Chérasse who assured to have obtained from the Minister for Public Works and Transport, Marc Jacquet, the promise of “building three cargo ships for the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, three submarines for Pakistan Navy and four cargo ships of 4,000-dwt for Morocco.” Hope calmed tempers – for a short time however. February 1965: ACSM management announced that, in order to remain competitive, the shipyard was forced to dismiss 155 people. Its decision was made known in mid-March. For the workforce, it was like a bolt out of the blue, especially since “they are working 46 hours a week”822 and only a short while before, “overtime was being done in the departments hit by the redundancies.” The metalworking section of the CFDT immediately announced its decision to use all means “to defend the dismissed workers – in particular the 36 workers

822 This and the subsequent quotations (except the one from Le Monde) are taken from the article, “Le Trait et son chantier naval, 7 années de lutte,” by Serge Laloyer in Le fil rouge, 1999.

Le Courrier cauchois (27 March 1965): On 25 March, 1,800 metalworkers, together with the inhabitants of Le Trait and many mayors from the region, marched through the streets of Rouen

aged between 50 and 60 – and full-employment,” wrote Le Monde on 17 March. “The metalworkers organise the struggle to defend their jobs, supported by the population of Le Trait and the neighbouring towns where ACSM employees live. On 18 March, the workers march through the streets of Le Trait, proclaiming ‘work for all,’ ‘retirement at 60,’ ‘a reduction in working hours’ and ‘the setting-up of new factories.’ Shopkeepers close their premises in solidarity.” The next day, “300 metalworkers gather in Yvetot and march in an impressive procession. On 25 March, the anger spreads to Rouen where 1,800 metalworkers, along with residents of Le Trait and numerous mayors from the region, arriving in 30 coaches, march through the city’s streets. At the head of the demonstration, the dismissed employees wear placards stating ‘Dismissed after 40 years of irreproachable service,’ ‘Dismissed after 44 years of irreproachable service,’ etc. Under their berets, caps or hats, incriminated Serge Laloyer, the looks in the eyes of these men – who, through their work, their sweat, their entire lives, had made ACSM a success […] – put the blame on the merciless logic of capitalist profits. At the Prefecture, they demanded an end to the dismissals and information on the company’s intentions.” The information given in the press and by commentators could not provide much hope to ACSM staff and the population of Le Trait. On 5 April 1965, L’Aurore wrote that the management of four shipyards, including the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, had just signed an agreement to merge and pool their assets. Roger Mennevée, in the April issue of his Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, wrote: “The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, which had already had to cut back its workforce […] should stop building ships – this part of its operations should be transferred to the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, already linked to ACSM – and to redirect its efforts towards boilermaking and specialised mechanical engineering. It is noteworthy that this solution is far more positive than what the government had previously been considering, which included nothing less than shutting down the shipyard owned by ACSM in Le Trait, near Le Havre.”823

Finding ways to stem the haemorrhage

The 155 dismissals did not resolve the problems. On top of the 16.6 million in losses accumulated since 1962 came the expected deficit of 20 or so million in 1965 (to a large extent due to losses on ships delivered: 14.3 million). Amortisations totalling approximately 3 million were expected due to the negative balance sheets of several participations. Shareholder equity, valued at 25 million in 1961, fell to 11 million at the beginning of 1965; the cash position continued to deteriorate: short- and long-term debt at the beginning of 1962: 101,747; year-end 1962: 112,767; year-end 1963: 211,949; yearend 1964: 244,356. To enable the company to reconvert its activities, 10 million francs were invested in equipment and tooling, and 5 million in stakes in other companies. Continually increasing since 1961, turnover from nonshipbuilding activities dropped in 1964: 16,343,000 F versus 21,314,000 F in 1963. The fact was hard to accept: ACSM, “which has generally sought to reconvert into fields compatible with its equipment and the skills of its workforce, has found itself faced with fierce competition in this sector from long-established specialised firms. Up to now, the company has had no opportunity in obtaining profitable serial contracts – other than for floating roofs. The results of the companies in which ACSM has acquired stakes in the past few years, notably in Botalam and Constructions Mécaniques du Trait, to boost its reconversion activities, have similarly not met up to expectations.”824 To allow the company to recover, various scenarios were studied and their related costs evaluated: reconversion activities with or without floating roofs, with or without water towers, etc.,825 estimation of the value of the industrial equipment, as well as ACSM production costs, according to whether the order was for a ship or another product, knowing that the disparity stemmed little from the cost of the materials used and a lot from labour costs.826 A fair hourly rate determined the competitiveness of the shipyard, and especially its viability. For that reason, cost-saving efforts focused mainly on the workforce.

823 Cf. Roger Mennevée, “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie en 1964,” published in Les Documents de l’agence indépendante d’informations internationales, in April 1965. 824 ACSM memo of 18 May 1965. 825 ACSM memo of 9 April 1965. 826 ACSM memo of 30 April 1965, to Audy Gilles; and memo of July 1965.

Audy Gilles827 reconciled the data provided by ACSM under the following assumptions that: - “general expenses will remain the same [in 1965] as in 1964; - annual man-hours [will] amount to 2,200,000; - of these 2,200,000 hours, 200,000 [will be] provided by external labour; - of these 2,200,000 hours, 450,000 [will be] allocated to non-shipbuilding orders, and 1,750,000 to shipbuilding orders; - of these 450,000 non-ship-building hours, 100,000 [will be] allocated to floating roofs, and 350,000 to other orders; - the shipbuilding orders [will be] charged at 14.50 F per man-hour (before application of subsidies); - the non-shipbuilding orders [will be] charged at 14.40 F per man-hour, and orders for floating roofs at 23.50 F; - the orders [will] not cause losses on raw materials; - the number of production hours listed on quotes [will be] strictly respected,” in other words, assuming that operating conditions would be under control as much as possible, he reckoned with 5 million francs as the loss for the year. An amount that the dismissals could reduce by 2 million francs. Audy Gilles underlined: “If we are […] unable to offset this loss […], we must consider closing nearly the entire shipyard, and dismissing approximately two-thirds of our workforce (more than 1,000 people). […] It must be pointed out that if the shipyard’s current financial status has not recovered before the conclusion of the four-way merger plan, ACSM will automatically be targeted as one of two shipyards to be closed, and it will be difficult to keep ACSM from bearing the major share of the losses caused by this closure.” These were calculated at “approximately 25 million francs (10 million in indemnities, and 15 million in yield losses).” The only way for the company to break even again and to survive in the new merged group was to increase employee productivity, halt investment, not replace retirees and employees who voluntarily resigned, bring down overheads and cut expenditure on outside labour and supplies.

“The crisis […] is now reaching an exceptionally grave level”

ACSM GeneraL MeeTinG, 29 June 1965 Although Pierre Herrenschmidt could be very pleased with the 12,258,000 F in orders booked in just four months in 1965 (1 January to 30 April), proportionally higher than the 16,264,000 F booked for the whole of 1964,828 the Board of Directors, during the General Meeting of 29 June 1965, lamented that “the efforts made to fill the order book [have] been disappointing,” while at the same time acknowledged that the contracts had been signed, after months of negotiations, by the Moroccan company Limadet in Tangiers, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique or the Société Havraise de Pêche. For its part, the workload in the non-shipbuilding division was expected to improve noticeably due to a large order for metal water towers. “Considering that it should be possible to redeploy part of its workforce in industrialised construction, notably in school facilities, ACSM [before halting its investments] has taken a 500,000 F stake in the Société Technique de Préfabrication, the commercial intention of which is to provide engineering services for this type of construction. ACSM also has participated in the establishment of the Compagnie pour l’Étude et la Réalisation d’Ensembles Industriels, Agricoles et Alimentaires (Cetral), a company based at 71, Rue du Moulin Vert in Paris, with worldwide operations, in which the Le Trait shipyard took a 20% share (500,000 F), along with Tunzini, Alfa-Laval, SchwartzHautmont and Frankel; the first activities involve the construction of slaughterhouses.”829 In 1964 “Botalam has devoted the bulk of its activities to manufacturing automatic bundling machines used in the rolling mill at the Ijmuiden steel plant in the Netherlands. While the first fiscal year resulted in a loss, by setting up the first installation of this size, interesting commercial prospects should open up for the company. […] The Constructions Mécaniques du Trait [has] not succeeded in overcoming the acute crisis besetting the mechanical engineering industry, posting

827 Memo from Audy Gilles to Guy Brocard, on 29 April 1965. 828 Memo from Pierre Herrenschmidt to Audy Gilles, on 12 May 1965. A memo of 2 July 1965 specifies that total non-shipbuilding orders concluded between 1 January and 31 May 1965 reached 16.5 million francs. 829 Cf. The ACSM annual report of 29 June 1965 and Roger Mennevée, “Les transformations de la banque Worms & Cie - Les affaires de Worms & Cie en 1964,” op. cit.

a loss roughly equal to its annual amortisation as of 31 December 1964.” The company’s balance sheet clearly shows that the crisis faced by European shipbuilding has now reached an exceptionally serious level and that in France the capital goods sector is seriously impacted. Thus, “at the invitation of the public authorities, the management of ACSM, FCM, Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and Chantiers de Provence, all four involved in the construction of large ships, have decided to study, with the assistance of experts, the possibility of grouping their companies together, with a view to improving productivity within the group’s shipbuilding activities and to extending their reconversion activities. Should the envisioned merger come to fruition, the public authorities would be amenable to applying to the whole sector certain measures favourable to both the shipbuilding and the non-shipbuilding sectors.”830 The future would decide otherwise.

“The foreseeable failure of discussions on a four-way merger”

ChanTiers navaLs de La CioTaT, 20 SePTember 1965 Within just a few months, two of the four companies involved in the concentration plan ceased to be associated with it:  The Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence (CAP) forced to file for bankruptcy After CAP was taken over by Georges Périclès Zarifi (spouse of Lucile Terrin), a son-in-law of Jean-Marie Terrin, another son-in-law, Baron Jean d’Huart (spouse of Françoise Terrin), assumed leadership of the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence. “From a single company, it split into three distinct entities, separating the Port-de-Bouc site from its ship repair and machine engineering divisions. In addition, between 1962 and 1964, CAP assets were used to form four companies specialised in heavy machinery manufacturing. By setting up the companies on-site, the Terrin group was able to receive reconversion grants amounting approximately to the sum spent in 1960 to purchase CAP shares. At the same time, the CAP sales department was dissolved.”831

830 General Assembly of 29 June 1965. 831 Jean Domenichino, “Construction navale provençale et de la Basse-Seine des années 1960. Étude comparative,” Les Ports normands : un modèle ? Actes du colloque Rouen - Le Havre 1998, textes recueillis par E. Wauters, Presses Universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 1999, pp. 215–224. On 19 March 1964, CAP management announced that the order book was empty. 900 employees were dismissed between 1964 and 1966, while numerous strikes and union struggles tried to prevent the closure. CAP was forced to file for bankruptcy. In February 1966, the company went into liquidation. 400 employees were dismissed, while 150 were transferred from Portde-Bouc to La Ciotat.  The Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM) being dismantled After an initial wave of 244 dismissals and 331 early retirements in autumn 1965, a rumour spread that FCM was in default with payment. The financial crisis was so dire that it was difficult for FCM to complete construction on its final ship. Neither the resignations and appointment of a new head of the company, “nor the numerous appeals for workforce mobilisation […] to prevent the closure planned by the government [… nor the] marches swelled by the local population and the clergy to such centres as Toulon, Draguignan, Marseilles and Paris”832 were to any avail. “Losses growing and growing, headcounts dropping from 3,000 to

832 This and the subsequent quotations are taken from the article “Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (19141966),” by the industrial draughtsman at FCM, Jean-Pierre Guiol, see https://sites.google.com.

2,000, [and] the lack of orders force the company to declare bankruptcy. […] On 11 February 1966, a legal administrator is appointed and the contract workers is dismissed.” FCM was soon broken up: after ceasing activities on 1 July 1966, the shipyard in La Seyne, which had received assistance in the form of a governmentbacked guarantee, was taken over by the Herlicq group, which renamed it, Constructions Navales et Industrielles de la Méditerranée (CNIM). The facilities in Le Havre were purchased by Draesser-Dujardin, while the Établissements de Graville became a subsidiary of the Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre.

Merging with CNC alone An underlying motivation: building of the “great form” in La Ciotat

On 30 April 1965, Audy Gilles and Baron d’Huart, General Manager of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, initiated closer ties between Le Trait and La Ciotat with an eye to merging the two shipyards. “Now that the foreseeable failure of discussions regarding a four-way merger has become a reality,” stated two documents signed in La Ciotat, “it is imperative that the leaders of the two companies present an alternative programme meeting the objectives defined in the letter from Mr Debré [i.e. the letter of 7 April 1962] and proposing the closure of two shipyards. CNC has already practically assumed the destinies of CAP, and thus, in exchange for the services rendered in the past, present and future, CNC has been assured of the CAP’s waiver of the State Aid Law. In the four-way agreements, ACSM was the second company earmarked for closure. Its Senior Management acknowledge that the size of the company does not allow it to remain competitive at that time. Under these conditions, ACSM management is ready to provide CNC with a letter renouncing any benefit of the Aid Law, effective as of 1969, if in return CNC allows ACSM to resolve its particular problems. Additionally, the Worms group, the owner of ACSM, is prepared to write off the debt owed to it by ACSM and to take a direct financial stake in the capital of La Ciotat, the terms of which shall be documented [elsewhere].”833 With this in mind, in mid-September 1965 ACSM was requested to “begin dismissing workers, managers and white-collar staff, both in Le Trait and in Paris,”834 for the purpose of “bringing the hourly wage rate down to 14.50 F, including all related expenses.” An executive committee was formed, made up of equal numbers of Worms and CNC representatives, but headed by a Chief Executive from CNC. It was incumbent upon CNC, within three months, to establish a joint entity responsible for sales, purchasing and design work. Moreover, it was understood that “any profits or losses from orders currently on the book will remain on the books of the Worms group, whereas La Ciotat will take over all orders after this agreement is signed.” Since “the reorganisation of the profession and the closing of two establishments were to benefit to all the other companies, principally Penhoët,” an agreement was to bring the Chantiers de l’Atlantique to share in the expenses of this transaction, “by assuring Le Trait a minimum volume of non-shipbuilding orders allowing the rapid retraining of ACSM staff.”

833 See CNC memos of 17 and 20 September 1965, which present several differences; thus, in the former, the failure of discussions was “confirmed,” whereas in the latter, it was “foreseeable.” 834 This and the subsequent five quotations were taken from CNC memos of 17 September 1965, entitled “Base d’un accord entre les CNC et les Chantiers du Trait.”

Finally, in the ultimate event of a merger, it was planned that “the land on which the ACSM shipyard was built would be separated from the asset contribution and grouped within a real estate company of which the Worms group would retain ownership.” This time, the merger was underway and nothing could stop it. The financial situations of both companies were evaluated and compared: earnings, working capital and cash, debts and loans, government grants, forecasts (especially the risks related to credit transactions and bad debt), […] were all examined in detail.835 At the heart of the matter, the issue of hours worked;836 their recording and the analysis of their variations and costs, kept experts and analysts busy – since savings were to be made on labour. The magnitude of the scheduled dismissals was of concern to public authorities on account of the social repercussions. The number of employees was reduced to 1,500 in December 1965. From summer 1965 to spring 1966, La Ciotat and Le Trait worked to define the mechanisms leading to closer ties, and notably “to determine the parity rate between the shares of the two companies, and the share of ACSM short-term debt which, after conversion into longterm debt, the merged company had to be taken into account.”837 While negotiating with the Merchant Navy over the cooperation that CNC “is ready to give to the banks and the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique to find a solution to the problems caused by the financial status of the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence,”838 CNC required “clear and formal assurances from the public authorities”839 regarding: - “the allocation of the CNC, ACSM and CAP quotas to the company arising from the merger, starting on 1 January 1966. The quota for the consolidated company would rise to 100,000 grt out of the 350,000 grt authorised by the framework legislation,” an increase assessed in light of the capacities of the future giant slipway or “great form” (359 m long, 60 m wide,

835 See memos (unsigned) of 29 September; 6 and 8 October 1965; ACSM memo of 15 November 1965; memo to the Central Tax Inspectorate of 1 December 1965; loan depreciation table of 31 December 1965. 836 See ACSM memo of December 1965, entitled “Relevé général des heures travaillées.” 837 Cf. CNC memo of 6 January 1966, to the Merchant Navy. 838 Cf. CNC memo of 19 January 1966, to the Merchant Navy. 839 Cf. CNC memo of 6 January 1966, to Merchant Navy. 212,460 m3), currently under construction in La Ciotat, - “the granting to the newly merged company, within the framework of the terms of the draft Finance Law for 1966, of long-term credit at low interest rates intended to finance CNC investment programmes and ACSM reconversion, - to the benefit of CAP, the acceptance in principle of an imminent request for FDES credit of approximately 12 million francs, for the purpose of maintaining and developing industrial activity that would employ at least 500 people in Port-de-Bouc.” This last request was cancelled on 19 January 1966. On 1 February 1966, Worms & Cie, along with Hall Montaigne Rond-Point and Cema (Compagnie Européenne de Matériels), together holding 87% of CNC’s capital and jointly referred to as Groupe Intra Bank (GI),840 signed a protocol for the merger of their respective subsidiaries: the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat. Article 2 stipulated that “in the face of the general economic climate, that of shipbuilding and that of CNC and ACSM specifically, Worms and GI, as principal shareholders of these two companies, are convinced, confirm and herewith acknowledge that it is in their mutual interest to merge. GI and Worms herewith agree to pursue everything incumbent upon them to ensure that the legal procedures required to complete this merger are undertaken, pursued, and brought to a conclusion as soon as possible; all to be performed in conformity with the principles, on the bases and under the terms, according to the valuations and parities which are hereinafter stipulated, and which have been agreed upon by the parties hereto after careful study.” To this end, Banque Worms reaffirmed its position

840 Originating in Lebanon, the group GI was founded in 1951 by Yousef Beidas (among others), and became one of the largest financial institutions in the Middle East, active in Africa, Europe, and the United States. Through the Société du Hall Montaigne and the Compagnie Européenne de Matériel (Cema), GI purchased 87% of the shares of Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat at the end of 1965, one year before its collapse. The entry of Intra Bank into the CNC capital is poorly documented, thus making it difficult to imagine: it seems that Jean-Marie Terrin lost control of the company in 1963 (see the article by Xavier Daumalin on the Terrin family in Dictionnaire historique des patrons français, under the direction of Jean-Claude Daumas, Flammarion, 2010). See “Questions écrites à l’Assemblée nationale,” Journal officiel, 25 February 1967.

towards the companies over which it served as joint and several guarantors, and for which it guaranteed “all credit extensions as well as all facilities of any kind,” namely, among others, to ACSM, the Constructions Mécaniques du Trait, as well as to Wean Damiron and the Chantiers et Ateliers de Provence.841

Audy Gilles replaces Pierre Herrenschmidt

“As the first step in restructuring the two companies (ACSM–CNC) and simultaneously marking the final launch of an era of mutual interest and unity,” Pierre Herrenschmidt resigned from his duties as Chairman at the Board Meeting of 14 March 1966;842 Audy Gilles took over his post. Joseph Brocard continued as Vice Chairman. Further Board members were Guy Brocard, Henri Nitot, Worms & Cie, represented by Raymond Meynial; Unife; and the Société des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, represented by Mr R. Gambert. René Biville served as Secretary of the Works Council and Bernard Lemarchand as one of its members. On 17 March, La Correspondance économique announced that: “Within the framework of the policy pursued by the government to concentrate the activities of shipyards, the urgency of which has recently been highlighted in La Seyne and Port-de-Bouc,843 a merger agreement between the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat is about to be signed.” The private agreement through which ACSM agreed to merge with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat was authenticated on 5 April 1966.

841 Memos of 20 January and 10 March 1966. 842 Pierre Herrenschmidt, “having accomplished the missions that he was to carry out,” (ref. Francis Ley) also withdrew from Worms & Cie management where he was replaced by Guy Brocard; he resigned as Chairman of Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, and the various positions he held on the boards of group affiliates. 843 In February 1966, the Port-de-Bouc shipyard was occupied by the workers, who were opposed to having the car ferry “Provence” fitted out by CNC, and prevented its launch. The vessel was ultimately towed to CNC, once CAP staff had been was assured that they would be transported to La Ciotat every day to finish fitting out the vessel, the last CAP built. See on http://www.ina.fr, the news film broadcast by ORTF on 17 March 1966 on the shipbuilding crisis in France. 11’50’’ into the film, reporting focused on the situation in Le Trait. It was filed, along with an acknowledgement of signatures, in the Register of Notarial Acts of Mr Chalain, a notary in Paris, on 3 May 1966.

CNC is summoned to explain itself

On 4 April 1966, Jean Morin, Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, sent the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat the following letter: “During their meeting with Mr Bettencourt [Secretary of State for Transport844] on 25 March 1966, your representatives discussed the problems that arose with regard to registration for the benefit of shipbuilding aid on various orders placed prior to the merger of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime. […] We were concerned about the position taken by your representatives on several fronts. It seemed that, should the new company have to engage in arbitration, said arbitration would risk giving priority to the orders concluded by the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat to the detriment of those to be executed in Le Trait, regardless of any industrial policy concerning the reconversion efforts of Le Trait. […] First of all, I would like to remind you below of the vessels recorded in the 1966 budget allocation both in your establishment in La Ciotat and in that of ACSM. […] I am taking this opportunity to inform you of my concerns regarding the reconversion efforts in Le Trait. In line with your commitments made in this regard in your letter of 6 January 1966 and with the assurances provided by the Minister for the Economy and Finance, and the Minister for Infrastructure, in their response dated 24 February 1966, I would be obliged if you would inform me of your intentions in this area as quickly as possible. […] Please forward to me, as agreed in the same exchange of letters, the commitment to cease all subsidised shipbuilding in the shipyard of Le Trait, under the terms which were set forth for you.” Admiral Deroo, Chairman of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, responded on 20 April 1966: “I am making it my duty to dispel any concerns you may have regarding the attitude of the general management of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat and the industrial policy

844 André Bettencourt (1919–2007) was General Councillor for the canton of Lillebonne; MP and Mayor of Saint-Mauriced’Ételan; and Chairman of the Haute-Normandie Regional Council. Director of L’Oréal, and also founder of the newspaper, Le Courrier cauchois. See Jean-Pierre Chaline, “André Bettencourt (1919-2007),” Études Normandes, 2008/1.

that it intends to follow for the reconversion activities in Le Trait. The explanations later in this text will, I am sure, help dissipate the negative impression and provide the necessary clarification of our arrangements. It troubles us to know that we are under suspicion [on the part of the public authorities…]. In a first phase, we are under an obligation to proceed with a certain number of dismissals, which we regret more than anyone. These must take place immediately and are indispensable for bringing the hourly rate at Le Trait down to a competitive level, thereby eliminating a huge portion of overhead costs; failing to do so would quickly place our company in financial difficulty. The overheads are as follows:

Le Trait Paris Total Management staff 9 5 14 Workers payed on a monthly basis 140 12 152 Workers payed on a hourly basis 44

[…] As regards employment, we have accepted a certain number of new orders negotiated by the former management, as follows: - 1 Malagasy freighter; - 1 ore carrier, for the Union Navale; - 2 ‘Daphné’-class submarines for Pakistan. These orders, on top of the work in hand, assure a full workload for the shipbuilding workforce in Le Trait – 540 production workers – until May 1968. The reduction of shipbuilding staff thereafter will be gradual, reaching zero by the end of 1969 after completion of the second Pakistani submarine. The workforce in reconversion activities – currently about 150 productive workers – is expected to increase gradually, compensating for the decrease in shipbuilding staff. We believe that the two-year period available to us for the reconversion is reasonable to allow us to gradually bring new boilermaking activities to Le Trait. We have embarked on prospecting, without delay, in order to achieve this goal. At the same time, we are looking at all external reconversion opportunities that may arise with a view to facilitating the settlement of new companies on the Le Trait premises capable of employing part of the available labour force. The 23 hectares of land with their rail siding, over which we dispose, along with our sizeable real estate holdings, and the favourable treatment measures recently decided by the government on behalf of the municipality of Le Trait are expected to make our task easier, although, of course, it is not yet possible for us to indicate the respective proportions of internal and external reconversion activities that we will reach in two years. We are currently negotiating with a company that employs 500 workers in the Paris region, which we hope to convince to come to Le Trait. The fact remains that the entire rescue operation poses considerable problems at the human, technical, and financial levels, and its success cannot be envisioned without close cooperation and perfect harmony between your departments and the general management of this company.” The success of the ACSM conversion was all the more expected by the public authorities as it was the counterpart of a long-term loan of 50 million francs granted to La Ciotat to finance the construction of the “great form.”

Second wave of layoffs (April 1966)

Two days later (22 April 1966), ACSM informed the National Employment Fund that: “Within the general context of the merger of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime and the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, [the shipyard is] obliged […] to lay off 200 people with immediate effect. The measure affects 185 people in Le Trait and 15 in the head office in Paris. […] We have tried to soften [this measure] as much as possible,” it stated, “by focusing the cuts on management and monthly employees; only 44 hourly employees are affected out of a workforce of 1,017, 19 of whom are older than 60 […] and likely to benefit from the early retirement system. We further hope that those employees reaching their sixtieth year between now and 31 December will be considered as having already met the conditions for early retirement” and that a temporary allowance agreement will protect those “workers who, after being dismissed, are unable to find jobs paid at the same level as at ACSM.”

Paris-Normandie headlines on 26 April 1966: “No to layoffs at the Le Trait shipyard – Le Trait has come down to Rouen – The impressive procession of shipyard workers has crossed the city”

It’s all over for ACSM

Inhabitants of Le Trait take to the streets

The first Constitutive Extraordinary General Meeting of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat took place on 25 April 1966; it approved the principle of the merger and the resultant contribution in kind; it increased share capital for the pending takeover of ACSM and appointed two auditors to oversee the contributions. That same day, 2,000 workers from Le Trait, the Rouen region and from shipyards in Le Havre organised a march on Rouen.845 An article in Le Monde reported on this protest: “Shipbuilding workers from Le Trait and Le Havre demonstrated in Rouen. They marched to the Prefecture, where the General Council devoted its entire session to the crisis in the shipyards and the scheduled layoffs. At 4 p.m., some two thousand people marched behind placards and banners along the city’s main arteries, to repeated shouts of ‘No layoffs!’ At the same time, elected department representatives met to examine several demands that had been filed, first by the Communist Group calling for ‘all measures to be taken to ensure that employment is safeguarded in the long term at the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée in Le Havre’; and second by Mr André Marie, who protested against the decision to cease all shipbuilding in Le Trait as of 1 January 1969. Mr Bettencourt, Secretary of State for Transport and occupying the post of General Counsel, stated during an interview that, had the shipyard in Le Trait not merged with La Ciotat, it would have had no other choice but to file for bankruptcy, an outcome which would have been even more disasterous for the region’s population. He added that the public authorities would do their utmost to fill the ACSM order book until the end of 1968 so as to limit the number of layoffs, and to promote the reconversion of ACSM and the settlement of new companies.”846 On 16 May 1966, the General Meeting of the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat ratified the merger by way of the takeover of the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime.

845 See “Le Trait et son chantier naval, 7 années de lutte,” by Serge Laloyer, op. cit. 846 See Le Monde of 23 April 1966.

13 May 1966: the final ACSM General Meeting

ACSM held its final Ordinary General Meeting on 13 May 1966. It was an opportunity for the Board of Directors to take stock of the fiscal year 1965 and the first four months of 1966, in a context where the ACSM results continued to be hit by “the crisis affecting shipbuilding for several years now […] whilst efforts made in the ground sector have led to marked growth in reconversion activities.” The year 1965 was marked by: - The “Jules Verne” delivery to Gaz Marine on 22 February. On 28 March at the Le Havre terminal, the methane carrier unloaded the very first cargo of liquefied natural gas in France: 25,000-m3 of methane at minus 160oC, thereby inaugurating the LNG supply chain between France and Algeria; - The launch of “Ville de Lyon” on 14 October. The vessel was registered under the NCHP flag in December and joined her sister ships, “Ville du Havre,” “Ville de Brest” and “Ville de Bordeaux”; - And the delivery of the “Stena Danica” and “Stena Nordica” ferry boats, on 18 and 30 June, to the Swedish shipping company, Stena AB (Sten A. Olsson). These two 2,690-grt and 640-dwt vessels designed to transport 1,000 passengers and 140 cars, were launched on 3 and 15 May, respectively. On 12 May 1966, the day before the General Meeting, the 3,510-dwt reefer ship “Ivolina” joined the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation fleet (launch: 10 December 1965). This was the first fully automated French ship and the last of the sixteen vessels built by ACSM for NCHP.847

The pusher “Dauphin” built for the Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine and launched on 23 December 1964

Within the domain of river navigation, five pushers848 and ten barges (built in a workshop from 10 July 1965) were launched by crane for the Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine: - “Dauphin,” fitted with two 152-HP diesel engines, on 23 December 1964, - “Montcalm,” fitted with two 540-HP diesel engines, on 10 February 1965, - “Dupleix,” fitted with two 540-HP diesel engines, on 20 February 1965, - “Marsouin,” fitted with two 400-HP diesel engines, on 8 November 1965,

847 The fifteen others were: “Ville de Tamatave,” “Ville de Majunga,” “Malgache,” “Ville de Tamatave,” “Ville de Tananarive,” “Nossi-Bé,” “Ville de Djibouti,” “Ville de Rouen,” “Ville de Dunkerque,” “Ville de Nantes,” “Ville du Havre,” “Ville de Brest,” “Ville de Bordeaux,” “Ville de Lyon” and “Ville d’Anvers.” The 17th, ordered by Denis Frères in 1962 and christened “Saint François,” was sold in 1969 to NCHP and renamed “Ville de Djibouti.” 848 The minutes of the Board Meeting state that seven pushers were delivered to the CSS. However, in Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, Maurice Quemin listed only five. And since he based his catalogue of vessels on the construction numbers, we considered that the minutes included a typographical error, and changed the seven into a five. The launches of “Montcalm” and “Dupleix” are dated 1 and 22 March 1965 in the newspaper Le Marin. Information on the engines for these vessels, as provided by Mr Quemin, does not tally with the information available on the Internet. Thus, on a website dedicated to river pushers, “Montcalm” is presented as having two 1,025-HP Caterpillar V12 engines; “Dupleix” with two 800-HP Caterpillar V12 engines; “Marsouin” with two 300-HP Caterpillar engines; and “Narval” with two 325-HP Mitsubishi engines. These ships, which were still operating in 2009, had probably received new engines.

The ferry boat “Stena Nordica” launched on 15 May 1965 for Stena AB

Fittings and furniture for ferry boats, made by ACSM

The reefer “Ivolina” launched on 10 December 1965 for the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation – the first fully automated ship built in France (Georges Derouard collection)

- “Narval,” fitted with two 400-HP diesel engines, on 5 December 1965, - and ten barges between 17 and 30 September 1965. In addition to these vessels, representing turnover of approximately 5 million francs, the Compagnie des Sablières de la Seine took delivery of the floating dock “Nautilus,” placed on the slipway on 28 February 1966 and launched on 25 April 1966. One month earlier (25 March 1966), the Compagnie Générale d’Équipements pour les Travaux Maritimes (GEM) had taken delivery of a jack-up barge. The very last vessel launched by ACSM before being taken over by CNC was the 2,893-grt ferry boat “Ibn Batouta” the order for which was signed on 1 March 1965 by the Moroccan shipowner, Lignes Maritimes du Détroit – Limadet; its keel was laid on 23 September 1965 in slipway No. 2, from which it was launched on 10 March 1966; it was commissioned on 15 July 1966. Three orders were ongoing on the day that the General Meeting was held: - the 7,914-dwt semi-container ship “Rochambeau” ordered on 12 December 1965 by the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (keel laid in slipway No.1 on 5 August 1966); Maurice Quemin stated that this ship, “along with her sister ship ‘Suffren’ (built in SaintNazaire), was one of the first semi-container ships built in France, supporting the transition from conventional freighters to full container ships,” 849 - the 1,665-dwt freezer trawler “Marie de Grâce” ordered by the Société Havraise de Pêche on 25 June 1965 (keel laid on 15 March 1966), - and her sister ship “Névé” ordered by the Société Navale Caennaise on 30 June 1965 (keel laid on 15 April 1966). A third trawler of this class was the subject of an agreement in principle, signed on 28 June 1965, by the Mauritanian shipping company, Guelfi, which would later be cancelled. As for the reconversion activities, despite the crisis that persisted in the areas of large-scale boilermaking and mechanics, the Board confirmed a 12.3% increase in the volume of orders and a 11.4% increase in 1965 deliveries over 1964, though lamented that this “marked

849 Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, op. cit., 1993, p. 339. The construction of the “Rochambeau” began on 1 June 1966 according to an inventory kept by Le Trait Naval d’Hier. but all too recent” improvement had no impact on the results for fiscal year 1965 which posted a loss of over 7.4 million francs before accounting for depreciation, but after Worms & Cie had written off an eightmillion franc debt. Having presented the financial statements, the shareholders held an Extraordinary General Meeting devoted to the merger. On 13 May 1966, “at 11 a.m., the shareholders of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, a public limited company with share capital of 8 million francs made up of 80,000 shares with a par value of 100 francs, with its headquarters in the 8th arrondissement of Paris, at 9, Rue Tronchet, and entered in the Trade and Companies Register of the Seine department under No. 56 B 13032, came together for an Extraordinary General Meeting at the ACSM headquarters convened by the Board of Directors via individual letters sent via registered mail to all shareholders on 25 April 1966. […] Audy Gilles presided over the Meeting. Worms & Cie and the Union Immobilière pour la France et l’Étranger, both shareholders, present and accepting, and representing both by themselves and as proxies the largest number of shares, are asked to serve as scrutineers. […] The Chairman makes documents [required for an informed vote] available to assembly members […] and […] states that: ‘the first Extraordinary General Meeting of the shareholders of the Société des Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, held on 25 April 1966, has approved the agreements regarding the merger and the contribution in kind made for this purpose […].’ The General Meeting, after having been informed of a private deed signed in Paris on 5 April 1966 and filed in the records of Mr Chalain, notary in Paris, on 3 May 1966, under which the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, for the purpose of its merger through takeover with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, brings to said company its total assets as well as all of the liabilities, in accordance with the clauses and terms, and for a total net value, after deducting liabilities, of 14,786,569.90 F, as set forth in said deed, in return for the allocation of 75,000 shares with a par value of 50 F, fully paid up, possession to be enjoyed as of 1 January 1966, to be created through an increase in the share capital of the absorbing company; - approves said merger, along with all agreements, in part or as a whole, setting forth its terms;

- votes to merge the company known as the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime through takeover with the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, in conformity with said agreements; - gives the Board of Directors all requisite powers to reach the ultimate conclusion of this contribution and merger. […] The Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime shall be dissolved ipse jure and placed in voluntary liquidation, without it being necessary to confirm such in any new deed or subsequent deliberation. The General Meeting names Marcel Angenault as Commissioner and Comptroller representing the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime.” The contributions were valued at 191,703,733.32 F,850 and included, among other things, land with a surface area of 23 hectares 15.33 ares connected to the SNCF, buildings and other constructions, etc., erected on said land, facilities and sidings, various plots of land and constructions used primarily for residential purposes and distributed over the territory of Le Trait and various communities within the Seine-Maritime department, other parcels of land; equipment, tools, facilities, fixtures and fittings, furnishings for industrial and commercial purposes; fixed assets; intangible assets of business capital (leases, patents, property rights); loans; holdings; deposits and securities; inventories; work in hand; amounts owed by clients; advances paid to suppliers; amounts owed by debtors; investment securities, etc.; available bank funds, etc., and the deduction of liabilities amounting to 176,917,163.72 F at 31 December 1965. Consequently, the value of the net assets brought into the merger was 14,786,569.60 F. The difference between the value of the contribution (14,786,569.60 F) and the par value of the compensatory shares (3,750,000 F), i.e. 11,036,569.50 F, was viewed as a merger premium.851 16 May 1966 was scheduled as the date CNC would take possession of said assets. The CNC General Meeting took place on 16 May 1966, presided over by Admiral Deroo, Chairman of the Board of Directors; serving as scrutineers were the two shareholders representing the largest number of shares: Hall Montaigne Rond Point and the Compagnie Européenne de Matériels (Cema). The Meeting adopted the conclusions reached in the independent auditor’s report on the contributions, approved the ultimate conclusion of the in-kind contribution, the merger, and the capital increase (up from 30 to 33.750 million francs); as a consequence, the company’s articles of association were amended. By virtue of said decision, the Société Anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime was ipse jure dissolved on that date.

From one State request to another

ACSM, for which the project of creation designed by Hypolite Worms in 1916 was re-scaled in 1917 at the request of the government, thus went out of existence in 1966 as a result of public authorities intervention! Fifty years apart, these two requests answered each other and cancelled each other out. Many have explained how the merger could have been prevented, had ACSM specialised in building mediumsized high-tech vessels, for example submarines – if the Navy had continued to conclude contracts with private companies. Others have upheld that the merger would have made more sense – and no doubt been more successful – had it been carried out with a shipyard in SaintNazaire, Nantes or Dunkerque, i.e. a company from the same region, with the same corporate culture, the same points of reference. Henri Nitot expressed that very sentiment, when in 1977 he stated that “the restructuring scheme recommended by the government [had] not been sufficiently studied in depth; it would have been more logical and efficient for the mergers to have been done by region; for example, merging the shipyards bordering the English Channel.”852 Be that as it may, the merger could not be avoided. First, because it was the will of a government seeking to save taxpayers’ money (with limited foresight, since the mergers were to sentence thousands of workers to unemployment and devastate entire cities and regions); and second, because the merger conformed to the European directives which will impose an increasingly strict limitation of public aid and encourage the sector to be dominated by a few shipyards capable of building ever larger ships. In the immediate term, the fifth

850 Independent auditors’ report for the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, dated 16 May 1966. 851 See the memo of 18 January 1967, from the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat. 852 Interview conducted with Francis Ley on 28 April 1977, for the purpose of the book Cent ans boulevard Haussmann.

five-year plan (1966–1970) allowed for the continuing existence of just five large shipyards:853  The Chantiers de l’Atlantique in Saint-Nazaire, able to launch ships up to 300,000 tons,  The Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, in La Ciotat and Le Trait, with a capacity of 300,000 tons,  The Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux, in Dunkerque and Bordeaux (capacity: 150,000 tons),  The Constructions Navales et Métallurgiques de la Méditerranée (CNIM) in La Seyne-sur-Mer and in Le Havre (capacity: 50,000 tons),  The Ateliers et Chantiers de Nantes, in Nantes (capacity: 30,000 tons). The cycle of crises triggered by the second oil shock in 1979 led to the merger in 1982 of CNIM, CNC and the Ateliers et Chantiers de France-Dunkerque (formerly, Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux) to become the Chantiers du Nord et de la Méditerranée (Normed), a group whose judicial liquidation was ordered by the court on 27 February 1989. In the meantime, CNC went through a period of trials and tribulations. In the months following the merger with ACSM, its main shareholder, the Intra Bank group, declared bankruptcy.

The “stormy” launch of the freezer trawler “Névé,” on 12 December 1966, for the Société Navale Caennaise Her sister ship, “Marie de Grâce,” for the Société Havraise de Pêche, was launched a month earlier, on 12 November 1966

Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat – Établissements du Trait

“The Chantiers de La Ciotat virtually without an owner”

paris-norMandie, 3 february 1967 Since October 1966, Banque Worms, which “in line with the terms of the protocol of 1 February 1966, […] provided CNC with a line of credit for 10 million francs,”854 had grown worried by the lack of transparency in CNC transactions. In a letter of 12 October, the issue was raised with the general manager of Banque Worms, Philippe Papelier, “of the respective participation of Worms & Cie and the shipyard in the expenses for interest payments and taxes” incurred as a result of the agreements related to the CNC/ACSM merger, agreements about which those responsible for their application at Worms were “only partially informed.” On 18 January 1967, the financial services tried to estimate the value of CNC shares “provided to ACSM shareholders in compensation for the merger-contribution of 16 May 1966,” protesting that “no post-merger financial statement has been drawn up or even sketched” by La Ciotat. These questions took a particular turn when the news burst of the failure of Intra Bank. On 3 February 1967, Paris-Normandie published an article under the heading “The Chantiers de La Ciotat, which took over ACSM in Le Trait, is virtually without an owner.” “The fate of the French branch of the Intra Bank and the future of one of the most dynamic French shipyards, the Chantiers de La Ciotat with which ACSM in Le Trait has merged, will play out in Paris over the next few days. The Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine decided yesterday, for the second time, to postpone for at least two weeks its decision on the bankruptcy of ‘Intra France.’ This postponement will allow the continuation of negotiations undertaken since the beginning of the week between representatives of the large Lebanese bank and the French authorities and private groups. The Lebanese have nothing to lose. Since the new banking law – known in Beirut as the ‘Intra Law’ – came into effect on 16 January, no bank has gone bankrupt in Lebanon. In addition, say the Lebanese, the Paris branch can very easily repay its French debtors, as its assets are nearly five times its liabilities. This new postponement will be used by the Lebanese envoys to negotiate the re-opening of the Paris offices of Intra Bank, and the sale of its majority holding in the Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat. Intra Bank holds nearly 80% of the capital through two subsidiaries, Hall Montaigne and Cema (Compagnie Européenne de Matériel). The Chantiers de La Ciotat is currently one of the few French shipyards in good shape. Its order book, which includes two 80,000-ton and one 130,000-ton oil tankers, guarantees good capacity utilisation until 1969. And CNC managers are developing a ‘form’ large enough to build 200,000-ton oil tankers, thus enabling them to survive the evolution toward large tonnages for this type of transport. But since the collapse of Intra Bank in October 1966, La Ciotat has been virtually without an owner, possibly posing problems for the financing of its investments. A trusted source has told us that three French groups may be in contention to purchase the business. Intra Bank negotiators have apparently contacted Groupe Schneider in Paris, through the intermediary of its subsidiary, the Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux (France-Gironde); Groupe Herlicq, which has recently purchased the Chantiers de La Seyne, near Toulon; and Banque Worms, the former shareholder of ACSM in Le Trait, purchased by La Ciotat.” Banque Worms did not go ahead with any such move, and later withdrew from CNC. For us, the history of the Chantiers de La Ciotat ends here. The analysis of the CNC archives as well as the study of the development of this company until its incorporation into Normed and the conversion of the shipyard into the construction of mega-yachts are outside the scope of this work. We will limit ourselves to evoking the last years of the Le Trait shipyard.

Construction of the semi-container ship “Rochambeau” started in mid-1966

“What are all these people going to do?”

RenÉ BonneT, ACSM head of human resourCe, 17 marCh 1966, rePorTaGe by frenCh TeLevison (orTf – ina) “Let’s suppose we are in 1969,” a television reporter suggested to René Bonnet, on 17 March 1966, “and someone said to you: ‘Shipbuilding in Le Trait is finished! What are you going to do?’” “Well, I don’t yet know,” answered the interviewee, “there’s been talk of creating an industrial estate in Le Trait. It is being backfilled, but I must say that the estate is being built in an area known as Le Malaquis which is currently a swamp; i.e. the land needs to be filled, the site connected to the public infrastructure, and then, industrialists must want to relocate there. […] Currently, there are nearly 1500 people [working in Le Trait]; some of them could reasonably find a new job, but not here. Anyway, who is going to come here? If it’s a boilermaking company, […] sure, we can make boilers. But what if the company makes boxes or whatever, who will they use? Most likely women and workers without defined skills. But what will become of us, engineers, managers, white-collar staff or supervisors? The designers, the draughtsmen? What are all these people going to do?”

The elected officials swung into action

The workforce fell to 1,200 employees at the beginning of January 1967. The threat of a permanent closure became increasingly oppressive with each passing day. The semi-container ship “Rochambeau” was the only ship launched that year on 11 April. Its construction had started in mid-1966. Successive layoffs had a strong impact on the municipality’s income. The financial imbalance was all the more alarming as the new industrial zone was slow to emerge. The municipality was forced to increase local taxes by 52% to restore its accounts. The threat loomed over all the local activities, small businesses and trades. In fact, the whole region was threatened by an economic disaster due to the end of shipbuilding in Le Trait set for 1 January 1969. The feeling of injustice is aggravated by the announcement of a probable participation of the State of seven billion francs for the financing of the large slipway of La Ciotat. The granting of additional time to complete the construction of two Pakistani submarines in Le Trait fooled no one: “As the progress of construction work that is underway or in the pipeline should not be accompanied by the taking of new orders, there will be increasingly significant reductions in the workload of various workshops! These initial drops will certainly be seen before the end of this summer of 1967!”855 On 25 April, the Seine-Maritime Regional Council, where the newly elected member of Parliament, Colette Privat,856 sat, unanimously demanded the opening of

11 April 1967: launch of the “Rochambeau” commissioned by the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, the only launch having taken place that year 855 Extract from a booklet titled Triste bilan d’une législature. L’assassinat des chantiers du Trait, dated March 1967. 856 Member of the Communist Party, member of Parliament for the 4th constituency of Seine-Maritime (1967–1968).

a parliamentary inquiry. Its purpose was the application of the decree of 25 April 1966.857 In actual fact, until then, no industrialist had benefited from the “highly conditional advantages”858 granted to companies engaging in investment programmes dedicated to the redeployment of the staff of shipbuilding companies. The elected officials questioned the government again in June. On 22 December, after a strike movement and demonstrations on 13 and 16 December, the union officials were received by Jean Morin, the Secretary General of the Merchant Navy, who committed to appoint a government delegate. At the same time, Colette Privat alerted the Minister for Transport, Jean Chamant,859 “about the fact that shipbuilding was nearing its end, that symptoms of underemployment were already showing and that no serious effort for reconversion activities had been made.” She urged him “to consider the extension of subsidised shipbuilding for the required time to avoid any disruption in the activity of the shipyards.” In January 1968, while the Works Council was trying to obtain new orders from CNC, Mr Monod, Deputy General Delegate, ensured “that the questions generated by the shipyard of Le Trait and by the new industrial area would henceforth be examined on the national scale, and that consequently an inter-ministerial commission would be formed, at the earliest, to plan the future of the shipyard and the region, and that a coordinator appointed by the government [...] would take up the problem.” However, days and weeks went by without anything happening, except for the increasingly shared conviction that the minister’s promises were “for the sole purpose of buying time for the La Ciotat Shipyard management and allowing to complete the dismantling of the Le Trait shipyard.” Even the weather conditions seemed unfavourable. The launch of the cargo ship

857 This decree provided for assistance to companies involved in investment programmes (up to a minimum of 300,000 F) dedicated to the creation of at least 30 permanent jobs reserved for the reclassification of the staff of shipbuilding companies. 858 This quote and the following ones are taken from the comments of Colette Privat during the debate session at the National Assembly on 3 May 1968. 859 Minister for Transport from 6 April 1967 to 20 June 1969 and 7 January 1971 to 6 July 1972. “Mananjary,” which had been scheduled on 15 January 1968, ordered by the NCHP and intended for the Société Malgache de Transports Maritimes, was postponed up to 19 January. The operation was purely technical, “excluding any ceremonies or celebrations.”860 Neither Admiral Deroo, Chairman of Les Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat, nor Baron d’Huart, the Managing Director, attended. “Several hundred workers shouted: ‘Work for all’ and ‘We want boats.’” “This ship,” Le Marin said on the day of the launch, “is, actually, the penultimate merchant vessel to be built in Le Trait, the last being the ore carrier ‘Sabinia,’ intended for the Union Navale.” “After that, it’s the unknown,” added Le Courrier cauchois.

The launch of the 14,905-dwt cargo ship “Mananjary,” built for the Société Malgache de Transports Maritimes, scheduled for 15 January 1968 and delayed to 19 January

The ore carrier “Sabinia,” ordered by the Société Navale Caennaise and the Union Navale. Scheduled for mid-March 1968, its launch was delayed to 15 May 1968 by work stoppages and demonstrations. Several thousand people took to the streets on 21 March, in Rouen, marching and chanting: “Sabinia will not leave.” The red flag was raised on the ship as a sign of protest

From the red flag of anger to the black flag of mourning

“‘Sabinia’ will not leave!”

The muteness and inaction of the government enhanced by the stubbornness of CNC spurred the staff to take an extreme action: preventing the ore carrier “Sabinia” from leaving the slipway. “We know,” stated Colette Privat, “what it means for the shipbuilding workers, who love their profession and their fine craftsmanship, to forego the launch which, in some way, honours acknowledges the work of their own hands.”861 Scheduled for 18 March, the launch of the bulk carrier was at stake in an arm wrestling engaged by the workers to get the public authorities to comply with their commitments and to get the management of the CNN to give work to Le Trait. Work stoppages followed walkouts. A demonstration was organised on 21 March to stop the dismantling of two cranes. On 28, “all the shipyard employees – workers, technicians and managers – accompanied by all that Le Trait had as an active population, representatives of local companies, elected officials – MP, the General Councillor, Mayors of the respective cantons – left Le Trait, which then became a ‘ville morte,’ to join a powerful demonstration at procession up to the Prefecture,”862 under the banner “‘Sabinia’ will not leave.” The red flag was raised on the ship as a sign of protest.863 The details of this day were reported by the press. Le Courrier cauchois of 30 March 1968 stated: “No dismissal in Le Trait this year, is the only assurance that could be given to the demonstrators who came to Rouen.”

862 Ibid. See Le Courrier cauchois on 16 March 1968: “The launch of ‘Sabinia,’ a cargo ship of 17,400 tonnes, is no cause to rejoice”; the same newspaper on 23 March: “Employment concerns for the future have delayed the launch of ‘Sabinia’”; idem in Le Marin on 29 March. 863 Le Marin dated 14 June 1968: “Strike on the Seine.” According to Paul Bonmartel, the red flag was raised on one of the cranes on 17 May 1968, see Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, 1917-1972, p. 104.

“The hour of truth”

GeorGes Chedru864 , aT The naTionaL assembLy, 3 may 1968 The fate that awaited the shipyard on strike and the “workers who show a fiery will to not let Le Trait die” as well as the National Shipbuilding Policy, were debated on 3 May 1968 in the National Assembly. “Internal reconversion is not making any headway,” lamented the parliamentarians while “the decision to stop aid to construction for Le Trait has been taken two and a half years ago.” “The land-based activity had even been reduced for a while. This reduction resulted in […] the closure of the shipyard’s subsidiaries that had been reconverted into other activities. […] Apart from too limited boilermaking works, the internal reconversion only happened […] by the manufacturing of specialised […] equipment for fire-fighting, and boilers. […] However, this activity only represents approximately a hundred jobs while the shipyard has […] more than twelve hundred employees. […] Until recently, the management seemed to have pinned all its hopes on a process of prefabricated construction. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that this process will be competitive and, in any case, its development will be too late to resolve Le Trait’s problem of full employment without delay.” Admittedly, the shipyard obtained the order for two submarines, but their construction “will not allow enough of the workforce to be employed as of the end of 1968.” Under these conditions, “the government must facilitate the transition, either through orders for ships not availing of the aid to shipbuilding – warships, French or foreign fishing vessels – or through orders for heavy boiler-making, civilian or military, directly or by subcontracting. Lastly, the external reclassification, which has only received encouragement in principle in Le Trait until now, must take form quickly.” To enable the staff to locally find jobs corresponding to their qualifications, the continuation of shipbuilding activity for some time still appears to be absolutely necessary – “the government could use its authority to obtain […] subcontracts for the shipyard of Le Trait […] and to confirm the contract, under discussion, of twenty-five Cuban shrimp vessels; secondly, in setting up large-scale reconversion activities as soon as possible: finally, in directing new businesses to the industrial communal zone under favourable conditions.” CNC, for its part, started making threats: On 7 May, before the Works Council, Admiral Deroo, who every week made the trip to Le Trait, declared that the repeated strikes in the past weeks “could lead to the permanent closing of the shipyard.”865 “The delay of the ‘Sabinia’ is a disaster,” stated Jean d’Huart, who decided that the ship would be launched on 13 May at 2 p.m. “The Secretary of the Works Council replied: ‘The workers have been scorned, deceived and abused in their trust, deeply marked in their hearts and minds by the events they have experienced. Some hope was rekindled with the construction of serial housing. However, now, since the 1967 holidays, the planned housing construction has not materialised. At the end of 1967, underemployment prevailed. The first quarter of 1968 showed the end of shipbuilding, without any long-term reconversion perspectives, which we have been hearing about for several years now. The root of the problem is not to leave the ships lying on the slipways, it is, in fact, the opposite. If the workers ask for ships, it is to have them delivered to the ship-owners. The root of the problem is [the fact] that the workers […] must have written commitments on the fate that awaits them. We are ready to initiate discussions.’” Jean d’Huart replied: “We are ready if the work conditions return to normal in Le Trait.” On 15 May 1968, the launch of “Sabinia” was put to a vote and executed after a two months postponement from the date originally decided. Only the workers essential to the operations and some managers of the La Ciotat shipyard were present. A placard placed at the front of the ship claimed: “She is leaving but the fight goes on.” Two days before, a strike was called in support of the student movement.

The events of May–June 1968 in Le Trait

Paul Bonmartel chronicled eloquently the events of May–June 1968,866 which make up one of the last pages of the shipyard’s history. “On Friday, 17 May, 8.45 a.m., the shipyard siren sounds. All the staff are gathered near the large offices inside the company. The indefinite strike with occupation of the premises is adopted by a majority of hands raised. The pickets are guarding the exits: gates and doors are closed, and the

864 MP, party of Independent Republicans, for the 5th constituency of Seine-Maritime (1966–1973). 865 This quote and the following ones are taken from Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, op. cit., p. 104. 866 Ibid., pp. 104–107.

telephone exchange is blocked. A heating of a submarine section, started at night, is underway. The unions allow the welding team to finish the job. The women employees go home. The red flag is hoisted on a crane, it will be replaced at 10 a.m. by a tricolour flag. The wives come to seek information; they will have to bring something to sleep on and eat for the strikers. The first week-end passed in a friendly atmosphere. There are picnics in front of the large offices, an orchestra leads dancers, a movie is screened and Sunday mass celebrated. The discipline becomes stricter over the following days. The management sends a note: ‘The Director of the establishment protests against this indefinite strike with confinement of the staff of the establishment, executives867 and members of the management who do not wish to be a part of the strike and the coercive measures that have been taken,’ stated Georges Raynaud. The three unions form a strike Committee. They organise life at the shipyard: watch towers, provisions, leisure time. The men go to collect provisions and money in the countryside. The petrol stations are managed by strikers who provide fuel on presentation of vouchers from the Committee. […] The unions decide to introduce exit passes: one for two men. The first one leaves at 10 a.m. and returns at 9 a.m. the next day. His colleague then leaves at 10 a.m. During the hour in between, there is a general meeting where the political and union leaders speak, give the latest information and boost morale. 200 workers made available by the suppliers joined the movement. In the city, the construction work of the Brossolette residence has stopped.” Paul Bonmartel quoted from the notes taken by an employee: “On 17 June, the representatives go to the general management in Paris. On the 18th, report of the agreements signed the day before. There is a secret vote.” “Tuesday, 18 June, 10.58 a.m., the siren sounds,” Bonmartel continued. “It’s over! The strikers take it upon themselves to clean up the establishment. Work resumes on Wednesday the 19th at 7.05 a.m. A part of the days of unemployment will be paid, another will be recovered and the last one will be lost for the employees. Salaries increase by 10%, the SMIG

867 Le Marin dated 14 June 1968 states that the executives were released on 21 May and they also went on strike.

16 May 1968: above, the women bringing supplies to the strikers Opposite, the picket line at the entrance of the company – in the background, the workers seated on the surrounding perimeter wall ©Loik Prat in Mai 1968, par celles et ceux qui l’ont vécu, Éditions de l’Atelier, 2018

(minimum guaranteed interprofessional wages) by 30%, and holidays are extended. An OP2 (level 2 professional worker) earned 883.03 francs in March 1967. In December 1968, he earned 1,106.62 francs (gross wages).” The 32 days of strike, the commitment, the bitterness of negotiations seemed to have exhausted the staff’s resistance. Only one strike was organised in 1969: on 11 March to demand an increase in wages. The protest seemed to have slowed down after the death of René BiviIle, General Secretary of the CGT (labour union), who was buried on 19 September 1969. The activity during the year focussed on the assembly of two bare hulls on the slipway, one for the bulk carrier “Alain L.D,” and the other for the sister ship, “Robert L.D,”

both ordered by the Compagnie Louis Dreyfus from Chantiers de l’Atlantique, one of whose subcontractors was Le Trait. The first hull was launched on 22 March and the second one on 31 July 1969. On the day before (30 July), the submarine “Shushuk” left slipway No. 6, where the construction of a second vessel of the same type continued. This second submarine, the “Mangro,” was also intended for the Pakistani Navy and would be launched on 7 February 1970. From 11 December 1969, and alternately until June 1970, the twenty shrimp vessels ordered by the Cuban Government were launched. They carried out their tests on the Seine, and then gathered in Le Havre from where they set sail for Cuba. While Christofle opted to set up in Yainville, the new industrial zone attracted two companies (Normab and the Société Européenne de Produits Pharmaceutiques which offered a reclassification opportunity to a few dozen workers. 698 hourly-wage earners (down by 145

Shrimp vessels built between 1969 and 1970 for the Cuban Government The submarine “Shushuk,” launched on 30 July 1969, and the submarine “Mangro,” launched on 7 February 1970, both for the Pakistani army

over the last 18 months), 317 workers hired by the month and 35 executives worked on the shipyard on 26 March 1970, on the day of the launch of the “Green-Fish,” the first of the two tugs & offshore supply vessels intended for Feronia International Shipping (Fish). The second one, the “Brown-Fish,” was launched on 23 April. The financial result of these two projects said Jean d’Huart to the Central Establishment Committee on 25 June “is one of the reasons why the Établissements du Trait is not profitable from the point of view of the construction of small ships.”868 In the eyes of the employees, the ploy was cruel: according to rumours, 500 jobs would be shelved in September. In the meantime, everyone was busy assembling the hull of a Soviet freighter.

TMT: take it or leave it!

In the autumn of 1970, news (confirmed by the press at the beginning of July 1971) spread: shipbuilding should be replaced at Le Trait by “a department of industrial equipment, the purpose of which was boilermaking for land use.”869 The company which should take the name of TMT – Travaux Métalliques du Trait (also referred to as Travaux Métallurgiques du Trait), should take on only 585 people. 171 should be reclassified to Christofle, 79 would take early retirement and 180 should be transferred to La Ciotat. It is “a terrible measure to take or leave” said Raymond Bretéché, the Mayor. This was followed by strikes, demonstrations and “ville morte” opérations. At the end of November, the staff repeatedly prevented the launching of the hull of the “Kandalakshskiy Zaliv,” the first of the two reefer cargo ships ordered by the Soviet Fishing Fleet Department – Sudoimport (USSR) whose finishing was to be done by CNC. “We do not create the TMT if the cargo ship does not leave,” threatened the management. On 1 December, 85% of the staff voted in favour of the launch, which took place the next day without an official ceremony. The ship “carrying a black flag as a sign of mourning”870 left the slipway and then towed to La Ciotat. Some of the conditions set out by the unions as pre-requisites to the launch were met. “Thus,” Le Marin reported on 11 December 1970, “a plan will be prepared

868 The information and quotes of this paragraph (apart from the newspapers extracts) are taken from Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, op. cit. 869 Le Courrier cauchois, 3 July 1971. 870 Le Marin, 11 December 1970. so as to avoid temporary unemployment between two jobs as much as possible: an effort will be made to match the dates of layoffs with the dates of rehiring in the local industries. Workers placed on pre-retirement could keep their accommodation and the right to complementary health insurance. The union representatives would remain at the shipyard until the launch of the ‘Taganrogskiy Zaliv.’ […] On the other hand, CGT declared that the creation of TMT would be effective from 1 January 1971 and the workers would be offered a greater choice in the possible reclassifications. But CGT noted that several points were not yet satisfied, mainly the payment of 90% of the gross salary of employees in pre-retirement and the maintenance of employment until the pre-retirement of employees aged 58 and 59 years.” “From the moment we learned that the shipyard was screwed up,” recalled a former employee quoted by Paul Bonmartel, “we fought to save our rights.” “At the beginning of 1971, everyone feared a summons from the management. A team leader returned to the workshop: ‘Guys! You won’t see me from tomorrow.’ Everyone was thinking: ‘When and how much?’ The amount of the layoff pay varied from one employee to another. A team leader receives 5 months’ salary, a young worker not too much, that is the law! The employees hired by Christofle keep their accommodation. If we go to La Ciotat, we discuss conditions.”

11 May 1971: the last launch

The end was finally here. It happened on 11 May 1971, “in deathly silence,” observed Le Marin, 871 when the Soviet refrigerated cargo ship, “Taganrogskiy Zaliv,” construction No. 199, was launched. This last launch “brings the fifty years of service to the French and foreign ship-owners to an end” and concludes the history of the ships built in Le Trait. Notwithstanding the press articles praising the success of the reclassification in Le Trait, and despite the promises of the public authorities, and especially despite the determination and professionalism of the 550 employees, with eight work stoppages in March 1972 forcing the management to increase wages by 6%, the verdict came through: TMT was not profitable. After having operated for hardly a year, its liquidation was scheduled

Launch on 11 May 1971, “in deathly silence,” of the hull of the Soviet reefer cargo ship, “Taganrogskiy Zaliv,” the last launch from Le Trait

for 31 December 1972. The waves of layoffs whittled down the workforce month after month. The first oil shock had not yet plunged the Western economies into recession and the populations into rampant unemployment; workers, whose qualifications were recognised, found employment fairly fast in companies that had started to set up there or among those in the surrounding area or in other departments. “Little by little, the workforce dispersed,” noted Henri Nitot at the end of his memoirs, “but not without the families having experienced a lot of anguish and concerns, and no one ever really knew how to show them signs of compassion and friendship that would have sustained their courage in these trying circumstances. And so we came to the final closure [on 31 December 1972], not without La Ciotat shipyard having scavenged Le Trait shipyard for all the equipment and tools likely to be of industrial interest to them.” The archives were burned.

Mission well accomplished

Over half a century, ACSM accomplished its mission: in the aftermath of two world wars, it actively participated in the revival of the French merchant and military fleets. The last vessel built numbered 199 – yet, taking into account the vessels listed under the same number (for example: ten barges were listed under No. 178, twenty shrimpers under No. 196) as well as the cancelled orders (for example: the submarines “L’Andromaque” and “L’Armide”),872 204 vessels and other machines873 were built in Le Trait between 6 May 1920, the date on which the first keel was laid, and 11 May 1971, the launch date of the final hull. 154 ships and engines expanded the fleets of private shipping companies; 50 (not taken into account “La Favorite,” “La Charente” and “Ingénieur Lacroix”) were commissioned by the French State, including the oceanographic research vessel “Président Théodore Tissier.” For the French Navy, ACSM built 3 oil tankers, 3 torpedo boats, 8 submarines, 4 submarine chasers, 4 minesweepers, 2 landing ship tanks, 2 hydrographic survey vessels, 2 sea barges, 2 filter barges and 1 ship caisson. Its know-how and reputation in submarine construction enabled the company to become suppliers to the Pakistani Navy in 1966. For the shipping companies, ACSM produced the widest range of vessels: cargo ships, colliers, oil tankers, ore carriers, methane carrier, butane cargo, selfunloading bulk carrier, semi-containership, reefer cargo ships, passenger liners, ferry boats, split hopper barges, filter barges, tank barges, flat-bottomed river boats, crane pontoons, mooring and boarding pontoons, platforms barges for unloading and pumping, ferries, floating dock, pushers, tugboats, tugs & offshore supply vessels, freezer trawlers, cod-fishing boats, shrimpers. 34 vessels were delivered to Maison Worms and its shipping subsidiaries: 11 cargo ships to Worms & Cie and Worms CMC; 16 to the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire (17 with “Saint François” bought in 1969); 5 oil tankers to the Société Française de Transports Pétroliers; and 2 ore carriers to the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest. Several foreign clients ordered from ACSM: - Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab A/S (Norway) - Anticosti Shipping Co., Ltd. (Canada) - Westfal Larsen & Co. A/S (Norway) - Petroleum Maatschappij La Corona (the Netherlands) - Atlantic Oil Carriers (Liberia) - Chilean Navy - Petroleum Shipping Co., Ltd. (Panama) - A/S Moltzau’s Tankrederi – Moltzau & Christensen (Norway) - Panama Gypsum Co., Inc. (Panama) - Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin - Grenehurst Shipping Co., Ltd. (Great Britain) - Niels Røgenæs (Norway) - Naviera Interoceangas SA (Chile) - Stena AB – Sten A. Olsson (Sweden) - Lignes Maritimes du Détroit – Limadet (Morocco) - Société Malgache de Transports Maritimes (Madagascar) - Pakistani Navy - Cuban Government - and lastly, Sudoimport (USSR). The ships that were the pride of the inhabitants of Le Trait have long since ceased to be in service. The garden city of Le Trait is the sole achievement of the ACSM and Maison Worms on the banks of the Seine that has stood the test of time. The families who live there today are perpetuating the collective work built up in this part of Normandy.

872 The list followed by M. Quemin in Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires according to the construction numbers attributed to the units whose keel has been laid, shows some gaps – for example, No. 7 “Château-Lafite” succeeds No. 4 “Cérons” and No. 14 “Capitaine Bonelli” succeeds No. 8 “ChâteauYquem,” etc. Construction numbers 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 likely correspond to contracts that have been cancelled. 873 Cf. the distillation tower built in 1967 under No. 193 for the Compagnie Française de Raffinage.