IV. 1939-1944 Under the yoke of the German occupiers and the Allied air raids

1939–1944 Under the yoke of the German occupiers and the Allied air raids

Preamble

The Second World War is the best-documented period in the history of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime (ACSM), as information was collected for the purpose of: - the investigation, entrusted by the occupation authorities to the Deutsche Treuhand und Revisionsgesellschaft and conducted from June 1941, for more than a year, of all Worms & Cie business activities; - the legal proceedings brought against Hypolite Worms, as the main General Partner of the company, and Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie,406 head of the Worms & Cie Banking Services, between 23 September 1944, the date on which they were indicted for collaborating with the enemy, and 25 October 1946, the date on which the Court of Justice dismissed the case. The investigation of this case produced a large amount of memos, historical background information, minutes, copies of letters, etc., submitted by Maison Worms and its branches to Gaston Bernard, the chartered accountant appointed by Judge Thirion and the author of a report counting more than 700 pages.407 These items have all been preserved in the Worms archives, as are the minutes to the interrogations, staff depositions and testimonies of individuals not belonging to the company. A portion of these documents can also be consulted in the French National Archives (Caran).408 On 25 September 1944, Hypolite Worms told two of his closest colleagues, Robert Labbé409 and Raymond Meynial,410 that “the operations at Le Trait seem to be the main grievance noted in the seized files.”411 The accusation “of having delivered military equipment to Germany in order to help the Reich pursue its hostilities”412 was also at the heart of an exchange between Hypolite Worms and the members of an American mission who came to question him on 5 October 1944, during his over four-month imprisonment in Fresnes.413 “It would seem,” said one of these “visitors,” “that you are accused of building submarines for the Germans, yet during their construction, you forewarned British authorities who then sank the vessels after they left the shipyard?” Hypolite Worms replied: “The truth is that my shipyard with its eight slipways delivered a total of two ships in four years414 to the Germans, ships belonging to the French Government and delivered in accordance with its formal orders; it took the shipyard three years to finish these two ships which should have been finished four to six months after the Armistice. […] I [am] probably the last Frenchman to be a threat and […] certainly the one who worked the least with the Germans.” In a memo sent to Robert Labbé on 11 December 1944, he recalled: “At our first meeting with Mr Thirion, we expressed our desire that he be fully apprised of all the activities of our group. From that point onwards, we gave him the constant impression that we ourselves,

406 Previously Director of the Banque de Paris et des PaysBas, posted to the Banque Franco-Polonaise in Katowice, Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie, in July 1929, joined the Worms & Cie Banking Services, created one year earlier (July 1928). Initially an authorised representative, he was appointed Director in June 1936. 407 The document may be consulted on the website: www. wormsetcie.com. 408 Cf. [references] Z/6/NL/74; F/12/9566; F/7/15343 and F/12/10273. 409 A grandson of Henri Goudchaux, Robert Labbé became an authorised representative of Worms & Cie in May 1938. 410 Coming from the Société Générale, where he had been an inspector, Raymond Meynial entered the Worms & Cie Banking Services in October 1932 as an authorised representative. 411 Memo may be consulted on the website: www.worms etcie.com. 412 Excerpt from a report entitled Note sur l’activité des chantiers du Trait depuis le 25 juin 1940, dated 29 October 1944 and addressed to Mr Lénard, lawyer for Hypolite Worms in the case referred to here. 413 Hypolite Worms was arrested on 7 September 1944 and imprisoned in Fresnes from 14 September 1944 until 21 January 1945. 414 In fact, three vessels were delivered, as we shall see later; but in this interview, Hypolite Worms referred solely to the two vessels ordered by the French Admiralty and launched on behalf of the Kriegsmarine (German War Navy); the third, a barge, was an order from the German Merchant Navy.

September 1939: general mobilisation in France

with utmost loyalty, would keep him informed of all the documentation in the W file, thus forming the basis for the trust he showed in us.” This desire for transparency and the focus of the investigation on shipbuilding explain the abundance of testimonies stemming from ACSM or referring to it. The history of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime during the Second World War spanned three time periods: - the first phase extended from the outbreak of hostilities (3 September 1939) to the Armistice (22 June 1940), a stage during which shipbuilding operations and life within the workers’ housing estate carried on without any great difference to peacetime. This all changed however when the fighting reached Le Trait, forcing the population and workforce to take the road; - the second phase ran from the re-opening of the shipyard on 25 June 1940 to the Franco-German Agreement of 16 September 1941, a period characterised by frictions between the Occupier, which demanded that shipbuilders in the occupied zone take part in the fight against England, at the risk of contravening the clauses set forth in the Armistice Agreement, and the French Government which, as a means of obtaining quid pro quos for the Reich’s confiscation of the country’s resources, put obstacles in the way of shipbuilding and engaged in a showdown (or a war of attrition) with the Germans, though with the shipbuilders bearing all the risks (intimidation, reprisals, etc.); - the third period extended from autumn 1941 to the liberation of the Le Trait shipyard (30 August 1944), a period during which ACSM, by dint of evasions and tergiversations, succeeded in delaying ship launches to the greatest possible extent, but also a period from which the shipyard emerged devastated by Allied air raids. Most of the documents produced or received by Worms & Cie or ACSM and quoted in this chapter may be consulted on the website, www.wormsetcie.com; they are classified according to their publication date (yyyy/ mm/dd).

From the Phoney War to the Blitzkrieg (September 1939 to June 1940)

“Nothing noteworthy happened for several months”

henri niToT, memoirs

Maintaining “a somewhat satisfactory financial balance”

henri niToT, memoirs After the intense concerns of the years 1932–1936, the contracts concluded with the Navy – for six submarines, the “Antiope” (1931), “Amazone” (1931), “Oréade” (1932), “La Sibylle” (1933), “Vénus” (1935) and “Cérès” (1938), and two torpedo boats, “L’Incomprise” and “Bouclier” (1937) – enabled the shipyard to maintain a somewhat satisfactory financial balance. Apart from the warships, the tonnage launched from the ACSM slipways between 1930 and 1938 represented 10.415% of French shipping production. In 1938 alone, this figure reached 12.05%, or 5,700 tons, out of a total of 47,290 tons. Between 1936 and June 1940, the following vessels were launched: - motor cargo ship, “François L.D” 4,580 tons - mixed cargo ship, “Malgache” 6,000 tons - tugboat, “Saint Louis” 325 tons - torpedo boat, “L’Incomprise” 609 tons - submarine, “Cérès” 600 tons - torpedo boat, “Bouclier” 609 tons - collier, “Danaé” 2,000 tons - four submarine chasers, Nos. 13–16 456 tons - steam collier, “Égée” 2,000 tons - collier, “Dioné” 2,000 tons for a total of 41519,179 tons

“French shipbuilding was basically in the hands of fifteen large private shipyards. This capacity was to a limited extent complemented by the French Navy’s dockyards (Brest and Lorient) and the small river shipyards. Over a period of twenty years, these shipyards

415 These figures were mentioned by G. Bernard in his report of 31 December 1945; they correspond more or less to the gross tonnage. combined constructed nearly 800,000 tons of merchant vessels and 700,000 tons of warships. Using 72 slipways, the annual construction capacity of these fifteen shipyards was 250,000 tons […] produced by a workforce […] numbering nearly 35,000. By contrast, the Navy’s dockyards employed 40,000 workers, nearly one third of whom worked on maintenance work.”416 The last vessel launched at ACSM before war broke out was the “Malgache,” a 8,960-dwt mixed cargo ship. Constructed in slipway No. 2 under construction No. 87, it was fitted out by the French Government.417 Its launch on 19 July 1939 was celebrated by Hypolite Worms418 in his twin capacity as head of ACSM and Chairman

On board the “Danaé” launched on 21 May 1936 (Joseph Kerdraon collection)

416 Claude Huan, with the assistance of François Bréchat, “La construction navale française 1940-1942,” Études d’histoire maritime, No. 1, 1990/1991. 417 The order for this vessel was part of a programme to renew the French merchant fleet, introduced in 1936 by the Under-Secretary for the Navy. Two other fast freighters of the same tonnage and with similar specifications were constructed, one by the Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde, the other by the Société Provençale de Constructions Navales. See Charles Limonier, Les 110 ans de la Havraise péninsulaire, Éditions P. Tacussel, 1992, pp. 193–199. 418 His speech is reproduced on pages 173–177. Hypolite Worms had been Chairman of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire since 1934.

of the Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire de Navigation, a shipping company rescued by Maison Worms between 1929 and 1934, and to whose management the “Malgache” had just been assigned. At that time, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime was the leading company in the SeineMaritime department by virtue of the number and skills of its workforce. Between 1,324 (31 December 1938) and 1,483 employees (31 December 1939) worked for the company, under the direction of Pierre Abbat who worked on-site and Henri Nitot who had been based in Paris since 1936, the year in which “the complexity [of the] tasks” made it “necessary to split the duties between a local management team in Le Trait and a general management team based […] with the Worms & Cie’s General Partners.”419

“Sheltered by the Siegfried and Maginot Lines”

tHe Journal de la coMpagnie navale WorMs, 1982 On 1 September 1939, at the height of several months of international tensions, the Wehrmacht crossed the Polish border, violating Poland’s territory and sovereignty. The French Government, under its President of the Council, Édouard Daladier,420 decreed general mobilisation. Two days later, on 3 September 1939, Great Britain, through the voice of its Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain;421 and France declared war on Germany, thus fulfilling their commitment of mutual assistance towards Poland.422 “Sheltered by the Siegfried and Maginot Lines, it was a ‘Phoney War’ to start with, a period of suspense interrupted here and there by a few local border skirmishes.”423 Upon French mobilisation, all French merchant vessels over 500 tons were requisitioned. Of the twenty-four vessels making up the Worms fleet,424 fifteen were chartered by the Maritime Transport Department, while eight were integrated into the third squadron of coastal patrol-boats attached to the Northern Maritime Forces, under the command of the French Navy. Deprived of the direct command of its ships, Worms & Cie suspended operations of its international cabotage lines. In Le Trait, “out of 1,100 men who could be mobilised, 700 were specially assigned to continue work in the shipyard.”425 To avoid the disorganisation of industry, and shipbuilding in particular, which had paralysed the country in 1914–1918, the authorities made sure this time that, in the event of conflict, key sectors of the economy and defence would have sufficient labour to maintain operations. Even so, a large number of ACSM workers were still conscripted, with their departure upsetting – at least momentarily – work in the company and life in the workers’ housing estate. “The mobilisation,” noted Henri Nitot, “took place in an atmosphere of sombre acceptance, with the ‘Phoney War’ dragging

On the Maginot Line – construction of a mortar launcher shelter (http://francois.munier2.free.fr collection)

419 Henri Nitot, memoirs, non dated printed text, private archives. 420 Édouard Daladier was appointed President of the Council following the resignation of Léon Blum (20 April 1938). 421 Sir Arthur Neville Chamberlain had been serving as Prime Minister of Great Britain since 28 May 1937. 422 Anglo-Polish Agreement of 25 August 1939. 423 Le Journal de la compagnie navale Worms, Éditions PEP, 1982, p. 52. 424 With a total gross tonnage of 31,235 tons (of 2.83 m3), the Worms fleet, as of 1 September 1939, constituted 1.03% of the French fleet. With their total displacement of 41,400 tons, its twenty-four freighters were all registered in Le Havre. See Worms & Cie memos of 11–13 June 1941 and 21 January 1942. 425 Cf. Paul Bonmartel, Histoire du chantier naval du Trait, 1917-1972, Luneray, Bertout, 1997, p. 47.

on for several months, a sad period sapping the morale of our armed forces.”426 The ACSM order book at the time was made up of fifteen vessels intended for the French Navy: eight Class 2 submarines (for coastal protection) belonging to the “Aurore” series,427 four of which were under construction:

Financing No. Slipway Placed in slip* Keel laid**

“La Favorite” (Q 195) 1937 tranche 88 3 29.07.1938 07.11.1938 “L’Africaine” (Q 196) 1937 tranche 89 4 01.09.1938 09.11.1938 “L’Andromaque” (Q 203) 1938 tranche 96 6 10.07.1939 10.07.1939

“L’Armide” (Q 207) 1938 bis tranche 98 6 01.11.1939 16.03.1940

*http://forum.netmarine.net: “La Saga des sous-marins de la classe ‘Aurore.’” **Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1987.

- four Class 5 submarine chasers:428 Financing* No. Slipway Keel laid**

N° 13 – “CH 13” Calais 1937

N° 14 – “CH 14” Diélette 1937

N° 15 – “CH 15” Paimpol 1937 N° 16 – “CH 16” Nantes 1937 90 5 16.02.1939

91 5 16.02.1939

92 5 27.02.1939

93 5 27.02.1939

*http://forummarine.forumactif.com: “Une marine française alternative”. **Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1987.

426 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 427 Specifications of the submarine, “Aurore”: displacement: 893 tons surfaced and 1,170 tons submerged; length: 73.50 m; width: 6.50 m; draught: 3.50 m; power: 3,000-HP/1,400-HP; 15 kn surfaced / 9 kn submerged; maximum submersion: 100 m; armament (original): 1 x 100-mm cannon; 2 x 13.2 mm; 9 torpedo tubes (4 bow, 3 external, 2 stern) – ref. http://forum.netmarine.net. 428 French warships: length: 37.10 m; width: 5.50 m; draught: 1.95 m; displacement (fully loaded): 137 t; powered by two Man 1,130-HP engines, they reached speeds of 15.5 knots. They were armed with 1 x 75-mm gun; 4 x 8 mm anti-aircraft machine guns; 2 x ASM mortars and 6 x submarine grenades. They were crewed by 23 men – ref. https://forumactif.com. - three “L’Adour”-class oil tankers, for the rapid refuelling of warships at sea:429

Financing No. Contract/ Order* Slipway Keel laid**

“La Charente” 1938 bis tranche 95 27.02.1939 1 04.05.1939

“La Mayenne” 1938 bis tranche 97 27.02.1939 8 21.09.1939

“La Baïse” 1938 bis tranche 99 25.08.1939 2 30.05.1940

*http://www.postedeschoufs.com. **Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1987.

The steam collier “Égée” (construction No. 94) occupied slipway No. 7. Intended for the Société Navale Caennaise, it was the last in a series of four ships, two of which, “Danaé” and “Dioné,” were built by ACSM and launched in 1936.430 The keel of the “Égée” was laid on 2 November 1938.

Boilermaking shop (Le Trait Naval d’Hier collection)

429 With a length of 132 m; a width of 16 m; empty tonnage of 4,500 t and fully loaded at 12,100 t; power of 5,200-HP; and speeds of 15 kn, “L’Adour” was launched on 9 October 1938, by the Société Provençale de Construction Navale, located in La Ciotat. It was the prototype for six refuelling vessels financed in the 1936–1938 tranches. Source: https:// clausuchronia.wordpress.com. 430 The fourth freighter, named “Phryné,” was built by the Ateliers & Chantiers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët).

Ships under construction for the French Navy in early 1939

Submarines “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” Submarine chasers Ω “CH 13” à “CH 16”

Jacques Barnaud (1893–1962)

General management on official missions

Like the three other divisions of Maison Worms (Fuel Merchanting Services, Shipping Services and Banking Services), ACSM was managed by the Worms & Cie’s General Partners, established as a limited partnership and headquartered at 45, Boulevard Haussmann in Paris since 1878, and whose capital of 4,000,000 F was distributed among the heirs of the founder, Hypolite Worms (1801–1877) and his successor, Henri Goudchaux (1846–1916).431 Management was in the hands of Hypolite Worms, grandson and namesake of the former, Michel Goudchaux, son of the latter, and Jacques Barnaud. Born on 24 February 1893, graduated from the higher-education establishment, the École Polytechnique, and a former Finance Inspector, where he served as Deputy Director for General Movement of Funds, Jacques Barnaud made the rounds at Maison Worms for one year. This took him to the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime, then to the Worms branches in England and Egypt, prior to assuming his duties as Managing Director in May 1928. Together with Hypolite Worms, Jacques Barnaud helped establish the Banking Services of Worms & Cie in July 1928. He became General Partner on 1 January 1930.

Jacques Barnaud at the Ministry of Armaments, then of Finance

An officer mobilised to the front in the 1914–1918 war,432 Jacques Barnaud was placed on special assignment by the Ministry of National Defence for a period of three months from the day of mobilisation in order “to manage the Worms fleets [including NCHP and SFTP] and the maritime branches [...] that Maison Worms had established in all the major French ports and in a number of foreign ports.”433 In October 1939, Raoul Dautry,434 Minister for Armaments at the time, suggested that Jacques Barnaud lead the French Procurement Mission in the Scandinavian Countries, given his deep knowledge of the region gained through the business relations developed there by the Worms & Cie Banking Services. Two months later, in December 1939, Paul Reynaud and Yves Bouthillier435 appointed him to the Ministry of Finance, in charge of dealing with foreign payment issues, in particular, the availability of currency in France and the control of purchases abroad. “In fact,” stated Jacques Barnaud in 1950,436 “I resumed the duties I had had fifteen years earlier, when I served as Deputy Director for the General Movement of Funds. Each day, I spent two to three hours at the Ministry of Finance, and one hour at the Ministry of Armaments, before trying as best as I could to handle any problems that had arisen at Maison Worms.” His task was made even more difficult due to the fact that Hypolite Worms himself had been in London since the end of November 1939, working there for an undetermined period of time.

431 The limited partners descending from Hypolite Worms were the descendants of his son, Lucien (1839–1914) and his daughter, Emma (1842–1926); descendants of Lucien included Hypolite Worms (born in 1889), Mrs Marcel Razsovich (born in 1886) and the heirs of the late Mrs Leroy; while the descendants of Emma included: Mrs FauchierMagnan (born in 1878); Mrs Fauchier-Delavigne (born in 1883), and Mrs Lebel (born in 1881). The limited partners descending from Henri Goudchaux were his two children, Michel Goudchaux (born in 1880) and Mrs Labbé (born in 1877). At the beginning of 1940, the capital was increased to 40 million francs by incorporation of reserves. 432 See memo on Jacques Barnaud, undated, available on the website: www.wormsetcie.com – archives 1945. 433 Excerpt from the hearing of Jacques Barnaud before Commission President Dhers, on 2 May 1950. 434 Raoul Dautry was Minister for Armaments from 20 September 1939 to 16 June 1940 (during the governments of Édouard Daladier and Paul Reynaud). 435 Yves Bouthillier served as Secretary General to Paul Reynaud, appointed head of the Ministry of Finance in 1938. 436 Excerpt from the hearing of Jacques Barnaud, op. cit.

Hypolite Worms in London

On 23 November 1939, Anatole de Monzie,437 Minister for Transport and Public Works, and Alphonse Rio,438 Minister for the Merchant Navy, appointed Hypolite Worms as head of the French Delegation to the AngloFrench Permanent Executive Committee for Shipping in London, a body set up following the agreement concluded, on 16 November 1939, by Édouard Daladier439 and Neville Chamberlain,440 seeking to pool the two countries’ resources required to wage war. Each major sector – armaments, supplies, aeronautics, blockading, oil, coal and shipping – was represented by a committee seated in London and comprised of an equal number of French and English delegates. Shipping was the most important one, having as its goal to coordinate tonnage needs, negotiate charter agreements with allied and neutral governments and share out between France and England the volumes available under time charters.441 Hypolite Worms was appointed to this post on account of his competences in shipping and financial affairs: he was a shipowner – transporting freight by cabotage (Worms) or by ocean-going vessels (Nouvelle Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire); Chairman of an oil tanker company (Société Française de Transports Pétroliers, created on 19 September 1938); Director of the Compagnie Nantaise des Chargeurs de l’Ouest; but also a shipping agent, shipbuilder and banker (Worms & Cie Banking Services). Since 1925, he had also served as Treasurer of the Central Committee of French Shipowners. His skills, already tested during the First World War, were recognised by Anatole de Monzie, with whom he had established a close relationship during that conflict. His reputation and his

437 Having served as Minister for Transport and Public Works from 29 October 1925 to 23 June 1926, Anatole de Monzie regained this portfolio on 23 August 1938. On 5 June 1940, Ludovic Oscar Frossard replaced him in this capacity. 438 Appointed Minister for the Merchant Navy on 13 September 1939, Alphonse Rio remained in this position until 16 June 1940. 439 Édouard Daladier handed over leadership of the French Government to his Minister for Finance, Paul Reynaud, on 20 March 1940. Under pressure from the Radicals, Reynaud appointed Daladier Minister for National Defence and War. 440 Sir Arthur Neville Chamberlain was replaced as Prime Minister by Winston Churchill on 10 May 1940. 441 A time charter is a time-bound agreement. The shipowner leases a vessel to a charterer for a fixed period of time, as opposed to a charter party for a specific voyage. relations within the French and international business worlds were as solid as his attachment to England: his wife, Gladys Mary Lewis Morgan, a native of Cardiff (where her father served as Lord Mayor), and his only daughter, Marguerite Viviane, resided in London with her first spouse, Robert W. K. Clive, a British subject, and their children. Hypolite Worms arrived in the City of London on 29 November 1939, accompanied by his two “secretaries,” Raymond Meynial and Robert Labbé. His mission statement set forth that he “will be responsible for representing France in all inter-allied negotiations regarding the purchase and chartering of neutral ships.” With this goal in mind, he managed to gain the assurance from the Ministry of Shipping that, from them on, no contract would be signed without the French delegation having participated in the negotiations. In addition, all tonnage agreements were now to be jointly signed by the representatives of the two countries. Up to then, the British Government had signed just one contract.442 Concluded with Norwegian shippers, the agreement covered 250,000 tons of freighters and 150 oil tankers of 10,000 tons on average. Since France had not participated in the discussions, it was unable to receive direct allocations; its role was limited to making monthly requests for the tonnages needed for oil imports, requests which were always granted. According to the Journal de la marine marchande of 11 January 1940, Hypolite Worms also obtained twentyfive to thirty small Norwegian colliers capable of transporting 75,000 to 80,000 tons per month, principally to small French ports. Furthermore, the Ministry of Shipping had unsuccessfully conducted negotiations with Greek shipowners. Hypolite Worms resumed the dialogue and, leaning on his personal connections with certain shipowners, obtained full power to negotiate singlehandedly on behalf of the two Allies. The subsequent agreement, signed jointly by both governments, guaranteed 500,000 tons of long-haul vessels under extremely favourable conditions, for the duration of the war.

442 A memo sent on 3 November 1939 by the Delegate of the Ministry of the Merchant Navy to the Ministry, a copy of which was sent to Hypolite Worms by Commander Le Terrier, provides an account of a draft tonnage agreement between the Swedish and British Governments, and the terms of an Anglo-Yugoslav agreement to charter ten ships.

Hypolite Worms’ diplomatic passport – 28 November 1939

At the same time, negotiations with the United States were underway to acquire several vessels. To avoid competition between the two Allies and a risk of overbidding, Hypolite Worms called on the British Government to coordinate the purchases and to arrange an equitable distribution thereafter. Likewise, on his initiative, he requested that the principle of pooling production capacities be applied to shipbuilding.443 Following approval by the British Cabinet, the agreement was confirmed by Alphonse Rio during a trip he made to London at the end of January 1940: the cost billed to France was to be exactly the same as that billed by English shipyards to their government. According to estimates, France would thus increase its annual capacity between 100,000 and 150,000 new tons. The events of May and June444 prevented the treaty from being signed, although all the terms were settled. Another extremely delicate area of involvement for the Shipping Executive was the supply of British coal to France. Following protracted negotiations, Hypolite Worms succeeded in greatly increasing the number of British freighters available to transport coal to France. Accordingly, French imports of coal were rose from approximately 500,000 tons in November 1939 to 1.3 million tons in May. By July, coal imports were supposed to reach 2 to 2.5 million tons per month, the volume that the French Ministry of Public Works considered sufficient. Also for the purpose of ensuring the energy autonomy of mainland France, around ten Norwegian oil tankers (50,000 tons in all) were to be ceded to the country. To fulfil these goals, a thorough knowledge of daily needs was needed, and of what the Merchant Navy lacked. Like the “Committee of Five” (see page 42) twenty-two years earlier, the Anglo-French Shipping

443 A memo sent by Henri Nitot to Hypolite Worms, on 6 February 1940, stipulated: “Carrying out the Merchant Navy construction programme envisioned by the Minister for the Merchant Navy is going to face numerous difficulties, not only for the supply of metal materials (the order notebook for the Comptoir Sidérurgique de France has reached three or four times the production capacity at the time), but also for the supply of ancillary equipment. Therefore, there is immediate reason to seek whatever assistance we can find in Great Britain to construct this equipment.” 444 The period between the launch of Germany’s “Case Yellow” (Fall Gelb): the invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (9–10 May 1940), and the signing of the Franco-German Armistice (22 June 1940). Executive became a vast data collection and assessment centre for monitoring the status of the Merchant Navy and import needs. In addition to the Anglo-Greek agreement, contracts were concluded with: - the Swedish shipowners who made available to the Allies all Swedish ships not needed to supply their country; - the Danish, who gave a guarantee to list on the London freight market all ships not needed for imports. This agreement enabled France and England, on the day the Wehrmacht invaded Denmark (9 April 1940),445 to seize the Danish ships docked in Allied ports;446 - the Norwegian shipowners, who, when Germany overran their country (9 April to 8 June 1940),447 handed over practically their entire fleet to the Allies, with the exception of the freighters serving regular shipping lines outside Europe; - the Dutch who, when their territory was invaded (10 May 1940),448 adopted the same measures as the Norwegians.

445 Despite having signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany, Denmark was invaded on 9 April 1940, during “Operation Weserübung.” 446 On 13 April 1940, the Cherbourg-Éclair published the following information: “New York – The Danish Consulate announced that orders had been given to the 705 ships comprising the Danish merchant fleet to sail immediately to neutral ports, or to stay there, if already moored. Despite the repeated exhortations on German radio to captains of Danish ships at sea to go to a German or neutral port, the commanders of these vessels nearly all went to Allied ports, in accordance with the instructions issued to them by the Danish Consular representatives to France and England via TSF [maritime wireless telegraphy].” 447 To protect the port of Narvik and the “Iron Route” from the Germans, who were threatening to invade Norway, the Allies planned a military expedition to Norway in January 1940, under the pretext of helping Finland, which the Soviet Union had just attacked. On 27 March 1940, Hitler decided on a counter-offensive, launched on 9 April. Within just two days, the Germans took over nearly all Norwegian ports. The Norwegian Government went into exile in London. Between 3 and 8 June, the Allies tried to resist, but then took to sea to concentrate on operations in France. The Germans were to remain in Norway until the end of the war, holding a key position in Scandinavia. See La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, chronologie commentée, André Kaspi, Nicole Piétri, Ralph Schor, Bibliothèque Numérique Perrin, 2012, pp. 76–78. 448 On 10 May 1940 (the day on which Winston Churchill was called to replace Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister of Great Britain), Germany invaded the Netherlands, thus violating its neutrality.

“The storm broke out”

henri niToT, memoirs

Production continued in Le Trait without any serious problems until spring 1940. Pierre Abbat maintained contact with the employees who had left for war and their families, while additional soldiers mobilised as special assignments swelled the ranks of the employees. In fact, in a speech he gave in 1946,449 Hypolite Worms observed that “the workforce, initially disorganised by the mobilisation, grew gradually until it reached numbers that were higher at the beginning of 1940 […] than before the war.” According to a memo written in June 1941,450 1,250 people (250 engineers and whitecollar workers, and 1,000 blue-collar workers) worked at ACSM in June 1940. The first four months of 1940 were marked by the launch of three vessels: - 3,400-dwt steam collier “Égée” on 28 January 1940; - submarine chaser No. 13, on 23 March 1940; - submarine chaser No. 14, on 21 April 1940. And “then came the sudden announcement of the German attack, its rapid advance through the Ardennes: the storm broke out,” wrote Henri Nitot in his memoirs.

The “lightning war” and the ensuing debacle

On 10 May 1940, at 4.45 a.m., German squadrons bombed Belgian and French aerodromes, marking the first phase of the Blitzkrieg which brutally put an end to the “phoney war.” This surprise attack allowed the Third Reich to gain control of the air. On land, the Wehrmacht bypassed the Maginot Line, launching an offensive against Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

The submarines “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” in spring 1940

The Battle of the Netherlands lasted just one week;451 panic gripped the population. The Dutch, as well as the Belgian and Luxembourg Governments, appealed to France and Great Britain to come to their rescue. By order of General Gamelin, Chief of Staff for National

449 Excerpt from the speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262). 450 Excerpt from a memo on ACSM dated 11 June 1941. According to the account drawn up by G. Bernard in his summary report of 31 December 1945, the total workforce rose to 1,076 persons as of 31 December 1940, including 812 blue-collar workers, 202 white-collar workers and 62 managers (foremen and shift leaders). These figures do not take into account the management teams in Le Trait and Paris. 451 Cf. Journal de la France et des Français, Quarto Gallimard, 2001. On 13 May, a German airborne commando landed in The Hague to capture the Dutch royal family, but Queen Wilhelmina, Princess Juliana and Prince Bernhard had already boarded a British counter-torpedo boat heading to Great Britain; in London, they organised a government in exile. On 14 May, the Germans sent an ultimatum to the Dutch Government, demanding the surrender of Rotterdam; failure to comply would mean that the city would be bombed. Shortly after expiration of the ultimatum, the surrender was announced, but the bombers, already in flight, were not recalled, and the city was destroyed. On 16 May, General Winkelman, Commander of the Dutch Army, signed the capitulation. Battles continued until the bombing of Middelburg on 17 May. Cf. André Kaspi, La Deuxième Guerre mondiale, pp. 78–80.

Spring 1940: progress on the construction of submarine chasers

Defence and guided by considerations dating back to the First World War (the Schlieffen Plan), the Army Group No. 1 launched an attack against the enemy forces, while the 7th Army was sent “to lend a hand to the Dutch”452 at the Belgian-French border. This manoeuvre, (known as the Dyle Plan) distanced the best French units from the zone not covered by the Maginot Line, the zone attacked by the Germans. The 1st Division and the British Expeditionary Force were sent to support the Belgian Army commanded by King Leopold III. Troops exposed to bombing and strafing began to flee. This was the start of the civilian population exodus. On 11 May, the German Panzers bypassed the Belgian positions and threatened the 7th Army. On 13–15 May, in the weakly defended Ardennes, the Germans crossed the Meuse near Dinant and surrounded Sedan. The 55th Infantry Division bowed down under the shock. The inappropriate initiatives of General Huntziger, the Commander of the Second French Army, facilitated the German advance. Panic-stricken by the intensity of enemy fire, some French units dispersed. The Wehrmacht turned to the north with the goal of surrounding the French, British, and Belgian forces. Brussels was occupied on 17 May, Antwerp on 18 May. As of 17 May, the Reich ordered that the French franc be tied to the German Reichsmark. On 18 May, Paul Reynaud reshuffled his cabinet; he took the Ministry of Defence from Édouard Daladier to which he entrusted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Marshal Pétain entered the government as Vice President of the Council of Ministers. General Maxime Weygand replaced Gamelin at the head of the armed forces. On 20 May, the Germans issued an order covering the occupied French territory whereby “all businesses engaging in trade and industry, food and agriculture, forestry and timber conservation must continue their operations, unless otherwise compelled by reasons of force majeure to take other decisions.” The Panzers opened a large breach towards the sea: Abbeville fell under German control on 20 May, Arras on 24, Boulogne on 25 and Calais on 26. The Worms branches in Boulogne and Dieppe were evacuated and communications with Dunkerque interrupted. Refugees from the latter were transported to Le Havre, Cherbourg, Saint-Malo and Brest. From Paris, Jacques Barnaud informed Hypolite Worms in London, on 25 May, that he had “transferred most of the Banking Services to Nantes (75 people out of 115), the others having been placed on leave. At CHP [Compagnie Havraise Péninsulaire] 18 of the 29 employees were transferred to Nantes, as well as 14 of the 20 employees of SFTP [Société Française de Transports Pétroliers].” “The general management of the Fuel Merchanting Services,” he added, “has sent a few employees to Bordeaux in an effort to reduce congestion in Nantes, while the DGSM [general management of the Shipping Services] has sent the accounts department (about 18 employees) to Nantes and the technical services and shipping to Bordeaux. However, all the directors and main department heads stayed put, either in Paris or in Le Havre.” These fallback positions had been prepared well in advance with the Ministry of the Merchant Navy.453

Initiatives taken by Abbat and Nitot compensate for the lack of military authority

Work continued in Le Trait, despite the debacle and the approaching front: on 23 May 1940, submarine chaser No. 15 (the third in the series) was launched.454 In the ensuing days, faced with the probability of an evacuation, management worried about the fate of the Navy vessels under construction.455 It appealed to General Gaston Duffour, Commander of the 3rd Military Region (Rouen), for instructions and explosives to keep the vessels from falling into enemy hands. Its request fell on deaf ears; the general refused to provide either instructions or means of destruction.456 On 31 May, submarine chaser No. 14 left Le Trait for Cherbourg, where on 2 June 1940, after highly successful testing, it was declared fit for service.457 From Paris, Henri Nitot stepped up his contacts with Le Trait. In his memoirs, he narrated: “Abbat and were trying to plan what we could do in the event of the Seine-Maritime region becoming engaged in the fighting. On starting

453 Excerpt from the hearing of Jacques Barnaud before Commission President Dhers, on 2 May 1950. 454 Excerpt from a speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262). 455 Cf. undated memo from Worms & Cie filed in 1944. 456 Ibid. 457 Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ? Cany-Barville, Impr. Gabel, 1987, p. 14.

June 1940: exodus along the roads (https://prisons-cherche-midi-mauzac.com collection)

to hear the far-off echoes of heavy fire [6–7 June458] coming from the Bresle Valley, we realised that, to safeguard the productive capability of a large segment of our staff, whose technical skills were of key importance for the defence of France, we would be forced to retreat – but to where and how? Concerns grew with every new hour and I tried to obtain, if not specific orders, at least instructions from a completely panic-stricken Ministry of the Navy. Albeit in rather vague terms, Central Directorate of Naval Construction gave me a mission: to try and find an assembly point in Rochefort where we could attempt to resume construction at the former Navy dockyard, practically abandoned for quite some time. Upon returning to Le Trait,459 Abbat and I quickly realised that our shipyard and workers’ housing estate would have to be abandoned soon. We divided up the tasks: Abbat would handle the evacuation of staff to the south, where he would try to establish gathering points, knowing full well that in any event he could barely count on anything but limited means. I, on the other hand, left with our engineer, Jean Huré, picking up our former Head Engineer, Alexandre Vince, now retired in the Loire-Maritime, on the way. I was to try and pinpoint bases for setting up shop in Rochefort. Mr Vince would try to determine the technical conditions needed to get the old Navy dockyard back into operation. However, events unfolded faster than we had foreseen, with the pace of the debacle accelerating quickly. Barely had I left, when the Bresle line,460 where General Weygand had tried in vain to halt the German advance, was overwhelmed for good [8 June].”

Evacuation of Le Trait (9–10 June 1940)461

On Saturday, 8 June, at 10 a.m., telephone lines to Le Trait were cut. In the afternoon, submarine chaser No. 16 was launched.462 On 9 June, Pierre Abbat warned Lieutenant (Navy) David, the commander of the vessels under construction and in particular submarine chaser No. 15 launched on 23 May, that the Germans had just surrounded Rouen: the news had been transmitted to him at 5 a.m. by Georges Métayer, MP and Mayor of the town. The Director of the Société Havraise d’Énergie Électrique in Yainville informed Henri Nitot of his decision to cease producing electricity. Deprived of its power supply, the shipyard found itself “forced to

458 In his memoirs, Henri Nitot referred to events, not to precise dates: the crossing of the Bresle Valley by the Wehrmacht, the storage tank fire at the Seine-Maritime refineries, the Germans entering Nantes, etc. 459 This elliptical phrase used by Henri Nitot to outline the stages of his account implies that he had left Paris. 460 Located, at its closest point, at about 80 km from Rouen. 461 The comparison of the testimonies from Henri Nitot and Pierre Abbat, the statements made by Hypolite Worms, etc., along with the important documentation preserved in the Worms archives, make it possible to recreate the unfurling of the events that caused, then punctuated the evacuation. 462 Excerpt from a speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262).

cease all work”463 – with the workers’ housing estate likewise deprived of electricity and water. Around 7 a.m., the La Mailleraye refinery owned by Standard Française des Pétroles and located near ACSM was set ablaze in accordance with plans; the subsequent explosions “ended up sowing confusion among the population,” causing “an exodus to the left bank of the Seine.” “After gathering together [his] fellow managers and part of [his] labour force, particularly those who had been ordered to work that day,” Henri Nitot had the most important of the company archives evacuated to La Mailleraye. During the morning, he “sent a motorcyclist to obtain orders, but his two attempts to get past Duclair proved unsuccessful.” The main bridges in the Seine-Maritime department had been destroyed.464 Lieutenant (N) David also sent “a seaman on a motorcycle mission. While he [was able to] reach Rouen, he did [not] bring back any orders, only confusing and dispiriting news.” Around 1 p.m., Henri Nitot “began to transfer members of [his] staff to the left bank, telling them to meet up in La Mailleraye.” Despite the “sky being tragically obscured by heavy smoke billowing out of the storage tanks at the Seine-Maritime refinery,”465 and the highly rudimentary means available to the population – “ferries were not allowed to be used as they were already highly insufficient ferries for the evacuees from the northern regions”466 – the evacuation from Le Trait and the crossing of the Seine took place in great calm. At 3 p.m., the tugboat “Attentif” arrived from Le Havre, bringing orders from the Navy: submarine chaser No. 15, of which only the starboard engine was operating, and chaser No. 16, launched the day before, had to be evacuated immediately. Twenty minutes later,

463 This and subsequent quotations are taken from a letter sent on 9 June 1940 by ACSM management to General Gaston Duffour, Commander of the 3rd Military Region. This letter is attributed to Henri Nitot and summarised in the report that Gaston Bernard sent to Judge Thirion on 31 December 1945. 464 See p. 262, the speech given by Hypolite Worms in Le Trait on 7 December 1946. 465 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 466 Ibid. According to the historian Alain Huon, 15 canoes from Military Engineering, built by ACSM, were used to evacuate Le Trait. These boats were sunk in La Mailleraye on 10 June on the orders of Colonel Millard, Commander for the defense of the Basse-Seine area. the “Attentif” left, towing the two vessels onto which Henri Nitot had loaded equipment belonging to the Navy.467

“I have no means of destroying any of the facilities or ships under construction”

henri niToT, 9 june 1940 With neither instructions nor explosives, Lieutenant (N) David decided to not destroy the three oil tankers, “La Charente,” “La Mayenne,” and “La Baïse,” as well as of the three submarines, “La Favorite,” “L’Africaine,” and “L’Andromaque.” These six vessels were left intact on their respective slips. After “taking a walk round the town,”468 where “there [remained] only Mr Dupuich, Mayor of Le Trait, Mr Mahé, the postmaster, and Mr Boudrenguin, the engineer in charge of supervising the construction of the ships for the Marine,” Henri Nitot took “the decision to cross over to the left bank” at 3.30 p.m. From La Mailleraye-sur-Seine, he sent a letter to General Gaston Duffour, which concluded as follows: “Surrounded by the large majority of my staff, whom I am ordering to remain at my disposal, I have the honour of requesting orders and instruction from you, which I would be quite grateful to have the messenger return to me in writing: either an evacuation order, if you deem it necessary, permitting me, under these circumstances, to execute the provisions planned by the labour inspectorate to withdraw the labour force; or permission for me to continue operations, under the assumption that power will be supplied as normal and that a military force will be organised to protect the facilities, which, as I have brought to your attention in several previous letters, are totally devoid of protection (no anti-aircraft defence, machine guns, military guard or surveillance). I must add that, in the event that I am given an order to evacuate, I have no means of destroying any of the facilities or ships under construction, the main reasons being that I have received no instructions to do so and that, despite my requests – and as you yourself have confirmed – the military authorities have been unable to supply me with the neces-

467 Maurice Quemin, op. cit., p. 14. 468 This and subsequent quotations are taken from a letter sent by Henri Nitot on 9 June 1940 to General Gaston Duffour, Commander of the 3rd Military Region.

10 June 1940: scuttling of the Duclair ferry

sary explosives.” This letter remained unanswered.469 At 10.15 p.m., the “Attentif” and the two submarine chasers anchored in the La Carosse, in front of the port of Le Havre. The next day, 10 June, at 4 a.m., the convoy headed towards Cherbourg, arriving at 5 p.m.470 With German troops advancing on Paris, General Weygand advised the public authorities to leave the capital, which was declared an “open city” on 11 June. The key ministerial departments left for Tours, where the Council of Ministers had decided that the government and Parliament would settle. Mussolini declared war on France that same day. Jacques Barnaud, whose missions at the Ministry of Armaments and the Ministry of Finance were both “virtually” terminated, left for Nantes, where “Maison Worms was organising its final withdrawal.”471 On 10 June at Le Trait, with the fires abating in Rouen but still raging in Caudebec, under an apocalyptic sky heavy with the thick smoke billowing

469 Historical account from ACSM – undated document, see www.wormsetcie.com – 1944 archives. 470 Maurice Quemin, op. cit. In a speech of 7 December 1946, Hypolite Worms indicated that chasers “15” and “16” arrived in Lorient on 16 June 1940, but that only chaser “15” was able to reach England; chaser “16,” which could not be towed across the Channel, was scuttled on 18 June 1940. 471 Excerpt from the hearing of Jacques Barnaud before Commission President Dhers, on 2 May 1950. from the burning oil storage tanks, ACSM employees and their families took to the road to reach the retreat positions assigned by the Navy in the southwest of France. “With absolute confusion all around,” stated Henri Nitot in his memoirs, “it was out of the question for Abbat to arrange the orderly withdrawal of our staff; he had to be satisfied with providing likely gathering points: the Worms branches in Nantes and Bordeaux, as well as Rochefort, etc. And given how these families quickly dispersed over hundreds of kilometres, we were very lucky that we had no tragic incidents to grieve.” On 12 June, General Weygand and other leaders came out in favour of an armistice. Opposing them, Paul Reynaud and some ministers referred to the agreement of 28 March 1940, under which France and the United Kingdom agreed not to conclude separate armistices. On 14 June, with Paris occupied by German forces, the government, deeply divided over the question of whether or not to continue the war, left Tours for Bordeaux, where Jacques Barnaud went at the request of Yves Bouthillier. Unable to return to Nantes, Jacques Barnaud followed the government to Vichy. On 16 June, Paul Reynaud, who wished to pursue the war outside Paris, was forced to resign. He was replaced as President of the Council of Ministers by Philippe Pétain, who formed a new government in favour of an armistice.

The scramble to Nantes (19 June to beginning of July 1940)

On 19 June, “at the very moment the Germans were entering Nantes,” wrote Henri Nitot, “a madcap automobile adventure got under way. […] Without realising it, we had crossed the lines of the German Army advance guard several times, without incident. We first tried to regain contact with high naval officials, and with great difficulty, we were able to reach them as night fell on the grounds of a castle in Montbazon472 on the banks of the Indre River […, where] all these admirals and engineer generals were going around in circles, only able to confirm very vague assembly points: Rochefort still, or perhaps set up shop around small shipyards on the Gironde, either… or... We left for Nantes, where we established our headquarters for several days. Several of our engineers were there. […] The staff of the branch there helped us greatly in finding lodgings for our staff who were starting to arrive, still by their own means. The same was happening in Bordeaux. As for Rochefort, we quickly realised that the naval dockyard there was in a state of utter destitution and would require immense efforts to get it back into operation […] the news was becoming increasingly bad, and all of France seemed to be going around in circles on the roads. […] Finally, and very quickly, announcement of the armistice reached us.” The Armistice Agreement between the government of Philippe Pétain and the Third Reich was signed on 22 June 1940473 in Rethondes. The commander of the German forces (Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich) “was put in charge of transforming the French economy to meet the war needs of Germany.”474 A demarcation line, punctuated with crossing-points, cut France in two: the occupied zone covered over three-fifths of the country, including Paris, where “the German Reich exercised all the rights of the occupying power”475 while the free zone, mostly to the south of the Loire, was left – along with the colonies – under the control of the French administration. “12 shipyards [including ACSM] out of 15 were in the occupied zone as were 3 of the 4 naval dockyards. In total, 85% of France’s shipbuilding capacity came under German control.”476 The same held true for the port facilities. The consequences of the Armistice: the French troops were disarmed; the French army was limited to one hundred thousand men in the free zone; the prisoners of war, i.e. more than 1.5 million soldiers, were to be kept in captivity until a peace agreement was signed; military vessels were ordered to return to their peacetime bases (Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, among others); the Navy, “with the exception of the portion that remained available to the French Government to safeguard the French interests of its colonial empire,”477 was demobilised and disarmed. Shipowners and their crews had not only to submit to the diktat of German and Italian forces (an Armistice Agreement was signed with the Italians on 24 June 1940), but also faced the English offensive, which, rather than seeing the French fleet pass under enemy control, began to seize the ships that had taken refuge in British Empire ports. In a letter sent on 16 December 1943 to Rear-Admiral Blehaut, Secretary of State for the Navy and Colonies, Maison Worms stated that “the Armistice alone prevented making available to the national defence authorities all ACSM workers, employees, managers [and] the new facilities planned for development at the time.” For the time being, the ceasefire rendered illusory any attempt to re-establish the shipbuilding site anywhere else than in Le Trait; and while Henri Nitot knew immediately that he had to return there, he preferred “to wait several days” in Nantes, “to take stock of the situation and […] assess events with greater clarity.”

472 Town south of Tour, approximately 200 km from Nantes and 230 km from Rochefort. 473 See François Berger, “L’armistice de 1940 : négociations et conséquences,” Revue de la société des amis du musée de l’Armée, No. 140, 2011, pp. 57–65. 474 Cf. Claude Huan, op. cit. 475 Armistice Agreement of 22 June 1940 – Article 3. 476 Cf. Claude Huan, op. cit. 477 Armistice Agreement of 22 June 1940 – Article 8.

From the Armistice of 22 June 1940 to the Franco-German Agreement of 16 September 1941

In application of Article 22 of the Armistice Agreement, a commission, acting under the orders of the German High Commander, was created to regulate and monitor the execution of the clauses agreed upon by France and the Reich. Headquartered in Wiesbaden, the commission “was also tasked with ensuring the necessary alignments with the Franco-Italian Armistice Agreement.”478 The French Government was required to form a delegation “responsible for representing French interests and for receiving the implementation orders issued by the German Armistice Commission.” General Charles Huntziger,479 one of the French signatories of the Armistice, headed the delegation. Whereas historians often think this delegation had just limited power, it in part decided the fate of the ships under construction in Le Trait.

“We decided to head back”

henri niToT, memoirs

On 25 June 1940, Pierre Abbat left Nantes and returned to Le Trait; on his way there, he tried to contact “the scattered members of his staff to instruct them to return to the fold by any means.”480 The workers’ housing estate and the shipyard seemed unharmed. Credit went to Mr Dupuich, Mayor of Le Trait, the “efficient guardian of the property” belonging to Maison Worms, who “had managed to obtain safeguards from the occupiers, thus preventing general pillaging.”481 Yet no one was able to enter the ACSM complex, as access was barred by a detachment of

478 The Franco-Italian Armistice Agreement of 24 June 1940 likewise initiated the creation of a commission headquartered in Turin. 479 Secretary of State for War, Charles Huntziger (1880–1941) headed the French delegation to the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden until September 1940, when he was replaced by General Paul-André Doyen. He was one of the signatories to the Law of 3 October 1940 on the status of Jews. 480 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 481 Ibid. guards from the Kriegsmarine. 482 Indeed, although Pierre Abbat was, according to Hypolite Worms, “one of the first industrial leaders not only to resume his post in Seine-Inférieure but also to renew vital contacts with the French authorities in both zones,”483 he first needed to obtain authorisation to re-enter the premises to restart work in accordance with the order given to all shipyards by the occupation authorities on 28 June 1940,484 an order conditional on the resumption of operations at the Yainville power station. For his part, Henri Nitot arrived back in the capital accompanied by Commander Denis, Secretary General of Worms & Cie. At the end of an uneventful journey, he found “Paris nearly deserted.” In the ensuing days, the teams trickled back to the Worms headquarters, whose doors re-opened on 2 July 1940, in the presence of the heads of the Banking Services and of the Fuel Merchanting Services,485 along with Jacques Barnaud.

482 The German Navy under the Third Reich (1935–1945). The question of this military guard set up “for the security of the shipyard” was addressed in the temporary agreement signed between ACSM and the Occupier on 8 July 1940. 483 Letter of 16 December 1943 from Worms & Cie to Rear-Admiral Blehaut, Secretary of State for the Navy and Colonies. 484 Cf. Claude Huan, op. cit.: “Starting on 28 June 1940, the order is given successively to all shipyards to continue work in hand. Warships under construction are considered spoils of war, and the German authorities count on their completion for their own account. An initial plan is being drawn up, fixing the order for 134 auxiliary ships of various kinds, and demanding that work be continued on 20 warships (for the most part torpedo boats and submarines). Written orders are being sent to the shipyards.” 485 Cf. letter from Hypolite Worms sent on 10 August 1940 to an unspecified correspondent.

June 1940: flight over ACSM by a German aircraft (Doucet collection, A. Huon)

Except for Hypolite Worms, who was still in London

Isolated in London since 12 June 1940 following the interruption of communications with Paris, on 25 June Hypolite Worms decided, in agreement with the leaders of the other delegations,486 to head back to France and update Admiral Darlan,487 Commander in Chief of the French Maritime Forces, on his mission. “While still in England,” explained Hypolite Worms in September 1944,488 “I asked myself whether I should remain in England or return to France. The situation of Maison Worms in England and my family situation would have enabled me to favour the former option, especially as I never doubted the outcome of the war. However, I believed it my duty to return to France to safeguard the heritage of my ancestors and the interests of my staff, workers and employees who numbered several thousand people. I wanted at all costs to avoid having my companies fall into enemy hands.” Leaving England via Liverpool on 19 July 1940, he travelled through Portugal and Spain to finally reach Vichy where, on 1 August 1940, he delivered to the Secretariat of State of the Navy a report on his activities as head of the French Delegation to the Anglo-French Shipping Executive; and more specifically, on the decisions he had to “make, in the interests of the country, both for the execution of the agreements in effect, and to face up to the new situation created by the cessation of hostilities between France and Germany.”

486 Cf. interview with Raymond Meynial, given during preparations for the book on the history of Maison Worms, published in 1993. 487 Promoted to Admiral of the Fleet on 6 June 1939, François Darlan (1881–1942) became Minister for the Navy and Merchant Navy under the first Pétain Government (16 June to 10 July 1940), then under the governments of Laval (16 July to 13 December 1940) and Flandin (14 December 1940 to 9 February 1941). On 10 February 1941, he succeeded Flandin as Vice President of the Council of Ministers, and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Navy, then Minister for the National Defence. He was forced to relinquish his position to Pierre Laval in April 1942. He was assassinated on 24 December 1942. 488 Excerpt from the interrogation of Hypolite Worms by Judge Georges Thirion, dated 26 September 1944. “Upon signing the Armistice,” he wrote, “most of the ships that had been assigned to France, or which we had to take under time charter, became unusable for the following reasons: 1. the Dutch and Norwegian Governments, which were continuing the war alongside England, found themselves forced to refuse to authorise their ships to sail to French ports; 2. the agreements with these countries, signed jointly by England and France, had been negotiated in consideration of the war continuing. Consequently, the British Government felt that the ships covered by these agreements should now be used exclusively for transporting goods to Great Britain, and thus could not be authorised to sail to French ports; 3. all of these vessels were insured or re-insured by the War Risks Insurance Office, and the British Government refused to cover voyages to French ports. The entire fleet of vessels assigned to France thus risked lacking insurance coverage from one day to the next; 4. finally, the British authorities were intercepting, throughout the world, all ships heading for French ports and re-directing them to British ports. As regards the neutral ships [chartered] under time charter by France in execution of the Franco-English agreements, England’s refusal to let them pass through their control bases and its cancellation of their insurance policies rendered their voyages absolutely impossible. What I sought to avoid was having our country incur considerable costs for ship rentals, insurance, crew bonuses, etc. – a sum amounting to fifteen to twenty million a day – if it were likely that the ships would remain blocked in ports, without war risk insurance. On the other hand, since these ships were no longer insured, the French Government ran a considerable capital risk, as the two million tons available to us represented a value of seven to eight million francs. The return of the ships to their owners raised a number of questions requiring comprehensive negotiations with the British authorities.”489

489 Excerpt from the report by Hypolite Worms to the Secretary of State for the Navy, dated 1 August 1940, in Vichy.

The Worms Agreement of 4 July 1940

At the end of the negotiations with the Ministry of Shipping, Hypolite Worms took it upon himself to sign an agreement on 4 July 1940 setting forth that: 1. “all ships under time charter to France and docked in English ports are to be taken over by Great Britain at current rates, without giving rise to claims for damages from the shipowners; 2. the same shall apply to all ships allied to England in all ports and to neutral ships, with the exception of vessels operating French colonial traffic, [to be the subject] of a future discussion; 3. all cargo on board said vessels, after having been rerouted by British authorities, is to be purchased at current prices, fob [free on board] plus the freight paid, based on British compensation rates.”490 According to the statement, dated 8 April 1946, of Emmanuel Monick,491 Financial Attaché to the French Embassy in London, Hypolite Worms, “on his own initiative, negotiated the transfer, to the benefit of the British Government, of all charter contracts signed prior to the Armistice by the Merchant Navy Mission on behalf of the French Government.” As a result, two million tons of allied and neutral ships (Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, and Greek) were transferred to England. This agreement was signed the day after the British Navy attacked a squadron of the French Navy moored in Mers-El-Kebir, near Oran, (“Operation Catapult”) on 3 July 1940. As of October 1940, this agreement would be used by the collaborationist press as proof of the betrayal and Anglophilia of Maison Worms and its leader.

Henri Nitot meets the occupation authorities: the “temporary” agreement of 8 July 1940

With an eye to “reconstituting a work programme […] by finding the necessary financial resources,” on 8 July 1940, Henri Nitot took the initiative to contact one of the highest-ranking representatives of the Kriegsmarine, Kapitän zur See492 Heinz Degenhardt.493 In his memoirs, the Director General of ACSM listed the reasons leading him to request this interview. “We very much needed,” he wrote, “to approach the German authorities now working in the Ministry of the Navy. Paying them a visit, despite the fact that no one yet had a clear assessment of the situation, I was warmly received. I explained our difficulties so well that within just a few days, we were assigned a new shipbuilding programme […, a programme] sufficient to ensure immediate job security.” The provisions decided in this meeting were the subject of a compromise written in these terms: “The Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime Worms & Cie, in Le Trait […] shall be tasked with: 1o- through the intermediary of the Prefect of Rouen, salvaging and refurbishing four ferries sunk in the Seine; 2o - for the needs of the German Navy high command: a) finishing the oil tankers ‘La Charente’ and ‘La Mayenne’; b) building four 700-dwt [tank] barges; these vessels are to be built without a propulsion system. For the purpose of pursuing these projects, authorisation to enter the shipyard is granted to its Director, Mr Pierre Abbat, as well as its staff. The military detachment initially sent to guard the shipyard will be withdrawn by the captain of the port of Rouen, as soon as work commences. The means of payment needed to pursue the work may be provisionally withdrawn from a bank. If needed, the assistance of the captain of the port of Rouen or Le Havre may be requested. A German Navy civil servant will soon be sent to Le Trait to conclude the final contract and to update the complementary agreements.” The occupation authorities considered this agreement – although defined as “temporary” – to be a firm and final commitment and never stopped referring to it as the basis for their demands (notably for the

490 Ibid. 491 Emmanuel Monick (1893–1983) was appointed, on 7 October 1944, Governor of the Banque de France. 492 Second-highest rank in the hierarchy of Kriegsmarine officers above flag officers and below Kommodore – English equivalent: Captain (Navy). 493 Also listed as Commander in the Worms archives, Heinz Degenhardt (born in 1893) was referred to as “special delegate of the OKM,” Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, by Arne Radtke-Delacor, in “Produire pour le Reich, les commandes allemandes à l’industrie française (1940-1944),” in Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, April–June 2001, p. 107.

submarines “La Favorite,” and “L’Africaine,” even though those vessels were not mentioned in that construction programme) and for putting pressure on ACSM, when Henri Nitot, undoubtedly better informed about the French administration’s reticence towards contracts that companies had negotiated directly with the Occupier, tried to reverse course.

Jacques Barnaud ceases to manage the business affairs of Worms & Cie (early July 1940)

Jacques Barnaud was assuredly one of the men best placed to advise Henri Nitot about how to deal with the German authorities. He became Deputy to Léon Noël, who had just been appointed to the post of Delegate General of the French Government within the Occupied Territories on 9 July 1940. His duties consisted of “resuming contact with civil servants, industrialists and merchants; handling the population returning to their homes; dealing with the supply problems caused by the destruction and the exodus; taking measures to deal with the unemployment brought on by the cessation of factory operations; reinstalling responsible authorities, the majority of whom had fled with the exodus; handling questions raised by the initial German requisitions.” “At that time,” testified Jacques Barnaud, “the German authorities, taking advantage of the absence of a large number of factory bosses and directors, demonstrated their intent to place a German administrator in all major companies. Above all, we wanted to avoid their complete stranglehold and to keep the French economy from operating exclusively for the benefit of Germany. We did everything to reinstate the heads of French businesses and to support them when faced with German demands. I pursued that policy for two years.”494 A variety of official missions were indeed entrusted to him until November 1942 (head of the Cabinet of René Belin, Minister for Industrial Production and Labour until February 1941; subsequently, Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations). As of July 1940, to avoid any conflict or suspicion of a conflict of interest, Jacques Barnaud chose not to continue working in his role as head of Worms & Cie. While he “abstained until the beginning of 1943 – in the most absolute manner – not only from intervening in the management of Maison Worms, but even from having himself informed about what was happening there,”495 he retained his post as General Partner so as not to weaken the core partnership, of which he was the sole representative in Paris (Hypolite Worms was still in London and Michel Goudchaux had stayed in Bordeaux) and to prevent the Germans from replacing him.

Law of 20 July 1940: termination and liquidation of contracts concluded with the State

As a consequence of the demilitarisation of France imposed by the Armistice Agreement, the Pétain Government, on 20 July, adopted the law on the “termination and liquidation of contracts concluded with the State for the needs of national defence.” This law, mentioned numerous times in ACSM correspondence insofar as it determined the fate of the vessels ordered by the Navy prior to the outbreak of hostilities, was one of the key elements used by the French administration to resist the German authorities and to obtain quid pro quos for the occupation of the territory. “Art.1. – All contracts concluded by the State for the needs of national defence, which are in the process of being executed and have not yet been withdrawn, are terminated ipse jure, irrespective of the termination clauses set forth in the contract, with the exception of those contracts for which the competent administration shall decide to continue, or shall accept to be modified through an amendment, for the purpose of the economic reconstruction of the country. Insofar as the administration has not notified the holder of said contracts of such termination, it shall take effect, at the latest, fifteen days after publication of this decree. Art.2. – The liquidation and settlement of sums owed to the holder of a terminated contract, irrespective of the form of said termination, shall be covered by an additional agreement concluded by the competent administration, or by ministerial decision if no agreement is reached. Said decision may, if needed, derogate from the contract termination clauses, but there must

495 Excerpt from a memo from Jacques Baraduc to Hypolite Worms dated 5 March 1947, and from a memo from Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie dated 13 October 1944.

be grounds for said action. Under no circumstances, as a result of the contract termination, may such compensation be higher than the expenses directly and necessarily resulting from the cessation of the contract and the additional depreciation specifically tied to the execution of said contract. Art.3. – The rules governing the liquidation and settlement of the terminated contracts will be set forth in subsequent decrees or instructions. In all cases, the State will have the right to take back, at cost price, the raw materials supplied for the purpose of executing the contract, the list of which shall be drawn up upon the advice of the Minister Secretary of State for Industrial Production and Labour. Any advance payments granted directly by the State with regard to the terminated contract may, in whole or in part, be rendered immediately repayable as of the date on which the contract was terminated, by special ministerial decision, and subject to the rights of voided debtors. To make it easier to mobilise the amounts owed by the State, the administration may, without waiting for the definitive termination of the contract and when presented with a claim, make advance payments to the contractor totalling up to three-quarters of the temporarily assessed costs. Art.4. – The rules applicable to the terminated contract shall also cover contracts which may be held by subcontractors regularly approved by the administration. The termination of a State contract in application of this decree shall constitute a case of force majeure, which the contractor may invoke as regards its suppliers for orders placed for the purpose of executing the terminated contract, but only for the terminated portion of said contract.”

25 July 1940: ACSM re-opens its doors

On 6 August 1940, Henri Nitot informed Hypolite Worms (who was still in Vichy; he was to return to Paris “around 15 August”496 1940) that “the shipyard re-opened on Thursday, 25 July, with 195 workers.” In accordance with Kapitän Dengenhardt’s undertaking in return for the construction programme accepted by ACSM, the German military guard left the site and returned to Rouen. “To cut back on general expenses,” stated Nitot, “we have gone ahead with retiring several foremen and draughtsmen and downgrading certain shift leaders. Wages have been temporarily reduced by 10–15%, in line with the measures taken in Rouen for all companies; it is deemed likely that we will soon cancel this purely local wage-cut, which contradicts the latest instructions issued by the government.” By mid-August, the workforce had risen to five hundred as a result of the return of “mobilised workers able to escape the Germans’ clutches.” Many more remained prisoners. In the following months, management did “its utmost to obtain their release, justifying this by the work […] ordered by the German Admiralty,” stated Henri Nitot in his memoirs, before going on to say: “Abbat put on our books – at our risk and peril – several young men from the Rouen region, thus enabling them to return to France. Moreover, I must say how much [the] help [of Pierre Abbat and his colleagues] for our staff spared them from great suffering. Even when it quickly became difficult to provide family with provisions, numerous measures were introduced, both to collect foodstuffs and to hasten the creation of numerous vegetable plots. Naturally, I continued to liaise with Le Trait on a highly regular basis, visiting at least once a week.” In his report, the expert Gaston Bernard noted that “the employee and manager headcount, low at the onset of the Occupation, soon re-achieved its 1938 and 1939 level. Most were technical staff associated to the establishment for a long time, whom management would not have found at the end of the war, had they been fired,” and towards whom it “unquestionably had moral obligations.”

496 Excerpt from the interrogation of Hypolite Worms by Judge Georges Thirion, dated 26 September 1944.

3 August 1940: German officers inspecting the shipyard

(Doucet collection)

On the other hand, the average headcount of bluecollar workers – which fluctuated between 970 and 1,130 in 1938–1939 – never achieved the same level during the Occupation. As of 30 September 1940, it numbered 672, and went up to 812 workers as of 31 December 1940, an increase stemming from “the return of many who had left in exodus and who had been unable to return to Le Trait as soon as the armistice was signed.”

The list of orders in hand

When the shipyard re-opened, work in the workshops which – other than the shipbuilding itself – was specialised in boilermaking, the manufacture of floating roofs, marine engines, and other related work, was guaranteed by the construction of four boilers ordered by the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée prior to June 1940 for the passenger liners “Londres” and “Vichy.”497 In addition, the Chantiers Navals Français in Caen had just commissioned ACSM to build two engines with an evaporator composed of four cylindrical boilers and two 1,500-HP triple expansion engines intended for two 3,500-ton colliers fitted out by the French Navy. We should immediately point out that these boilers were never delivered, even though the materials for them were supplied in 1941. As regards the engines, their construction was to be delayed so much that only 5% of the work had been completed by 1943. Indeed, the Germans never laid claim to them. In this same vein, we should add that the Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde in Bordeaux commissioned ACSM in November 1940 to manufacture four 1,000-HP triple expansion engines for four tugboats for the German Navy. In January 1941, the French Navy in turn placed an order for four complete cylindrical boilers with their encasements, intended for two 2,650-ton colliers under construction at the Chantiers de Normandie in Rouen.

497 Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1987, p. 15: “These two passenger liners had been ordered by the SNCF (Western network) and the British Southern Railways, and had temporarily been named ‘Dieppe’ and ‘Newhaven.’” The slipways were occupied by:498

Slips Vessels Progress Projected launch dates 3 Submarine: “La Favorite” 37% October 1940 4 Submarine: “L’Africaine” 33% February 1941 6 Submarine: “L’Andromaque” 17% September 1941 6 Submarine: “L’Armide” 3% November 1941 1 Squadron supply ship: 46,84% End of November 1941 “La Charente” 8 Squadron supply ship: “La Mayenne” 11%* January 1942 2 Squadron supply ship: “La Baïse” 9%* July 1942

*Maurice Quemin, Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires, que sont-ils devenus ?, 1993, p. 19.

In addition, four submarines, No. Q 219 to 222, were on the order books, for which construction had yet to begin.

Spoils of war in theory and in practice

In application of The Hague Convention,499 all vessels intended for the Navy were declared spoils of war: from that moment onwards, it was up to the German authorities to decide whether to stop or pursue their construction – in theory at least. In practice, enforcing the Law of 20 July 1940 thwarted the automatic transfer of property to Germany: France apparently had to terminate the contracts before they could be taken over by the Reich. However, at ACSM (as perhaps everywhere else), the French Government took no steps in this direction. Such was the case for “La Charente” and “La Mayenne.” While Kapitän Degenhardt, at the meeting on 8 July, had ordered their completion on behalf of the Kriegsmarine, a similar request for these two vessels was made

498 Gaston Bernard, in his expert report, established that “La Favorite” totalled a launched tonnage of 800 t, of which 250 t remained to be constructed, as of 25 June 1940: 550 t / 800 t = 68.75%. For this same vessel, Maurice Quemin listed a completion level of 37%: the difference can be explained by a confusion between tonnage launched and deadweight. G. Bernard also established that “La Charente” totalled a launched tonnage of 4,910 t, of which 2,610 t remained to be constructed, as of 25 June 1940: 2,300 t / 4,910 t = 46.84%. For this same vessel, M. Quemin gave a completion level of 24%: here again, the difference can be explained by the fact that the latter calculated the level of the ship’s progress on the basis of its deadweight (9,420 t). 499 Cf. Art. 53 of the Hague Convention (IV), 18 October 1907.

Le Trait – 3 August 1940

several days later by René Norguet, head of the Technical Service for Naval Constructions (STCN), this time on behalf of France. Faced with these identical instructions, ACSM management saw itself unable to determine who owned the vessels. It accordingly wrote to both the French Admiralty (letters of 24 and 27 September 1940) and the German Admiralty (letter of 21 September 1940) for confirmation of their directives. “We are trying to coordinate the instructions we have received as best we can,” Henri Nitot commented to Hypolite Worms on 6 August 1940. “The Germans have told us to pursue the construction of the oil tankers ‘La Charente’ and ‘La Mayenne’ and to proceed with the construction of four petrol barges. The French side has ordered us to pursue the construction of the three oil tankers ‘La Charente,’ ‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Baïse’; moreover we have confirmation to build two ‘Malgachetype’ vessels.” The disorganisation of the French public services only served to amplify the confusion surrounding the clash of orders.

Ending the confusion

The debacle, the exodus of the government, followed by the Armistice and the subsequent division of the country into two zones, one of which, under German control, covered Paris “with everything the physical occupation of administration buildings implies.”500 This all blocked the wheels of bureaucracy. As Henri Nitot made abundantly clear in his memoirs, the greatest confusion reigned. “We had to wait weeks before a French Navy administration was organised, capable of negotiating with the German authorities. The fact that two levels were needed, one in Vichy and the other in Paris, did not help matters.”

500 François Berger, “L’armistice de 1940 : négociations et conséquences,” op. cit.

The Technical Service for Naval Constructions – STCN and René Norguet, head of service

Under these circumstances, René Norguet came to be the primary intermediary of ACSM, with Henri Nitot welcoming their “invaluable collaboration.” Appointed head of STCN in 1938, this Engineer General in Marine Engineering was “in Paris to handle shipbuilding questions on behalf of the French Government.”501 Among its tasks, the STCN “has to draw up the final and complete plans for the vessels in the fleet; to check the plans, calculations and estimates drawn up either by engineers working in ports or by private industry; to check the technical specifications drawn up by central or local entities within shipbuilding directorates or private shipyards regarding construction and major repair projects; and generally speaking, to study any question of principle related to shipbuilding. […] Although placed under the high authority of the Central Director for the Naval Construction, its head alone reported to the Minister regarding new constructions and overhauls, responsibility for projects and cost estimates: from this perspective, he enjoyed all the prerogatives of a director.”502 Other than the almost daily contacts he maintained with the companies within the industry, René Norguet503 was in constant contact with the Chamber of Shipbuilders – and particularly its Chairman, René Fould,504 whom he would succeed postwar – an organisation that played an important role as

501 Excerpt from the memo sent to Hypolite Worms by Henri Nitot, on 6 August 1940. 502 Excerpt from the Law of 22 April 1927 – in Collection complète des lois, décrets d’intérêt général, tome 27, année 1927. 503 René Norguet (1888–1968) was Secretary General for Industry and Domestic Trade in the Ministry of Commerce (17 August 1942–20 January 1943), then Secretary General for Industrial Production (20 January 1943–February 1944). 504 René Fould (1875–1961) was “Director of the Forges Committee from 1918 to 1940 and of the UIMM from 1931; he was appointed Secretary of the Chamber of Manufacturers and Constructors of Equipment for Railways and Tramways in 1927, and Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders. He was also a member of the Executive Committee of the CNPF (National Council of French Employers) and of the French Steelworkers’ Union” (Wikipedia French version). He was also Chairman (from 1923) of the Société des Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët), and a member of the Board of Directors (1936–1940), then Vice Chairman (1940–1947) of the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire. He was forced to resign because of his Jewish origins. the intermediary between the administration and the industry until January 1941 when the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction, created at the end of December 1940, began to function.

The resumption of ACSM activities is ensured by the construction or conversion of barges

Degenhardt and Nitot again met on 31 July 1940. One can suppose that, over the course of their conversation, the question of the future of the two submarines “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” was broached, though it is not mentioned in the minutes. On the other hand, the minutes highlight the efforts of the ACSM head to have the order for the four tank barges (accepted on 8 July) cancelled. After inquiring whether this order stemmed from an urgent need of the Kriegsmarine, or whether its purpose was (simply) to provide work for its workers, Nitot stated that “under the former scenario, ACSM would be happy to be freed from this construction, as [its] means of production were better suited to vessels with a higher tonnage.”505 His argument seemed weak. It makes us wonder whether Nitot had realised that he had rushed Maison Worms into a verbal commitment without first consulting the relevant departments within the French administration, for which “one of the major concerns,” historian Michel Margairaz mentioned, “was to avoid direct exchanges between the German purchaser and the French seller.”506 From Paris, Kapitän Degenhardt led an inquiry to assess “the possibility for all Channel shipyards to work on converting river barges,”507 also referred to in the correspondence as flatboats. As part of the debate,

505 Memo from Gaston Bernard of 13 October 1944. On 6 August 1940, Henri Nitot wrote to Hypolite Worms explaining that “the problem of supplying sheet metal and profiles [for tank-barges] seems to be coming up against considerable difficulties, which our entire industry must try its best to resolve. […] All in all, the volume of orders on our books should logically allow us to provide work for a normal workforce during the coming months, but we fear that we may be forced to trim operations at times due to a lack of certain supplies, for which we are currently encountering considerable problems.” 506 Michel Margairaz, L’État, les finances et l’économie. Histoire d’une conversion 1932-1952, vol. 1, doctoral thesis prefaced by François Bloch-Lainé and published by IGPDE – Comité pour l’Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 1991. 507 Expert report by Gaston Bernard of 31 December 1945.

Pierre Abbat, whose initial reflex, once he had been able to re-enter the shipyard, had been to inventory stocks “to regulate production as best as possible,”508 was summoned to Rouen on 4 August 1940 by naval architect Freiberg, who gave him plans and drawings. The next day, Abbat returned with his rates and terms. On 9 and 11 August, German officers went to the shipyard to conduct “an on-site inspection of the situation.”509 Among them was frigate captain Iahl to whom a letter was sent on 11 August summarising the work to be performed and the potential delivery schedule: services included tracing, cutting, shaping, and installing (riveting and welding) sheet metal, as well as woodworking details, all capable of being completed in one week. The contract stated in particular that: “- ACSM will rebuild the barges according to the plans and within the timeframe set forth by an inspector from the Reich; - the work will be performed with all possible speed; staff must work on Sundays, if requested, and do overtime; - the Reich may be able to supply the raw and semifinished materials that the shipyard may not have in stock; - the Reich may cancel the contract at any time.” The other clauses covered invoicing and the settlement of advance payments. This was a typical contract that had also been offered to the Chantiers de Penhoët and the Chantiers Augustin Normand, which had similar orders to fulfil. Management approved the contract, subject to three provisos: the first two dealt with calculating shipyard expenses, while the third specified that, under all circumstances, the “[the company] would not be liable for any accidents that might occur to the barges.” The work began as soon as the first barges arrived in Le Trait on 13 and 14 August 1940. This order also included the construction of twenty-one platforms, for which ACSM estimated that they had enough sheet metal in stock. However, it lacked some iron supplies, which the Germans would have to provide. Six clear days were needed to build the first platform; subsequent platforms could be delivered at the rate of two a day. In total, twenty-seven barges were converted. And on 24 September, at a meeting in Paris between Henri Nitot and the German Admiralty, the agreement on the total cost of the operation was signed. In the meantime, discussions on the tank barges continued, against Nitot’s expressed wish. On 24 August 1940, Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich (KAF)510 Rhein, who had just succeeded Degenhardt, addressed the following letter to ACSM: “Following our meeting with your Director, Mr Nitot, and following our prior agreement of 8 July, we hereby confirm our order for four 700-dwt tank barges to be built quickly and in accordance with the drawings and detailed estimates submitted to us in anticipation of an acceptable price. You are hereby requested to present your offer for final acceptance. You have planned a delivery deadline of three to four months. We kindly request you to provide us with a definitive deadline. […] The work will be overseen by my inspectors while it is being performed.” The final agreement was not ratified until the end of September: the first of the barges was to be delivered four months after the additional material was received, while the others would follow in six-week intervals. The Germans were to supply the missing materials, which would be billed to ACSM. Thus, in Le Trait, as in numerous companies, the Germans filled the order books.

24 August 1940: Formation of the German Order Service (SCA)

“The pressure placed by the German authorities on French industrialists in the occupied zone,” confirmed General Huntziger on 19 August 1940, “is very high […]. It would be a good idea to check whether many of these industrialists have already bowed in to these demands, or are on the verge of accepting orders to which the government is hostile. […] The acceptance of orders for aggressive weaponry should […] be considered only if […] dealt with in negotiations resulting in explicit counterparties for the country. […] There may also be reasons to ask the Delegate General in Paris [General de La Laurencie, appointed that day, see infra] about which practical measures are to be envisaged, allowing the

508 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit. 509 Gaston Bernard, op. cit. According to the captions of several photos (see pp. 206–207), the Le Trait shipyard would have been inspected by German officers on 3 August 1940. 510 The Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich (a rank that translates as Amiral Commandant en France) represented the high command of the Kriegsmarine in France. Karl-Georg Schuster was the first officer to occupy this post (27 May 1940 to 1 March 1941).

organisation of the new department for Franco-German and Franco-Italian industrial trade to be brought to the attention of the industrialists; and what forms of pressure may be envisaged to prevent industrialists from entering in to contracts without the prior approval of this organisation.”511 The bureau in question was the German Order Service (SCA) established in Paris on 24 August 1940 by the Ministry of Industrial Production and Labour and which had just taken over from the Industrial Trade Department. It was “responsible for examining requests from the German administration to French industrialists, and for authorising or refusing them on a case by case basis, depending on whether they involved ‘defensive’ or ‘offensive’ products.”512 Its creation coincided with the decision reached at the end of July by Admiral Darlan to restore supervisory bodies at the shipyards in the occupied zone. Both a body for centralising German orders and an intermediary between the Occupier and French producers, the SCA, according to the wishes of General Huntziger, had the competence to compel the Reich to grant “counterparties” for its occupation of the country, and to force the Reich to conduct “comprehensive negotiations” on alleviating the constraints placed on France by the armistice. In practice, this tactic placed the shipyards in the centre of a field of opposing forces: - on the one hand, the SCA, headed by the Engineer General of Shipbuilding, Jean Herck,513 and the STCN, headed by René Norguet; - on the other hand, the KAF [Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich] Rhein, soon joined by Vice Admiral Kinzel and Professor Noe (see below). A Navy Supervisory Department was set up, under orders from Rhein in Rouen, with a detachment in Le Trait. Police Inspector Jean Jourde, head of the judicial police in Rouen, recalled in February 1945 that the Germans had sent technical specialists to the shipyard, whose role was generally to directly oversee the work, dictating their orders through the channels of the directorate. Likewise, they installed a guard post tasked with watching over the shipyard and all working there.514

“Since the conflict is continuing, France must contribute to the war effort, irrespective of whether such obligations are contained in the Armistice Agreement”

auGusT von KaGeneCK, la France occupÉe515 For Germany, pursuing the war against England was of paramount importance. By signing the Armistice, France had not concluded peace, but had undertaken to contribute as widely as possible to the Reich’s victory. On 26 August 1940, Göring issued a directive stating: “It is imperative for the Reich that the potential and raw materials available in the occupied territories be exploited methodically and on the broadest scale possible in support of Germany’s arms industry and to boost the country’s potential to wage war.”516 While the German delegation to the Armistice Commission affirmed that it had the right, based on its struggle against the enemy, to place orders with industrialists in the occupied zone via freely-negotiated agreements, on 10 September 1940, Vichy set up an agency tasked with distributing industrial products, the Central Bureau for the Distribution of Industrial Products. Reporting to the Secretariat of State for Distribution, itself a branch of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Bureau was headed by Jean Bichelonne, Secretary General of the latter. One gauge of its impact on shipbuilding were the 2,500 tons of steel that the bureau undertook to earmark on a monthly basis for the sector. On the German side, a Bureau for centralising orders was set up in Paris (Zentralauftragstelle = ZAST) on 15 September 1940. At nearly the same time, the Kriegsmarine was given two new departments: one for shipbuilding (Werftbeauftragter) and the other for repairs (Oberwerftstab), led by Vice Admiral Kinzel517 and assisted by Professor Noe, former Director of

511 Excerpt from a letter from General Huntziger, quoted by Annie Lacroix-Riz, in Industriels et banquiers français sous l’Occupation, 2013, p. 122. 512 Yves Beauvois, Léon Noël, de Laval à de Gaulle via Pétain (1888-1987), Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2001, p. 156. 513 Jean Herck (1885–1961) also signed as the head of the Department for War Material Licences; see in particular a memo of 3 January 1941 – National Archives AJ41 537. 514 See the statements of Jean Jourde before Judge Thirion, dated 10 February 1945. 515 August von Kageneck, La France occupée, Perrin, 2012. 516 Quoted by A. von Kageneck in La France occupée. 517 Walther Kinzel (1880–1964), placed at the disposal of the Kriegsmarine from January 1939, was made responsible for these services on 22 October 1940, after completing an inspection round in July. See http://www.1940lafrancecontinue. org.

Danziger Werft. At the same time, the Occupier progressively exerted greater control over the appointment of higher-ranking French officials: for example, when on 25 August 1940 Admiral Darlan, in search of a representative in the occupied zone capable of defending his interests, suggested the appointment of Captain (Navy) Léon Dupré518 to the Government Delegate General, his plans were dashed. The post, the goals of which were to have the shipyards receive support from the Secretary of State for the Navy, and to allow Admiral Darlan to hold sway – as far as possible – over shipping affairs in France, was given to the Commissioner of the Navy, Louis Fatou, on 22 November 1940, and subsequently, at the insistence of the German authorities, to Admiral de Rivoyre on 13 April 1941. Even more symptomatic was the choice of the Government Delegate General. This highly sensitive post, involving representing the French Government with the German administration and coordinating services in occupied territories, first went to Léon Noël (8 July 1940). However, his lack of docility provoked the hostility of the Germans, leading him to be replaced on 19 August 1940 by General de La Laurencie and later by Fernand de Brinon519 on 17 December 1940. In the face of the Reich’s increase in power, the keywords for orders from the administration to the private sector became: play for time, delay and stall. The risks of this policy, followed by ACSM, weighed down on the companies, with their “greatest passivity”520 exposing them to sanctions and retaliation from the Germans.

518 Claude Huan, op. cit. 519 In July 1940, Fernand de Brinon (1885–1947) was appointed by Pierre Laval, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and head of the government (12 July to 13 December 1940), to represent the French Government with the German High Command. On 5 November 1940 (or 18 December 1940?), he was appointed French Ambassador to Germany, then Delegate General of the French Government within the Occupied Territories. See Yves Beauvois, Léon Noël, de Laval à de Gaulle via Pétain (18881987), op. cit. 520 The expression was taken from a police report attached to the report by the expert, Gaston Bernard, according to which, “it is widely known throughout Le Trait that the Worms shipyard showed the greatest passivity during the Occupation, and that in fact, management has the gratitude of nearly all its staff.”

The shipyards caught up in politics

While awaiting instructions from the government: what to do with the submarine “La Favorite”?

Following several visits to inspect the submarine by German military missions, Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich Rhein in a letter to ACSM dated 2 September 1940 confirmed the demand made verbally to Henri Nitot on 8 July 1940 to resume construction of said spoil of war, “provided that the final price be ratified by the department for shipyard contracts. A draft proposal for a construction contract or a priced offer likely to be verified – along with all supporting construction costs – shall be studied as quickly as possible.” This demand gave rise to a number of problems, beginning with that of supplies of materials, as the shipyard, pursuant to the Law of 20 July 1940, had cancelled its subcontracts and no longer had a steady supply of (raw) materials. Moreover, payment terms had to be settled. As with the oil tankers “La Charente” and “La Mayenne,” the French Admiralty had not terminated the contract, thus raising the question as to who was responsible for payment; in other words, who was the vessel’s general contractor. The government held the answer, and ACSM solicited its response as to which position to adopt. Before acknowledging receipt of the order of 2 September, Maison Worms referred the issue to René Norguet, head of the STCN, in a letter dated 9 September 1940: “We would be much obliged if you would forward us precise instructions from the French Government in this matter. May we draw your attention to the urgency of the issue.” Rather than handle the requests on a case-by-case basis, the public authorities preferred to define an overall policy. For the time being, René Norguet referred the case to the German Order Service (SCA).

The Secretary of State for the Navy encourages companies to play for time

Engineer General Herck, head of the SCA, forwarded his response on 16 September 1940 through the Chamber of Shipbuilders, stipulating that, in the absence of instructions from the French Government, he could not sign off on any order. He recommended playing for time until Vichy reached a decision. The next day, 17 September, management issued a verbal refusal to resume work on the submarine under the pretext that the ship was still owned by the French Government,

and that only it could issue the order to continue with its construction – or not. On 21 September, Herck confirmed to ACSM that the Secretary of State for the Navy had not yet settled the issue, signalling that, general speaking, “the industrialist may comply with orders or demands from the occupying authority, limiting itself to executing only what is strictly necessary to avoid serious trouble.”521 As vague and incomplete as they were, these instructions were repeated that same day in a letter sent by ACSM to KAF Rhein: “Thank you for your letter of 2 September 1940 to our shipyard in Le Trait on resuming construction of the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ […] As the Managing Director of our shipyard pointed out to you during your visit to Le Trait last Sunday, 15 September, we consider it necessary, given the nature of the work and the many technical and financial questions that need to be resolved with our Admiralty, that the latter be able to give us its instructions before we continue with this construction project. Moreover, we understood that your government planned to refer this affair to the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. In the meantime, our shipyard, as previously explained, is busy with reconstituting their design studies and with establishing the exact status of the subcontracts.”

27–29 September 1940: Henri Nitot in Vichy

On 27 September 1940, Henri Nitot travelled personally to Vichy, carrying a letter for Admiral Darlan: “We are pleased to provide you with a copy and translation of the letter of 2 September from the German Admiralty which reached our shipyard in Le Trait on 6 September. This confirms its order to pursue construction on the submarine ‘La Favorite’ on its behalf. We immediately brought this communication to the attention of the Engineers General Norguet, Herck and Genon.522 Engineer General Norguet informed us that, during his scheduled trip to Vichy in the week of 9 to 15 September, he intended to speak to the government about the problem thus caused by the occupying authorities. Upon his return, and after contacting both him and Engineer General Herck, we responded to the German Navy, in

521 These same “instructions” were sent on the same day to the Secretary of the Chamber of Shipbuilders. 522 Quoted several times in the Worms archives, Engineer General Genon is presented as the head of the French Department for Monitoring Works and Manufacturing. a letter dated 21 September, a copy of which you will find attached; this letter refers in particular to the verbal instructions that Commander of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) Rhein gave to the Managing Director of our shipyard on 15 September, whereby his government would contact the French Government, through the intermediary of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, regarding resuming construction work on the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ Having learned from a letter dated 21 September, sent by Engineer General Herck to the Chamber of Shipbuilders that no decision had yet been reached regarding the submarine ‘La Favorite,’ we consider it imperative to draw your very special attention to a serious matter, sharing with you our concerns, and requesting your instructions. I - The submarine ‘La Favorite’ is being built in execution of a contract with the French Navy dated 31 March 1938; on the basis on its terms (Article 15), the ownership of the vessel, its equipment, its machinery, along with anything fitted to the vessel in question in our shipyard or elsewhere, shall be transferred to the Navy, as construction and outfitting progresses, without exception or reserve, up to the amount of the advance payments from the Navy for this portion of the contract. Thus, it is up to your department alone to provide formal instructions regarding the definitive position that our shipyard must take regarding the request formulated by the occupying authority. II - Under the current state of affairs, Article 1 of the Law of 20 July 1940 would apply, unless your department issues instructions to the contrary concerning the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ Therefore, we feel that your instructions should determine the position that the Navy will ultimately take regarding the application of these legal clauses to ACSM. III - If, in accordance with your instructions, construction of the submarine ‘La Favorite’ is to be pursued on behalf of the German Government, we think that you will agree that the difficulties stemming from the current situation should not in any way engage our financial liability, nor should there be any interruption or delay in payment of the amounts owed to ACSM throughout the construction period; therefore, the measures to take in this regard would have to be addressed directly by both governments. IV - Since pursuing the construction of this vessel may clearly expose ACSM to serious risks of being bombed,

we feel that the government must offset these risks, be it to the shipyard itself, its staff, its equipment or its supplies. V - Moreover, the completion on behalf of the German Admiralty of a submarine previously intended for the French Navy risks causing reactions among some members of our staff, which may escape our control, and on which we think it useless to insist. It is important that we are also not held liable in this respect. VI - On the other hand, we must point out that, in the event we do not comply with the orders given to us by the German Admiralty to complete the submarine ‘La Favorite’ on its behalf, we run the risk, through requisitioning, of having the occupying Admiralty take possession of our company and its facilities. VII - Finally, we must point out that the question regarding the submarine ‘La Favorite,’ posed by the written order we received, the various aspects and possible consequences of which we have examined in this document, may again arise in the near future for the submarine ‘L’Africaine.’ This opinion stems from recent verbal comments from the German Admiralty.”

The French Admiralty seeks compensation for the “pillage” of the occupied zone

In Vichy, Henri Nitot (among others) was received by Admiral Le Luc,523 in charge of military shipbuilding, and Rear-Admiral Auphan, Chief of Staff for the Merchant Navy, on 28 and 29 September 1940. In the minutes he took of these exchanges, he noted that: – the French Government was “willing in principle to approve continuing construction of the vessels ordered by the French Navy, provided that, at the Armistice

523 Admiral Maurice Le Luc (1885–1964) was one of the signatories of the Armistice of 22 June 1940, as a representative of the Navy, alongside General Charles Huntziger (Army) and General Jean Bergeret (Air Force). He commanded naval forces until September 1941, and subsequently from November 1942 to the beginning of April 1943. Rear-Admiral Gabriel Auphan (1894–1982) was head of the Darlan Cabinet, Secretary of State for the Navy. “He himself was a member of the Laval Government from April to November 1942. Alongside Admiral Darlan, or in the Laval Cabinet, Admiral Auphan bore his share of responsibility for the actions of the Vichy Government. But he never shared Darlan’s conviction that ‘France’s salvation was to be found in its collaboration with Germany,’” nor the desire of Pierre Laval of victory for the Third Reich. Source: Encyclopaedia Universalis. Commission in Wiesbaden, the German Government agreed to certain trade-offs,”524 such as easier access to raw materials, which could be granted “to certain industries which would be designated by the government,” or even “the release of certain categories of prisoners”; – as for merchant vessels, the dividing-up of French shipyard activities between German and French orders should be discussed in Wiesbaden; – the general instruction was to wait and see, letting “winter pass by, after which things could be seen a bit more clearly.” Henri Nitot returned to Paris with a letter dated 29 September and signed by Admiral Le Luc, on behalf of Admiral Darlan, through which the Secretary of State for the Navy (Central Directorate of Naval Industries) established the legal framework within which the fate of all vessels intended for the Admiralty (the submarine “La Favorite” as well as the oil tankers “La Charente,” “La Mayenne” and “La Baïse”) was to be debated: “1 – The orders for weaponry placed with you by my department fall automatically under the Law of 20 July 1940 and should be the subject of a cancellation procedure. 2 – The question of resuming the construction of the vessels on behalf of the German authorities cannot be decided by the department of the Navy alone. It will be covered by further instructions to be sent to you by the Engineer General, the head of the German Order Service in Paris. 3 – Irrespective of the decision taken in this regard – either a definitive stop of construction and the cancellation of the contract or its continuation on behalf of the German authorities –, you will have to come to terms with the Engineer General, head of the Department for Monitoring Works and Manufacturing in Paris, regarding the execution of the instructions sent to you.”

The Germans threaten the shipyards

On 30 September, during a meeting in Paris, Mr Puech, Secretary General of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, was warned by two German naval advisers (Freiberg and Bergreen [sic]) and three representatives of the Reich Ministry of Communications that “the French shipyards

524 This quotation and subsequent excerpts were taken from the expert report by Gaston Bernard, dated 31 December 1945.

must strictly execute the orders given to them by the German Navy. Failing this, the local directors will be held personally responsible.”525 A circular written in threatening terms was sent to the shipbuilders (Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire in Saint-Nazaire; Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire Penhoët; Chantiers et Ateliers de la Loire in Nantes; Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime) and to the Chamber of Shipbuilders, by KAF Rhein on 4 October 1940: “Some shipyards have shown hesitance as to whether continuing the construction of unfinished warships for the German Navy was compatible with the terms of the Armistice. On this subject, we hereby confirm that, fundamentally, the High Commands of the German Army and Navy are justified in using French industry in the occupied zone in any manner and to the extent required by the continuation of the war against England. This includes, among others, the completion of weaponry and ships still under construction in French factories or shipyards. I herewith demand that work be resumed immediately – in the event you have not already done so – and that you report back to me immediately once work has recommenced. If it turns out that shipyard managers have not done their utmost to ensure the continuation of construction, I shall regretfully be obliged to place the shipyards concerned under the management of a German commissioner.” The serving of this formal notice was confirmed by Vice Admiral Kinzel that same day, and by Engineer General Herck, head of the SCA, the following day, 5 October, in a letter sent to the Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders: “During our meeting on 5 October 1940, attended by Chief Engineers Norguet and Borde, you handed me the translation of a letter of 4 October 1940 from the Commanding Admiral in France in charge of shipyards, calling on your members […] to finish construction of the warships currently under construction in French shipyards. It warns them that, if it were found that not everything has been done at the shipyards to continue construction, he would regretfully be obliged to place the noncompliant shipyards under the protection of a German commissioner. Under these conditions, and in light of the written instructions he has sent you, I hereby confirm that the construction of the warships in question must be undertaken while awaiting the arrival of final instructions, as announced in the letter sent to the Worms shipyard on 29 September 1940, by the Admiral of the Fleet, Secretary of State for the Navy.”

8 October 1940: construction work resumes on “La Favorite”

A memo dated 8 October 1940 announced the following to ACSM staff: “This authority [Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich Rhein] has requested that we resume work immediately on the submarine, ‘La Favorite,’ adding that ‘if not everything is done at the shipyards to ensure the continuation of the construction, the authority will, to its great regret, be obliged to place the noncompliant shipyards under the management of a German commissioner.’ This summary of the situation is intended to be understood by all.” After the Liberation, certain workers produced this document as proof of “management’s desire to accelerate production for the benefit of the Germans.”526 Maison Worms retaliated by arguing that it had no way of circumventing the German injunction, on account of the threats to which the company was exposed. These threats were to materialise several days later, involving the entire Maison Worms (see below). In a second memo dated that same day, Henri Nitot stated: “Construction work on the submarine ‘La Favorite’ No. 88 shall resume and progress in line with the availability of supplies, design studies and blueprints. The supply department will request providers to resume work on the subcontracts terminated ipse jure in accordance with the Law of 20 July 1940. We will need to notify them, requesting them to report the current state of supplies, the likely delivery date, as well as detailed information as foreseen in memo No. 5 of 9 August 1940. The Navy’s Study Bureau will do everything to ensure that the necessary construction plans are sent to the shipyard. The Chief Manufacturing Engineer will provide all instructions for the work in hand on 8 June to be restarted, to the extent that the circumstances ensuing from the two preceding paragraphs allow such. He is

525 Excerpt from a memo of 13 October 1944 by Gaston Bernard. 526 Expert report by Gaston Bernard of 31 December 1945.

to inform me in detail of the amount of labour needed, broken down by trades and is to submit to me, in agreement with the foremen involved, the proposals for rehiring men, without losing sight of the need to proceed in tandem or simultaneously with the redeployment of the temporary workers doing work unrelated to their trades. In addition, engineers and department heads are, following an examination of the situation, to send me proposals possibly justified in light of these instructions.” Also on 8 October, the Navy ordered ACSM to dismantle the submarines “L’Armide” and “L’Andromaque,” the order for which was officially cancelled on 9 October 1940. The same held true for four submarines, Q 219 to Q 222, the order for which was officially cancelled on 23 February 1943. Two days later (10 October 1940), the Secretary of State for the Navy reaffirmed that the shipyard was to continue construction work on the supply ships “La Mayenne,” “La Charente” and “La Baïse” via a telegram worded as follows: “Following the verbal instructions that my department gave to you on this subject, I have the honour to confirm that you are to proceed with the execution of your contract […] for the construction of the oil tankers ‘La Charente,’ ‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Baïse,’ ships which are to be exempted from application of the Law of 20 July 1940 on the termination of contracts concluded by the government for the needs of national defence.” However, the recipient of said vessels was not specified: was it to be the French Admiralty or the German Admiralty? And, if in alluding to the exemption from the Law of 20 July 1940, the French Admiralty seemed to give its implicit approval for the vessels to be delivered to the German Admiralty, a handwritten memo from the office of Rear-Admiral Auphan specified that the Occupier’s orders remained subject “to the discussions underway at the Armistice Commission.”527 Faced with such a lack of clarity, Hypolite Worms feared that, despite all these assurances and orders, his company would to a great extent be held responsible. Thus, during a meeting of the Technical Committee for Shipbuilding held on 11 October 1940, he attempted to find out whether the French Government intended to discuss the basic issue with the German Government, i.e. whether the continued construction of warships conformed to the clauses of the Armistice. Four days later, he received his answer.

15 October 1940: the manufacture of war material is forbidden by law

On 15 October 1940, Marshal Pétain decreed that “in consideration of the Armistice Agreement that entered into force on 22 June 1940 […] [you are] forbidden, on the territory of mainland France (including Corsica), Algeria, in the colonies, protectorates, and territories under mandate, to manufacture new war material and to continue any manufacturing thereof currently underway.” Included among the construction projects listed in Article 2 were “equipment carrying firearms or intended for use in combat: warships of any kind.” By obstructing the German policy, the goal of which – according to Bichelonne – was “to empty France of its substance,”528 this measure sought to push the Reich to open negotiations on all economic problems raised by the application of the Armistice Agreement, and in particular the use of the shipyards in the occupied zone: this happened the very next day, on 16 October 1940 in Wiesbaden. Discussions were to focus on the topics brought up with Henri Nitot in Vichy: - to obtain monthly deliveries from Germany of 5,000 tons of raw materials; - to earmark 30% of production capacity for France; - to rebuild the labour force (notably skilled labour) through the return of 5,000 prisoners; - to settle German purchases through the intermediary of clearing houses.529

Darlan’s ulterior motives

“On 17 October 1940,” reported Claude Huan [unfortunately without citing his sources], “Admiral Darlan recalled that, through the Armistice Agreement, the German Government agreed not to use the [war?] fleet.

528 Words quoted by Claude Huan, op. cit.: “‘The German policy seeks to empty France of its substance,’ wrote Secretary General for Industrial Production, Bichelonne.” 529 Clearing house, or compensation chamber. Compensation refers to all operations tied to a transaction between its ordering and its settlement. A clearing house is a national or international entity that calculates the net sums to be paid and makes the payments. It aims to liquidate debts and claims between banks or between countries.

He protested to Vice Admiral Kinzel about the formal notice sent to the shipyards, calling on him not to follow through on the threats and pointing out that the orders would be given by the government, which would subsequently convey them to the Reich within the framework of the negotiations. Darlan, in fact, wanted to negotiate. He was ready to accept that shipyards within the occupied zone lend their support to the German war effort with their facilities and personnel, but he felt that this support had to be debated. If the German authorities were against crosssector negotiations, they should at least accept sectoral negotiations. In this way, Admiral Darlan intended to maintain control over the private shipyards (20,000 workers) through the intermediary of the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction (COCN),530 over the naval arsenals (15,000 workers) and over his military personnel (3,000 officers and sailors with the status of prisoners) still subject to his authority, even in the occupied zone. As of that day,531 the German orders covered twenty warships, three freighters, six oil tankers, one hundred and thirty-seven assorted vessels, as well as the requisitioning of thirteen tugboats and four water tanks under construction. This programme represented 100,000 tons of raw materials.” Within this framework, starting at the end of August 1940, the German Admiralty informed the Chamber of Shipbuilders of its intention to order freighters of varying tonnages, a project that would be divided up among the shipyards in the occupied zone.

ACSM is commissioned to build three 1,150-ton freighters for the German Navy

On 22 October 1940, the Chamber of Shipbuilders formally commissioned ACSM to build three freighters, each weighing 1,150 tons.532

530 The reference to the COCN (Comité d’Organisation de la Construction Navale) is anachronistic, since the decree creating this committee was published three months later, on 17 January 1941. 531 17 October 1940? 532 According to memo No. 2, which Gaston Bernard included in his report of 31 December 1945, “in correspondence and various documents, the weight of these freighters was listed as 2,000 tons, 1,150 tons or 1,000 tons. There is an obvious reason for the difference: 2,000 tons referred to the total displacement; 1,150 tons to deadweight; and 1,000 tons to light displacement. Light displacement was used in the rest of the study and in calculations.” KAF Rhein sent the following letter to ACSM: “On the basis of negotiations with the Chamber of Shipbuilders on 28/09; 30/09; 1/10; 4/10; 5/10; 18/10 and 19/10, the minutes of which are held by the latter, you are herewith commissioned to construct the ships listed below, within the following maximum deadlines for delivery, in your shipyard in Le Trait: - three 2,000-ton ships to transport various packages, in accordance with plans that you will draw up to match the German plans, to be delivered: - the first ship, 12 months after receipt of one-half of the materials - the second, 15 months after receipt of one-half of the materials - the third, 20 months after receipt of one-half of the materials. You will be provided with the German plans as soon as possible. […] Formal confirmation of the intentions, recently forwarded to you, covering the warships currently under construction in your shipyard will arrive shortly. You are requested to present a price estimate as soon as possible, based on the following: a)cost of materials, without additional expenses b)production labour force, including family benefits c) application of overheads for b) d) sum of a + b + c e) profit f) total of d + e g) tax at 11.10% h) proposed cost, the sum of f + g i) the height of the coefficient for overheads listed in c) is to be provisionally set at 120%. Final approval shall depend on the positive outcome of the price check carried out by the relevant department of the Oberkommando of the War Navy. Payment will be made as follows: - 20% upon receipt of the order - 20% after confirmation that all materials have arrived in the shipyard - 30% at launch - 20% on provisional acceptance - 10% after any remaining work has been completed. We kindly request you to send the specifications for the materials needed as quickly as possible, if you have not already done so, to the Chamber of Shipbuilders, which is collecting the specifications from all the shipyards. Please also indicate the monthly breakdown of the deliveries to made to your shipyard.”

The submarine “L’Africaine” enters the scene

At the same time, the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich issued the formal order to ACSM to complete construction of “L’Africaine” (letter of 24 October). Maison Worms referred the order to Admiral Darlan on 30 October, requesting him to provide specific instructions: “As you are well aware, we have received the official order to continue with the construction of this vessel, as previously been for the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ In addition, the German Admiralty seems to be affirming the principle that it will be taking over the contracts concluded by us with the French Navy, and is asking us to specify both the amount of money we have already received as advance payments and the costs incurred by us as of the date on which Le Trait was occupied by the German Army. All is to be communicated within one week. In our opinion, it is thus vital that we receive definitive instructions from the French Government on the points previously covered in our past correspondence before the deadline expires.” On that very day, Wilhelm Beines von Ziegesar, head of the Commerzbank AG branch in Cottbus, assumed his duties as CommissionerAdministrator of Worms & Cie.

25 October 1940: Maison Worms under the iron rule of the Occupier

Von Ziegesar, Commissioner-Administrator of Worms & Cie

On 25 October 1940, the head of the Militärverwaltung in Frankreich (der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres) informed Maison Worms that Wilhelm Beines von Ziegesar had been appointed Commissioner-Administrator of the Worms & Cie Banking Services, under the terms of the Government Order of 20 May 1940, and following the second Government Order of 18 October 1940 relating to measures against the Jews. The document was signed by Dr Michel. Olivier de Sèze was appointed his deputy. On 30 October, von Ziegesar sent the following message to Hypolite Worms, Jacques Barnaud and company staff during a meeting at Maison Worms headquarters: “While I have been appointed by the head of the military administration in France […] Mr Olivier de Sèze has been designated by the French Government. […] The Maison Worms to which you belong groups together a variety of both industrial and commercial interests. We intend to untangle intertwined threads and to gain exact information on the size and profitability of each company.”

The slander of the collaborationist press

The reasons for this unprecedented appointment, which had not happened to any company other than the Banque de France, were to be found in a set of rumours unleashed several weeks earlier against the company and its leader. A “report” was in circulation: attributed to a certain Dr Henri Martin (a doctor, a former member of La Cagoule and founder of a private intelligence service), it focused on a “mysterious secret society,” the “Synarchy,” with the goal of “obstructing the ‘socialist’ tendencies of the national revolution and Petainism, protecting the economical interests of Jews, Anglo-Saxons and basically all foreigners, and blocking the efforts to shape continental Europe as an economic entity excluding Anglo-Saxons.”533 Without providing any evidence that this secret organisation existed, Worms & Cie was named as being at its core. Fiercely anti-Semitic and Anglophobic, the idea of a “synarchic plot” was encouraged by the Law on the Status of Jews, which Vichy had promulgated on 3 October 1940 without German pressure. On 7 October, Marshal Pétain received a defamatory letter against Worms & Cie and Ministers Baudouin and Bouthillier. In this contaminated climate, Michel Goudchaux resigned as General Partner one week later (14–16 October). Although a Catholic, he was actually considered to be an Israelite under the provisions of the Government Order of 27 September 1940, which was tightened on 18 October by the Government Order concerning Jewish companies. Following his resignation, the company statutes were modified. Jacques Barnaud, who had distanced himself from all his administrative positions, remained a partner, without receiving any compensation. On 21 October, a calumnious campaign began, orchestrated by the collaborationist newspaper, Paris-Soir, whose heinous attacks against Hypolite Worms for having surrendered the French fleet to the English (see the Worms Agreement of 4 July) and for being a British

533 Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera, Les Patrons sous l’Occupation. II, Odile Jacob, 1995, coll. Opus 1997.

Appointment of Wilhelm Beines von Ziegesar as Commissioner-Administrator of the Worms & Cie Banking Services (known as Banque Worms) – 25 October 1940

sympathiser were relayed throughout the Occupation period in publications of similar ilk: Au Pilori, L’Œuvre, Franciste, L’Appel, France Europe, etc.

The hostility of Laval

Interrogated in October 1944 about the reasons for these attacks, the head of Maison Worms recalled the role of Pierre Laval: “In August and September 1940, I made several trips to Vichy to meet Admiral Auphan, Director of the Merchant Navy, regarding the mission that I had fulfilled in England. During one of these trips, having heard that Mr Laval had said hostile words against me personally and Maison Worms, I asked to meet with him. Though he received me, Mr Laval was violent and reproached me for being opposed to his politics. I assured him that I had never done anything against him, and that my rule was to abstain from all political activity. Mr Laval spoke to me about some people working for me, and more specifically about Mr Le Roy Ladurie [at that time head of the Worms & Cie Banking Services], whom he accused of being a monarchist. Mr Laval insisted that he ‘would break the back,’ to use his own expression, of anyone who opposed him. After that, I never saw Mr Laval again, nor Admiral Darlan or any other minister. I never attended any political meeting, private or otherwise.” In this same deposition, Hypolite Worms mentioned that his meeting with Pierre Laval took place several days before the press campaign was unleashed against Maison Worms. “Although unable to confirm the situation,” he noted, “I wondered whether there might be a link between my visit and the subsequent campaign. I realised that the gist of the campaign was to accuse me of being hostile to the Franco-German collaboration.” The fact remained that Laval, “around 10 August 1943, explained to high-ranking members of the Legion of War Veterans that, had Hypolite Worms been arrested as he had intended one and a half months before 13 December 1940 [the date on which he was dismissed by Pétain], 13 December would never have happened.”534

In the clutches of the Occupier

The German authorities took an interest in Maison Worms as a result of its diversified business activities and its divisions: Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie testified as to the numerous attempts of high-ranking German officials to take up shares in the company’s capital and/or to enter its management. It is also likely that the shipyard’s great passivity in the face of the demands of the German Admiralty contributed to Maison Worms being placed under administration. For that matter, Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie was to highlight that ACSM had been placed under the control of the Kriegsmarine.

Waiting for Wiesbaden

All construction work must be endorsed by the French Admiralty

In anticipation of the instructions from Admiral Darlan, but without presaging who would receive the vessels, the ACSM management informed the Le Trait shipyard on 31 October that “construction on the submarine ‘L’Africaine,’ No. 89 will resume under the same conditions as those for ‘La Favorite,’ as defined in memo No. 37 of 8 October 1940, all provisions of which apply in this case.” The memo went on to state the following: “Construction work on the submarines ‘L’Andromaque’ No. 96 and ‘L’Armide’ No. 98 has been permanently interrupted. To free up the slipway, we shall proceed as quickly as possible with dismantling and demolishing the portions of the submarines already built. The materials from the dismantled vessels shall be stored out of the way in a to-be-determined corner of the shipyard, classified either as potentially re-usable or as scrap. The costs associated with each vessel are to be booked on a separate account. Prior to dismantling, the status of the work done on the submarines is to be documented. Similarly, all technical and accounting information is to be collected, thus enabling us to draw up the precise calculation bases for termination, as set forth in memo No. 5 of 9 August 1940. We could, where necessary, consider using the materials, equipment and any accessories originally intended for ‘L’Andromaque’ and ‘L’Armide’ in the construction of ‘La Favorite’ and ‘L’Africaine,’ though all necessary precautions will need to be taken to avoid booking errors.” Through the intermediary of Admiral Le Luc, Darlan issued his instructions on 2 November 1940. These conformed with the instructions issued by Herck on 5 October: “I see no major problem in you submitting the information to the departments under ‘Admiral Frankreich,’ as requested in his letter of 24 October 1940. Nonetheless, I ask that you limit the communication of the contracts to their administrative content, not communicating the portion that deals with the specifications, unless formally demanded by the Germans. In addition, I hereby inform you that the negotiations covering shipbuilding in the occupied zone are part of the overall negotiations underway between the French and German Governments. The French Government has not lost sight of this issue, and a response will be sent forthwith to the German authorities by the French delegation in Wiesbaden. In the meantime, the French Government acknowledges, in application of the Law of 15 October covering the ban on manufacturing weaponry, that the only weaponry able to be manufactured is that for which orders have been were placed with industrialists by the German Order Service (SCA) in Paris. Any other orders from German authorities are to be turned down as long as the shipyard has not received authorisation from the French Government. You may, where necessary, forward what is stated above to the German authorities as being the instructions you have received from the Admiralty.” Around the same time (2 November), the Secretary of State for the Navy allowed construction work to proceed on the oil tankers “La Mayenne,” “La Charente” and “La Baïse,” but “with the exception of weaponry.”

28 November 1940: the SCA secretly authorises construction work to continue on “La Favorite”

On 28 November 1940, a decisive step forward was taken: the Admiralty ordered Engineer General Herck (SCA), through the intermediary of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, to issue ACSM with a licence “to legalise orders for war material.” Departing from the Law of 15 October 1940, this authorisation was granted on a temporary basis: one single copy was provided to the Chamber of Shipbuilders and ACSM respectively, which were “forbidden from reproducing or circulating it.” The licence had to be kept secret from the Germans, “so as not to compromise the initiation of negotiations on the use of shipyards in the occupied zone, [which sought] to reserve a French share in future

construction work.”535 This authorisation applied to “La Favorite” and to this submarine alone. It sought to discharge the company from any liability. It extended “to all subcontracts in the occupied zone,” and not “to subcontracts in the free zone [where French approval was mandatory], or to those involving shipyards in the Gironde, which were subject, through the intermediary [of Herck], to approval by the Secretary of State for the Navy.”536 In all likelihood, this was one of the first nine approvals temporarily granted by the SCA, to which Claude Huan referred. “The definitive licences,” he added, “[are to] be handed out upon conclusion of the negotiations” in Wiesbaden.

Cessation of work on “L’Africaine”

Sheltering behind the absence of an exemption similar to that granted for “La Favorite,” ACSM was not authorised to resume construction work on “L’Africaine.” The Worms management in Paris instructed the local management in Le Trait to cease work on it. However, on 22 December, ACSM was contacted by KAF Rhein: “In conjunction with the verbal negotiations, the provisional contract of 8 July and the letter from the shipyard chargé d’affaires of 2 September 1940, we now confirm the previously provisional order for: 1. the submarine ‘L’Africaine’; 2. the oil tankers ‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Charente,’ subject to definitive agreement on the final price between the ACSM chargé d’affaires and the Commanding Admiral in France.537 Completion of the oil tanker ‘La Baïse’ is also included in this order, subject to the same proviso regarding the price. We expect you to submit for checking as quickly as possible the original construction contract concluded with the French Navy, or the price estimate together with the whole construction file.” On 28 December, management turned to Engineer General Herck at the German Order Service for instructions regarding the response to this letter, and possibly, to obtain a licence to manufacture war material: “Please

535 Depositions of 20 October 1944 by Jean Dieudonné and Jean-Jacques Balland, marine engineers; the former was in charge of the Merchant Navy, and the latter, in charge of the Navy. 536 Licence granted by the German Order Service (SCA), 28 November 1940. 537 Translation of the title, Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich. find attached a copy and translation of the letter of 22 December 1940, which we received from the German Admiralty. In accordance with the instructions that you gave to the Chamber of Shipbuilders, we attach an application (in eight copies) for a licence to manufacture war material intended to legalise the completion of the submarine ‘L’Africaine.’” On 30 December, the Engineer General in Marine Engineering, René Genon, head of the Supervisory Service for Works and Manufacturing at the French Secretariat of State of the Navy, was updated on the progress of the work on the oil tankers “La Charente” and “La Mayenne”: “We are currently working normally on these vessels under the instructions we received previously from the French Navy. Following our recent conversations, we reckon with soon receiving from you the cancellation of your dispatch of 24 December 1940 regarding ‘La Baïse.’”

Will the oil tanker “La Baïse” have to be demolished?

For several weeks, debates waged over the fate of this squadron supply ship. Whereas on 2 November, the Secretary of State for the Navy had authorised its continued construction, on 8 November, the Bauaufsicht der Kriegsmarine (Navy Supervisory Department) in Rouen had rang up, demanding that the oil tanker be destroyed. An official from this Department came and drew up a list of materials in storage so they could be reassigned to another vessel; on 19 November, Maison Worms sent a report of this visit to René Genon. The shipyard tried to use this and other letters to get the French Admiralty to oppose the vessel’s dismantling and the reassigning of its components by the Kriegsmarine. Simultaneously, it sought to obtain approval from the Kriegsmarine to continue construction work on “La Baïse” which it received: the chargé d’affaires to the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich ordered that construction work be resumed on the oil tanker, an order which the KAF ratified in the letter of 22 December quoted above. But on 3 December, the French Admiralty, wishing to send a positive signal to the occupation authorities, opted to cancel the contract for “La Baïse” and authorised its demolition, a choice it confirmed on 24 December. Faced with two contradictory orders, management hastened to have the French Admiralty reverse its decision. On 28 December, management sent Engineer General Herck (SCA) the letter of

22 December from the KAF, and on 30 December made its case with René Genon, head of the Supervisory Service for Works and Manufacturing, regarding the work in hand, including “La Baïse” for which notice of the cancellation of the termination order had finally been served through a ministerial dispatch of 3 January 1941. Permission to continue construction work on the oil tanker was thus granted by both the German and French sides. Yet the question of for whom the ship was intended – France or the Reich? – had still not been resolved. It was not until the resolutions of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden in August–September 1941 the issue was finally resolved. Until then, the vessel would continue to be counted among the German orders. Thus, in a letter of 5 February 1941, ACSM advised the Rustungsinspektion of Saint-Germain that delivery of the three oil tankers would take place: - on 1 October 1941, for “La Charente,” - on 1 February 1942, for “La Mayenne,” - in September 1942, for “La Baïse.” In reality, though, the Kriegsmarine was uninterested in this last vessel, as the lack of materials was becoming increasingly severe. On 24 March 1941, or one and a half months after the preceding letter, the Rustungsinspektion was informed that deliveries would be postponed: - for “La Charente,” to 1 April 1942 (+ 6 months), - for “La Mayenne,” to 1 December 1942 (+ 10 months), - for “La Baïse,” to 1 May 1943 (+ 7 months).

Obtaining supplies becomes increasingly difficult

These delays, as much as the temptation of the German authorities to stop work on the least finished vessels, to dismantle them and reuse their materials in more completed vessels, stemmed from the growing shortage of all kinds of supplies. “We have no news concerning additional profiles and the entirety of the sheet metal,” wrote Le Trait to Paris on 9 November regarding an order for materials for the four tank barges, which had been scheduled since 8 July 1940, “and thus, we cannot provide a start date for construction.” The situation was aggravated by the complications caused by the many formalities to be fulfilled in order to ship supplies to the shipyard. Since 27 November, the government had subjected shipments from the free zone to the occupied zone to the issuance of a licence. Under these circumstances, the ACSM management, in its note of 24 March 1941 to the Rustungsinspektion, stated that, in order to respect the delivery dates for the: - 1st barge, on 1 October 1941, - 2nd barge, on 15 November 1941, - 3rd barge, on 1 January 1942, - 4th barge, on 15 February 1942, it was imperative “that all materials needed for their construction be at the shipyard by 1 May 1941, and that the supplies be delivered on a regular basis thereafter.” An additional reason for delays cited by ACSM was the design of the plans, for example, for the 1,150dwt freighters, the order for which, signed by the Kriegsmarine on 22 October, was received by ACSM on 16 November. On 30 November, a memo was sent by Paris to Le Trait: “The German Navy has placed an order with us for three diesel-engine freighters each with deadweight tonnage of approximately 1,100 tons. The construction numbers allocated to these orders are: 111, 112, and 113, respectively. In principle, these ships, subject to updated specifications, will be built in accordance with the plans provided by the German authorities. The metal materials are to be supplied through their intermediary by German industry. The diesel engines remain to be determined. They will most likely be covered by a contract with a French manufacturer. The auxiliary equipment and other materials or various devices will, in principle, be provided by French industry, in accordance with the standard procedure.” The execution of this order gave rise to numerous observations and reservations on the part of ACSM regarding deadlines, prices, payments terms, etc. The problem caused by the plans was so thorny that an engineer from Le Trait, Mr Scheerens, had to be sent to the Kriegsmarine naval base in Wesermunde, Germany. But far from bringing about a quick solution, this option required numerous updates, meaning that work on the first two ships did not begin until December 1941, and not until January 1942 for the third ship, i.e. fourteen and fifteen months, respectively, after the order date. The growing lack of supplies notwithstanding, the German Minister for Transport (Julius Dorpmüller) announced, during a trip to Saint-Nazaire in mid-December 1940, his intention to launch a second wave of orders for freighters, bringing the total order up from three to sixteen vessels (160,000 tons of deadweight tonnage). Admiral Darlan approved, in principle, the construction of eight freighters (76,000 tons), encouraging René

Fould, Chairman of the Chamber of Shipbuilders, to in return obtain delivery of raw materials and the release of appropriate staff held prisoner. “At the end of 1940,” noted Claude Huan, “the situation was blocked. […] Settlement by a clearing [house] was the only approval granted (16 November 1940). […] The government sought to gain time by retrenching behind its proposal for comprehensive negotiations in Wiesbaden (and not at the Paris level). Pending this, if necessary, advance payments were granted to all the shipyards. […] Matters were heading towards a showdown or negotiations.”

“A showdown or negotiations”

CLaude huan, “La ConsTruCTion navaLe française 1940-1942”

The French Admiralty blocks the licences

Although more than one thousand people worked at ACSM, the Worms management recommended that work on the ships not be sped up, particularly on the warships (letter of 3 January 1941). Instructions provided on 14 January 1941, by the head of the Central Directorate for Naval Industries, the Engineer Balland, also took the same tack: “You have submitted a request for a licence to manufacture weaponry in order to finish the submarine ‘L’Africaine.’ In accordance with the orders that I have received from the Admiralty, I would like to inform you that the issuance of licences is subject to the conclusion of the negotiations underway in Wiesbaden. Accordingly, no licence may be issued at this time. Under the current circumstances, I encourage you: - not to make any change in your current position for orders whose licences are thus being delayed; - to respond to the questions you may be asked that the instructions of the French Government are not to undertake any new work to finish the warships until the discussions underway in Wiesbaden are concluded.” Having informed the German authorities of this position on 5 February 1941, the ACSM management adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The situation was repeated on 20 January 1941, after ACSM filed a request for an additional licence to validate the sub-orders placed in the free zone for the submarine “La Favorite.” In response to this, Engineer General Herck, head of the German Order Service, wrote: “No new licence to construct warships shall be issued until further notice, unless and until the discussions underway on this subject in Wiesbaden have been concluded.” A refusal he repeated in a letter of 5 February 1941, of which ACSM informed the KAF that same day. More than ever, the holding back of licences and the subsequent slow-down of shipyard activity were the “roundabout means [through which] […] the French Government [tried] to put pressure on the German Commission in Wiesbaden, for the goal of reaching a formal agreement and obtaining the quid pro quos discussed with Henri Nitot during his trip to Vichy in September 1940.”538

The Reich ups its demands

In the eyes of the German Commission, “licences to manufacture war material were not subject to approval, but to the stamp of the French Government.”539 And the occupation authorities fully intended to complete their construction programme: in addition to the eight freighters approved by the French Admiralty in midDecember, the Germans announced on 16 January an order for eighteen warships in addition to the twenty initially scheduled, plus eighteen merchant vessels instead of the original sixteen. Moreover, they decreed that vessels located south of the Gironde would be considered spoils of war. These increased demands were to a certain extent tied to Petain’s dismissal of Laval from his duties as Vice President of the Council of Ministers on 13 December 1940, and his subsequent arrest: the Führer viewed the removal of this German partisan as proof that France was not prepared to participate in the German war effort. On “10 January,” noted Claude Huan, “Marshal Keitel, [head of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht,] insisted that from now on both the occupied zone and the free zone be called on to supply raw materials, munition and weaponry for the war against England, in accordance with the Preamble of the Armistice Agreement. The German authorities drew up a very broad plan to quickly make the French economy subservient to their needs. […] As for shipbuilding, the French had to complete the vessels at a lower cost and where necessary by force.”540

538 Expert report by Gaston Bernard of 31 December 1945. 539 Claude Huan, op. cit. 540 Ibid.

27 December 1941: France responds by creating the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction (COCN)541

“Faced with the risk of being completely stripped by the German orders,”542 the government created the COCN, along the lines of the organisation committees set up in each industrial sector by the Law of 16 August 1940. This Committee, led by Georges Bourgès, succeeded the Chamber of Shipbuilders,543 whose Chairman, René Fould, was arrested by the Gestapo on 27 January 1941. The COCN oversaw the industrial and commercial activities of the shipyards (programmes, supplies, production, prices, distribution of materials, wages, etc.), serving as the liaison between companies within the sector, the government and the German authorities. In practice, its establishment and function were decried by the trade, which complained of the excess “procedural paperwork.”544 “In Paris,” Henri Nitot noted in his memoirs, “during all those years [of Occupation], I had to put up with the constraints imposed by our Organisation Committee for Naval Construction created through Vichy legislation, difficulties with obtaining supplies of materials, the tyranny of the ‘bons-matières’ [ration coupons for raw materials]. Fortunately, the official departments were represented by two great marine engineers, Balland for the Navy and Dieudonné for the Merchant Navy, both of whom performed their duties with great courage and supreme diplomacy, and thus did us many great favours.” The increasing complexity of the administrative tasks “regarding both social laws and regulations on the distribution of raw materials”545 led to an increase in office staff, the number of which exceeded in 1943–1944 (295 people) that of 1938–1939 (275 people).

Advances and setbacks

The line followed by Darlan seemed to be on the verge of bearing fruit: “On 14 February 1941, the German Armistice Commission indicated at last that it would

541 Some authors date the creation of the COCN to 17 January 1941, the day of the publication in the Journal officiel of the Decree of 27 December 1940. 542 Claude Huan, op. cit. 543 See L’Ouest-Éclair of 24 January 1941. 544 Cf. Les entreprises de biens de consommation sous l’Occupation, by Hervé Joly, Presses Universitaires François Rabelais, 2010. 545 Report by Gaston Bernard, op. cit. agree to study the various problems raised by German and French shipbuilding programmes in the free and occupied zones (financing, construction and maintenance programme, compensation, raw materials).”546 Several days later (25 January 1941), “the German authorities [demanded] to be informed of the free zone’s construction capacities. […] Of the 3 billion francs […] representing the totality of vessels under construction, one-third had to be advanced by the French Government in the absence of a final agreement.” An initial financial agreement was initialled by René Sergent, Director of the Foreign Procurement and Sales Office (tasked with correcting the new exchange rate of the Reichsmark, deemed to be too low), and the future Deputy Director of Foreign Trade as of September 1942, along with Professor Noe, Kinzel’s Deputy. Admiral Darlan was still not granting the requested licences. A highly tense period ensued in Paris, with the German authorities expecting construction work to resume and threatening retaliations. In an attempt to appease them, Jacques Barnaud, acting in his capacity as Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations, met with Vice Admiral Kinzel and explained the affair to him, as conceived by Darlan – to no avail. The situation remained tense. In the shipyards, work progressed as slowly as the negotiations. Few orders were passed on to subcontractors. The German drain on French production was so strong that the shipbuilding industry had to make do with 750 tons of steel in February and 1,000 tons in March, instead of the monthly 2,500 tons initially scheduled.

The Germans go on the offensive: the case of “L’Africaine”

Management found itself in limbo since receiving the instructions from Balland and Herck in mid-January. This, in conjunction with the letter on the cessation of work on “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” sent by Le Trait to the Rustungsinspektion on 5 February 1941, provoked the anger of the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich, leading to him serving formal notice on ACSM on 4 March 1941. “In the course of a conversation you recently had with Marinebaurat Isemer on the subject of the aforenamed ship [‘L’Africaine’], you mentioned that the posi-

tion of the French Government did not allow you to pursue its construction. That said, please note the following. A memo exchanged in January 1941 with the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden expressly states that German armament orders placed within occupied French territory are not subject to the approval of the French Government, and that the High Commander of the German Army has the right, on the basis of the Armistice Agreement, to make use of French industry within the occupied territory in any manner and to any extent needed for the pursuit of the war against England. Any different stance taken by the French Government and your shipyard contradicts this memo and the spirit of the Law of 15 October 1940 relating to the prohibition of the manufacture of war material. For this reason, you are ordered to continue work immediately on the above-named ship, without delay, and to so inform the chargé d’affaires reporting to the Commanding Admiral in France. Should you continue with your wait-and-see attitude, the chargé d’affaires will be obliged to take specific measures.” Maison Worms immediately informed the Central Directorate for Naval Industries and the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction of these threats, both of which intervened on 11 March, calling on Vice Admiral Kinzel not to exert any pressure on ACSM as long as the negotiations in Wiesbaden had not resolved the issues between the two governments. In the meantime, work ceased on “L’Africaine.” Engineer General Herck himself had to confront the exasperated Germans. “On 19 March, General Barckhausen, in charge of economic problems within the occupied zone, summoned [him] […] and ordered him to sign the licences. Admiral Darlan responded that it was not his responsibility if Germany decided to negotiate so late, but that he agreed to sign the licences once his demands had been met. There would be no construction under pressure,” he stated.547

The keel of barge No. 105 is laid in slipway No. 7 between two air raids (Summer 1941)

For better or worse, work resumed on the ships during the second quarter of 1941, with the number of bluecollar workers peaking at 895 on 30 June (a figure that would never be surpassed during the Occupation). “However,” indicated Gaston Bernard, “it seems that no particular effort was made to find the pre-war workforce as, starting in [the second half of] 1941, headcount collapsed rapidly”548 under the combined effects of a slowdown in construction and the flight of part of the workforce faced with the danger of Allied air raids. The first wave of air raids occurred on 6, 11, and 22 July 1941, with Le Trait and ACSM again targeted on 12 and 31 August. Destruction to the shipyard was listed as follows: - first air raid – 6 July 1941: 0.061% - second air raid – 11 July 1941: 0.008% - third air raid – 22 July 1941: 2.479% - fourth air raid – 12 August 1941: 0.298% - fifth air raid – 31 August 1941: 0.265% Though the impact of the air raids was still moderate, it was set to increase until the Battle of Normandy (6 June to 29 August 1944). “Production,” indicated Gaston Bernard, “slowed down each time, more or less in accordance with the amount of damage.”549 Despite the strafing, fires and bombs, the keel of barge No. 105550 was laid on 19 August 1941 in slipway No. 7. But in September 1941, ACSM received notification from the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich that it had cancelled the order of 24 August 1940. The Germans’ idea was to use the materials intended for the tank barges for repairs to other Navy vessels. But they had to face up to the facts: stocks were so depleted that the materials were used immediately they were delivered. “In consideration of the degree of progress made in the machining of material already in the shipyard,” the occupation authorities decided on 4 October 1941 to cancel their project and to go ahead with the construction of the ship. The keel of a new barge, construction No. 106,

548 Gaston Bernard, op. cit. Relative collapse, since in December 1941 the workforce, with 1,237 employees, reached a peak. 549 Ibid. 550 M. Quemin in Le Trait, berceau de 200 navires […], 1993, provided the following information on the barges: No. 105, initially called “Ingénieur Lacroix” then “Loir” – keel laid down: 19.08.1941 – slip No. 7 – launched on 31.12.1943 and delivered to the German Navy on 04.03.1944 // “Courlis” (No. 106) – keel laid down: 11.10.1941 for the German Navy – slip No. 7 – launched on 07.06.1948 for the Purfina group // “Lutetia” (No. 107) – keel laid down: 12.06.1946 – slip No. 7 – and “Djinn” (No. 108) – keel laid down: 04.11.1946 – slip No. 7 – respectively launched on 13 and 30.01.1948 for Soflumar (Société Fluviale & Maritime).

was laid in slip No. 7 on 11 October 1941. The cancellation of orders with a view to re-using the equipment and supplies once again underscored the Occupier’s inability to ensure sufficient supplies to the shipyard. However, more than the supply problems, the activity of the shipyards was conditioned by the wait for the Wiesbaden decisions.

16 September 1941: the Franco-German Agreement on shipbuilding in the occupied zone is signed

The negotiations in Wiesbaden ultimately led to an agreement officially recognised by the French Government on 16 September 1941. “In practice,” wrote Claude Huan, the French Government “succeeded in curtailing German claims for fifteen months and in earmarking 30% of the shipyards’ capacity for France. The agreement also specified that work would be paid through a clearing house, and not through occupation fees. In reality, we are led to believe that the occupying authorities, after believing that they could pressure the French shipyards, ended up accepting the negotiations, once they realised that they could not provide the supplies for their own orders. […] The following were the key points of the agreement: the French Government authorised the shipyards to construct for the Germans a specific number of warships (twenty-eight, for 44,000 tons), service vessels that the French Navy had already ordered, along with a German programme for merchant and service vessels (250,000 tons in total). It allowed subcontractors in the free zone to work for the shipyards. As for the German Government, […] it undertook to provide 2,500 additional tons of iron products (for three months!), and authorised the completion of the torpedo boat ‘Aventurier,’ three patrol frigates [avisos], two oil tankers (‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Baïse’) and several service vessels. […] Admiral Darlan felt that France had thus obtained satisfactory quid pro quos.”551

3–9 October 1941: The Germans take over as project managers for “La Favorite,” “L’Africaine” and “La Charente”

Maison Worms was informed of the results of discussions in Wiesbaden on 3 October 1941 by Engineer General René Genon (Supervisory Service for Works and Manufacturing): “I have the honour to inform you that by virtue of a recent Franco-German Agreement, the German authorities, as of 26 June 1940, shall assume the project management of the further construction work on the following ships:

Contract Date Number Type Name Paris 5.771-B 31.03.1938 2 Submarines “La Favorite” and “L’Africaine” Paris 6.881-A 21.04.1939 1 Oil tanker “La Charente”

The French Navy has relinquished delivery of these ships. Nonetheless, the payment terms set forth in the contract, for which you had requested confirmation of the entitlements to payment prior to 26 June 1940 and which were paid by the French Navy, are rightfully yours to keep; those which might not yet have been paid shall be paid. Amounts not fulfilling this condition but which may nonetheless have been paid to you will be recalled. All financial guarantees currently existing for the payments received shall be released. You are to provide the list thereof to the relevant supervisory authority. Within the framework of the Franco-German compensation agreement, you are authorised to receive German payments based on the due dates set forth in the contract and acquired after 26 June 1940, as well as for other payment obligations that have arisen since that date. The necessary authorisations are hereby granted so that the supplies previously ordered by you in the free zone and intended for the aforementioned boats can arrive without further delay. ACSM is authorised to place new subcontracts in the free zone for the equipment intended for said ships. All these orders, as for those executed in the occupied zone, are subject to the provisions set forth in the general regulations in effect for the placing of German orders.

These provisions also apply to the materials which you may have to take from stocks other than those explicitly earmarked for the vessels in question. The French Navy is no longer under any obligation to oversee the construction work in question, nor the related subcontracts to supply the various equipment and materials which the Navy had agreed to make available to you to fit out the vessels. It is understood, however, that the supervisory authorities shall lend you any assistance you may need in settling various detailed questions arising from this change in project management. Last but not least, I call your attention to the need to release the Navy, as quickly as possible, from the interest payments on any advances that Crédit National may have granted. As regards the Navy, these advances must be repaid as and when cash inflows coming from German payments. For this reason, I request you and your main subcontractors, the Compagnie de FivesLille and the Matériel Électrique SW, to inform us of the date and amount of the advance granted to you and to keep the supervisory authority informed of any payments or reimbursements made by the occupying authorities, from which the advances received are to be deducted. PS. The issue of the engines for ‘La Favorite’ will be the subject of a later communication.” On 9 October 1941, Herck (German Order Service) wrote to ACSM: “I attach a copy of Licence No. 10 AF-bis regarding the completion of the submarine ‘L’Africaine’ in accordance with the Franco-German Agreement of 16 September 1941 on shipbuilding in the occupied zone. This copy was stamped on 4 October 1941 on behalf of the German Armistice Commission by the head of the Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsstabes Frankreich and also includes the decree which I signed on 9 October 1941, by delegation of the Secretariat of State of the Navy. Kindly confirm receipt of this document. Please note that, as of now, you will have to apply for an AT export licence as soon as the German Navy takes possession of the above-mentioned vessel: all information of use in making this application will be provided by my department within the desired timeframe.” A memo from ACSM dated 25 September 1944 stated that: “The order to continue construction work [on ‘L’Africaine’] was confirmed in a letter from the French Navy received during the month of October 1941 and sent, following intervention by the Government’s Commissioner, Engineer General Balland, by Mr Bourges, Chairman of the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction, this latter entity having been the only one to intervene on behalf of shipyards as an intermediary between the German Admiralty, the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden and the French Navy.” In application of the measures taken in Wiesbaden, ACSM was also informed, on 8–9 October 1941, by the Secretariat of State of the Navy, that “ownership of the squadron supplyships ‘La Mayenne’ and ‘La Baïse’ has been handed back to France. Everything is thus in order (or would appear so). The German Navy is reckoning on the three vessels, of which it had just been recognised as the owner (‘La Favorite,’ ‘L’Africaine’ and ‘La Charente’) being delivered without delay: in particular ‘La Favorite’ which the Kriegsmarine intends to use to train ASM forces552 – and which, with construction progress at 68.75% in June 1940, should have been launched one year before.” Five months after the Franco-German Agreement, on 12 February 1942, ACSM tried once again to shelter behind the fact that it had not received a formal order to continue work on “L’Africaine” as justification vis-à-vis the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich of why it had not resumed work on this vessel, but the argument no longer held. Confirmation was given to ACSM on 16 February 1942 by the Marine Bauaufsicht of Rouen: “Following the telegram from Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich Werftbeauftragter of 17 December 1941, work on the submarine ‘L’Africaine’ must also be stepped up. The preceding has already been transmitted to you verbally and is herewith confirmed in writing.” From now on, Maison Worms would have to come up with other excuses: technical problems, a lack of (raw) materials, air raid warnings and air raids, electricity blackouts, and soon staff requisitions, to justify the incessant delays in its launches to the occupation authorities.

Sign indicating the direction of a bomb shelter, placed in front of the Chantiers Worms

Avoidance and dithering (end of 1941 to August 1944)

Throughout the period ending with the liberation of its shipyard, ACSM engaged in a balancing act between a form of passive resistance and the repercussions precipitated by its evasions and equivocation.

Between shortages, air raid warnings and air strikes

Shortages of materials

“By the end of 1941, the overall situation in the shipbuilding sector,” noted Claude Huan, “had clearly become worrying. […] Deliveries of raw materials continued to decline: 50% for metals, 30–40% for copper, zinc and aluminium. Worse still, the occupation authorities were considering going ahead with the requisitioning of stocks of materials and machine-tools. Instead of the 5,000 tons of steel needed monthly for the [new construction] programme, not even 1,000 tons could be guaranteed in 1942. […] It was quite clear that the major projects from the previous year could not be executed.”553 Whoever they were – Chantiers de la Loire, Schneider & Cie, Aciéries de Rombas, Matériel Électrique SW, etc. – the ACSM suppliers delayed their deliveries. These delays, resulting from real or organised shortfalls, coupled with frequent work interruptions caused by air raid warnings, played havoc with schedules. Work on “La Mayenne” stopped at the beginning of 1942, as did that on “La Baïse,” the stem of which was to be requisitioned in January 1944 for use on repairs. Construction on “L’Africaine” had slowed down to such a point that the submarine would ultimately not be delivered to the Germans. The problems with supplies led the occupation authorities to downgrade their construction programme and focus on repairing their warships, tasks for which Hypolite Worms was to make the following statement in September 1944:554 “Although we were asked to repair or transform ships, we did our best to turn

553 Claude Huan, op. cit. 554 Interrogation of 26 September 1944. down the work under the most diverse, and most often spurious, pretexts.” Many orders were cancelled, including that for two of the four tugboats, for which Maison Worms had been ordered to build the 1,000HP triple expansion engines in November 1940. The Kriegsmarine cancelled two of these engines in June 1942, while the remaining two were not delivered; the work would resume in September 1944 on behalf of the French Navy. Likewise, the manufacture of the four cylindrical boilers intended for two 2,650-ton colliers for the French Navy was stopped at the end of March 1943, and not restarted until June 1945. By contrast, two of the four boilers ordered for the passenger liners “Londres” and “Vichy” prior to June 1940 were completed around the end of 1941. The French Government had in the meantime ceded one of the two ships to which the boilers were intended to the Germans, who demanded that the vessel be rush delivered to Le Havre. The ACSM management was opposed to this demand, arguing that the crane pontoon owned by the port of Rouen before 1939 and needed to put the boilers on board had been destroyed. The Kriegsmarine itself subsequently took care of finding the necessary equipment and went ahead with installing the boilers without the help of ACSM technicians. The other two boilers were never delivered. The pace of production, already slowed down by shortages and, according to several workers, deliberately braked by ACSM management, was deemed unacceptable by the Germans. To avoid sanctions, Worms & Cie wrote to Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich: “Our shipyard continues to put pressure on its suppliers; for our part, we plan to intervene with our suppliers in the Paris region, but we think it would be a good idea for you to do [likewise], in particular with regard to the Établissements Merlin & Cie in Grenoble and the Société de Construction Électromécanique in SaintÉtienne. Without your intervention, we will most likely have difficulty obtaining satisfactory delivery deadlines.” One of threats was that some ACSM staff would be imprisoned if the ships were not launched by the scheduled dates. This led management to request Vice

April 1942: the submarine “La Favorite” is covered with a camouflage against air raids (National Navy Museum Paris collection)

Admiral Kinzel to intervene so as to obtain the supplies promised by the Kriegsmarine on time and on schedule, thereby highlighting the latter’s responsibility for the delays. On 24 July 1942, ACSM wrote to KAF: “We hope that you will kindly pass on [the] specifications forthwith to the steelworks involved, allowing ACSM to take possession of the materials needed for the work within the shortest period of time.” On 1 August 1942, Worms Paris informed Le Trait of its intention to “pay another visit to the German Admiralty to ensure that the latter has undertaken everything necessary for the materials to be delivered to ACSM as quickly as possible.” On 14 December 1942, ACSM management urged the KAF to provide “as soon as possible one of the copies [of a] plan so that ACSM could quickly start executing it.” This insistence sought to give basic satisfaction to the Occupier, and “according to the details given by Hypolite Worms, was part of an overall plan to increase stocks. […] These materials, once on site, would be used in construction only after many tergiversations and delays. Basically speaking, the goal was to immobilise as much material as possible on site, only allowing a minimum to be used in production.” Raw materials and supplies increased in absolute value from 8,550,000 F in 1940 to 11,300,000 F in 1943.

The oil tanker “La Charente” is rechristened “Ostfriesland”

On 25 March 1942, Le Trait was the target of such intense air raids that nearly 7% of the shipyard was devastated. Following this new wave of destruction, the third after the air raids of July and August 1941, many workers holed up at home. The decrease in the workforce drew the attention of the Gestapo, whose threats of reprisals were the subject of circulars distributed by ACSM management as a means of getting the absentees to return to work. The investigation conducted by the expert Gaston Bernard revealed that management deliberately “closed it eyes when workers did not resume their work immediately after air raid warnings.”555 The reason for the delay in the construction work on “La Charente” however had nothing to do with the air raid warnings or the attacks. Initially scheduled for January 1942, delivery was pushed back to April, then postponed again because of an order to convert this oil tanker, which the Germans had rechristened “Ostfriesland.” In a letter of 27 May 1942, ACSM management notified the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction that a sizeable extension would be needed, with the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich being informed on 30 June that: “Insofar as we are currently able to assess the repercussions, execution of the scheduled modifications leads us to believe that the earliest possible delivery date for the ‘Ostfriesland’ is April 1943,” i.e. ten months later than planned. There is no information in the archives regarding the nature of the conversion work planned and executed. On the other hand, the archives point out that “the steering gear, ordered in Oran before June 1940, only reached the shipyard in March 1943, after numerous incidents.”556

12 September 1942: launch of “La Favorite”; ACSM is taken hostage

Despite the lack of zeal shown by ACSM staff during its construction, the submarine “La Favorite” was launched from slipway No. 3 on 12 September 1942. In anticipation of the event, a management memo relates,557 “Admiral Kinzel, Commander of the German Navy, had his Chief of Staff ring up Henri Nitot to announce the following: ‘Admiral Kinzel intends to come to Le Trait to attend the launch of the submarine. He expects to find Mr Worms there and would like to know what type of launch ceremony has been planned for this ship.’ Mr Nitot passed the message on to Mr Worms, who responded to Kinzel several hours later, stating that, in light of the difficult circumstances that France was going through, the launch of a ship on behalf of Germany could not be considered a day of celebration, and accordingly, there would not be any kind of ceremony, nor would Mr Worms be attending the launch of the ship.” That day, remembered Henri Nitot in his memoirs, was “particularly dismal: A fair number of representatives from the German Navy had come to Le Trait for the occasion, which I, along with Abbat and our engineers,

556 Ibid. 557 This undated document without addressee is filed in 1944, see www.wormsetcie.com. According to some sources, the launch is dated 5 or 19 September 1942; other documents confuse the launch and the delivery they date 2 or 5 November 1942. We have chosen to follow the date given by the expert G. Bernard.

Launch of the submarine “La Favorite” – commissioned by the Kriegsmarine under the name “UF2”

observed from afar, not mingling with them for one second. Both groups were thus present at the launch, each side in silence. Once the launch was over, we left without speaking to the Germans. The workforce, wherever they were in the shipyard, watched us, clearly moved and very tense. The atmosphere was leaden. The submarine was moored at our wharf, where fitting out and preliminary tests lasted another several months. Just as the final trials were set to start, the Gestapo arrested Jean Roy, our beloved Secretary General, and René Bonnet, head of the Secretariat.” In his report, Gaston Bernard detailed that: “On 10 September 1942, the German Shipbuilding Supervisory Committee, undoubtedly fearing sabotage, felt compelled to take Mr Roy, Mr Bonnet, Mr Émile and André Rougeolle [the latter two were workers] as hostages.” Henri Nitot continued: “Imprisoned in the cellars of the Rouen court building, each understood that they would remain hostages until the submarine was commissioned; and that any incident considered as a malicious act on the part of the shipyard might cost them their lives, or at least their deportation. Roy and Bonnet were among my closest friends. It was my duty to do everything possible to obtain their release. Along with Robert Labbé, we approached German Navy representatives in Paris several times. Unfortunately, we quickly realised that, instead of being received by our usual contacts, including Commander von Tirpitz, we were in the presence of officers who were representatives of the Gestapo in the Ministry of the Navy. Consequently, we received a glacial welcome, full of venomous and threatening innuendos. Quickly understanding that any intervention was doomed to failure, we left these meetings with shivers down our spines, very worried about the fates of our friends, and even fearing further preventive arrests. Fortunately, the trials went well, and several weeks later – a period which must have seemed far longer for those involved – they were finally freed, to our great joy.”

Air raid on ACSM on 25 March 1942

Gaston Bernard mentioned that they were freed on 4 November 1942, a few hours after the Occupier took possession of “La Favorite.” It seemed that the taking of hostages was, in fact, caused by the discovery of an anomaly: when the vessel was launched, the safety plumbs underneath the keel dropped out and poked into the channel, passing through the dock of Rouen. Suspecting sabotage, the Germans imprisoned several members of ACSM management staff. “Roy and Bonnet,” praised Henri Nitot in his memoirs, “endured their ordeal with magnificent courage. Locked up in their cells with other Gestapo victims, I know that not once did they stop being paragons of camaraderie for their companions, always seeking to raise everyone’s morale, preaching hope, and helping maintain a general atmosphere full of dignity and Christian resignation under deplorable sanitary conditions with insufficient food. At the end of hostilities, I was assured that no commission of inquiry was able to trace the fate of the submarine ‘La Favorite.’ I leave it up to each and every one of you to find a suitable theory about the circumstances surrounding how the vessel vanished in the ocean.” On 5 November 1942, the Kriegsmarine took acceptance of the submarine, putting it in service on 24 November 1942 under the name “UF 2.”558 Hypolite Worms noted that “this vessel, for technical reasons, (removal of its swivelling torpedo tubes as well as three of its four bow torpedo tubes) was devoid of any military value.” According to the report by Gaston Bernard, the hour/ ton coefficient559 corresponding to the manufacture of this vessel rose from 454 h/ton before June 1940, to 1,140 h/ton during the Occupation. The more than two-year delay of the launch, automatically led to large operational losses for Maison Worms, since the same staff worked on “La Favorite” for twenty-seven months instead of six.

558 Source: http://www.u-boote.fr/uf-2.htm. The vessel was used for training. Disarmed in Gotenhafen on 5 July 1944, it was scuttled in May 1945 and then turned into scrap. 559 Definition of return based on the number of hours needed to build one ton of a vessel.

December 1942: 120 workers from Le Trait are sent to Gdansk

While on 24 August 1942 the air raids of destroyed nearly 2% of the facilities, a new ordeal awaited the shipyard: the requisitioning and transfer of staff, dictated by Vichy, to German arms manufacturing factories. “At that time,” noted Claude Huan, “there were 8,800 German managers and workers working in France (in Brest, Lorient, Saint-Nazaire), but 23,000 French (shipyards and Navy dockyards) who for numerous reasons were working at a much lower productivity rate (lack of materials, air raids, blackouts, insufficient food, low wages, etc.). Since the summer of 1941, the occupying authorities had considered transferring workers from Cherbourg to Bordeaux where German facilities were being developed. Moreover, they had the opportunity to reduce deliveries of raw materials to create unemployment wherever they wanted. German authorities also complained about the output of French workers.”560 Following the failure of measures encouraging voluntary departures (the “relief system” construed by Laval561 in June 1942 sought to obtain the release of one prisoner of war by sending three Frenchmen to Germany), Fritz Sauckel, the “slave driver of Europe” who was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Labour Deployment on 21 March 1942, threatened to order the removal of contingents of male and female workers from the occupied territory in August 1942. Negotiations were launched with the COCN in early July 1942: the interest of the German Navy was spurred by the higher proportion of specialists in French shipyards than in German shipyards. To keep his hand on this requisitioning of labour, Laval had the Law of 4 September 1942 voted through. This established obligatory conscription in both zones for all men between the ages of 18 and 50, and for single women between the ages of 21 and 35. French shipyards were forced to send 5,000 members of their besttrained staff to the Reich’s Navy dockyards.562

560 Claude Huan, op. cit. 561 After being dismissed on 13 December 1940, Pierre Laval returned to the upper ranks of the government on 18 April 1942. His appointment to the new post of head of government confirmed the decline of Darlan, who fell into disgrace following the failed meeting between Pétain and Göring in Saint-Florentin (1 December 1941). 562 Claude Huan, op. cit. A German delegation visited ACSM on 7 October 1942, laying claim to one hundred and twenty-nine people. The next day, “the first detailed list of staff to be requisitioned from each shipyard and Navy dockyard (4,396 in total)” was published.563 On 21 November 1942, a further delegation to Le Trait increased this number to one hundred and fifty men. Management intervened with the Germans, who allowed this figure to be reduced to one hundred and twenty. These workers, designated by name by the labour inspector of Rouen, departed on 5 and 12 December 1942, en route to Danziger Werft in Gdansk, a Polish port annexed to the Reich since 2 September 1939. Two of them, recognised as unfit for work, were soon repatriated. In his memoirs, Henri Nitot emphasised that for ACSM: “The position was made even more difficult by the major slowdown in construction activity due to the destruction caused by the air raids. We were quickly presented with demands to transfer large numbers of workers. There again, Pierre Abbat reacted in an extremely wise and energetic fashion. Courageously standing up to all of the Occupier’s interventions, fighting tooth and nail against its demands, he succeeded as best he could in limiting departures for Germany, sparing those on whom this exodus would have caused particularly serious hardship for their health or families. Nonetheless, one hundred or so of our workers had to leave for the shipyards in Danzig. [Mr] Abbat demanded that they remain together, and our Engineer Chabrol was able to accompany them in order to watch over the material aspects of their lives, which he did with great devotion and skill. Fortunately, providence protected our workers right up to the end of hostilities. They came through the bombardments and vicissitudes of the Russian advance unscathed, and for them at least, this dangerous adventure ended without anything serious to decry.” Since ACSM continued to be threatened with staff requisitioning (January 1943), Professor Noe informed it that the only way to avoid this danger was to have the German Admiralty recognise the shipyard as a “training centre for specialist labour.” Management alerted the COCN, to the danger, which responded on 22 January 1943: “It has been formally acknowledged by the German Navy that no more

labour will be taken from your shipyard.” Nevertheless, in February and March 1943, further workers were listed by name. Each time, management worked hard to keep them in place, although it was unable to avoid the departure of small contingents of young men from the 1940–1941 and 1942 classes. Out of an average workforce of around eight hundred workers, one hundred and eighteen workers and two foremen were forced to leave for Germany under the French legislation in force at that time. “Management,” reported Gaston Bernard, “does not seem to have made any moves encouraging the departures. […] Quite the contrary, it is possible to say that ACSM tried as hard as it could, with the support of the COCN, to keep hold of its workforce in Le Trait.” The resultant drop in the workforce was to be compensated by requisitioned workers sent to the shipyard by the Germans, particularly during the first half of 1943.

19 June 1943: launch of the “Ostfriesland”

To meet the scheduled delivery date of this squadron supply ship, for which the Kriegsmarine had been waiting for months, the ACSM management informed its staff in two memos of its decision to grant performance bonuses. “In the final days leading up to the launch,” explained Henri Nitot to Gaston Bernard,564 “the Germans frequently exploded in management offices, complaining of overall inertia. To avoid extreme solutions, and fearful of renewed arrests similar to those preceding the launch of ‘La Favorite,’ management had to take this measure to calm the German authorities. Mr Nitot added that this was the only time during the Occupation that a performance bonus was offered, and besides, there was no guarantee that it would be effective.” The first memo was dated 21 April 1943: “Taking into account the highly specific and exceptional circumstances surrounding the completion of ‘Ostfriesland,’ we have decided to grant a bonus to the staff working directly on the project, based on two work aspects: assiduity and the effort made to meet the delivery date. Starting today and up until the completion of the work, all workers employed continuously on board the ‘Ostfriesland’ will receive a bonus fixed at the following maximum amount: - 600 F, if the ship is delivered before 5 June 1943 - 525 F, if the ship is delivered between 5 June and 10 June, inclusive - 450 F, if the ship is delivered between 10 June and 15 June, inclusive - 0 F, if the ship is delivered on any date thereafter. The amounts set forth above, which are payable as a lump sum upon delivery of the ship, will not be decreased in the event of an excused absence (with supporting documentation) for the following reasons only: marriage of the worker involved; death of a close relative (ascendants and descendants, relatives by blood or marriage), the birth of a child or an official summons. For all other absences, the bonus will be decreased: - by 35 F per day and 15 F per half-day, when the absence is authorised or supported by a medical certificate; - by 75 F per day and 40 F per half-day for all other absences. In addition, the bonuses may be reduced when the workers concerned demonstrate insufficient activity in the eyes of the engineers and foremen. The figures defined above have been scheduled for workers working continuously on the ‘Ostfriesland,’ between now and the delivery date. In the event of this employment being intermittent or reduced for a longer period due to departmental and work needs, the maximum bonus shall be calculated based on the time passed in relation to the number of weeks of continuous work. The measures described above will thus take account of the diligence of those deserving this bonus. However, everyone’s attention is drawn to the fact that those not demonstrating this attitude will not only be deprived of the bonus but will also not be immune from the sanctions which such an attitude (lacking diligence, lacking performance, lacking discipline) may give rise to. In this regard, it does not seem that everyone realises the severity of such sanctions, nor the reality of the current situation. Devoid of superfluous comments, we hope that this memo will be of assistance.” The second memo was dated 10 May 1943: “To avoid the problems that might arise on completion of the ‘Ostfriesland’ outside the shipyard, the German Navy has set 19 June as the date for the launch of the ship.

Photograph taken in haste by Maurice Quemin two days before the launch of the squadron supply ship “Ostfriesland”

This decision does not lead to any appreciable change in the timeframe established for the shipyard, and we draw everyone’s attention to the following two points: 1o) all work shall be terminated on 19 June; 2o) the greatest possible number of equipment tests shall be undertaken at the slip in order to reduce the duration of the shakedown cruises as much as possible; To take account of this change in schedule, only the bonus of 525 F set forth in memo No. 351 of 21 April will be paid, insofar as the work is fully completed by 19 June. All other instructions contained in memo No. 351 shall remain in effect.” Effectively launched on 19 June 1943, the vessel was delivered to the German authorities on 15 September 1943, i.e. more than two years late, having spent four years on the slip. The hour/ton coefficient of 166 h/ton achieved between laying the keel (4 May 1939) and June 1940 rose to 448 h/ton during the years of Occupation, “showing a considerable decline in labour productivity,” confirmed Gaston Bernard in his expert report. “According to reliable sources,” stated an ACSM memo of 5 September 1944, [the “Ostfriesland”] “suffered serious damage while crossing the Channel”; it was taken to the Blohm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg and used as a supply ship for U-Boats. As completion of the “Ostfriesland” and “L’Africaine” was deemed a priority by the Kriegsmarine, work on the 1,150-ton freighters was stopped at the beginning of 1943. Work was to resume at the end of the year, but only on two of the vessels (No. 111 and No. 113); No. 112 was abandoned. None of these vessels was actually delivered to Germany. They were still in their slipways when the shipyard was liberated.

August–September 1943: new attacks by Allied bombers

On 4 August and 11 September 1943, Le Trait suffered two new attacks by Allied bombers, the eighth and ninth since the beginning of hostilities. Stepping up the bombing, they destroyed more than 20% of the industrial complex, causing “great depression” (to use the expression of Gaston Bernard) among the workforce. “Toward the end of 1942–1943,” reported Henri Nitot in his memoirs, “heavy air raids began, first by the English, and later by the Americans, which for months caused the workers and the entire population to be on near-permanent alert day and night. These raids were completely useless, as our shipyard contributed an infinitesimal amount to the German war effort; clearly, the English intelligence services worked poorly or received completely distorted information. […] The whole of Le Trait started living in perpetual apprehension, wearing away at everyone’s nerves. Then the inevitable happened: in two raids, the planes came in broad daylight, just when the workforce was hard at work, destroying our two rows of workshops and generating panic everywhere. Both times, the unfortunate outcome was thirty or so deaths and scores of injured, victims of the absolutely inexcusable and savage bombing. What can I say about the sorrow of the families, the horror of searching for victims, or the infinite pain felt by all after losing such or such a colleague, such and such a friend. The entire town, stricken, went into mourning; and each time, a single funeral service was held for all who had died at the same moment, moving funerals in their simplicity during which the entire appalled population gathered around the coffins of those who, just a few days ago, had still been courageously busy at their jobs. I was able to attend the first of these ceremonies, and my feelings ran deep in the church, where the coffins of all those unfortunate souls who had served under my orders stood in a line. For the most part I had recruited them and had asked them to come to Le Trait. They had always shown great friendship to me.”

Praise for Pierre Abbat

On 16 December 1943, Worms & Cie wrote a letter, propably penned by Hypolite Worms,565 to RearAdmiral Henri Bléhaut, Secretary of State for the Navy and Colonies:566 “Since the Armistice, many are the Frenchmen who have displayed their share of devotion and sacrifices during the ordeals endured by our Country. For nearly four years, colleagues from our Maison Worms, a company primarily focused on ships and shipping, have fulfilled their duty in the various ports where they reside. Nonetheless, I would like to draw your particular attention to Mr Pierre Abbat, head of our Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime in Le Trait, for whom the ordeals have been particularly burdensome, and whose attitude, both within our company and on a national scale, is in my mind worthy of special praise.” After recalling his action in June 1940 during the evacuation, then upon the return of the staff and the resumption of activity at the shipyard, “a period [which], as anguishing as it appeared at the time, must seem relatively easy in comparison with the tragic situations that have since ensued,” the author of the letter continued: “Indeed, between 6 July 1941 and 11 September 1943, our shipyard was the target of nine air raids, resulting in many people being injured and the deaths of twenty-eight of our workers; 215 bombs on the factory were counted, causing extensive destruction (the plan appended to this letter allows you to appreciate the extent thereof). After each raid, the material damage had to be repaired under the greatest of difficulties, while the morale of the working population, working under particularly stressful conditions, had to be boosted, a task accomplished with great diligence by our Director. The day before the air raid of 4 August 1943, despite near impossibilities with regard to supplies, and despite the atmosphere created by the requisitioning of an appreciable share of our workforce, our shipyard was operating at a satisfactory pace. This result was primarily the work of Pierre Abbat, who was able to create, at all levels of the workforce, the atmosphere essential for overcoming the challenges they had been faced with. On 4 August and 11 September, two massive air raids seriously interrupted shipyard operations. But once again, we started back to work. In light of these circumstances, and with utter frankness, I would like to ask you, Admiral, to consider

565 The copy of this document kept in the Worms archives is unsigned. 566 From 26 March 1943 until 10 September 1944.

the possibility of promoting Pierre Abbat to the rank of Officer of the Legion of Honour. A marine engineer on the reserve list, Pierre Abbat, who entered Maison Worms in 1926 and has headed our shipyard since 1937, was made a Knight of the Legion of Honour in 1935. A promotion of this nature, the highest level of recognition of the civic courage and professional skills of one of our most highly esteemed and dearest employees, would also serve as a sign of the interest attached by your department to one of the hardest-hit companies in a branch of particular importance for the national economy, a company whose main concern, whether in the past or in the future, is to contribute to the prosperity of the French fleet.” Pierre Abbat was decorated five years later, in October 1948. The ceremony, described by Le Calfat du Trait of November 1948, afforded to Hypolite Worms the occasion to pay tribute to the “eminent merits” of the Director General of ACSM and to look back on the “tragic situations” that the company faced in the conflict.

Further requisitioning of workers

Although departures to Germany had ceased, the Occupier began further requisitioning in early 1944. The purpose this time was to boost workforces in other shipyards in France. By order of the Bauaufsicht in Rouen dated 25 January 1944, forty-four workers were thus summoned to leave Le Trait at the beginning of February 1944 and go to Rochefort. Their transfer was to be extended beyond the three months initially scheduled. Shortly after, another contingent was sent to Rouen to dismantle four barges in the port. Work continued until 11 August 1944. One month later, on 27 February 1944, the Bauaufsicht in Rouen sent sixty-one workers to Cherbourg to perform “special short-term work” for one month. During their absence, these employees no longer had an employment relationship with ACSM, receiving their pay from the companies employing them. Nonetheless, they continued to be part of the ACSM workforce.

The final work

Although one month earlier (8 February 1944), the shipyard and the town had been bombed, ACSM delivered to the Germans the 700-dwt non-self-propelled tank barge No. 105, ordered in July 1940 and launched on 31 December 1943. The three others, Nos. 106, 107 and 108, would not be completed until 1948. Signed by Pierre Abbat on 4 March 1944, the delivery report stated: “Construction work on the non-selfpropelled barge No. 105 with deadweight tonnage of 700 tons started in August 1941. It was ordered from the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine-Maritime – Worms & Cie via a letter of 24 August 1940 from the Kommandierender Admiral Frankreich. The construction work has been performed in Le Trait in accordance with the specifications, under the local supervision of the Marine Bauaufsicht, on the one hand; and the expert from Bureau Veritas, whose verification certificate is attached hereto. The non-self-propelled barge No. 105 was delivered to the German Navy on 4 March 1944. The latter acknowledged receipt thereof that same day, taking charge of the vessel without any reservations.” Despite the Allied landings on the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944, and the ensuing violent battles, the Germans, in a spirit of fighting to the end, continued to place their orders. On 20 June 1944, the Bauaufsicht in Rouen placed an order for eight 15-ton ferries, in accordance with plans already communicated: - the first was to be delivered on 3 July 1944; - the second, on 5 July 1944; - the third, on 15 July 1944; - and the rest, every ten days. The occupation authorities demanded that work be pursued during air raid warnings. According to the list kept since January 1944, such warnings accounted for 217,000 hours, i.e. 20% of the total hours paid up until Liberation. Their impact cumulated with the decline in the workforce (658 workers as of 30 June 1944, versus 1,126 workers out of a total workforce of 1,483 people as of 31 December 1939). In return for their diligence, the employees were given an 80% wage increase. A bonus of 16,000 F and 10,000 F was also scheduled, in the event of an early delivery. The first two ferries were completed, with the Germans taking possession of them. On 22 July 1944, ACSM received the order to build three 24-ton ferries, in accordance with the instructions of 1 July and 3 July 1944. Construction started on an additional ferry on 4 August 1944, just a few days before the liberation of the shipyard.

The British Army in the Normandy Campaign 1944 © IWM B9329 – www.dday-overlord.com

Landing of the Allies and liberation of the shipyard (6 June 1944 to 30 August 1944)

30 August 1944: Le Trait is liberated

Hypolite Worms, in his first speech delivered in liberated Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262); and Henri Nitot, in his memoirs, offered precise and moving account of the events that took place between 6 June and 30 August 1944. Henri Nitot: “At the time the Allies landed, the situation in Le Trait was getting worse and worse. As each day passed, the Germans became harder and harder, demanding more and more. They threatened to requisition our stocks of materials and transport them back to Germany but, with the German Navy representatives adopting a passive attitude, no shipments took place. More serious was the growing number of English and American air raids, obviously aimed at attacking the enemy’s channels of communication, but executed in a very clumsy manner. Our town was hit more and more, frequently resulting in innocent victims.” Hypolite Worms: “During the second half of August 1944, in the final phase of the Battle of Normandy, Le Trait came under fire day and night, the target of bombing, strafing and shellfire. This greatly exacerbated the damage already incurred though previous raids. The retreating enemy added to the shelling. Three times – on Sunday, 20 August; Tuesday, 22 August and Thursday, 24 August – the Germans systematically shelled more than thirty carefully selected points, bringing further destruction through explosives and fire. We watched

this dreadful scene, unable to distinguish between the aerial bombs and the explosives on the ground, both occurring simultaneously.” Henri Nitot: “As the Allies advanced, the communication channels between Paris and Le Trait became increasingly difficult and perilous. Abbat got through a couple of times on the back seat of a motorbike. […] For several days, a wall of silence fell between us. With Seine-Maritime now the battle theatre, I apprehensively waited for the news trickling through from Rouen to Paris. In the capital as well, things were coming to a boiling point. In my office one morning, rumours started coming in faster and faster of an uprising in the capital. I decided to hurry over to my residence across the Tuileries, where armed Resistance units were beginning to gather. Just as I entered our building, the first gunshots rang out. If I’d gone just a few moments later, I think that I would have been in great danger. With Paris liberated [25 August 1944], I anxiously awaited the news from Le Trait. Soon Pierre Abbat arrived to announce that Le Trait, too, had been liberated after several days of trials and tribulations for the population stuck in the middle of the combat zone, just where the Allies were crossing the Seine.” Canadian troops were the first to enter the shipyard on 30 August 1944. Hypolite Worms: “On the evening of 30 August, among the still-smoking ruins of the shipyard destroyed beyond repair, among the general chaos, the piles of rubble and the dead horses, the Liberation forces found ships under construction in the slips, gutted, overturned, offering a sorrowful scene of desolation. According to our count, 217 bombs, most of them 500-kg ones, hit the shipyard during the nine air raids in 1941, 1942, and 1943. In the course of the fighting from 18 to 30 August 1944,567 at least a further 56 bombs still fell on the shipyard, causing not just considerable material damage, but also inconsolable griefs. All the buildings had been hit, with some, including the management offices and the general warehouse, completely destroyed. All roofs had been blown off, all the lifting equipment and cranes had been flattened, and many of the machines were affected. However, right from the very start, a spontaneous act of faith seized everyone in the face of this frightening desolation.” Learning from Pierre Abbat that Engineer Jean Huré568 had been killed during an air raid, Henri Nitot spoke the following words of praise: “An individual of exemplary morality and rare intellect, an engineer through and through, I held him in high esteem and great affection. His very character fostered loyalty.” And as regards the courage of the Le Trait population, Henri Nitot said the following: “May I content myself with highlighting the exemplary civic conduct of both staff and the entire population over these past few years, with each bearing their ordeals with great heart. The liberation did not cause any problems in Le Trait.”

“Nothing but ruins and desolation”

henri niToT, memoirs “On making my first visit to Le Trait,” reported Henri Nitot, “I found nothing but ruins and desolation.” A report resulting from a Gestapo investigation in May 1944 confirmed (somewhat hastily): “As the result of some ten air raids [from 1941 onwards] the workshops were completely destroyed. The few employees still there are working on clearing the rubble. Production has come to a halt, and we can say that this branch is totally dormant.” As the contingent sent to Danzig now back in Le Trait, as the prisoners gradually returned, without “any bereavements to be deplored or serious illnesses to be recorded,”569 the situation was revealed with harshness: 55% of the industrial complex had been destroyed; the war damage exceeded 250 million francs; and losses were estimated at more than 30 million.

Final assessment: “The tonnage built for the German did not even reach 8%” of the shipyard’s capacity

GasTon bernard, 31 deCember 1945 A detailed assessment of the Occupation years was drawn up by the expert, Gaston Bernard, who, we recall, was appointed by the investigating magistrate Thirion in a case that, upon Liberation, pitted Hypolite Worms and Gabriel Le Roy Ladurie against the public prosecutor. Among the various points that he was asked

567 The list of destructions showed that these air raids wiped out 20.67% of the shipyard and caused 131,543,000 F of damage. 568 Several days later, Jean Huré’s wife was killed when their villa was bombed, as were her mother and the wife of another engineer. 569 Henri Nitot, memoirs, op. cit.

to analyse, the most significant data stemmed from a comparison between the tonnage built under German orders between 25 June 1940 and 31 August 1944 and that produced by the shipyard from 1 January 1936 and 25 June 1940 (a corresponding period of time). The result is as follows:

Tonnage launched

From 1936 to June 1940 From June 1940 to August 1944 - “La Favorite”

- “La Charente”

- barge Total 800 tons

4,910 tons 200 tons 19,179 tons

5,910 tons

Ratio: 5,910 / 19,179 = 30.81%

“This does not mean,” specified Gaston Bernard, “that ACSM activity from 1940 to 1944 was three times lower than during the period from 1936 to 1940. In fact, at the beginning and end of each period under consideration, it so happened that vessels had been partially built, with work still underway. For this reason, it is important to supplement the study with a comparison of the tonnage built: - first, from 1936 to 1940 - second, during the Occupation.”

Tonnage under construction

- from 1936 to June 1940 - June 1940 to August 1944 23,909 tons 7,765 tons

Ratio: 7,765 / 23,909 = 32.47%

Gaston Bernard noted that “in the years 1936 to 1940, tonnage built per year was never less than 4,100 tons (counting 1940 as a complete year). During the Occupation, the annual tonnage built never reached this figure, with the peak 3,105 tons being reached on 30 June 1941. Moreover, starting in 1941, the tonnage built dropped constantly, slipping to just 30 tons in the first eight months of 1944.” Given that the slipways were not continually occupied between 1936 and 1940, and that their maximum production capacity was 10,000 tons per year, the expert calculated the ratio of the 7,765 tons built during the Occupation at 19.4% of the shipyard’s potential over four years (7,765 / 40,000).

Tonnage ordered / tonnage delivered

Gaston Barnaud also compared the tonnage ordered by the Germans with the tonnage delivered.

Orders placed by the German Merchant Navy - completion of the oil tanker, “La Charente” - three 1,000-ton freighters - four 200-ton barges

Total 2,610 tons 3,000 tons 800 tons 6,410 tons

Orders placed by the “Kriegsmarine” - completion of “La Favorite” - completion of “L’Africaine” Total

Total ordered by the Germans

Total delivered 250 tons 200 tons 450 tons

6,860 tons

5,910 tons

Ratio: 5,910 / 6,860 = 86.15%

Tonnage ordered / tonnage built

However, of the 6,860 tons ordered, the following tonnages were actually built during the Occupation:

- “La Charente” - one barge (total tonnage) - “La Favorite” Total 2,610 tons 200 tons 250 tons 3,060 tons

Ratio: 3,060 / 6,860 = 44.60%

Gaston Bernard fine-tuned this estimate by comparing these 3,060 tons with the 7,765 tons built on slipways during the Occupation, which represented 39.40%. “Though the tonnage launched by the Le Trait shipyard during the Occupation,” commented the expert, “was delivered in full to the Germans, it represented just 30% of the tonnage launched during the four years preced-

ing the Occupation. While the tonnage built during the Occupation accounted for just one-third of the tonnage built between 1936 and 1940, 60% of the former was never delivered. This basically means that the Germans mainly took delivery of the previously indicated tonnages, benefitting from the construction work started prior to June 1940. It should further be noted that the tonnage actually built for the Germans represented just 44% of the tonnage they had ordered. Moreover, knowing that the Le Trait shipyard had an annual construction capacity of 10,000 tons, or 40,000 tons during the Occupation, the tonnage explicitly built for the Germans did even not reach 8% of that figure. The total number of hours worked in 1938 and 1939 was 4,128,144, i.e. an annual average of 2,064,072 hours. This average was never achieved during the Occupation. 1940 comes close with 1,923,354 hours, but it should be noted that the German Occupation did not begin until June 1940, with only 178,142 hours, or barely one-tenth, being devoted to German orders. Moreover, the total number of hours recorded during the years of Occupation show the number of hours paid, and not necessarily the hours used for production. In 1942, 1943, and 1944 for example, 751,523 hours were devoted to repairing war damage: - on facilities: 673,624 hours - on ships in slips: 78,479 hours.The table showing the hour/ton coefficient for each slipway during both fouryear periods is particularly telling. It looks like this:

Slip No. 1 Slip No. 2 Slip No. 3 Slip No. 4 Slip No. 5 Slip No. 6 Slip No. 7 Slip No. 8 Total coefficient Period 1936–1940 The period of Occupation 166 448

166 258

434 1 140

561 497

960 202

574 316

151 262

155 229 174 325 Accordingly, the hours devoted to construction in relation to the tonnage built before and during the Occupation total 229 overall from 1936 to 1940, versus 325 during the Occupation, indicating a decline in productivity of about 30%.”570 In light of this data, Gaston Bernard concluded: “As for the shipbuilding division, it seems that the management of Worms & Cie, which in this case had received the order from the Ministry of Industrial Production and Labour to slow down operations, went beyond what had been requested, engaging in obstruction. In fact, not only did it not actively seek German orders, but it limited itself, in general, to solely accepting those orders imposed upon it by the Germans from July 1940 onwards. Indeed, in the presence of a German officer, it even asked to be discharged from an order for four 700-dwt barges. On the other hand, it was only on the express orders of the French Government, in execution of the agreements reached in Wiesbaden in October 1941 and under German pressure and sometimes even threats, that the Le Trait shipyard restarted work on a number of ships already under construction on 25 June 1940. They did so only after ACSM management had drawn the French Government’s attention to the potential serious consequences of delivering weapons to the Occupier, and in some cases refused to assume any responsibility for any sabotage that might ensue. The ACSM management did not always start construction immediately after accepting an order, as was the case with ‘L’Africaine.’ Moreover, the study of the ACSM accounts revealed that, throughout the Occupation, the shipyard’s construction capacity was used only to a minor extent; and that, on the other hand, the hourly productivity for tonnage built during the Occupation was markedly lower than before the Occupation. Statements made by nearly all workers and foremen during the inquiry revealed that the decline in productivity was due notably to the fact that ACSM management did nothing to encourage staff to step up production.”

570 Gaston Bernard, in his expert report of 31 December 1945, pointed out “that the hours allocated to German orders represented 2,348,628 hours out of an overall total of 7,548,143 hours recorded during the Occupation, or 31%.”

1945–1959 Rebirth,

Le Trait Naval d’Hier collection

This conclusion was summarised by Mr Lénard, a Lawyer, in a sentence taken from a memo dated 29 October 1944: “The accusation brought against Maison Worms that it delivered weaponry to Germany, thereby helping the Reich in its war effort, has not been substantiated by the examination.” In fact, ACSM is “considered by the Organisation Committee for Naval Construction and by the officials in the shipbuilding department at the Ministry of the Navy as having been among the most resistant shipyards.”571 On 7 December 1945, André Marie, Chairman of the General Council of Seine-Inférieure department, sent the following telegram to ACSM (quoted by Henri Nitot in his memoirs): “General Council unanimously congratulates Ateliers et Chantiers du Trait on its highly patriotic stand during Occupation.”

“Ready to resume work”

hyPoLiTe Worms, 7 deCember 1946 Hypolite Worms gave his first speech in Le Trait on 7 December 1946 (see page 262), depicting the conditions under which operations resumed in the shipyard in the initial days following the end of the war and summarising the problems raised by the challenge of reconstruction. “Despite the shortage of resources, we courageously set about clearing the rubble, re-erecting and restoring buildings; and while awaiting authorisation to go ahead with overall reconstruction, we undertook makeshift repairs to the vital facilities. Shortly thereafter, a large segment of the workforce was able to return to work, and from that point onwards, despite the extreme shortages, the Le Trait shipyard did its part to get things going again in the region by salvaging and refurbishing the Duclair ferry, enabling it to resume operations in December 1944. One by one we undertook the task of righting the damaged ships and re-installing them on their slips – the righting of ‘L’Africaine’ in particular, hit in several places, gutted inside, lying on its starboard side at a 45o angle, was accomplished with complete success on 10 February 1945. Gradually, our thoughts turned to reconstruction and modernisation projects. Since the destruction of our facilities freed up large spaces, why not take advantage of this to redesign and improve the production layout? Since shipbuilding technology had made considerable advances throughout the world during the war – in Great Britain, Sweden, and especially in the United States – why not try to incorporate these advances and align our facilities with the state of the art? Since we, in sum, were ready to resume work, why not try to turn our shipyard into one operating with the latest technology, while maintaining its relatively modest scale in relation to the French shipbuilding giants? These ideas guided our thinking during the months following Liberation. Following the return of our Director from a long study mission abroad, we started developing the reconstruction programme – with the full approval of the departments involved.” To gain access to the resources required for this metamorphosis, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la SeineMaritime ceased to be a division within Maison Worms and assumed the status of a public limited company. This transformation was the first step in a move to restructure Worms & Cie, during which the three other divisions were to be re-established as joint-stock companies, subdiaries of Maison Worms: Ω in 1957, the traditional activities – Shipping and Fuel Merchanting Services – were incorporated into one entity by the creation of Worms Compagnie Maritime et Charbonnière (Worms CMC); Ω and in 1964, the Worms & Cie Banking Services became Banque Worms.