DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA by Armada International & Asian Military Review

Kanwal Sibal Can India-Russia ties stand the test of strengthening Indo-US relations? I 06

Ajai Shukla A hard-hitting interview with Russian ambassador Vyacheslav Trubnikov I 14 JULY, 2008

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 1

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Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Army The military remains a formidable political force, and the new regime has not disclosed any plan to renegotiate the social contract in civil-military relations I 44

Beyond the Nuclear Deal Whatever the fate of the civil nuclear deal, India and the US are on the path to further strategic affiliation and increasing military tie-ups I 54

RETHINKING INDIA'S TIBET CARD India's muted response to the most recent crisis in Tibet has drawn widespread criticism by C. Raja Mohan

JULY, 2008

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

EDITOR

Defence & Security of India

T a time of surging global interest in India, our editorial team is excited at bringing you the first Indian publication exclusively devoted to national security policy. With evaluations and forecasts from top-drawer analysts and policymakers, Defence & Security of India (DSI) will equip its often busy readers with the perspective needed for making strategic decisions --- business, security and political --- relating to India and the broader South Asian region. While retaining a South Asian centricity, DSI will explore the strategic and security situation in the context of its surrounding geographies, including China, the Indian Ocean region, the Gulf and South Central Asia. The magazine will also closely examine Indian security planning and alliances, its procurement of military equipment and technologies and the maturing Indian defence industry. DSI will remain politically neutral; our contents will reflect a cross-section of political and policy opinion in South Asia. The articles we bring you will be carefully pitched at an analytical level to enhance the debate on regional and national security. This is not a modest ambition but we will do our utmost to equip you, our reader, for confronting the challenges of the world’s most dynamic region. This inaugural issue of DSI focuses primarily on India’s unsettled relations with its most proximate major power, China. Even as the Indian government gropes for a response to the resentment in Tibet, we dissect the various options before New Delhi: should it ratchet up the pressure on Beijing, supplementing the Tibetan aspiration for political and cultural autonomy? Or should India use its leverage with the Tibetan leadership to gain China’s confidence and extract concessions from Beijing on critical bilateral issues, such as the resolution of the boundary dispute? These are important questions for Indian policy-making, and an eminent panel of writers looks for answers from the Indian, the Chinese and the Tibetan perspectives. This issue also explores India’s growing defence relationship with the United States, the increasingly complex friendship with Russia, and analyses the continuing insecurity in Pakistan and Nepal. And, sadly, in our inaugural issue, we bid farewell to a legendary Indian military hero, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who played a major role in shaping the geography of South Asia into the form it bears today. 1

We dissect the various options before New Delhi: should it ratchet up the pressure on Beijing, or should India use its leverage with the Tibetan leadership to gain China’s confidence

JULY, 2008

CONTENTS

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INTERVIEW 14

“WHAT IS INDIA’S CLAIM TO BE PART OF 5TH GEN FIGHTER”

and Russia.

BORDER LINE 62

PHANTOM LINE IN THE SAND As demographic changes sweep along the desert districts of Rajasthan, the

Russian ambassador to India Vyacheslav I. Trubnikov is a career diplomat but he doesn’t allow his profession to get in the way of a hard-hitting conversation in which he outlines the contours of the changing ties between India

question everyone is asking is, will this border too see the kind of violence that has affected other parts of the international border with Pakistan?

SPECIAL REPORT 28

CHINA, MORE CREDIBLE As military expenditures have grown, it is increasingly probable that more and more of what it truly costs to run the PLA is being reflected in China's budget.

JULY, 2008

COVER STORY

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RETHINKING INDIA'S

TIBET CARD India’s muted response to the most recent crisis in Tibet has drawn widespread criticism. Liberals and Conservatives alike would like to see India respond more positively to democratic upsurges in the neighbourhood.

INDO-US TIES 54

BEYOND NUCLEAR DEAL Whatever the fate of the civil nuclear deal, India and the US are on the path to further strategic affiliation and increasing military ties.

FROM BEIJING 24

COMMON AGENDA As great changes sweep the

world, India and China must leverage their complementary strengths and common objectives to focus on domestic prosperity and regional stability.

PAKISTAN

lead Nepal's nascent democracy, its neighbours wonder about etiquette, and keep a watchful eye on their own radical left movements.

NEIGHBOURS 36

44 relations or will it only be a return to the past?

CAN THE ELEPHANT DANCE?

NEPAL 50

Pakistan has a new army chief and a new government in Islamabad. Will the new dispensation mark the beginning of a new era in Pakistan’s politico-military 3

OLD DOG, NEW TRICKS? As the Maoists prepare to

MIDDLE PATH FOR TIBET? The lack of trust between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama’s representatives has meant that, despite the closeness in rhetoric, their talks continue to be a dialogue of the deaf.

CONTRIBUTORS

C. RAJA MOHAN

C. Raja Mohan is currently a Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Earlier, Mohan was Professor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. He also served as the Strategic Affairs Editor of The Indian Express in New Delhi.

AYESHA SIDDIQA

RAHUL BEDI

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for the Janeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes regularly to it on a diverse range of security and military-related matters. He is also the India correspondent for The Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times, Dublin for which he writes on a variety of issues.

CLAUDE ARPI

Claude Arpi, French by birth, has lived in India for the last 34 years. He is the author of several books on Tibet, India, China and Indo-French relations, including the just-released Tibet, the Lost Frontier (Lancer Publishers). After graduating as a Dental Surgeon from Bordeaux University in 1974, he decided to come to India.

YUBARAJ GHIMIRE

Yubaraj Ghimire is a Kathmandubased journalist and among the few Nepali news professionals who honed their journalistic skills abroad and eventually returned home to practice the craft. He is the editor of the popular Samay newsweekly and Newsfront, a English news tabloid. He is the former editor of Kantipur.

KANWAL SIBAL

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from 2002 to 2003. Most recently he was India's Ambassador to Russia (2004-2007). He joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1966. He began his career in France (1968-1973), and was Deputy Spokesman in the Ministry of External Affairs (1973-1975).

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA JULY 2008

VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1

EDITOR

Sonia Shukla RICHARD A. BITZINGER

XIAOJUN HENG

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Richard A. Bitzinger is an Associate Professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, where his work focuses on military and defence issues relating to the Asia-Pacific region, including regional military modernisation, weapons proliferation, local defence industries and arms production.

Xiaojun Heng is currently Professor and the Vice President of the China Foreign Affairs University. He is also member of European Association for lexicography (EURALEX), China Education Association for International Exchange, Translators Association of China.

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INDIA-RUSSIA TIES

INDIA-RUSSIA TIES: FU R KANWAL SIBAL

Russia and India today stand on the threshold of establishing a more equal relationship as their respective capacities grow. But for that to happen the economic pillar of the relationship must be strengthened.

ELATIONS between India and Russia have been remarkable for their stability. No other relationship between big countries provides a parallel. If India and Russia (including its Soviet incarnation) have maintained an unbroken friendship for almost 50 years, it is because of shared national and geo-political interests. Those interests have not changed, even if the international situation has. As a nonaligned country in a Cold War setting, India was opposed to any exclusive relationship with the Soviet Union even when our strategic dependence on it was high. In the post Cold War setting, when there is no pressure to choose camps, India continues to promote its interests without aligning itself with any country. We can maintain traditional ties with Russia while establishing strong relationships with other partners. India and Russia have a common interest in maintaining an equitable balance in international relations. Aweak Russia is not in India's in-

terest, as the void will be filled by China. The emergence of the US as the sole superpower in 1991 drove America towards unilateralism and costly foreign policy mistakes. For multilateralism to function, Russia, India, and others need to be able to exert their weight in international relations. This requires a continued good understanding between Russia and us. Between the southern borders of Russia and our western borders, there is the great expanse of Central Asia where for strategic reasons India wants to increase its presence, and Russia wants to preserve its position. Increasing Chinese penetration in this area, capturing energy resources and local markets, would be at the expense of our ambitions. Projects like those linking some of these states to the Karakoram highway and on to Gwadar Port, which Pakistan is pushing in order to make strategic inroads beyond Afghanistan, would further limit our opportunities in Central Asia. Russia has a large Muslim population and is

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Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (L), Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Indian Minister for External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee (far left); Russian President Vladimir Putin (above); Russian paratroopers

LL TILT AHEAD fence systems being installed in Russia's European periphery. Western geopolitical moves in Central Asia and in the Caspian Sea region, to evacuate their hydrocarbon resources while bypassing Russian territory, challenge Russian core interests. To ease pressure from the West, Russia has strengthened its understanding and engagement with China, which, until recently, was the biggest customer of Russian military hardware. In the UN Security Council both countries cooperate well on several issues where both are at odds with the West. Working together prevents the diplomatic isolation of either on sensitive issues such as Iran, Myanmar, Kosovo, the Middle East, human rights and disarmament issues. The trilateral India-Russia-China dialogue initiated by Russia was part of its effort to counter western pressure and promote the idea of multi-polarity. China was initially reticent, while India's approach was tentative. Now the dialogue has acquired a rhythm of its own,

Now the India-RussiaChina dialogue has a acquired a rhythm of its own, with four stand alone meetings already held but the weak leg in this tripod is the India-China relationship

â&#x20AC;&#x153;

threatened by religious fundamentalism and terrorism, just as we are. We are closer to the epicentre of this twin menace in Pakistan and adjoining areas of Afghanistan, but Russia too sees Afghanistan as its frontline, as any spillover into Central Asia would make southern Russia vulnerable. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan into Central Asia, and on to Russia, is already a major problem. Both India and Russia have a long-term interest in insulating Central Asia from religious fundamentalism and terrorism, so that our own polities are not endangered. Both countries are deeply concerned about Afghanistan's stability, the rise of Taliban forces, and Pakistan's complicity. Our past cooperation to counter the Taliban remains an option in the future. The West is applying unrelenting strategic pressure on a weakened Russia, with NATO seeking now to expand to Ukraine and Georgia, the European Union extending its frontiers into Russia's neighbourhood, and missile de-

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INDIA-RUSSIA TIES

Russia, though weakened, is a resurgent power, while India, though still a weak power, is rising. As a result, the relationship between the two today is more balanced than in the past

ties. Our preoccupation with interwith four stand-alone meetings al- A commercially active nal politics has muted our voice on ready held. The weak leg in this tri- Moscow city is a the international political stage, pod is the India-China relationship. living symbol of a and our anxiety to avoid annoying Russia's intent in promoting this fo- resurgent Russia the US in the context of the nuclear rum was also to create another platform for India and China to interact on major deal adds to our normal caution. As we are not global issues, besides exploring trilateral eco- permanent members of the Security Council, we nomic synergies. The West was initially in- can get out of taking positions on a gamut of intrigued by this potentially far-reaching initia- ternational issues. China's weight as a permanent member can tive, but no longer sees it as threatening; the reality is that each of the three participants has be leveraged by Russia on issues of the highest concern to it. For Russia, the most effective fopowerful interests tied up with the West. Russia, though weakened, is a resurgent rum to resist US unilateralism is the UN Secupower, while India, though still a weak power, is rity Council, where it has a veto. As India is abrising. The relationship between us today is sent from the Security Council, Russia does not more balanced than in the past. India, however, need to engage intensively with it on front-line isstill punches below its weight internationally sues. The limited visibility of India-Russia diplobecause of an acute sense of its own vulnerabili- matic engagement because of these factors cre-

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JULY, 2008

INDIA-RUSSIA TIES

The Kremlin and the Red Square form the centre of Russia from where all power radiates

Russia’s recognition of India’s pre-eminence in South Asia is part of our strategic understanding. Russia does not arm India’s adversaries or help them develop strategic capabilities

ates the misperception that either Russia now attaches less importance to India, or that it is signalling its unhappiness with India's new proUS leanings. But Russia attaches as much importance to India as serves its interests. We tend to sentimentalise our relationship with Russia because of past Soviet linkages. The Russian leadership is unsentimental. For a while, during the Yeltsin years, our relationship suffered because new Russia wanted to free itself from close Soviet-era entanglements. But Russia's European option was rebuffed, and Russia turned eastwards. President Putin is the real architect of the current India-Russia strategic partnership, for practical, not sentimental reasons. His goal is to rebuild Russia's Great Power status and, while stabilising ties with Europe, reassert its Eurasian role through a 'multi-vectored' policy. Under his watch, the two countries have maintained a regular dialogue at the highest level-eight summits in as many years. Our strategic partnership with Russia is based on common thinking-not necessarily accompanied by common initiatives-on a broad range of issues: the need for multipolarity, respect for the principle of sovereignty of countries, rejection of the doctrines of intervention and regime change, combating international terrorism without double standards, etc. In the bilateral framework, it expresses itself in Russian support for India's permanent membership of the Security Council, a strong defence relationship with Indian access to advanced Russian defence technologies, cooperation in sectors such as space, including Glonass, nuclear energy, and so forth. Russia's recognition of India's pre-eminence

in South Asia is part of our strategic understanding. Russia does not arm our adversaries or help them develop strategic capabilities. It does not insert itself into conflicts in the region and press for solutions that fit into its regional interests, or concern itself with a "strategic balance" in South Asia. If one were to calculate the political, military and economic cost to India of policies pursued in our neighbourhood by some outside powers, the enormous value to us of benign Russian policies in the Subcontinent would be evident. Our strategic partnership has solid defence content. Russia gives us technologies that other countries do not. In significant ways, they are helping us build a robust defence base. Our relationship is based on trust, which takes time to build in this sensitive area. The important thing is political reliability. Russia has offered us participation in their Glonass system, including access to military signals. Over 50 percent of the equipment used by our services is of Russian origin. Today, India is Russia's largest market for defence exports. India is procuring the aircraft carrier Gorshkov and twelve Mi29K aircraft, as well as 230 SUMKI aircraft; it will manufacture 1000 T-90 tanks locally under license and procure 347 more; it has acquired three Project 1135.6 frigates and ordered three more; it has followed its acquisition of 2 Smerch rocket launchers with a third; and has ordered eighty Mi 17 medium-lift helicopters. It is considering upgrades of various aircraft, and acquiring equipment for indigenously built Project 17 ships, etc. Our Navy and Army have placed large orders for the Brahmos missile, and an air version is being developed. As of mid-2007, over $14 billion worth of Indo-Russian defence contracts were in varying stages of implementation. The decision to jointly develop the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft and the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft, which will tie our respective defence planning and industries even more closely, signals Russia's continuing position of privilege in India's defence sector. We should, for the first time, get access to design capability. Product support for Russian equipment supplied to India's armed forces has, however, become a major issue, provoking calls to diversify sources of supply and reduce dependence on Russia. In the context of major inroads being made by Israel, and the hectic efforts of US suppliers to get a share of India's huge market, Russia needs to address Indian concerns with greater promptitude. Russian supplies are bedevilled with problems in maintaining support facilities, supplying spare parts, training and technical documentation. Russia's tardiness in dealing with teething problems in new equipment developed to our specifications, and, at times, its reluctance to absorb the cost of rectification, have exacer-

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Sukhoi 30MKIs

Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan in 1988

bated negative feelings. Violations of contractual obligations and departures from delivery schedules have become serious problems, especially in the case of Gorshkov. The biggest weakness in our strategic partnership is the low level of bilateral trade. At $4 billion, the two-way trade is unimpressive. India and Russia are among the four largest emerging markets and have entered the league of trillion dollar economies. India is growing at 8 to 9 percent, and Russia at around 7 percent. Russia has the third-largest foreign exchange reserves; India's reserves are sizable too. Russia

attracts even more foreign investment than India. However, these strengths are not being reflected in mutual exchanges. State-directed trade is no longer possible. The private sector on both sides must be galvanized. But our growth sectors, especially IT and ITES, are largely tied to western markets. Russia's big story is oil and gas, minerals and metals; its manufacturing is losing competitiveness. The Russians are not yet sufficiently equipped for competitive bidding in our conditions. The two governments are targeting a figure of $10 billion two-way trade by 2010, which would be an improvement, but not enough compared to our other big partners. India got a good break in Russia's hydrocarbon sector in 2001, when ONGC invested $2.7 billion in Sakhalin-1 in partnership with Russia's Rosneft. With Russia asserting state control over its vital energy sector, the rules for foreign investors have become tighter. India has made several proposals for participation in other Russian energy assets, but so far without success. At the political level the doors are said to be open, but political will has not been easy to concretize at the company level. Energy-rich Russia and energy-deficient India have compatible interests. Their lack of geographical contiguity creates c practical difficulties in linking them with energy networks. India could potentially be a market through swap deals, as is happening with India's share of oil from the Sakhalin-1 project. If Russia aims to retain its dominance in India's defence market and potentially its civilian nuclear market, then India can legitimately look for openings in

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INDIA-RUSSIA TIES

The MiG-29 has hydraulic controls and a SAU-451 three-axis autopilot but, unlike the Su-27, no fly-bywire control systems

Russian-made T-90 tank

Energy-rich Russia and energy-deficient India have compatible interests.Their lack of geographical contiguity creates clear practical difficulties in linking them with energy networks

Russia's oil and gas market. Finally, our relationship with Russia is based on mutual trust built over time, and our broad national and geopolitical interests are compatible. Russia and India face common challenges, especially those of terrorism and religious extremism. We do not weaken Russia's position in its neighbourhood; likewise, Russia has over the years respected our interests in the Subcontinent. Radical changes in the international situation haven't undermined the basis of our understanding. Today there is greater scope for establishing a more equal relationship. Rising India and resurgent Russia can forge more mutually beneficial ties as their capacities grow. The economic pillar of the relationship must be strengthened; we need an expanded economic relationship, involving the most enterprising

and productive elements of both societies. Russia could use India's IT and ITES capabilities more, with pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and trade in raw diamonds as other areas of considerable potential. Defence, space, nuclear energy, scientific and technological exchanges remain core areas of cooperation. In defence, which dominates the relationship, the Russian side must take steps to resolve product support issues, as slow action in this regard could steadily erode its standing in India. Recent protocol-level incidents have given rise to speculation here that some coldness has crept into Indo-Russian ties because of the rapid warming in Indo-US ties. But Russia is not seeking an exclusive relationship with India, and Indo-US ties follow a logic unrelated to our relationship with Russia. The India-Russia relationship, strong in the past, has every reason to remain strong in the future. Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from 2002 to 2003. Most recently he was India's Ambassador to Russia (2004-2007). He joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1966. His diplomatic career spans 41 years. He began his career in France (1968-1973), was Deputy Spokesman in the Ministry of External Affairs (1973-1975). He then spent an academic year at Oxford University (1975-1976). He thereafter served in Tanzania (1976-1979) and Portugal (1980-1982). He was Deputy Chief of Mission in Nepal (1982 -1985) and then Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (1986-1989). He was India's Ambassador to Turkey (1989-1992) and Deputy Chief of Mission in the United States (1992-1995). He served thereafter as India's Ambassador to Egypt (19951998) and France (1998-2002).

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INTERVIEW

“What is India’s claim to be a part of a new 5th generation fighter?” There is much to be happy about in IndiaRussia relations, especially in Russia’s willingness to provide India with high technology. But there is growing friction over time and cost overruns in defence purchases like the Gorshkov. Are there also difficulties in negotiating the respective roles of India and Russia in forthcoming joint development projects like the proposed 5th Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA)? I can only speak about the political approach to what we have been doing, the general principles of our cooperation. The general approach is to participate in the creation of (the FGFA) from the very beginning. It means designing, then construction and production and then marketing. All the processes will be discussed by both sides and together they will determine who is responsible for what. And of course, contribution of either side will be in the framework of what (each side) is able to produce in best quality and of the most modern type. If we speak about the Russian side, the Sukhoi design bureau… is well known for its fighters and the brand of Sukhoi 30 MKI is well known to India. It is considered by the Indians to be one of the best of its type. Now it is being assembled in Nashik. Both sides signed an additional contract for 40 such aircraft to be assembled here. So the quality is guaranteed. It is now essential to determine what the Indian designers might suggest (can be done) from the Indian side (in developing the FGFA). I know perfectly well an aircraft that was created entirely by the Russian side: the Sukhoi 30 MKI. But I don’t know what the Indian side will do. So one must ask the question to the Indian designers, the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), what is their claim to be a part of a newly built aircraft, a fighter of the fifth

The Russian ambassador to India Vyacheslav I. Trubnikov, is a career diplomat but he doesn’t allow his profession to get in the way of a frank and hard-hitting conversation with Ajai Shukla, in which he outlines the contours of the changing partnership between India and Russia.

generation type. Is it avionics, an engine, or what? I don’t know. In defence production India is a relative newcomer compared to Russia, which has experience of more than 70 years. This year, for the first time, India (displayed) its product in the (ILA 2008) air exhibition in Berlin: the Dhruv helicopter which is produced for selling in the international aircraft market. It is an Indian brand. I do not know another completed military machine that is created by India for selling in the international market. Although India has experience in producing on its own, its own military equipment, e.g. Tejas and, in tanks, the Arjun… these are not for selling in the international market. It means that India does not consider these brands mature yet, to be proud of, and to have them as a brand for international selling. Now when India is engaged with Russia in the production of a 5th generation fighter, it has the goal of selling it in the international market. Up to now, the best and brightest example of a military product produced here in India is Brahmos missile. It is a unique product of absolutely contemporary weaponry, of extreme capacity and effectiveness. This product deserves to be sold in the international market.

In going for joint development partnerships like the FGFA and the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MRTA), how much confidence does Russia have in India’s ability in systems development? Are those projects based on a genuine technological synergy, or are they more driven by political partnership? It is not just showing strength in political partnership, the weapon systems are going to be assessed by their quality and how they correspond to today’s international requirements

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and (they) should be judged at their face value. Year after year, India as a partner of Russia is proving itself more and more effective and has more and more experience. Now when we talk about the FGFA we would like to talk as equal partners and have the same level of responsibility for a product that is being produced by one side or the other. Both sides should have the same kind of high quality and bring in the same kind of profits in case it is sold. It should be competitive in the international market. It is not just a token of our friendship, it should get assessment at its face value. It should correspond to the highest standards. This must be the yardstick by which we measure our cooperation in the military field. We must assess ourselves as equal partners in a joint venture. This is the approach we should stick to.

For decades, Russia has treated India as a strategic partner and sold it military equipment at “friendship prices”. Is Russia’s new commercially driven approach to defence sales symbolic of a new political approach? We are not changing. The approach is the same as that of a strategic partner because both countries are engaged in a strategic partnership. Which means that we are not partners for one hour, or in one show. It means we should project a very high level of responsibility and interdependence and effectiveness. Our partnership should produce mutually acceptable and useful results. In (the case of the FGFA, neither side can consider the other side its younger brother or elder brother. We are equally responsible for what we jointly produce, the brand is IndianRussian, (whether) it is 30 per cent Indian or 70 per cent Indian. It is a joint product and we together must be responsible for it. No one would say Russians are excellent because their part of the aircraft is excellent. In case the overall product is excellent then our partnership in the creation of this product is excellent, independent of the percentage of our cooperation in terms of money, value or technical characteristics. And we should be equally demanding of each other. This is not just a show of our political friendship. Nothing has changed in the attitude. What has changed is that India started producing (defence equipment) that it did not produce previously, and India was relying on the Soviet Union for these. Now it is self-sufficient in very important areas. For example, in space research, India is producing satellites completely indigenously. But it started not in an empty place; it used certain experience and technology which it got from the Soviet Union, no doubt about it. The bulk of ISRO got education in Russia. I was very proud when in Bangalore I was shown two assembly lines where two satellites were assembled by Indian specialists without any for-

For the first time India took the Dhruv helicopter to the air show in Berlin

eigner —- and completely indigenously —but many people who supervised the assembly line spoke Russian. Now they do not need Russians in the assembly line. Are you saying that this joint development is not a slogan and it is not politically driven, but the reason why India and Russia can now enter these joint partnerships is because Indian industry has reached a certain level of maturity? I am saying it should be so. Is the issue of intellectual property rights (IPR) still a significant hurdle in these joint development projects? No. We have a bilateral treaty that guarantees IPR in military technical sphere. We are satisfied with that. From what I know there was never any leakage of information that the Russian or Soviet side shared with India. India was immaculate. Sometimes, even before signing the IPR treaty three years back, we shared sensitive information with India for decades because we were sure of India as partners.

Step by step India will reach a point where it would not be jealous of Russia’s“practical ties” with Pakistan and other countries which might be considered “notvery-convenient” neighbours of India

As India diversifies its partnerships, will New Delhi’s growing relationship with Washington impact on the Russia-India relationship? Is there a sense in Moscow that India is moving away from an old and comfortable partnership? I believe (India’s growing strategic relationship with the US) would not influence our partnership, to an extent that Russia might be jealous or concerned. (The US-India partnership) is an inevitable process because India is now developing into a state, definitely of regional dimensions, and verging on a country with global interests. How can a country with global interests be oriented only on one friend or partner country? Look at Russia, we are maintaining good

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INTERVIEW

The Arjun tank is one of India’s success stories in defence production (Photo: Ajai Shukla)

relations with the world, independent of (relations with) China and the US and India. With all these countries we would like to have equal and well-developed relations because we can survive in a complicated and challenging world today because we are all bound by interdependence, mutual assistance, mutual steps. The challenges of today are impossible to fight on one’s own. The period of unilateral steps, especially use of force, is over. And the results of unilateral steps are sometimes catastrophic. I think you understand that really I am talking about Iraq. Unilateral steps, especially the use of force, are unacceptable now for the whole international community, not just Russia. We do not think that competition in the market economy should be looked upon suspiciously. But, in case, competition is not honest then we would have concerns.

India had asked Russia not to allow China to provide Pakistan with the Russian RD-33 aircraft engine, which powers the joint ChinaPakistan JF-17 fighter. Do you see New Delhi as unduly circumscribing Russia’s genuine commercial interests, in that case? Step by step India would reach a point where it would not be jealous of Russia’s practical ties with Pakistan and other countries which might be considered not-very-convenient neighbours of India. I think today’s world is too complicated to have a straightforward outlook.

Now when we strike contracts with the Indian side, they agree to put into the text of the contract an escalation clause.That every year there will be an amount of escalation in prices, it may be just 5 per cent

We have to distinguish not only black and white but also shades of colours in the relations between countries of the world. No doubt if we are strategic partners then we should have closer relations and a better understanding of many things compared with other countries. When we are engaged in such enterprise as mutual creation of an interceptor or fighter, in mutual production and with sharing latest technology of very delicate character, it is a reflection of our strategic partnership. We sell to India certain technologies that we do not sell to anybody else. So we trust India as strategic partner, all the history of our friendship is trusted history; we never let down each other. We (have) supported each other. And on the RD 33 engine, have you stopped

China from providing it to Pakistan? There is still no real clarity. For me also there is no clarity. This engine was sold to China with (the provision of) an end user certificate. So it cannot go to Pakistan according to the certificate.

The increase in price of the aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov; that has created bad blood with the Indian Navy. Why has that price raise happened? It was an initial mistake, the general price of the contract was below admissible, it was unreal. It happened because developments that

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came afterwards were unforeseen at that time. The change of price of oil, (the depreciation) of value of the dollar; who could see it at the time the contract was signed? But the amount of work which (the Russian shipyard, Sevmash) undertook to fulfil cannot be done now at the price which is fixed in the contract. Either (the work) should be cut, but then India will not get the product it wanted at the time of signing the contract or the price should be high. We cannot sell it at a loss. This is the reality.

But people may argue, as has India’s navy chief, that a contract is a contract. But a contract may be correct or incorrect. To an extent, that contract was incorrect. I have explained the circumstances: the navy building industry was urgently in need of money and the Indian side used it not only to utmost, but practically pressurised the Russian side on price, without foreseeing the practical consequences. Now when we strike contracts with the Indian side, they agree to put into the text of the contract an escalation clause. That every year there will be an amount of escalation in prices, it may be just 5 per cent, depending on how the international prices are changing. There was no such clause at that time. It was a very serious lesson for both sides.

You are saying that the Indian side was to

blame for excessively taking advantage of the Russian shipyard’s compulsions, and the Russians were to blame for not evaluating the contract correctly. Correct. The international press has reported, in the case of a number of projects other than the Gorshkov, about problems in the Sevmash shipyard. Is there a problem in the way Sevmash is structured and run? I told you we needed money; it was Sevmash that needed money. I don’t know the exact situation now but, as I was told, it requires a certain amount of money for its modernisation and upgradation. And probably it is also not suitable for the kind of work needed on Gorshkov, because the ship is too large. This was a mistake. Never has this shipyard undertaken such a job. They were not prepared to deal with this situation. There were some objective and some subjective circumstances that influenced the decision. Is there also a problem with fixing the price

for an engine for the Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is developing? NPO-Saturn, which has finally completed the development of the IL55I engine for the IJT, has apparently demanded an extra US $64 million from HAL.

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Both sides are engaged in fixing the price. I think it will be solved. The question is about future production of these engines in India, and the price of the licence. It is not just about price of the engine but also about the price of technology for production (of the IL-55I engine) in India. AJAI SHUKLA works in both the visual and the print medium. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for New Delhi Television (NDTV), India’s best-reputed news broadcaster, for whom he anchors prime time news and special discussion programmes. In addition, he is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard, India’s thinking business daily. He has also published opinion pieces in the Wall Street Journal, Asia. Ajai specialises in defence, security and international affairs. He has travelled extensively in the South Asia and Gulf regions, particularly in the insurgency-hit states of Jammu and Kashmir and India’s north-east. Ajai has also reported from Afghanistan, Pakistan, US-occupied Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Before becoming a journalist, Ajai served in the army for over two decades. He retired as a Colonel after commanding the reputed tank regiment, Hodson’s Horse. Ajai did his MA in War Studies from King’s College, University of London.

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COVER STORY

RETHINKING INDIA'S TIBET CARD I C. RAJA MOHAN

India's muted response to the most recent crisis in Tibet has drawn widespread criticism. Liberals and Conservatives alike would like to see India respond more positively to democratic upsurges in the neighbourhood.

NDIA's muted response to the most recent crisis in Tibet has drawn widespread criticism. Liberals who would like to see India respond more positively to democratic upsurges in the neighbourhood, and conservatives who see China as the principal long-term threat to national security, have both accused New Delhi of abject surrender to China. The Tibetan tragedy unites socialists on the left with the Bharatiya Janata Party on the right and Gandhians in the middle. The Western world, too, is dismayed by India's seeming reluctance to take an active position in defence of the Tibetans who have demonstrated extraordinary political courage in defying the Chinese state. The Dalai Lama himself has called India's response "too cautious". The Congress coalition's dependence on the Communist parties for its political survival, its apparent willingness to put the historic nuclear deal with the U.S. on hold until the Left is placated, and its attempts to signal some political distance from Washington on a broad range of foreign policy issues, suggests a political imperative of pleasing, if not appeasing, Beijing. The Chinese premier Wen Jiabao's public expression of gratitude to New Delhi seemed to confirm the worst suspicions of the Congress Government's critics. For India, the Tibetan crisis played out at two levels: the government's reaction to Tibetan exiles

who attacked the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi and threatened to march across the SinoIndian border; and the extraordinary lengths to which the Indian state went to protect the passage of the Olympic torch through New Delhi. It was quite clear from the outset that the Indian government had inescapable obligations to prevent any Tibetan violation of the Sino-Indian border, provide iron clad security to Chinese diplomatic properties and personnel, and ensure a smooth ride for the torch. At the same time, democratic India had an obligation to safeguard the Tibetan right to peaceful protest. On

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litical and administrative coherence it both fronts, however, the Congress- Tibetan led government signalled confusion. protestors march had. Be that as it may, our focus here is New Delhi was right to remind the on the streets of on the second, more substantive Tibetans that they are "guests" in In- London level of India's Tibet policy. The big dia and must abide by the nation's laws. But as India was inexorably sucked into question is whether India could have rethe crisis in Tibet, the government proved ut- sponded to the latest crisis in a more muscuterly incapable of managing this complex dy- lar manner. The Tibet issue is quite obviously namic. Its weakness and vacillation can be likely to remain on the front burner for a while. partly explained by its apparent surprise at the Although the Beijing Olympics have generturn of events in Tibet, and the reaction to them ated an important focus point for Tibetan within India. In addition, the Manmohan Singh protests, the reality is that they are a consegovernment appears to have lost what little po- quence of heightened Chinese repression in re-

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cent years. The defiance of monks in Tibet, who a few weeks ago were daring enough to protest in front of foreign journalists being shepherded around by Chinese officials, underlines the depth of resentment. More importantly, Tibetans no longer seem afraid of the consequences. Given that the Tibet issue will be with us for some time, does India have any options other than those it has exercised? Could it ratchet up pressure to make Beijing yield to what most Indians agree are the legitimate aspirations of the Tibetan people for political and cultural auton-

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COVER STORY

During the third and worst phase of bilateral relations with China, from 1962 to the late 1970s, New Delhi provided strong political support to theTibetan movement and tried to mobilise international pressure against Beijing

â&#x20AC;?

The Dalai Lama with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959

omy? Or should India play the Tibetan card the other way, leveraging it to gain China's confidence and extract concessions from Beijing on other critical bilateral issues, such as the resolution of the boundary dispute? These are important questions for Indian policy-making; but there are no easy answers. The fact is that there are many real constraints on Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to play the Tibetan card one way or another. The year 2009 will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Dalai Lama's escape to India after an unsuccessful uprising in March 1959. Looking back over the last six decades, Tibet has always been at the very centre of the turbulent Sino-Indian relationship. China would not have been India's neighbour but for the fact that Beijing occupied Tibet. The intractable boundary dispute between New Delhi and Beijing, and its many associated problems, is in reality about Tibetâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; about the geographic, political and cultural dimensions of the Indo-Tibetan frontier, and the contestation of New Delhi's cultural and political relationship with Lhasa. Failure to resolve various issues relating to Tibet has resulted in deep Sino-Indian suspicion and the knowledge that either country could significantly threaten the unity and territorial integrity of the other. It is not that India has not played the Tibet card before, or that China has not retaliated. American Professor John Garver, author of a definitive history of Sino-Indian relations, divides India's Tibet policy into four phases, from the middle of the last century to the turn of the new millennium. In the first phase, from 1947 to 1951, as China prepared to gain control over Tibet, India tried to boost the international standing of the Tibetan government and considered a few military options to shore up Lhasa's defences against an invasion. But, weakened by Partition and its consequences in Jammu and Kashmir, it was in no position to protect Tibet from Chinese occupation. Since then, India has continually had to balance its desire to secure the interests of the Tibetan people with its severely limited capacity to do so. In the second phase, during the 1950s, India sought to befriend China in the hope that Beijing would grant Tibet substantive autonomy, limit its military presence on the plateau and accept the boundary disposition. Beijing, for its part, used the time to consolidate its military and logistical control over Tibet. When India offered political asylum to the Dalai Lama after the 1959 revolt and collaborated with the U.S. to support resistance within Tibet, bilateral relations rapidly deteriorated and resulted in the 1962 war. During the third and worst phase of bilateral relations, from 1962 to the late 1970s, New Delhi provided strong political support to the Tibetan movement and tried to mobilise international pressure on Beijing. China, in turn,

strongly supported Pakistan's slogans on "selfdetermination" for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and provided assistance to insurgent groups in the North East. The fourth phase, from the late 1980s to the turn of the century, saw more give and take, and improved bilateral relations. India reaffirmed that Tibet is an autonomous region of China, accommodated some of Beijing's demands to limit the political activities of Tibetans in exile, and condoned the Dalai Lama's political outreach to the West. China, in turn, modulated its positions on Kashmir and withdrew support to rebels in the North East. We might add to Garver's summary by identifying a fifth phase, in the present decade. When China reacted harshly to India's nuclear tests in May 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signalled India's willingness to play the Tibetan card by meeting with the Dalai Lama. Soon after the brief post-Pokhran chill, India reverted to the basic moorings of the Tibetan policy in the fourth phase. After returning to power in October 1999, Vajpayee made a special effort to

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Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping with Panchen Lama (centre), and the Dalai Lama at the Standing Committee of the Politburo of CCP in Beijing in 1954; Potala Palace in Lhasa

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resolve the boundary dispute with China. During his visit to Beijing in June 2003, he struck a deal agreeing to the formulation that the "Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of the People's Republic of China". Beijing, in return, agreed to recognise Sikkim as part of India. The two sides agreed to renew border trade between Tibet and Sikkim, and elevate negotiations on the boundary dispute to a political level. Although the Vajpayee formulation on Tibet was widely criticised as a major concession to China, the fact remains that India is one of the few countries that does not endorse Beijing's formulation that Tibet is an "inalienable" part of China. India is willing to acknowledge the current reality that the TAR is a part of the PRC, but stays close to the Dalai Lama's position on Tibet. The Dalai Lama has agreed to drop the demand for independence and is willing to accept that Tibet is part of China, but not Beijing's demand that he certify that Tibet was always part of China. Despite the domestic and external criticisms of India's Tibet policy, it must be recorded that

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COVER STORY

The world's highest railway connecting Tibet with eastern Chinese provinces for the first time by rail, operational since July 2006

Tibetan monks leading a protest march in Lhasa

New Delhi has stood by certain basic principles. Besides its emphasis on the autonomy of Tibet, India allows a Tibetan government in exile to function in Dharamshala, notwithstanding New Delhi's position that it does not allow Tibetans to conduct political activities on its soil. Above all, it has assisted in the survival of Tibetan culture outside China for the last fifty years. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan leadership fully understand the importance of Indian support to their cause. During the recent crisis, India's seemingly low-key response masked some strong articulation of the Tibetan cause by the Foreign Office. A Ministry of External Affairs statement issued on March 15, 2008 said: "We are distressed by reports of the unsettled situation and violence in Lhasa, and by the deaths of innocent people. We would hope that all those involved will work to improve the situation and remove the causes of such trouble in Tibet, which is an autonomous region of China, through dialogue and non-violent means." Acareful reading of the statement underlines a number of Indian positions. It gives a clean chit to the Tibetan rioters, rejects Beijing's charge that the Dalai Lama was responsible for the protests, and asks China to address the sources of the tension through peaceful dialogue. In the end, what India says about Tibet is less important than what it does. A number of factors will continue to shape India's Tibet policy. First, recent events have revealed the profound popular empathy in India for the Tibetan cause. No Indian government can ignore the special historic relationship with the Tibetan people. Second, the weight of China has steadily expanded in the world. As it becomes India's largest trading partner and a dominant economic and political force in Asia, New Delhi will be bound by necessity to maintain good rela-

tions with China. Third, India does not have the capacity to forcibly liberate Tibet from China. Put another way, playing the Tibet card beyond a limit will have costs. However, within the constrained political space defined by the above factors, India can and must pursue a more imaginative policy towards Tibet. Such a policy would necessarily involve the following elements: One, India must join the international community in urging China to embark on a productive dialogue with the Dalai Lama. While the initial contacts between the two sides are welcome, India needs to help sustain international encouragement of the dialogue after the Beijing Olympics, and facilitate the resolution of a number of outstanding issues between the two sides. Two, New Delhi can do a lot more to help Tibetan culture flourish. It can strengthen various Tibetan centres in India, including the Tawang monastery, by improving their national and international connectivity. Three, India must work with Bhutan and Nepal to rapidly modernise trade and transport infrastructure all along the Indo-Tibetan frontier from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. Until now, China has taken the initiative to promote Tibet's regional integration. It is now India's turn to actively contribute to cross-frontier cooperation with Tibet. Four, while reaffirming India's commitment to China's territorial integrity, New Delhi must suggest that an autonomous Tibet be seen as a natural element of China's political modernisation. Finally, India must convince Beijing that both countries need the Dalai Lama to bless a boundary settlement along the Indo-Tibetan frontier. New Delhi and Beijing cannot delude themselves that a border deal without reference to Tibetan interests can really be effective. A Tibet that is at peace with itself will re-emerge as the natural bridge between the two Asian giants. C. Raja Mohan is currently a Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Earlier, Mohan was Professor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. He also served as the Strategic Affairs Editor of The Indian Express, and the Diplomatic Editor and Washington Correspondent of The Hindu. Mohan has a Masters degree in Nuclear Physics and a Ph.D. in International Relations. He was a member of India's National Security Advisory Board during 1998-2000 and 2004-06. Mohan was a Jennings Randolph Peace Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, during 1992-93. His recent books include Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2004) and Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006).

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COVER STORY VIEW FROM BEIJING

A Common Agenda XIAOJUN HENG

As great changes sweep the world, India and China, the rising stars of the global economy, must leverage their complementary strengths and common objectives to focus on domestic prosperity and regional stability. plays, Marlowe depicted three types HINA and India are close of human being in the Renaissance neighbours and ancient civi- Economic (1300-1500AD), a period of tremenlizations that have greatly globalisation is dous historical, social, political and contributed to human progress and sweeping across development. Now, as the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s all the major cities economic transformation in Europe which bears an amazing resemtwo largest developing countries, in China blance to the period of global transboth rising powers in the 21st century, their bilateral relations are naturally of formation we are now experiencing at the begreat importance in maintaining regional, and ginning of the third millennium. Marloweâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s even global, peace, stability and development. types stood for the will to power, the desire for Since today almost every aspect of our life has wealth, and the thirst for knowledge. Let us look first at the will to power. The been touched by the advent of the Information Age and the knowledge economy, it is world needs order; without it, we would fall necessary to look at China-India bilateral re- into a state of anarchy. But what kind of international order or system should we establish, lations from a global context first. The world is in the throes of tremendous and how? By conquest, or through dialogue change. Scientific and technological innova- and consultation? This is a debate about multitions have changed our way of life; economic lateralism versus unilateralism. History has globalisation, regional economic integration shown that unilateralism is a dead end. The insaand the information superhighway have tiable will to power is likely to lead to confrontabrought us closer; countries are increasingly in- tion and conflict, especially given the range of terdependent. We inhabit a global village. Amid non-traditional security issues we face today, this tremendous historical and social transfor- such as the proliferation of weapons of mass demation, the world is at a crossroads. We face op- struction, international terrorism, infectious disportunities and challenges, and also difficult eases, transnational organised crime, global choices, the effects of which will considerably warming and climate change, the energy crisis, and so forth. No country is capable of solving influence future generations. The 16th-century British dramatist Christo- these problems alone. It will require a joint efpher Marlowe, a contemporary of Shakespeare, fort by the international community; our apis most remembered for three plays: Tam- proach must be multilateral. Next, consider the desire for wealth. Ecoburlaine the Great, The Jew of Malta, and The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus. In these nomic globalisation is sweeping across the

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COVER STORY

Instead of the traditional strategic triangular relationship aimed at balancing power, in which one country unites with another in order to deal with a third, we can look forward to a future of peace and prosperity

” The Beijing stadium can seat as many as 91,000 spectators during the Olympics. The capacity will then be reduced to 80,000 after the Games. It has replaced the original intended venue at the Guangdong Olympic Stadium. The stadium is 330 metres long by 220 metres wide, and is 69.2 metres tall. The stadium uses 258,000 square metres of space and has a usable area of 204,000 square metres. It was built with 36 km of unwrapped steel, with a combined weight of 45,000 tonnes. The stadium has some 11,000 square metres of underground rooms with waterproof walls. The stadium will cost up to 3.5 billion yuan (423 million USD).

world at ever-accelerating speeds, and its impact can be felt in almost every corner of the planet. Countries today naturally try to develop their economies so as to best improve the lives of their people. One of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to eliminate poverty. However, two by-products of globalisation are often neglected. The first is economic marginalisation, which has widened disparities between the North and South. The second is environmental damage and deterioration. We face a serious dilemma: we cannot develop at the cost of the environment, nor can we give up development for the sake of environmental protection. The best way to achieve common prosperity is therefore to find a balance between sustainable development and environmental protection. Third, let us look at the thirst for knowledge. Knowledge is power, and this is the age of rapid technological advancement. Scientific and technological innovations have eased our lives. However technology is a doubleedged sword; it can also be used to produce weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. A small nuclear device in the hands of international terrorists could cause a global catastrophe. Faced with these opportunities and challenges, what are the possible solutions? We need an effective international system for global governance, for global security, conflict management and crisis resolution, for climate security and environmental protection. Instead of the traditional strategic triangular relationship aimed at balancing power, in which one country unites with another in order to deal with a third, we can look forward to a future of peace, cooperation, prosperity, and a win-win result. The alternative is containment, conflict, confrontation and war. Against this large historical background and global context, let us look at the relations between China and India. Both countries need a stable international and domestic environment favourable for economic development, in order to strengthen bilateral cooperation, achieve common prosperity and maintain regional peace and stability. This is based upon the following considerations: China and India’s splendid ancient civilizations are important component parts of world civilization. The cultural exchange between the two countries dates back over 2,200 years. Buddhism came to China from India in the 1st century AD, and during the Tong Dynasty (618-907) the Buddhist monk Xuan Zang, who was also a scholar and traveller, went all the way from China to India in order to obtain Sanskrit texts. As Premier Wen Jiabao said, 99.9 percent of the 2,200-year-long exchange between China and India consists of friendly cooperation. Carrying this traditional China-In-

dian friendship forward is both a general trend and the responsibility entrusted to our two peoples by history. China and India have both suffered the humiliations of imperialist power and colonial rule, and therefore both particularly value national independence and state sovereignty. We all remember that during the War of Resistance against Japanese aggression, the famous doctor Dwarkanath Kotnis came all the way from India to help the Chinese in their fight, and sacrificed his life for them. Mahatma Gandhi once said that China and India are friends who share the same sufferings. Both China and India face the common task of economic development to eliminate poverty, encourage prosperity, and enable their people to live a better life. In 1820 the combined economic strength of China and India accounted for about 48 percent of the world, but a hundred-odd years later, China and India lagged far behind. Now, with rapid development in both economies, India’s GDP has grown at over 8 percent in the past three years, and China’s by over 10 percent in the past five years. The economic growth of China and India has attracted the world’s attention and become a driving force for the world’s economy. China and India now play an increasingly important role in global economic affairs, not because of their vast populations, but because of

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the competitive power of their in- The Beijing CBD is the for a multilateral approach to redustrial products. Tata Motors city's new central solving international disputes and has just purchased the British lux- business district, and is various non-traditional security ury icon Jaguar, and Land Rover home to corporate issues. India was the first non-sofrom US car-maker Ford, for over regional headquarters, cialist country to establish diploUS$2 billion. shopping precincts, and matic relations with China on Besides, the economies of high-end housing April 1, 1950. Chinese Premier China and India are complemenZhou Enlai and Indian Prime tary. Both constitute a huge market. While In- Minister Jawaharlal Nehru exchanged visits dia excels in the computer software and serv- in 1954, and jointly initiated the Five Princiice sectors, China’s manufacturing and ples of Peaceful Coexistence, which provides computer hardware industry occupy an impor- the foundation for friendly relations between tant place. Therefore, a win-win result can be the two countries. achieved through mutually beneficial exchange It is natural for countries to have differing and cooperation. views on some issues, but these differences China and India face common challenges can be peacefully resolved through dialogue, in the process of economic and social devel- consultation and negotiation. In 1988, Prime opment. With the largest and second-largest Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s historic visit to China populations in the world, both struggle to pro- laid a solid foundation for the future developvide better education, employment, medical ment of bilateral relations. The following care, and housing for our people; reduce the dis- twenty years have seen frequent visits exparity between rich and the poor and realise so- changed between heads of states and heads of cial equality; and balance economic develop- government. To name just a few, Premier Wen ment and environmental protection to achieve Jiabao visited India in 2005, and the two counsustainable development. On the issue of global tries established a strategic cooperative partwarming and climate change, for example, there nership oriented towards peace and stability. is ample scope for China and India to strengthen Early this year, in January 2008, Prime Minister their cooperation, taking into account history, Manmohan Singh visited China and, together total emissions and per capita emissions, as well with Premier Wen Jiabao, signed a joint document called “A Shared Vision for the 21st Cenas production and consumption. Finally, China and India share many tury”. China’s trade with India in 1991 was apviews in international affairs. Both stand proximately $300 million, but in 2007

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amounted to more than $37 billion. Both countries expect trade volumes to grow to $60 billion by 2010, which is “China Year” in India and “India Year” in China. All these things serve as a solid foundation for the future development of bilateral relations between China and India. To conclude, China and India are cooperative partners, not competitors. In this new period of history, replete with the opportunities and challenges of economic globalisation, it is very important to strengthen mutually beneficial exchanges and cooperation to savour the fruits of development, promote mutual understanding and trust, and shoulder the common responsibility of maintaining regional and global peace and prosperity. Xiaojun Heng is currently Professor and the Vice President of the China Foreign Affairs University. He is also member of European Association for lexicography (EURALEX), China Education Association for International Exchange, Translators Association of China. Heng was deputy editor-in-chief for the publication, Contemporary China and Its Foreign Policy, World Affairs Press, 2003. Between 1995 and 1999 he was Education Consul in the Chinese Consulate General in New York; and a lecturer and associate professor at the Foreign Languages Department, Anhui Normal University from 1987 to 1994. Between 1986 and 1987 Heng did his Master of Philosophy (MPhil.) in Applied Linguistics from the University of Exeter, UK.

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SPECIAL REPORT

If Not More Transparent, A

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At Least More Credible RICHARD A. BITZINGER

As military expenditures have grown, it is increasingly probable that more and more of what it truly costs to run the PLA is being reflected in China's official budget.

VERY March, as part of the release of its annual budget for central government expenditures in the coming year, Beijing makes public a single overall figure for national defence spending. In 2008, that amount was 418 billion yuan (CNY), or US$58.8 billion--an increase of nearly 18 percent over last year. Yet, a flurry of incredulous reports in the world press fanned speculation that Chinese military expenditures are much higher than are declared in the country's official defence budget, and, furthermore, that China's lack of transparency in defence spending is only another sign of BeiThe PLA has no jing's aggressive intents, shortage of manpower (Photo: perhaps even a warning of a covert military Gordon Arthur) buildup. But before we embark on another bout of conjecture about how much the Chinese are really spending on their military and what it all means, it might be advisable to stop a moment and ask ourselves: What if the official defence budget increasingly does reflect

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SPECIAL REPORT

Lack of data is the greatest obstacle to constructing useful methodologies and approaches for an indepth study and interpretation of Chinese defence spending

” Source: “Chapter IX: Defense Expenditure,” China's National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, December 2006); “China’s Defense Budget to Rise 17.8% in 2007,” ChinaToday.com, March 15, 2007.

actual spending? If the declared budget is not more transparent, is it at least more credible, and, if so, what does that mean for Chinese intentions and capabilities? What we hope to learn from looking at defence budgets. To being with, what insights do we gain from analysing defence budgets and military expenditures? Ideally, such analysis should throw more light on: Intentions and resolve: As an indicator of the country's determination to modernise its armed forces over the long haul, what are China's long-term commitments to defence spending? Is Beijing willing to increase such spending both in real terms and over a sustained period? How does this compare with neighboring states and potential rivals? The burden on the national economy: Is China spending an inordinate amount of money on defence, compared to other nations? What does this say about commitments and resolve? How sustainable are current levels of spending? Modernisation priorities: Which defence technologies, military research and development (R&D), and arms procurement programs are receiving priority funding? What weapons systems, and how many of a particular type, are being produced or acquired? What does this say about current or emerging Chinese military doctrine or strategy? How much is being spent on personnel versus operations and maintenance (O&M) versus equipment, each of which indicates different priorities for force improvement and has different timelines for payoffs? Is any particular area of expenditure starving?

OFFICIAL CHINESE DEFENCE BUDGET, 1997-2007

Future military capabilities: How much funding is going to which branch, or branches, of the military? Is more money being spent on modernising the navy and air force, and hence on increasing power projection capabilities, or more on ground forces and territorial defence, i.e., the People's War? Is the People's Liberation Army (PLA) putting more funding into technologies relating to the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA), particularly information warfare and precision-strike, which could result in increased capabilities to fight an unconventional or asymmetric war? Basically, therefore, we analyse defence budgets to see if (and where) a country is putting its money where its mouth is. As such, the strength of defence budget analysis lies in its use of 'hard' empirical information-i.e., fiscal authorisations, appropriations, and outlaysthat can be quantified and charted. This information, in addition, can be compared, tracked, and trend-lined over time, subjected to a variety of statistical analyses, and therefore used to reveal insights into a country's plans, priorities, and likely capabilities.

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Before we can use defence budg- The Chinese Navy no question that the PLA has been ets and military expenditures to ad- is expanding from the beneficiary of a long-term exdress such quantifiable issues, how- a coastal to blue pansion in defence spending. Beever, we must first have the water navy (Photo: tween 1997 and 2005, Beijing inbudgetary figures to work with. Gordon Arthur) creased defence spending by More than almost any other field of double-digit doses every year-13.7 inquiry, defence budget analysis is a highly percent per annum, in real terms, i.e., after indata-dependent field of study-in other words, flation, according to the Chinese's own statisit involves a lot of number crunching. Conse- tics. China's official 2006 defence budget of quently, it demands a lot of numbers to CNY284 billion (US$36.65 billion), for examcrunch; the more numbers we have, the more ple, constituted a 14.7 percent rise over the predetailed and useful the analysis. It is therefore vious year-while the 2005 budget was itself a ironic that defence budget analysis is depend- 12.5 percent increase over 2004. ent on some of the least reliable data in any A 2008 budget of US$58.8 billion means area of Chinese military studies. Lack of data is that Chinese military expenditures have more therefore the greatest obstacle to constructing than quintupled in real terms since 1997, thus useful methodologies and approaches for an permitting Beijing to put considerable addiindepth study and interpretation of Chinese tional resources into the hardware and softdefence spending. ware of military modernisation. China now outspends Japan, France, and the United China's exploding defense budget Kingdom, and likely Russia as well, on naSo what do we know about Chinese mili- tional defence. tary expenditures? First of all, a few firm facts: China appears to be putting particular emphasis on equipment purchases. China's defence budget has grown significantly for over a decade. There is All areas of the country's defence budget have

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benefitted from these increases, such as personnel, training, and operations. Nowhere, however, has Beijing's munificence been greater than in the PLA's equipment budgetthat is, expenditures for procurement and, supposedly, research and development (R&D). The PLA's annual spending on equipment has increased from US$3.1 billion in 1997 to an estimated US$15 billion in 2007-again, a fivefold increase in real spending; if this trend holds true, the equipment budget will likely reach US$20 billion in 2008. This means that China probably has the second-highest level of procurement spending in the world (after the United States, which, admittedly, still outspends China by a factor of ten to one). If anything has supported China's recent expansion in military power, it is this explosion in defence spending, which has permitted the PLA to acquire, over the past decade, new surface combatants and submarines, modern fighter jets, air-to-air refuelling aircraft, satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, and a host of ballistic, cruise, and tactical missile systems. This upward trend is likely to continue for

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SPECIAL REPORT

This bronze axe was used in hand-to-hand combat, and was also a ritual object symbolizing power and military authority.

Shang infantry were armed with a variety of stone or bronze weaponry, including máo spears, yuè pole-axes, ge pole-based dagger-axes, the compound bow, and bronze or leather helmets (Wang Hongyuan 1993). Their western military frontier was at the Taihang Mountains, where they fought the ma or “horse” barbarians, who might have used chariots. The Shang themselves likely only used chariots as mobile command vehicles or elite symbols. Although the Shang depended upon the military skills of their nobility, the masses of town dwelling and rural commoners provided the Shang rulers with conscript labour as well as military obligation when mobilized for ventures of defence or conquest.The subservient lords of noble lineage and other state rulers were obligated to furnish their locally-kept forces with all the necessary equipment, armour, and armaments, while the Shang king maintained a force of about a thousand troops at his capital, and personally led this force into battle.

are believed to be missing from offisome time. In May 2006, Beijing ap- The PLA are cial figures, including: proved a new 15-year national devel- expanding their Research and development costs: It opment plan for defence science and Special Forces is generally believed that military retechnology that would boost military (Photo: US DoD) search and development (R&D) is R&D spending and focus on developing high-technology weapons and 'IT solu- funded from other parts of China's state tions' for the PLA, support advanced manufac- budget, such as the country's general R&D turing technologies, and cultivate more fund and from a special fund for "new prodcollaborative international defence R&D ef- uct promotion". A reasonable estimation of anforts, with the goal of "transforming the PLA nual Chinese defence R&D spending could be into a modernised, mechanised, IT-based as high as US$2-3 billion. Arms imports: Many Western analysts beforce." Chinese defence expenditures are a lieve that most arms imports are also extramanageable burden on the national budgetary purchases, often covered under economy. In 1996, China's official defence special or supplemental appropriations. Bebudget absorbed around 9 percent of central tween 1998 and 2005 Beijing signed new arms government expenditures (CGE) and per- import agreements worth some US$16.7 bilhaps 1.5 percent of GDP. Over the past lion, according to the U.S. Congressional Redecade, defence expenditure as a percentage search Service; in 2005 alone, it purchased of CGE has fallen to a little over 7 percent, US$2.8 billion worth of foreign weapon syswhile it has remained at around 1.5 percent tems. of GDP. This indicates that, even as defence Expenses for the People's Armed Police and budgets have been increasing, military militia/reserve forces: Expenditures for the spending has actually been a modest and sta- paramilitary People's Armed Police (PAP) are paid for out of a separate central government ble burden on the Chinese economy. budget, while costs for PLA reserves and miliStill off the books? Extrabudgetary de- tia forces are partly borne by the provincial budget. fence expenditures At the same time, it is widely accepted in State support for China's military-industrial the West that the official budget released by complex: Much of China's military-industrial the Chinese every year accounts for only a complex has long operated at a loss. Official fraction of actual defence spending. In particu- defence budgets probably do not include the lar, whole categories of military expenditure costs of direct subsidies to Chinese defence in-

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But is it fair to continue to make such arguments about 'hidden' Chinese defence spending? In the first place, evidence that certain elements of military spending are not in the official budget-in particular, spending on R&D and arms imports-has always been spotty and usually uncorroborated. In addition, such arguments are too often based more on inference than fact, such as the question: "How could an armed force of 2.3 million men have a procurement budget of only a

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few billion dollars?" After all, India maintains a force roughly half that size and of similar, on a budget of approximately US$20 billion. Why, therefore, is a PLA budget of US$45 billion or even US$58 billion so incredible? In addition, many estimates of 'actual' Chinese defence spending use some kind of purchasing power parity (PPP) multiplier that attempts to take into account the 'true value' of these expenditures in terms of spending power relative to Western industrialised

industries or (in more recent years) forced loans by state-owned banks to arms factories, many of which end up having to be written off as nonperforming. Earnings from PLA-run businesses: Until their forced divestiture in late 1998, the PLA operated thousands of commercial enterprises, including farms, factories, hotels, discotheques, arms exports, and other services. The profits or budgetary offsets from these activities could be counted as additional sources of revenues for the military. It is still unclear how many PLA-owned business were actually sold off (most PLA-run farms were exempted, for example), how many are still secretly owned by the Army (e.g., through dummy partnerships), and how many divestiture orders were simply ignored. The extent of all this extrabudgetary spending is the subject of considerable debate and opinion in the West, and, as a result, a veritable cottage industry has sprung up dedicated to estimating likely 'real' Chinese defence expenditures. These unofficial estimates employ many different approaches and methodologies, and not surprisingly, vary widely in their results-from anywhere between 1.5 to ten times greater than the official figure. The U.S. Defence Department, for example, has stated that China's actual defence budget is two to three times its official figure, which would make it the world's second-largest military spender.

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SPECIAL REPORT

It is evident that over ten years of double-digit increases in defence spending have begun to pay dividends in terms of improving the quality of Chinese military equipment

â&#x20AC;? countries-for instance, savings from relying on cheap conscripts, lower wages paid at defence factories, and so on. Unfortunately, there exist no reliable PPPs for China, and the ones we have vary so widely as to be nearly useless. In fact, it is just possible that China's declared defence budget is actually becoming a more accurate indicator of what the Chinese actually spend on defence. Especially as military expenditures have grown, it is increasingly probable that more and more of what it costs to truly run the PLA is being reflected in the official budget. There is some precedent to believe that this might be so. In the late 1990s, when the PLA was told to get rid of its outside business operations, such as factories, hotels, and real estate companies, at least part of the plus-up in the official budget was to compensate the Army for these divestitures. Therefore, is it increasingly likely that the official budget now does include spending that may have once before been covered in extrabudgetary supplementals.

So What Does It All Mean? If the official Chinese budget does, more or less, account for all actual military expenditures, what does this mean? First, just by looking at the decade-long rise in official defence spending, we can deduce that Beijing is seriously committed to putting sufficient resources into modernising the PLA and to overcoming current personnel, equipment, and operations-related impediments to fielding an advanced military force. Salaries and allowances for military personnel have been increased, training has improved, and education has become more professional. In particular, it is evident that over ten years of double-digit increases in defence spending have begun to pay dividends in terms of improving the quality of Chinese military equipment. The PLA today is much more modern and capable than it was only a few years ago, with new fourth-generation fighter jets (such as the recently unveiled J-10 fighter), surface combatants equivalent to the

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The PLA has reaped enormous U.S. Aegis-class destroyer, and up- The Guided to-date submarine designs. It has es- Missile Destroyer gains from very low inflation rates over the past decade, but this may pecially made dramatic improve- Shenzhen be set to change. China's inflation ments to its command, control, (DDG-167) rate surged to an 11-year high of communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 7.1 percent in January 2008, and is expected to (C4ISR) architecture, an increasingly critical climb further this year, undermining any decomponent in modern armies. China has also fence rises. It may be that the Chinese still signifibeen able to make large-scale purchases of Russian weaponry, including fighter aircraft, cantly under-report their military spending. missiles, and naval combatants-items that Even so, it might matter very little in the end, make up some of the sharpest edges of the as even the official budget for PLA is large enough, and expanding quickly enough, to pointy end of the PLA spear. We may thus infer that China is using give one pause. On balance, one does not these budget increases to signal to potential need to count all the beans to know that adversaries-especially Taiwan and the China is emerging as a military-as well as United States-that it is serious about using economic and political-power in the Asia-Pamilitary force, if necessary, to gain certain po- cific to be reckoned with. litical-military objectives, such as the "reRichard A. Bitzinger is an Associate Professor turn" of Taiwan. At the same time, it is important to watch with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, future increases in Chinese defence spend- where his work focuses on military and defense ising relative to the country's inflation rate. sues relating to the Asia-Pacific region, including

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regional military modernisation activities, weapons proliferation, local defence industries and arms production, and the challenges of defence transformation in the Asia-Pacific. Bitzinger has written several monographs, articles, and book chapters, and his publications have appeared in International Security, Orbis, China Quarterly, and The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. He is the author of Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? (Oxford University Press, 2003); and Gearing Up for HighTech Warfare: Chinese and Taiwanese Defense Modernization and Implications for Military Confrontation Across the Taiwan Strait, 1995-2005 (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996). Bitzinger was previously a research analyst with the RAND Corporation, the Defence Budget Project, and the US government. In 1999-2000, he was a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council of the United States. He did a Masters in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Affairs.

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NEIGHBOUR WATCH

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The Middle Path: Autonomous Status for Tibet? The lack of trust between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama’s representatives has meant that, despite the closeness in rhetoric, their talks continue to be a dialogue of the deaf.

N JUNE 18 1988, the Dalai Lama dropped a bombshell in Strasbourg. Addressing the Members of the European Parliament, he declared: “I have taken the initiative to formulate thoughts which, we hope, may serve as a basis for resolving the issue of Tibet.” He went on to elaborate: “The whole of Tibet should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People’s Republic of China. The Government of People’s Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy. The Government of Tibet should however, develop and maintain relations, through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of commerce, education, culture, religion, tourism, science, sports and other nonpolitical activities.” From that day, he stopped claiming independence for his country, pleading only for a genuine or meaningful autonomy. Most Tibetans, especially the younger gener-

The whole of Tibet should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with China

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CLAUDE ARPI

ation, were dejected that their leader had suddenly abandoned the objective of full independence for Tibet. A couple of years ago, I interviewed Lodi Gyari, the Dalai Lama’s Chief Negotiator with China. He recounted the course of events: “I remember very vividly that in 1987, when His Holiness [the Dalai Lama] first presented the ‘Middle Way approach’ in a formal document, he consulted a few people outside of the Tibetan leadership. One of them was former [US] President [Jimmy] Carter. I flew directly to Minneapolis to show President Carter an 8-page document, which later became the ‘Strasbourg Proposal’. He really took time to read it very carefully. Then he turned to me and asked: ‘What is His Holiness’ bottom line?’ I told him: ‘This is the bottom line.’ He was surprised: ‘If this is the bottom line, you have to start from somewhere else.’ I responded to President Carter saying this issue was raised, but His Holiness’ position is that he is not a politician but a simple monk who wants to be really sincere and transparent and place on the table what he really wants.” Thus was born the ‘Middle Path’ approach. It was not only younger people who were upset about dropping their cherished dream of a ‘Free Tibet’. Lodi Gyari remembers his own experience: “When I accompanied His Holiness to Strasbourg to present the Proposal, my mother was deeply upset with me. Until His Holiness’ presentation of his proposal to the

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NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama receive Zhou Enlai in New Delhi in 1957

The fact that the Strasbourg Proposal was well received by Western governments provides grist to the rumour mill that the Dalai Lama was influenced by certain western politicians who promised political support in exchange for abandoning the objective of Tibetan independence

European Parliament, I would keep this document under my pillow because it was extremely confidential. When I returned from Strasbourg, the first thing my mother said was: ‘If I had known that the document that you were so preciously guarding was this Proposal, I would have ripped it apart.’” What motivated the Dalai Lama to Anti China protestors in walk this Middle the Gansu province in Path so unpopular March 2008 (right); the with his people? main street in Lhasa As a Buddhist monk, he would naturally emulate his Master, who first propagated the Middle Path. But a more practical reason was that Gyalo Dhondup, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, had had a meeting with Deng Xiaoping in 1979, at which China’s new boss told him that “the door to negotiations remains wide open… except for the independence of Tibet; all other questions can be negotiated”. This encounter between Deng and the Dalai Lama’s emissary triggered the first rapprochement in the early 1980s. It led to the visit of four fact-finding delegations from Dharamsala who travelled through the three main provinces of Tibet, and later, to two rounds of talks between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese officials belonging to the United Front Department. Another reason that the Dalai Lama chose the Middle Path was what he himself called the “vast seas” of Chinese migrants who “threaten the very existence of the Tibetans as a distinct people”. In an article in the New York Times, he explained: “In the eastern parts of our country, the Chinese now greatly outnumber Tibetans. In Amdo province, for example, where I was born, there are, according to Chinese statistics, 2.5 million Chinese and only 750,000 Tibetans. Even in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (i.e., central and western Tibet), Chinese govern-

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Panchen Lama (L) and Dalai Lama with Chairman Mao (C) in Beijing in 1954

ment sources now confirm that Chinese outnumber Tibetans.” Asimilar process had already taken place in Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) and in Mongolia. In the article, the Dalai Lama pointed out: “Today, in the whole of Tibet 7.5 million Chinese settlers have already been sent, outnumbering the Tibetan population of six million…” This was in 1985; during the following years the situation deteriorated considerably, especially after the arrival of the railway line to Lhasa in 2006. This explains the deep resentment recently expressed by people in the three traditional provinces of Tibet, and the risks taken by those who took to the streets in March/April 2008. The fact that the Strasbourg Proposal was well received by Western governments tends to provide grist to the rumour mill that the Dalai Lama was influenced by certain Western politicians who promised political support in exchange for abandoning the objective of independence. The Dalai Lama has always denied that he was ‘influenced’. It is true, however, that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize a year after he made his proposal and that since then, his popularity has tremendously increased in the West. However, the Chinese leadership has never accepted his Middle Path approach. In 1993, a year after the Dalai Lama had written a long letter to Deng Xiaoping on “everything except independence”, Sonam Tobgyal, Chairman of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile renewed contact with Beijing. He was invited to China for a week to meet officials of the United Front Department. The Tibetan Minister remembers: “One thing was clear: these officials, with whom we were talking, did not have the authority to decide anything on their own.” Further they only wanted to talk about the status of the Dalai Lama in case the latter decided to return to China. In 2003, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited the US, he was interviewed by The Washington Post. When asked: “The Dalai Lama has declared that he is not seeking independence for Tibet. Do you foresee face-to-face

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NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Marshal Zhu De and Premier Zhou Enlai receive the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama at Beijing railway station (top); Zhou Enlai, Panchen Lama and Dalai Lama with Chaiman Mao in 1954

meetings with the Dalai Lama and representatives of China?” The Premier replied: “Regrettably, the Dalai Lama has not genuinely given up his position of Tibet independence and has not given up the separatist activities aimed at splitting the motherland.” For unclear reasons, he added the issue of Taiwan to the already complicated Tibetan question: “[The Dalai Lama] also has not recognised that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.” Wen added: “We have taken note of the recent remarks by the Dalai Lama but we still need to watch very carefully what he really does…” These words were obviously for the American public’s consumption. Unfortunately, during the last two decades the litany from Beijing has continued unabated. More recently, in April 2008, when Chinese President Hu Jintao met the visiting Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, he told him: “Our conflict with the Dalai clique is

not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, nor a human rights problem… It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland.” Like Wen in 2003, he reiterated that Beijing was “ready to meet the Dalai Lama, but only if he met certain pre-conditions, such as desisting from trying to split the motherland”. From these declarations of the top Chinese leadership, we can understand why the six rounds of talks held between Gyari’s team and Chinese officials between 2002 and 2007 have been a dialogue of the deaf. While the Dalai Lama’s envoys speak of ‘meaningful’ autonomy for the three traditional provinces of Tibet, the Chinese are ready to discuss the TAR only, which is less than half of all Tibet. This seems an insurmountable difference; so too is the introduction of democracy in an autonomous Tibet, as mentioned in the Strasbourg Proposal.

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violent approach is not having As he continues a tour of China has launched a charm an effect,” he said. European cities to rally sup- offensive on Tibet by settling Asked whether he was losport for Tibet’s autonomy, the its populations and creating Dalai Lama has expressed state-of-the-art infrastructure ing control over his followers, the Tibetan spiritual leader, hope that China will, in a few weeks, begin serious negotiations with his rep- said: “Yes, naturally. My efforts have failed to bring concrete results, so this criticism is becomresentatives. However, the 72-year-old Nobel laureate ing stronger and stronger.” He repeatedly rejected calls to pursue the Tihas warned that he is losing the support of many followers inside Tibet because of the Chi- betan cause through violence. “We must carry nese government’s refusal to strike a deal with forward that just cause through non-violent him. In an interview with the Financial Times principles,” he said. “If the violence grows out of in the UK, he indicated that radical Tibetans, control, then my only choice is to resign.” The who urge violent confrontation with China, are June meeting between the Dalai Lama’s repreincreasingly losing faith in his strategy of au- sentatives and the Chinese authorities will be tonomy through peaceful dialogue. He warned critical in determining whether Beijing can conthat in recent times, many Tibetans have shown tain the Tibet issue ahead of the Olympics. What is India’s position on the question of “clear signs of frustration” with his lack of progress in talks with the Chinese. “There are autonomy? To answer this question, one must many Tibetans who have the view that our non- recap a little history.

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When Tibet adopted Buddhism in the 7th century AD, the powerful empire suddenly turned pacifist, and as a result lost the ability to defend itself effectively, instead relying for military support on the Mongol Khans and later the Manchu Emperors, in return for religious guidance from Tibetan Lamas to their royal patrons. This worked relatively well till the end of the 19th century. In July 1904, a young British Colonel named Francis Younghusband entered Lhasa with a small army and forced upon the Tibetans their first Agreement with the mighty British Empire, by which London ‘acknowledged’ Tibet as a separate nation. In 1912, the Thirteen Dalai Lama formally declared Tibet’s independence, and Tibet remained a de facto independent nation till October 7, 1950 when the People’s Liberation Army marched into Eastern Tibet. At the time of Indian independence in 1947, the Government of India considered Tibet to be an independent nation under a ‘vague and hazy’ Chinese suzerainty. But the situation changed after the Chinese invasion of Tibet in

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NEIGHBOUR WATCH

In 1959, Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama came to India after the Chinese conquest of Tibet, and was offered refuge in McLeod Ganj.

Over the years the Government of India’s position on the issue of Tibet has undergone change, and today New Delhi does not even insist on an autonomous status for theTibetan Autonomous Region

October 1950. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was rather embarrassed. In a Note trying to define India’s Tibet policy, he wrote that after the entry of the PLA on the Roof of the World, for Tibetans the “autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so.” A month later, the Prime Minister stated in Parliament that he had made it clear to the Chinese Government that India was anxious that “Tibet should maintain the autonomy it has had for at least the last forty years”, and added: “It is a right and proper thing to say and I see no difficulty in saying to the Chinese Government that whether they have suzerainty over Tibet or sovereignty over Tibet, surely, according to any principles they proclaim and the principles I uphold, the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else.” But he had already stated, in his Note: “We cannot save Tibet.” Over the years the Government of India’s position has evolved, and today Delhi does not even insist on an autonomous status for the TAR or greater Tibet. It is worth mentioning that the Chinese leadership has not always been as rigid on the question of autonomy as it is today. Phuntso Wangyal, known as Phunwang, a veteran Tibetan Party leader, was the first Tibetan Communist in the 1940s; he led Chinese troops into Lhasa in September 1951. In his memoirs he recounts: “One day [in 1955 in Beijing], Mao unexpectedly came to visit the Dalai Lama at his residence [where he stayed]… During their conversation, Mao suddenly said, ‘I heard that you have a national flag, do you? They do not

want you to carry it, isn’t that right’?” Phunwang continues: “The Dalai Lama just replied, ‘We have an army flag’. Mao perceived that the Dalai Lama was concerned by his question and immediately told him, ‘That is no problem. You may keep your national flag.’ Mao definitely said ‘national’ flag [tib. rgyal dar]. ‘In the future,’ he said, ‘we can also let Xinjiang have their own flag, and Inner Mongolia, too. Would it be okay to carry the national flag of the People’s Republic of China in addition to that flag? I was amazed to hear’.” This remark had a deep impact on Phunwang, who was arrested in April 1958 on a vague charge of ‘local nationalism’; he needed to ‘cleanse his thinking’. During the following 18 years he was tortured and jailed in the most atrocious conditions. When he was rehabilitated at the end of the seventies, he continued to ponder the ‘nationalities’ issue and its place within the People’s Republic of China. He believed that nationalities in a multiethnic state should have a relationship of complete equality and autonomy, and that the State must guarantee this equality (by, for example, not imposing the Chinese language over a ‘nationality language’ such as Tibetan). In the 1980s, Phunwang managed to send a 25,000-character memo to senior Party leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. He stressed that the outcome of a debate on the question of nationality would hugely impact future work in ‘minority nationality areas’ such Tibet.While certain Party members wanted to show him the door, Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping instructed officials not to remove him as a member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. His stand was vindicated; in December 1982, he was proud that the new Chinese Constitution stated: “Socialist relations of equality, unity, and mutual assistance have been established among the nationalities”. Will Hu Jintao and his colleagues take note of Phunwang’s point on the issue of nationalities, or will Han chauvinism prevail once again? Perhaps the fate of Tibet depends on which way the wind blows in Beijing. In the meantime, it is not advisable to go around Lhasa with a national Tibetan flag; Mao’s Thoughts have not percolated that far in contemporary China. Claude Arpi, French by birth, has lived in India for the last 34 years. He is the author of several books on Tibet, India, China and Indo-French relations, including the just-released Tibet, the Lost Frontier (Lancer Publishers). After graduating as a Dental Surgeon from Bordeaux University in 1974, he decided to come to India. In December 1974, he joined Auroville, the International community founded by the Mother, Sri Aurobindo’s spiritual collaborator.

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NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Can the elephant b Pakistan has a new army chief and a new government in Islamabad. Will the new dispensation mark the beginning of a new era in Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s politico-military relations or will it only be a return to the past?

AYESHA SIDDIQA

ANY see Pakistan's 2008 elections as a milestone in the country's history, a chance for the new civilian government to renegotiate the social contract with the military-dominated establishment. Pakistanis place their hopes in the promise made by Asif Ali Zardari, Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, to reduce the power of the military. According to one school of thought, this will be the prime determinant of the country's political future. Transforming the nature of Pakistan's civilmilitary relations will not, however, be easy; it takes two to tango. The military must also be willing to take a step back and rethink its role in politics, economy and society. Observers in Western capitals judge that the new army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, described in the Western press as liberal and highly professional, is capable of effecting that change. Soon after taking charge as army chief in November 2007, General Kiyani expressed his desire to distance the armed forces from

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be taught to dance

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Some in US policymaking circles talk of General Kiyani as their knight in shining armour who will tame the Pakistani army, there are others who still believe General Musharraf is their only option

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politics and professionalise them. Whether he will succeed is the million-dollar question. The professionalisation of the military will have a direct bearing on its future military strategic role and on Pakistan's role in regional and global geo-politics. But it hinges on numerous issues, including the ethos and objectives of the institution, and the capacity of the new political leadership to renegotiate the rule of power politics with the armed forces. The West suffers from a Cinderella syndrome when it comes to Pakistani politics. Washington and other capitals repeatedly look to a prominent individual-especially a military commander-every time there is talk of change in Pakistan. True to tradition, some in the US policymaking circles have begun to talk about General Kiyani as their knight in shinning armour who will professionalise Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s armed forces (there are others who still believe that Musharraf is the only option for America). Opinion pieces in the US and British media laud him for being an avid golfer, a professional officer with a 'can-do' image. He is someone that the West can comfortably work with. But notwithstanding the General's desire, it takes more than one individual to achieve these objectives. Like all militaries, Pakistan's is conservative and resistant to change; institutionalising transformation will require a concerted effort. Past experiments to de-politicise the army have failed. The end of General Ziaul-Haq's government kindled many hopes for permanent change in Pakistan when a series of officers, including Generals Aslam Beg, Asif Nawaz Janjua, Waheed Kakar and Jahangir Karamat, took a back seat in politics. However, General Musharraf's challenge to Nawaz Sharif's government on October 12th 1999 proved that no institutional change had taken place. Any general could still come to power

Generals Musharraf (left) and Kiyani

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It might not be possible for General Kiyani to revolutionise the military within his three-year term as army chief and shift its focus away from political ambition

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

with a military coup. It might not be possible for General Kiyani to revolutionise the military within his brief three-year term as army chief. Getting the military to shift its focus away from political ambition and back to doing its job is not as simple as redeploying a battalion from one front to another. Four factors make the shift a Herculean task. First, Pakistan's armed forces are currently overstretched in terms of power and stakeholder interest. They continue to enjoy extraordinary visibility in society. Although General Kiyani was quick to recall serving of-

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Women lead the Guard of Honour at the Quaid Tomb; Pakistani soldiers (below)

ficers from civilian departments to create space for the new government, there has been no corresponding shift from military to civilian power in the case of senior retired officers who continue to hold important government posts. For instance, Lt. General (retd) Javed Hassan and a team of other retired officers continue to head the key training facilities for civilian bureaucrats. Similarly, military foundations and retired military officers continue to use their influence or armed forces connections to obtain business contracts. Large public sector corpo-

rations such as the national airline, PIA, continue to award lucrative contracts to companies owned by senior retired military officers. Keep in mind that the overall share of the military economy is over seven percent of the GDP and one-third of total heavy manufacturing in the country. Currently, all major public sector construction projects are also given to military companies such as the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) and the National Logistic Cell (NLC). Second, because of its involvement in internal security matters, there is no evidence

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that the military will redefine its domestic political role. Despite the new government's claim that it will hold talks with terrorists and not use the military option, the fact is that internal security remains undefined. It will be years before the Para-military forces are sufficiently trained to replace the army. Either way, the military will continue to play a role in critical areas that have always been within the purview of the security establishment. Third, the new government does not have the capacity to reduce the military's role in the short to medium term. A powerful Ministry of Defense (MoD), as it was conceived by the 1973 paper on 'Higher Defense Re-organization', suffered a setback in its infancy; the security management structure created in 1976 could not deliver because General Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law in 1977. The MoD, conceptualized as a powerful civilian institution, gradually became militarized, and in the ensuing years its civilian bureaucracy lost its teeth. The situation worsened under Musharraf when a retired general was appointed minister. It would take five to ten years of consistent training and effort to re-energize the MoD's civilian bureaucracy, and since the new regime does not have a clear plan for it, this seems an unlikely event. The appointment of people like Maj. General (retd) Mehmood Ali Durrani as National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, on the pattern of the Indian PMO, will only strengthen the military rather than the civilian government. Fourth, transforming civil-military relations is directly dependent upon many other changes, starting with a stronger political regime. Given the perils of coalition politics and the vulnerability of the political leadership, it appears unlikely that the power of the military can be substantially curbed. Currently, the important political parties and their advisors are more concerned with keeping the army happy than with taking critical decisions for the country's long-term future. Finally, there is as yet no evidence that the armed forces' intelligence agencies have been told to reduce their interference in politics. As a result, one possible scenario is that the military will bide its time until its improved image, and a corresponding slide in the image and influence of the political leadership, allows it to stop pulling its punches. We are yet to see the new government present a political and economic agenda that can allow ordinary Pakistanis to hope for an enduring transformation. Under the circumstances, General Kiyani seems to be pursuing three parallel options. The first is to improve the military's battered image. The army has a history of withdrawing in the face of a domestic crisis: it surrendered political power in 1971 after a civil war in East Pakistan and defeat in war with India;

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NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Ghauri Missile test launch

Sections of junior and middle-ranking officers are uncomfortable about allowing the US forces to carry out operations in Pakistani tribal areas and the new regime in the army is trying to distance itself from this decision

Pakistani army soldiers patrol the streets against a terrorist threat

and again in 1988 when its top leadership, including the then army chief, was killed in a mysterious air crash. Some sources suggest that it will take up to two years for the armed forces' image to recover. It would be politically expedient to take a back seat until the new regime collapses under the dead weight of compromised politicians, by which time the army will have regrouped and can reclaim a place in the forefront of power politics. Second, General Kiyani is working to reduce organisational cleavages created by Gen-

eral (retd) Musharraf's policy of-blatantly, some would say-following American advice. Segments of junior and middle-ranking officers are uncomfortable with the policy of allowing the US to carry out military operations in tribal areas, and there is very little consensus in Pakistan on the efficacy of fighting the war on terror, which is seen as America's war imposed on Islamabad. The new Pakistani regime's insistence on distancing itself from the earlier policy on tribal areas, and on talking to the jihadis, will help to bridge these cleav-

JULY, 2008

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March, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) inducted seven Saab 2000 reconnaissance aircraft fitted with Eireye radar. One assessment is that the PAF hopes to replace its aging Mirage and F-7 fleet with approximately 250 JF-17 Thunder and 110 F-16s. There is discussion about procuring the Chinese J-10 fighter aircraft, and the PAF has begun to induct an indigenously made UAV. These measures will bolster the overall capability of the armed forces. The Navy is in talks to add Chinese F-22P frigates and German submarines to the existing inventory of French midget and Agosta 90-B submarines. Some German sources are curious about whether the navy is interested in adapting the submarines to launch nuclear weapons. The service is also working to increase its fleet of P-3C Orion aircraft to enhance anti-submarine warfare and naval reconnaissance capability. The Pakistani military is a permanent actor in the country's power politics. The present army chief and the army might get sucked into politics again if the existing political instability might increase in the coming days due to the tension between the pro-Musharraf and and anti-Musharraf or pro-democracy forces in the country. Already there are cleavages in the army between forces supporting Musharraf and officers that support the new army chief. General Kiyani might get sucked deeper into politics due to political instability. This will probably mean that the future of Pakistan's military in the coming years does not look any different from its past. It continues to be a formidable political force, and the new regime has not so far disclosed any systematic plan to renegotiate the social contract in civilian-military relations. Consequently, any global or regional power strategising future relations with Pakistan would be well advised to base policy on the present power equation.

ages. The alleged policy change recreates pre2003 conditions, when the Pakistani GHQ impressed upon the United States the importance of allowing Islamabad to deal with the Taliban while America targeted Al-Qaeda. In a related issue, the services also plan to garner greater support from disgruntled communities by improving the ethnic balance in the organization. In the past five years about 80,000 ethnic Sindhis have been inducted into the army. In an information brief published by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR)

in September 2007, the military plans to reduce the proportion of Punjabis to 57 percent by 2011, while increasing Sindhis to 17 percent and Baluch to 3.2 percent. The number of Pashtuns in the military will be reduced from 9.11 percent to 9 percent, in light of current operations in Waziristan and tribal areas. Third, Kiyani will concentrate on modernising the armed forces with weapons procurement and related issues. The services are already trying to acquire American F-16s and Chinese JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft. In

Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent political and defense analyst currently teaching at the University of Pennsylvania. She did her Ph.D. in War Studies from King's College, London and is the author of Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99 In Search of a Policy; and Military Inc, Inside Pakistan's Military Economy. She was the inaugural Pakistan Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Ford Fellow at the Bonn International Center for Conversion. Siddiqa is a columnist for Pakistani newspaper Daily Times and has contributed articles in international academic journals. She taught at the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and Lahore University of Management Sciences. Prior to her academic career she served in Pakistan's civil service including a two years stint as the Director of Naval Research with the Pakistan Navy. She has also worked for a year as correspondent for Jane's Defense Weekly.

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NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Old dog, new tricks? M YUBARAJ GHIMIRE

As the Maoists prepare to lead Nepal's nascent democracy, its neighbours wonder about etiquette, and keep a watchful eye on their own radical left movements.

Maoist leader Prachanda giving a speech as Nepal becomes a democracy

The tally does, however, enNDIA was perhaps the only Nepali Congress sure that the Maoists will be the country more surprised than demonstrators wave flags single largest party. The nonNepal's own government near the Thamel shopping Maoist parties, whose combined agencies, by the triumph of the area of Kathmandu strength of 360 outnumbers them Maoists in the April 10 polls to the Constituent Assembly (CA). The Communist by about 120 seats, watched helplessly as the Party of Nepal - Maoists (CPN-M) secured 120 Maoists declared that they will not compromise out of 240 directly-elected seats contested under on their radical agenda even after the CAis formally constituted, and the government formed. the 'first past the post' system. The influence and implications of a party The fact that the party garnered only around 31 percent of votes among the 335 seats allo- that waged armed war against the state for more cated under the proportional representation sys- than a decade are serious, and will spill beyond tem applied a powerful brake on the CPN-M's national boundaries. They will almost certainly roll to majority. In the final tally, the Maoists impact Nepal's neighborhood, South Asia as a ended up with 220 members in the 601-member region, and to some extent, wider international CA. They are short of at least 80 members for policy (the Maoists remain on the United simple majority, and at least 180 short of the two- States's terrorist list). Of course, worries at home are most acute. thirds majority it would require to settle major isThe fear is that the Maoists will abolish the sues in the House in its favour.

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aoists in transition

Worries at home are most acute that the Maoists will abolish the monarchy, bring the Nepali Army under their control and then target the freedom of the media and judiciary

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monarchy, bring the Nepal Army under the political control of the People's Liberation Army, and then target media and the judiciary to stall any resistance to their march towards one-party rule. How will 'no compromise' on a radical agenda impact economic and political programmes? Will it erode basic democratic values like freedom of the press and an independent judiciary? Or will a Maoist-led government be flexible enough to accommodate established democratic norms and practices such as accountability to Parliament (here the CA), transparency, and tolerance for dissent? Nepal's concerns are reverberating through the regional neighborhood, especially in India. Nepal shares almost 1,750 kilometres of open border with India. The Naxalite movement in India, which is ideologically close to the Nepali Maoists and shares common objectives and

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sometimes joint action, has grown rapidly and is now active in over 180 of 630 districts. The COMPOSA-an India-based federation of South Asian Maoist parties-still exists, and the CPNM remains affiliated to it even after entering the democratic system in Nepal. A joint pledge issued in September 2005 by Prachanda, Chairman of the CPN-M, and Ganapathy, General Secretary of the Communist Party of IndiaMaoists for armed struggle in Nepal and India and the world over in solidarity with other revolutionaries, is still alive. All these facts pose serious challenges. The Government of India will now need to monitor the equation between the two Maoist groups, as it has serious security implications. India's initial approach has been tactful; Foreign Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee called Prachanda to congratulate him, signalling the bureaucracy under him to engage the Nepali revolutionaries and encourage them to honour the age-old friendship and bilateral interest between the two countries. In a recent post-election interaction with supporters, Prachanda said that his government will adopt a policy of equidistance between India and China, but both sides are waiting to see how that plays out. The Chinese embassy in Kathmandu has lodged its concern with both Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and CPN-M chief Prachanda about growing anti-Chinese activities, mainly related to Free Tibet, and been assured by both that the government will deal seriously with its concerns. But the US and most European and Scandinavian countries take the approach that the Nepali government should not suppress the right of Tibetans to raise their demand peacefully. China's immediate goal seems to be to prevent Free Tibet activities from operating in Nepal, but in the changed political situation it will also want to cultivate the Maoists, and the government under them. Nepal's increased proximity to China will be a matter of great concern for India, which jealously wants Nepal to be a part of its security umbrella. K V Rajan, India's former ambassador to Nepal, explicitly expressed this concern, saying that India is dealing with a 'protectorate' now when it should be dealing with an independent nation. In November 2005 the government of India successfully brought the CPN-M back to the negotiating table when it was still a terrorist outfit both in India and Nepal. The international community, beginning with India, Britain and the United States, had stopped supplying arms to the Nepal Army in its battle with the Maoists, months before India had convinced other international players that it could bring the rebels into the democratic fold. New Delhi's initiative bestowed political legitimacy on the CPN-M, both in Nepal and India and in the rest of the world. That initiative culminated, on April 10,

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NEIGHBOUR WATCH

The People’s Liberation Army of Nepal’s success is an inspiration to Indian Naxalites, as seen in the jailbreak in Jehanabad and in more successful attacks on police posts in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and eastern UP

” Main office of the All Nepal National Free Students Union, Kathmandu

in a democratic election process. India now fears losing its influence, and its suspicions are growing. There are many reasons for this. The Maoist insurgency that began in February 1996 took an anti-imperialist (America) and anti-expansionist (India) stance which it has not yet given up. The Maoist manifesto states that it will scrap all inequitable international treaties, first and foremost the 1950 treaty of peace and friendship with India, which brings Nepal into India's security umbrella. It advocates rationalising Nepal's potential 42,000MW production of hydro-electric power, in which India has a vital interest. The Maoists also want to scrap Gorkha recruitment in the Indian and British armies. So far India has not exhibited panic, and is moving cautiously. It began by assuring Prachanda of its respect for the people's mandate, and that it will be business as usual as far as India is concerned. Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil said in Parliament that the CPN-M

and Indian Naxalites were different, and formed no nexus. But this belies the border vigil based on suspicions of just such a nexus, and does nothing to reassure the Indian security forces. At least one top CPN-M ideologue, Mohan Baidya, was arrested and detained in Siliguri for over two years on suspicion that he was working with Naxalites in West Bengal. Another prominent Maoist leader was arrested on the charge of being a conduit for arms purchases by Kashmiri Jehadis for Nepal. Both were, however, later released. The Bharatiya Janata Party, which took power in New Delhi in 1999 for one full term, still argues that a 'compact revolutionary zone' (CRZ) extends from Nepal right to Andhra Pradesh. Despite India's diplomatic engagement with the Maoists, the security vigil against a possible cross-border nexus will only intensify. There is also the possibility that CPN-M puritans who reject the democratic process will find easy refuge in India, since the Maoists in

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United Nations soldiers on the streets in Nepal before it went to polls

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their underground days are reliably known to have been trained by the PWG in Assam, and some by the LTTE. There are still very sketchy reports on how well-armed the CPN-M cadres are. The United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN), which oversees the arms and armies of the Maoists as part of the peace process, has registered only around 3,200 weapons, against a 31,000 force of combatants whom the Maoists call the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Top Maoist leaders have claimed that their arms were "swept away" by rivers, while Prachanda has said they were destroyed in a fire. Senior leader Baburam Bhattarai fuelled suspicion of a vast number of undisclosed arms when he said, on the eve of the polls, that if the election was rigged, the Maoists could capture Kathmandu in ten minutes, The CPN-M will be the first party to own private arms and armies besides having total control over the state's machinery--an uncomfortable fact that neither the international community, nor the major political parties in Nepal have been able to raise. The PLA's success is an inspiration to Indian Naxalites, as evidenced by the Jail break in Jehanabad and more successful attacks on police posts in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and eastern Uttar Pradesh. The CPI(M)'s Sitaram Yechury, considered close to the Nepali Maoists, hopes that the CPN-M's electoral victory will encourage Indian Maoists to follow suit. But that seems far-fetched for now, because though both sides of the border share similar agendas, and both find fertile ground for ideological cultivation in widespread poverty and illiteracy, the authority of the Indian state has never collapsed in the manner it did in Nepal. Nevertheless, the CPN-M allegedly has a substantial base and an organised network of members and sympathisers in the hilly areas of West Bengal. Prachanda himself has publicly stated that he favours the ' right to self-determination' for the people of Kashmir and India's north-east. Pragmatism demands that he put this on the back burner when he assumes leadership of the government, but fears persist that the bonds between revolutionary comrades on both sides are inseparable. Yubaraj Ghimire is a Kathmandu-based journalist and among the few Nepali news professionals who honed their journalistic skills abroad and eventually returned home to practice the craft. He is the editor of the popular Samay newsweekly and Newsfront, an English news tabloid. He is the former editor of Kantipur, Nepal's largest-selling newspaper. He hit the headlines after the 2001 massacre of King Birendra and the royal family and was arrested on charges of treason for running an article by Baburam Bhattarai calling on the Nepalese army to revolt against the new king, Gyanendra. He was later released.

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INDO-US RELATIONS

Beyond the Nuclear

Deal T

HE India-US civil nuclear agreement might be imperilled by domestic constraints imposed on New Delhi by complex coalition politics, but the bilateral security and defence partnership between the two countries is steadily proliferating, particularly in military sales. While President George W. Bush’s administration considers the nuclear deal a major foreign initiative, former US defence secretary William S Cohen said: “If the India-US civilian nuclear deal collapses, it will not impact on the growing military ties between the two countries.” Cohen was speaking at Delhi’s Defexpo in February 2008, where he led the largest-ever US contingent of defence majors to India—Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Sikorsky. US defence secretary Robert Gates’ visit to New Delhi at the same time was more to assess the impact of the fading nuclear deal on the 10year India-US Defence Framework Agreement of April 2005, than to salvage the atomic agreement itself. By all accounts, he was not disappointed. Gates’ principal focus was on arms sales, as India strives to modernise its military against the backdrop of a turbulent neighbourhood and China’s burgeoning defence growth. Most analysts agree that, with ongoing collaborations between American and local firms, greater US-India defence cooperation is a reality. India’s military hardware purchases are expected to double to over US$30 billion by 2012, and to US$80 billion a decade after that as its predominantly Soviet and Russian arsenal reaches collective obsolescence. This is the vast lacuna that US defence companies are vying to fill; and progress, which has

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been incremental since sanctions against India’s multiple nuclear tests were lifted in October 2001, is steadily gathering momentum. As a sweetener, the IAF earlier this year inked a deal for six Lockheed Martin-built Hercules C-130J-30 military transport aircraft in Special Forces (SF) configuration for US$962 million, through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme. An add-on order for an

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A US officer during the Malabar exercise

equal, if not larger number of similar aircraft is possible, to augment the IAFâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ageing transport fleet of largely Soviet and Russian Antonov and Ilyushin variants. The IAF will operate the C-130Js, capable of short takeoffs and landings from unprepared runways, for the armyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s seven SF battalions. They expect to buy four more by 2010. Besides AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning

Whatever the fate of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, India and the United States are on the path to further strategic affiliation. 55

Systems and counter-measure dispensing systems for protection against heat seeking missiles, the C-130Js are equipped with radar warning receivers and special avionics geared for SF deployment, like electric flare paths for night flying operations and low level extraction, or dropping paratroopers or supplies from low altitudes. The deal includes establishing ground infra-

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INDO-US RELATIONS

The government that will assume office after the April 2009 general elections in India is expected to conclude the contract for the Medium MultiRole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA)

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structure facilities from scratch at Hindon, on Delhi’s outskirts, and training 18 officers and 100 technicians in the US ahead of aircraft deliveries in 2011. The C-130J’s will serve as an interim measure until around 2015, when the 18.5 ton Multi-role Transport Aircraft (MTA)—a cargo and troop transporter with low altitude parachute extraction system capability—being developed jointly by the State-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangalore and Russia’s newly formed United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), becomes operational. India acquired 12 Thales-Raytheon Systems AN/TPQ-37(V) 3 Firefinder artillery locating radar for US$142.4 million in 2002; a refurbished 16,900-ton Austin Class landing platform dock (LPD), the USS Trenton—renamed INS Jalashwa—for US$50 million; and six surplus Sikorsky Uh-3H Sea King helicopters to operate off it for an additional US$39 million. The LPD joined service with the Indian Navy’s (IN) Eastern Fleet in September 2007. Like the C-130Js, both acquisitions, were made via the FMS programme, which is in-

creasingly Washington’s preferred way of selling defence equipment to India. It strengthens bilateral relations, supports coalition building, and enhances interoperability, thus furthering American national security and foreign policy objectives. It also improves the US balance of trade position, since India or any client pays a service charge to the US military for sourcing equipment from vendors on terms similar to what it would negotiate for itself. India could negotiate directly with the vendors, and perhaps even secure a price lower than the FMS cost; but then the US Department of Defence would not be the contract guarantor, ensuring product support and after sales service. In short, the FMS programme, invariably used to transfer sensitive technologies, gives the US subtle leverage over its clients. India also imported 41 General Electric F404-GE-IN20 after burner engines to power prototypes of the locally designed ‘Tejas’ light combat aircraft (LCA), as well as for fitment on the first tranche of twenty fighters ordered by the IAF, which are expected to join service by 2012-13.

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Side by side, the Indian Navy is in the final stages of negotiations with Boeing to acquire eight P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft (MRA) based on the Boeing 737 platform, for an estimated US$2.2 billion, to replace an equal number of obsolete Russian Tupolev Tu142s. During DefExpo 2008 in New Delhi, Boeing officials said that the MRA agreement would arrive at a competitive price. The contract would be a mix of direct commercial sale and FMS: the Boeing 737 derived P8I platform being a commercial sale, and the Indian Navy’s requirements of weapons being provided under FMS. The final purchase agreement is likely to be concluded in Delhi in the current financial year ending March 2009. Washington is also aggressively backing the US$11 billion contract for 126 medium multirole combat fighters (MMRCA), for which Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F, and Lockheed Martin’s F 16IN export model are competing alongside Russian and European manufacturers. Officials hint that this number will eventually increase to 200 units, if not more. In the MMRCA contract, both US companies are offering technology transfers of hitherto pro-

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scribed features, like the IAEA headquarters clearing it with Washington. Bringing Northrop Grumman-de- since 1979, Vienna, India on board the F-35 programme — - which the US has allowed only its signed active electronic Austria closest allies so far —- would not just scanned array (AESA) radar, which provides the pilots with en- be a symbolic statement, but would also greatly hanced situational awareness and the boost Lockheed Martin’s chances of winning the ability to engage multiple ground and MMRCAcontract, since the F-16 is a logical stepair targets simultaneously. Boeing too is ping stone to the F-35. The government that assumes office afwilling to transfer technology for the APG 79 AESA radar on its F/A-18 E/F ter India’s April 2009 general election is ex‘Super Hornet’ fighter. With the IN in- pected to conclude the MRCA contract. Seterested in acquiring the naval version nior military sources said that the MMRCA of the F/A-18E/F for its depleting air choice would ultimately depend on three arm, the ‘commonality’ factor could factors: price, life cycle cost, and the Indian administration’s political affiliations with swing the deal in Boeing’s favour. US defence companies are increas- the government of the eventual winner. Lockheed Martin is also offering India its adingly willing to transfer military know-how in order to exploit India’s advanced information tech- vanced Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) nology (IT) industry and low labour costs, and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. “We will be make it a hub for exports. India’s booming econ- interested in seeing how to share technology omy, and its hunger for civilian and military air- and find ways to get a comprehensive missile craft-which is expected to grow exponentially defence system for India,” said former Lt. Gen. over the next two decades-also strengthens the Dennis D Cavin, Vice President of Lockheed case for transferring US aviation technology to In- Martin’s International Air and Missile Defence dia. Beginning with direct offsets, the two sides Strategic Initiatives. The US, he said, had spent billions of dollars would eventually move towards joint production, followed by co-production as technology perme- developing the Patriot, and India need not invest so heavily in designing its own ABM system, says ates into Indian industry. US officials obliquely hint that an evolving in- Lockheed Martin. The offer followed soon after dustrial partnership between the two countries’ India’s Defence Research and Development Ormilitary-industrial complexes could act as a ganisation (DRDO) successfully tried out its hedge against sanctions at a later stage, should In- fledgling ABM programme. This was followed by dia opt to strengthen its strategic deterrence with Robert Gates’ declaration in February that Washanother nuclear test. This argument, however ington was ‘examining’ the possibility of a joint disingenuous, is gaining credence in Indian mili- missile defence system with India, as part of evolving bilateral strategic ties. However, he tary circles. In July 2007 Lockheed Martin threw in a stressed that talks on such collaboration were at sweetener by tentatively offering the IAF its fifth an incipient stage. “We’re not looking for quick results or big generation F35 ‘Lightening II’ joint strike fighter (JSF), in order to boost the ‘lethality’ of the air leaps forward,” Gates stated, “but rather a force beyond the 126 MRCA it plans to procure. steady expansion of this relationship in a way This offer could not have been made without first that leaves everybody comfortable and one that

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INDO-US RELATIONS

Missile collaboration with the US would confirm India as an ally, rather than a strategic partner. It would also dilute, if not neutralise, efforts to locally develop an indigenous ABM capability, and would circumscribe India’s strategic missile programme

” A US naval helicopter landing on INS Mysore during an Indo-US naval exercise

works in terms of Indian domestic politics and also for us.” Missile collaboration with the US would confirm India as an ally, rather than a strategic partner. It would also dilute, if not neutralise, efforts to locally develop an indigenous ABM capability, and would circumscribe India’s strategic missile programme (in which the US can never, under any circumstances, be involved), thus crippling India’s deterrence capability. Lockheed Martin is also competing with European companies and India’s Tata Group to upgrade 30 IAF airfields and their air traffic control systems, in a contract estimated at US$1.5 billion. The effort is part of the Indian military’s decision to augment mobility and network centricity for future conflicts, which India’s defence planners anticipate will be short and intense. To further leverage their position, and meet the offset obligation of 50 percent of the MRCA contract value—up from the mandatory 30 percent—both American rivals signed extensive partnerships with India’s state-owned and private defence companies to jointly manufacture aerospace equipment. Like Lockheed Martin, Boeing recognises an opportunity to integrate its commercial and military enterprise in India. Both companies are considering the prospect of initially producing components, and later, completed systems for sale to third countries. In December 2007 Boeing signed a ten-year memorandum of understanding with HAL to bring US$1 billion of aerospace manufacturing work to India. It also indicated that it was likely to source sub-systems from this joint venture (JV) for F/A-18’s, CH-47F heavy-lift Chinook helicopters and P-8I MRA. Three months later, Boeing entered into a joint venture with Tata Industries that is expected to generate over US$500 million of aerospace component work in India for export to the US conglomerate and its international customers, irrespective of the outcome of the MMRCAcontract.

Meanwhile, US defence contractors like Raytheon, General Dynamics and Sikorsky have entered into similar outsourcing arrangements with Indian defence companies. They plan to bid for a joint Services demand for 384 light observation helicopters, seven frigates, and assorted SF and force multiplication material like radar and electronic warfare equipment. Bolstering this aggressive sales pitch by the US defence corporations are bilateral multiservice exercises, of which India and the US have conducted over 50 since 2001 to enhance “functional interoperability” between their armed forces. India’s military is enthusiastic about this new opening. Despite opposition from the Congress Party-led coalition’s Communist allies, who also oppose the nuclear deal, the IAF has bid to participate in the prestigious ‘Red Flag’ exercises in 2008 at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. “It’s the most sought-after exercise in the world,” said IAF chief ACM Fali Homi Major. “The facilities at Nellis can simulate all kinds of air warfare and we want our pilots and technicians to be exposed to it.” India’s military realises the utility of joint exercises, and is unwilling to politicise operational issues. Both sides agree that military co-operation and an exchange of military personnel could eventually lead to jointly-conducted multinational operations in varied terrain, sub-conventional warfare, and peace-keeping operations in ethnic conflict zones like Afghanistan, where US and NATO troops face a stubborn and seemingly unending insurgency. The most significant manoeuvres, however, are the Malabar exercises, upon which the US lays great stress as it views the Indian Navy as a stabilising force in the strategically vital Indian Ocean Region (IOR). One common cause for Indo-US concern is China’s strategic submarine base near Sanya on Hainan Island, off its southern coast. The Jin-Class nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) housed here could significantly alter the balance of power in the IOR. After the 9/11 attacks the IN patrolled the Malacca Straits with the USN for twelve months. Last September, the US Navy conducted multilateral exercises in the Bay of Bengal with India, Singapore, Japan and Australia as part of its pro-active strategy in the IOR, triggering concerns in Beijing about an incipient anti-China military grouping. Over the years these exercises have shifted focus from conventional to anti-terror manoeuvres that include ‘intercepting’ weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials and technologies, as well as their delivery systems, and even ‘liberating’ states from terrorists. India’s participation implicitly endorses the 11nation, US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that empowers itself to interdict vessels, and ultimately aircraft, suspected of ferrying

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INDO-US RELATIONS Indo US joint exercise: IAF's two MiG 27 with USAF's F-15

WMD and associated equipment. Given the Indian Navy’s presence across the IOR, the US has persistently pressed India to sign up for the PSI. But although the IN has often privately expressed its willingness to do so, on the grounds that regional WMD powers grievously undermine India’s security interests, the country’s political leadership remains unwilling. The IN is also not averse to joining the US-inspired Regional Marine Security Initiative, a partnership of willing regional nations with varying capabilities to identify, monitor, and intercept trans-national maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws. Meanwhile, besides obvious commercial interests, the US also seeks a credible ally in a region where its hold is slipping in inverse proportion to China’s growing strategic relevance. Both the US and India view China as a fast emerging threat, and share an interest in understanding and countering Chinese strategic intent, though they do not discuss this publicly. America believes that with Washington’s help and military investment, India can emerge as a counterweight to China. While the US State Department’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ continues to shape Washington’s overall approach to Beijing, the Pentagon is anxious to spend peacetime forging closer ties with India. It was, after all the Pentagon that took the lead in cementing strategic relations with India after the Soviet Union’s break-up in the early 1990’s, leading to the Kickleighter proposals for greater military co-operation between Washington and Delhi. Named after General Claude Kickleighter, then head of the Pacific Command, the proposals aimed to

gradually strengthen military ties by the end of the decade. This eventually led to the 2005 Defence Pact and other agreements, like the High Technology Cooperation Group-the first formulation that Washington set up with any country to deal with the long-standing bottleneck in high technology transfers. “If China emerges as a major power, the US needs to have friends—preferably friends who share the same values (like democracy). In future India will have more clout and weight (in the region),” declared an analysis for the US DoD, adding that in 2020 Washington wanted a

friend capable of militarily assisting the US in dealing with a Chinese threat. But several procedural issues remain unresolved before this alliance can be

cemented. India’s hesitancy in inking the US-backed LSA—also known as the Access and Cross- Servicing Agreement—stems from strong opposition from Communist MPs, whose support is crucial to the survival of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Congress Party-led federal coalition. The Leftists view the LSA, like the nuclear deal, as a ‘hegemonic ploy’ by the US to ‘strategically enslave’ India. Another unresolved issue is the End-use Verification Agreement, which allows spot checks by US defence officials at Indian military installations where American equipment is employed. The Agreement, as per US law with regard to military equipment sold via the FMS programme, also restricts its operational deployment to Washington’s diktats. Although the US Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter declared in March that this is not the case, Indian officials believe it is a ‘codicil’, liable to be invoked if bilateral security relations sour at a later stage. India also questions the bilateral Communication, Inter-operability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) that requires US defence equipment purchasers to ensure its compatibility with other American systems. However, officials in Delhi say that the two nations are working on a compromise suggested by India, under which the US could be provided access to Indian military records with regard to the deployment of its equipment. Whatever wrinkles remain to be ironed out, therefore, and whatever the fate of the civil nuclear deal, India and the US are on the path to further strategic affiliation and increasing weapons sales. Decades of reliance on Soviet and Russian equipment has left its imprint on Indian military planning and it will take a while before senior officials overcome an institutional tendency to “think Russian”. US arms companies are confident that the superiority of their product and after sales support will eventually prevail and they are pulling out the stops to build a comprehensive defence relationship with a country that they do not yet know well, but are confident that has all the attributes needed for an ally in the 21st century. Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for the Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes regularly to it on a diverse range of security and military-related matters. He is also the India correspondent for The Daily Telegraph, London and the Irish Times, Dublin for which he writes on a variety of political, social and diplomatic issues.

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JULY, 2008

T MANVENDRA SINGH

HE fencing of the border is the best thing that's happened to us,” said Fateh Khan of Sehlau village, in Ramsar tehsil of Barmer district. I wondered at his comment, as I had always thought that communities artificially separated by the Radcliffe Line would benefit from a porous border. After all, marriages could take place without having to get visas from a thousand kilometres away, and the lucrative cross-border trade in groceries and contraband sustains many lives. But his logic was simple. “At least now,” he said, “the Muslim living on the border will not automatically be suspected of being a smuggler or a spy”.

The importance of Fateh Khan's observation came back to me when data from the 2001 Census became public. Initially it was a mere trickle of information, but even those bits and pieces were enough to ring bells beyond the long desert boundary between India and Pakistan. The four districts of Ganganagar, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Barmer form the longest stretch of the Indo-Pak border in any state; taken together with Kutch, this is the longest socially-contiguous border that India has with any country. Curiously, as the Radcliffe Line cuts its way along the desert, crossborder societal connections increase. While Ganganagar residents have only a few rela-

JULY, 2008

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BORDER ISSUES

PHANTOM

THE LINE IN THE SANDS percent, and Jaisalmer an astonishtives across the border, those in Jaisalmer, ing 47.45 percent increase in popusouthernmost Barmer and Kutch Bikaner,Ganganlation. The fact that these three disare predominantly related across agar and Barmer tricts were so far above the national the Radcliffe Line, or have migrated districts form the and state averages triggered alarm from the other side. longest Indo-Pak bells about the long-term implicaBut what arrested people's atten- border stretch tions of national security planning tion was the Census data on population growth rates for the desert districts. Be- and strategy in these areas. The question asked tween the 1991 and 2001 Censuses, both nationally and locally was: Will this inGanganagar and Kutch showed a fairly large ternational border be affected as the others growth in population of 27.53 percent and have been? The partition of India in 1947 saw untold 20.70 percent respectively. But it was the growth rates in the three districts between violence along the eastern and western borthem that raised eyebrows: Bikaner saw a dra- ders as Punjab, Bengal, Jammu, and Kashmir matic increase of 38.18 percent, Barmer 36.83 were torn apart socially. The desert border

As demographic changes sweep along the desert districts of Rajasthan, the question everyone is asking is, will this border too see the kind of violence that has affected other parts of the international border with Pakistan?

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BORDER ISSUES

Calm prevailed on both sides of the border until 1965, when the second Indo-Pak war shattered the peace and ended the isolation of the desert communities. A frontier appeared literally overnight

â&#x20AC;?

alone witnessed no violence or migration, even though the Radcliffe Line also divided families and communities; it was as if lines drawn in the sand meant little to daily life. Calm prevailed on both sides until 1965, when the second Indo-Pak war shattered the peace and ended the isolation of the desert communities. A frontier appeared literally overnight. The Munabao-Khokhrapar rail link and the Gadra road link ceased to be crossing points, and the route to Karachi and back became a long one. Wartime fears spurred Hindu families from Sindh to move into India, and Indian Muslims to travel in the other direction. This was the first time that there was human migration across this border. Some families moved back to their original home in India once conditions improved following the ceasefire, though none are known to have returned to Pakistan. The same cycle was repeated less than six years later when India and Pakistan fought their third round in December 1971. A prolonged Indian army presence in adjoining areas of Sindh provoked similar movements to and fro, and a return back to India for some Muslim families from Jaisalmer district. But the numbers of Hindu families moving into India was the largest ever. The first real demographic impact of mi-

The Blue City of Brahmpuri from the ramparts of Mehrangarh Fort

gration along this border was felt in the years following the 1971 war. New villages came up, and certain towns reserved areas for 'refugee colonies'-a term alien to the desert, now downloaded from government terminology. Very soon, however, the migrants-all of whom were anyway related to the Indian communitywere absorbed into daily life. Cross-border smuggling and marriages resumed, as though the line in the sands weren't real. By the end of the 1970s things began to change in Sindh. An anti-democracy crackdown and the Islamisation campaign of the late Pakistani president General Zia Ul-Haq, coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, directly impacted the border districts as a trickle of movement began across the border in the desert. This phenomenon continued through the 1980s, and gained strength after 1992, when

JULY, 2008

Hindu fundamentalists destroyed the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. By the middle of the 1990s, however, the entire border in Rajasthan had been fenced except for one technically impossible portion in Jaisalmer, making human migration into India impossible. As sectarian excesses became more frequent in Pakistan, more families migrated legally on their passports, though they settled in urban centres like Jodhpur, and therefore did not affect migration patterns in the border districts. Despite these instances of migration, however, this India-Pakistan border remains uniquely trouble-free. Right through the height of the terrorism problem in Indian Punjab and Kashmir, it was the only border where there was no crisis, though a number of Punjab terrorists are said to have crossed into In-

DSI

dia through it (the perpetrators of Jaisalmer fort looms this section, they could well also be the biggest beneficiaries of imthe infamous bomb blast at the In- over this desert city proved rural health services. In ter-State Bus Terminus at Delhi in 1985 are believed to have come via the Jaisalmer the growth among Scheduled Jaisalmer border, crossing over near Khuri and Castes is almost 50 percent, which is higher then hitching a ride to the town to hire a vehicle than the overall district figures of 47.45 perto Delhi). Despite the porosity of the Radcliffe cent. For Barmer, the figures are only a little Line, and despite a potentially large recruitable lower. It is true that Muslims constitute alpopulation, peace and sanity has prevailed most 30 percent of the population of Jaisalmer, amongst the highest percentages along its length. This claim to fame is not lost on the local in the country. But that is not a security population. So when the 2001 census figures threat, for a simple sociological reason. The Muslims along this part of the border were released amid widespread concern, the local reaction was only a muted murmuring. are emotionally, socially, psychologically and There are justifiable socio-psychological rea- historically connected to Sindh. They have sons for this confidence, and an analysis of nothing in common with mainstream Pakthe 2001 data reveals why that is so; local istan, ideologically or psychologically. The growth has to be understood in the context of same connections apply to a large section of the non-Muslim population across social local factors. Migrations from the 1970s onwards did add strata. Strong bonds with Sindh make for a to local numbers, well beyond what could be common sociological mindset, which ultitermed natural growth. As the numbers in- mately makes this region unique among the creased, so did the potential for further multipli- border states. That common sociology, and cation, particularly in the decade of the 1990s-so common concerns, make for harmonious commuch so that growth rates in the 2001 census munal relationships. The only time they are stressed is during mirrored that of some Assam districts. While Bangladeshi migrations can be held responsible political battles, but then the Indian phenomefor the numbers in Assam, Pakistani migra- non of success through alliances kicks in. All tions are one reason for the growth in these In- elections here are fought through multiple alliances and arrangements, thus nullifying the dian border districts. The other reasons are, once again, local. risk of social schisms. Ultimately, when there is They can be best explained simply by better little chance of social schism, there is little health services. Of a total population of chance of malicious meddling, demographic 1,964,835 in Barmer district, almost 847,335 data notwithstanding. were under the age of 14 years, and 978,039 were in the 15-59 age bracket. Of a total popula- Manvendra Singh is a Member of Parliament tion of 508,247 in Jaisalmer, 216,264 were aged and represents Barmer & Jaisalmer districts in under 14 years, and 260,643 were in the 15-59 India's 14th Lok Sabha. This is his first term bracket. In percentage terms, almost 55 per- having failed to get elected for the 13th Lok cent of the under-14 bracket in both districts is Sabha in 1999. Prior to that attempt he was a aged 4 and below. This begs the questions: journalist with The Indian Express in various capacities. Singh is a member of Parliament's what of future demographic trends? The spectre of threat was prompted by a Committee on Defence since 2004. He was edufear that the dramatic increase in population cated at the School of Oriental & African Studwas caused by growth amongst Muslims, ies in London, Hampshire College at Amherst, which might have a spiraling effect in the USA and at the Mayo College in Ajmer, India. district, and for the country's security sce- Singh has an enduring interest in security isnario. However, further analysis of popula- sues, as well as an interest in Arab Politics. He tion growth shows that the rates are highest is an avid football follower, he enjoys books and amongst the Scheduled Castes. While the music for company. Married to Chitra, they largest migration from Pakistan has been in parent over a boy and a girl.

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defencetalk

An update on military policy

France offers Indian Army its best artillery FRANCE, which has supplied advanced Mirage-2000 fighters and Scorpene submarines to India, has offered to become its full weapons development partner to produce front-line land combat systems for the Indian Army. “We are ready to transfer front-line technology and work to co-produce and jointly develop advanced systems like higher firepower, longer range artillery guns, and high mobility land mine secure vehicles for Indian security forces,” said officials of the top French land armament company, Nexter, in Paris. The French offer comes at a time when the Indian Army is on the threshold of floating its biggest-ever global tenders for 2,000 to 3,000 wheeled, towed and tracked 155 mm guns of .52 calibre, and 1,000 to 2,000 high speed mineprotected troop-carrying 4x4 and 8x8 specialised troop combat vehicles for forces operating against terrorists and Maoists. The tenders, according to experts here, could run up to 5-7 billion Euros with deliveries expected in three to five years.The French offer was echoed by the country’s Defence Minister Herve Morim, as he threw open the world’s biggest land system exhibition, Eurosatory 2008, near Paris. Spelling out that terrorism had become an international scourge, Morim said France was ready to co-produce and jointly develop hightech weapons with its strategic partners. His comments came as leading companies from the US, Europe, Africa and others have put on display technology-driven new weapons systems to combat terrorism, keeping in mind their first hand experience gath-

ered during operations in Afghanistan. The Indian Army is planning to float new tenders to purchase up to 3,000 155 mm .52 calibre artillery guns, of which 814 would be wheeled guns and another 1,500 towed guns, to bring its artillery firepower up to NATO standards. The state-owned French land combat systems company, which has recently downsized to become Europe’s leading artillery and tank building company, has expressed its willingness to co-produce and jointly develop land combat systems with India. However, Indian defence planners are in a quandary over the purchase of higher firepower artillery guns, with an apparent hesitation over the controversial Bofors guns. While the Indian army has made tremendous progress in modernising infantry and armoured units, its artillery upgrade programme is running 10 years behind schedule. Nexter is offering its just-produced truckmounted Caesar wheeled .52 calibre gun which, its top official Laurent Nicolas says, “is unequalled in strategic mobility and air transportability in a C-130 J transport aircraft.” The French guns have already been inducted into the French Army and have seen action in Afghanistan. For the Indian Army’s forthcoming order, the French firm would be in competition with Israel’s Atmos Soltam System, Serbian Nora, South African Condor and matching guns from Slovakia. Nexter officials said they are ready to offer the guns on a government-to-government sale basis if India so wants. The Caesar gun can fire six rounds to a distance of 40 km, with a rate of fire of six rounds per minute, and a gun crew of just five. The Caesar guns support an on-board navigator and ballistics computer with muzzle velocity measurement radar, and can be used with any fire control system. Published in www.rediff.com

NEXTER Versatility, mobility, easy operability, combat readiness and survivability are the key features of this new 155mm/52calibre weapon system which is fully interoperable with the NATO 39 cal. equipment and 52 cal

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JULY, 2008

defencetalk

Army to raise two ‘offensive’ mountain divisions THEArmy will raise two “offensive” mountain divisions in three years, according to sources in the Army. They will be equipped with air portable guns and an integral air component to quickly transport troops into battle positions. In simple terms, each division, with about 10,000 to 13,000 troops, will take the battle into the enemy camp in the Himalayas. A substantial part of India’s border with Pakistan and China is an unresolved mountainous stretch known as the Line of Control (Pakistan), the Actual

Ground Position Line (Siachen/Pakistan) and the Line of Actual Control (China). The Army already has 10 mountain divisions and a complete infantry division for operations at high altitudes. India is negotiating with the US to import six large troop transport carriers, and is planning to manufacture over 300 medium-lift transport helicopters. It has also called tenders for light artillery guns that can be air dropped. HAL has been asked to manufacture 67 helicopter gunships. The other option is to import addi-

tional helicopters. Sensing the opportunity, the world’s helicopter majors are lining up to offer their wares.The Army is also mulling over a proposal to better equip its soldiers to fight at heights. The Cabinet Committee on Security cleared the Army’s proposal a couple of months ago. Sources claim the outlines of the two divisions, including headquarters should be in place in another two years. It will take another year to make the divisions fully functional. Published in The Hindu

Arjun versus T-90: Army avoiding trials INDIA’s Arjun tank is fighting its first battle even before it enters service with the army. The Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) and key Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials, confident that the Arjun is superior to the army’s Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks, are demanding “comparative trials”, where the Arjun, theT-72 and theT-90 are put through endurance and firing trials in identical conditions. But the army—particularly the nodal Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF)—is shying away. Earlier, the DGMF declared that theT-72 andT-90 were proven tanks that needed no further trials. Now, with the MoD adding its voice to the demand for comparative trials, the DGMF has told Business Standard that they must be put off until the army gets a full squadron of Arjun tanks (14 tanks) and absorbs the expertise to use them. DRDO sources say the army is stonewalling the Arjun by demanding levels of performance that neither of its Russian tanks can deliver. Meanwhile, more T-90s are being imported from Russia on the plea that the army is short of tanks. The DRDO’s fears are grounded in experience. On July 28, 2005 Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee informed Parliament, “The Arjun tank is superior to (the)T-90 tank due to its high power to weight ratio, superior fire on the move capability during day and night and excellent ride comfort. MBT Arjun has gone through

all the tests and it is meeting the (requirements) of the Army.” But a year later, in December 2007, India bought 347 more T-90s for Rs 4,900 crores.That despite the MoD’s admission in Parliament that the 310 T-90s purchased earlier had problems with their Invar missile systems, and the thermal imagers that are crucial for night fighting. A comparative trial, says the DRDO, will conclusively establish that the Arjun is a better tank than theT-90.That will at least put a stop to the import of more T-90s. But the DGMF is putting off such a trial.The DG of Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen D Bhardwaj, told Business Standard, “The Arjun is based on a very stringent GSQR, and is in a class by itself. User trials are conducted based on this GSQR. Nevertheless, comparative trials will be conducted once a squadron worth of tanks (i.e. 14 Arjun tanks) is inducted into the army.” This new insistence on 14 tanks will delay the trials until at least December 8. In 2005, the army agreed to comparative trials, with five Arjun tanks pitted against five T-72s and an equal number of T-90s. The DGMF had even written the trial directive, spelling out how trials would be conducted.Those trials were postponed as the Arjun was not ready to operate in high summer temperatures. Now, the Arjun is ready but the army is not. Published in Business Standard

ARJUN DRDO and CVRDE were tasked with developing the hull, armour, turret, running gear and gun, with the powerpack bought from abroad. The Arjun’s project requirements were upgraded to 58.5 tons with a 120mm gun

T-90 is a Russian main battle tank, currently the most modern in the Russian Ground Forces and Indian Army arsenal. The successor to the T72BM, it uses the gun and 1G46 gunner sights from T-80U, a new engine, and thermal sights

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Russia to drive hard bargain for aircraft carrier RUSSIA will drive a hard bargain in renegotiating the price of an aircraft carrier which the Indian Navy has purchased and for which Moscow is seeking $1.2 billion over and above the $1.5 billion that had been agreed on, says the Russian ambassador. AmbassadorVyacheslav I.Trubnikov hedged his bets on transferring technology for theT-90 main battle tank and for the cryogenic engine of the BrahMos cruise missile that India and Russia have jointly developed. Trubnikov was addressing a press conference after inaugurating a Russian Information Centre in New Delhi. “It’s a complicated issue. There are objective and subjective factors,” the ambassador said while referring to the negotiations underway on the Russian demand for more money for the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov that has been renamed INSVikramaditya. “Our economy was in a very different condition (when negotiations for the ship first began). Our shipyards were out of work.We agreed to the hard deal struck by the Indians,” the ambassador maintained. “The reality is very different today.When we look at the figures, they are unrealistic as the scope of the work (involved in refurbishing the ship) was grossly underestimated,”Trubnikov added. Under the original deal, India was to buy the carrier for

$1.5 billion. Of this, $970 million was meant to refurbish the vessel that has been mothballed since a devastating fire in the mid-1990s. The remaining $530 million was meant for the MiG-29K fighter jets, Kamov surveillance and anti-submarine warfare helicopters that will be deployed on the vessel. The increased cost, the Russians now say, has been necessitated by the new engines and boilers that the ship requires, ‘hundreds of miles’ of cabling, the strengthening of the flight deck, refurbishing the arrester wires and other safety equipment, as also the extensive sea trials the ship will have to undergo after the refit. Indian officials admit they will have to fork out more for the vessel but are not too sure of the figure.The vessel’s 18-month sea trials are to begin in 2010, with delivery scheduled for 2012.

MiG-29K is based on the 'basic' MiG-29K airframe, but is lighter in answer to the Indian Navy's requirements for the smallest possible dimensions to maximise space on the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya. The MiG-29K's fuel tanks are situated in the dorsal spine fairing and wing leading-edge root extensions. This reportedly gives the aircraft a 50per cent fuel increase over the land-based MiG-29. Flight range can also be increased by in-flight refuelling capability

Published in www.indiaprwire.com

Navy to upgrade ageing fleet with six Recce aircraft AFTER homing in to a Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft, the Navy is all set to fill another crucial gap in its surveillance capabilities by acquiring six new medium-range recon aircraft to replace its ageing Islander fleet. A global Request For Proposals (RFP) will be floated shortly by the Defence Ministry to acquire the aircraft that will also play an anti-submarine and anti-ship role. Several leading manufacturers will be approached for the contract and platforms being looked at, including the Falcon 900 (France), the An-74 (Russia/Ukraine), ATR-42 (European Consortium) and Embraer (Brazil). While the initial order will be for six Medium-

Range Maritime Reconnaissance (MRMR) aircraft with maritime patrol radars, jamming pods and limited air-to-air capabilities, the contract will have a provision for acquiring an equal number of aircraft as a follow up on the order.The aircraft will have a speed of over 200 knots and a range of over 400 nautical miles. They will have an endurance of at least 4-5 hours. There is a sense of urgency to acquire maritime reconnaissance assets, given the growing shipping traffic in the country and the expected expansion of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends beyond the shoreline of the country. India currently has 2.2 million sq km of EEZ that it An-72 has a flight crew of two pilots and a flight engineer, and can seat 68. The An-74 provides for a radio operator an d a payload of 10 tonnes The ATR 42 seats up to 60 passengers, while the ATR 72 seats 74 passengers. Both aircraft are operated by a two-person crew

is set to increase to 2.5 million sq km after the delineation of the continental shelf by the UN. India will soon float a global tender for the mid-life refurbishment of its fleet of Sea King and Kamov-28 helicopters.The deal is valued at $150 million. The refurbishment will involve replacing the engine, the avionics, the mission computer, the radar system and missiles.The navy operates 14 Sea King and 12 Kamov anti-submarine helicopters. In addition, the Sea Kings are also used for reconnaissance, search and rescue operations, and for ferrying personnel and supplies. Published in The Indian Express

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India, France to make surface-toair missiles INDIA and France plan to co-produce surface-to-air missiles (SAM) on the lines of the Indo-Russian ‘Brahmos’ missile. Termed Maitri (Friendship), the IndoFrench short-range missile will be offered to the Army to replace the near-obsolete Russian SAMs, said Antoine Bouvier, chief executive officer of MBDA, one of the world’s largest missile manufacturers. “We have been assured of support at the highest political level by French President Nicolas Sarkozy after he discussed the project with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the former’s visit to New Delhi in January this year,” he told journalists. “We initiated discussions with Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) and the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) in November 2005 on a completely new missile version. The next step is joint development with the DRDO and production by the BDL some of which can also be earmarked for export,” said Mr. Bouvier. The proposal is in line with the views expressed by Defence Minister A. K. Antony and DRDO chief M. Natarajan.They have expressed a preference for taking on board an experienced foreign company instead of Indian defence research and production companies trying to strike out on a lonely and time-consuming path of their own. Termed the Brahmos model in Indian defence circles, the government had attempted a partnership with an Is-

raeli company for a different class of missiles. But the project was put on hold as the Central Bureau of Investigation is probing the company for alleged malfeasance. The missile will be on its first test when the MBDA and the BDL respond to a multi-billion dollar Army tender for 1,000 quick-reaction SAMs.These mobile missile units are generally placed near army units and their tactical headquarters for protection against aerial threats.The missile can strike at hostile aircraft nine kilometres away and can also be used to protect sensitive government and economic complexes.Therefore, company officials see a sales potential beyond the Army tender and are confident of its use by the other two armed forces as well. The MBDA has a two-decade-old relationship with the Indian defence sector.The company will also be involved in upgrading the French origin Mirage-2000 fighter fleet by supplying new missiles. Its missiles are also likely to be the preferred option for the French Rafael, the Swedish Grippen and the European Aeronautics Defence Space (EADS) company, all of which are bidding for the lucrative $10 billion Indian tender for 126 fighter aircraft. Published in The Hindu

Indo-US military ties surge ahead IN AN indication of the furious pace at which India-US military ties are expanding, all three services are girding up to hold the next rounds of joint combat exercises with US forces at various times between August and October. India is also finalising several big-ticket defence purchases from the US, with the nearly $2billion deal for eight Boeing P-8i long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft being just one example. India has already signed a $962 million deal to buy six C-130J Super Hercules aircraft. The procurements, of course, hinge on the finalisation of two key India-US military pacts— the End-Use Verification Agreement (EUVA) and the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA)— which too is underway on the quiet. The flurry of joint exercises, of course, is simply breathtaking. India and the US have held as many as around 50 such wargames in the last seven years to build “interoperability”. By contrast, the

BRAHMOS is a supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, aircraft or land. Propulsion is based on the Russian Yakhont missile, and guidance has been developed by BrahMos Corp. At speeds of Mach 2.5 to 2.8, it is the world's fastest cruise missile, about three and a half times faster than the American subsonic Harpoon cruise missile

BOEING P-8I is a long-range antisubmarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft. It possesses an advanced mission system for maximum interoperability in battle space. Capable of broad-area, maritime, and littoral operations combined figure for India’s military exercises with Russia, France and UK is not even one-third of that. And the exercises certainly don’t come cheap. India is shelling out a whopping Rs 100 crore or so to participate in the celebrated “Red Flag” exercise at Nellis US Air Force base in Nevada, the training ground for Nato air combat forces.

Eight Sukhoi-30MKIs, one IL-78 mid-air refueller and an IL-76 heavy-lift aircraft, along with over 150 IAF personnel, will shortly leave for the US to take part in the exercise scheduled from August 9 to 24. Around the same time, between August 1 and August 24, a US Special Forces contingent will be at the Army’s unique Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte (Mizoram) to match their anti-terror skills with Indian forces in the “Vajra Prahar” exercise. The Navy is also finalising plans for the 14th edition of the Malabar wargames, which will be held on the western seaboard in September-October this year. Incidentally, the 13th Malabar wargames, held in the Bay of Bengal in September last year, were expanded to include Japan, Australia and Singapore, apart, of course, from India and US. This had riled China no end. Beijing lodged strong protests against the so-called “axis of democracy” emerging in the Asia-Pacific region. Not to be left behind, the Left parties in India, too, organised protests along India’s east coast, holding that the US was using India to build up a security cooperation arrangement to “contain” China. Published in The Times of India

DSI

JULY, 2008

First Indian-built Hawk takes to the skies The Indian Air Force (IAF) has been flying the British-made Hawk advanced jet trainer (AJT) since November last year, but now a significant new landmark has been kept secret: the first Indian-built Hawk has taken to the skies. On the 7th of May—just eight days after a British-made Hawk trainer crashed near Bidar, in Karnataka—a group of more than 100 technicians of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) gathered at the company runway in Bangalore.The Hawk had been restricted from flying after the accident on 29th April; but HAL was going ahead with an unannounced first flight of the first Hawk trainer manufactured in its plant in Bangalore. As Chief Test Pilot, Squadron Leader Baldev Singh, lifted the Indian Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) off the ground, the tension evaporated into applause. A normal test flight takes about an hour, but Baldev took an extra fifteen minutes on his test routine, finally ending with an audacious barrel roll manoeuvre right above the cheering group of watchers. No announcement has yet been made; HAL wants to shake off all the demons of the earlier crash before inviting a VIP for its formal unveiling. But at the company, the celebrations have already unfolded.

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“We were all pumped up,” Baldev admitted to Business Standard, “there’s always a certain thrill when you’re putting a new aircraft into the skies. And in the case of the Hawk, which we have waited for twenty years to build ourselves, it was a special feeling.” At the high-tech painting plant in HAL, the first Indian Hawk is being painted in the matte grey finish that all Indian Air Force (IAF) planes wear. By this weekend, the aircraft will be ready, but HAL says it will conduct several more tests before handing it over to the IAF. The first Hawk was to have been handed over in April, but it was delayed by two months by the complexity of the assembly, which involves putting together 11,000 components shipped in individual plastic packets from the Hawk plant near Brough, inYorkshire, UK. HAL says it will make up for this delay while building the 42 Hawks that the initial contract stipulated (24 were to be built in Brough and transhipped to India).That order, say senior HAL officers, will be executed on schedule by mid-2011. “We’ve been working in three shifts, practically round the clock”, explains Ashok Nayak, the Director of HAL’s Bangalore Complex. “The initial learning curve is slow while building a new aircraft, but by the time the 5th or 6th aircraft is completed, everyone knows exactly what to do.” Now HAL has received orders for another 57 Hawks: 40 for the IAF and 17 for the Indian Navy. At the targeted production rate of 20 Hawks a year, this order will keep the production line going till early 2014. Published in Business Standard

HAWK-132 is a variant of the highly successful BAE Systems Hawk AJTs. It incorporates an open architecture mission computer, glass cockpit and a state of the art avionics suite including a new generation Inertial Navigation System with GPS (INGPS). It is also equipped with several Indian components such as the communication sets, identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system and the radio altimeter

In addition to being an AJT, the Hawk-132 is fully combat capable and can carry air-to-air missile and air-to-ground strikes. It can also be used as a lightweight fighter

DSI

JULY, 2008

IN MEMORIUM

Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw MC APRIL 3, 1914 - JUNE 27, 2008

am Manekshaw was the first of only two Indian military officers to achieve the highest rank in the Indian Army. His distinguished career began with his commission into the Army in 1934, and spanned four decades and five wars. He fought in the Second World War, was sent to check the Chinese intrusion in the NEFA in 1962, and served as Eastern Army Commander during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Appointed Chief of Army Staff in 1969, he steered India to victory in the 1971 Indo-Pak war and was awarded the rank of Field Marshal in 1973. Sam Maneckshawâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s outstanding service is fondly remembered by a grateful nation.

Any one who says he knows no fear, is either lying, or Gurkha! SAM MANEKSHAW

DCP No.F.2(D-23)Press/2008