Asian Military Review - August/September 2019

Volume 27/issue 5

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Contents august/september 2019 VOLUME 27 / ISSUE 5

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The business end of a General Dynamics M1A1 Abrams; buying new armour or upgrades such as the M1A2 are appealing to several of Asia’s armies. (General Dynamics)

In Asia, Offshore Patrol Vessels are as likely to be operated by the Coast Guard as the Navy. Tim Fish considers their utility to both sets of operators.

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STEEL GAUNTLETS - ASIA’S TANK FORCE REVIEWED

Modernising armoured formations is once again on the shopping list of the region’s armies, as Grant Turnbull reports.

AUSTRALIA LEADS ASIA IN UAS ACQUISITION Australia has quickly developed a strategy for identifying and integrating unmanned system into its armed forces, as Tim Fish explains.

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CHINA BROADENS CYBER OPTIONS

HAWKISH CHINA TRIGGERS TAIWANESE DEFENCE BUDGET RISE

JR Ng examines China’s cyber activities that work across a spectrum of targets, from civilian to military.

The increase in China’s rhetoric towards Taiwan has spurred the country into affordable modernisation. JR Ng reports.

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ANALYSTS COLUMN Columnist Ben Ho examines the likely reasons behind China’s recent testing of its anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability.

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Editorial Index of Advertisers

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HONG KONG SHOWS TAIWAN ITS FUTURE UNDER CHINA

T

he extensive protests by the people of Hong Kong reveal a deep concern about the increasing rate at which the Chinese government is taking control of all aspects of the territory. China is not waiting to see out the terms laid down in the handover of Hong Kong agreement between the British and Chinese governments that came into effect at midnight on 1 July 1997.

The “high degree of autonomy” laid down in the agreement was supposed to last for 50 years up to 2047 - based on a “one country, two systems” principle. However, the Chinese government has continually demonstrated its intolerance to anything other than a single nation run by Beijing. Changes are being made continually with the Hong Kong government being reshaped to increasingly include pro-Beijing members who are not elected by the population.

While the UK’s Minister of State for the Foreign Office, Sir Alan Duncan, recently announced that the UK was “fully committed to upholding Hong Kong‘s high degree of autonomy and rights and freedoms under the one country, two systems principle; which is guaranteed by the legally binding joint declaration of 1984,” there is virtually nothing that can be done. With the UK undergoing a change of leadership and a potential no deal Brexit looming in October, Britain is hardly likely to jeopardise its economic relationship with Beijing by applying any measure remotely effective or painful to Beijing.

The subjugation of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet have provided enough evidence that any form of independence within China and its territories is not tolerated. News of Uyghur muslims forced into re-education camps where they are effectively prisoners is regularly covered by the world’s media, and the erosion of Tibet’s identity including the persecution of Buddhist by the authorities who view them as a threat to overall national security may cause outrange - but little else.

It is hardly surprising that Taiwan continues to discount out of hand Chinese ‘assurances’ regarding the future independence of its government under Chinese rule. During his speech on 2 January this year to mark the 40th anniversary of the 1979 ‘Message to compatriots in Taiwan’, President Xi Jinping referred to Taiwan once again being part of the mainland although under Beijing’s concept of ‘one country, two systems’. Casting eyes over to the seemingly inevitable fate of Hong Kong, who were given the same guarantee, the offer has never been less appealing than it is now.

Andrew Drwiega, Editor-in-Chief

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COAST GUARDS WELCOME OPV BOOM Asia-Pacific navies focus on OPVs to counter China but struggle with budgets and inter-service rivalry.

by Tim Fish

O

ffshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) have gained in stature in the Indo-Pacific region as maritime security has come sharply into focus for governments. The economic and political value of Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs) has been realised by leaders due to regulations under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and countries in the region are belatedly prioritising investment in new ships of this kind.

OPVs are operated by a mix of naval and coastguard forces although this depends on each country’s maritime security structure. Dr Collin Koh Swee Lean, research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore told AMR that there are two

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Lurssen

The OPV80 design from Lurssen that was delivered to Brunei and is close to the design used for Australia's new Arafura-class OPVs

main issues: “The biggest issue has always been funding and this is related to the second biggest: inter-service problems.

This is often a barrier to establishing a maritime security architecture, which has an impact downstream about how they allocate resources more optimally.” This is especially the case in the sub-region of South East Asia where rival naval and coastguard services compete for limited funding.

Another trend in the region according to Dr Colin Koh is that the line between OPV and corvettes is often blurred.

“Shipbuilders tell clients that if you buy a full-size OPVs then the heaviest armament can be a gun with helicopters, but these can be scaled up to become a light frigate,” he said. This is notable in a few OPV acquisition programmes where

| Asian Military Review |

designs are flexible for the addition of advanced sensors and weapons if required.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is undertaking one of the largest new OPV programmes in the Asia-Pacific region under its Project SEA 1180 Phase 1 for 12 new ships. Known as the Arafura-class, these are being built to the OPV80 design

by German shipbuilder Lürssen under a contract worth $2.5 billion (A$3.6 billion).

The Arafura-class design is a variant of the baseline model OPV that Lürssen provided to the Royal Brunei Navy with the Darussalam-class of four ships that entered service from 2011-14.

Lürssen was selected in November 2017 and the company has partnered with Australian shipyards for construction.

The first two OPVs will be built at

sea

OCEA

power

The Philippine Coast Guard will get one 84m-long OPV to the OPV270 design from OCEA.

has actually passed the Vietnam Coast Guard law that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the Coast Guard vis-à-vis the other services like the Navy, that will justify future procurement,” he explained. “The Coast Guard comes under the Ministry of Defence anyway, so getting funding is easier compared to other SE Asian counterparts as the Navy wants to focus more on warfighting capabilities,” he added.

The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) has also opted for a Damen design, the OPV1800. Three

DSNS

ASC Shipbuilding in Adelaide, South Australia, with the remaining 10 by Civmec in Henderson, Western Australia.

Construction of the 1,640 tonne OPVs started at ASC in 2018 and the RAN announced that the keel was laid for the first ship, Arafura, in March 2019. The ship is expected to enter service in 2022.

The RAN wants the OPVs to become multipurpose ships and will host highend sensors, with Saab Australia’s 9LV Combat Management System and EOS 500 fire control director. The ships will also be equipped with special mission packages to support maritime tactical unmanned aerial systems and mine countermeasures capabilities.

ships are being built by TH Heavy Engineering (THHE) and Destini in a Joint Venture arrangement at the DestiniTHHE Pulah Indiah shipyards in Port Klang. A spokesperson from DSNS confirmed to AMR: “Three Damen OPVs 1800 are under construction at Destini Shipbuilding & Engineering for the MMEA in Malaysia with an expected delivery time of 2020.” The project is slated to cost $160 million for all three 83 metre long ships but DSNS was unable to confirm what stage of construction the ships had reached therefore it is unclear if the mid-2020 delivery date can be met. Dr Colin Koh said that with only $12 billion (RM50 billion) funding for defence over the next 10 years it will not allow them to buy many. “We won’t see the MMEA get any more ships beyond the existing programmes under construction,” he said.

Meanwhile the Pakistan Navy is set to receive two new 2,300 tonne OPVs from DSNS, which are under construction at the company’s shipyard in Galati, Romania. The first ship was launched in May 2019 and is expected to enter service later this year. Steel cutting started on the second vessel in August 2018 and is due to enter service by mid-2020. The Pakistan Navy has referred to the ships as multirole corvettes but Dr Colin Koh said that they are “much closer to an OPV than anything else” and are based on the DSNS 90m long OPV2400 design.

Vietnam Eyes Larger OPVs Dutch shipbuilder Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) has also been successful in the region and its 9014 OPV design was selected by the Vietnam Coastguard (renamed the DN2000) for a class of new 2,400 tonne ships being built at the state-run Song Thu Group in Danang.

The first ship was launched in November 2015 as a multipurpose ship designated CBS 8005 but it is unclear if the vessel has entered service or if the construction of a second ship has progressed. Vietnam has a requirement for OPVs to counter the encroachment of Chinese vessels into the South China Sea and Dr Colin Koh said Vietnam is now looking at the larger 4,000 tonne DN4000 design from Song Thu to meet a requirement for up to six vessels to serve both the Coast Guard and fisheries patrol. “The Vietnamese Parliament

Vietnam is expanding its fleet of OPVs to secure its EEZ from Chinese encroachment. The DN2000 design from Damen will be the first ships to spearhead this force

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sea power

BAKAMLA

At 110m-long KN Tanjung Datung (1101) is on sea trials and was built to counter the 111m-long 3,450t Chinese vessel Haijing 3303.

to be an 84m OPV built to the yard’s OPV270 design. The Philippines Coast Guard has announced that the OPV is under construction and will be named BRP Gabriela Silang, with delivery expected in August 2019. A second is under consideration. Meanwhile Defence Minister Delfin Lorenzana has indicated his preference for Austal to participate in a new OPV programme for up to six ships to be built in-country for the Philippine Navy. Austal is offering its 81.7m OPV design.

Indian OPVs Dogged by Delays

Indonesian Coast Guard The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) has been moving towards operating mainly combat vessels and high-end frigates and this leaves the Indonesian Coast Guard (BAKAMLA) to undertake the constabulary role. It has already taken delivery of a large new 110m 2,700 tonne OPV named KN Tanjung Datu in January 2018 from indigenous shipbuilder PT Malindo, built to its own design. Dr Colin Koh said this OPV looks impressive and “is designed to counter the Chinese in terms of size and length and in terms of tonnage will be a match for the frontline OPVs that the Chinese Coast Guard has been fielding in the Natuna Sea area.”

Under its medium-term development plan, BAKAMLA had an ambition to build 30 ships by 2019 including four 110m OPVs and as many as 10 of the 80m vessels, much of which remains to be achieved. It is not just funding but inter-service rivalry that is an issue. “The TNI-AL does not like that BAKAMLA is going to get more funding and will do what it can to prevent it from getting the necessary resources, so even if the Navy does not get OPVs it will make sure BAKAMLA does not get too many of them either,” stated Dr Colin Koh. “The Navy would rather send frigates to do mere fisheries patrol.”

In December 2018 another Indonesian shipyard, PT Citra, announced that three new 80m OPVs were launched by the company to a Terafulk design. Built for an estimated $42 million the ships are named

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Pulau Nipah (8001), Marore Island (8002) and Dana Island (8003). It is not clear when the OPVs will enter service and unconfirmed images online seem to show the second vessel damaged after a broken lock flooded the dry dock area where it was fitting out.

In Thailand local shipbuilder Bangkok Dock in Sattahip completed construction of its first 90m Krabi-class OPV in August 2013. It was built to the 90m OPV design from BAE Systems under a technology transfer agreement worth approximately $79.2 million. Construction of a second ship started in 2016 for an estimated $155 million and is expected to be delivered during 2019. The company told AMR that it “provided in-country assistance for a two-year period with the initial design support to integrate the 76mm main gun and, on the second OPV, to add Boeing Harpoon anti-ship missiles.”

Dr Colin Koh believes there is space for at least four Harpoon anti-ship missiles and although integration is a challenge “it is not a straightforward or easy process,” he added that it “should not be a problem”, but the issue is whether the RTN will “cough up the money to do that.” The RTN has a requirement for a total of five OPVs but it is unlikely to secure funding for more ships in the short term.

The Philippines has been taking delivery of a set of five small patrol ships from French shipbuilder OCEA for the Philippines Coast Guard under a $103 million contract, but one is expected

| Asian Military Review |

India has large OPV programmes underway but after steel is cut there seem to be issues getting them into service.

Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) has already completed the delivery of six Samarthclass OPVs in 2017 and a contract for a further five could be expected.

Meanwhile Larsen and Toubro (L&T) was awarded a contract to build seven OPVs for the Indian Coastguard in March 2015 and although it launched the first vessel in October 2017, it is not clear what stage of construction this ship has reached or the status of follow-on ships. Elsewhere, Reliance Naval and Engineering Ltd (RNEL) – formerly Pipavav Offshore and Engineering – is building five new 1,500 tonne Shachi-class Naval OPVs (NOPVs) under Project 21 (P-21). The first two (Shachi and Shruti) are under construction and were launched in July 2017 with an expected delivery date by June 2020.

Progress getting these into service has been slow and riven with delays.

India’s Standing Committee on Defence reported last year that following a $388 million contract awarded in May 2011 the schedule for the NOPVs was originally to accept the first of class in November 2014 with the remainder to follow on sixmonth intervals. After the keel laying of the second ship in May 2014 the project suffered delays due to design issues caused by a “change in design partner” and a management takeover of Pipavav

by RNEL that was not completed until early 2016. The Committee said there were no additional costs despite the delays.

The Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) has received two new OPVs from GSL for $155 million based on the Samarth-class that were delivered in 2017 and 2018 to bolster its ageing fleet. These were the largest ships in the SLN until May 2019 when it took delivery of the 115m ex-US Coast

sea

BAE Systems

power

The new Thai OPV, HMTS Krabi, will be joined by a second ship with more powerful armaments.

Guard Hamilton-class cutter, Sherman.

It was transferred to the SLN under the US Foreign Assistance Act following an upgrade and systems installation work. It has the pennant number P626 and will be commissioned shortly.

Of particular interest has been Myanmar, which has built and brought into service a new 81m OPV, UMS Inlay, in December 2017. Media reports state the OPV was built at Thanlyin Navy Dockyard near Yangon with Singaporean assistance.

That Myanmar is able to construct and commission an OPV displacing about 1,500 tonnes within a two-year timeframe is beyond what many analysts had expected. It was also announced in February 2019 that Myanmar intends to establish a Coast Guard service. Although it is unclear when this will happen and what platforms will serve under this new force Collin said that the military have stated it will be formed under the defence department.

In North East Asia, Taiwan is replacing its older OPVs and has plans to build six 1,000 tonne ships by 2027 for the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) with construction taking place at CSBC. The CGA will get extra OPVs from Jong Shin Shipyard which will build 12 600 tonne OPVs by 2027 based on the catamaran hull of the existing Tuo Jiang corvette. In addition, CSBC is building four larger 4000 tonne OPVs based on the Cheng Kung frigate design. Construction on the first started in February 2019 and will be delivered to the CGA in 2020. According to Dr Colin Koh one of the new weapon systems for the new OPVs will be a multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS) that will be mounted on the deck. “This is a bit strange,” he said, “Why use a rocket launcher to stop a fishing vessel; it does not make sense to me.”

Japan is building new OPVs for the protection of the Senkaku Islands to counter Chinese encroachment in the area.

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Media reports state that the Japan Coast Guard is to get three new 6,000 tonne patrol ships built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries shipyard in Shimonoseki.

Meanwhile the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force will initiate a new OPV programme for about 12 new ships.

The new National Defense Programme Guidelines (NGDP) published in December calls for the construction of two or three 1,000 tonne vessels to start in the FY2020-22 timeframe and a first launch expected in FY2024. The JMSDF ships will support the JCG in patrolling outlying islands.

These efforts are in response to the creation of the Chinese Coast Guard in 2013 which rapidly grew in size. Although it uses mainly small coastal patrol boats, it has also taken delivery of two very large 10,000 tonne patrol ships and has initiated an OPV construction programme for new vessels based on the Type 054 frigate and Type 056 corvette. AMR

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land

Vitaly Kuzmin

warfare

Type 96 tanks are the mainstay of China’s modern MBT fleet, along with the advanced, but more expensive, Type 99.

STEEL GAUNTLETS - ASIA’S TANK FORCE REVIEWED While the replacement of old MBTs for new on a 1-to-1 basis is

unlikely, Asian governments are seeking new or modernised armour to keep ‘a heavy punch’ available if needed.

W

hile much has been made of their operational irrelevancy in recent years, main battle tanks (MBTs) remain the premier armoured vehicle capability for most land forces. The MBT represents the pinnacle of firepower, mobility and protection - usually having all three in abundance.

MBT numbers have reduced significantly since the end of the Cold War, particularly during the early 2000s when conflict against non-state actors was in vogue. Today, however, the uncertain

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By Grant Turnbull security environment, and the return to great power competition between states, has seen a renewed interest in the capabilities of MBTs.

China WIth the largest defence budget in Asia, the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces (PLAGF) continues to rapidly develop its land capabilities. The US Department of Defense’s (DoD) most recent Chinese military assessment, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (May 2019), noted that production

| Asian Military Review |

capacity is advancing in nearly every land category, including APCs, assault vehicles, air defence artillery systems, ground artillery systems and main and light armoured vehicles.

In recent years, the PLAGF has restructured as part of its modernisation with each group army (equivalent to a US Army Corp) now including six combined arms brigades, serving as the service’s primary manoeuvre force. “Lower level changes are also simultaneously occurring within the PLA [Army], including an ongoing increase in the size of tank platoons from three to four tanks,”

l and warfare

noted the DoD assessment.

The Pentagon estimates China’s total MBT inventory at 5,800. While this number is significant, much of the PLAGF’s inventory is made up of the antiquated Type 59 MBTs, a license produced version of the Soviet T-54. Its more modern inventory includes the First Inner Mongolia Machinery Factory manufactured Type-96 (ZTZ-96) and Type 96A - numbering over 2,000 according to the state-run China Daily - along with approximately 600 newer China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco) Type-99 (ZTZ-99) and Type-99A. China’s significant investment in developing a ‘blue water’ navy and advanced stealth aircraft for its air force have clearly taken some focus - and consequently resources - away from developing its land forces. According to local reports, the upgraded Type-96B will now be the main focus for the PLAGF, with limited fielding of the more capable and sophisticated Type-99 due to higher procurement and sustainment costs.

Rather than scrap its fleet of Type59s completely, the PLA is now looking at roboticising a number of vehicles.

China appears to be replicating efforts elsewhere to introduce unmanned combat vehicles in an effort to boost combat mass of armoured formations, as well as reduce the danger for manned operators.

Technical challenges persist and how far this is to becoming an operational capability remains buried in secrecy.

The PLAGF has also introduced a new ‘light’ battle tank into service alsof from Norinco and known as the Type15, or ZTQ-15 (export designation: VT5).

The Type-15 is armed with a 105mm

gun and has a GVW of around 35 tonnes, depending on armour configuration, giving it a low ground pressure that would allow it to operate in difficult terrain, such as rice paddies and mountainous terrain.

India Another sizeable MBT fleet resides in India, with the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) place the figure at approximately 3,000 units.

The bulk of this is made up of Russian T-72/T-72M1 and T-90S ‘Bhishma’ MBTs, mostly locally-assembled in India from Russian supplied kits.

In April, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security approved the acquisition of an additional 464 T-90MS tanks from Russia. The committee’s approval is effectively the last step in the acquisition process, with the signing of a contract expected shortly, although there has been no contract announcements so far.

Much like previous Russian MBT acquisitions, manufacturer Uralvagonzavod will provide kits to be assembled by the Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi, southeast India. The T-90MS is currently the most advanced export version of the Russian MBT, featuring a new digital fire control system linked with stabilised day and night optics, along with an upgraded autoloading 125mm gun.

Once assembled and handed over to the Indian Army, the new MBTs are likely to be deployed in the north and northwest of the country, bolstering its armoured presence along both Chinese and Pakistani borders.

India’s nearly $2 billion commitment to purchase new MBTs from Russia is also

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MND

South Korea’s procurement of the K-2 MBT has been beset by delays and technical problems, although deliveries of a second batch are now underway.

a sign that its indigenous Arjun MBT, and plans to upgrade it to an interim Mk1A, and finally a MkII standard, continues to be dogged by problems. The Indian Army currently operates 124 Arjun MBTs, a platform that was conceived back in the 1970s, with a sizeable amount of that fleet reported to suffer ongoing technical issues.

In February, local reports indicated that the Mk1A had now been accepted by the army and that 118 units would be ordered this year. The upgraded Arjun features new explosive reactive armour, as well as upgraded optics that enable nighttime operations and an enhanced communication suite. The upgrades have increased the Arjun’s weight significantly to almost 70t and the Indian Army is keen for the MkII variant to lose weight in order to regain lost mobility. The Arjun saga will seemingly continue for the foreseeable future.

Like China, India is also interested in a light tank capability that can be operated in the mountainous north - although as with most Indian programmes, this has been painfully slow and its realisation is likely a long way off.

Republic of Korea The Republic of Korea’s (ROK) troubled relationship with its northern neighbour, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), drives much of the state’s defence planning, including retaining (and investing in) significant conventional land forces and equipment.

This includes MBTs, with the country one of the few industrial powers in the region that can design, develop and manufacture their own platforms.

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land warfare

Ukroboronprom

Most numerous in its MBT fleet is the K1 (Type 88), which came off the Hyundai Rotem production line in the 1980s and in the early 2000s the design was updated to the K1A1 standard with the introduction of a M256 smoothbore 120mm cannon, and other modifications. The K1 - armed with a 105mm gun - was designed and developed by General Dynamics Land Systems (then Chrysler Defense) in the 1980s and based on the M1 Abrams.

Acquisition of a follow-on 56t K2 Black Panther MBT - designed and developed

by Hyundai Rotem and earmarked to replace the army’s M47 Pattons and older K1s - has been beset by delays owing to financial and technical problems. The first batch of K2s, numbering 100, began delivery in 2014, several years after initially planned and three years after the signing of a contract.

A second batch, also numbering around 100 and finalised in 2014, has

Thailand operates the Oplot-T MBT sourced from Ukraine, although difficulties with that acquisition has ultimately led the country to source additional VT-4 tanks from China.

also been delayed due to issues with the indigenously-developed transmission from S&T Dynamics, which will now be replaced with a system sourced from Renk, linked to a domestic engine from Doosan. “The power pack’s domestic transmission failed to meet the national defense standard,” said a Defense Acquisition Program Administration statement.

In May 2019, Hyundai Rotem shipped the first ‘second-batch’ K2 from its Changwon factory, with an Hyundai

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Rotem official noting that all units are now expected to be delivered by 2021. A third batch could also be contracted in the future.

Taiwan In 2019, the Republic of China (Taiwan) once again raised the prospect of purchasing M1A2 Abrams tanks from the US. Taiwan’s Central News Agency reported that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) would allocate nearly a $1 billion to purchase 108 vehicles with

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the potential acquisition of precision antitank and short-range air defence weapons forming part of the deal also. These could include TOW missiles, Stinger missiles and Javelin anti-tank weapons.

The M1A2s could be a variation of the US Army’s new C variant (previously known as SEP v3), helping the country’s land forces begin replacing older M60A3 and CM-11 Brave Tiger (a hybrid M48/ M60) in its 1,000-strong inventory. The tanks would likely to be assigned to the Sixth Army Corps that is responsible for defending northern Taiwan, where central government is located.

It is, however, not the first time that Taiwan has requested the US Army’s premier fighting machine and a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) is not guaranteed.

The Taiwanese authorities requested Abrams tanks from the President Bush’s administration nearly 20 years ago, and despite being approved it eventually came to nothing. Several requests have been made in the years since, with Taiwanese lawmakers critical of the Abrams’ capability to traverse the islands’ difficult terrain.

US Army Taiwan has once again shown interest in acquiring M1A2 Abrams from the US Army, although the country is still likely to upgrade its old M60 fleet.

Just over 100 Abrams will not fully meet the Taiwan armed forces’ needs, therefore the MND is still planning to upgrade its existing fleet of M60A3s, with the principle aim being to upgrade the increasingly obsolete M68 rifled 105mm gun with a 120mm smoothbore example.

The upgrade will give tank crews greater range and lethality, particularly against newer armour being deployed by China.

Other developments In 2019, Russian manufacturer Uralvagonzavod completed its deliveries of new T-90S/SK MBTs to Vietnam. The deliveries were part of a contract signed in 2016 for a total of 64 vehicles, delivered in two batches this year. The acquisition of the modern T-90S/SK adds to an already sizeable fleet of Cold War-era tanks, principally sourced from China and the Soviet Union.

These tanks - including the Chinese Type 59 and Russian T-54/55 - are increasingly obsolete, particularly when

compared with Chinese armoured capabilities. Along with the T-90S/SK acquisition, the Vietnamese are also looking upgrading a portion of its T-54 fleet to the T-54M3 standard, with the addition of explosive reactive armour and improved optics, although the 100mm gun remains.

The IISS think-tank notes that Vietnam has around 850 T-54/55 MBTs still in its inventory.

In 2018, Ukrainian company Ukroboronprom announced that it had concluded a contract worth $200 million to supply Thailand with 49 Oplots-T MBTs, with the final batch of vehicles successfully passing acceptance tests.

While it was expected that more Oplots would be ordered, the programme was protracted (mainly the result of the fighting in the Ukrainian) and as a result the Thai government opted to supplement the Oplot-Ts with 28 Chinese VT4 tanks from Norinco in 2016.

Apparently happy with the VT4 -

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l and warfare

and seemingly wrapping up its sales relationship with Ukraine - the Thai government ordered an additional 10 units in 2017 and earlier this year it was reported that there is budget allocated for an additional 14 units. Thailand remains the only export customers for the 125mmequipped VT4, which shares lineage with China’s Type 99, and with obsolete tanks such as the M41 still needing replacement, there’s likely scope for yet more orders.

Singapore, meanwhile, is believed to have taken delivery of brand new Leopard 2A7 MBTs from Germany, with data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) validating such claims. Singapore is highly secretive at the best of times, but this is particularly the case when it comes to its MBT fleet.

It denies that it has taken delivery of the newer A7 variant.

Singapore took delivery of 182 surplus Leopard 2A4s from Germany through 2007-2012, with these being domestically upgraded and assigned the Leopard 2SG moniker. Similarly, Indonesia procured nearly 100 ex-Bundeswehr Leopard 2A4s from Germany in 2012 and upgraded with armour packages from Rheinmetall and several subsystem enhancements, including improved optics and turret modifications. These vehicles are now labelled the Leopard 2RI. Meanwhile, Australia has plans to upgrade its M1A1 Abrams under its Land 907 Phase 2 programme, which is likely to closely align with the M1A2C configuration. The programme has existed for some time but has been a slow burner, with other initiatives including the Land 400 Phase 2 (Boxer 8x8) and Phase 3 (IFV requirement) taking priority. A request for tender was expected earlier this year, although that has yet to materialise.

Conclusion While several nations have committed to new MBT fleets, the numbers being acquired do not represent one-for-one replacements of legacy fleets. This is especially the case in those countries that possess significant numbers of Cold Warera vehicles (Thailand and Vietnam being two examples). More MBT acquisitions should be expected in the future, along with upgrade programmes for those that cannot afford hundreds of new vehicles.

Some land forces could also choose to streamline, and ultimately reduce, MBT numbers and attempt to do more with less. AMR

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sea power

GA-ASI

The Australian Government named GA-ASI to provide the Armed RPA system under Project Air 7003, with the specific variant – the MQ-9A or advanced MQ-9B – to be selected during 2019.

AUSTRALIA LEADS ASIA IN UAS ACQUISITION

Understanding which UAS systems to acquire and how to deploy them across all three services was a challenge that the Australian Defence Force accepted at an early stage.

T

he acquisition of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the Asia-Pacific region varies depending on national budgets and requirements for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) across each service branch.

Countries with large maritime areas and healthy budgets can opt for more expensive Group 3 and 4 Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) and High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) systems while the rest mainly use smaller UAS in Groups 1 or 2 that are short-range tactical UAS. In the region, Australia has taking a leading role in developing UAS capabilities with the procurement of new platforms for all three services that will dramatically enhance the country’s ISR capabilities over the next decade.

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) intends to start operating its first MQ-

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by Tim Fish 4C Triton from 2023 with additional platforms entering service in 2024-25.

There are orders for two aircraft under a US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement with the US Air Force (USAF) that will be built by Northrop Grumman, with plans for a total of six or seven to be purchased over time.

Australia has a considerably large land mass and maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to monitor and with a range in excess of 8,000 nautical miles and endurance of 24 hours the Triton UAS seem to fit RAAF requirements. They will operate alongside the new P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft that are being delivered by Boeing.

Triton is fitted with a search, identification and tracking system for ships at sea, the Sierra Nevada Corporation AN/ZLQ-1 electronic support measures (ESM) suite, a deicing capability and it can be fitted with

| Asian Military Review |

the enhanced EO/IR sensors. Three aircraft on rotation could provide 24 hours coverage of a target area about 2,000nm away. A fleet of six aircraft could theoretically allow this level of coverage at two separate locations simultaneously if all the platforms are operational.

Training has started for RAAF crews in the US to ensure that enough personnel are ready to operate the aircraft once they arrive.

The RAAF is also expected to receive its first unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) under Project Air 7003 with the selection of the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper system and the RAAF already has experienced staff operating the Reaper in USAF service since 2015. Reaper is expected to provide close air support to the Australian Army and Special Forces. A decision about which type of Reaper has yet to be made: Warren Ludwig, director of international strategic development for

Australia and Southeast Asia at General Atomics Aeronautical System Inc (GAASI) told AMR a variant down-select between the MQ-9A (Reaper) and MQ-9B (SkyGuardian) is expected to be made in Q3 2019.

“From a GA-ASI perspective, the MQ-9B appears the better platform because it is more future-focussed, has a certifiable design baseline, has provision for a Detect and Avoid system, contains a number of weatherisation improvements, and provides for flexible payload options. The MQ-9B will also provide greater Australian industry capability opportunities as the aircraft is just entering production,” Ludwig said.

However, he added that a ‘Gate 2’ contract will not be signed until 2021 with a view of reaching an initial service date around 2023. “These milestones have yet to be confirmed. Prior to Gate 2, work to determine the MQ-9 variant and the acquisition method (FMS, DCS or a hybrid arrangement) will be required. Platform numbers have not been determined.

However, GA-ASI expects 12-16 will be acquired,” Ludwig said.

The Australian Army wants to replace its existing Textron RQ-7 Shadow 200 v1 under its Project Land 129 Phase 3 initiative. The project is set to get approval in mid-2019 with a competition to follow that will decide which offering will replace it. A decision and acquisition contract is due in 2021 with an initial operating capability (IOC) to be achieved in the 2023-24 timeframe when the Shadow is expected to be withdrawn from service.

David Phillips, senior vice president and general manager of Textron told AMR that the Army is looking for a

Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) capacity in a UAS as small as possible but that can still conduct the same missions as Shadow. “That is the challenge they put out to industry. Aerosonde is one of the systems we anticipate being in the running for Australia as they define the requirements,” he said.

Textron has developed a quadrotor kit for a hybrid VTOL version of Aerosonde.

He added that Australia has purchased “several Aerosonde platforms to test and integrate EW and SIGINT capabilities to be able to understand the ElectroMagnetic Interference (EMI) and how to use them as UAVs and disseminate and process quickly.”

In terms of maritime capability Phillips sees the need for a flexible platform that can be integrated with but not necessarily

Royal Australian Navy officers and sailors of 822X Squadron on parade during the commissioning ceremony at HMAS Albatross. A Schiebel S-100 Camcopter is in the foreground.

| August/september 2019 |

power

hard wired to a ship. There is interest in Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) for an all-weather capability and Aerosonde has demonstrated a SAR capability with wide area search and an integrated Ground Movement Target Indication (GMTI) and change detection to identify patterns of change across a landscape over time.

The Army is also leasing the S-100 Camcopter VTOL system from Schiebel for trials with different payloads in runway-independent scenarios. It is expected the company will bid for Land 129 with S-100.

Requirements released by the Army indicate the need for 24-hour coverage of two different locations simultaneously, connectivity to at least 125km from the nearest ground control station, and ability to operate on the move. The new system must be compatible with existing Australian Army communications systems, battlefield management systems, and even a future attack helicopter platform intended to replace Tiger under Project Land 5403.

In the Group 1 (1-10kg) UAS range, the Army also plans the additional procurement of new nano-sized UAS under its Project Land 125 Phase 4. The Army already operates 161 Black Hornets consisting of both Black Hornet 1 and 2 variants built by Norwegian manufacturer Prox Dynamics, which was bought by FLIR in 2016. A new RQ-12 Wasp AE micro-UAV from AeroVironment is already being procured under the larger Land 129 phase 4 programme with 67 systems to be delivered by 2021. Further

Royal Australian Navy

Northrop Grumman The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has its first two MQ-4C Triton on order and intends to start operating them from 2023

sea

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sea power

systems are being investigated under phase 4B for procurement by 2023-25.

Ole Aguirre senior director at FLIR Unmanned Systems and Integrated Solutions told AMR there is a trend towards vertical take-off and landing UAVs that are in the Group 1 range because of an increasing number of operations taking place in urban areas and that need to integrate with vehicles.

“Black Hornet is by far the smallest system available out there now and there is no similar competitor in the market,” he said.

“Bringing UAS down to the soldier levels is really unique… it is about providing the solider on the ground with their own flying binocular and don’t make it any more advanced than that - an elevated eye in the sky, day or night, urban or open field to give a 360 degree view. The Australian Army has been one of the quickest adopters of this technology.”

Australian has used the Black Hornet 1 and 2 since 2013, experimenting and operating with new technologies. This has led to an ‘Army Minor’ contract signed in early 2018 for an undisclosed number of Black Hornet 3 that have been delivered and are being support with spare parts.

“Bringing UAS down to the soldier levels is really unique… it is about providing the solider on the ground with their own flying binocular…”

“Land 125 is of interest to us and Land 400 and other vehicle programmes where there is a need for protection for vehicle crews, additional situational awareness and getting targeting information to crews. We are following all these closely and working with the stakeholders to see if we can adapt our technologies for their needs,” Aguirre said.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN)

AeroVironment

The Australian Army is procuring the AeroVironment RQ-12 Wasp AE under the Land 129 phase 4 programme with 67 systems to be delivered by 2021

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| Asian Military Review |

is also investigating future UAS options and stood up 822X Squadron - its UAV development unit at HMAS Albatross in October 2018. The RAN has already completed operational evaluations of the Insitu ScanEagle and uses a pair of Schiebel S-100 Camcopter UAVs under a NMP1942 contract as part of its studies. 822X will operate two flights of ScanEagles and one flight of S-100s as part of its assessment of fixed wing and rotary wing UAV operations.

The RAN plans to acquire maritime UAS from 2023 for its new fleet of OPVs under its Project Sea 129 Phase 5, with the intention to have up to six UAV systems and 10 flights operational in the initial stage. This will be followed by a rollout across the wider fleet of frigates and destroyers. A request for tender has yet to be issued.

Insitu’s Duggan said that the RAAF has been on the path to procuring MALE systems for some time and both the Land 129 and Sea 129 programmes are progressing. He expects that the Land 129 replacement of Shadow will move a little bit faster and will be pushed to the left to bring in a new platform earlier, but believes that Sea 129 to equip the OPVs fairly soon will instead move further to the right and be included in plans to equip the rest of the fleet.

“Both programmes are planning to adopt something in the next 2-3 years and are working with experimental systems to understand what they need. They are trying to become educated customers before they start writing RFPs and inform themselves of the technology and human factors,” Duggan said. In the past due to long procurement cycles by the time the requirements are laid out and systems procured are often out of date. This is something that 822X will help de-risk using ScanEagle.

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) was an early adopter of the ScanEagle for maritime surveillance has fully integrated the systems on its Victory-class missile corvettes for the past few years.

Singapore also has requirements for Tier 1, tactical and MALE UAS and Duggan expects growth in all of these areas.

Elsewhere in South East Asia the ScanEagle 2 UAS is being adopted by Royal Malaysia Navy (RMN) and the Philippines under the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) programme. The RMN is slated to receive two units in second quarter 2019 and the Philippines six systems. It has also been reported

sea

GA-ASI

power

Although the Indian Government received US FMS approval for the procurement of the Sky Guardian/Sea Guardian in June 2017 the acquisition has made little further progress.

that Indonesia could get four and the Vietnamese Coast Guard is slated to acquire ScanEagle too.

Malaysia has operated ScanEagles since 2011 under a services contract that allowed the acquisition of a quick capability providing coverage in the Sabah region of Eastern Malaysia operated by Malaysian company CTRM. But the RMN is now going for outright procurement. The ships the ScanEagles will be embarked on have not been decided but Duggan hopes this will lead to the procurement of further systems.

“This is a bit like an 822X adventure for them, get a couple of systems on board out there doing maritime surveillance in the South China Sea and assess whether they want more. For them it is similar to what the RAN is doing,” Duggan explained.

The Philippines procurement is also a ‘buy and own contract’ and although all six platforms are yet to enter service, they are a little ahead of the RMN in the preparing for operations. The adoption by these countries indicates that there is a recognition of a need for a tactical UAV from ground and naval forces that

can provide an extended situational awareness capability they don’t currently have.

Duggan said believes that requirements for these types of UAS will develop across the Asia-Pacific region over the next few years as countries see initial acquisition programmes mature and then push ahead under their own procurement processes, although this is expected to take time.

“Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) is in the early stages of adoption, they have done experimentation for a few years and are now taking early steps in rolling that out with the trials and testing of ScanEagle alongside some indigenous systems. It is learning about it like Australia to test and assess and develop requirements,” Duggan said.

He added the JGSDF is also making advances in Tier 1 and larger UAS with investment in MALE/HALE UAS by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) for the surveillance of potential North Korean missile sites. Here Japan has ordered three RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 (I) aircraft through a FMS contract worth $490 million with Northrop Grumman

| August/september 2019 |

that will include ground stations and support. Deliveries are to be completed

by September 2022. South Korea has also placed an order for four of these aircraft.

It is not clear if deliveries have started.

It has also been reported that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is considering the GA-ASI Predator C Avenger to complement its existing P-3C Orion and P-1 maritime patrol aircraft.

However, Ludgwig said that a request from the JMSDF “was not included in in the recently released National Defense Programme Guidelines,” but that there is still “strong interest” in GA-ASI products.

The one country where development if UAS has not advanced as rapidly as might be though is India. An FMS approval for the procurement of the Sky Guardian/ Sea Guardian was granted in June 2017 little progress has been made. Reported numbers range from 10-12 or as high as 22. Ludwig said that since FMS approval was granted, “there have been numerous high level and technical discussions between the Indian Government and the US Government” but the final number of UAS and when to procure has not yet been decided. AMR

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land

Beebright, Shutterstock

warfare

China is leveraging on its large base of cyber militias to perform low-level cyber attacks

CHINA BROADENS CYBER OPTIONS

China is prepared to use its burgeoning cyber capabilities for industrial espionage, trans-national harassment, national defence and as a support to military operations.

I

n its annual assessment released on 1 May 2019, the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) report to Congress on China’s military capabilities painted a rapidly modernising People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its growing ability to exploit cyberspace to offset the traditional advantages of its peer rivals.

According to the DoD, the PLA has consistently advocated cyber warfare to achieve a range of operational objectives, such as targeting an adversary’s command, control, and communications (C3) and logistics networks to hamper its ability to

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by JR Ng generate combat power during the early stages of an armed conflict. At the same time, its cyber warfare capabilities can also be used to collect intelligence or to serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with conventional kinetic attacks.

“PLA researchers believe that building strong cyber capabilities are necessary to protect Chinese networks and advocate seizing ‘cyberspace superiority’ by using offensive cyber operations to deter or degrade an adversary’s ability to conduct military operations against China,” the DoD noted in its report.

Chinese writings suggest cyber

| Asian Military Review |

operations allow [the PLA] to manage the escalation of a conflict because cyber-attacks are a low-cost deterrent,” it added, noting that this enables China to scale these attacks to achieve desired conditions with minimal strategic cost.

“The writings also suggest that cyberattacks demonstrate capabilities and resolve to an adversary.”

The PLA’s growing cyber warfare capabilities gained worldwide attention in February 2013 when US cybersecurity company Mandiant – now a FireEye subsidiary – released a report that claimed Chinese military involvement in several

PLA Daily

high-profile cyberattacks. The report placed specific responsibility with certain individuals and locations associated with the 2nd Bureau of the PLA General Staff’s 3rd Department, also known as Unit 61398. The PLA 3rd Department is essentially its signals intelligence branch.

A report compiled for the USChina Economic and Security Review Commission at the same time noted that China’s cyber warfare capabilities would pose a credible threat to US military operations in the event of a conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. The PLA, it said, was gearing up for “information confrontation” and is seeking to “integrate all elements of information warfare, electronic and non-electronic, offensive and defensive, under a single command authority”.

Other than offensive cyber capabilities, state-linked hackers have reportedly compromised the computer networks of US defence companies on multiple occasions, pilfering valuable data on classified military developments. In June 2018, the Washington Post reported that a US Navy Naval Undersea Warfare Centre (NUWC) contractor lost 614 gigabytes (GB) of sensitive material including signals and sensor data, cryptographic systems related to communications, and the navy submarine development unit’s electronic warfare library in two separate incidents in January and February. This data part of a classified programme known as “Sea Dragon”, which the Post claimed is an initiative being pursued under a special DoD office stood up in 2012 to “adapt existing US military technologies to new applications…and will introduce a disruptive offensive capability” by “integrating an existing weapon system with an existing Navy platform.” The paper also reported that the DoD had already requested or spent over $300 million for the project since late 2015.

Strategic Support Force In December 2015, the PLA established the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) as part of wider modernisation reforms.

Although much of its remit and activities remain shrouded in secrecy, this new force is believed to be responsible for facilitating the integration of the PLA’s space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic (EM) spectrum warfare capabilities.

The PLASSF is believed to comprise several divisions. These include the Space Systems Department, which provides space-based information support and

l and warfare

PLASSF insignia

intelligence for the PLA’s newly established theatre commands and enable future joint operations and power projection.

In contrast, the Network Systems Department is responsible for managing cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities.

The PLA’s ongoing structural reforms may further change how PLASSF organises and executes its missions, particularly as it evolves over time. In consolidating cyber and other information warfare-related elements, the PLASSF is likely generating synergies by combining national level cyber reconnaissance, attack, and defence capabilities in its organisation.

“Modern western military infrastructure is dependent on a communications backbone that supports the eyes, ears and operational command and control vital to support in-theatre assets…it will therefore be viewed as a legitimate military target by any adversary,” an industry source told AMR, noting that the PLA’s close relationship with key Chinese telecommunications companies provides an avenue for statesponsored penetrations of supply chains for micro-electronics supporting western governments and commercial industries.

Civil-Military Integration China’s military cyber warfare capabilities are increasingly being augmented by a growing civilian dimension. The strong civil-military association of Chinese military power can be traced back to the early days of the Chinese Civil War and manifested within Mao Zedong’s “People’s War” doctrine, which essentially stressed that military advantage can be gained by utilising and mobilising the immense population base within the mainland. In more recent papers, the PLA has stated that “the cooperation between regular warfare and irregular warfare stresses that we should give full play to the creativity of the masses…” and that in the field of civil-military cyber development, there is an imperative for “the military to serve the people, and the people to prepare the military.”

In January 2017 the Central Commission for Integrated Military and

| August/september 2019 |

The Chinese military are prepared for defensive and offensive cyber operations.

Civilian Development was established, with civil-military cyber integration being identified by President Xi Jinping as one of the core missions of the new centre. Under the instruction of the commission, China’s inaugural ‘cybersecurity innovation centre’ was established in December 2017 and has been charged with enhancing private sector cooperation to “help [the military] win future cyber wars.” The centre is being operated by 360 Enterprise Security Group, one of China’s leading cybersecurity companies.

Moreover, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released key policy document that highlighted Xi’s and party thinking on cyberspace in the lead-up to the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) 19th National Congress in October 2017. The document outlined a directive to ‘promote the deepened development of militarycivilian integration for cybersecurity and informatisation’, and provided instructions to implement civil-military integration systems, cybersecurity projects, and innovation policies. The PLA has responded to such demands and has reportedly advanced its partnerships with the civilian sector – with notable examples being telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE – and deepened engagements with universities.

Cyber Militias State-affiliated cyber militias have been one of the clearest products of civilmilitary development efforts, with a membership base believed to number in excess of 10 million people today, since these organisations emerged around 20 years ago. Cognisant that such militias could undermine the work of regular PLA cyber units if given the remit to operate as they wished, it is likely that these organisations have been tasked to

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land

Xinhua

warfare

President Xi Jinping has exhorted Chinese industry to support his government's cyber ambitions

perform cyber surveillance and espionage as opposed to offensive cyber operations.

China’s infamous ‘patriotic hackers’ are perhaps the most well-known face of the cyber militias. While these hackers can be a useful tool in hampering state adversaries they can also often be unruly, erratic and heavy-handed. These hackers are typically driven by popular nationalism which is often defined by effusive, unsubtle, and rash pursuits and rhetoric, which is incongruent with the calculated version of state nationalism that the CCP espouses and pursues.

Evidently, there has been a tension between the need for the state to enable and encourage the development of national identity while still preserving the national interest. The integration of these civilian entities into formalised state structures like the PLASSF will thus represent a desire by the state to mitigate as much as possible the inherent volatility of these actors.

However, the continued drive to formally integrate these hackers into military organisations like the SSF, coupled with the increasing scope and scale of their operations will likely lead the PLA and the Chinese government to a state where it will lose its ability to maintain plausible deniability, when the activities of these hackers are uncovered by other countries. The improved US ability to attribute cyber operations to Chinese actors combined with Washington’s budding approach of sanctioning major Chinese state-owned enterprises has caused Beijing to realise

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the need to implement closer control.

While the civil-military dimension of China’s cyber power projection has been sporadically apparent since the beginning of the millennium, it is only recently that we are seeing concerted efforts to wholeheartedly leverage the civilian sphere and, more importantly, to centralise and organise it so that it can consistently serve China’s military aims.

Further Evolution Finally, China plans to leverage its growing mastery of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to boost its cyber defence and offence capabilities. The CPC has outlined three phases for indigenous AI development, with the first aiming to boost capability to support the growth of a globally competitive AI industry by 2020.

The second phase outlines development to 2025 with ‘major breakthroughs’ in AI technologies and applications. By 2030, China aims to establish itself as the global leader of AI technologies, which will be fully integrated in all if its industrial sectors including national defence construction, where AI will underpin key military developments, systems, and capabilities The vast amounts of data and the speed of cyber attacks demands a degree of cognitive power and agility that is beyond what human actors working in isolation can provide. Chinese military leaders are fully aware of the potential of AI to boost the effectiveness of its personnel and even systems by processing and filtering information, enabling them

| Asian Military Review |

to adapt to rapidly evolving operational environments. For example, AI is being viewed as a tool to automate processes that govern cyber attacks, potentially alleviating the existing compromise between the scale and efficacy of attacks.

For cyber defence, AI support could significantly increase reaction speed by using predictive capabilities that enable mining and leveraging historical and realtime data at exceptional swiftness. To that end, China is investing heavily in cuttingedge information technologies, such as quantum computing. It is also successfully operationalising cyber technologies for public security, such as facial recognition and citizen surveillance, as well as vehicle and smartphone tracking.

Other defensive capabilities are also beginning to mature, providing greater resilience against external attack from its western rivals. One such example is the China National Cyber Threat Intelligence Collaboration (CNTIC) established in 2017 by government agencies and eight leading domestic cybersecurity companies such as 360 Enterprise Security Group and NSFocus Information Technology (NSFOCUS).

Other national agencies including the National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team (CNCERT) are also supporting CNTIC. “The platform can solve problems like data isolation and fragmentation,” Liu Baoxu, director of CNTIC, told People’s Daily in January 2019, noting that the team can access over 200 threat intelligence (TI) sources, with nearly 100 billion pieces of information available.

“Through data collection and analysis, high-value intelligence can be formed and shared among the nation for better cyber defence.”

It is also worth noting that cyberattacks on Chinese infrastructure is also among the most frequent in the world. According to a February 2019 report by local consultancy Beijing Zhidao Chuangyu Information Technology, China suffered the highest rate of distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) – averaging over 800 million recorded events – in the world in 2018. According to the company, scanning and backdoor intrusion attacks accounted for the majority of these attacks, with domestic hackers accounting for 97 percent of these. However, it also noted that overseas attacks targeting government and financial websites from the US, South Korea, and Japan have been increasing in frequency. AMR

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Taiwan MND

M i l i t a r i e s

The F-CK1 is an indigenously developed multirole fighter

HAWKISH CHINA TRIGGERS TAIWANESE DEFENCE BUDGET RISE Taiwan’s force modernisation still short of international buy-in so indigenous development and manufacturing remains vital.

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ensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and the Republic of China (RoC, or Taiwan) – which claims the latter as a part of its territory and seeks to achieve eventual unification, by force if necessary – has never been this pronounced since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996.

Although China had for decades been seemingly content to maintain an uneasy status quo with Taiwan, military encounters between their armed forces have been steadily growing in recent years given the rapid modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the growing frequency and complexity of its military exercises around the Taiwan Strait. In March this year, two PLA Air Force (PLAAF) J-11 combat aircraft crossed the de facto ‘median line’ over the waters that separate Taiwan from the mainland, prompting a scramble by the island’s own air force to shadow the intruding aircraft.

The military exercises are only part of China’s multi-pronged efforts to tighten its noose on Taiwan, which has also seen Beijing wield its growing diplomatic and economic clout to pressure global industry to cease references to Taiwan as a nation, as well as convince governments

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by JR Ng to sever their diplomatic ties with Taipei.

The uncertain security environment has spurred Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s administration to increase defence spending in 2019 to $11 billion (NT346 billion), a 5.6 percent ($600 million) increase over expenditure in 2018.

According to Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Chen Chung-chi, the government plans to incrementally increase the military budget to $13.6 billion (NT$421.8 billionn) by 2029.

With only rare exceptions, Taiwan’s acquisition of weapon systems has long been limited to the United States as Chinese pressure has deterred many countries and suppliers from even considering the sale of military equipment or technology to the island. However, this has instead instilled a strong sense of self-reliance that has nurtured robust indigenous defence research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capabilities.

“Generally, insufficient investment since the mid-2000 has resulted in poor lifespan management within the three services,” Dr Wu Shang-Su, a research fellow specialising in regional security, told AMR. “Among them, the army would suffer most, the air force least, and the navy in the middle.”

“The current efforts in defence

| Asian Military Review |

modernisation reflects the [current state of] strategic planning, layered defence, or in the previous phase: air defence, sea denial and anti-landing,” he added.

“Thus, the air force and navy enjoy the great deal of investment [in recent years].”

Regarding the threats, Taipei’s defence investment is insufficient.

Although Taiwan has a sluggish economy, some governmental expenditures, such as some social welfare and infrastructure, could be reallocated to defence.

Army modernisation According to the 2017 edition of the National Defense Report (NDR), the Republic of China Army’s (RoCA) core peacetime roles include protecting Taiwan’s main island and its outlying islands by building basic warfighting and contingency response capabilities, carrying out contingency operations, and securing critical infrastructure. The army also supports anti-terrorism operations and proactively assists with local disaster prevention and relief when required.

Disaster relief is also a priority mission of the army during peacetime as Taiwan is regularly hit by natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and typhoons. This requires the service to be able to mobilise quickly to offer aid to affected areas and

Regional

F-16V - The RoCAF's upgraded F-16V aircraft seen taking off from an alternate runway during Han Kuang 2019

a $2bn arms package. The ministry confirmed on 6 June that it had already submitted a formal request to the US government and that that the sales process is progressing as anticipated. On 8 July, the US State Department announced that it has approved the request, although the decision unsurprisingly prompted Beijing's protest. The MBTs are expected to equip two armour battalions in northern Taiwan, should the vehicles be successfully delivered.

The army is also moving forward with plans to replace its ageing M113 and CM21 tracked and wheeled V-150 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to improve the mobility, firepower and survivability of its mechanised infantry brigades. The indigenously developed and built 8x8 CM32/CM33 Yunpao (Clouded Leopard) was selected in 2010 as the replacement under a programme estimated to be worth at least $1.8bn (NT$58bn).

A total of 1,400 CM-33 APC and CM32 command variants of the Clouded Leopard had originally been envisaged, although production figures were subsequently cut. Several technical defects were also discovered during early production runs – including cracks in vehicle armour plates – although the MND announced in March 2010 that these problems had been resolved and series production of the first tranche of up

to 652 vehicles was to begin by November, with an initial contract for 368 vehicles being filled by 2018.

A new infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) variant armed with a turreted Orbital ATK 30mm Mk44 Bushmaster II automatic cannon is reportedly entering production in 2020 with up to 284 of these expected to be delivered by 2023. The MND announced a $112 million contract for 285 30mm Mk44 Bushmaster II cannons on 29 September 2017.

Navy modernisation The Republic of China Navy (RoCN) is responsible for the protection of Taiwan’s sea lines of communication as well as control and surveillance of its surrounding waters. The service’s principal combatants include four Keelung-class (ex-US Navy Kidd-class) destroyers equipped with the New Threat Upgrade combat system, which offer a significantly enhanced anti-air capability, as well as several types of frigates.

The newest of these are the six 3,800 tonne Kang Ding platforms derived from the French La Fayette-class design, which are primarily configured for anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare (ASuW and ASW) with the Hsiung Feng II (Brave Wind II, or HF-II) anti-ship missiles (ASMs) and Mk46 torpedoes.

The ten 3,000 tonne Chi Yang-class frigates (former US Navy Knox-class frigates) feature an enhanced air defence capability with the integration of the Standard Missile-1 (SM-1) surface-to-air missile (SAM) along with an improved air surveillance radar, as well as the H-930 modular combat system (MCS), enabling the vessels to engage newer generation Chinese aircraft.

Under the broader tri-service Po Sheng

Taiwan MND

work closely with civilian agencies.

Approximately 80 percent of the RoCA’s manpower is positioned on the main island, with the remainder on the outlying islands to respond to wartime contingencies. The NDR stipulates that the army must be able to swiftly integrate with other services operations in a “mobile, speedy, and decisive” fashion and to repel an invasion force by methods such as mounting beachhead assaults and counter-airborne operations.

The service maintains around 400 CM-11 Brave Tiger and 300 M60A3 Tank Thermal Sight (TTS) main battle tanks (MBTs). The CM-11 MBT is a hybrid design – comprising a modified M48 turret mounted on a standard M60A3 chassis and equipped with a fire control system (FCS) that is comparable to that of the General Dynamics M1A1 Abrams platform – developed by Taiwan’s Armoured Vehicle Development Center with assistance from General Dynamics’ Land Systems Division.

In October 2017 the MND announced that it would explore the possibility of upgrading the army’s M60A3 TTS fleet and allocated almost $6.6 million to the state-owned National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) to lead R&D work including the integration of a 120mm calibre main gun, as well as updates to the ballistic FCS and turret hydraulic system. Two MBTs have been assigned to the agency for use as prototypes and are expected to be ready by the end of 2019, ahead of upgrade work commencing in 2020. There is also an interest to upgrade the CM-11/12 MBT fleet, although the growth potential of these vehicles will be limited given their age.

However, the planned MBT modernisation could be abandoned as a result of the MND's request to procure 108 M1A2 tanks along with an assortment of missile systems – comprising 250 Raytheon FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, 409 Raytheon-Lockheed Martin FGM-148 Javelin and 1,240 Raytheon BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles – under

Taiwan MND

M i l i t a r i e s

The RoCA is hoping to replace its ageing M48 and M60 tanks with the M1A2 Abrams

| august/September 2019 |

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Regional

Taiwan MND

M i l i t a r i e s

Up to 11 Tuojiang stealth missile corvettes could eventually be fielded by the RoCN

(Broad Victory) upgrade programme, the RoCN’s eight 2,800 tonne Cheng Kungclass frigates have been upgraded with the latest HF-III ASMs, enhanced C4ISR systems and new Link 16 tactical datalink multifunctional information distribution systems (MIDSs) designed to provide secure high capacity voice and data communications.

However, understanding the futility of standing toe-to-toe with the far betterequipped PLA Navy (PLAN) surface fleet, the RoCN has invested in highend asymmetric capabilities centred on its fleet of high-speed stealth missile corvettes and attack craft. The MND has commissioned local shipbuilder Lung Teh to construct the first production batch of three Tuo Jiang-class missile corvettes, which will be better equipped and armed than the first-of-class prototype constructed in 2012 and commissioned into service in 2015. These would carry a ‘high-low’ mix of HF-IIF and HF-III ASMs that would be launched in salvos against high-value PLAN targets such as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, with both types of missiles adopting distinct flight profiles to confuse ship point defence systems. Another seven Tuo Jiang corvettes are planned following the delivery of the third vessel in 2025.

The service has also fielded several squadrons of Kuang Hua VI (KH-6) guided missile craft that have been armed with HF-II ASMs. These stealthy boats are primarily configured as hitand-run platforms and are not equipped with surface or air surveillance radars to maintain their low observability characteristics. Instead, they rely on targeting data supplied via datalink by shore-based sensors or other friendly surface combatants.

The MND has also awarded a contract

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to CSBC Corporation to build the first of four projected 16,000 tonne amphibious assault ships that will be able to carry over 500 troops and up to two utility landing crafts (LCUs) or four 16m mechanised landing crafts (LCMs) in its well dock.

It will also feature a flight deck that can accommodate a medium-lift helicopter.

Besides point defence weapons, the new assault ships will reportedly be equipped with HF ASM launchers.

Meanwhile, the RoCN’s perennially delayed plan to field a new generation of indigenous diesel-electric submarines to replace its ageing Dutch-built Hai Lung (Sea Dragon)-class boats and Guppy II/ Hai Shih (Sea Lion)-class submarines has advanced considerably with work on a dedicated submarine production facility in the southern port of Kaohsiung getting under way in May 2019. The new centre will be operated by CSBC’s Submarine Development Centre and expected to be functional by 2020. The MND awarded a contract in 2017 to CSBC and NCSIST to design and build between six and eight submarines.

Taiwan defence minister Yen Defa told media in March 2019 that the “contract design phase” of the submarine effort had been completed and that the government expected the construction of the first submarine – reportedly displacing up to 3,000 tonnes with an overall length of 70m and a beam of 8m – to be completed by the mid-2020s.

Air force modernisation The Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF) is widely regarded as Taiwan’s premier military asset, which has for decades offered a technological superiority over the PLAAF’s legacy combat aircraft and bomber fleet.

However, this advantage has been

| Asian Military Review |

eroded by potent fourth- and fifthgeneration Chinese combat aircraft such as the indigenous J-10, J-11, and J-20 that are also augmented with Russianmade Su-30s and Su-35s. The PLAAF is also fielding increasingly capable beyond-visual range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAMs) such as the PL-12 and PL-15.

The RoCAF is also facing the prospect of a reduced fighter inventory from 2020, when its ageing Northrop Grumman F-5E/F and Dassault Mirage 2000-5 aircraft are progressively retired due to increasing maintenance costs.

The MND has attempted to bolster its Lockheed Martin F-16A/B fleet with up to 66 F-16C/D Block 52 aircraft from the United States since 2006. However, Washington declined to approve the request in September 2011 and instead struck a deal to upgrade the RoCAF’s existing F-16A/Bs to the latest F-16V configuration, which features the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar derived from the F-18E/F Block 60 AN/APG-80 system, a new Raytheon mission computer, the Link 16 datalink, updated cockpit displays, an enhanced electronic warfare (EW) system, and a ground collision avoidance system.

Lockheed Martin was awarded a $272 million contract to install 142 F-16V aircraft upgrade kits acquired under a separate $1.85 billion deal, with upgrade work in Taiwan and in the United States to be completed by May 2022. Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) has constructed a dedicated hangar at Taichung that can modify up to 24 aircraft annually. One of the first updated examples made its public debut at an alternate runway launch and recovery exercise during Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise, which simulates a Chinese invasion.

The AIDC has also developed and manufactured the RoCAF’s F-CK-1 Ching Kuo Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), which entered service in 1994 and has benefited from considerable upgrades – including the improved GD53 radar, digital cockpit displays, 32-bit digital flight control computer (DFLCC), as well as dorsally mounted conformal fuel tanks (CFT) – between 2009 and 2017.

The upgraded fighters are designated F-CK-1C and F-CK-1D and also feature additional payload capacity. For example, they can now carry four Tien Chien II AAMs as opposed to two previously. AMR

Analyst C o l u m n

WHITHER CHINA’S RECENT ASBM TEST

By Ben Ho

T

he People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tested its much-vaulted anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability at sea last month, according to news outlets CNBC and NHK, quoting American defence sources. A Pentagon official said that a total of six missiles were fired from the mainland into the South China Sea (SCS) over a few days, marking the first deployment of such a capability at sea.

However, other details of the test, like what type of missile was used, remain scant. Marking a significant escalation in China’s military posture in the hotly disputed SCS, the ASBM drill came on the back of rising politico-military tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and was arguably carried out to send a strong message to Beijing’s strategic rivals in the region, especially the United States.

The ‘China threat’ thesis has gained increasing prominence in American policy-making circles in recent years.

Indeed, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) released early last year alludes to “inter-state strategic competition… as the primary concern in US national security” and explicitly names China as inimical to US interests. In the months since the document’s release, there has been much debate over how best to implement the NDS. To illustrate, Washington DC thinktanks have come up with new operational concepts to counter China. This period has also seen increasing American and allied naval deployments by the likes of Britain, Canada, and France to the region.

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For instance, the French carrier Charles De Gaulle and its consorts recently completed a four-month deployment in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, the United States’ Ronald Reagan carrier strike group conducted drills in the South China Sea with the Japanese helicopter destroyer Izumo in mid-June. What is more, these developments overlapped with the SinoAmerican trade imbroglio.

Naturally China felt somewhat reined in by these events and saw the need to respond forcefully. A par for the course deployment of regular forces (again) such as anti-ship cruise missiles or fighter jets would arguably not send a strong enough message of deterrence. It was time for a step-change. And what better way for China to do this by showcasing one of its silver bullets? After all, the PLA’s two anti-ship ballistic missile types far exceed in terms of striking reach everything else in its conventional missile inventory. The DF-21D ‘Carrier Killer’ can hit targets around 1,500 kilometres away, holding at risk enemy ships within and around the First Island Chain. The DF-26 ‘Guam Express’, as its nickname suggests, is even more potent as it can hit the American territory given its stated range of some 4,000km. The ASBM was developed primarily to counter the threat of US carrier forces, and July’s test of this capability were arguably meant to signal to Beijing’s potential foes that it was serious about defending its regional interests, whether they be in the two China seas or over Taiwan.

| Asian Military Review |

Going forward, July’s ASBM drills could just be a one-off event. However, some commentators speculate that China’s ASBM drills in July could be the harbinger of stepped-up Chinese belligerency. Therefore, expect more of such developments with different, more potent capabilities. That being said, what would really raise eyebrows and cast a cold chill over the region is the successful testing of the Chinese ASBM against a mobile maritime target. After all, this capability has been tested only against stationary objects on land, which does not offer the complexity of a maritime target.

Alarm bells would ring even harder in Western defence establishments should such a successful test also involve other capabilities such as missiles launched from other platforms like aircraft and submarines. Should this come to pass, the US Navy will have to genuinely face up to a threat which bedevilled its planners during much of the Cold War – the multidomain, multi-vector attack launched by the Soviets to overwhelm an American carrier force. The 21st Century Chinese incarnation could be ominous given the strides made in ship-killing technology using the ASBM.

Note: Ben Ho is an associate research fellow with the military studies programme at Singapore’s Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

E-mail: iswbh@ntu.edu.sg

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