CAUCUS
Contributors
EDITORS
AidenCarter
PaoloSanJose
CONTRIBUTORS
AmaniAjaje
AleaBabeck
AidenCarter
SarahD’Souza
SiennaEswaran
RachelGewargis
PaoloSanJose
SruthiSivakumar
GRAPHICDESIGN
AidenCarter
fragments fallacies
TheCaucusistheUNSW UnitedNationsSociety’s annualpublication;a collectionofstudentworks compiledandeditedbythe Publicationsteam.This year’stheme,‘fragments andfallacies’, isareflection oftheintricatewebofsocial andpoliticalissuesexisting withintheinternational sphere,groundingThe Caucusasatestamentto grass-rootslevel scholarship,writingandart. Inaworldpolarisedby mediaandpolitics,The Caucusisawelcome reprieve,whereacademia meetscurrentaffairsand socialissues.
DemocracyManifest?:theFallaciesof WesternForeignInterventionin AfghanistanandLibya
TheNewColonialism:India’sHoldon JammuandKashmir
AidenCarter
FairisFoulandFoulisFair:Liberalismin Practice ontheCroatia-Bosniaand HerzegovinaBorder
TheFallaciesofaSino-AmericanWar
ObdurateCycles:ClimateChangeand Inequality ImpactsofColonialismonHinduism SiennaEswaran
SarahD’Souza PaoloSanJose AleaBabeck AmaniAjaje
FallaciesofFreedom:Rousseauandthe SocialContract
RachelGewargis SruthiSivakumar
IndigenousIdentityintheMiddleEast: FragmentsoftheAssyrianEmpire
Creator:
Democracy Manifest?:the FallaciesofWestern ForeignIntervention inAfghanistanand Libya
Whilst at face value foreign intervention of post-conflict states may appear a noble cause, a deeper look may expose such ‘benevolent’ intentions as having a darker underbelly of colonialist undertones and destructive potential with severe human costs. In this essay I propose nation building efforts as inherently problematic, posing a significant threat to the peace and prosperity of vulnerable states Firstly, I will first unpack how the US’ ‘top-down’ approach precipitates a lack of local participation that delegitimises indigenous institutions and diminishes accountability, severely compromising the democratisation process (Acemoglu 2021).
Jan Chipchase; CC BY-SA 2 0
Creator: FMT;CC BY-SA 2.0
I will then discuss the idealistic imposition of Western political values without contextual and cultural consideration, existing as a manifestation of neo-colonialism that undermines sovereignty and incites resentment (Yage 2012). Such limitations of intervention are epitomised within the US’ involvement in Afghanistan, with the establishment of a centralised political order made in complete disregard of the state’s heterogeneous and volatile societal makeup and rich history of informal governance (Acemoglu 2021). I will then corroborate this idea through the intervention in Libya, resulting in illegitimate and weak institutions that were rapidly dismantled by widespread conflict (Green 2019). Ultimately, this inability to buttress new and sustainable institutions produces catastrophic consequences, cultivating radicalisation and discontent that sets the stage for democratic backsliding and worsened socio-political outcomes.
A ‘top-down’ process of nation building works to create fragile state regimes and fosters dependency that eradicates the accountability crucial to a healthy democracy. Nation building includes the imposition of political, military and economic institutions to construct a stable state in the wake of conflict or regime change (Council on Foreign Relations 2023). However current trends within intervention theory point to the execution of vast social engineering project at the highest level. As opposed to reforming the defects of existing states, target nations are treated as ‘blank canvases’, constructing parallel frameworks as manifestations of victim-saviour dichotomies entrenched in racial hierarchies that prompt intervening states to underestimate existing indigenous state capacities. That is, “even the poorest, most fragile and traumatized nations… [are] densely patterned with functioning local forms of security, administration, and dispute resolution” (Stewart & Knaus 2011). Hence, interveners are often extremely reluctant to delegate power to local hands, importing the expertise of foreigners whilst pouring in resources and capital from NGOs (Acemoglu 2021) However, inherent to such aid is an isolation and remoteness from local society, producing policy decisions and appointing foreign bureaucrats: processes that lack the assent and cooperation of the people (Stewart & Knaus 2011). Not only does this cultivate a dependence on foreigners that increases the chances of the regime’s collapse post-withdrawal,¹ but delegitimises the government and weakens domestic accountability (Pei & Kasper 2003). Moreover, whilst tax income provides taxpayers with leverage for better political governance, foreign aid income is not associated with the same loss for individuals, thus lowering voter’s inclination to hold politicians responsible for how it is spent (Asongu 2014) This lack of a citizen-state relation significantly hinders social mobilisation, removing the space to articulate opposition and increasing demand on welfare-oriented institutions. Such constraints on the executive and rule of law are not only crucial to reduce the risk or corruption and rights suppression but are positively linked with upward economic growth and order (Fukuyama 1989). This inability of intervening nations to establish accountability engenders the creation of weak or illiberal democracies that must either fall back on repressive policies to preserve power after withdrawal, or breed enough discontent to be seized by resourceful autocrats (Pei & Kasper 2003). Ultimately, by not involving locals in efforts of democratisation, developmental aid can severely harm the peace and prosperity of nations by generating unstable institutions prone to collapse and corruption.
¹ A study conducted by Mixin Pei evidenced that seven out of the sixteen instances of US nation building display the American chosen interim administration as having a virtually complete reliance on Washington.
Neo-colonialist and liberal idealist undercurrents within foreign intervention exposes the fundamental flaws of democracy promotion, drastically impeding the ability to deliver peace and prosperity to weak nations. Whilst democracy is an important tool in ensuring social welfare and economic growth, foreign democratisation is often rooted in excessive American idealism under the “belief in the perfectibility of society through democracy” (Haig 1994); a reflection of liberal idealism and the paternalistic notion that ‘modern’ nations know what is best for vulnerable societies (Etzioni 2012). I would like to problematise traditional, Westernised conceptualisations of democracy as highly complicating when attempting to transplant such models in non-European nations, with “the belief that non-Western peoples should adopt Western values, institutions, and culture” (Huntington 1996). This ‘one size fits all’ approach necessitates target nations to exhibit characteristics including ethnic homogeneity, high state capacity, and stability to guarantee sustainability; all selective conditions that are scarcely observed in nations recipient of foreign intervention. Instead, these states are often characterised by highly heterogenous societies with ethnic divides and historical conflict, rendering them intrinsically resistant to fundamental social and political alterations (Etzioni 2012). Moreover, when policy decisions are made devoid of contextual consideration to such cultural and political complexities, they run the risk of exacerbating existing conflict, likened by Stephen Walt (2016) as to “asking someone to build a nuclear power plant, without any blueprints, on an active earthquake zone. In either case, expect a rapid meltdown”. This ineffectiveness is compounded by neocolonialism that is inherent to nation building in post colonialist states, with forced democratisation a means of redistributing political power (Wolff 2015). Here we witness the instrumentalisation of aid to advance foreign policy by creating conveniently ‘Western-friendly’ systems shaped by values of intervening states, dictating the behaviour of countries through financial incentivisation This is corroborated by dependency theory, which posits that a veneer of ‘modernisation’ allows states to ingress into society whether through an economic, political or educational facet, in turn maintaining a level dependency in target nations that perpetuates their subjugation (Hills 1994). Rather, principled incrementalism should be championed to build democracy organically, building on past policies, cultural values and social structure via making small changes over a prolonged period (Stewart & Knaus 2011) However, even if malintent is absent, the strong involvement demanded for nations lacking state capacity culminates in a quasicolonialism (Wolff 2015). These clouded and complex stakes of interveners within nation building produce intentions that are often unaligned with the needs of the state, rendering the aid ineffective and often damaging to the peace and prosperity of respective nations.
These disastrous implications are epitomised in the catastrophic failure of US and NATO nation building in Afghanistan, leaving the nation steeped in conflict and under the iron grips of the Taliban. After invading Afghanistan in 2001 in pursuit of a ‘war on terror’, the US allocated 133 billion dollars on efforts to reconstruct a self-sustaining state, only for it to collapse 20 years later (Whitlock 2019). When uncovering what went wrong one may discover the provisional government’s inability to accommodate for the country’s rich diversity, featuring fragmented regions and a vast array of ethnic, tribal and linguistic groups (Evason 2019) Moreover, authorities displayed an ignorance of Afghanistan’s prior political dynamics, including a history of informal governance, with an estimated 90% of disputes resolved via informal means such as through public forums and Shuras, or community councils (Acemoglu 2021). Hence by establishing a “highly unitary system” customary authority was severely undermined, whilst simultaneously accruing a personal stake for the US in
initiating lasting control and influence within the region. This unified structure would be easier to coordinate, control and facilitate access to oil reserves (Murtazashvili 2022). These indigenous structures were, ironically, far more democratic in nature than the centralised structure imposed by the US (Ibid). The interim government, with Hamik Karzai as its US-backed leader, was highly authoritarian in nature, as codified by the 2004 constitution, disabling Afghans from electing local officials and bolstering power of the executive (Parliament of Australia 2021). A lack of contextual knowledge also led to inadvertent funding of corrupt politicians, who siphoned off foreign aid funds: it was found that almost 30% was used on “waste, fraud and abuse” (Ibid) according to studies conducted by the ‘Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’. This was exacerbated by the state’s poor spending capacity, which, in tandem with the foreign injection of billions of dollars into the economy, cultivated conditions highly conducive to fraud (Ibid). The US’ initial allying with nefarious warlords to remove Al-Qaeda also proved gravely detrimental to construction efforts, whereby after being absorbed into the new government they resumed the expansion of criminal networks and private militias (SIGAR 2016). This endemic corruption and lack of accountability served to “[revive] the rotten political system of the authoritarian era and simply slapped a veneer of democracy on it” (Murtazashvili 2022), ultimately inciting drastic anti-Western sentiment whilst reducing the regime to almost complete illegitimacy in the eyes of the population This was exacerbated by the hyper fixation on military build-up in accordance with a realist construction of international relations that sees matters of the state and military as paramount to national security. Nation building took a back seat to protecting the new government from counterinsurgency, with Douglas Feith, Secretary of Defence for Policy stating in a memo that “Nation-building is not our key strategic goal” Ultimately, US intervention served to profoundly alienate the Afghan population, culminating in the fleeing of President Ashraf Ghani and the taking of Kabul by insurgents in 2021 (SIGAR 2016).
Libya remains mired in conflict even 9 years after foreign intervention, consisting of reforms characterised by the implementation of unbelievably weak and unstable institutions that hindered progression past a stage of political transition (Athalia 202). Following Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi’s threats to brutally suppress opposition, US and NATO intervention was mandated by the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine and aimed to protect civilians amidst the increasing risk of civil war (Green 2019). Here we see dependency theory typified in the US’ blatant ulterior motivations behind the ousting of Gaddafi, who was strongly opposed to international influence and proved a challenging economic partner to the US. Hence, such efforts are tainted with imperialism as modernisation attempts betray significant economic benefits for the US, with Libya being Africa’s largest source of crude oil (Ibid). Nevertheless, NATO succeeded in aiding the formation of a secular and moderate government that had popular support, featuring a progressive constitution including provisions to ensure the representation of women in the general assembly (FundforPeace 2021). However, attempts were destined to fail from the start due to conditions inherently resistant to social and political engineering from outsiders Under Qaddafi existed hollow institutions with restricted power, constrained to insignificant governmental functions. This lack of state capacity and inexperience with democracy, like Afghanistan, was highly unconducive to nation building, reflecting Fukuyama’s argument that without pre-existent modern state mechanisms, democratisation processes are prone to produce clientelism (Athalia 2020). Subsequently, the US’ ability to form robust institutions was greatly hindered and resulted in the omission of a potent
military and police force (Ibid). It was therefore inevitable that soon after foreign withdrawal a security vacuum ensued, prompting over 60 rival political factions to war for power over security, encouraging the action of militia ascribed with authority by the National Transitional Council (Lynch 2021). This was accompanied by a proliferation of Islamic radicalism, previously stifled under Qaddafi, that swept across the nation, violence aggravated by the excess of weaponry remaining from international actors after withdrawal (Kuperman 2013). Ultimately, the dysfunctional Libyan military was left with the impossible task of demobilizing these groups. Military capacity was further crippled by the UN’s contentious decision to immediately extract all foreign military following Qaddafi’s defeat, replacing them with the ‘United Nations Support Mission in Libya’ (‘UNSMIL’) (Smits 2017). UNSMIL’s mandate to execute nation building via political methods alone left the fragile government, desperately lacking experienced bureaucrats and effective public policy, vulnerable to relentless political opposition from prominent tribes and families (FundforPeace 2021). Cultural ignorance by intervening forces caused a misbelief in simplistic victim-perpetrator dichotomies that were far from reality, whereby rebel groups and insurgents had roots deeply embedded within society through familial ties and a complex network of loyalties (Smits 2017). Groups who once banded together to support Qaddafi’s overthrow began pursuing their own agendas so that ultimately there were “[too] many local counterweights to central authority” (Ibid), proving democratisation efforts to be futile. It was therefore an inability to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of Libyans and legitimise the UN that caused Libyan society to descend into a myriad of armed conflicts and instability that slowly eroded bureaucratic functions and basic social services; a disintegration that earned the nation title as the 2010’s “most-worsened country” by the Fragile State Index (FundforPeace 2021). Hence, Libya is a pertinent example of the invaluable need for the understanding of a nation’s social and political landscape prior to nation building, which, if not obtained, can lead to the further degradation of peace and prosperity in post-conflict states
Whilst it is undeniable that forms of foreign intervention are necessary in mitigating the violation of human rights across the globe, the tendency for nation building to backfire in target states forces us to reconsider when, why and how powerful nations are so inclined to interfere in matters others than their own. Ultimately, we must strike a careful balance between genuine humanitarian aid and imperialistic, paternalistic actions in order to empower post-conflict states to shape their own future as a more peaceful and prosperous nation
SIENNA ESWARAN
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TheNew Colonialism:India’s HoldonJammuand Kashmir
SarahD’Souza
The governance of Kashmir by the Indian state has long been a subject of contention, with deep-rooted historical, political, and social complexities shaping the region's trajectory. India’s exertion of control over Kashmir, a former colonised state, has itself garnered criticism for its imposition of sovereignty, underpinned by a right-wing political ideology that villainizes Indigenous Muslim populations. In recent decades, scholarly discourse has increasingly turned to the question of whether India's governance of Kashmir can be characterised as settler colonialism a form of colonialism that involves the permanent settlement of colonisers in indigenous territories, facilitated by displacement and extermination of indigenous populations (Wolfe 2006). This essay seeks to explore the extent to which India's governance of Kashmir aligns with settler colonial principles and practices. By examining the historical context, legal frameworks, demographic changes, and militarised control in Kashmir, this essay aims to provide a nuanced analysis of India's presence in the region and its implications for the indigenous Kashmiri population
Positionality
In undertaking this inquiry, I must acknowledge the ways in which my own identity and circumstances shape the epistemological process and the conclusions I will draw. Particularly, I draw upon the post-positive view of reflexivity adopted by Miller (2005), which rejects the notion of value-neutral knowledge creation, instead asserting that individual identities and contexts are inextricable from the ways we engage with knowledge and research. In adopting this position, I am better able to acknowledge the ways in which my personal biases exist and shape (consciously or otherwise) my understanding of colonialism in the Indian subcontinent As a person of Indian origin, I acknowledge that my cultural and ethnic ties to a region colonised by two different European empires are innately tied to my conception of colonialism. In this way, not only is my own identity deeply entrenched in imperialism, my understanding of colonial practices and enduring coloniality is steeped in my personal circumstances. Notwithstanding my personal connection to India’s colonial past and present, I also recognise the external perspective from which I participate in this inquiry, as I belong to neither of the two religious majorities which underpin much of the conflict and colonial practices in the Kashmir region. A significant epistemological consideration is the geopolitical definition of Kashmir and Indian occupied Kashmir, which in themselves are contentious.
Settler Colonialism
Imperialistic practices can be separated into two distinct colonial systems: extractive colonialism and settler colonialism. As Veracini (2014) posits, the two praxes are analogous to either a bacterial infection or as a virus. In the same way that viruses are dependent on host systems, extractive colonialism requires local populations to continue the colonial apparatus in the form of labour, material and administrative structures. Conversely, as bacteria can attach itself to surfaces without dependence on the host cell for replication, settler colonial powers do not need Indigenous people or structures to sustain themselves and aim instead towards permanent occupation by settlers. In this way, while extractive colonialism places an emphasis on the subjugation of Indigenous peoples, settler colonialism attempts to reorganise territories and exterminate native populations. Wolfe (2006) asserts that settler colonial agendas are executed through the seizure of land, imposition of settler sovereignty and establishment of permanent settler communities This offers an effective framework to understand and critique India’s occupation of Kashmir, as it cannot be tied to a single event or policy; rather, it exists as a product of enduring practices and systems that allow settler colonies to endure. Therefore, India’s goals to both occupy Kashmir territory, and eliminate the Indigenous population in the process, indicates not only colonial aims in the region, but a specifically settler-colonial project.
Overview of Kashmir’s History
Disputes over Kashmir’s territory and conflicting ascents to power reveal a history founded in colonialism even prior to the creation of the British Raj. Kashmir, located in the northernmost region of the Indian subcontinent, is bordered by Pakistan, China and India, placing it in a position vulnerable to geopolitical conflict Kashmir itself is historically composed of the three distinct regions of Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir Valley, each with varying Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist and Sikh populations. Sovereignty and religious conflict have thus been a point of contention even prior to the settlement and decolonisation of the British Raj.
SARAH D’SOUZA
Afghan and Mughal rule prevailed for four centuries until control was passed onto Sikh armies under Ranjit Singh in 1819, who had conquered Afghan territory throughout modern-day Punjab over two decades (Schofield, 2003). The following decades saw a brutalisation of the majority Muslim population under Sikh rule, with the closure of mosques, banning of the azaan (the Muslim call to prayer recited in public) and agricultural taxes that disproportionately impacted the Muslim peasantry (Zutshi, 2004). In 1846, the signing of the Second Treaty of Amritsar between Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu and the British East India company heralded a new political and diplomatic status for the region: the Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu. The absorption of Jammu, Ladakh and other regions in the north-East of the subcontinent into the Kashmiri Vale brought about a massive demographic shift, with different ethnic, religious, linguistic and socio-cultural traditions forced to amalgamate under the rule of a single Hindu Maharaja As Raazia, ur Rehman and Aslam (2021) explore, though Muslim Kashmiris formed the majority religious and cultural group, they were subject to the greatest brutalisation under the Hindu regime. Under Hindu rule, subjugation of Indigenous Kashmiri Muslims continued to manifest despite forming a majority of the population, precipitating even greater social stratification and the rule of a Hindu elite over an impoverished Muslim working class.
Claims to control the region were further exacerbated after the decolonisation of the British Raj and partition of the subcontinent into the states of India and Pakistan, becoming a source of much of the animosity between the two nations. While the division of other princely states in the subcontinent were based by religion, with Muslim majority states becoming Pakistani territory and all other religious majorities becoming India, the complex geographical and demographic nature of Kashmir prevented this neat division (Kanji 2021) In contradiction to the ethno-religious demographics of Kashmir and the popular assent aligning with Pakistan, the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947 signed an Instrument of Accession under the Indian Independence Act, surrendering the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to the Dominion of India (Raazia et al 2021). The first war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir erupted shortly after independence, leading to the division of the region along the Line of Control (‘LoC’) and the establishment of a de facto border. Subsequent wars and military skirmishes, including the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, further exacerbated tensions and solidified the status quo in Kashmir. The Kargil War of 1999, sparked by Pakistanibacked infiltrations into Indian-administered Kashmir, further escalated tensions between the two states. Despite intermittent efforts at peace talks and confidence-building measures, including the Lahore Declaration of 1999 and the Agra Summit of 2001, Kashmir remains subject to warfare between India and Pakistan over rightful sovereignty to the region. Kashmir’s history, one that is deeply intertwined with India’s own colonial experience, is thereby characterised by the contentious accessions and claims to power that have all occurred without the assent of the Indigenous peoples of Kashmir (Osuri 2017).
Hindutva and its Dissemination
Settler colonial praxes are only able to endure beyond a single event and become a system through the dissemination of the ideological framework that underpins the elimination of indigenous populations. In the case of India’s occupation of Kashmir, Hindutva ideology replaces the white supremacist rhetoric of European empires that subjugate ‘inferior’ beings and races. Drawing upon the modus operandi of European right-wing fascist movements, Hindutva emerged from the rise of anti-colonial sentiments that championed the superiority of Hinduism in the face of secularist independence movements (Leidig 2020) Importantly, Leidig articulates that Hindutva, though placing an emphasis on Hinduism and Hindu supremacy, is not a religious ideology.
Rather, it champions the politicisation of religion in that being a part of Hindu culture generates ethnonational identities and consequential ‘otherness’ of non-Hindu cultures. In this way, rather than being underpinned by the racialised theories of the Western imperial powers, the Indian colonial project instead aims to politically cultivate a homogenous cultural and national identity grounded in religious practice and values. India thus utilises Hindutva rhetoric as a means of villainising Indigenous, primarily Muslim, populations, creating a justificatory narrative of Kashmir as a rightful and sovereign Indian territory. This has been instrumental in India’s conception of sovereignty and claims to ethnonational superiority over Kashmir, particularly regarding the desire to restore Akhand Bharat (Undivided India) from the hands of ‘foreign’ Muslims as invaders of a ‘pure’ Hindu nation (Liedig 2022) Hindutva ideology has particularly come to be associated with India’s ruling right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (‘BJP’), led by current Prime Minister Narendra Modi
In practice, the BJP utilises censorship and media control as a means of disseminating the Islamophobic, anti-Kashmiri and Hindutva rhetoric that underpins their settler colonial endeavours. Mushtaq and Amin (2021) term India’s use of epistemicide as ‘memoricide’, wherein India’s control over Kashmir operates not only in the physical sense, but also through a war on Indigenous Kashmiri history, memory and narratives (Mustaq and Amin 2021), thus demonstrating a dual eliminationist and assimilationist approach to colonialism. This ‘memoricide,’ imposed through politicised media, aligns with Althusser’s theory of the Ideological State Apparatus (Althusser 1971). Althusser asserts that Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) are the means by which dominant political forces control the media, culture, education and arts in order to sustain cultural hegemonies and quell dissent from working class populations (Ibid). Indeed, the wielding of this power backed by a right-wing political ideology allows the Indian state to disseminate Hindutva into popular culture, normalise their settler colonial praxis and erase Indigenous Kashmiri identities
The release and governmental endorsement of the 2022 film The Kashmir Files exemplifies India’s control over media in order to erase Indigenous experiences and propagate a revisionist history that enables the extermination of native populations. The film, composed by a ‘Modi acolyte’, concerns the mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in the 1990s amidst increased animosity from Pakistansponsored Muslim militants, framing the event as a genocide to eliminate the Hindu minority in Kashmir (Roy Chowdhury 2022). The film’s thinly veiled Hindutva rhetoric was publicly endorsed by Modi and other BJP members, leading to a rise in anti-Muslim and anti-Kashmiri violence and online outrage. Ultimately, the BJP’s outright promotion of media such as The Kashmir Files demonstrates the sociocultural means by which states disseminate the colonial ideological framework, and thereby quell Indigenous realities from challenging the regimes of settler colonialism
Indian Militarism in Kashmir
India’s military presence in Kashmir after independence in 1947 was largely concerned with military occupation and the facilitation of Indian tourism. However, the 1989 Kashmiri insurrection against India marked the creation of the Kashmiri (Muslim) terrorist in the eyes of the Indian state, an enemy of the “other” so classified for their exercise of self-determination (Shah 2023). In doing so, India began to create the narrative of the invasion of Kashmir, a supposed ‘integral’ part of the Indian state, by what was in reality the Indigenous population. Thus, the fictionalised Muslim enemy, supported by Hindutva ideology and anti-Pakistan sentiment, further served to merge ideas of Indian identity with a homogenous Hindu society, necessitating the extermination of Kashmiri populations The extensive deployment of the Indian military in Kashmir thus facilitates the forceful seizure of land and destruction of native Kashmiri livelihoods, furthering the Indian settler-colonial agenda.
SARAH D’SOUZA
Importantly, Indian military presence operates on a “hearts and minds” approach, beginning under Operation Sadbhavana, which aims to minimise physical violence exacted on the civil population (Nabi and Ye 2015). Yet, Kashmir remains the most militarised zone in the world (SBS News 2019). This begs the question of how the settler colonial praxis, particularly the extermination of the native, can be possible. As Nabi and Ye (2015) explore, India’s military presence in Kashmir operates to facilitate land grabs to be claimed under India’s sovereign territory. Beginning in 1947 and continuing well into the 21st century, Indian militarism in Kashmir has carried out land grabs under the guise of “national security”, enabling the establishment of colonial settlements on native Kashmiri land. Interestingly, these land grabs even include the residential regions abandoned by Kashmiri Pandits in their 1988 mass exodus, which suggests that the need to fulfil India’s colonial project trumps the apparent injustices faced by Hindus in the region India’s military presence in Kashmir aligns with the ‘state of permanent war’ utilised by settler colonies like the United States that inscribe militarism into the very livelihood of indigenous populations to uphold settler-colonial power structures and dispossess Indigenous peoples. Annexation of Indigenous lands and the establishment of militaristic administration exemplifies the forceful seizure of land which Wolfe (2016) stipulates to be characteristic of settler-colonial praxes. Ultimately, India's military presence and operations in Kashmir mirror the tactics historically employed by settler-colonial regimes to assert dominance over indigenous populations and expand into ‘rightfully Indian’ territory.
Demographic Engineering and Manipulation of the Legal System
India’s demographic engineering through which their settler colony is established in Kashmir is enabled by its manipulation of the legal system Feminist scholarship on colonialism and war emphasises the ways in which colonial projects are able to sustain control through the reorganisation of social structures. In doing so, states are able to manufacture consent and frame social and epistemological violence as intervention from a benevolent patriarch rather than a suppression and elimination of Indigenous realities. One way in which colonial powers are able to exact this control through non-physical violence is through the legitimation of legislative and judicial misconduct. Justifying colonial endeavours through misuse of law is not unique to India’s endeavours in Kashmir. Rather, it is a strategy that has been adopted since the advent of imperial praxes. Spain, in their conquest of Central and South America, established a system of jurisprudence for context, drawing on the European principle of ‘just war’ in order to enable and justify the violence exacted on native populations in order to establish colonial presence (Benton 2018). India, in their own practice of settler colonialism, draws instead on legislative misconduct in order to enable the Hindutva agenda and formalise a stripping of what little autonomy remained in the hands of the Kashmiri population. In August of 2019, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which gave special, semi-autonomous status to Kashmir through provisions like an independent constitution and internal administration structures, was nullified by Presidential Order. In abolishing Kashmir’s semiautonomy, Article 35A, which guaranteed exclusive land ownership rights to native Kashmiris, was also rendered redundant. In doing so, any semblance of Kashmiri autonomy was effectively quashed, facilitating an efficient and comprehensive denial of any rights to self-determination or opposition of India’s colonial endeavours.
Through the legal abrogation of Kashmir’s semi-autonomy, the Indian colonial project is thus able to execute demographic engineering in order to erase Kashmiri Indigeneity and perpetuate the narrative of Indian sovereignty. McGarry (1998) examines the displacement and movement of ethnic populations, be it coercive or forceful, as a means to deliberately engineer ethnic and cultural demographics within given territories. In doing so, states are able to carry out “ethnicisation” through governance by regimes that align with the dominant ethnic (and in India’s case, ethnoreligious) group. Those outside of these groups are “otherised” and become threats to national security and social cohesion. Here, India’s desire for ethnicisation is tied closely to nationalism and Hindutva ideology, with an aim to not only displace Muslim Kashmiris, but to also replace Indigenous populations with settler colonies Particularly, McGarry highlights that demographic engineering is most effective in regions where sovereignty is disputed, as it enables for greater disruption of Indigenous claims to autonomy. Such political and ideological endeavours are certainly not unique to India’s settler colonial project. Indeed, in response to criticism regarding the legal revocation of Kashmiri’s autonomy, India’s Consul General to the United States, Sandeep Chakravorty, asserted, “If the Israeli people can do it, we can also do it.” (Al Jazeera 2019). In explicitly drawing upon Israel’s contemporary settler colonial project and elimination of Indigenous Palestinians, which also draws upon religious ideology, Chakravorthy sheds light on the explicit intent of the Indian state to establish Hindu settlements in Kashmir at the cost of the destruction of Kashmiri livelihoods.
Conclusion
It is therefore clear that India has consistently maintained a setter-colonial form of governance over Kashmir. Indian-Hindu political elites have specifically pursued settler colonialism under the Hindutva ideology, disseminated through media control and exacted through militarism and judicial misconduct. These praxes ensure that Indigenous Kashmiri culture, specifically Kashmiri Muslim culture, slowly erodes, in order to ensure the homogeneity of the larger Indian nation. With this colonial project only intensifying under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi, the continued survival of the Kashmir region remains in doubt.
SARAH D’SOUZA
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FairisFoula FoulisFair: Liberalismin Practiceont
Croatia-Bosniaand HerzegovinaBorder
Living in an ostensibly ‘liberal’ society, it is challenging to dissect its mechanism and approach its core. That is, we get stuck in grandiose vista that liberalism ties around our eyes, forgetting to peak beneath the blindfold. In this essay, I argue that liberalism systems of governance and thought not only perpetuates but encourages inequality. In particular, the contradictions and fallacies of liberal universalism predicate active forms of racialized violence. That is, under a liberal structural framework, the process of ‘maintaining’ inequality is not passive but active: the hegemonic structures of the European state aim to displace and conceal violent acts such that they are ‘liberalised’ in spatial peripheries (Isajkee et al 2020).
This essay will focus on the experience of people attempting to cross the Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter ‘Croatia-Bosnia’) border into the European Union (‘EU’), a broad class of persons whose experiences are not well studied or documented in critical migration scholarship. Through this case study, I aim to interrogate the indicia and purposes of inequality through the framework of classical Rawlsian liberalism, in particular the fallacies stored at its very core.
The broader region surrounding the Croatia-Bosnia border is one where the practicalities of border enforcement has been ‘outsourced’ (Trakilović 2020), thus producing a fecund environ to engage in the examination of contemporary securitisation practices. Since the 2016 change in border controls, migrants who have attempted to make journeys into the EU – through Croatia –, have been met with physical violence and abuse from border forces inside the confines of the EU. While some scholars have argued that it is the more distant acts of violence which are the most destructive – the sinking of boats, the lack of critical and essential food and water supplies (Isakjee et al. 2020) – I argue that it is the physical manifestation of violence that is the most ‘illiberal’ – beatings, sexual violence, use of weapons (Border Violence Monitoring Network 2020)
A discussion such as this is vital since liberalism is said to be in crisis (Green 2016). Loosely taking Green’s argument (2016), I will argue that the liberalism-inequality relationship is ouroboros; that is, liberalism causes inequality, and inequality furthers liberalism. While such a dichotomy is in keeping with the existence of some levels of inequality to allow for the functioning of incentive-based class transitions (Rawls 1971), the legitimisation of active and violent methods to enforce these structures cannot be truly justified within any contemporary liberal system.
‘Inviolable rights’: the EU as a bastion of liberal thought
“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected, protected and constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights” (European Union 2019).
The inviolability of fundamental rights places liberal thought as a paragon of the modern age. In the seminal text ‘The End of History’, Fukuyama goes further, cementing liberalism and liberal thought as so universally viable and accessible that its practical conception marked the end of political history (1992): liberalism is the final evolution of natural human and political processes of individual and market freedoms
Green writes of liberalism as a product of – at least – four distinct and hermetic strands: political; religious; economic; and ethical (2016). That is, politically it allows for governance through liberal democracy where all citizens are free and equal. Religiously, it denies the ability for religion to play any major part in public civil affairs but allows the practicing of all faiths in the private sphere. Economically, it vehemently protects the paramountcy of private property and celebrates free market mechanisms. Ethically, it protects the sanctity of the individual and the state’s primary purpose to protect it, fostering self-realisation, freedom, and diversity.
Rawls and the ‘purpose’ of inequality
This analysis of the cornerstones of liberalism must be read in conjunction with the Rawlsian notion of liberal justice. Rawls understood justice and liberal thought as one protecting civil liberties and resolving the tensions that exist between freedom and equality found in critiques of the liberal state (1971). A Rawlsian understanding of liberal justice rests upon the manifestation of the ‘basic structure’; a just arrangement of the social and political institutions that make up a society (Rawls 1971). By this, Rawls provides both a positive and negative thesis.
Rawls’ negative thesis reads that an individual does not deserve to have inherited traits that give them some sort of social hierarchy over others – for example race, class, or gender (1971) Given that these traits are morally arbitrary, individuals are not entitled to further social benefits or institutional favour due to them.
The positive thesis is based on ‘equality-based reciprocity’ (Wenar 2021). That is, all goods should be equally distributed, unless some unequal distribution of these goods is to the advantage of all individuals in that society (Rawls 1971). Seeing that all individuals are equal under societal institutions, true ‘justice’ necessitates that inequalities benefit all citizens – in particular those who are the least advantaged.
In this way, liberal rights are universal and not predicated upon arbitrary or inherited social conditions such as race, gender, or class (Parekh 1992). These are the values that form the foundation of the EU’s liberal framework.
Given this, we must question whether liberalism has acted as a structural mechanism for the alleviation of racial inequality, or as an oppressive tool for the perpetuation of racialization and injustice. Is the violence on the border a concerning exception to modern liberal values, or does it represent an underlying, foundational flaw in the liberal system? Have these devastating levels of racial inequality been masked and camouflaged by a liberal credo of individualism, universalism, and equality?
Imagined considerations: understanding inequality through the migrant experience at the Croatia-Bosnia border
Interrogating the issue of border violence on the Croatia-Bosnia border (henceforth ‘the border’) involves the thorough interrogation of the dyad of racial and economic factors: that is, firstly, how is the racialized framework of liberalism weaponised to increase – not decrease – inequality in marginalised groups; and secondly, how does the inherently liberal economic interests of the EU shape border policies and securitisation, leading to inequality.
Under a Rawlsian interpretation of liberalism, violence may be justified where legitimate state authority takes action to protect the equality of a society (1971), yet Galtung argues that violence in liberal societies is not a by-product of unequal societal relations (1969). That is, in practice, state violence is not predicated on persevering equality, but instead perpetuating inequalities Galtung 1969). Understanding the scholarship of Galtung is key to interrogating the mechanisms that promote and legitimise structural forms of violence in cross-institutional contexts. That is, such violence should not be viewed as individual, hermetic circumstances, but instead as systemic harms perpetuated and carried through political, social, and economic institutions (Galtung 1969)
At the border, active forms of violence and extra-legal processes are used to perpetuate and encourage inequality. Displaced people attempting to pass through the border are consistently met
with violent ‘pushbacks’ and illegal expulsion to Bosnia and Serbia without the proper legal process for the administering of their asylum claims (Amnesty International 2019).
Isakjee et al. write of their experience doing fieldwork on and around the border, where they cite migrants with “bruises, wounds or bandages” as an everyday occurrence (2020). Tangible manifestations of this violence include sexual violence, beatings, electric shocks, and the use of knives, razors, and food deprivation (Border Violence Monitoring Network 2020).
Describing such acts as “unexamined liberalism”, Neu echoes Galtung’s sentiment that consideration must go beyond the specific, fragmentised acts of violence to the broader policy considerations in play (2018, p 22) As Isakjee comments, the propagation of violent pushbacks can be directly attributed to Croatia’s desire for Schengen membership (2020). Such an argument is supported by a Council of Europe report that linked the heightened use of violent modalities and border strengthening to “preparations to access the border- free Schengen area” (Council of Europe 2019, p. 3). Further, there was collective knowledge and appreciation of the violence occurring on the border, with some EU officials going as far as to praise the Croatian border force: the EU provided 150 million Euros in monetary support for border securitisation over this period (Council of Europe 2019, p. 26). In this way, these violent methodologies are not only institutionalised and structured (Ombudswoman for Human Rights 2019) but encouraged when they further liberal economic or political goals.
As Neu suggests, viewing the considerations of the system we note the paramount power that the economic system has over humanity: economic considerations vastly trump the need for ‘justice’ The Schengen area creates significant economic benefits to states involved in its system, imposing a greater and wider ambit of the liberal market. Such change benefits not only Croatia, but the wider European Union. This exemplifies the ways in which the collective political and economic interests of states outweigh the palpable human concerns of already disadvantaged and marginalised groups.
This shows that under liberalism, inequality is organised and actively perpetuated by the state and state-affiliated groups. While – as aforementioned –, some level of inequality which advantages the whole of society is reasonable (Rawls 1969), the modalities of inequality here are not constructive but destructive.
It is clear that this ‘liberalism’ is not “unexamined” (Neu 2018), but the situation and level of violence on the border is known Given this, we can understand inequality in a liberal society as being contingent on inherited and arbitrary cultural factors. Rawls’ theory of justice stresses that society must cater its benefits to those who are the least advantaged, yet the EU actively abdicates from their obligation and responsibility to uphold such principles.
Fragments of the mirror: implications of inequality for liberalism
Under a liberal analysis, inequality is contradictory. In this way we must reconcile the ‘liberal promise’ with the ‘liberal reality’.
This paradox of liberalism is not new: European thought has systemically discriminated against racialized groups while genuinely justifying and applying their liberal credo. While the roots of such action lie in Europe’s colonial past, in the post-colonial present, these structural inequalities between the European-state and colonised-peoples remain strikingly visible, evolving into institutionalised and systemised violence.
Mehta argues that this paradox is a flaw in-built into the very foundation of liberal thought: the ‘universalising’ and ‘liberalising’ principle of liberalism is inherently dismissive and antagonistic towards the ‘other’ (1999), assuming the dominance and acceptance of ‘European’ thought. In this way, the very bounds of liberal thought are twisted and warped when it comes to the treatment of racialised and marginalised groups.
The compartmentalisation of these active modes of violence to spatial peripheries – such as the Croatia-Bosnia border – uphold liberalism’s façade as conforming to its promises. This illuminates the performative nature of contemporary liberal thought when it comes to dealing with issues of inequality
Such a discussion of inequality is particularly crucial at the present time as some scholars posit that liberalism is itself in crisis due to inequality (Green 2016). That is, the ‘positive’ mechanisms of liberalised inequality are quickly disappearing. As Rawls argues, inequality should exist within a ‘just’ society (1971). That is, to the extent that inequality exists at all, it exists to benefit all those present in the system: it provides equal opportunities and fair treatment. Yet in practice, we see that this is not the case. Under the case study, we see that inequality and the way it is practiced in liberal societies is not universal, but targeted. We see this inequality is direct, active and perpetuates existing structures of marginalisation. It does not, as Rawls argue it should, exist such that it especially benefits those who are most disadvantaged (1971). Indeed, a Rawlsian approach would condemn the use of extra-legal processes as this violates and obstructs the functioning of a ‘just’ rule of law.
Interrogating the state of the Croatia-Bosnia border exemplifies the ways in which states and collective organisations can use liberal principles to justify violent practices where it creates greater political and economic incentives for those classes of people in positions of institutional beneficence. We see that inequality is not static, but an active process which the state participates in, using its hegemony to liberalise and conceal violent acts that maintain historic and pre-existing power dynamics.
That is understanding inequality through a liberal framework is key to mitigating liberalism’s ogic.
AIDEN CARTER
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TheFallaciesofa Sino-American
The ever-intensifying US-China relationship has raised concerns that a military conflict is inevitable between the two powers. However, such concerns misrepresent the true relative power capabilities between the US and China, overlooking nuances in China’s revisionist policies. Applying Power Transition Theory (‘PTT’), this paper will argue that the US-China great power struggle will not lead to an inevitable armed conflict for hegemony, though tensions will continue between the two. Power in this sense is conceptualised as the capacity to influence the behaviour and policies of other states, which stems from converting “resources into capabilities” (Marcella in Bartholomees 2004). While ‘hard’ power substantially characterises US-China tensions, ‘soft’ power is also central in their efforts to grow power through diplomatic influence. The two forms of power are combined in Nye’s concept of ‘smart power,’ which reinforces the importance of a strong military yet highlights the need for “alliances, partnerships, and institutions” as tools to consolidate influence and legitimacy (Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2007: 7). P a o l o S a n J o s e
Through this understanding of power, the willingness and capacity for China to participate in a hot war against the US is questionable. While China’s post-Mao economic and technological development has challenged the US’s economic trade policies in the Indo-Pacific (Ross 2021: 64) and their well-established strategic primacy (Mearsheimer 2010: 381), China lacks the hard and soft power resources necessary to pursue a hegemonic conflict with the US. After discussing the analytical framework of PTT, this paper will first examine how conventional applications of PTT have been used to predict the inevitability of a US-China war. Next, the nature of China’s satisfaction with the current US-led system will be examined. Subsequently, the questionable power parity between the US and China, and the role of their respective alliances in underpinning this, will be examined Such factors point away from the certainty of an armed hegemonic war
PTT provides an effective theoretical framework to examine the possibility of a US-China war. Formulated by Organski, PTT states how rising powers dissatisfied with the current status quo seek to overthrow the existing hegemon through conflict (Organski 1968). The theory posits that power fluctuates between states due to varying rates of industrial development. PTT thus asserts that power disparity between the weaker ‘challenger state’ and the stronger hegemon sustains a peaceful and stable system, as power parity induces the challenger state to pursue aggression to facilitate a hegemonic transition (Sample 2018: 1906). Contrary to realism, PTT argues that the international system is hierarchical rather than anarchical (Ibid), and the challenger state’s dissatisfaction with this system increases the likelihood of the occurrence of conflict. The existing hegemon thus maintains their dominance by inducing satisfaction rather than fear (Tammen, Kugler and Lemke 2017: n p ) through both soft and hard power strategies Interpretations of China’s rise as a threat to US unipolarity is comparable to the historical analogies that underpin PTT. The theory thus provides a suitable analytical framework, as US-China tensions are largely centred on a zero-sum understanding of power which fuels Western concerns surrounding China’s potentially hegemonic intent. While PTT is criticised for being based on Eurocentric analogies and thus overexaggerates the militaristic aims of the challenger state (Peters et. al. 2022: 1504), such criticisms overlook the element of satisfaction and a realistic consideration of power disparities in applying PTT to predict that a war would be unlikely (Jeffrey 2009: 312). Hence, by foregrounding the position and relative power capabilities of the revisionist state, PTT can be utilised to analyse the capacity of ‘challenger states’ such as China to facilitate hegemonic warfare.
Traditional applications of PTT argue that the trajectory of US-China tensions will inevitably result in conflict. Beijing has often interpreted Washington’s policies in the Indo-Pacific as hostile acts against China (Lim 2015: 296). According to Liu (2021), hegemonic order can be weakened through three approaches, all of which China has adopted – consolidating the military, providing competing public goods to state actors, and ‘de-legitimising’ the hegemony. While Lim (2015) argues that China’s unprecedented military development is the clearest indication of their dissatisfaction of the US-led system, several scholars note China’s attempts to de-legitimise US hegemony as equally illustrative. Loke (2021: 1225) notes how Chinese President Xi Jinping has increasingly offered alternatives to the US ‘rules-based’ order, such as suggesting a more neutral order founded on the rules of the United Nations charter at the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly (Liu 2021: 272) Ross (2021) also observes how China’s aggressive maritime policies have sought to undermine US naval dominance in the Indo-Pacific, as demonstrated by China’s rejection of Philippine territorial claims in the South China Sea –areas where US military presence is prominent (Ibid: 65). Such aspects of China’s revisionist behaviour is often interpreted as precursors of an inevitable attempt by China
to subvert the current balance of power through war. Medeiros (2019) argues that the US’s practical engagement with China, especially demonstrated in the 1970s, had faded as evidenced through US responses to China’s behaviour. For instance, alongside blocking Huawei technologies and expanding tariffs on Chinese exports, the Trump administration increased military spending in the Indo-Pacific and developed greater port access for the US Navy in East Asia and the Indian Ocean in clear attempts to sustain a power disparity with China (Ross 2021: 65). Medeiros therefore concludes that intensifying power competition between the US and China, in drawing more actors, heightens the risk of conflict (2019: 113). Thus, conventional applications of PTT argue for the inevitability of a US-China war
However, a closer examination of the level of China’s dissatisfaction raises doubts over their willingness to pursue a militaristic war against the US. The above application of PTT ignores important nuances in China’s revisionist intent. In reality, a PTT analysis demonstrates that China’s dissatisfaction is insufficient to constitute a genuine willingness to engage in a hegemonic war. In applying PTT, Kim and Gates (2021: 22) states that as long as China is satisfied with the status quo, war is less likely even if China’s power becomes equal to the US. Considering this, China is not seeking to subvert the current world order as a wholly dissatisfied power, but, as Nye (2020) asserts, is instead seeking to expand their influence within it. As China depended on the US-led international order to provide the stability required for their internal development (Buzan 2010: 22), Qin argues that China practically and ideationally accepts current rules (Qin in Buzan 2010: 16) The current international order is one that is “more difficult to overturn and more straightforward to join” than previous Eurocentric orders (Ikenberry in Jeffery 2009: 316), and one within which China rose. While China is indeed ideologically averse to the US-led liberal international order, the pragmatic benefits arising from the current system renders their dissatisfaction insufficient to engender an inevitable war. China’s acceptance and version of market-based state capitalism has underpinned their unprecedented economic and industrial growth, and as Organski held industrialisation as the ‘driving engine’ of international politics (Sample 2018: 1931), such a system would not be beneficial to undermine through a war with the US. Hence, by applying PTT to examine China’s relative dissatisfaction, it is likely that China will continue to operate within the rules of the current order to further its internal development. In this respect, war does not remain inevitable. Moreover, China has yet to achieve true power parity with the US, further decreasing the likelihood of an inevitable war Since PTT holds that power parity facilitates hegemonic warfare, the shortening gap of relative hard power capabilities between China and the US is often used to substantiate an inevitable conflict. Indeed, China has seen rapid development of its hard power resources as it transitioned from an internal to an external balancing policy (Liu 2023). Nonetheless, according to Organski, the challenger state must be at least 80% as powerful as the dominant state in order for a hegemonic overthrow to be feasible (Organski and Kugler in Jeffery 2009: 314). Hence, as Kim & Gates (2015) explains, Organski was unwilling to predict a great power war between China and the US. While the power disparity between the US and China has indeed lessened after Organski first conceptualised PTT, China’s hard power capabilities are holistically inferior to the US. While economically the two powers are on par in terms of purchasing power parity (Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2022: n p ), China lacks the military, economic and technological capabilities to match and rival US hegemony (Becky, Brooks and Wohlforth in Loke 2021: 1216) Considering this, Allison (2015: n.p.) argues that the US’s explicit efforts to rebalance and hedge against China will only exacerbate tensions to the extent of war if China’s rise poses a genuine risk to their hegemony of ‘Thucydidean proportions.’ In illustrating how the
dominance of the US as the pole hegemon is embedded within regional hierarchies, Loke (2021: 1216) explains that China, as a ‘secondary’ regional hegemon, lacks necessary levels of hegemonic capacity and intent. China’s aforementioned industrialisation under the current US-led system prescribes a ‘subordinate power’ status, which is likely to endure due to China’s need to further industrial growth without the cost of an armed conflict (Kim & Gates 2015). However, it remains important for the US to avoid underestimating China’s hard power since China has gained substantial capacities to project force beyond East Asia and into the wider Indo-Pacific (deLisle 2020: 176). China’s 2022 security pact with the Solomon Islands is a testament to this, which allows China’s navy to replenish resources in the nation and establish a growing military presence in the US-led Pacific Islands (Harding 2022: n p ) Nonetheless, reflected by the fact that a Pacific-wide security pact was abandoned due to objections from several states (Smith and Tillett 2022: n.p.), China’s hard power capabilities remains limited to a regional threat, and has yet to be global in scope similar to the US. Hence, in accordance with PTT, the continuing power disparity between China and the US means stability in the US-led system is likely to endure.
Furthermore, differences between the respective powers’ alliance systems have underpinned this power disparity, further diminishing the inevitability of warfare. Middlepower states provide valuable external aid for a great power’s balancing resources and competition management (Liu 2023), and thus substantially influences balance of power politics. The ways in which great powers align themselves with other states in a specific system can thus determine patterns of great power interactions (Ibid: 266) While China has built extensive diplomatic coalitions in the Indo-Pacific through projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (‘BRI’), their overall power and reliability is questionable. Zhao (2022: 179) states how China has fewer allies with the same global influence as the US, noting how the 53 states who supported Beijing’s Hong Kong national security law in the United Nations Human Rights Council only comprise 4% of the global GDP. Zhao further notes how China’s threat levels as a regional power (Ibid: 274) and its aggressive behaviour in territorial and maritime disputes (ibid: 275) threatens the durability of its alliances. This undermines the practicality of a potential hegemonic war for the Chinese side, as its alliances differ in character to that of the US. In comparing the US-China hedging strategies of three small-middle power states, Campbell (2023) concludes that states tend to rely on China for economic concerns such as trade, while the US is relied upon for strong security ties Thus, because harder forms of power lie at the centre the US alliance system as opposed to China, the US bears stronger militaristic capabilities through its alliances in the event of a hegemonic war, making conflict infeasible for China. Furthermore, while both powers have attempted to build opposing alliance systems (Zhao 2023: 184), they have instead created coalitions with overlapping states. Liu (2023: 277) observes how various BRI states have also participated in negotiations under the Biden-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. As Liu argues, this means that US-China tensions are not heading towards two competing camps, but rather overlapping groupings, creating a ‘bipolar Asia devoid of polarisation’ (He et. al. 2021: 267 in Liu 2023: 267). While engendering intense power competition, differences in the U.S. and China’s alliance systems further reinforce the power disparity between the two and thus, as per PTT, the possibility of an inevitable war remains low.
Conclusively, the US-China great power struggle will not result in an inevitable war While a conventional application of PTT would argue otherwise, such an application ignores important nuances in Beijing’s perspective of a US-led world order and the true nature of its relative power capabilities. China’s level of dissatisfaction has not reached a level
necessary to fuel a serious pursuance of a hegemonic war. Moreover, despite China’s unprecedented smart power growth in the past decade, China has yet to reach necessary levels of power parity with the US, which, as per PTT, will ensure stability under the current system for the foreseeable future. Weaknesses in China’s alliance system compared to that of the US perpetuates this power disparity. Hence, an examination of Sino-American tensions foregrounds the difficulties of revisionist powers to fully realise their hegemonic capabilities against Western hegemony. For now, an inevitable militaristic Sino-American war remains a fallacy.
Bibliography
Allison, G. (2015) ‘The Thucydides trap: are the US and China headed for war?’, The Atlantic 24(9).
Buzan, B. (2010) ‘China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?,’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2010(3): 5-36
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deLisle, J (2020) ‘Foreign Policy through Other Means: Hard Power, Soft Power, and China's Turn to Political Warfare to Influence the United States’, Orbis 64(2): 174-206.
Harding, B and Pohle, C (2022) China’s Search for a Permanent Military Presence in the Pacific Islands, available at https://www usip org/publications/2022/07/chinas-search-permanent-military-presence-pacificislands#:~:text=The%20pact%20grants%20permission%20for,that%20it%20is%20a%20base [accessed 8 November 2023].
Jeffery, R (2009) ‘Evaluating the ‘China threat’: power transition theory, the successor-state image and the dangers of historical analogies’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 63(2): 309-324.
Kim, W and S Gates (2015) ‘Power transition theory and the rise of China’, International Area Studies Review 18(3): 219226
Lim, Y. (2015) ‘How (Dis)Satisfied is China? A power transition theory perspective’, Journal of Contemporary China 24(92): 280-297
Liu, F. (2023) ‘Balance of power, balance of alignment, and China’s role in the regional order transition’, The Pacific Review 36(2): 261-283.
Loke, B (2021) ‘The United States, China, and the politics of hegemonic ordering in East Asia’, International Studies Review 23(4): 1208–1229.
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Organski, A.F.K. (1968) World Politics, New York: Knopf.
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AmaniAjaje
Fallaciesoffreedom: Rousseauandthe SocialContract
Manisbornfreebutinchainseverywhere.
The opening line to Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract represents what he believed to be a plague on the ‘natural goodness’ of man. Rousseau believed in the state of nature; man was free, both politically and from the exerted control of biological needs and forces It is this freedom which differentiates man from other beings However, society places ‘chains’ upon man, preventing the true realisation of their freedoms, compelling man, without consent, to perform acts out of fear of
punishment, some of which he views as unjust. No man would consent to be bound by laws perceived in this manner, and as such, without consent, Rousseau believes the constraints lack legitimacy.
Rousseau addresses this issue with his metaphysical principle of the ‘general will’ which is best understood as the collective interest or common good of the community, as opposed to the culmination of specific wills of individuals or factions.
e contract sees individuals, by their own consent, relinquish ecific individual liberties to the communal in return for the otection of their remaining rights and the maintenance of social bility. In this way, civil liberty is superior to natural liberty. This eoretical framework defines the essence of legitimate political thority; Rousseau argues that a just society is one in which the neral will is the guiding principle in the formation of laws and licies. Rousseau claims that the general will is the source of vereignty and is the guiding principle in the formation of law. e general will decides the laws which people are bound by as posed to the power lying with coercive lawmakers. The nction of government, an impartial, non-citizen ‘lawgiver’, is to e force to the general will. Through mutual agreement to abide laws that they themselves establish, they ensure their own edom because the origin of these laws lies in their own will, her than being dictated by an external authority.
knowledging the dynamic essence of the general will, usseau suggests that the sovereign should convene periodic semblies to assess its present condition. Individuals are pected to vote not based on personal interests but rather cording to their understanding of the general will. This is tinguishable from democracy where power is given to a select w to represent the whole.
Rousseau's conception contains an inherent flaw in its interpretation of freedom, particularly evident in his assertion that ‘whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body, which means nothing other than he shall be forced to be free’. This statement highlights a contradiction within Rousseau's framework: the notion that freedom can be attained through coercion By insisting that individuals must be compelled to adhere to the general will, Rousseau paradoxically undermines the very concept of liberty. Instead of fostering genuine autonomy and self-determination, his theory implies a form of freedom that is imposed externally, negating the essence of true liberty. This contradiction raises questions about the feasibility and desirability of Rousseau's vision of political authorityandthegeneralwill.Itsuggeststhathisconceptionmayfailtofullyreconcile the tension between individual autonomy and collective governance, ultimately limitingitseffectivenessasabasisforajustsociety.
Suppose one individual’s will differs from that of the general will’s; can they, by Rousseau’s understanding of consent in governance, said to be consenting? If law requires consent to be legitimate, does it then lose its legitimacy? It would seem inconsistent with Rousseau’s theory that laws can be legitimate if individuals are coerced into compliance out of fear of punishment. Rousseau's framework struggles to address this question. According to his theory, individuals must abide by the general will, even if it contradicts their personal preferences. This tends to resemble the very system which Rousseau began to critique.
Furthermore, Rousseau’s emphasis on the collective interest of the general will risks neglecting the rights of minority groups or dissenting individuals If the majority determines the general will, what safeguards are in place to protect the rights of minorities? Without mechanisms to ensure the inclusion of diverse perspectives and protect against tyranny of the majority, Rousseau’s framework may lead to the suppression of dissenting voices and the marginalisation of minority interests.
Further, the endeavour to define a universally applicable and accepted concept of an ‘actor’, such as the reasonable person, has long suffered critique for its rather limited and subjective view despite purporting to be a ‘general’ view. The feminist critique of the reasonable person highlights its roots in patriarchal norms and assumptions, prioritising traditionally masculine traits and perspectives, thereby marginalising women’s experiences and reinforcing gender-based inequalities (Parker). In this way, the reasonable person does not necessarily represent a general actor, but is rather a construct reflective of its constructors who tended to be white males Rousseau’s ‘general will’ risks suffering the same fate, particularly given he ‘envisages those citizens [who form the general will] as exclusively male’ (Bertram 2020).
Ultimately, Rousseau’s social contract, while deeply influential and worthy of consideration, is greatly weakened by its inability to reconcile individual autonomy with collective governance, leaving critical gaps in the pursuit of a truly just society.
Bibliography
Bertram, C 2020, Jean Jacques Rousseau, in EN Zalta (ed ), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2020, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/#:~:text=Rousseau's%20commitment%20to%20the%20freedom, determination%20of%20the%20general%20will v
Parker, W n.d., The reasonable person a gendered concept? https://www6.austlii.edu.au/nz/journals/VUWLawRw/1993/28.pdf
Impactsof Colonialismon Hinduism
British colonialism has played a key role in shifting perceptions of Hinduism through imposing rigid Judaeo-Christian models on what was pre-colonially an open-ended philosophy and way of life. However, it is imperative to recognise the role of Indian figures within and outside of colonial structures in constructing modern Hinduism. This is in the context of a continuing assumption in colonial studies that the colonised were passive subjects to the all-pervasive efforts of colonisers. Such an assumption diminishes the agency of indigenous groups, resulting in a one-sided perspective on the nature of colonisation. Considering this, this essay first provides a brief history of pre-colonial Hinduism to enable analysis of how this contrasts from Western conceptions of religion.
Second, the agency of Hindu reformers is highlighted to challenge assumptions regarding their passivity to British rule. Finally, a brief account of contemporary Hindu nationalism and its inherent relation to colonialism is provided to highlight how religion has become a key feature of contemporary India. S r u t h i S i v a k u m a r
Colonialism is defined as the structures imposed by a colonial power over an indigenous population to exert territorial, political, and cultural control over them (McLean and McMillan 2009: n.p.). The term also encompasses a racial superiority over the colonised group, and an impetus to ‘civilise’ them.
Pre-Colonial Hinduism
Until colonisation in 1858, Hinduism was not a religion. The term ‘Hindu’ was originally used by Persians in the 15th–16th century to differentiate between native Indians and migrants (King 1999: 162) There was no religious connotation to the term, highlighted in how there were Hindu Christians and Hindu Muslims in India (King 1999: 163). It was the presence of British colonists from the 1600s that sparked the use of the term as an explanatory concept to differentiate Indian spirituality from Islam and Christianity.
In reality, classification as a monolithic entity is inconsistent with Hindu practice. Pre-colonially, Indian spirituality constituted philosophical discourse surrounding tenants of morality (Ranganathan 2022: 893). This centred around questions of dharma (right or good), metaphysics, and logic. Dissenting positions and discussions were vital to Hinduism, seen in how belief systems like Buddhism and Jainism were understood as dissenting positions on dharma (Ranganathan 2022: 894). Moreover, Hinduism has no single founder, no universal teachings, and no single sacred text (Leach 2014: 15) Rather, the South Asian region encompassed a diverse range of beliefs, languages, customs, myths, and laws Hindus could be atheist, monotheistic, or polytheistic (Van Niekerk 2020: 5) These features are incongruous with the Judaeo-Christian model, since religion itself is a conception of the West. Thus, Hinduism was not a religion before colonialism.
Role of Colonialism
British colonialism in India was an extractive exercise of power beginning in 1858, though its origins began earlier in 1600 during the occupation of the East India Company. From this time, colonial powers sought to classify and categorise aspects of Indian life in order to impose Western values. In practice, this meant domination over politics, media, and education (King 1999: 166). Considering this compartmentalisation, the British were unable to make sense of the diverse belief systems and spirituality of Indians Hence, in an effort to homogenise the sub-continent, the British defined Hinduism as a religion as early as 1817 (King 1999: 155)
A key aspect of this classification involved efforts to textualise the Hindu belief system. Given its dynamic nature, regional beliefs and customs were largely passed down orally. However, the Western commitment to language as a medium for cultural expression, the Protestant model of Bible-centric religion, and the textualised education system, led to an impetus to find a central Hindu text. Outside of this general inclination, some colonial scholars like William Jones claimed a textualised India was necessary since Indians were “unreliable interpreters of their own laws,” and there was a need to “purify Indian culture” (Jones in King 1999: 155). This process occurred partly through direct translations of sacred texts from Sanskrit to English by members of the East India Company (Sweetman 2004: 13). Notably, the British perceived the Vedanta – scriptures from the Vedic period centring around the pursuit of knowledge – as the central text of Hinduism As Sweetman (2004: 13) argues, this is reflective of the Vedanta’s conservative views since the British believed that placing it as central to Hinduism would reinforce false perceptions surrounding Hinduism’s focus on myths rather than philosophy (Sweetman 2004: 13). This demonstrates how colonialism shaped perceptions of Hinduism.
Ultimately, this categorisation was used as a political tool to compartmentalise colonial influence on politics and social life away from indigenous moral philosophy. A key implication of this was how Hinduism gradually moved away from being perceived as an open-ended philosophy which actively encouraged free thinking to a static institution based on rituals (Ranganathan 2022: 910). Systems of law and politics which were founded in custom were deemed religious beliefs, and thus not tenable as a basis for legal and political life. This enabled Western figures to deem Hindu religion as an irrational practice focused solely on tradition and therefore irrelevant to the workings of modern political structures (Ranganathan 2022: 894). As a result, Western traditions became viewed as a rational platform necessary for economic and political functions to succeed (Ranganathan 2022: 894) For example, the exaggeration of regional religious honours that were not universal to Hinduism, such as the carak pūjā - a uniquely Bengali tradition where metal hooks were implanted into the flesh of participants who swung from a metal pole in worship of Lord Shiva) (Pennington 2005: 150), furthered the racist view of Indians as irrational subjects needing civilisation (Sweetman 2004: 14). Colonialism thus played an active role in the construction of Hinduism as a religion.
Hindu Reformers
While colonialism was a significant driver for reform in this period, it is important not to overstate its influence. To do so would be to diminish the role of Indian reformers in the changing perception of Hinduism and reinforce narratives of native passivity In the discipline of Politics and International Relations, these one-sided stories continue to be told For example, Van Niekerk (2020: 2) described the development of modern Hinduism as a consequence of “uncritical acceptance of all things Western”. Similarly, Dirks (1992: 61) argues that “colonialism seems to have created much of what is now accepted as Indian tradition”. Such assertions are not only factually incorrect but propagate ideas of Indian passivity in the colonial era. In reality, Indian communities exerted influence on modern Hinduism in many ways.
Some Hindu elites, who were concerned with the decline from traditional practices, desired a reinforcement of traditional ideals (Sweetman 2004). Considering this, some Hindu figures used their agency to bring their own interests into the construction of the religion rather than resist the imposition of Western models. While some of these figures were British educated, meaning they carried implicit biases towards colonial political models, their indigenous agency remains important given their commitment to propagating Hinduism and challenging colonial perceptions of its inferiority
A key example of this is the role of Swami Vivekananda. Vivekananda emphasised scriptural authority and the conception of Hinduism as a unified entity in order to bring Hinduism into the pantheon of world religions (Weiss 2019). He endeavoured to propagate a universal view of Hinduism, epitomised in his poignant introduction at the 1893 Parliament of World Religions, “sisters and brothers of America” (Van Niekerk 2020). This strategically aimed to represent the unity and oneness of Hinduism, broadening it from a set of beliefs geographically linked to India to a universally applicable religion (Van Niekerk 2020). Moreover, he propagated the Vedanta as a foundational text, alongside colonial scholars (Van Niekerk 2020). This demonstrates how the imperatives of Indian leaders to gain global recognition of Hinduism placed it within a JudeoChristian model of religion, and contributed to its perception as a homogenous institution Hence, through employing Western models and ideas, Hindu figures pursued their own imperatives to reform Hinduism and shape perceptions of its universality.
Non-Reform Hindus
It is equally important to recognise the role of Hindu figures who were lived on the “margins” of colonialism in shaping modern Hinduism (Weiss 2019). It is important to give regard to such ffigures in order to avoid narratives that religious reform was solely reactionary to Western ideas. Failing to address this reinforces false distinctions between Western modernity and Indian tradition, propagating the idea that Hinduism was a static and traditional institution which required the help of innovative colonisers to evolve (Weiss 2019)
For example, Ramalinga was a Tamil Saiva leader (proponent of Lord Shiva) who was relatively isolated from colonial authority in Tamil Nadu in the late 1800s, but nevertheless modernised Hinduism to address emerging contemporary challenges (Weiss 2010). Ramalinga, who was not British-educated, did not live in a cosmopolitan colonial city but rather taught in the village of Vadalur (Weiss 2019). His Hindu teachings involved embracing new technology, protesting caste hierarchies, encouraging community affiliation, and ritualising charitable outreach (Weiss 2019). As Weiss (2019) observes, his efforts centred around addressing poverty and social inequality, reflecting how he viewed religion as a social enterprise and way of life. For example, his ideology of cīvakāruṇyam (compassion) heavily influenced the caste critiques of other Tamil scholars throughout the 19th century (Raman 2022). Another way in which his teachings departed from that of reform Hindus was his resistance of hegemonic religious norms, with even the most radical interpretation of his ideas endorsing secularism (Raman 2022) This demonstrates how Ramalinga’s non-reactionary teachings on Hinduism can only be described as a modern approach given his focus on emerging contemporary social issues. It also reflects how, despite colonial representations, Hinduism continued to encompass diverse beliefs and values. Hence, perceptions and practices of modern Hinduism did not solely evolve in reaction to colonialism.
Hindu Nationalism
Another key factor in how colonialism shaped perceptions of Hinduism was the emergence of anticolonial nationalism, which, ironically, employed Western conceptions of religion to foster national unity and homogeneity. Indian nationalism originated in colonial India in parallel to Hinduism (Manjari 2019: 203), and therefore shaped many of Hinduism’s characteristics. While religious homogenisation initially occurred as a consequence of colonialism and the interests of Hindu elites, it was mimicked by Indian leaders as a basis for anti-colonial resistance movements (King 1999: 150). Many Indian leaders believed that Hinduism was central to Indian nationalism since it could become a foundation for national unity within a country of diverse languages and cultures (Paranjape 2012: 155). This was for two reasons. Firstly, to gain independence from the British, the state would have to demonstrate cohesion and cultural strength to garner support from all Indians in efforts for independence Secondly, to establish their nationhood to the rest of the world, nationalist leaders sought Western validation of Hinduism as a world religion
Vivekanada served as a key religious leader who propagated Hindu nationalist rhetoric. His efforts to change the image of Hinduism to the West is fundamentally linked to the beginnings of Indian nationalism. As discussed, Vivekananda emphasised the Vedanta as a textual basis for Hinduism to establish the rationality of Hinduism and challenge stereotypes of superstitious rituals (Hatcher 2007: 303). Notably, in rejecting Western political models which were isolated from spiritual life, he rejected the secularisation of political life, an ideology which continues to play a role in Hindu nationalism. This demonstrates how the propagation of nationalistic rhetoric played a role in the construction of Hinduism, shaping its perceptions as a homogenous institution.
Considering the role of figures like Vivekananda, it becomes clear that Western models of religion and nationhood were used to unite Indians. Colonial structures ironically shaped anti-colonial efforts, and consequently, Hinduism was placed at the centre of those efforts. Hence, colonialism shaped the perception of Hinduism as central to Indian national identity.
Hindu Nationalism Today
Ultimately, analysing the construction of Hinduism as a religion helps to understand how India functions today on a foundation of colonial models
As theorised by Rao (2021: 345), growing Hindu-centred supremacist ideology is a reaction to the social trauma caused by colonialism. Colonists instilled inferiority into every public and private sphere, including religion, in order to justify their pervasive control. Accordingly, the presence of a strong paternalistic government who could prevent social disorder was also impressed upon Indians (Rao 2021: 356). Consequently, Indians became susceptible to fundamentalist ideology in fear of social collapse and threats to group belonging (Rao 2021: 356). This accounts for the continuing desire to pursue a cohesive and homogenous identity and destroy any potential threats to this. Hindu nationalism and its perception as the epitome of Indian identity is largely a consequence of the colonial hierarchy impressed on Indians by colonists.
Conclusion
Therefore, to a great extent, colonisation shaped perceptions of Hinduism as a homogenous religion. Through the role of Western scholars and leaders, Western expectations of religion were enforced upon the diverse pre-colonial belief systems. However, the agency exercised by Indian leaders like Swami Vivekananda and Ramalinga in shaping modern practices and customs during this reformation period cannot be overlooked The convergence of Indian and Western ideas is evident in anti-colonial resistance movements, where nationalist leaders reinforced colonial models of religion to unite Indians. Understanding this causal connection between British colonialism and contemporary Hinduism is necessary in recognising how colonialism did not end in 1947 when India gained independence. Beyond explicit structural changes, the implicit societal models imposed by the British has entrenched colonial models into core aspects of society, whether this was intended by colonists or not. As such, it is necessary in efforts of decolonisation to understand how these biases have shaped our understandings of religion. While decolonisation occurs on a large structural scale, it is also a process we can observe through actively addressing our prejudices and the ways in which we position ourselves in relation to society.
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I. Introduction
Societies have struggled with inequality for decades; however, the current trajectory of climate change threatens to exacerbate inequality to unprecedented levels. Global warming has already reached about 1.2 degrees (UN 2023), and despite the solidity of the scientific consensus, this problem has worsened. By examining the intersection of climate change and inequality, a vicious cycle is revealed: initial inequality causes disadvantaged groups to suffer disproportionately from climate change, which subsequently increases inequality This cycle also makes it more difficult to cope and recover from damages, perpetuating the effects of climate inequality This essay will examine how climate change causes difficulties in accessing basic resources such as shelter and water, leading to inequality. The essay will then turn to potential solutions to address climate change and inequality. In doing so, nationwide policy solutions to reduce emissions and inequality will be examined; namely Degrowth and the Green New Deal (‘GND’). Then, to consider international approaches addressing inequality, the Green Climate Fund (‘GCF’) will be examined.
II. How climate change causes inequality
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (‘IPCC’) has identified a direct correlation between climate change and the exacerbation of existing inequalities (IPCC 2014: 796) The IPCC has highlighted that the climate crisis profoundly impacts all aspects of life. However, the initial impact on basic essentials will have the greatest impact on inequality, as it will strip already marginalised communities of essentials, worsening inequalities. Article 25 of the UNDHR identifies that everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for health and wellbeing, including shelter and water. This essay will explore how climate change causes inequality by destabilising access to necessities through displacement and water insecurity.
A. Displacement
Climate change has already caused significant disruptions to lives, causing migration and displacement as homes become uninhabitable or destroyed by natural disasters. This leads to inequalities as migrants often leave everything behind and consequently struggle to access education, employment, and basic health services The current 1 2 degrees of warming have already displaced over 100 million people globally (Celegon 2022). This record is exacerbated by severe weather-related disasters which have tripled over the past four decades, now resulting in approximately 21 million people displaced annually (Displacement Monitoring Centre 2022). Tragically, this number is predicted to surge with an estimated 1.2 billion people likely to be displaced by 2050 due to climate change (Institute for Economics & Peace 2020). Coastal areas are particularly vulnerable because of rising sea levels: the populations in these high risk areas have increased from 160 million to 260 million people over the past 30 years. A significant number of these people live in developing regions (Neumann et al. 2015), which are already struggling to provide basic necessities, stability and employment, let alone mitigating the risk of rising sea levels (Institute for Economics & Peace 2020). The foundational inequality of these nations means they cannot mitigate the effects of global warming, exacerbating the inequality Bangladesh is an example of this; 20% of the population already live under the poverty line and the UN predicts that 17% of the territory will be submerged by 2050, displacing about 20 million people Displaced individuals in Bangladesh and other nations often relocate to urban or peri-urban areas where infrastructure and services are already under strain. The sudden population increase in these areas can lead to overcrowded living conditions, inadequate sanitation, and limited access to health and educational services. These conditions hinder the ability of displaced persons to improve their circumstances and integrate economically and socially into new communities, thereby perpetuating
cycles of poverty and inequality (Islam & Winkel 2017).
B. Water insecurity
The impact of climate change on water security further illustrates how climate change causes socioeconomic inequalities. About two-thirds of the global population already face severe water scarcity for at least one month each year (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016). This exposure is expected to increase with climate change. For example, the number of people exposed to droughts could rise between 9 and 17 % by 2030 in scenarios where emissions are not reduced (Winsemius, et al. 2015). Rural areas where poverty is more concentrated are particularly vulnerable, experiencing greater drought exposure and subsequent health risks from contaminated water during floods (Hallegatte et al 2016) Besides the evident health impacts, the socioeconomic impacts are severe In the short term, vulnerable populations face losses in productivity, employment and income. Over time, these challenges contribute to the loss of human capital, for example development of chronic conditions such as stunting and higher mortality (Zivin and Neidell 2014). According to Hallegatte et al. (2016: 56), the poorest households in the developing world spend 40-60% of their income on food and beverages, compared to less than 25% of wealthier households. The urban poor are thus particularly hard hit by rising food prices, exacerbating the inequality (Hallegatte et al. 2016). Given the profound effects of climate change on fundamental human needs, robust solutions must be considered.
III. How do we address it?
Over many decades, efforts have been made to overcome inequality The UN rightly claims that significant progress has been made in poverty reduction, hunger, childbirth and other areas (UN 2022). However, a real breakthrough in inequality has not been achieved as the inequality index continues to rise (Ibid). Whilst climate change is a threat to humankind, it is also an unprecedented opportunity to advance equality. This is because the Global North is forced to cooperate with the Global South on fundamental ecological, political, social and economic issues. For example, cooperation is needed because large countries like Brazil, Congo and Indonesia contain vital rainforests which are important to preserve as carbon sinks for water storage, filtering, and ensuring biodiversity. Other countries have the capacity to produce renewable energy due to their exposure to the sun.
Many argue that the Global North must make the most drastic changes, not just because of its financial capability but also as a consequence of its historic culpability (Tan 2023: 827) Nations in the Global North have consumed more than 3 times their share of emissions while the poorest 10% of nations have contributed less than 1% of CO2 (Roberts and Parks 2007). Moreover, currently 75% of annual carbon emissions originate from the Global North, even though this region constitutes only 15% of the global population (Ibid). Thus, there are calls on the Global North to make significant changes to radically combat climate change and finance the Global South’s transition to a renewable future. Degrowth and the GND are policy solutions that can be implemented within states to reduce emissions and address inequality nationally. However, addressing global inequality requires an international approach such as the GCF.
A. Degrowth
To combat climate change, scientific evidence suggests that changes must be rapid and large: at least an 8% emission reduction per year (UN 2019) Such large emission savings have never been seen, except in periods of economic collapse, thus degrowth becomes a compelling argument. Supporters of the Degrowth movement argue that low-carbon technologies will be unable to achieve this ambitious level of reduction and that deep cuts in energy demand are necessary for
wealthy countries. Many scholars have argued that achieving required emission cuts, even at a somewhat lower level, is incompatible with an economic model oriented to maximise growth (Jackson 2009) The evidence of this is compelling, as the most successful emissions reductions have occurred on economic contraction This can be seen in the Soviet Union which had a reduction of one-third of their emissions between 1992-2000 along with a 18% decline in per capita GDP (York 2008). The 2009 recession in the US is another example: it is estimated that emissions in 2012 reduced by 17%. Just over half of that reduction is estimated to have been due to the recession (Council of Economic Advisors 2013:194-96). Therefore, Degrowth would address the climate crisis by reducing emissions, however the political backlash regarding such an approach is making it an unlikely solution. Governments resist implementing Degrowth strategies due to concerns about triggering recessions and increasing unemployment, all of which could lead to political unpopularity and potential backlash from both voters and powerful economic stakeholders. Alternatively, countries like the US have proposed measures which reduce carbon emissions whilst increasing growth by confronting climate change and inequality simultaneously.
B. Green New Deal
The GND, inspired by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s, aims to address climate change and socio-economic inequality simultaneously. It was initially proposed in the US but has now been adopted around the world including in the EU in 2020 at an estimated cost of €1 trillion, aiming to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 (Green 2022: 645). It proposes reducing emissions through renewable energy and energy efficiency enhancements, tackling the high-consumption lifestyles of the wealthy, and addressing systemic economic barriers to effective climate policy. To address these issues, the GND also promotes progressive taxation of the wealthy, stringent corporate regulations to decrease carbon footprints, and substantial public infrastructure investments to create jobs and reduce inequality (Ibid: 636). Furthermore, to address inequality, the GND emphasises the importance of social justice by aiding workers to transition from fossil fuel industries and enhancing access to clean energy and efficient transport Policies under the GND include affordable housing, universal healthcare, and job guarantees which are designed to protect communities as economies pivot towards sustainability (Ibid) Given this, the GND is a mechanism to lower emissions whilst harnessing the opportunity to confront inequality. However, it faces significant resistance, particularly from conservative elites and market fundamentalists in the US who criticise the GND’s departure from neoliberal policies, favouring minimal government intervention (Fremstad 2022). This opposition is rooted in the belief that government intervention should be minimal, which is at odds with the GND's approach of substantial government involvement in driving the transition to sustainability. Although critics highlight the high costs of mitigating climate change, advancements in renewable technologies, like China's progress in electric vehicles, help offset these expenses. Moreover, the cost of not acting is far greater, as evidenced by the US spending over $1.2 trillion on climate disasters in the past decade alone (Smith 2024).
Both Degrowth and GND are solutions which can be implemented predominantly by the Global North to reduce emissions and address inequality within their own country. Nations in the Global South do not have the resources to introduce GND and since they already don’t emit significantly, they need financial support to leapfrog over the industrial revolution and land in an era where they produce energy from renewable energy sources only. This would also reduce inequality as renewable energy provides decentralised power – solar power –, and is available to all households. The GCF is a potential mechanism to achieve this.
C. GCF
The GCF, established by 194 countries, is the largest climate-focused multilateral fund globally, designed to foster climate solidarity and equality between the Global South and Global North. It
aims to mobilise significant financial resources, pledging USD 13.9 billion as of December 2023 which will be invested over the next 4 years to assist developing countries in implementing climate mitigation and adaptation strategies (GCF 2023). This fund establishes a solution to combat global inequality as it recognises the culpability of developed nations and their responsibility to aid developing nations. It does so by investing into mitigation and adaptation strategies in countries most at risk. These strategies include enhancing agricultural practices, improving water management, reinforcing infrastructure against extreme weather, and investing in renewable energy to reduce fossil fuel dependence (Hammersley 2023). This approach addresses climate change’s direct impacts and promotes sustainable development while reducing global inequality. However, despite its achievements, the GCF's contributions still fall short of the initial goal of mobilising $100 billion by 2020, with estim should triple to about $2.4 clean energy transition in 2022). Nevertheless, the GC Agreement governance replenishments, focusing countries. While the GCP development banks or bi emerging economies, it ra adaptation support to the m
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, climate chan most vulnerable population
ALEA BABECK
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IndigenousIdentityinthe MiddleEast:Fragments oftheAssyrianEmpire
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
In 2007, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (‘UNDRIP’) seemed a beacon of hope for Indigenous peoples globally, who had experienced a history tainted by colonisation, oppression and violence Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Chair of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues called upon international actors and states to make the UNDRIP a “living document”. Whilst the sentiments of the document can easily be met with verbose speeches and heartfelt head nodding, it is more difficult to manifest each and every article in complex international spaces.
Naturally, we must ask ourselves: what does the UNDRIP actually say about the rights of Indigenous people? Has this been upheld historically and in the contemporary international sphere? And if it has not, what can we do to ensure Indigenous peoples worldwide are entitled to a future where governments and global actors enshrine and protect their interests?
On a conceptual and symbolic level, this instrument affirmed the universal right to freedom from discrimination and self-determination while protecting Indigenous rights to “strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions.” The UNDRIP also offered specificity, rejecting assimilation practices and threats to exercise Indigenous cultural practices.
RachelGewargis
Australia voted against UNDRIP in the UN’s General Assembly and has not ratified the document through domestic legislation. The Australian Human Rights Commission has recommended implementation through creating policy and legislation consistent with UNDRIP, deliberating with Indigenous leaders to create a National Action Plan, and altering current policies to align with the goals and declarations in the instrument.
Whilst the Australian government’s actions attempt to manifest the spirit of UNDRIP – such as the 2023 Voice to Parliament referendum – it is indisputable that there is room for accountability and development. As we consider the application of this document to Indigenous Assyrians, it is appropriate to reflect on what Australia can do for our First Nations People.
Assyrians and Indigenous Identity Prior to UNDRIP
The Assyrians are a distinct ethnic group, indigenous to Ancient Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran) Despite the collapse of the Neo-Assyrian Empire in the 7th century BC, the Assyrian people have retained cultural customs; a variation of their Indigenous Aramaic language, traditional dress and music.
Through this continuity, this empire once fuelled by innovation, creativity and military strength is now glued together by its people. However, Indigenous identity is not always favoured or celebrated, evident in both subtle, societal attitudes and blatant government policies that have historically repressed Indigenous Assyrianidentity.
My mother, Rita Gewargis, has offered us her perspective as a young Assyrian girl during Saddam Hussein's (fromtheBa'athParty)presidencyinIraq.Growingup,I’doftenheardstoriesfromheraboutlifeinIraqandthe tribulations she and her family faced. The topic piqued my interest as my understanding of Assyrian identity differed significantly from hers Patriotism has always been a privilege for me, going to Assyrian New Year celebrationsandproudlywearingtraditionalAssyriandresstoschoolmulticulturaldays
However, the insights my mother revealed from her adolescent experiences have caused me to reflect upon how a nation’s perspective on Indigenous rights impacts individual identity and affinity with culture. After all, how can you protect and preserve something you never knew held value? Growing up in the Iraqi city of Kirkuk, she expresses that “we [the Assyrians] were Iraqis before we were Assyrians.” She highlights that the Iraqi government was adamantly against Assyrian self-determination and distinctness as an ethnic group. Drawing upon her experience in primary school, my mother reveals that the Assyrian language was not permitted to be taught in schools. She notes that whilst the Assyrian Church in Iraq provided language classes,thiswasconcealedfromthegovernmentunderthepretenceofreligiouseducation.
AccordingtoHumanRightsWatch,in1987,theAssyrianpeoplewereforcedtoidentifyasAraborKurdishon the national census Implicitly, the Iraqi government signalled that Assyrian ethnic identity was invalid, attempting to assimilate them into other groups. The experiences my mother shared reflect just one of the thousands of Assyrians who lived through this regime in their homeland. Through the treatment of Assyrians inIraq,thenecessityforUNDRIPasaninternationalmechanismisdemonstrated.
How could the UN manifest its commitment to human rights when Indigenous ethnic groups with ancient cultural practices were being systematically erased?
In 2007, Iraq was one of 143 votes in favour of UNDRIP. However, the rise of ISIS in Iraq has devastated the predominantly Christian Assyrian people who have experienced religious and culturally-based violence. In 2014, Assyrian families were faced with one of three choices: (1) pay a tax; (2) convert to Islam; or, (3) lose their lives. Furthermore, ISIS destroyed ancient Indigenous rock carvings dating back almost 3000 years. This is not only shattering for the Assyrian people who have prided themselves on a rich history, but simultaneously a gross violation of UNDRIP’s Article 8 which protects Indigenous people from “destruction of their culture”. Whilst it is almost ten years since ISIS entered Mosul and destroyed valuable cultural artifacts, if we remain silent on past injustices, they are bound to become a cycle How can the UNDRIP be a “living document” if it closes its eyes to clear injustice?
Assyrians and Indigenous Identity Following UNDRIP
The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court ruled that quota seats in the Kurdistan Region Parliament were potentially unconstitutional, advertently removing enshrined political representation for religious and ethnic minorities within the region Of the eleven quota seats removed, five belonged to Chaldeans, Syriacs and Assyrians, silencing valuable voices in Iraqi politics who could advocate for the rights and interests of Indigenous people.
Due to relentless waves of persecution, it is unsurprising that over half of the world’s 3-5 million Assyrians no longer live in their ancestral homeland.
Prospects for Piecing Together Fragments of Assyria
In Australia, the independent not-for-profit Assyrian Cultural and Social Youth Organisation strives for the “conservation and protection of Assyrian cultural heritage” through extensive research, fundraising and archiving of valuable resources and publications. Moreover, my participation in UNSW’s Assyrian Student’s Association has allowed me to connect with other Assyrians and share our passion for our culture, creating a community that goes beyond a physical country
Whilst Assyrians in the diaspora have made extensive efforts to reclaim language, culture, music and art, the echo of the UNDRIP still lingers and governments internationally must unite to call injustice to account for the future of Indigenous peoples.
In response to the surge in ISIS activities in Iraq, we must ask whether the lack of governmental protection for the Assyrian people is contributing to the continuity of institutionalised suppression. How can those in positions of power watch as artifacts that date back thousands of years are destroyed? How can they implement policies that diminish the hushed voice that minorities have?
Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon asserted that UNDRIP be implemented through “policies and programmes at all levels”. To address contemporary violence and the destruction of Assyrian culture, there must be urgent government intervention and protection mechanisms
Assyrian artefacts and history need protection. But far more importantly, the Assyrian people need protection. They too need UNDRIP to be alive and breathing. We can not sit back and watch as the Assyrian culture in Iraq is fragmented until no traces are left.
