The LanguageEdition
Featuring articles by students and staff
Hi.
Fromtheeditors
Welcometothe2025editionofiThink Magazine,TrinitySchool’sannual philosophypublication.
The theme of this year’s edition is language, with our writers encouraged to explore how this affects a kaleidoscope of areas within philosophy It is a subject that is addressed at A-Level, and our Upper Sixth editors directly address the specification. Caitlin de Sousa discusses cataphatic language, while Mia McAllen and Dhyan Ruparel discuss the language of morality. There is also an insight into Upper Sixth Religious Studies, with a heated debate on types of religious language.
Yet the magazine also aims to move beyond A Level, encouraging broad and advanced thought on areas of interest. Our feature article is written by Mr Oliver Hutchings, who links Wittgenstein’s teachings on language to his own experiences in a brilliant read. We are also delighted to present two articles by Lower Sixth students Harry Lamb and Katy Newell, who contribute brilliant, erudite contributions that look at contemporary issues surrounding language.
iThink is also a platform for some of our younger philosophers, and this year, we are excited to include three articles involving Lower and Middle School students The first is by Joshua Lai, who asks important questions about inaccuracies in religious scripture. Meanwhile, Kieran Logendra presents an animated discussion of descriptions of God. Our Junior Philosophy Club also makes a welcome return to the magazine, asking some of the biggest questions about language and life.
We hope that you enjoy this edition of iThink.
Editors
Caitlin de Sousa
Dhyan Ruparel Mia McAllen
If thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.
GeorgeOrwell
Philosophy & Language
Language Games
Trinity’s Head of History and Politics, MrOliverHutchings, discusses his readings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the magic of language.
THERE was a time I believed philosophy was a kind of occult art. Mysterious. Dangerous. Powerful. It demanded precision, clarity, the exact right word like casting a spell. I thought if I could untangle the knots of meaning and I could just speak accurately and then the world (and its problems) would finally make sense. Not just to me, but to everyone… because obviously we’d all simultaneously benefit from this great leap forward in the field of knowledge And once we understood each other—really understood—then naturally we’d stop fighting each other and the world would be a better less divided place, we’d solve anything.
It’s clearly naïve and, in retrospect, highly embarrassing. But I wasn’t alone. After philosophy’s socalled “linguistic turn,” many people far brighter than myself seemed to share this belief –that we couldn’t really solve any of philosophy’s more scintillating problems until we solved the fundamental problem of language and meaning. But, if we could refine language enough make it clean, tight, unambiguous then maybe, just maybe, we could solve the deeper problems of philosophy.
The issues I was truly interested in, epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, ethics, had been asked for so long that it seemed preposterous to doubt that they were the right questions. It just happened to be that answering these questions first involved untying the horrendously complicated knot that thousands of years if human civilisation had tied language in. The task was surely possible.
All that stood in the way? The right combination of carefully chosen words and a couple of hundred headaches.
THEN I encountered Wittgenstein or more precisely, the later Wittgenstein, author of the Philosophical Investigations, who quietly dismantled everything I had come to believe.
The early Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, had argued that most philosophical problems stem from misunderstandings about language. If we could clarify how language logically represents reality, he claimed, these problems would simply dissolve. For him, the structure of language was meant to mirror the structure of the world, and meaningful statements were those that could be logically expressed.
But the later Wittgenstein ran a sword through the Gordian knot that had bound this earlier philosophy. Instead of proposing a logical overhaul of everyday language, he suggested it was our idea of philosophy that needed rethinking. Philosophical Investigations didn’t offer answers in the traditional sense it elliptically questioned the very need for them Wittgenstein, deeply ambivalent about publishing the work, allowed it to circulate in draft form around Cambridge for years, where it became the focus of a series of legendary seminar groups. It wouldn’t reach the public until after his death.
The book feels less like a philosophical treatise and more like marginalia fragments of thought
scribbled beside someone else’s work. It is both enchanted by language and profoundly uneasy about it; especially about how meaning gets frozen once words are printed.
It doesn’t read like philosophy as I’d known it.
And yet, in its fragments, Wittgenstein seemed to rewrite the rules entirely. He certainly changed how I thought.
Where I had once imagined language as a ladder we climb toward truth, Wittgenstein showed me something more humble but more fascinating: some language may be ladderlike, but much more of it took on other forms - more like hammers, drills, hoses, screws and washers tools in a box, each with its own purpose. The problem comes about when we try to use the wrong language for a particular job and become disappointed by its failure to function as we expected. Language, he suggested, is not a mirror but a series of games rule-bound yet flexible, shaped by context, and embedded in the fabric of life. The “grand problem” of philosophy wasn’t awaiting a solution; it was the problem. Meaning doesn’t reside in abstract definitions it lives in use, in context, in the messy, ordinary weave of human life
I reread one typically riddleesque sentence that surmised this position endlessly:
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict
becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. -- We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!” [Philosophical Investigation 107}
ATFIRST, I was devastated.
Then oddly, relieved. I no longer had to crack the code there was no code. There were just people talking, trying, failing, laughing, misunderstanding, and trying again.
The profound feeling I felt when I first encountered Wittgenstein has dulled with time and distance. Sometimes I assume everyone has come to this conclusion but then I realise that is absurd and that each moment on this planet an unknown proportion of the 8 billion people who call this world home are encountering the questions I once did and are coming to their own conclusions
My appreciation for the elegance of Wittgenstein’s later work has only deepened now that I have a young son, Rufus. Watching him learn to speak is like watching a tiny chaotic philosopher at play. When he calls our cat a "dog," or says “down” as he climbs up the stairs I don’t panic or reach for a dictionary. I correct him gently, knowing he's experimenting. He’s not wrong; he’s learning. He’s discovering how the world works, not through perfect definitions, but through mistakes.
And this, I have recently remembered, was Wittgenstein’s insight:
isn’t that how we all learn language? We don’t begin with truth we begin with trial. Rufus is learning the rules of the game, just as we did, one joyful (and occasionally catastrophic) mistake at a time. Looking at how messily we learn language should be enough to help us see the folly of trying to change it.
Language, in this sense, isn’t sacred it’s social We use it to play, to bond, to argue, to imagine And over time, almost without noticing, these games begin to shape how we see the world. The philosophical ambition to make language perfectly logical starts to look like a beautiful example of closing the gate after the horse has bolted.
While I grew to love this way of thinking often described as ‘language games’ I also felt an unease with the lightness of the term. It seemed too playful to capture the seriousness of what was at stake.
After all, this view stripped philosophy of its utopian certainty, and the world itself was often bleak enough to remind me that not all the games humans play with language are fun or harmless. This led me back to the hard problems at the core of the subjects I have spent the past decade teaching at Trinity
TAKE
politics Ask any seasoned observer and they’ll insist the stakes couldn’t be higher than they currently are. Yet, the longer we watch its endless churn, the more absurd it all becomes and 2025 may well go down as a golden year for political doublespeak. Language here no longer tries to describe reality it constructs it.
Whether it’s the state of the economy, a policy proposal, or the latest front in the culture wars, words shape what becomes visible, acceptable, and true.
Political discourse isn’t, for many key actors, a search for truth. It’s a contest of framing a game of manipulation. The ‘game’ here is messy, chaotic, and, for many, no longer much fun though its likely someone, somewhere, is still enjoying it Political words are often weapons: sharpened, polished, and deployed for maximum effect. The language of politics is rarely playful; it is serious deadly serious. Words are used to control, to divide, to rally, and to deceive. Politicians don’t just speak; they perform. They spin failure into strategy, rebrand cruelty as strength, and package contradiction as coherence.
And here’s the terrible trick: the more confidently someone speaks, the more likely we are to believe they know what they’re talking about.
Rhetorical force is mistaken for moral authority. In politics, language does’t clarify - it obscures. It distracts, divides, and disorients. Even when we all know the game isn’t working,we can’t seem to stop playing it History plays a different, though closely connected, game As a student, I wanted to see history as a noble pursuit—a disciplined excavation of truth through archival research and careful language that would give me a privileged access to worlds that have faded and disappeared. But the deeper I went, the more I realized how constructed it all is. We don’t uncover truth; we assemble stories. From fragments, from silences, from
that language ut there is no we grow older, more serious –ions; we draw em; we declare e peace with slate, inspire, ve all through d sound
ver stop loving ossibilities of e learned to be oo
ht me to search ve given up on be the best we refully.
“The limitsof my language meanthe limitsof my world.”
Lower Sixth HarryLambevaluates language as a logical system
Can language ever fully represent logic?
It is possible that language originated from a singular group of humans, and likely that it came from only a limited number of groups. Whilst linguistic scholars debate the origins of language, evidence for this rests on the fact that languages share incredible similarities within syntax and other rules, seeming as if they may have all branched off from a simple prototypical language Despite there being no exact scientific consensus, it is true that language is something all humans have had for millennia across all societies, and it has been the predominant, almost only medium of communication over any other communication system.
Less developed communication patterns have been observed and studied, such as in whales, and these can shape our understanding of why we have developed the ability to communicate under such rigid system. If you were to ask, why did humans develop to use language in the way we have, the answer boils down to two main reasons: survival advantages, and cognitive byproduct. Firstly, it is important to understand that early forms of communication were almost definitely confined to developing because of being advantageous for survival, even in animals who are unable to pass tests to confirm degrees of consciousness, still use basic noises and gestures to signal meaning This suggests that even with the human roots of language, it likely developed from survival, however humans have undergone something very unique within the evolutionary process, which no other animal has to our extent: experiencing the by-products of evolutionary intelligence. Higher intelligence
within species poses much greater chances of survival and thus it makes sense how evolution caused our species to become very intelligent. However, once our species got beyond an undefined point, they start to face issues that form when having higher cognition, and awareness of others struggles beyond biological altruism and empathy, and instead, rationality
This predisposed by-product, can explain why we have developed such a sophisticated form of language from purely survival adaptions of communication. Language is a necessary way of expressing our sudden meta-cognition in the context of evolutionary history, a way to portray our feelings of injustice and recognition of rationalised morality, beyond primal, purely selfish, emotion. This makes for one of the most complex systems of logic ever, something that almost transcends abstract objects in a metaphorical way. A system that represents an accumulation of human ideas and perspectives, that allows for a universal recognition of feelings and thoughts that are not clearly defined. Take beauty, awe, or justice for example, something which we all understand and have felt; if you were asked to explain it in terms of formal objects, in essence as a piece of code, you couldn’t without discreetly inferring human complexity Language is not just about communication; it is explaining human universal experience that is left misunderstood if not used in the way we do.
This essay will cover how the root of language holds it applicable and expressible in terms of pure logic; does it do a
good job? I will argue that whilst language might not be an efficient logical system, it may be the closest logical system to perfection that we have for a lot of purposes.
Now moving away from the origins of language, we must approach the question of the article and clear up any ambiguities in the terms. By language, I am referring to the common and primary means of communication done through speaking and written pieces By ‘represent logic’, I mean a few things, firstly logic denotes correct reasoning, therefore reaching a sound conclusion based on valid premises. Therefore by ‘represent logic’, I am referencing the potential ability of language to entirely create a correct logical argument.
In order to understand how logic is represented, you must think of it in terms of ‘systems.’ Logic itself is the derivation of truth, and to have a truthful conclusion you must assume some basic axioms (rules). Therefore, you can think of formal (logical) systems as abstract structures which are products of their foundations which are the assumed rules (axioms). An example of this is the common understanding of maths - for example, the rule that when two things are added, they form their sum, is an arithmetic axiom, so from this we can derive that 1+1=2 The axioms that we choose to base formal systems off are classically taken from the sensory experiences we have, so for example we can understand from the sensory world that two opposite things cannot take place in the same conditions at the same time, this is called the Law of NonContradiction. But ultimately,
one may validly argue that there is no reason to assume that any sensory experiences we have represents the truth behind reality, as it would be a dogmatic assumption to make. However, if we do not make this assumption in the context of this essay, we fall into the problem of logical nihilism, from which no axioms can be formed and therefore the question of the essay is left unanswered
Historically, logicians such as Gottlob Frege, have attempted to form a language that conforms strictly to rules to be fully confined to the formal system, this is understandably called formal language. He aimed to create a language that mirrored arithmetic patterns, by using syntax and grammar that reflected itself entirely in a totally sound logical statement clearly. Later on, thinkers such as Russel, along with others, tried to form a mathematic system using symbols to represent ‘pure’ logic, forming a type of calculus. And whilst this may have been successful in that era, these projects and future suffered from a discovery in maths, Gödel’s incompleteness Theorems. In these Gödel managed to show that in any sufficiently large formal system (capable of arithmetic expression), could never fully incorporate all axioms to create an entire system as it would hold contradiction within the system So, what many do not know is, that what we know as pure truth (logic) is fundamentally impossible to be expressed in one system, destroying any hope of creating an entirely logical (formal) language. This Gödelian problem is the reason why mathematicians, and computer scientists can frequently use different logic systems validly, despite them
being conflicting, as one will provide a ‘better’ logical analysis in comparison to the other. So fundamentally, no language would never entirely be able of expressing logic, but neither would any other system, so how does it compare more abstractly?
Non-formal language is called natural language, which is a more flexible, context dependent way of approaching statements, and it is what we use whenever we speak Whilst it does restrict itself according to its vocabulary, grammar and syntax, its semantics are shape by other non-sentence-based factors, such as tone, assumptions and context, which explicitly change a statement’s meaning. What is great about natural language is that it avoids the problem of not being able to fully define abstract human concepts such as happiness, or peace. Yet, it is easy to critique this ‘advantage’, by saying that whilst these concepts exist for us, they hold no meaning without the mind and also hold no objective meaning. However, it undeniably means that natural language is more usable practically due to the ability to express things that humans are most passionate about flexibly.
Yet the way that language is used almost surpasses logic by adding another layer Logic itself does not give reason to being used However, humans have a reason for saying utterances, and there is likely reason for that. The two most popular theories for people saying what they choose to say are the Relevance theory and Grice’s maxims. Relevance theory suggests that something is only said if the person that said it deemed it to be relevant to say to a listener, Grice’s maxims are very similar but are
based of reasons for them being relevant. Why this is important is natural language is a product of us trying to convey relevant information, due to language ultimately evolving in a way that makes it easiest to make relevant claims, according to the general consensus of linguists. Therefore, natural language is going to be the most helpful way of forming and expressing ideas in a way that is relevant to others So, whilst it may not be entirely ‘truthful’, it has evolved specifically to pose its statements most relevantly and thus meaningfully to recipients.
This idea of helpfulness is further shown when the concept of nominalism is suggested. Nominalism suggests that abstract objects such as ideas, numbers and mathematical sets, and commonalities in objects do not exist in reality. This means that lots of what we think about (everything if you are an idealist) does not actually exist in reality. The argument is based on the fact that any abstract object is not directly observable in in the universe without the existence of the mind, and therefore, presuming that a metaphysical approach is not taken due to an ultimate result of metaphysical agnosticism (as explained earlier), the objects cannot be proven empirically to exist But under this concept lots of the things that we care about most do not exist, for example love, politics, and ultimately philosophy. This means that according to this widely recognised viewpoint, what we care about cannot be discussed meaningfully in a purely logical framework, as the things that are being discussed do not exist. Therefore, the adoption of what we call natural
language, provides abstraction to be able to discuss what we actually care about and therefore must discuss, this would not be possible through formal language due to abstract object not existing, undermining the whole formalist approach.
Therefore, language has not and will not ever be able to express logic fully, but according to all understanding, it will never, proven by Gödel Even when higher order systems of formal language are used it is impossible to express the abstract objects due to their ultimate non-existence, which means that it is proven that formal language cannot be used to form any type of statement. Interestingly this approach would suggest that one political view will never be more ‘correct’ than another, due to a dependence on abstract objects which do not exist. However, whilst natural language falls short of having much objectivity, it does manage to manifest itself as one of the most relevant and helpful forms of expression for all of humanity, due to its evolutionary make up in the context of relevance theories. So, next time you question whether an idea-based sentence is true, whether that be political or artistic, know it is impossible to objectively decide, yet there is no way of expressing it that avoids the problems of ambiguity even mathematically
If two people speak different languages, dotheyexperiencetheworlddifferently?
Tommy: In certain languages, when you discuss for example a key, one language may make it masculine and one may make it feminine. Studies show that this changes the way you see that bridge - the masculine ones made it strong, whereas the feminine one had other associated stereotypes
Hei: No, they just communicate slightly differently, but they're describing the same thing, so I'd disagree with Thomas.
Daniel: I think with most things, you'll experience them similarly or the same, but in small things - like the name of a brand, made in the UK - it has different meanings and associations in different cultures and countries. You see that thing as a different thing.
Filip: Considering they're two different person, they'll naturally think in separate ways, so this difference is not necessarily due to language.
Is there any feeling that cannot be expressedinwords?
Thomas: In French, there is a verb for throwing something out of a windowevery language has its own sub-texts and nuances which means we can't express certain feelings, because they're specific to a language
Freddie: There are words to describe emotions, but it's hard to ever accurately describe any emotion We perceive different languages so differently, so it's hard.
Doanimalsspeakadifferentlanguage?
Freddie: Animals don't have their own language - cats, for example, are separated at birth, so they can't learn a language from their parents. They don't have a set language but communicate in different ways like body language of the pitch of their voice.
Filip: In terms of sending emotions to other beings, they do have a language, but it's far more primitive than something like English or Chinese There is a form of communication
Thomas: If you look at cats, a meow is a cat trying to imitate a human voice. If they communicate with other cats, it's a very different vowel sound and pitch. This suggests they have some kind of changing language based on context.
Hei: They have a different language because they communicate in a different way - like ants using body language.
If God exists, what language does God speak?
William: My guess is that God wouldn't speak a language. They might be able to communicate with our brains, but they wouldn't speak.
Daniel: I think they'd probably be able to speak every language, because the idea of God is this all-powerful being who is the only perfect thing in existence So I think it's quite unlikely a God would be able to communicate in an equal or lower way to humans, if they are so much higher than us They'd be able to communicate with anything
Filip: God is all-powerful, so doesn't need language to communicate with angels, but they can and will communicate with everything under their control.
Languages aren't just made of words. They're modes of looking at the world. They're keys to civilizations.
R.F.Kuang
Ethics & Language
Linguicide
Lower
Sixth KatyNewell explores culture erasure
Languages not only facilitate communication, but tie to individual identities, preserve traditions, foster cultural identity, bridge communities and families and infinitely more. The imminent threat of linguicide endangers and affects culture, families, religion, politics, and every element of life today, yet it goes largely unnoticed by the global northwest and most territories which champion dominant languages such as English. It is estimated that 6000 languages are spoken worldwide today, almost half of which are classed as endangered following EGIDS Some experts estimate that 90% of the currently spoken languages in the world will have disappeared by 2050, and regardless of whether this erasure is deliberate or accidental, more concern is needed about the dangers of cultural means being destroyed. Linguicide is defined as the death of a language, either naturally or from political causes. This has been an issue predominantly since the beginning of colonial practices, although it has been swiftly exacerbated under different empires and by globalisation.
Lower Sixth KatyNewellexplores the ethics of culture erasure
Languages shape the way we think and our identities. Patterns of consonants and vowels down to the simple phonetic structures are proven to have emotional effects, often heightening emotion, or calming people Due to the lack of explicit tense in Chinese Mandarin, instead focusing on markers and context, speakers tend to view time and states of being as bottom and top rather than backward and forward like most English speakers. The presence of gendered nouns in many languages again shapes attitudes, as speakers of these
languages must think of gender each time they use a noun or a pronoun, which can make them more aware of gender differences and similarities. Many bilingual people also cite that their personality and mannerisms change depending on which language they speak, or experience pitch changes which affect their external perception by others. The philosopher Martin Heidegger stated that language is the ‘House of Being,’ meaning they are more than a mere tool of communication and are what we live by They “establish something present at hand instituting being through the word and in the word” by summoning “things to the world and the world to the things.” Language means that things and abstract concepts are not all transcendent and in a realm above, as many historical philosophers believed, but instead grounded by our speaking and communication. Many anthropologists also argue that language and culture are homologous, as culture started when speech was available and developed and influenced each other as they evolved. If culture is a product of human interaction, cultural acts are manifestations of communication assumed by a speech community. Different languages facilitate different expressions and worldviews, and for this reason language death actively erases culture.
It is important to consider all reasons of and conditions for language death, which is typically presented in two forms: active linguicide, which is usually a facet of genocide, or occurs through colonial regulations and bans on speaking native languages within a region; passive linguicide, which is normally a
much less dramatic neglect by the government or people of their native language, failing to regularly speak it or pass it on through generations. There are blurred lines between active and passive death of languages, as they often occur at the same time and it can be hard to define whether natural language loss is due to active discrimination and pressure.
Forced language loss in the past is seen mostly through colonisation by empires and entities including the British, French, Portugal and the the Arab conquerors. In Australia alone, under British colonisation the number of spoken languages halved from 250 to 123, with 109 classed as endangered. Today linguicide typically presents itself through a perceivably much less sinister means: globalisation. Similarly to climate change, this destruction is not a gradual and inevitable loss. Of the quarter of languages which have been lost, 90% were in the past 60 years. The anglicisation of the world has historically been a result of the British empire, and these effects are still undisputed and prevalent today, but today the pressure to adopt English affects governments on larger scales and individuals in non-native English-speaking countries Globalisation has led to English most commonly being people’s ‘lingua franca’ – the language adopted as a common language between those with different native languages There is increased pressure worldwide to promote English as a language for trade, and international relations, but also on a more individualistic scale for citizens to pursue international working and educational opportunities which tend to be higher paying than
those in one’s native nonEnglish speaking country.
Following the colonisation of Tasmania, there are no individuals of solely Aboriginal Tasmanian descent remaining. Efforts were also made by the British to suppress the language and eliminate its oral tradition. In the 1990s, the Tasmanian Aboriginal centre, supported by the Australian government, began attempting to revive the language By analysing historical records, of which there are only two, the goal was to create a unified language of the multiple historical dialects within the country, called Palawa Kani, and the number of speakers has increased from 0 to 400 speakers. The artificial reconstruction of languages is an immensely powerful way to reclaim native speakers’ cultural heritage and continue to acknowledge the brutal means of cultural erasure they experienced.
Religion and religious institutions have also led to the preservation of some languages such as Coptic Egyptian, as small communities tend to hold religious services in their native languages, and the family values and close relations between strongly religious small communities also help to pass languages on to younger generations Most view ancient Egyptian as the dead language of the pharaohs and merely depicted in hieroglyphs in pyramids, but Egyptian continued to evolve in over 5 stages until its latest, Coptic. During the 10th century, under the Arab conquest and Islamification of Egypt, penalties were imposed on those speaking the language during the reign of Fatimid Caliph Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah.
Arabic rapidly took over as the dominant written language of Egypt, although Coptic Egyptian is estimated to have lived on as a spoken language in some localities until the 17th century. It is not spoken today other than by some Egyptian priests, the language has been preserved on a smaller scale through the Coptic Orthodox, which still uses it in liturgical services The church and communities surrounding it have begun documenting the language so it can be preserved even if younger speakers do not continue to speak it
Overall, most languages which die out are due to many factors but mostly propelled by force and active linguicide rather than the natural loss or assimilation leading people to not pass on their native language. Although there is effort to revitalise and reignite dying languages, it is imperative to spark more awareness and effort globally. The most obvious solution for active linguicide is more effort to end existing colonisation and global conflicts which threaten millions of lives across the world. Passive linguicide, being more preventable, can be easier stopped without ending globalisation, but instead ensuring that languages are preserved by their localised communities, with resources and funding granted to begin programmes and enhance documentation
Metaethics is the discussion of how we form moral judgments. It aims to dissect the language we use, how it relates to our moral assertion, and whether it is a valid way to share a judgment. It adds another dimension to ethical studies, allowing us to look more broadly at how we view our actions. Where normative ethics seeks to ask “What is the right thing to do?”, metaethics asks “what does right even mean?”
In understanding classical metaethical theories, there are some key categorisations to understand As discussed elsewhere in this magazine, language has often been separated into cognitive and non-cognitive. In ethics, this refers to whether language is propositional - cognitive language carries moral ‘truth,’ claiming an objective judgment, whereas noncognitive statements deny this propositional element. There is also a distinction between natural and non-natural statements, with the former relating morality to observable, natural qualities.
N a t u r a l i s m
Cognitive and natural theory
Naturalist theories are based upon two central ideas: morality is cognitive, and ‘goodness’ can be defined in relation to properties that exist in the natural world. Normative ethical theories fall into this campKant, for example, relates ‘goodness’ to duty, Aquinas to telos, and Fletcher to agape. F.H. Bradley is a famous example of a moral naturalist, claiming that moral propositions must “contain a reference to something beyond ” He suggests that this sense of morality, placed in a non-moral property dependent on our culture and life, helps us to cohere within our own society
Philippa Foot offers a defence of naturalism, arguing that we can often observe morality in others. This suggests the external, natural quality of ‘goodness.’ However, there are many critiques of such thinking. Hume’s Fork leads him to the isought gap, which suggests that descriptive statements cannot be converted into prescriptive ones. Moore’s Naturalistic Fallacy concludes similarly, leading him towards intuitionism.
Explaining Metaethics
n t u i t i o n i s m
Cognitive and nonnatural theory
Developing his Naturalistic Fallacy, Moore suggests an alternative view of ethical language which is cognitive, but does not relate ‘good’ to natural properties. Instead, his ‘good’ is ‘sui generis’ (irreducible) and intuitive: as he famously said, “good is good,” akin to the colour yellow in that it can be recognised through examples, rather than a definition. This theory has a suggestion about the human moral compass, suggesting an instinctive knowledge of ‘goodness.’
He is supported by W D Ross, who continues the Kantian focus on duty by suggesting intuitive ‘prima facie’ duties To him, these are seven duties (including justice, beneficence and reparation) which are immediately clear from our simple intuition. There are those who critique the cognitive elements of this theory, such as the emotivists. Mackie’s Argument from Relativity also makes a compelling point: if good is intuitive, how do we explain the diversity in moral choices and views that exists among humans?
m o t i v i s m
ENoncognitive and nonnatural theory
There are many non-cognitive, non-natural theories which attempt to resolve the flaws of naturalism and intuitionism. Hare’s prescriptivism, for example, positions moral statements as imperatives: “Stealing is wrong.” becomes “Do not steal.” The most famous example, though, is Ayer’s emotivism, which claims that moral judgments are personal, subjective evaluations that express emotions. To him, the statement “Stealing is wrong” becomes “I do not like stealing.” Moral fact is non-existent; a moral assertion holds no objective meaning other than expression of feeling
Co-editor Dhyan Ruparel explores three dominant theories of ethical language I
Stevenson develops this emotivism into a slightly different form. He agrees with Ayer’s view of cognitive theories as “mere psuedoconcepts,” but rejects the idea that a moral statement holds no meaning. As he writes, they hold “emotive meaning rather than descriptive,” holding the ability and power of persuasion. The main criticism of this theory is its implications: is there any solid concept of morality under emotivism?
Istheterm‘good’ meaningless?
Co-editor MiaMcAllendiscusses the approaches of Emotivism, Intuitionism and Naturalism and the meaning of ethical language
WITHIN ethical debates, there are two main perspectives on whether ‘good’ is meaningless. The first approach taken by cognitive theories, naturalism and intuitionism, perceives ethical statements as prescriptive and capable of an objective meaning. However, this position is not convincing given the cultural and personal variety of moral stances throughout the world, as demonstrated by the normative ethical theories. Thus, the term ‘good’ is ultimately meaningless, as A.J Ayer’s emotivism establishes. However, it is important to acknowledge as Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive approach to language does, that whilst ‘good’ has no objective meaning, it is still a useful term that can be understood contextually and within societies
A J Ayer’s emotivist position, which establishes that ‘good’ is meaningless is mostly convincing From his verification principle, which deems synthetic and analytical statements capable of truth claims, Ayer concluded that ethical terms such as ‘good’ were meaningless, as they are not evident through logic or empiricism.
Thus, Ayer believed that moral statements were merely expressions of subjective emotion. However, whilst Ayer is correct in identifying that
there is no objective morality, since attempts by ethical naturalists to establish a definition of ‘good’ have failed, given the varying definitions, which are apparently observable, he is too reductionist by entirely disregarding terms such as ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ It is important for situations of applied ethics, such as Euthanasia debates, for the possible discussion of ethical terms, as people must be able to come to an agreed baseline, in order for to make consistent choices.
This may be supported by Hare’s prescriptivism, which also takes a non-cognitive position on ethical language, but highlights the importance of moral consistency. Hence, even though ‘good’ is meaningless, people must behave in a universal manner by always expressing the same moral stance This is convincing as it allows for a more practical noncognitive position
Conversely, non-cognitive arguments may be criticised for being too antinomian, given that any attempts to define good are simply disregarded. William Barclay, for example believed that “law is the encourager of morality” and so a moral baseline was required to make decisions ‘good.’
Furthermore, the normative ethical theory, Natural Law
entirely opposes Ayer’s emotivism, given that Aquinas believed there to be a permanent and objective divine law evident through reason. This highlights two key weaknesses with emotivism as it bases morality on emotions, ignoring the potential role of rationality, as G.J Warnock argued.
Equally, emotivism may not be appealing for religious believers, as it rejects any kind of meaning beyond subjective emotion. Conversely, whilst these criticisms of emotivism are valid, it is clear that the term ‘good’ has no objective meaning given its varying definitions –Utilitarians understand good as the maximum pleasure, yet Kant defined it as pure good will. This problem with ethical naturalism was correctly surmised by Charles R Pidgen – “Naturalists – although arguing that good can be reduced to something else or identified with some other property – differ as to what good and evil… are to be reduced to. Thus, emotivism and the non-cognitive prescriptivism offer a better understanding of the term ‘good.’
Furthermore, the cognitive, naturalist position, which argues that ‘good’ is meaningful as we can derive such meaning from experience is ultimately unconvincing. David Hume provides an effective critique
for the naturalist approach, arguing that ethical naturalism jumps from descriptive statements to prescriptive statements. This was termed the “Is/Ought” gap.” This is a strong criticism as demonstrated by the following example – a descriptive statement “This monkey is ill” may be followed by any number of prescriptive statements “We should shoot the monkey” or “We should treat the monkey ” Thus, ethical naturalism is not effective in deeming ‘good’ meaningful
In addition, G.E. Moore argued that ethical naturalists fall foul of the Naturalistic Fallacy –“confusing ‘good’ with a natural or metaphysical property.” Moore refers to a jump between a moral term ‘good’ and a nonmoral term such as ‘pleasure’ or ‘love’, an issue which ethical naturalism cannot currently overcome as it continues to raise open, rather than closed, questions upon defining ‘good’.
Conversely, Moore’s Naturalistic Fallacy is somewhat flawed, as Mary Midgely stated, “The real danger, is not naturalism, but crude reductivism… to exclusiveness” an argument which proposes a need to consider a more holistic understanding of ethical terms such as ‘good’ as not merely ‘duty’ or ‘pleasure’ but a combination of rationality and emotion, which emotivism also fails to achieve
Hence, Mill’s Utilitarianism, which emphasises the importance of attempting naturalist definitions of ‘good’ for the benefit of social order and mutual prosperity, demonstrates the issues with accepting the emotivist position that “good” is entirely meaningless. If there is no way
to establish a collective understanding of morality, then it becomes increasingly difficult for social cohesion. Consequently, Wittgenstein’s understanding of language, in so far as “language mirrors the world” is a useful non- cognitive approach for ethical language, since its function may be understood collectively and contextually, though not objectively This demonstrates a strength of emotivism, as it is supported by cultural relativism, since many cultures and societies throughout the world understand ‘good’ so differently Non-cognitive understandings of morality are the only ones that accept this reality, and therefore the most convincing despite their flaws.
Furthermore, the cognitive position offered by G.E Moore’s Intuitionism is not effective in its argument that ‘good’ is meaningful. J.L Mackie’s argument from relativity demonstrates that Moore’s suggestion “Good is good and that is the end of the matter” is entirely insufficient.
Our observation of the world makes it evident that morality is not self- evident, rather it is often a product of the societies in which we grow up. Mackie also used the argument from queerness to effectively critique Moore, proposing that there must be a “queer faculty enabling us to discover mora truths, the existence of such a faculty he believed could not be determined, meaning that mora properties must not exist. This may be linked to Ayer’s criticism of Intuitionism, which in rejecting empirical definitions cannot be verified. Whilst this is Moore’s aim, given that “good is a non-definable property” i makes it challenging to assess the nature of ‘good’ and the
process of following our intuition to make moral decisions. Hence, situations of real-life decision making are limited by intuitionism as there is no obvious generalisable basis from which to draw.
Therefore, the emotivist position, whilst weakened by its impracticality, best explains moral terms as lacking an objective basis, given human experience, as supported by Mackie’s argument from relativity However, the term ‘good’ is not entirely meaningless as identified by Timothy Chappell, “The more of our common experience [Ayer] deems illusionary, the less we are likely to find his views credible.” Thus, non- cognitive positions such as those taken by Wittgenstein and R. M Hare, which do not entirely disregard the significance of ethical language, seem to succeed where emotivism fails.
Consequently, whilst arguments made by naturalists admiringly attempt to define ‘good’ to make ethical language useful, they fail due to their existence being evidence that there can be no objective meaning of ‘good’
Language is the light of the mind.
JohnStuartMill
Religion & Language
Canwetalkabout Godusingpositive language?
Co-editor
CaitlindeSousadiscusses the cataphatic way
THROUGHOUT history, theologians have grappled with the challenge of speaking meaningfully about God without reducing Him to human concepts or misrepresenting His attributes. Three primary approaches to this issue have emerged: the Cataphatic way (via positiva), the Apophatic way (via negativa), and the use of symbolic language. While the Apophatic way emphasises God’s ineffability, I would argue that positive statements about God are both possible and meaningful, especially through St Thomas Aquinas’ and Ian Ramsey’s analogical approaches. Although Paul Tillich’s theory of symbols provides another route to understanding God, its subjectivity limits its effectiveness. Ultimately, the analogical method offers a balanced and theologically grounded way to speak about God using positive language.
Aquinas’AnalogicalApproach
AQUINAS makes a compelling case for the use of positive language in religious discourse, through analogical reasoning. He argues that while human language cannot capture God directly, it can point meaningfully towards Him when used analogically, thus recognising God’s transcendence He calls this a ‘mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation’—language that neither assumes complete sameness with God nor denies all similarity. This is a strength of the Cataphatic view as it provides a compromise between extreme negative language and trying to talk about God in human terms without qualifying our language. It allows us to speak about God whilst never saying God is
precisely the same as us. Aquinas presents two key forms of analogy: analogy of attribution and analogy of proportion. The analogy of attribution is based on the idea that all creation reflects God’s nature.
Brian Davies uses the example of a baker and his bread to illustrate this just as the quality of the bread reflects the skill of the baker, human attributes like love can reflect divine love, providing strength to the Cataphatic view as it allows us to understand our connection to God. It overcomes the issues with univocal language, as these types of love are not the same but there is a direct attribution. Similarly, William Paley’s watchmaker analogy supports the idea that the complexity of creation implies a complex creator, reinforcing the legitimacy of using human terms to describe divine attributes. The analogy of proportion further refines this approach. Here, words describe a quality that varies based on the nature of the subject. For instance, the word “loyal” applies differently to a dog and to a spouse, yet the core concept remains. In the context of God, such terms imply a vastly superior form of the attribute. As John Hick suggests, we recognise God's power or goodness in proportion to His divine nature —not in a human sense but on a different scale altogether This shows that the Cataphatic view is convincing as it avoids anthropomorphising God while still permitting meaningful discourse.
Nevertheless, critics such as Vincent Brümmer and Karl Barth challenge this method. Brümmer argues that we presume too much when applying analogical
reasoning, claiming we cannot define God’s nature without knowing it directly, as ‘we do not know the nature of God himself, and we want to define his manner of being wise precisely in terms of his nature.’ He believed that the argument from attribution could lead us to suggest that God is many things, which may be inaccurate, leading to hugely controversial and blasphemous statements being made as a result Barth goes further, stating that any human attempt to understand God must be based on revealed theology, not analogy.
However, these criticisms overlook the purpose of analogy: it bridges the gap between divine and human, not by defining God comprehensively, but by using human experience as a signpost toward divine reality. Moreover, analogies align with the biblical method of teaching. Jesus often used parables analogical stories beginning with phrases like "the Kingdom of God is like..." to communicate spiritual truths. The Bible also uses positive language, such as in 1 John 4:8, “God is love,” to affirm divine attributes. These examples suggest that analogical language is not only theologically sound but scripturally grounded As a result, Aquinas’ analogical approach provides strong and convincing evidence for the argument that we can talk about God using positive religious language.
Ian Ramsey’s Expansion on Analogy
BUILDING on Aquinas, Ian Ramsey offers a modern articulation of the analogical method. He introduces the
concepts of models and qualifiers. Models are human terms that serve as analogies for divine concepts, while qualifiers (e.g., “infinite” or “eternal”) ensure that these models do not limit God's transcendence. According to Ramsey, these qualifiers stimulate awe, worship, and deeper understanding, thus protecting divine mystery while fostering meaningful engagement This approach strengthens the Cataphatic view by resolving the issue of univocal language—where God’s attributes are mistakenly assumed to be identical to human ones. Ramsey ensures that our descriptions are not mere projections but reverent approximations.
His emphasis on worship and spiritual response highlights how qualified positive language leads not just to intellectual understanding, but also to a deeper relationship with God.
Critics from the Apophatic tradition, such as PseudoDionysius and Moses Maimonides, reject any positive language about God. They argue that since God is wholly other, human language is inadequate and possibly disrespectful. Maimonides illustrates this with his analogy of a ship, as he described what it was not – ‘a mineral it is not a plant growing in the earth’ and seemingly believed that it would be easier for people to understand what is being described through this method. This reflects the principle of negation, which was highlighted by Peter Cole, who wrote that ‘by denying all descriptions of God, you get insight and experience of God rather than belief and sceptisicim’, allowing us to avoid misleading assumptions.
Tillich’sTheoryofSymbols
ANOTHER approach to speaking about God positively is through Paul Tillich’s theory of symbolic language. Tillich argues that religious language functions symbolically rather than literally because God is beyond human comprehension. Symbols, unlike signs, participate in the reality they represent They point beyond themselves and open dimensions of experience not otherwise accessible, as symbols can hold multiple different meanings which invite personal interpretation and engagement. Tillich’s view complements Aquinas in that it avoids anthropomorphism while enabling meaningful discourse. His view is supported by scripture as seen through the Genesis verses, which many see as containing ‘symbolic truths’, about God and reality. This is similar to other biblical metaphors, such as in Psalm 23, where ‘God is a shepherd’, which convey complex divine roles like guidance and protection in accessible terms.
However, this theory is not as useful as Aquinas and Ramsey’s arguments from analogy. Tillich’s approach faces criticism for its subjectivity. Since symbols can be interpreted differently across cultures and individuals, they may lack consistent theological content and lead to people making incorrect assumptions about God J H Randall critiques symbols for being non-cognitive and unverifiable, making it difficult to assess their truth and insight into reality. William Alston echoes this, warning that if everything is symbolic, even doctrines like Heaven and Hell lose their concrete meaning.
Nevertheless, these criticisms
of symbols are not extremely strong because religion is a human impulse towards something higher than the limits of our scientific or philosophical reasoning, and positive symbolic language reflects this.
Tillich refocuses Christianity towards the spirituality of human life and doesn’t need to be verified or factual to be spiritually fulfilling The subjectivity of symbols allows them to remain relevant across time and cultures
Yet, Tillich simply goes too far in reducing almost all language to symbols, which risks distorting core beliefs or reducing faith to mere psychological or emotional experience. While symbols certainly enrich religious language, they do not offer the same structured clarity and theological consistency as the analogical Cataphatic method.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the belief that we cannot speak positively about God underestimates the potential of analogical language. Aquinas and Ramsey demonstrate that, when properly qualified, human language can meaningfully refer to God without diminishing His transcendence While the Apophatic way and symbolic language each offer insights, they fall short in clarity, coherence, or theological robustness The analogical method not only respects God's mystery but also fosters a relationship between humanity and the divine, rooted in scripture, reason, and worship. Therefore, we can and should say positive things about God.
Lostin Translation
Fourth Year JoshuaLaiexplores inaccuracies in the religious texts of today
force used by God to achieve his will. Through this, it can be seen that the users of the NWT edition are reading an entirely different narrative to the readers of other editions, in order to show their unique beliefs as correct.
Another mistranslation comes from Zechariah 12:10, where the NWT reads: “And I [God] will pour out on the house…, and they will look to the one whom they pierced,” compared to the NIV: “And I will pour out on the house…. They will look on me, the one they have pierced,” the translation of “me” to “the one” removing the personal connection of God to Jesus, validating their belief that Jesus is not God on the Earth, but subservient to him, not part of the creator, but created from God. From these examples, it is clear that the Bible has been changed to agree with their theology, deliberately misleading their followers into believing an altered version of their supposedly infallible text.
This is not the only edition in which this is evident, however, with the previously quoted New International Edition (NIV), used by many Evangelical Christians, also containing deliberately ambiguous translations. The translators of this edition commit to the belief of the infallibility of the Bible more so than other translations, as shown in the forewords to their translations:
From the beginning the translators have been united in their commitment to the authority and infallibility of the Bible as God’s Word in written form.(TNIV,2005)
Our work as translators is motivated by our conviction that the Bible is God’s Word in writtenform.(NIV,2011)
The problem arises when one realises that the Bible is not infallible, but even filled with errors, chronological, contradictory, et cetera. Because of the NIV’s commitment to present the Bible as without error, translators have taken liberties in changing the word of the text to fit an infallible over-arching series of events An obvious example of this comes from 2 Samuel 21:19, where the NIV reads: “Elhanan son of Jair the Bethlehemite killed the brother of [b] Goliath,” with the footnote reading: “Hebrew does not have the brother of.” If the original Hebrew does not have “the brother of”, why include it in a translated edition? The attempt to reconcile the factual error of who killed Goliath, be it David or Elhanan, is not seen in other editions of the Bible. In this case, translators seem to have deliberately invalidated the claim made in 2 Samuel, in order to fit the rest of the text.
Another problem arises when reading Esther 8:11, where the Jews are permitted to kill their enemies, including their wives and children. Because the verse is so morally reprehensible in nature, the NIV edition changes the emphasis on women and children from the ones being killed to the ones being protected by the killing, opposed to every other English translation. It reads: “to… kill and annihilate the armed men of any nationality or province who might attack them and their women and children,” compared to the Christian Standard Bible (CSB), which reads: “annihilate every ethnic and provincial army hostile to them, including
women and children,” showing the NIV’s alteration of the text in order to keep the moral integrity of the text.
When comparing editions in this way, one cannot help but feel a sense of pointlessness in the affair; there is not, and will never be, a definitive edition that all other editions must measure up to. However, it is extremely important to do so anyway, as this is how inconsistencies in translation are found in “erroneous” editions such as the NWT and the NIV Seeking examples of bias in translation to validate doctrine and belief, then, is one of the most important things to do when reading through any Bible edition.
The Quranic approach to translations is completely different to the Christian. It is believed to be the verbatim word of Allah, hence the rejection of any and all deliberate changes, such as translations, as reliable to the Islamic canon. Translations are treated as interpretations or summaries, and cannot be taken (as the Arabic Quran is) as infallible. Because of this, Muslims are encouraged to learn Arabic, in order to learn the Quran in its original form. Interpretation of the text is also not an issue, as there are appointed religious leaders who have the power to interpret “correctly ” However, the origins of this canonised version of the Quran are debated How can we be so sure of this Quran’s infallibility?
The Prophet Muhammad received the Quran over a span of 23 years (610-633CE), but it was never compiled in a written form during his lifetime. In a mostly oral society, accounts of the Quran were memorised
from Muhammad, and recited to others to spread. In addition to this, Muhammad was described as “al-nabī al-ummī (the illiterate prophet)”, and so was unable to record the revelations of the Quran in written form immediately. It is extremely likely, therefore, that there could have been a misinterpretation, or a misunderstanding of the recitation, distorting the spread message of the Quran
Some scholars believe that a few verses of the Quran may have been recorded by scribes in Mecca, however it was never fully recorded until after his death, when Abu Bakr, the authority for Sunni Islam after Muhammad’s death, ordered a compilation of the Quran from Muhammad’s companions. This compilation was kept through generations, until Uthman ibn Affan ordered the canonisation of the text over all Muslim populations. It is unknown, to what extent the Quran today differs from the Quran revealed to Muhammad back millennia ago, but those years in between revelation and canonisation gives scholars pause over the wholeness and accuracy of the Quran.
GiovanniBattistaCimadaConegliano ‘GodtheFather’
In conclusion, religious texts such as the Quran and the Bible hold incredible sway in influencing the belief of their followers, but distortions occur, be it deliberate, in some cases in Christianity, or accidental, in the case of the gap before canonisation for Islam. Mistakes are unavoidable when tracking and interpreting the holy books of long ago. Given their perceived power and influence in our religion today, and with the context of many centuries of change and adaptation, should we reconsider how we interpret our sacred texts?
Can
we describe
GOD is often described as an omnipresent, infinite Creator, who has had no beginning and will have no end. He created the universe as we know it today, and guides us through our lives, helping us make good decisions and live happy lives. However, this isn’t always the case.
There are many faiths that don’t believe in your stereotypical God Hinduism, and other polytheistic religions, believes in millions of Gods, all for different aspects of life, nature, and the universe Many religions following multiple deities believe in not only male Gods, but female as well. On the other end of the scale, there are religions such as Buddhism. Buddhism is the 4th largest religion in the world, and is nontheistic, meaning it doesn’t believe in a God at all. You could travel the world asking people to describe God, and no two individuals would hold the same answer. This is because there is no true way to describe God – all we can do is describe who – or what – we think God is.
Based on this, I decided the only way for me to truly describe God was to go around Trinity and ask people how they would describe God. Even though there were many students and teachers with the same beliefs, everyone’s answer was slightly different
Firstly, I asked Arnav Khosla (3M), a Hindu, if he could put God into words He said that God is “anywhere, and there is a God in everything we do.” He believed that God is the “creator and the person who decides the fate of everyone on Earth”. When I asked him what he thought God looked like, he told me “God looks like anything
and is present in many places,” and that “there are many Gods –some boys, and some girls.”
Afterwards, I asked computer science teacher Mr Spero, who referred to God as “an ocean of consciousness that has no physical form.” This is an interesting response as it aligns with classical views of God as an all-knowing being, however can be taken in many different ways Referring to God as an ocean could suggest they are constantly changing, just like water and other liquids, and adapt easily It is clear that, when we put these two responses side by side, it would be impossible for me to summarise God in one sentence, or even an essay. Over the course of the next five days, I continued asking students and teachers how they would put God into words.
Daniel Pickles (1R) has faith that God exists, although “he varies in power.” Dan believes that God, whilst having created the world as we know it today, doesn’t control destiny – not all is up to him. I then headed to French where I found Mr Van Graan running E-Sports. He told me that it’s impossible to even fathom God, let alone describe them. Jake Aldridge (3T) expects that there isn’t a stereotypical, all-powerful God, yet a “higher power who made the universe and those in it” does exist On the other hand, Cole Mitchell (1R) believes that God is all-knowing, decides everything, and guides you through life. Many answers contrasted others, even from people of the same faith. Daniel Nwosu (JM) looks to God as an “all mighty” powerhouse. Nsama Nsambateshi (3P) told me that God is “not human-like in any sense”, whilst Mr Bright, physics, sees God embodied in
Josh Lai (4T) and Jack Kelly (3D) both doubt there are deities, however they still described God in different ways. When I asked Jack why he thought people chose to put their faith and time into religions, he told me he only sees God as a “thing to explain the unexplained.” This theory is formally known as God of the Gaps, in which God is used to cover for the blanks in scientific understandings As education and knowledge spread over the world, with the population generally being smarter as a whole from where we were centuries ago, this “excuse” is consistantly being used less and less. Does this mean that, in the far future, God may have no real purpose anymore? For example, if scientists found a reason for the creation of the universe, would God still hold purpose?
This survey I conducted around the schools shows not only our diversity but how important it is to respect the faiths of the people around you. Everyone that I asked, no matter whether they were the same religion or not, responded differently, just proving how it would be impossible for me to describe God alone.
I personally am agnostic, meaning I am neither religious nor atheist, because I do not believe nor disbelieve in God I believe that it is impossible to discover all the secrets of the universe, such as how it was made, or whether a celestial being does exist. This is partly because if an all-powerful, allmighty, omnipotent being was real, if humans discovered his/her/it’s/their existence, he/she/it/they would not be any greater than the human to
discover them. This is Immanuel Kant’s argument against the idea that God’s existence could be proven by logic alone. Søren Kierkegaard also backed this idea up
As I see it, it is important for everyone to have some sort of faith, whether that belongs to a religion or not. Faith brings people and communities together, giving people purpose and a reason to keep going, even if there is no one way to describe the deity you follow.
With thanks to Arnav Khosla and Saahil Mahajan for their contributions.
GiovanniBattistaCimadaConegliano ‘GodtheFather’
cognitiveornotto b ?e
UpperSixthRSstudentsdebate the best approach to religious language
Cognitivelanguage is language for which the meaning can be known with certainty. It makes factual claims about the empirical world (what we can apprehend with our senses).
Non-cognitivelanguageis language for subjective language for which the meaning may be interpreted Non-cognitive language expresses attitudes or interpretations.
Shayaan: Cognitive language describes religious language better because religious language by definition is a true or false statement - it's a claim of truth. So, when you look at the example of what Jesus said, as in John 14:6, when he says ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life’ - he's making a truth claim no matter if he is right or wrong, so there can't be sort of in-between when deciding that Jesus is God or he isn't It's the same thing with any religion when deciding whether their God exists or he doesn't He can't be in this sort of ‘middle ground’ of existing and not existing, so by definition religious language must be cognitive!
David: When trying to describe God - not technically trying to figure out whether he existsjust stating things about God such as ‘God is good,’ we can't limit him because he's transcendent and so beyond us. This means that we must use non cognitive language like symbols to properly discuss God, in order not to anthropomorphise him or offend anyone by insinuating that their beliefs are false as the cognitive approach may.
Debate
Jake: Personally, I think religious language is all about influence, as in RM Hare’s ‘Lunatic and the Dons’ The lunatic is clearly influenced by the fact that he believes the Dons are trying to kill them just like in religious language, people’s belief in God truly influences their lives. So, I don't think you can say that noncognitive religious language is meaningless or unhelpful because that undermines many people’s beliefs - language noncognitively influences
everything they do in their lives and so this is the only way that people can make sense of religious language.
Shayaan: It doesn't matter - just because even though something could be influential to you, it can still be true or false. For example, I could be really influenced by the fact that the sky is green, but it could be false because it is blue Just because there's something's influential to you doesn't mean it can't be cognitive, showing that the best way to discuss religious language and make sense of it is obviously cognitively.
Daniel: I want to talk about Tillich’s view on religious language. He argued for a symbolic approach - that language is meaningful and non-cognitively useful only through using symbols. A lot of religious language and symbols, for example the crucifix, connect a person's soul to God and that's what makes it meaningful and causes it to make sense. It’s not about whether there's an objective truth it's about how it impacts or influences individual and so religious language doesn't need to be cognitive - true or false for it to be meaningful - it's about the influence language has on a person's life that makes it useful and allows us to make sense of it
Matteo: Just to develop on what Shayaan has mentioned, I believe it's very important we do not make the error of correlating belief and meaning/coherence. Just because one may believe something, that doesn't inherently give it a meaning. Religious language must provide more than a meaning to the individual but rather a meaning
must be usable by all people in a universal context - it cannot be this idea of individuality. So, using non-cognitive language does not provide true meaningwe don't define the meaning of water by what one person thinks water is - it wouldn't make any logical sense and so we mustn't use this double standard for religious language in order for it to make sense!
David: The non cognitive approach makes more sense than the cognitive approach because it doesn't just emphasise that there is something true or false found in language but rather opens up an entire range of meanings which is particularly useful for religious believers. This is because religion has lots of different meanings for different people. Each person has a different interpretation, as religion is special to them, so I don't think we should put religion into a box of ‘true or false’ but rather allow people to look at religion and make sense of it within their own language games, as Wittgenstein argued, and believe it in their own way –it is special to the individual!
GiovanniBattistaCimadaConegliano ‘GodtheFather’
Shayaan: Religion must be subject to the same verification as everything else, so you can't say that the religion is true to one person and not true to someone else because those truths could be conflicting Just because religion has meaning and just because it can be true to an individual doesn't mean it's true for everyone else. You then run into the problem of being unable to universalise that truth which is essential for understanding religious language as a whole!
MagazineEditors
Caitlin de Sousa
Dhyan Ruparel
Mia McAllen
Contributors
Mr Oliver Hutchings
Harry Lamb
Tommy, Hei, Daniel, Filip, William and Freddie from Junior Philosophy Club
Katy Newell
Dhyan Ruparel
Mia McAllen
Caitlin de Sousa
Joshua Lai
Kieran Logendra
Arnav Khosla
Saahil Mahajan
Matteo, Shayaan, David and Jake from Upper Sixth Religious Studies
MagazineDesign
Dhyan Ruparel
MagazineImages
Unsplash
Metropolitan Museum of Art
FrontCover
Thomas Waterman Wood’s ‘Reading the Scripture’
Withthanksto
Rahul Mehan
Ms Beresford-Miller
Ms Gerlach
Ms Boyce
The Religious Studies Department