Ukraine: The Big Questions

POLITICS Ukraine: The Big Questions

Lenin (a leader of the Russian Revolution in 1917) once remarked that “there are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” The latter seems to be correct when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has seen large-scale warfare return to Europe for the first time in nearly 80 years. This is big news, terrifying news, with many in the West concerned about the conflict escalating towards a confrontation between two nuclear powers. It is certainly one of the most consequential political events of our time — and one of the most confusing, dominating the global news agenda as events move with incredible pace and with implications for global stability. What follows is an attempt to make some sense of all of this by tackling a few of the biggest questions everyone is asking about the war. It’s not enough to know what’s happening. We need to know why it’s happening, and what may happen next.

Why did Russia invade Ukraine?

In a speech on February 24th, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the invasion was designed to achieve “the demilitarisation and de-Nazification of Ukraine.” This rhetoric revealed Putin’s aims of regime change and the elimination of Ukraine’s status as a sovereign state outside of Russian control. Ukraine and Russia have significant, deep, and longstanding cultural and historical ties and, whilst part of the Soviet Union since the 1920s, this rule ended in 1991 when 92% of Ukrainians voted for independence in a referendum. Fast forward to 2013: Ukraine’s then president, Viktor Yanukovych, wanted Ukraine to be loyal to Russia, so he decided not to sign a trade agreement which would bring Ukraine closer to Europe. Ukrainians protested, kicked Yanukovych out of office, and elected a government that favoured Europe rather than Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that, despite this change in government, most Ukrainians wanted ties with Russia. He also worried that Ukraine would join the NATO military alliance with the U.S. and Europe and that this would present a threat to Russia. In response, Russia took over an area in southern Ukraine called Crimea in 2014. They sent soldiers and weapons to eastern Ukraine, claiming to be helping people who wanted to be part of Russia. Armed by the Kremlin, and backed by disguised Russian troops, about 14,000 people have died, and 1 million people have fled to escape the fighting in the eight years since then. Beneath Putin’s rhetoric, according to experts on Russia, lies a deeper unstated fear: that his regime might fall prey to a similar protest movement that led to Yanukovych’s downfall. Ukraine could not succeed as a state, in his view, because it might create a pro-Western model for Russians to emulate. This was a central part of his thinking in 2014, and it remains so today. In July 2021, Putin’s rhetoric became more aggressive as he published a 5000-word essay arguing there was no Ukrainian nation, that the country was historically always part of Russia, and that a pro-Western Ukraine posed an existential threat to the Russian nation. This demonstrates his longtime belief in the urgency of restoring Russia’s greatness combined with a desire to bring Ukraine back under direct Russian control. And in Russia, where Putin rules basically unchecked, that meant a full-scale war.

What has the war meant for ordinary Ukrainians?

As the fighting continues, Russia has started using tactics that hurt civilians. Most notably, they have attempted to lay siege to Ukraine’s cities, cutting off supply and escape routes while bombarding them with artillery. The purpose of the strategy is to wear down the Ukrainian defenders’ willingness to fight, by inflicting mass pain on the civilian populations. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 3.8 million Ukrainians fled the country between February 24th and March 27th. That’s about 8.8% of Ukraine’s total population, causing massive refugee flows to its European neighbours. For those civilians who have been unable to flee, the situation is dire. There are no reliable estimates of death totals; a UN estimate puts the figure at 1,119 but cautions that the actual figures will be considerably higher. Nowhere is this devastation more visible than the southern city of Mariupol, the largest Ukrainian population centre to which Russia has laid siege. Airstrikes and shells have hit the maternity hospital, the fire department, homes, a church, and come close to a school. For the estimated hundreds of thousands who remain, there is simply nowhere to go. The surrounding roads are mined, and the port blocked. Food is running out, and the Russians have

stopped humanitarian attempts to bring it in. Electricity is mostly gone, and water is sparse, with residents melting snow to drink. Some parents have even left their newborns at the hospital, hoping to give them a chance at life in the one place with decent electricity and water.

A humanitarian crisis unlike anything we have seen in recent times

How is the world responding?

On the surface, the world appears to be united behind Ukraine. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the Russian invasion by a 141-5 margin. However, the UN vote conceals a great deal of disagreement, especially among the world’s largest and most influential countries. The most aggressive anti-Russian positions can unsurprisingly be found in the USA, Europe, and the broader West. EU and NATO members have strongly supported the Ukrainian war effort and implemented sanctions on Russia. It’s the strongest show of European unity since the Cold War, one that many observers see as a sign that Putin’s invasion has already backfired. Germany, which has important trade ties with Russia and a post-World War II tradition of pacifism, is perhaps the most striking case. Nearly overnight, the Russian invasion convinced the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to support rearmament, introducing a proposal to more than triple Germany’s defence budget. Though Scholz has refused to outright ban Russian oil and gas imports, he has blocked the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and committed to a long-term strategy of weaning Germany off Russian energy. China, by contrast, has been the most pro-Russia of the major global powers. The two countries, bound by shared distrust of a US-dominated world order, have grown increasingly close in recent years. That said, it’s possible to overstate the degree to which China has taken the Russian side. There’s a notable amount of debate among Chinese policy experts and in the public, with some analysts publicly advocating that Beijing adopt a more neutral line on the conflict. Most other countries around the world fall somewhere on the spectrum between the West and China. Outside of Europe, only a handful of mostly pro-American states, like South Korea, Japan, and Australia, have joined the sanctions regime. Most countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America do not support the invasion, but won’t do very much to punish Russia for it either, so dependant are they on current and future trade with Russia.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) defines war crimes as “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, a set of humanitarian laws to be observed in war. The UN assessment of civilian deaths in Ukraine notes that “most of the civilian casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area, including shelling from heavy artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems”. Human Rights Watch has announced that there are “early signs of war crimes” being committed by Russian soldiers in these kinds of attacks. Following the discovery in Bucha of mass graves and bodies of bound ci-

vilians shot at close range, the US President Joe Biden has called for the prosecution of Vladimir Putin for war crimes. Russia continues to deny this and building a case against Putin, senior members of the Kremlin hierarchy, or military commanders, will be difficult. A prosecution could argue that Putin and his inner circle committed a war crime by directly ordering an illegal attack or knew crimes were being committed and failed to prevent them. This may be hard to prove. Philippe Sands, a professor at University College London, told the Associated Press: “You’ve got to prove that they knew, or they could have known or should have known. There’s a real risk you end up with trials of mid-level people and the main people responsible for this horror will get off the hook.” The ICC’s chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, said in February that he had opened a war crimes investigation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the US, China, Russia, and Ukraine are not members of the court and so there is little chance that Russia would comply, and the ICC cannot try someone if they are not in court. There is the potential that alternative organisations could be involved, and the UN has been suggested as an obvious option. However, one problem with going through the UN security council is that Russia is a permanent member and could therefore use their veto to block any action against them. Any prosecution of Putin for war crimes, even if there is substantial evidence will be very difficult and would take many years.

Any prosecution of Putin for war crimes will be very difficult

How could the war end?

Wars do not typically end with the total defeat of one side or the other. More commonly, there’s a negotiated settlement — either a ceasefire or more permanent peace treaty — where the two sides agree to stop fighting under a set of agreed terms. It is possible that the Ukraine conflict turns out to be an exception with total defeat for one side or the other, but most analysts believe this is unlikely. Peace negotiations between the two sides are ongoing. On March 28th, there was progress on a draft agreement covering issues including Ukrainian NATO membership. The next day, Russia pledged to decrease its use of force in Ukraine’s north as a sign of its commitment to the talks. However, it appears all that has happened is that those troops have been redeployed to the east of the country and observers remain sceptical about Russian seriousness in the talks. There are lots of barriers standing in the way of a successful resolution, for example in relation to Ukraine joining NATO. Russia wants a pledge that Ukraine will remain “neutral”. The current draft agreement does preclude Ukrainian NATO membership, but it permits Ukraine to join the EU. It also commits at least 11 countries, including the United States and China, to coming to Ukraine’s aid if it is attacked again. This would put Ukraine on a far stronger security footing than it had before the war — a victory for Kyiv and defeat for Moscow, one that Putin may ultimately conclude is unacceptable. There is also the status of Crimea and the two breakaway Russian-supported republics in eastern Ukraine. The Russians want Ukrainian recognition of its annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; Ukraine claims all three as part of its territory. Observers suggests that there may be some compromise here, but a way forward is not obvious. The resolution of these issues will depend on the war’s progress and, even if there is an agreement, it may not end up holding. On the Russian side, an agreement is only as good as Putin’s word. Even if it contains rigorous provisions designed to deter him taking future action, that may not hold him back from breaking the agreement. This invasion did, after all, start with him launching an invasion that most commentators believe will hurt Russia in the long run. Putin dragged the world into this conflict; when and how it gets out of it depends just as heavily on his next decisions.