Insights May Edition

Dear Friends:

Greetings from the Synergia Foundation!

This issue takes on some subjects discussed during important conferences attended by Synergia Foundation recently. These include the prestigious gathering of top military echelons from around the globe during the LANPAC 2023 at Hawaii under the aegis of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command discussing Emerging Challenges to Warfare, the DEFSAT Conference and Expo at New Delhi and the C-20 Summit held at Coimbatore on ‘Technology and Security for One World’.

Our cover story is on the views that emerged during a roundtable jointly organised by the Russian International Affairs Council and Synergia Foundation, on Indo-Russian Relations: Evolving Geopolitical Realities, in which diplomats and security analysts from both sides participated.

Cyber-attacks upon CSOs puts at risk the delivery of essential services to the population, especially to the most in need. This threat does not generally dominate the fight against cyber warfare as mostly NGOs and lesser-known organisations are at risk. Similarly, the threat posed by cyberattacks to the healthcare sector is being underestimated or entirely ignored. This must be corrected expeditiously.

In the technology segment, we put the spotlight on breakthrough technology innovations in the field of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). It is remarkable how much progress has taken place and the significant gap that India must cover to remain current.

Sincerely yours

The supposedly brilliant performance of the Starlink space-based internet system in Ukraine has caught global attention, and we analyse how China is quickly trying to get onboard. Staying with Ukraine, we carry a powerful article arguing why there is a real danger from the use of nuclear weapons by Russia in Ukraine.

We also present the views of Western military experts on how Ukraine highlighted the era of indecisive wars in which technology will only provide short-term results but not dramatic conclusive outcomes as it happened on the 20thcentury battlefields.

Geopolitically, we have articles on Syria’s rehabilitation by its Arab brotherhood and the increasing relevance of India in the Gulf security ecosystem. Both these developments are critical for India’s relations with this important region.

We have a curtain raiser on the U.S. Presidential Elections scheduled in Nov 2024. We will continue to track this subject in our successive issues as the race heats up. President Erdogan has won a third five-year tenure after a closely contested election. We do some crystal gazing as to what the road ahead for Turkey looks like.

We hope our esteemed readers will continue supporting us as we strive to further evidencebased research on strategic issues with global resonance.

Maj. Gen. Ajay Sah Chief Information Officer

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COVER STORY

WHO BLINKS FIRST - THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE

“Considering the basic macroeconomic statistics, the situation in Russia is under the control of the government.”

INDO - RUSSIA RELATIONS

INDIA’S STANCE IN THE UKRAINE WAR

03

TECHNOLOGY

STARLINK: GIVING CHINA JITTERS!

Starlink’s global footprint has raised alarm bells in China, adding heightened impetus to the Sino-US rivalry.

PAGE 28

GEO-POLITICS

ARE NUKES AN OPTION?

“Putin and his leadership have, step by step, prepared the Russian people with reasons why he should use nuclear weapons”

GEO-POLITICS

WHY INDIA MATTERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

“India’s positions have been excellent; how we have navigated the sharp differences is quite exemplary. And the position that India has adopted has been firmly anchored in how we see our interests being furthered.”

INDO - RUSSIA RELATIONS

INDIA-RUSSIA-LIVING WITH UKRAINE

“The nuclear rhetoric is worrying; it should be toned down to keep the conflict in manageable proportions.”

C - 20 SUMMIT

CSOs UNDER CYBER ATTACKS

06

The unprecedented getting together of NSAs of the U.S., Saudi Arabia, UAE and India has invoked great interest. Does it augur new alignments?

35

GEO-POLITICS

RETURN OF THE PRODIGAL?

The Syrian Arab Republic has been reinstated in the Arab League. How did this come about, and what it entails for the region?

Cyber-attacks upon CSOs puts at risk the delivery of essential services to the population, especially to the most in need.

IS

TECHNOLOGY

SPACE THE FUTURE OF ISR ?

This article is based on a discussion at the DEFSAT 2023, in which Synergia Foundation participated.

PAGE 08 PAGE 13

US 2024- A CURTAIN RAISER

With barely 18 months to go for the next U.S. Presidential elections, the race is heating up.

41

US - ELECTIONS

22

TURKIYE: NO LONGER THE SICK MAN OF EUROPE?

Dragged down by a struggling economy, Turkey, under Erdogan in his third term, faces an uphill task.

TURKEY WARFIGHTING

A NEW AGE OF INDECISIVE WAR

Armed forces will still be useful in an age of indecisive warfare. They can be used to achieve limited war objectives against an unprepared adversary and for deterrence by denial.

WHO BLINKS FIRST - THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE

The views expressed below are based on a roundtable organised by the Russian International Affairs Council and Synergia Foundation, India on INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: EVOLVING GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES , in which diplomats and security analysts from both sides participated.

The unfortunate conflict between Russia and Ukraine started almost a year and a half ago, and many experts in Russia, Europe, Asia, in the United States claimed that this conflict was a game changer. It was being said that the world would never be the same again as revolutionary shifts in global politics and in the global economy had been triggered. But then, almost the same narratives have been used for the COVID-19 pandemic. It is typical for experts and for politicians to exaggerate and dramatise crises.

POST UKRAINE GLOBAL SCAN

One year and four months after the beginning of this conflict, if just one word were to be used to describe the preliminary outcomes of this dramatic crisis, the word would be resilience. All the participants, as also the international system at large, have demonstrated a remarkable degree of resilience. The resilience of the Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian political system, the resilience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was quite spectacular. Not many experts predicted that Ukraine would be in a position to continue its fight. Russia, too has displayed immense resilience. A year ago, there

As regards the future, arguably the most important independent variable is the current deglobalisation cycle and whether it will continue for a long time or is it coming to an end. Will we see a new attempt at globalisation in terms of an EU rise of direct foreign investments, international trade, international migrations and trans-border information exchanges? This image is unclear, but it will depend on major powers. And, of course, India remains one of the key actors.

were speculations that Russia would economically collapse under the burden of unprecedented sanctions, that the Russian social and economic systems demonstrate their fragility, that the public support for President Putin would plummet, and the political opposition would catch the momentum to complete a regime change in Moscow. Nothing like that happened.

Considering the basic macroeconomic statistics, the situation in Russia is under the control of the government- in fact, the country has outperformed some of its Western neighbours in dealing with multiple economic challenges. Of course, sanctions do bite, but again, Russia has displayed a degree of flexibility and adaptability in its economic system-looking at the rates

“Considering the basic macroeconomic statistics, the situation in Russia is under the control of the government.”

of inflation and the federal budget; both have been balanced. Similarly, unemployment is under control. The country is clearly not close to a major collapse or an implosion. Russia demonstrated its resilience and its ability to mobilise resources. Many European nations and the United States, of course, have also demonstrated these attributes. They were very fast in introducing unprecedented sanctions against Russia, which underscores the cohesion of the West seen at the beginning of last year and which continues. The U.S. has consolidated the Western alliance under its leadership. A global coalition of liberal democracies emerged that was not restricted to transatlantic relations but included countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Even though there are certain dissenting voices in the West, there are no signs that the cohesion of the West will crumble anytime soon.

The term resilience can also be used to also describe the position of the Global South because the Global South has demonstrated a persistent intention not to be involved in the conflict between Russia and the West. This has been demonstrated at various international fora, and there has been a constant flow of important visitors from the Global South to Moscow, clearly demonstrating that the position of the Global South is different from the West. This has been prompted by interests and differences in the perceptions of the narratives that exists between the South and the North.

PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Looking at the international system at large, there have been major disturbances. However, the impact has not been as catastrophic as it is being made to look. The global energy crisis is back at approximately the same level that it was on the eve of this crisis, just like the prices of major food items. Unlike the financial crisis of 2008-09, there has been no global recession. Some financial institutions turned out to be shaky, with banks in the U.S. and Switzerland collapsing, but the system remains intact.

What will happen next? There are a couple of independent variables that must be kept in mind. Firstly, with the war in the midst of the so-called Ukrainian counter-offensive, whose end result is too early to predict, the outcomes of these conflicts are not going to end well for the Ukrainians. So far, not a lot of space has been gained by Ukrainians. Their losses are heavy, but we might still see some surprises from the

However, if there are no dramatic gains by early or mid-July, probably this counter-offensive will lose steam. Whatever the outcome of this conflict, it will have a formative impact on the international system.Another independent variable is the dynamics of U.S.-China relations. At the level of the economic leadership in the two governments, both sides are doing their best to prevent a breakdown. But on the other hand, Taiwan remains a major bone of contention. Unfortunately, the worst-case scenario cannot be ruled out in the shape of a major military conflict between the two nations.

The sustainability of Western cohesion is also under the scope. Some say this cohesion is situational, tactical rather than strategic. It is related to Russia only and is not correlated to China. But this assumption remains to be tested, especially in light of next year’s U.S. Presidential elections. As regards the future, arguably the most important independent variable is the current deglobalisation cycle and whether it will continue for a long time or is it coming to an end. Will we see a new attempt at globalisation in terms of an EU rise of direct foreign investments, international trade, international migrations and trans-border information exchanges? This image is unclear, but it will depend on major powers. And, of course, India remains one of the key actors.

CONFLICT TERMINATION IN UKRAINE?

That Russia can sustain the war is beyond doubt and is supported by three factors.

First is the military hardware. Russia has an advantage because it has a bigger industrial base than Ukraine, and this industrial base is not affected by the conflict, at least so far. Ukraine is trying to bring the war to Russian territory, but these incremental attempts are not very successful. On the other hand, Ukraine receives a lot of military hardware from the West.

The West is gradually escalating its engagement in the conflict. They started relatively small and moved from mostly defensive systems to javelin ATGMs to tanks, and right now to F-16s. However, this involvement has its limits. Europe depletes its stocks of weapons and munitions very fast. President Putin maintains that Russia has efficiently destroyed close to 1/3 of what the world has supplied to Ukraine; of course, it’s very hard to make accurate assessments.

Second is the issue of military personnel. It’s not just about how many people can be recruited or mobilised but how many trained soldiers you can bring to the trenches. And here, both sides have certain limitations. The Russian leadership has argued against the second phase of mobilisation. But there are volunteers and contractual servicemen. There is no shortage of personnel on the Russian side. On the Ukrainian side, many people still can be brought to the frontline, but

ANDREY KORTUNOV Academic Director, Russian International Affairs Council

the quality of the soldiers can be questioned. Ukraine is bringing soldiers to battle with no real training, which is the reason for their high losses. The third and most important issue is social cohesion and public psychology- how people feel about the war, whether they believe that their side is winning or are starting to lose hope. It is difficult to make an accurate assessment because of the lack of reliable sociological data, especially on the moods of the Ukrainian population.

But this resilience is not limitless-clearly both sides are getting into some red lines that they should not cross. A lot will depend on the West’s engagement and whether the world decides to engage in this conflict more systematically. But this is dangerous because it could mean group escalation to the level of a nuclear war. Some voices in Warsaw or Baltic states argue for direct NATO engagement. But this is not the predominant NATO position. And this is not what is supported by the United States. Therefore, we will continue to see this incremental escalation by the West, but without an attempt to start a direct military confrontation with Russia.

As regards the endgame, there are two narratives in Russia.

First is the minimalist narrative, which implies that the goal of the military operation is, the demilitarisation and de-Nazification of Ukraine and to protect the people of Donbas. And if, indeed, these are the goals, then probably, Russia should focus on securing the regions that have joined the Russian Federation recently. That implies taking hold of the territories left in Ukrainian hands and creating a buffer zone for the West.

But the other narrative, it’s not about territory. It’s about the nature of the political regime in Ukraine. If this regime is not changed, we will see an emphatically anti-Russian revanche seeking irredentist leadership, which will look for opportunities to start it all over again. The only way to avoid it is to make sure that some political changes will turn Ukraine into a country that is not as hostile to Russia as it is right now and where the Western influence will not be as significant as it is today. The Russian position might turn out to be tougher and more rigid, but it is probably too early to talk about the final settlement. The immediate objective should be de-escalation or even escalation management to assist in what can later be turned into a lasting political peace settlement.

INDIA AS A SWING STATE

It’s trivial to say that India is the largest global democracy; it can also be argued India is the largest global swing state in the sense that India is trying very carefully to balance the two dimensions of its foreign policy. On the one hand, it remains a major Eurasia power, and this year it presides over the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It is also an active member of BRICS. At the same time, India has its Indo-Pacific face where it is very active and within which it invests a great deal into the bilateral relations with the United States with other

maritime countries of the Indo-Pacific region. The position taken by India in preparation for the G 20 meeting, that will take place later this year will be a very important indicator of Indian ambitions and aspirations.

It can only be hoped that the Indian position will not be limited to mostly tactical, narrowly defined national security or national development issues, but it will involve more ambitious, more general ideas on reforming the global world order.

This is a unique opportunity for India to demonstrate its ability to perform not as a regional or a continental but as a global leader. This year will tell us a lot about the future direction of Indian foreign policy, especially considering that India will face elections next year. It is hoped that the continuity in Indian foreign policy, including its relations with the Russian Federation, will continue.

INDO RUSSIA RELATIONS

The current imbalances in the bilateral trade between Russia and India are an important factor. In Russia, there is a thought process: instead of trying to balance the trade, Russia should try to convert its trade surplus into direct foreign investments in India to produce goods and services that Russia might need. And by doing that, Russia will move beyond its traditional pattern of economic cooperation beyond trade to more industrial cooperation, which is a more advanced format of economic cooperation.

However, there is criticism of this proposal on two counts. First, it is argued that there are simply too many protective regimes in India; for instance, India opted out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. This would make it difficult to calibrate Russian investments so they can serve Russian markets. And the second argument, which is probably more serious, is that this investment will be difficult because Indians are likely to be concerned about secondary sanctions considering that India is well integrated into the global economy, including that of its Western partners. Russian investments in production sites in India could come under Western sanctions, making them unattractive for Indian partners.

To succeed, both sides must work on specific issues and opportunities and enhance cooperation. They will have to go beyond the traditional patterns and traditional areas of cooperation. For example, India will definitely continue diversifying its arms import, and Russia will face serious competition in other traditional areas in which it intends to work with Delhi. But new opportunities also present themselves.

One such enterprise could be a Russian Indian research project to compare our experiences in Africa or the Middle East. Perhaps multilateral initiatives would be more productive and more efficient than our unilateral attempts to get into African or Middle East markets and to work with our partners in these regions of the world.

INDIA’S STANCE IN THE UKRAINE WAR

“India’s positions have been excellent; how we have navigated the sharp differences is quite exemplary. And the position that India has adopted has been firmly anchored in how we see our interests being furthered.”

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

RESEARCH TEAM

For India, the conflict in Ukraine came at a bad time because, by the end of 2021, India was recovering from the COVID pandemic. The pandemic had a very serious impact on the Indian economy. At the same time, India was grappling with Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control. These multiple crises have disrupted development plans, both in terms of economic development as well as in foreign policy ambitions.

THE FALLOUT OF THE WAR

The impact of the war in India has been two dimensional. One impact has been on the economic trade and energy/ fertilizers, and the second on the political, strategic and security aspects of India’s interests.

The economic impact has evolved over the last 15 months, softening in some aspects while hardening in others. There is also a possibility that things could get worse in the months ahead.

Initially, there was a spike in energy prices and shortages of food and fertilizer, but after 14 months, despite OPEC plus getting entangled in energy supplies, there is today price stability in global energy prices. There was a $75 per barrel spike in oil prices in the immediate aftermath of the war, but it is back to a more stable price and supply regime. However, the projected

Given where India is located geographically and its threat perceptions, India must resort to policies that enhance its national power to meet current and potential threats. But it also must engage in external partnerships, which help it to reinforce its national power.

growth rates in advanced economies, both in Europe and the U.S., are more worrisome. For Europe, the predictions are probably a zero-growth rate, while in the U.S., growth is projected at 0.5 per cent.

This directly impacts India as these two are its biggest export markets, which may adversely affect Indian growth targets. The global economic outlook has been gloomy, resulting in the softness of the energy prices because demand is low in trade, and the investment environment.

On the strategic, security and political side, India has had to walk a very thin line to continue to preserve its relationship with Russia, which is in India’s national interests. The Western countries have put enormous pressure on India and everyone in the world. India has withstood that pressure, maintaining an independent line on the war. However, the return to hard security issues in Europe has deflected attention from the problems which affect the Global South. The rest of the world feels extremely marginalized because their agen-

da somehow got misplaced or removed from the global agenda.

A great part of India’s G20 presidency aims to ensure that the voice of the Global South and the issues affecting the vast majority of the globe return to the global agenda’s centre stage.

A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

The diplomatic position that India has adopted has been excellent, and in the way the country navigated the sharp differences on both sides.

India’s position has been firmly anchored in how the country sees its interests being furthered. It is not an ideological position but a pragmatic one, unlike the one seen in the 1950s and 60s. Lines of communication have been kept open with all sides, including Russia, Ukraine, Europe and NATO. Publicly and privately, India has advocated a solution through negotiation and diplomacy rather than through war.

India and Russia have been able to work out their bilateral trade, which has been mutually beneficial during this period. India provided a ready market for Russian energy, procured at competitive prices. However, due to the sudden escalation in trade volume, and the currency of the trade, Russia has accumulated a large amount of Indian Rupees. This problem must be addressed.

THE TRAJECTORY AHEAD

Russia is going to be preoccupied in Europe, and the Europeans and NATO are simultaneously going to be preoccupied with Russia, with Russia; a serious escala-

tion and tensions between the two sides can be anticipated. This is destabilizing because of its impact on the whole architecture of European security. It is going to significantly create serious divisions within the world.

When India navigates its relationships with the United States, Russia and China, it will have to make choices on the developing alignments and coalitions and how these impact India.

Russia’s preoccupation with diversion of resources to the war will remove its limited resources from its other responsibilities globally.

India would also look at the behaviour of the Russia- China relationship because India is concerned about the shape and direction in which this relationship is going or will go.

The security challenge for India from China, has become an almost permanent feature in its foreign and security policy. Therefore, China’s relationships with other countries, including Russia, have become very important for India. The US-China relationship, too, will have a bearing on India.

Given where India is located geographically and its threat perceptions, India must resort to policies that en hance its national power to meet current and potential threats. But it also must engage in external partner ships, which help it to rein force its national power.

and Ambassador to Russia

PANKAJ SARAN Deputy NSA

INDIA-RUSSIA LIVING WITH UKRAINE

“The nuclear rhetoric is worrying; it should be toned down to keep the conflict in manageable proportions.”

This conflict has no early end; it is a militarily stalemated conflict. We will have to wait and see what happens in Ukraine’s summer offensives and the Russian response to it. Even if there is a settlement or an outcome in the war followed by a settlement, the conflict between Russia and the West looks like it is getting tougher, more long-standing, and more comprehensive.

This is deeply unfortunate because it will have regional security implications in Europe and the global situation.

GEOPOLITICAL DISRUPTIONS

Russia is concentrating on defending its peripheries and borders with an expanded NATO, and an overextended U.S. has reinvested in Europe and NATO.

Both powers are pursuing a path where chances of miscalculations are of a very high order, making it a recipe for international stability- instability for some time to come. This has impacted energy prices, food prices, inflation, economic growth prospects, instability, and proxy conflicts elsewhere. It has also given new life to multipolarity because Russia has a sense of rebelling and pushing back against the American idea of a unipolar European security order. Whether Russia will succeed or not, we will see. But the fact is that rebellion has

India has unambiguously called for an end to the conflict. Public sentiment is largely in favour of Russia, but public sentiment also supports peace. India wants normalcy to be restored as quickly as is practically and politically possible.

encouraged multipolar instincts and sentiments across the world, in the Middle East, in Africa, Southeast Asia, Asia and elsewhere.

But it has also created pressures because the conflict between Russia and the West imposes many systemic challenges on everyone, including the imposition of sanctions.

The nuclear rhetoric is worrying; it should be toned down to keep the conflict in manageable proportions.

GIVING PEACE A CHANCE

There are several peace proposals on the table. Ukraine has proposed the 10-point programme, which has little prospect of success as it presumes a Russian defeat on the battlefield, after which there will be a peace conference.

This proposal is not connected with reality. Then there is a Chinese proposal, and recently the President of South Africa visited Russia and Ukraine with a peace proposal drafted by African nations concerned with this war. India has unambiguously called for an end to the

RESEARCH TEAM

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

conflict. Public sentiment is largely in favour of Russia, but public sentiment also supports peace. India wants normalcy to be restored as quickly as is practically and politically possible.

These are turbulent times, and many relationships, including the Indo-Russian one, have come under pressure. But the goodwill, the level of trust and confidence and mutuality of interest in the relationship, built up over many decades, has done reasonably well to insulate the relationship from the crosscurrents in the international system.

RE-INVENTING INDO-RUSSIAN TIES

But the longer the war continues the greater the challenges are, including some that are multifaceted and multi-dimensional. Then it will probably not be in our hands nor Russian hands to take care of the consequences.

Certain weaknesses creep in if there is inertia in the relationship, which may have done well in the past. Every relationship must re-invent itself for the new times and challenges for every age and time.

And the new challenge this time is that the India-Russia relationship is an absolute building block of multipolarity; without Russia’s participation, the world will not grow closer to bipolarity.

But as far as India is concerned, the gateway to multipolarity lies through Russia, and the Russia-India relationship is one of the essential defining features of multipolarity. But it is equally important for India and Russia to see that multipolarity is what was negotiated, not what is conflicted over or through war but through dialogue, growth, discussions, and reforms.

We need new drivers for the Indo-Russian relationship to grow. This sets a basis for making long-term plans for preferential energy suppliers to India, agro products, high technology, cooperation, automobiles etc.

Europeans have vacated several sectors of the Russian economy and the Indian private sector in India, if it had a little more courage and a little more vision, it could take up the opportunities in the Russian economy.

It adds new importance to the north-south corridor and builds up on our cooperation in the Caspian Sea area. We also need to build up the Vladivostok eastern route linking up with the Northern Sea Route.

The sanctions regime is going to be a semi-permanent feature. A way must be found of working around

it both on a bilateral basis and for the long-term. India takes a lot of risk in navigating the Western sanctions, not that we implement them, but there are commercially present risks in the system. Therefore, we must find new ways of banking channels and innovative services.

Understandably, Russia is uncomfortable with the huge amount of rupee resources it has accumulated. But at another level, I think Russia should have trust in the Indian economy. We have been arguing in favour of national currencies for over two decades. Now, there is an opportunity to put this concept into practice.

When the Rupee-Rouble trade was started in the 1950s, it was an investment in faith. We must find vehicles, investment projects, and opportunities both governments underwrite for Russian capital to come to India. In the past, Russia had a lot of opportunities for investments in Europe and America; now, the same opportunities are available in India.

Russia is well ahead of other countries in the field of defence cooperation with India and best positioned to make use of the growing opportunities in the burgeoning Indian defence sector.

Lastly, India is guaranteed to grow by at least 7 per cent for the next decade, and if it does well, the growth figures can be pushed up to 9 per cent. Russia can participate and benefit from this growth as an international partner with a great tradition of friendship with India. Have faith in the Indian economy, and Russian investments in India will only grow.

India is improving and strengthening its relationship with the United States. But what India has been able to do with the Russian Federation in the last one and a half years is also a result of the strength of its relationship with the United States.

If the United States did not consider India as a valuable partner, it would not have hesitated to impose sanctions on India much earlier than there is the case.

Russia is entering the markets of Southeast Asia and Africa, and the global south is a big component of Russian foreign policy. India is an extraordinarily growing and friendly base.

Both countries need a new approach and mental ity to do business bilater ally or in third countries. A detailed discussion between the two gov ernments of a systemic nature will be able to find solutions.

VENKATESH VARMA Ambassador to Russia

The position taken by India on special military operations in Ukraine corresponds to the vision of the ruling Indian elites based on their country’s fundamental interests and strategic goals.

Firstly, to align oneself with the West as some people expected, would in no way promote the interests of India becoming a great power, a sovereign independent centre in world politics.

From the partnerships established on a bilater al basis with leading Western countries and its participation on present terms, mostly with co alitions of interests, such as the Quad, India is extracting the maximum possible at this stage.

While joining the anti-Russian coalition would not add anything of tangible signifi cance to it.

We cannot but agree with the economists stating that India is unlikely ever to enter a formal alliance with America.

Secondly, India perfectly sees through the double standards of the West on the Ukrainian issue, remembering most likely in every colourful detail how similar treatment was applied to itself- in Goa in 1961 and Bangladesh in 1971!

Not to speak about other examples like Kashmir, where the global democratic community would denounce India.

We have in India an American strategic partner that mistrusts the West and has relations with Russia, the largest state in the world, a traditional ally with which there have been no contradictions and any significant issues, a reliable partner in building up the Indian armed forces, as well as in strategically important sectors of the trade like in the field of energy supplies.

Moreover, speaking out against Russia, the way the

prevailing status quo in relation to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The current consolidation of the West under the leadership of Washington, predominantly based on their self-persuasion in the success of their chosen, actively aggressive line in Ukraine, is pushing China to a more purposeful and accelerated preparation for its decisive battle.

This creates a danger for New Delhi to be drawn into an alien war at the wrong time.

India wants to bolster its land defences

The West would be interested in using the G-20 platform for the purposes of its information war around Ukraine.

An important step for India is its as an unofficial but universally recognized leader of the Global South.

New Delhi will redouble its efforts to pursue its goals on this account, utilizing its forthcoming chairmanship in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its voice in the BRICS grouping.

It seems, though, that the United States has seriously miscalculated in assessing the prevailing sentiments in India.

According to some recent surveys, most Indians do not believe that Russia committed aggression against Ukraine and blame NATO or the West led by the United States.

Undoubtedly, it results in no small measure from the tremendous failure of credibility in India.

Indian elites are characterized by their belief in the greatness of their huge multilingual country, its unity, uniqueness, and independence in relation to the rest of the world.

This is in line with what the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called recently, the objective process of forming and elevating New World centres on a fair universal basis having a balance of interests.

SERGEY VELICHKIN

Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to Nepal

We in Russia very much appreciate the well-balanced position of India. And we appreciate that despite the pressure from the United States and some EU countries on India to join the sanctions, India continues to pursue its independent sovereign policy.

I know from the history of our relations; India never accepts any external pressure or even mediation in its relations with other countries. We must consent that India is not only an Asian regional power but a global power that plays a significant role internationally. India is becoming one of the important centres of the multipolar world.

India is also a global economic player, now the fifth-largest economy in the world. In the coming years, it would develop to take the third or even the second slot. And we would be happy because we shall reach out from our bilateral cooperation.

The character of the India-Russia relationship is based on mutual trust, confidence and respect, which is a unique feature of our cooperation.

We are not making the differences between India and China because both are interested in our cooperation. We wish to give impetus to the cooperation within the triangle of Russia-India-China without interfering with the bilateral progress between India and China. We know there are problems, including territorial disputes. And I want to stress that we never thought of developing our relations with China at the cost of our relations with India.

We understand the purposes of the foreign policy of India. It is a multicoloured foreign policy, where India has excellent relations with Russia, EU countries and the United States. We salute this development because it is in the national interests of India. But at the same time, naturally, we wish that the United States would not use the progress of its bilateral cooperation with India to harm our bilateral cooperation.

We understand that during the forthcoming visit of the Indian Prime Minister to the U.S., there will be a breakthrough in the possible military cooperation between the United States and India.

We have no objection in the belief that our military cooperation is quite solid; practically 50 per cent of the Indian arms and armaments are of Soviet or Russian origin. We have excellent cooperation in different fieldsin energy, in the nuclear sphere, in Cosmos, and our re-

lations are unique. For the last year, our trade turnover increased by many times from 10 billion to almost $50 billion.

At the same time, it is very unfortunate that there is a great imbalance between exports and imports. I appreciate the ideas that were put forward regarding how we could use the present situation to further develop our bilateral cooperation in trade. I am sure we can buy everything we missed in Europe in India.

India is a global economic and political power. With a rate of growth of 7 per cent, India, in the years to come, may be the second economy in the world. Even according to the GDP, it is in the first three countries of the world, India produces everything.

Of course, there is competition between the goods from China and India. Our experts must think very thoroughly about what to buy in India and what to buy in China.

Our joint commission on trade, economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation works quite well, and there should be meetings of the working groups to think about what to do with this route for investments and buying such items that we missed because of the sanctions of the Western countries.

The total investments of Russia to India and India to Russia are approximately the same, roughly about $15 billion. But we could increase this. We, in Moscow, understand that India will continue to pursue its foreign policy, which meets the interests of India first, even in this unfortunate and difficult period of the Ukrainian conflict.

Our relations have withstood the test of time. I want to remind you that in the 50s, and 60s, Western countries were not very inclined to help India, and it was the Soviet Union that could build 60 or 70 different industrial-agricultural projects and set up the basis of the industry of India.

Countries like Russia, India, China, and some other important multipolar world cen tres could bring new efforts to lasting peace and security, including settling the prob lem with Ukraine. Once it is settled, there should be no doubt that the position of Russia will not change.

ANVAR AZIMOV

Senior Research Fellow, Eurasia Academic Institute, MGIMO University, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

The conflict in Ukraine created a security crisis essentially in Europe. But the Western response has made it a global and world-order issue.

Coming out of this war is a perspective of strategic autonomy and the importance of multipolarity, not alone of India but of several other countries.

There are many long-term implications arising, and non-nuclear weapon states will start questioning their position under the NPT.

Initially, the Western strategy looked like we were going back to the 1950s, of a maritime order challeng ing a heartland order.

However, this is no longer a valid inter pretation, as the President of China said that changes not seen in the last 100 years will be seen now.

We see the rise of the Global South with many countries resisting being forced into a Western-driven anti-Russia position.

But it has severe limitations because of the destabilization of the financial global financial architecture. It is not just sanctions; it is the destabilization of an architecture we have grown up in.

Even the concept of global commons is coming under challenge because of the non-reaction to the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline.

This was a very serious incident with long-term consequences. India has robustly defended its strategic autonomy, but it needs greater understanding from Russia.

We must be more innovative about preserving specifically our defence relationship, but also our economic relations flowing out of the strategic triad of Defence, Space, nuclear, and energy and the importance for India of alternatives to Western plans against Russia, as well as the Chinese plans for extending their influence through the Belt and Road Initiative. India looks to Russia as a part ner to influence China.

Collaboration with multiple entities is essential. BRICS is important, and India and Russia need to make sure that BRICS survives and is preserved against the Chinese attempts to dominate it.

Russia and India need to adapt to the rupee trade with a change in mindset in Russia about accepting more Indian goods, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and so on.

Russia and India must collaborate on supply chain security and manage their excessive reliance on Chinese supply chains.

The global energy situation did not develop into a crisis because of two factors ; first, the Western countries spent $750 billion to protect their consumers against the higher gas price created by their short-sighted stoppage of pipeline supplies from Russia.

And secondly, the United States has put almost 300 million barrels of oil from its strategic petroleum reserve into the market to control the oil price. Once these two situations change, oil and gas will be another new Great Game.

On the nuclear side, the onus is more on India to be willing to collaborate with Russia in third countries. So that achievements, which we have done together, can be replicated.

In the 80s and 90s, there were some very innovative programs on coal, including the magneto hydrodynamics program. The new materials which have emerged today give another chance for programs like that.

As far as renewable energy is concerned, the Russian strength in geology and metallurgy could still be of very great importance to India.

And if they can devise plans to get involved in mineral exploration and refining of metals, they could evade sanctions.

India’s policies on exploration and production have been changing and Russia need to study them. There are very serious global strategic implications from changes that are coming about, and India and Russia are uniquely positioned to benefit from them or at least reduce to the maximum extent the damaging effects of these changes on their foreign policy if they learn to work together.

RANJAN MATHAI, Former Foreign Secretary of India

CSOs UNDER CYBER ATTACKS

Cyber-attacks upon Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) puts at risk the delivery of essential services to the population, especially to the most in need.

Synergia Foundation participated and contributed to the Civil 20 (C-20) Summit, an official engagement group of G20, held at Coimbatore, India, from May 13th to 14th. The Focus was on “Technology and Security for One World”.

Alittle-known fact, and even lesser publicised, is the increasing frequency of cyber-attacks that Civil Society organisations (CSOs) have to endure. Lacking the status of critical infrastructure or the aura of a national security entity, these attacks seldom receive the attention they merit, allowing the perpetrators to inflict damage and remain undetected and unpunished.

This vulnerability is scarcely surprising because, like all other organs of our society, CSOs are equally reliant on digital technology and the Internet for their operations and service delivery.

CSOs include, according to The World Bank’s definition, ‘the wide array of nongovernmental and not-forprofit organisations that have a presence in public life, express the interests and values of their members and others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.

AN EVOLVING THREAT LANDSCAPE

The seriousness of the threat can be gauged by the fact that in 2020 Microsoft’s Digital Defence Report revealed the extent of exposure of CSOs to targeted offensive cyber attacks by Nation states and non-state

The seriousness of the threat can be gauged by the fact that in 2020 Microsoft’s Digital Defence Report revealed the extent of exposure of CSOs to targeted offensive cyber attacks by Nation states and non-state actors. The attacks comprised as high as 32 per cent, far ahead of attacks on professional services providing consultancy and contract services to governments (31 per cent) and international organisations at 10 per cent.

actors. The attacks comprised as high as 32 per cent, far ahead of attacks on professional services providing consultancy and contract services to governments (31 per cent) and international organisations at 10 per cent.

The 2022 Report is even more dire. It states that today’s foreign influence operations utilise new methods and technologies, making their campaigns erode trust more efficiently and effectively.

Nation states increasingly using sophisticated influence operations to distribute propaganda and impact public opinion domestically and internationally. These campaigns erode trust, increase polarisation, and threaten democratic processes. Skilled Advanced Persistent Manipulator actors are using traditional me-

dia together with Internet and social media to vastly increase the scope, scale, and efficiency of their campaigns and the outsized impact they are having in the global information ecosystem. In the past year, we have seen these operations used in Ukraine, as also in China and Iran, increasingly turning to social media-powered propaganda operations to extend their global influence.

Even an influential agency like the U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID) was rendered vulnerable when in 2021, it was attacked by an emailbased phishing attack. So, the question arises, why are CSOs attacked when they are involved in non-political, charitable kind of activity?

First is their increased reliance on digital technologies, which constrain and adversely impact the CSOs, for example, by increasing CSOs’ exposure to new and advanced cyber risks, such as disinformation campaigns and advanced persistent threats (APT) attacks. Under this evolving threat landscape, CSOs remain ill-positioned and under-resourced to mitigate these risks, making them more susceptible to cyber risks relative to the public and private sectors.

As per a United Nations University Paper of 2021 titled “Civil Society Organizations’ Cyber resilience”, globally, 71 per cent of Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) regularly send email updates to supporters and donors, and half of them (51 per cent) increased spending on technology in 2019. More prominently, Asia witnessed the highest rate of increase (56 per cent) in NGO spending on technology in the same year.

CHALLENGES FOR CSOS

As per the report, despite cyberspace being multidimensional and multi-layered (i.e., comprising the physical, logical or technical, and social layers), research has found that the predominant framing of cybersecurity issues, in large part, has neglected the social layer, which is the most vulnerable dimension to cyber threats.

The lack of awareness and capability to identify cyber threats and be resilient against adverse cyber incidents, such as social engineering attacks and disinformation, have impacted CSOs and remain the leading cause of CSOs’ vulnerability to cyber risks.

Although cyber threats against CSOs of ten have low technical sophistication, recent uses of aggressive zero-day exploits against politically vulnerable organisations and journalists suggest that threat actors will likely employ more advanced tools, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as the target organisations’ cyberse curity posture improves.

Nation states and their prox ies, and even non-state actors, in creasingly see CSOs as powerful opponents to their influence operations. Many interna tional and national NGOs have a deep pen

etration within many conflict zones and carry a level of influence upon the local populace far beyond their size and capacity. This is feared by those who wish to subvert public opinion and either try to use the platforms of CSOs to spread their message through cyber attacks or try to muzzle CSOs in case they are acting against the interests of the manipulating agencies.

As per the United Nations University paper, CSOs remain ill-positioned and under-resourced, making them more susceptible to risks from adverse cyber incidents relative to the public and private sectors. For example, in the UK, where the senior management of charities have prioritised cybersecurity over the years, over a quarter of charities still experienced cyber-attacks in 2019.

The COVID-19 pandemic also increased cyberattacks against organisations, for example, through phishing emails related to the pandemic. The attacks have been exacerbated by the fact that remote working has expanded organisations’ attack surfaces due to the increased use of personal devices.

Many large NGOs like Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and OXFAM, both international NGOs with large budgets, have cybersecurity experts on their staff; they, too, cannot stave off attacks, as was recently experienced. Their smaller peers with limited resources, protocols or ability to respond quickly are totally exposed.

The powerful US AID was attacked by employing a mass mailing service to pretend it was USAID and targeted about 300 accounts in more than 150 organisations associated with US AID, involved in international development, human rights, and humanitarian work.

The breach could potentially compromise beneficiary information, staff data, and more. The U.S. accused Russia of the attack but could not provide clinching evidence to support its accusation, as is the norm in such attacks.,

LOOPHOLES IN THE CYBER DEFENCE

It would not be entirely true if one claims that CSOs are blissfully unaware of the threats posed to them by cyber criminals and antagonistic nation-states. Most

NGOs and social services organisations are well aware of the global outlook on cyber threats. Still, they lack the funds and infrastructure to navigate their digital transformation securely and fend off basic technical online threats even though the targeting of the information they manage could well result in increased vulnerabilities of their beneficiaries.

It can be safely assumed that globally, CSOs share the common characteristics of limited financial means, inadequate technical know-how and IT skilled staff, poor awareness of compliance risks and an inability to engage in long-term cyber policies for their organisations.

Furthermore, their donors, both public and private, are consistently exerting pressure to remain focused on their primary mission and accordingly, the budgets are zealously guarded against any diversion from the stated mission of the NGO.

As a result, overhead costs are ruthlessly pruned, impacting IT and cybersecurity-related expenditures. Not surprisingly, cyber resilience- the capacity to prepare for, defend against, recover from, and adapt to adverse cyber incidents when they occur- suffers.

Cyber-attacks upon CSOs could not only put at risk the delivery of essential services by these organisations to the population, especially the most in need but the targeting of the information they manage could also result in increased vulnerabilities of their beneficiaries.

THE WAY AHEAD

The work of protecting the digital infrastructure of CSOs has to start from the basics, to begin with. External support and partnerships can be hoped for but are not guaranteed, considering the size and scope of the CSOs and the magnitude of cyber threats encompassing the world. For smaller CSOs who may not be able

to procure or acquire expensive security technologies, building a cyber security culture within the organisation is critical by consciously embedding security protocols in all the organisational activities performed on digital media. This would entail clear and simply written policies, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and basic cyber hygiene training for all members.

Larger and more influential civil society groups can manoeuvre themselves into a strategic position by documenting cyber attacks’ human and societal effect and feeding it into national and international policy-formulating platforms.

Such CSOs can play a valuable role in providing credible and relevant inputs for developing cyber security capacity programmes that meet civil society groups’ specific needs, which larger donors find acceptable to include in their annual budgets.

In fact, an effort should be made to convince donors to make separate and specific contributions to the strengthening of cyber defences of these organisations so that their primary social work is not impacted. Civil society groups have a vast footprint and presence in both underdeveloped, developing and developed worlds.

They have access to vast sources of information, and if focussed, they can help investigate cyber-attacks on other CSOs, sharing the best practices and the modus operandi for the benefit of other actors under similar threat envelopes.

Source : Cyber Security Ventures

In an increasingly interconnected digital society, cybersecurity is not an option but a necessity. Regardless of its nature or size, every entity is a potential target for cyber threats. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are seldom perceived as likely targets for cyber-attacks because of the benevolent nature of their work, but sadly, this is fast changing. Even CSOs, are equally vulnerable, a fact that needs to be recognised as a challenge and measures put in place to counter it.

CSOs, much like their counterparts in various sectors, such as banking, insurance, and energy, are susceptible to cyber threats. These organisations must shed the illusion of inherent protection and focus on proactively securing their information systems and networks.

IDENTIFYING THE THREATS

A proactive stance on cybersecurity begins with cultivating an informed awareness about the nature of cyber threats. These threats could range from data breaches to ransomware attacks, cyber fraud, or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. By understanding these risks, CSOs can better prepare for and defend against potential attacks. An effective cybersecurity strategy begins with the identification of potential threats. This includes understanding the specific types of sensitive information a CSO holds, the systems they use, and how these might be vulnerable to cyber threats.

Once these threats are identified, assigning someone within the organisation with the explicit responsibility for managing cybersecurity is crucial. This individual should be equipped with the knowledge to understand the potential dangers, the systems that could be affected, and the measures necessary to mitigate these threats.

A key step is the establishment of a specialised cybersecurity community among CSOs. This approach, already adopted in sectors such as banking, insurance, and energy, offers a collaborative platform for the exchange of expertise and best practices and facilitates the development of common defence strategies.

By participating in such communities, CSOs can draw upon their peers’ collective knowledge and exence. They can also leverage this collaborative effort to keep abreast of the latest developments in the field of cybersecurity, including emerging threats and defence techniques. Addressing cybersecurity issues requires dedicated resources. For CSOs, this primarily involves allo-

cating financial resources to purchase necessary equipment, software, and hardware and potentially hiring experts to guide them through the cybersecurity landscape.

Furthermore, these resources could be used to provide training to staff, equipping them with the skills and knowledge to contribute to the organisation’s overall cybersecurity posture. Another significant aspect of cybersecurity is the implementation of regular backups. CSOs should back up their data multiple times and, perhaps more crucially, practice restoring this data on a regular basis.

Monitoring networks and associated equipment is another critical aspect of cybersecurity. Continuous surveillance helps detect any unusual activity, often an early indicator of a cyber-attack. It’s a proactive approach that enables organisations to respond swiftly to potential threats, thereby minimising damage.

CHARTING A COUNTER STRATEGY

Every organisation should have a well-drafted crisis response plan outlining the steps to be taken during a cybersecurity incident. Equally important is rehearsing this plan to ensure that, should a crisis occur, every team member is aware of their roles and can act efficiently. In addition to focusing on their organisation’s specific cybersecurity needs, CSOs should also consider the broader context of cybersecurity threats. These threats should be understood at four levels—organisational, sectorial, national, and international.

At the sectorial level, cooperation among CSOs can help identify trends and threats that affect the sector as a whole. At the national level, governments need to understand a cyber-attack’s economic or financial impacts on CSOs and formulate appropriate responses. Finally, countries need to share information and knowledge about cybersecurity threats and responses at the international level. Given the interconnectedness of the global financial ecosystem, it’s crucial to consider the potential ripple effects of a cybersecurity incident anywhere in the world.

In conclusion, CSOs, like all organisations, must recognise their vulnerabilities to cyber threats and take proactive steps to mitigate them. As Micha Weis, Head of the Financial-Cyber Unit of the Israeli Finance Ministry, aptly points out, “We are not different from the rest of the world; we are part of it.” This statement highlights the global nature of cyber threats and underlines the necessity for CSOs to become active players in the worldwide effort to enhance cyber resilience.

MICHA WEIS, Head of the Financial-Cyber Unit of the Israeli Finance Ministry.

Many CSOs are passionate about their work but unaware safety and security needs. This lack of standing extends to the broader sues discussed in the panel. CSOs have a significant role in addressing their security and empowerment. Instead of merely receiving policy recommendations, they can and should take active steps to enhance their safety.

The launch of the Global Internet Governance and Digital Empowerment and Security Alliance, and the tactics platform, are steps towards achieving this. Amidst all this, there is an immediate need for the younger generation to be educated about both computational thinking and ethics.

The future depends on young individuals who know the right thing to do and can think for themselves. The current education system should not only impart knowledge but also instil ethics and holistic development. This will help students become responsible individuals who can think about potential solutions and their impact on themselves and others.

DR KRISHNASHREE, Dean of Amrita University Coimbatore

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATIONS

Information sharing has become an integral part of an effective defence strategy against cyber threats in the digital age. The financial sector, which is repeatedly victimized by cyber-attacks, stands to benefit significantly from collective learning and knowledge sharing. However, implementing such a practice is not as widespread as one might assume.

The Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (FS-ISAC) is a key model for this collaborative strategy. The premise of this organization is simple yet powerful: to bring together diverse entities, promote information sharing, foster collective learning, and drive growth through collaboration. For instance, the organization’s Global Intelligence Office collects threat intelligence from members, enriches it, and redistributes it to the collective network, creating a robust feedback loop of shared knowledge.

Over the past decade, FS-ISAC has grown to encompass approximately 75 to 80 per cent of the global financial services network. Even though the information-sharing process was initially manual and labour-intensive, the enduring participants quickly recognized its value.

The longer the entities stayed with FS-ISAC, the more information they shared, leading to a more potent collective defence strategy. A clear demonstration of the power of this collaborative approach was observed during the ransomware attacks prevalent between 2016 and 2018. Information about the attacks, which often

originated in the East, was shared swiftly across the network. This rapid dissemination of threat intelligence allowed for early intervention, significantly mitigating the impact of the attacks on the financial services network in the West. Despite these successes, obstacles to information sharing persist, especially in certain regions such as Southeast Asia. Cultural and regulatory environments often pose significant barriers.

Organizations are often penalized for admitting mistakes, which inhibits the free flow of information. Disclosing an internal incident may even bring an organization into uncomfortable encounters with its legal and compliance teams.

However, it’s crucial to emphasize the importance of collective action. Information sharing is not merely a charitable act; it’s a strategic move where the benefactor is also the contributor. Failure to actively participate weakens the whole system, leaving every individual entity more vulnerable.In a world where cyber threats are rapidly evolving, no single organization can tackle this problem alone. The way forward lies in the collective, learning from each other, and a shared commitment to mutual defence.

The culture of informa tion sharing needs to be nurtured and embraced across the board, as it is the only viable path to a stronger, more resilient financial sector.

MR RAJAT SEN Regional Director, India for Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (FS-ISAC)

In an era defined by rapid technological advancements and digital interconnectivity, the urgent need to address the escalating threat of cybercrime has never been more apparent.

The shift from occasional cyber-attacks to a burgeoning cyber pandemic necessitates the active involvement of not only governments but also civil society organizations (CSOs) in strategizing preventive measures and solutions.

Cybersecurity has emerged as a critical issue of our time, with the advancement of technology making us more connected while paradoxically presenting new threats. Several aspects demand our attention: security, safety, resilience, technology for empowerment, artificial intelligence, and transparency.

These areas encompass securing cyberspace, countering cybercrime, protecting users, leveraging technology for empowerment, and building resilience against cyber threats.

ROLE OF THE UN

The UNODC, entrusted with addressing global drug problems and organized crime, aims to bolster peace, security, and the rule of law, in addition to promoting health and well-being.

With its diverse actors and broad reach, civil society plays a pivotal role in this endeavour. Working alongside governments, law enforcement agencies, health institutions, and businesses, CSOs can help build a safer, more peaceful, healthier digital landscape.

Among UNODC focus areas, countering cybercrime, bolstering cybersecurity, and ensuring online safety are high on the priority list. It strives to bring together countries to develop policies, conduct leading-edge research, and provide evidence-based technical solutions to governments. Yet, as the digital landscape constantly evolves, the strategies must adapt accordingly to maximize cyberspace as a driver for development while also ensuring its safety.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE FOREFRONT

and harassment underline the need for awareness and preventive measures.

Other pressing issues include identity theft, payment fraud, and the misuse of darknet for illicit activities. Cybercriminals frequently use phishing attacks to steal personal information, presenting considerable risks to individuals and institutions alike.

In this scenario, civil society can help raise awareness and promote caution when sharing personal details online.So, how can civil society contribute to strengthening cybersecurity and addressing these issues? First, there is a need to ramp up awareness and education on cybersecurity.

CSOs can organize campaigns and training programs to educate people about safe online practices. This could include advice on using strong passwords, understanding the importance of software updates, and how to identify and report cyber threats.

Second, CSOs can collaborate with governments and the private sector to combat cyber threats. By working with law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders, CSOs can aid in identifying and addressing cybersecurity threats.

Third, there is a need to increase investment in cybersecurity research and development. CSOs can partner with academic institutions and the private sector to develop new technologies and strategies to combat cybersecurity threats. Finally, enhancing international cooperation to combat cyber threats is paramount. The G20 has recognized the importance of this cooperation, an area that necessitates continuous reflection and strengthening.

In this direction, it’s heartening to note the Civil 20’s leadership in developing the Global Internet Governance, Digital Empowerment, and Security Alliance, an initiative geared toward an inclusive, open, non-discriminatory, and fair digital society.

In conclusion, cybersecurity represents one of the most urgent challenges of our time. With its unique position and extensive reach, civil society can play a decisive role in addressing this global threat.

Through collaboration, increased awareness, investment in research and development, and fostering international cooperation, we can indeed upscale our responses to address this cyber pandemic. Together, united, we can help create a safer digital world.

Civil society can play a crucial role in promoting cybersecurity and safedren falling prey to online bullying

MARCO TEIXEIRA, Representative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Office for South Asia (UNODC ROSA).

In our rapidly evolving digital world, algorithms have assumed a crucial role in mediating our experiences, shaping our perceptions, and guiding our interactions.

AI algorithms, in particular, have permeated nearly every aspect of our lives, acting as silent gatekeepers to the world’s information.

However, this newfound centrality has ignited a host of concerns, particularly regarding the impartiality, transparency, and ethical implications of these digital intermediaries.

We must explore the gatekeeping role of AI algorithms, shedding light on the potential implications for society and individuals alike.

THE ALGORITHMIC IMPERIUM

AI algorithms, designed to distil complex information and make predictions or decisions, increasingly govern a variety of areas.

These algorithms dictate what we see, hear, and even believe, from search engines to social media feeds, from job application screenings to personalized advertisements.

However, this omnipresence of AI, coupled with a lack of transparency about its inner workings, presents a series of potential concerns.

Google’s search algorithm, for instance, essentially decides what content we can readily access, significantly influencing our understanding of the world.

Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter use algorithms to curate user feeds, potentially exacerbating polarization and spreading misinformation.

AI algorithms often operate as ‘black boxes,’ with the processes underlying their decision-making largely obscured from view. This lack of transparency raises serious concerns about the accountability and fairness of these systems.

AI-driven hiring systems, like HireVue, have faced criticism for their opaque decision-making processes, which may inadvertently introduce bias or unfairly exclude qualified candidates. AI algorithms used in criminal justice systems, like COMPAS, have been questioned for their potential to reinforce societal biases due to a lack of transparency in how they predict recidivism rates.

ETHICAL CONUNDRUM

The ethical implications of AI algorithms are a rising concern, particularly when it comes to privacy and consent.

The widespread use of algorithms for data collection, analysis, and prediction can result in significant invasions of privacy.

AI-driven ad targeting systems, such as those used by Google and Facebook, track users’ online activity to create detailed profiles for personalized advertising, raising issues of privacy invasion.

Also, facial recognition technologies have sparked controversy over privacy rights, with some systems, like Clearview AI, criticized for identifying individuals without their explicit consent.

CALLS FOR REGULATIONS

Given these concerns, many are advocating for more stringent regulation and oversight of AI algorithms. Regulatory interventions aim to promote transparency, accountability, and fairness in AI-driven systems, thereby mitigating potential harms.

Elon Musk has repeatedly called for proactive regulation to prevent the potential misuse of AI. The European Union has proposed AI regulations focused on transparency, accountability, and safeguarding user rights.

AI algorithms, as the new gatekeepers of our world, wield significant power over our digital experiences and societal structures.

While they offer undeniable benefits in managing vast quantities of information and automating complex tasks, their gatekeeping role’s ethical, societal, and individual implications necessitate careful consideration.

Striking a balance between technological innovation and ethical accountability is paramount as we navigate the algorithmic labyrinth that underpins our digital world.

As the silent orchestrators of our digital lives, AI algorithms call for vigilant scru tiny, conscientious use, and thoughtfully crafted regula tion to harness their trans formative potential respon sibly.

MANOJ KUMAR PARMAR, CEO AIShield, Bosch

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATIONS

In our fast-paced, tech-driven world, data has become the new gold. And in this realm, Personal Health Information (PHI) has emerged as a prized asset, attracting cybercriminals with its high value in the black market. Consequently, the health industry faces an unprecedented number of data breaches.

THE VALUE OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION

The allure of PHI lies in its worth, which surpasses that of credit card details or regular Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Stolen PHI can be sold for up to $363 on the black market, whereas credit card details fetch a mere $1-$2.

This discrepancy stems from the immutable nature of a person’s med ical history, which cannot be easily changed or replaced, unlike credit card information or social security numbers.

Moreover, PHI can be exploited for various illicit activities. Criminals can leverage this information to execute scams based on victims’ medical conditions, fabricate in surance claims, and procure prescriptions for personal use or resale.

In India, recent cyber-attacks on prominent healthcare institutions like AIIMS and NIMHANS underscore the sector’s vulnerability.

These ransomware attacks disrupted daily operations and compromised the data of millions, from the destitute to high-profile politicians and judges. The fallout of such breaches involves financial losses and severely undermines trust in the healthcare system.

STRENGTHENING CYBERSECURITY IN HEALTHCARE

Enhancing the cybersecurity infrastructure is crucial in combating this emerging threat. Robust application and network security measures should be implemented to protect patient

transit. Adopting quantum encryption, which offers superior security against emerging threats, is a vital step, especially for critical infrastructure.Moreover, proper employee training on the appropriate handling of PHI can minimize data breaches stemming from human errors.

Regular updates to antivirus software and privacy settings, combined with strong, unique passwords, can further bolster cybersecurity. In India, efforts are underway to regulate data security in healthcare services.

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has introduced DISHA, a law akin to the U.S.’s Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), designed to standardize and secure digital health information. DISHA’s enforcement would significantly aid in mitigating the cyber threats faced by the healthcare sector.

A COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

Both institutions and individuals must prioritize digital hygiene practices and cybersecurity. The digital age, while laden with opportunities, carries inherent risks. Awareness and caution are crucial for navigating this landscape.

Every digital action we take leaves a footprint – an email, a web search, a social media post – creating trails of personal data.

Thus, it is essential to be mindful of what we share online. Resisting deceptive messages, using VPNs, backing up important files, and educating family members about online safety are steps towards this goal. A culture of caution is imperative in our digital interactions.

As the BESCOM scam in Bangalore highlighted, even seemingly urgent communications may be deceptive, potentially leading to compromised bank accounts.

Adopting a cautious mindset, pausing to verify, and staying vigilant are powerful tools against such cyber threats. In conclusion, as we embrace the digitization of healthcare, we must collectively prioritize the security and privacy of sensitive patient data.

Encryption is a paramount technique, securing data from unauthorized access, both at rest and during

It is our responsibility to foster a secure ecosystem, paving the way for improved healthcare delivery. Only then can we fully harness the potential of digital healthcare without compromising patient trust.

SAMBRATHA SHETTY Chief Operating Officer at Synergia Foundation

IS SPACE THE FUTURE OF ISR ?

The Ukraine war has clearly demonstrated how technology determines tactics on the battlefield. Once a new disruptive technology is introduced into the tactical battlefield, it not only forces change in the accepted battlefield norms but has an impact at the operational level forcing the higher echelon commanders to revisit their campaign plan.

To cite an example from the ongoing war, how deep penetration and encirclement by armoured columns, as tried by the Russian Army in the opening phases of the war, were rendered a costly and self-defeating tactic in the face of shoulder-fired missiles, combat drones and modern artillery using state of the art intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)systems.

The ISR environment is one that is most technologically driven, and in the Indian context, it would require indigenous software coupled with indigenous hardware. To achieve this, a joint vision bringing together the military and civil elements of the Indian arms industry will have to be created.

These indigenous solutions should be able to link up the tactical level to the strategic; any strategic asset can provide tactical intelligence, and any tactical asset can provide strategic intelligence; the linkages between them must be in near real-time.

A military dictum states that during planning if the enemy is granted three courses of action, once the battle is joined, he will follow the fourth one-the battle plan collapse the moment action starts! This will be nullified with the 24 x7 ISR capability from space when there is a near real-time image or a revisit time of fewer than 15 mins.

SPACE ASSISTED IPB (INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD)

Space has no boundaries and few restrictions and enjoys such domination over the earth’s surface that it is extremely difficult to hide objects on land from spacebound ISR- hyperspectral images. Airborne and spaceborne ISR is essential today to meet the modern battlefield’s defence challenges. To enhance the information content of ISR, modern militaries are increasingly depending upon electro-optical devices, including hyperspectral imaging (HIS). This optical sensing technology gives a very high spectral resolution covering visible to long-wave infrared wavelengths.

With increased spectral information available to modern computers, even difficult-to-detect targets at the sub-pixel level can be automatically analysed, distinguishing between hidden features and camouflage, identifying chemical agents, tagging disturbed earth over buried objects, and quickly performing image classification with greater accuracy.

This article is based on a discussion at the DEFSAT 2023, in which Synergia Foundation participated.

Maj. Gen. Ajay. Sah SM, VSM (Retd), is the CIO at Synergia Foundation, with experience in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and counterterrorism.

The new technological innovations have revolutionised what military planners call the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) using space bound ISR plat forms. In non-military terms, it means obtaining a geo spatial perspective of the land.

Today the industry can provide digital elevation mod els with an accuracy of less than one me ter. After that, by using a series of overlays, the analyst can get a clear idea of high-value tar gets (HVTs) and possible routes available to these HVTs in the existing terrain, thus making their interception and liquidation much easier and more comprehensive.

A military dictum states that during planning if the enemy is granted three courses of action, once the battle is joined, he will follow the fourth one-the battle plan col lapse the moment action starts! This will be nullified with the 24 x7 ISR capability from space when there is a near real-time image or a revisit time of fewer than 15 mins. Enemy movements will not be tracked constantly in near real-time. Also, the nature of the terrain that will protect him or expose him can be concurrently assessed.

If this capability of ISR is coupled with the predictive analytics of AI, one could foretell every move of the enemy, at least in theory. The modern ISR would be a multi-domain space-bound operating system that will keep an eye on the aerospace or the land surface and the subsurface. A multi-sensor image fusion will facilitate AI prediction of adversary’s options.

Space will enable IPB to be on facts and not just speculations. It will have to be a joint IPB, with inputs from all three services, paramilitary forces deployed on the border and civilian agencies at central and state levels like the Survey of India and Forest Departments.

All these inputs will be automatically plotted on convergent maps wherein the highest accuracy is possible. The final aim would be to shorten the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop to make real-time intelligence coming out of space available to field commanders. However, IPB is just one small part of the military decision-making process. Ultimately, what enemy course of action you are predicting will change with what course of action you are developing and therefore, the intelligence requirements will also change.

The end result has to be a common operating picture of the enemy and own put together on a common template. To get a comprehensive intelligence picture, space facilitates must see further than what you can shoot. If a cruise missile has a range of, say, 2000 kilometres, the operator does not need ground or airborne sensors to look at targets at this range- space platforms will facilitate him looking beyond 2000 km.

SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Just like for Naval forces, maritime domain aware

it an inactive satellite that has got activated?

THE WAY AHEAD

Any country today functions on talent. India has one of the largest talent pools available anywhere in the world. If we can optimise it, undoubtedly, it will produce impressive results.

Many things need to be reduced, whether it is the time, size, cost, weight, power, bureaucracy, or the risk to our own satellites.

Privatisation will play a crucial role and should be able to plug in and play fidelity. Functioning in silos is no longer feasible-you must come together and optimise. And whether space assets must be launched on demand or activated on demand, all the assets need to be convergent.

Orbital slots are becoming scarce-Starlink has taken thousands; the Chinese are now looking at over 13000 slots for their space- based internet system. All this cannot be achieved if only the Government has to take on the R&D- the civil industry must be incentivised to take the lead on R&D like it is done in advanced western economies.

The shortage of skilled manpower exists, but if India can put it all together in one framework, reduce that kill chain cycle and ensure the bureaucracy is not there, we will achieve the desired aim.

The three pillars of any AI system are data, computing power, and algorithms. The data must match all this, whether coming from 5G, 6G, quantum Metaverse, or whatever, but it must function at hyper speed. Hence, data requires policy, interoperability, good quality archival and storage and operational training because that data needs to be stored. Within that, the users, the operators, and the developers must sit together.

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATIONS

INTELLIGENCE: THE HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE

When we are young , we often believed in symbolism; the colour black portends a bad omen or the colour red is represents danger. But in China red is the colour of prosperity, symbolizing good luck, happiness and a rich life. Analysts working in protective intelligence must overcome such biases including cultural, organisational, self and cognitive interests. Here we will focus more on cognitive biases, They are rooted in the way our brain works and can be difficult to combat.

Cognitive biases are rather mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies. These biases or coding errors often influence our decisions even when facts may indicate otherwise.

Intelligence gathering, or accessing information in common parlance would be available to those who are adept at mining it on open source platforms and have sensors in the right places. In the next five years, it is more likely that ninety per cent of the intelligence can be harvested from Open Source Intelligence Operations (OSINT).

Automation or the introduction of AI is going to be a universal phenomenon in the near future. From cyber operations to disinformation, artificial intelligence extends the reach of national security threats that can target individuals and whole societies with precision, speed and scale. Machine learning is addressing fundamental challenges created by the volume and velocity of information that analysts are tasked with evaluating today. However the problem with AI-assisted information gathering is the inevitable data error that may creep in.

The outcome could be consequential, especially in military affairs, if erroneous data is fed because somebody had not ciphered it well. It could lead misjudgement on the part of a nation-state intending to protect its national interests through pre-emptive action, and the data error could result in a catastrophic outcome.

While AI intelligence is critical to accelerated decision making, the significance of human intelligence (HUMINT) must be emphasized clearly.

While the live satellite imagery is nice to behold, we need humans to accurately interpret and not leave it to AI to make automated intelligence assessments. If the human element

is bypassed, coding errors can make the machine make mistakes, and serious ones at that.

Automation presupposes aggregating data collected from a host of sources because AI cannot work without data. With increased automation, systems increasingly require raw data to feed the system to discern trends.

We now tend to face a more human problem: the competition within organizations. Take the example of the intelligence apparatus of a small country like Israel. It is believed that there is intense competition between Aman (military intelligence), Mossad (overseas intelligence), and Shabak or Shin Bet (internal security).

The challenge that larger countries like India (with RAW, IB, DIA, MI, NTRO, NIA etc.) would face cannot be underestimated. The military has no choice but to move all its data onto the Cloud, and within the protocols for accessing this data, there must be democratisation of decisions.

While such democratisation is not something militaries are accustomed to so, the question arises of how much trust and confidence they will repose on Cloud architecture.

Then there is the perennial debate on the cost-benefit analysis of the time and resources expended on collecting intelligence (what type of int and how much) to make the right decisions. This has been a military dilemma for the last hundred years and will continue to endure. A new class of weapons are now on the drawing boards that are being called knowledge-based weapons of mass destruction using a combination of AI, robotics and nanotechnology that can be assembled in small rooms. No elaborate manufacturing facilities are needed.

This aspect has been amply vindicated by drone technology, wherein a relatively less advanced nation like Turkey has forged ahead of even the most advanced nations in the designing and producing affordable yet highly effective combat drones.

Then, it can be said that Turkey, the successor to the great Ottoman Empire, had the DNA to create such weapons. This could be equally applicable to India, which for centuries has understood space because we have this peculiar ability to think spatially.

One aspect we must be prepared for is that in the future, the adversary will use disproportionate forces to start the conflict to shock, awe and achieve an early conclusion. Many startups are entering the defence sector with purely a technical background and have very

TOBBY SIMON, President & Founder Synergia Foundation

little knowledge of conflicts and what they entail. So, they start projects only when some user asks them to produce some specific weapons system, and the business ends when that use case is completed. This will not lead to enduring private enterprises in the defence sector. These businesses must consistently upgrade them-

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATIONS

INDUSTRY SUPPLIED SOLUTIONS

A 100 per cent ISR is a big question mark, but we are getting there. We have been operating the HawkEye 360 system of satellites since 2019 that can pick up signals from radar or satellite phones on the ground.

The adversary will try to keep his communications to the minimum and hide his emitters, but they need to communicate for some time.

This is where the high revisit frequency of the system

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATIONS

FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE

Aiming for anything above 90 per cent takes an exponential jump in capabilities because the first 80 per cent is easy; 80 to 90 per cent is probably five times the effort. And we have learned this the hard way by working with as regulated a sector as banking and finance.

So as of today, we work with all the financial institutions and all the public sector banks in India, and we pro- vide intelligence as a service to them.

We give them the intelligence on whether a loan to a farmer goes out with the highest accuracy possible.

So, when we are in that business where the finances can be controlled, or whether Pharma has an acceptance or rejection from a Loan Manager, we are controlling someone’s fate.

selves with the future of warfare to remain relevant in the defence sector so that they can come out with products that the military will find consistently useful. Think tanks can work with the industry to help them discern the trajectory of future warfighting and make smart decisions.

A visit to the same area every 10 mins would help since, in a 24-hour cycle, the enemy has to use his communication devices sometimes. If the frequency of visits is lesser, the chances of missing the transmission window are higher.

Next comes the analysis part of the collected data, which involves evaluating the total data collection over the same period, day after day, over several days and weeks. This leads to the discernment of patterns or a spike in communication activity that points to many emitters in one geographical area. This could indicate troop concentration and would later be confirmed by imagery. Therefore, today the industry can provide a complete service for ISR needs.

So, it is putting the onus on all of us. And we are trying to always strive for the best accuracy possible.What we can rather do is to give accuracy and confidence. Yes, we may be 90 to 95 per cent accurate, but my confidence can be, let’s say, three sigma Six Sigma, or with what tolerance I can build around it.

Like us, most of the ISR community or any analytic provider or service provider always struggles with understanding the context.

And what is the user persona that we are dealing with? Because every case is so much incrementally different than the previous one.

And that differenti ator is entirely depen dent on background data.

DR RAO RAMAYANAM, International Sales Executive Space Technology, HawkEye 360

ARPAN SAHOO, COO at KaleidEO (a subsidiary of SatSure)

MILITARY–INDUSTRY SYNERGY

Intelligence gathering always faces the dilemma of ascertaining whether the information provided is believable, actionable, denied, or selected for release. Since pictures don’t lie, means exist to record the action on the tactical battlefield with imagery that will help field commanders make correct combat decisions.

But before the industry, private or public, makes available to the soldier the means to keep the battlefield under surveillance, the military must convey to the industry its specific needs. Speed is an important component of the overall network-centric battlefield.

In the Indian context, especially while confronting China across our Northern and Eastern Borders, we need eyes in areas 700 to 800 km from the LAC where the PLA build-up for any offensive will commence. These depths can only be covered by space based ISR supported by aerial platforms.

This would require synthesising various technologies for which fusion between the technical and tactical domains must occur comprising the industry, academia, the Government, and the military.

Options must be decided on how to pick up the movements of the adversary as far in-depth as possible so that by the time they are around 400 km from the LAC and have fully built up, including with logistics stocks, we have a clear picture before the enemy closes up to the LAC.

The challenge in this existing ISR profile is that multiple agencies are working on the problem, but there is a void of a common intelligence aggregator platform. While expertise and efforts exist in respective domains, no joint effort and synergy exists.

This seriously impacts the dissemination process as to how fast the intelligence collected by spatial assets reaches the man on the ground- he does not need raw data but intelligence.

We have to make intelligence gathering and processing a complete service which has to be built up by the industry, for which it must understand the basic science behind the need for ISR as a service, including its operational dimensions. Currently, there are space and air assets, UAVs etc., available to the military for ISR purposes which have their challenges and limitations because of oblique imagery or the limited depth of coverage etc.

The latest technology that is under R&D by the Government and in some ways with the private industry should provide an enhanced ISR capability with high accuracy, broad frequency coverage, space based ELINT concentration, multi-sensor integration, improved revisits to enable automated image processing persistent coverage, duly enhanced by embedded AI.

The complete intelligence package, including image analysis, should reach the front-line soldier in near real-time so that rapid decisions can be made to keep pace with the momentum of a high-intensity mobile battlefield. The industry must clearly understand the needs of the military. The operational depth areas require 24 hours of surveillance over the permanent military installations of the enemy, their communication centres, movement along critical lines of communications, strategic bridges etc.

Further into the strategic depth of the enemy hinterland, the military would need a surveillance picture once every 48 to 72 hours over the permanent military bases, training areas, staging areas along the strategic lines of communications, known missile sites etc. The growth trajectory to empower the military with such an ISR architecture has already commenced, with the industry fully co-opted to provide indigenous solutions for a common goal.

Warfare is a subject where you want to actually go into precision fighting and where the economy of a nation cannot afford speculative fighting.” “Precision battles [which requires] the technology, which is hugely expensive, competitive in a contested environment, is also very confusing.” The aspiration for our country is to become a global power, but before that, we have to become capable of having civil industry enabling India to become a global power.”

LT. COL AMANDEEP SINGH, Spatial Domain Expert and Author

INDIGENISING THE SPACE DOMAIN

We speak of the upstream, midstream, and downstream in the space domain. Upstream is basically sensors and payload on board the spacecraft, midstream is the data coming down from the spacecraft, and downstream is the analysis done at ground level.

When we talk about upstream, then, of course, comes the question of the sensors available to us as of now, as everybody knows that the full electromagnetic spectrum comprises EO, SAR, IR, and recent hyperspectral imaging.

In our context, we have certain capabilities, but if we see globally, many more things must be taken care of. These are constellations with multi-sensor spacecraft payloads, data fusion and AI prediction embedded in the spacecraft.

These are the things that need to be taken care of upstream. We know what we have in the defence or government sectors.

Still, the private industry must come forward and declare their area of interest, whether in SAR, the IR domain or even the hyperspec-

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATIONS

If you want a particular portion of the land to get your cognitive narrative IW narrative, the space will help you in that with archived calibrated data.

Someone sitting in the civil, someone sitting in Government has the right adds to the repository of data to put things together using predictive analysis.

To minimise the fog of battle, the field commander needs a four-D geospatial terrain matrix, predicting the operational time and giving out what is your own and the enemy’s visibility and lethality profile. If you have a particular cruise missile in your arsenal, can it fire at a

When we talk about the midstream, then it is the question of how this data is relayed onto the ground- how do we communicate with the ground station or satellite-to-satellite communication, whether encryption is available, what sort of redundancy is available, and what is the fallback available.

As regards downstream, the analytical systems have to be built to include the hardware and the software with the technology available indigenously. However, as of now, downstream technology is not available in India and must be imported.

Many foreign companies have created joint ventures with Indian companies, but the technology remains in their possession.

To indigenise the entire ISR system, we must create the technology here in India. I have been associated with this domain for the last 24 years, and things have been moving very, very slowly.

Since the last two years, thanks to government efforts, many private players have come into the picture, but they are mostly launch-side companies.

Of course, there is the issue of security revolving around projects delving into the national defence domain. Hence, the private players must adhere to the Government security regulations.

particular point? What kind of trajectory will it need to adapt? If you have a good image, it will work out camouflage.

It’s not only to cover but also to uncover. When you move on to a stage of quantum stealth de and sensors, we may uncover most the issues.

And, of course, persistent track ing requires minimal resolutions, whether it is spectral, spatial, or temporal.

BRIGADIER ANSHUMAN NARANG,

GROUP CAPTAIN ARVIND PANDEY (RETD), Author and ISR Domain Expert

Sr. Fellow, Geospatial Intelligence in Military Operations, CAPS

STARLINK: GIVING CHINA JITTERS!

Starlink’s global footprint has raised alarm bells in China, adding heightened impetus to the Sino-US rivalry.

Suchitra Padmanabhan is the Policy Research Associate at Synergia Foundation and has Post Graduate Degree in Social Policy & Planning from the London School of Economics

Space has been a keenly contested place, as evidenced by great power rivalries from the times of the Cold War. This rivalry has only heightened in recent times with the addition of new players, such as China and India, who have laid a claim to this arena. Satellite communications now form an integral part of this competition.

Starlink is a highly ambitious satellite communication project that aims to offer broadband internet services to a broad range of users, including commercial and military sectors worldwide.

With a continually growing constellation of over 2,300 satellites deployed in orbit, Starlink is often regarded as a robust and resilient system. Its design allows for sustained operation and functionality even in the event of satellite loss, further contributing to its perceived durability.

CONTESTED SPACE NETWORK

Elon Musk, the visionary behind SpaceX, has garnered immense admiration in China as a beacon of innovation and a role model. However, criticism directed towards Musk and his enterprises experienced a substantial surge following an incident last year involving two Starlink satellites that came perilously

According to Chinese space authorities, the StarNet system will consist of a relatively small constellation of a few hundred satellites. However, it aims to deliver exceptional performance by establishing connections with other Chinese satellites, thus creating a robust and high-speed information infrastructure. This advanced network will incorporate cutting-edge technologies like laser communication and artificial intelligence (AI), ensuring its efficiency and resilience.

close to the Chinese space station. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential impact of Starlink satellites on China’s national security, both in space and on the ground. Consequently, the Chinese military found it necessary to enhance its current space surveillance systems in order to capture highly detailed images of these compact satellites. This would enable experts to identify any particular characteristics or anomalies that may arise.

CHINA’S ANTI-SATELLITE INITIATIVES

China asserts that it has successfully developed multiple ground-based laser imaging devices capable of capturing photographs of orbiting satellites with a re-

markable millimetre-level resolution. However, alongside optical and radar imaging capabilities, the country recognises the importance of intercepting signals from each Starlink satellite to effectively detect any potential threats that may arise.

China has dedicated efforts to the development of diverse anti-satellite technologies, encompassing various alternatives. These include the creation of microwave systems capable of disrupting communications or causing electronic component damage. Additionally, Chinese scientists have made advancements in laser technologies intended for the purpose of blinding or impairing satellites. Furthermore, they have explored the utilisation of nano deployed in vast quan tate larger satellites. China has also fodeveloping cyber weapons to potential ly infiltrate satellite commu nication networks.

China has commissioned research that suggests that it must hasten the devel opment of a situational awareness network that integrates space and ground-based sensors.

China currently operates a significant number of Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites, fulfilling diverse functions such as communication, navigation, and remote sensing. In a bid to counter the impact of Starlink, China has set ambitious goals to launch approximately 13,000 satellites with the aim of mitigating its influence.

China is actively engaged in the development of high-power lasers, which hold the potential to incapacitate sensors or communication equipment on adversary satellites. Additionally, the country is advancing the construction of large-scale radar stations, enhancing its capacity to accurately track the movements of GSSAP satellites and other orbital objects. Moreover, China is harnessing the power of artificial intelligence (AI) to enable satellite operations without human intervention. This development allows for swift and efficient responses to potential space-based threats, bolstering overall effectiveness.

COUNTERING STARLINK

In an effort to counter the domination of Starlink, China has embarked on a comparable initiative named Xing Wang, also known as StarNet, with the objective of facilitating worldwide internet connectivity.

According to Chinese space authorities, the StarNet system will consist of a relatively small constellation of a few hundred satellites. However, it aims to deliver exceptional performance by establishing connections with other Chinese satellites, thus creating a robust and high-speed information infrastructure. This advanced network will incorporate cutting-edge technologies

like laser communication and artificial intelligence (AI), ensuring its efficiency and resilience. Dedicated researchers in China are diligently working on an ambitious endeavour to construct and deploy an extensive network of satellites in either near-Earth orbit or lowEarth orbit, aiming to deliver global internet services to users across the globe. This project, codenamed “GW,” is primarily driven by the objective of countering Elon Musk’s Starlink initiative and maintaining a balance in the industry. Associate Professor Xu Can, from the Space Engineering University of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Beijing, is leading this innovative

forthcoming GW satellite stellation will comprise precisely 12,992 satellites, all of which will be owned by the recently formed China Satellite Network Group Co. While the exact launch date for these satellites remains uncertain, the sheer quantity of satellites in the GW constellation will rival SpaceX’s ambitious plan to deploy over 12,000 satellites by 2027.

The Chinese spacecraft could potentially be equipped anti-Starlink payload designed to undertake diverse tasks, such as conducting close-range and long-term monitoring of Starlink satellites. This capability would allow for comprehensive surveillance and analysis of the Starlink network from proximity.

As per the experts’ insights, radar and other tracking measures would serve the purpose of continuously updating a comprehensive “Starlink catalogue.” This catalogue would encompass detailed information on each individual satellite within the Starlink network. The aim is to maintain an up-to-date record of the entire satellite constellation, enabling enhanced monitoring and analysis capabilities.

THE MILITARY ANGLE

China’s endeavours to counter Starlink coincide with growing concerns regarding the potential military applications of the global satellite network. During the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Starlink technology has been utilised to enhance communication capabilities, although SpaceX recently implemented measures to restrict its use in operating military drones within the country.

The Ukrainian military has effectively employed Starlink systems against Russian forces, showcasing their tactical value. Consequently, Chinese military researchers have consistently advocated for the development of capabilities that could potentially neutralise Starlink if the need arises. Concerns have been raised regarding the utilisation of Starlink services in Ukraine, particularly in the context of drone operations. There is alarm about the potential implications of employing Starlink’s capabilities, including big data and facial

recognition technology, in the ongoing conflict with Russia. These concerns stem from the possibility that Starlink’s services might have already played a role in the conflict, amplifying apprehensions surrounding the use of advanced technologies in warfare. Despite Starlink positioning itself as a civilian programme focused on delivering high-speed internet services, reports have highlighted its significant military associations. These reports have pointed out the establishment of launch sites at Vandenberg Air Force Base, indicating a close relationship with the military.

Starlink has launched satellites from various American airbases and has acknowledged multiple instances of cooperation with the military. In 2020, the U.S. Army allegedly signed a deal to use Starlink’s broadband to transmit data, plus a $150-million contract to develop military satellites, and last year it was transmitting data to F-35A fighter jets at speeds “30 times faster than traditional connections,” as per reports.

It is being claimed in Western military circles that Starlink’s proactive initiatives played a vital role in thwarting a Russia-backed electromagnetic attack targeting its Starlink broadband satellite service. The attack aimed to disrupt connectivity and hinder internet access for people in Ukraine. However, thanks to Starlink’s efforts, the attack was effectively blocked, ensuring that individuals in Ukraine could maintain their crucial link to the internet during this critical period.

The China Military Online Report raises concerns about Starlink’s ability to transform global communica-

tions, which could monopolise the future space application market. This, they claim, could pose a challenge for cyberspace sovereignty for many countries. In the military operations in Ukraine, it is estimated that Starlink has already put to use big data and facial recognition technology to interact with UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles). SpaceX has made a significant decision to raise the number of Starlink satellites from 12,000 to 42,000, marking a substantial expansion of the programme.

The unchecked growth of Starlink, coupled with the company’s aspirations to utilise it for military purposes, should serve as a cause for heightened vigilance within the international community. This development underscores the importance of closely monitoring the implications and potential consequences of such an extensive satellite network. Chinese military analysts have expressed growing concern regarding the limited availability of frequency bands and orbital slots necessary for satellite operations.

They believe that these critical resources are being swiftly acquired by other nations, posing a challenge for China in terms of securing the necessary spectrum and orbital positions for its own satellite ventures. This scarcity has raised apprehensions among Chinese military analysts who recognise the importance of obtaining and safeguarding these resources for national security and strategic purposes.

Chinese military observers have consistently voiced their concerns over the United States gaining a significant advantage in the realm of space, which is increasingly seen as a potential future battleground by militaries worldwide. The U.S. has been noted for its swift efforts to establish the next-generation military communications network, leveraging the capabilities of satellite-based internet technology. This development has raised apprehensions among Chinese military observers, who perceive it as a potential strategic advantage for the U.S. in space-based military operations.

Satellite communication has added another dimension to the space rivalry with the advent of powerful technologies via Starlink. Following Starlink’s rapid multiplication and deployment, China has prioritised developing space surveillance systems to identify any potentially threatening activity.

The war in Ukraine has amply demonstrated the potential use of satellite communication technologies such as Starlink in military conflict zones. Starlink has stood out with its ability to be used in tactical conflict situations through big data and facial recognition technology. While its commercial viability may still be in doubt, the demonstration of its efficacy under combat conditions needs no further corroboration.

"This time the space race is between billionaires."

ARE NUKES AN OPTION?

“Putin and his leadership have, step by step, prepared the Russian people with reasons why he should use nuclear weapons”

Retired Brigadier General Kevin Ryan is a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He served as U.S. defense attaché to Moscow and deputy director for strategy, plans and policy on the Army Staff. This article is from ‘Russia Matters’ of Harvard Kennedy School

Recent developments in Ukraine suggest Russian military commanders have exhausted their ability to effectively respond to a Ukrainian escalation in fighting, which is expected any day. An influx of 300,000 new soldiers over the winter has done little to improve the fighting of Russian units, and the reported appearance of 1950s Russian tanks near the battlefield confirms Russian materiel is running out. President Vladimir Putin’s bombing campaigns have not broken Ukraine. It is becoming clear, in my view, that the only way he can meet escalation with escalation is by introducing nuclear weapons.

HOW REAL IS THE NUCLEAR THREAT?

Moreover, during the past 12 months, Putin has laid the groundwork for using a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. He has removed domestic and operational barriers to doing so and has created justifications, fabricated and real, so that his people support him. In speeches and interviews, he has made the case that Russia is under existential attack — a situation, under Russian policy, that warrants the use of nuclear weapons. He has reshuffled his military leadership accordingly, assigning

Putin’s threats have included both strategic nuclear weapons, which can reach the United States, and tactical nuclear weapons, which are generally smaller in explosive power and could be launched from shorter distances to strike Ukraine.

the three generals responsible for employment of tactical nuclear weapons to command his “special military operation” in Ukraine. He already has tactical reasons to explode a nuclear weapon: saving Russian soldiers’ lives, shortening the war, destroying Ukrainian forces. He also has strategic reasons: rejuvenating the deterrent value of his nuclear arsenal and proving that he is not a bluffer.

Putin’s threats have included both strategic nuclear weapons, which can reach the United States, and tactical nuclear weapons, which are generally smaller in explosive power and could be launched from shorter distances to strike Ukraine. His threats include pre-emptive strikes against those who threaten the survival of Russia. Unlike Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO have their own nuclear weapons to deter a Russian strike. But they have made it clear they will not use their nuclear weapons to defend Ukraine. This leaves Ukraine especially vulnerable to nuclear attack.

Many Western experts say they take the threat of a Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine seriously but make the

mistake of asserting that the odds are low. The result is that many officials view the problem of tactical nuclear weapons as serious but not urgent. Earlier this month, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told a Senate hearing that Putin’s weakened conventional force would make him more reliant on “asymmetric options,” including nuclear capabilities, for deterrence, but that it was “very unlikely” that Moscow would use nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine. Speaking at the same hearing, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, also assessed the chances as “unlikely.”

In fact, the evidence is strong that the problem is urgent and I argue that Putin will use a tactical nuclear weapon in his war in Ukraine. Western leaders need not wonder about Putin’s nuclear-use red lines and how to avoid crossing them while supporting Ukraine, in my view. Putin is not waiting for a misstep by the West. He has been building the conditions for nuclear use in Ukraine since early in the war and is ready to use a nuclear weapon whenever he decides, most likely in response to his faltering military’s inability to escalate as much as he wishes by conventional means. This article will not consider exhaustively what may prompt Putin’s decision, but we should not fool ourselves by thinking we can prevent it. Instead, we should prepare responses for a new world in which the nuclear genie is out of the bottle.

INCREASED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

For much of the past 80 years, Russia’s security has rested on two pillars whose relative strength has waxed and waned — its conventional ground forces and its nuclear weapons. The conventional forces have been used to influence, bully and force Russia’s neighbours and adversaries to bend to its will. The nuclear forces were intended to deter the United States and the West from interfering militarily in Russia and its perceived zone of influence. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s conventional forces have at times struggled with their share of the task. To compensate, Russian leaders have had to rely on their nuclear forces to do both: strategic nuclear weapons to deter the West and tactical nuclear weapons to threaten neighbours.

In today’s situation, a single nuclear strike in Ukraine could thwart a Ukrainian counterattack with little loss of Russian lives. For Moscow, this consideration is as much practical as it is moral or image-related: Last year’s large-scale mobilization and increase in military units showed that Putin’s army was too small for its task. Nevertheless, Russia has managed to create only a few new battalions because most new personnel and equipment went to replace losses in existing units. Putin and his military leaders are running out of the people and materiel needed to achieve his goals.

Russian military and security experts have been encouraging this greater reliance on nuclear weapons for years. In 2000, responding to the U.S. bombing of former Yugoslavia, Russian international affairs expert

and former lawmaker Alexey Arbatov advised that Moscow should “enhance its nuclear forces to deter not just nuclear, but also, large–scale conventional attacks of the type demonstrated in the Balkans.” He predicted a plan some say Putin has embraced: “a suicidal threat of nuclear escalation [that] could present a credible deterrent against a full-scale, theatre-wide conventional aggression — including major ground warfare.”

PREPARING FOR A NUCLEAR STRIKE?

In the first three months of 2023, Putin took several public steps to demonstrate that he is not bluffing about the use of nuclear weapons.

In February, he signed a law “suspending” Russia’s participation in the strategic nuclear arms treaty New START. This step officially ended joint inspections of American and Russian nuclear weapons sites and released Russia from limiting its number of strategic nuclear weapons, Russian promises to remain limited notwithstanding.

In March, Putin announced that he would station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, building a storage facility to house them, to be completed as early as July. Since Russia has already deployed nuclear-capable Iskander ground-launched missile systems and thousands of troops to Belarus, this would put nuclear delivery systems and warheads in close proximity to one another, greatly reducing the warning time of their use. Putin noted that Russian trainers would also train Belarussian forces to use the weapons. Analyst Dmitri Trenin, former director of the now-defunct Carnegie Moscow Center and a retired Soviet military officer, observed that the Belarus deployment “demonstrates that the conflict between Russia and the West is developing into an armed clash between Russia and NATO, and is a signal to Washington that further American/Western involvement in the military conflict in Ukraine could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.”

Putin has taken these increasingly threatening steps in the belief that NATO and the West — in particular, the United States — are not listening to him as he proclaims Russia’s demands on the international stage. In 2018, when Putin unveiled a bevy of new nuclear weapons, he warned: “You will listen to us now!” Four years later, his invasion of Ukraine was a wakeup call for those in the West who were still not listening.

Even after the invasion though, some in Russia undoubtedly fear that the threat of a nuclear strike has begun to ring hollow. For Putin, whose regime is at risk, in my view, continuing to threaten a tactical nuclear attack in Ukraine without doing it carries perhaps as much risk as doing it. To remind the West of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, Putin and his generals may decide it is necessary to explode such a weapon. This would enable Russia to escalate the war to its tactical advantage and let Putin prove he is no bluffer.

Besides warning the West many times that he might use a nuclear weapon, Putin and his leadership have,

step by step, prepared the Russian people with reasons why he should use nuclear weapons.

Among these justifications, Putin has repeatedly invoked “whataboutist” comparisons to the United States. When announcing plans for deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus on Russian state television, he said: “The United States has been doing this for decades.

They have long … deployed their tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of their allied countries, NATO countries, in Europe, in six states. … We are going to do the same thing.” Putin has also several times referenced American nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and equated American goals then — to save soldiers’ lives and shorten the war — with Russian goals today.

Putin has also made clear to the Russian people that Moscow’s red lines for the use of nuclear weapons, spelled out in its official documents, have all been crossed in the conflict in Ukraine. These include “aggression with conventional weapons against the Russian Federation, when the very existence of the state is threatened.”

Putin has repeatedly claimed that the very survival of Russia is at stake in the current struggle. At this month’s Victory Day parade, he claimed that the West’s “goal is to achieve the collapse and destruction of our country.”

He asserts that Crimea and other Ukrainian lands are Russian territory, meaning that, from Putin’s perspective, battles that were occurring on Ukrainian land

one day are suddenly happening on Russian land. Another of Russia’s officially designated red lines for nuclear use is “attacks … against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces’ response actions.” Russia has claimed that Ukrainian drones have struck Russian strategic nuclear bombers inside Russia, and that Ukraine and the U.S. are responsible for drones launched to assassinate Putin. All these claims, real and fabricated, are used to establish the pretext for Putin to use nuclear weapons when he decides.

Some Western observers of the Russian military claim that because we have not yet seen any movement of nuclear weapons, we have no tangible signs of intent to use them. I disagree.

First of all, last fall, Kyiv officials reported that Russia was firing “Kh-55 nuclear cruise missiles” with dummy warheads. Observers suggested these missiles — which are designed to carry only a nuclear weapon — were launched to erode Ukrainian air defences by “decoying” them into destroying the Kh-55s rather than missiles with conventional explosives.

This claim makes little sense: Missiles, even unarmed, would be too valuable to shorthanded Russia to use as decoys. But launching the Cold War-era missiles with dummy warheads to test their reliability and readiness for use in a real nuclear strike would be a good reason for what we saw.

Another sign of Russia’s increasing readiness to use nuclear weapons is the most recent change in the leadership of the war, which both underscores Putin’s message that Russia is fighting for its survival and puts at

Source :The Seattle Times

the helm the very men who are in charge of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. In January, Putin appointed his chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, to head the military operation in Ukraine. (Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said the change was connected to a coming “expansion in the scope of [the war’s] tasks.”) Not since the second world war has the chief of the general staff been in command of a military operation for Russia.

Putin also appointed two generals to be Gerasimov’s main deputies in the war, Gen. Oleg Salyukov, head of Russia’s ground forces, and Gen. Sergei Surovikin, head of Russia’s aerospace forces.

This is even more worrisome since, under Russian doctrine, the chief of the general staff and the heads of the ground and aerospace forces are the three officers who control all tactical nuclear weapons use in ground operations. Putin has now placed in direct control of the war the three senior-most officers who have the authority to employ tactical nuclear weapons when he gives the order.

When these developments are coupled with the impending deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, nearer Ukraine, we can no longer pretend there are no tangible signs of intent.

TRIGGER FOR NUCLEAR USE

With the groundwork laid to justify a tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine, what will trigger Putin’s decision to launch? Most likely it will be the inability of the Russian military to escalate the war by conventional means when Putin demands. For example, if a Ukrainian offensive threatens the loss of Crimea or the provinces that form the land bridge to it, Putin would demand an escalation of the fighting to prevent that loss.

If the conventional forces could not successfully respond, however, a nuclear strike against the Ukrainian forces would be the only way to escalate. On the night Putin illegally added four Ukrainian provinces to Russia, he declared, “If the territorial unity of our country is threatened, in order to protect Russia and our nation,

Estimated global nuclear warhead inventories

we will unquestionably use all the weapons we have. This is no bluff.”Putin is also under pressure to escalate the war from Russian nationalists. These groups have supported Putin in his rise to power, but now are vocal in their dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war. Some, like former FSB officer Igor Girkin, openly criticize the senior military leadership and even Putin. That criticism may be morphing into opposition, forcing Putin to consider escalating his war before his conventional forces are ready.

Claims that Putin would be dissuaded from using nuclear weapons by important partners like China or India are belied by experience thus far in the war. Although Putin values the support of others, he has not shied from putting that support at risk to get what he wants.

None of this is to say that we in the West should pressure Ukraine to forgo its goal to liberate all seized territory. But it does mean that we should anticipate a nuclear weapon will be used and develop our possible responses accordingly.

NORMALIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As soon as Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the “fallout” will begin and spread. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians will be dead, suffering or dealing with the effects of the nuclear explosion. Hundreds of millions of Europeans will be bracing for war. But 7 billion others around the globe will go about their business, alarmed to be sure, but physically unaffected by a nuclear explosion in Ukraine.

This last outcome of a Russian tactical nuclear strike may ultimately be the most dangerous to the international order.

The image that many people have of nuclear arms as civilization-ending weapons will be erased. In its place, people will see these weapons as normal and, although tragic, acceptable in war. Just a “bigger bullet.” It is in this dramatically changed context that the United States will have to decide how to respond.

THE COUNTRIES HOLDING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL

WHY INDIA MATTERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The unprecedented getting together of NSAs of the U.S., Saudi Arabia, UAE and India has invoked great interest. Does it augur new alignments?

The Middle East has been considered for a long time as a part of the extended neighbourhood of India.

This region has always eluded significant geopolitical leverage from India despite hosting nearly 9 million Indians as guest workers for last so many decades. With great powers competing amidst themselves to wield the greatest influence in the oil-rich middle east, India stayed away from this contestation.

However, as India grows in comprehensive national power and international recognition, the Indian approach to the Middle East is undergoing a change.

The recent meeting of NSAs of India, Saudi Arabia, UAE and the U.S. was a pathbreaker and attracted much global interest. As per press reports, the subject discussed was using Indian expertise to bring rail and sea connectivity to the Gulf Region, a move apparently to counter China’s BRI. But why the NSA should discuss a commercial project leaves many questions unanswered. Clearly, there is much more to it than is being discussed in the public domain.

OVERCOMING HISTORICAL PREJUDICES

For most of the second half of the twentieth century, the Arab countries of the Gulf were wary of any

This was mainly what this meeting in Saudi Arabia was about- a strategic outreach by India to the Gulf and the wider Middle East in tandem with the United States. Blindsided by Beijing in the recent Tehran-Riyadh deal, Washington wants to break out of its inertia and recover lost ground. It needs reliable partners with greater acceptability in the Gulf, and India fits the bill.

kind of engagement with India. There were a number of reasons for this. First was the international geopolitical climate. The Cold War started to heat up as soon as India became independent.

Third-world countries increasingly had to make a difficult choice at the time. They had to choose either of the superpowers as their main partner. What they could not afford to do was to sit on the sidelines. This is where India chose a different path in 1947.

It decided to follow a principled foreign policy of not supporting either the United States or the USSR in the merging Cold War.

This won New Delhi respect in the global arena. But it also alienated India from other third-world countries who had already made their decision to align with either of the power blocs. The Arab countries in the Gulf

and the Iranian monarchy under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi were some of these countries. These states were conservative kingdoms.

The greatest internal threat that they faced was from worldwide communism. So, they needed the United States and the broader Western alliance by their side. With the end of the Cold War, global ideological differences were no longer a factor in Indo-Gulf relations.

When an independent state for the Muslims of South Asia came into being following the bloody partition of British India, this was welcomed by nearly all of the world’s Muslim-majority nations. The emotional basis of this was the supposed solidarity between Muslims everywhere.

However, there was also a geopolitical rationale. Soon after its independence, Pakistan had a great feeling of insecurity. It felt threatened on both of its borders by India and Afghanistan, respectively. Islamabad was looking for an outside power to militarily support it. And the United States readily tried to bring Pakistan on its side due to its strategic location in the developing Cold War.

So, the Gulf Arab and the Shah of Iran backed Paki stan during most of its wars with India. But geopolitics never stands still. The undercurrents of change were already underway.

Islamic solidarity would prove to be a fallacious argument for these countries to base their relationship with Pakistan.

It did not help Pakistan in winning any of its wars with India. Instead, Pakistan generously used Gulf money, especially from Saudi Arabia and financial assistance from the former Shah of Iran.

In return, it failed to give back anything substantial. As a result, the confidence of the Gulf countries towards Pakistan began to fall. They came to realise that they could not put all their eggs in one basket in South Asia. India had to be a part of their engagement in the region one way or another.

Great changes have also occurred in the Gulf nations during this time, as a consequence of the Arab Spring and despite its apparent failure.

When the Indian economy began to liberalise post1991, it became a much more lucrative destination for the Gulf countries. Arab investors from the Gulf started showing their interest in India.

In the meantime, Pakistan had increasingly become a state with links to global terrorism. Terrorism affected

every other country in the Middle East, especially those in the Gulf.

These states were searching for a regional partner who could join them in the fight against this menace. Again, India turned out to be the logical option. They wanted to learn the lessons which India has got from its fight against terrorism.

A RENEWED FOCUS

India has also emphasised a ‘Look West’ Policy focusing on the Middle East. The main aim is to take India’s interaction with this region to the next level.

The current dispensation in New Delhi is aiming at a more well-rounded relationship that moves beyond energy dependence and cooperation on counterterrorism. Businesses in the Gulf are also looking at India now as a potential untapped market to be explored.

India does not in the quarrels lieves that stagion is importworld energy and this longperspective has now started paying dividends.

India has conducted joint naval exercises with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. India is looking at the Gulf region as a stepping stone to Europe, aware of the significant linkages that tie this region to the E.U. Even though Pakistan has tried to use the supposed problems of the Muslim minority in India as a wedge between New Delhi and the Gulf countries, this has not entirely worked, to Pakistan’s frustration.

The Gulf States have full confidence that the Muslim minority in India is well protected and secure (and do not hesitate to call out India if they perceive some aberrations).

The investment-seeking Gulf nations see a booming economy with acknowledged social and political stability, which can provide profitable investment opportunities. So, they, too, seek to take this relationship with India to the next level.

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL DIMENSIONS

This was mainly what this meeting in Saudi Arabia was about- a strategic outreach by India to the Gulf and the wider Middle East in tandem with the United States. Blindsided by Beijing in the recent Tehran-Riyadh deal, Washington wants to break out of its inertia and recover lost ground. It needs reliable partners with

greater acceptability in the Gulf, and India fits the bill.

Another significant player in all this for Indian foreign policy calculations is Israel. Indo-Israeli relations have improved at a frenetic pace since official contacts were re-established in 1992.

Now Israel has official diplomatic relations with two countries in the Arab Gulf, the UAE and Bahrain. This increases Israel’s strategic relevance for India.

There is a growing convergence of interests between India, Israel and like-minded Gulf Arab countries. The growing strategic partnership between India and Israel cannot be entirely without America’s silent approval.

This again explains India’s presence in this meeting as in the earlier effort to cobble together the I2U2 (Israel, India, UAE, U.S.) group that was created last year.

India is not the only outlier country seeking to make its presence felt in the Gulf and the Middle East. China is also in the fray.

And it is using all its diplomatic and economic muscle to make its way through. Recently Beijing mediated a peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This shows that both sides trust China equally.

India is naturally wary of China’s growing influence in the Arab Gulf and the Middle East. New Delhi has to engage deeply with the Gulf States, with which China has a strong relationship. The Indian economic model must be shown to be more attractive than its Chinese

Source : Cartoonstock

counterpart. There is talk that this meeting of the NSAs heralds the development of a new Quad-like organisation.

However, the Quad framework cannot be exactly replicated in this context, and a new arrangement has to be worked out among the concerned parties.

A closer relationship between India and the Gulf Arab States is to be expected in the future. But New Delhi must be careful not to get caught up in regional power struggles.

Assessment

This meeting in Saudi Arabia is a good beginning for a greater Indian presence in the Gulf and the Middle East. For the Gulf countries, India is an alternative pole to China and the United States, a perception that India must work towards turning into a hard fact.

Key areas where collaboration between India and the Gulf countries is likely to increase in the future are cooperation in intelligence sharing and joint security manoeuvres.

Any trade connectivity between India and Europe through the Gulf will be beneficial to all three regions.

'You're going through a middle-aged crisis and a middleclass crisis, aggravated by the middle-east crisis.'

RETURN OF THE PRODIGAL?

The Syrian Arab Republic has been reinstated in the Arab League. How did this come about, and what it entails for the region?

While the world has been engrossed with the war in Ukraine and the high-profile diplomatic manoeuvring orchestrated by China in bringing Tehran and Riyadh to re-establish diplomatic relations, the return of Syria back into the folds of the Arab League went largely unnoticed.

For the last two decades, the Middle East has experienced turmoil that has been, at times, the worst in its recorded history. While the entire region has been impacted in one way or the other, the most consequential impacts have been in Syria.

Twelve years ago, Syria was voted out of the Arab League as the uprising within its borders turned ugly, causing nearly half a million deaths and displacing half of its 23 million population. On May 7th, it turned full circle, with Syria being reinstated by the League by a majority vote of 13 out of 22.

The return is not without strings attached. Syria has committed to an ongoing dialogue with other Arab governments to arrive at a political solution to its internal conflicts in line with UN SC Resolution No 2254.

The Arab League will set up a communications committee comprising Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq to follow up on the developments.The biggest surprise has been the Syrian President Bashar al Assad,

The return is not without strings attached. Syria has committed to an ongoing dialogue with other Arab governments to arrive at a political solution to its internal conflicts in line with UN SC Resolution No 2254. The Arab League will set up a communications committee comprising Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq to follow up on the developments.

who has proved beyond doubt that he is a fighter and a survivor.

Though he has been in power for nearly a quarter of a century (and a fourth seven-year term), many observers have given up on this strong man several times in his career.

THE POLITICAL DNA OF SYRIA

For almost half a century, the political landscape of Syria has been eclipsed by the Assad family. The ruling Baath Party and its minority Alawite sect have ruled Syria with the support of strategically placed loyalists in the state’s security organs.

While ruled like a typical authoritarian state, Syria enjoys a relatively moderate culture free from Islamic radical extremist mores; its women enjoy a high degree of cultural freedom. In fact, the current President has a British -born wife.

Bashar al Assad, 58, a London-trained ophthalmologist, took over the mantle of the country on the death of his father in 2020, who had ruled the country for more than a quarter of a century.

His first brush with destiny came in 2005 when as a reaction to the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, the former prime minister of Lebanon, Syrian forces were evicted from Lebanon, a position that had given them immense influence in the region.

Bashar al-Assad nearly paid the political price for this miscalculated act, blamed on the Syrian secret services.

When the Arab Spring swept through the Middle East, taking away a host of well-entrenched Arab leaders from Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to Egypt’s Mubarak and Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi, Bashar al Assad was also considered to be toppled by a rising tide of opposition at home, abetted by Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia and its western allies.

The Assad regime miraculously survived (thanks in no little measure to Iran and Russia), but the country had to pay a heavy price.

Syria is, by all accounts, an explosive mix that can be set alight by the smallest fuse. The ruling Baath Part rests on a very slim foundation, having crushed by brute force all opposition.

On top of this, the Baath Party is itself controlled by a small sectarian minority. These are from the Alawite

community, an offshoot of Shia Islam. Therefore, the regime heavily relies on outside powers to ensure its survival.

AT THE CROSSROAD OF REGIONAL RIVALRIES

The two countries which have stood by the side of the Syrian government through more than ten years of civil war are Iran and Russia -both for different reasons. Iran has had a close relationship with the Syrian regime since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Syria was the only Arab country that did not oppose the growing influence of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East.

Russia also has historical ties with Syria. This goes back to the time of the Cold War. At that time, Syria was a major Arab ally of the Soviet Union. It provided Moscow access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean, which it continues to do today.

The Iranian involvement in the internal conflict raised the proverbial red flag in the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies. So, the Gulf Arabs had to act quickly. They immediately declared their support for the emerging Syrian opposition.

There was just one problem with this arrangement. There was no unified, coherent Syrian opposition to begin with. Instead, the opposition was divided into various groups and factions. Each group received support from a specific country. The moderate democratic opposition could not bring about any significant change. Radical Islamist groups readily filled up this vacuum.

Source : Paresh

They received backing from unofficial sources in the Gulf. At the same time, unrest among the Sunni population in neighbouring Iraq grew due to oppression by the Shia-led government there.

All this created a perfect storm. Due to instability in Iraq and Syria, the border between the two states dissolved. The caliphate of the Islamic State was established.

The United States was in a conundrum right from the beginning of the fighting in Syria. It sympathized with the opposition. Washington offered arms and weapons training to the moderate rebels.

But these forces were facing an increasingly uphill task. They not only had to fight the Assad regime but also the growing number of Islamist groups.

To add to this complexity were the Kurds in northern Syria, who always longed for autonomy. In the chaos of the civil war, the Kurdish forces did get a certain amount of independence. However, this was seen as a direct threat by Turkey.

The Turks had been fighting the Kurdish rebellion in their southern provinces for years. This led to a convergence of interests between the Syrian regime and the Turkish government.

The Syrian people were caught up in the middle of these clashing forces. Many were internally displaced. They moved to rebel-safe areas. Others had no other choice but to leave the country altogether. The first likely options were the neighbouring countries. This included Jordan and Lebanon.

The next wave of Syrian refugees began to search for more fertile grounds in Europe. This created its own set of problems.

So, in the end, the Syrian internal conflict did not turn out well for the neighbourhood. It became a universal problem stretching across the Mediterranean Sea into Europe.

COMING OUT ON TOPS

In the end, who won the civil war in Syria? Apparently, it looks like the Assad regime won it because it survived in the end.

This was obviously a boost for Iran. Its indispensable security partner in the Arab world had prevailed.

For Russia, Syria was a testing ground of its military action before its current war in Ukraine. Many Russian generals, soldiers and mercenaries fighting in Ukraine now got their bearings in Syria.

Moscow tested its latest weapons on Syria’s population just like it would later use the same tactics on Ukrainians. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, an external intervention has succeeded.

Russia still has a foothold in the Arab world.

The Gulf nations always wanted Syria within their geopolitical orbit. If that could be achieved without toppling Assad, then this was par for the course.

This was the feeling that dawned on the Gulf Arabs after more than ten years of failed policy in Syria. The rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia also helped.

Both Iran and Russia know that they cannot possibly play a part in the full economic reconstruction of Syria on their own. As a result, they are allowing financial ties between Damascus and the Gulf Arabs to continue. Syria is way too important an investment for these powers to be lost to an economic meltdown.

For India, any reconciliation in the Middle East is always good news. The secular Assad regime is always a better partner for New Delhi than radical Sunni Islamists.

The Syrian government adds to the support that India has in the Arab world on the Kashmir issue. The impact of the Islamic State has been felt in India as well. So, New Delhi will be glad that the fighting in Syria is finally over.

Assessment

Even though the Gulf Arabs have re-established relations with Damascus, it will be a long time before the Syrian government once again receives full international recognition. There still remains deep division amongst Arab ranks on allowing Damascus back into its fold. Many countries, notably Qatar, absented and continue to support the opposition groups.

Technically Iran and Russia are the winners of the Syrian civil war. But they have not been able to reap the benefits. On the other hand, it appears as if Western policy has completely failed in Syria, as it did not achieve any of its objectives. Worse, any meeting of minds between Syria and the Gulf Arabs is bad news for Israel, which has long bayed for Assad’s blood.

Continued survival for the Assad regime will not be easy. The country remains deeply polarised, and reconciliation will be difficult after almost a decade of blood-letting. The country also needs massive investments in rebuilding its infrastructure, shattered by years of brutal urban combat. If Assad falls, the future is even grimmer; we could have another Libya in the making! Hopefully, Syria will reap the benefits of an Iran-Saudi Arabia reproachment.

US 2024- A CURTAIN RAISER

With barely 18 months to go for the next U.S. Presidential elections, the race is heating up.

FOUNDATION

TEAM

With so much at stake and a long list of possible candidates for the prime post, the U.S. elections promise to be an intense pursuit next year.

The United States is still grappling with the enduring effects of a devastating pandemic that tragically resulted in the loss of over 1.1 million lives. Additionally, the nation faces persistent concerns regarding inflation, which, although reduced from previous highs, continues to pose significant challenges.

Politically, the country remains deeply divided, contending with the aftermath of restricted federal abortion rights, frequent mass shootings, and the escalating impact of climate-related disasters.

This election will feature the usual contenders again while throwing up a few new “long shots” in the process.

BIDEN TO RUN AGAIN

President Joe Biden has officially declared his candidacy for the 2024 presidential election, seeking another term and urging Americans to grant him four more years to “complete the task.” This announcement potentially sets the stage for an extraordinary rematch with Donald Trump. President Biden, already the oldest president in U.S. history, would reach the ripe old age of 86 before completing a potential second term, making

The 2024 campaign will likely be influenced by several significant factors, including the accessibility of abortion, ongoing indictments involving a leading candidate, and the decision to elect or reelect an octogenarian to the White House.

him nearly a decade older than Ronald Reagan when he departed from the White House in 1989. In contrast, former President Trump is currently 76 years old.

Furthermore, Vice President Kamala Harris, the highest-ranking woman and person of colour in U.S. politics, is expected to be Biden’s running mate again.

Biden continues to face challenges due to his low approval ratings and concerns regarding his age. According to a survey conducted by the Associated PressNORC Centre for Public Affairs Research, only a quarter of Americans express a desire for him to run again.

However, among Democrats, that number rises to 50 per cent. If Biden secures the nomination, as anticipated, the majority of Democrats are expected to rally behind him.

Biden has taken significant actions during his presidency, including signing the American Rescue Plan, which provided crucial financial aid to those adversely affected by the Covid pandemic. He also authorised a $1 trillion infrastructure bill, enacted the first major federal gun safety legislation in nearly three decades, and

RESEARCH

implemented initiatives to support veterans exposed to toxic burn pits and bolster the semiconductor industry.

Additionally, he made history by appointing Ketanji Brown Jackson as the first Black woman to serve on the Supreme Court. Under his watch, the response to police excesses against the African American community has also been robust.

One of Biden’s notable legislative accomplishments thus far is the Inflation Reduction Act, representing a substantial U.S. response to address the climate crisis.

Despite the overall popularity of Biden’s policies, he has faced challenges in receiving recognition for his accomplishments. Over the past few months, he has been actively promoting his economic policies and rallying the American public in preparation for a confrontation with Republicans concerning the federal debt limit.

On the international front, Biden has successfully gathered global support for Ukraine in response to Russia’s invasion and has also focused on bolstering U.S. defences against China. However, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan stands as one of the lowest moments of his presidency, despite fulfilling his com mitment to end America’s longest war.

Biden faces the challenge of nav igating a divided Congress, with Re publicans holding the majority in the House. He asserts that Republican economic interests align more closely with big business and special interests, aiming to highlight this contrast during the negotiations.

Despite a narrow Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate and a House of Representatives that shifted to Republican control during his tenure, Biden has managed to maintain a relatively productive presidency. He successfully advanced several key legislative priorities, such as increased funding to address climate change and strengthen U.S. infrastructure, which were passed through Congress early in his first term.

Among the Democratic candidates, only two longshot contenders have entered the race to challenge Biden so fare. Notably, Marianne Williamson, an author and spiritual leader, and Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the son of the late Robert F. Kennedy, stand out as notable figures in the Democratic field.

Marianne Williamson, a former self-help author, previously ran for the presidency in 2020 but was unsuccessful. In March, she announced her intention to run again for the presidency. Williamson has embraced crucial themes of economic and racial justice in her campaign. She advocates for the protection of social security, strengthening labour unions through increased support, and pursuing slavery reparations for Black Americans.

Another candidate for running is Robert F Kennedy Jr. Kennedy, known as an anti-vaccine activist and the nephew of former U.S. President John F. Kennedy, who officially launched his candidacy in April.

If elected, Kennedy has pledged to vigorously challenge the “corrupt merger between state and corporate power.” This commitment reflects his determination to address and counteract the influence and collusion between the government and corporate entities.

THE REPUBLICAN LINE-UP

Following the November midterms, Trump announced his candidacy. The Republican field has seen several notable contenders enter the race. Nikki Haley, the former Governor of South Carolina, has already launched her campaign. Additionally, Senator Tim Scott and Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida have also thrown their hats into the ring. While former Vice President Mike Pence is widely anticipated to join the Republican arena, he has not made an official announcement as yet.

Trump’s ability to tap into the public’s frustration with the U.S. political establishment has granted him a lead over his competitors in the race for the Republican nomination. Furthermore, he continues to wield significant influence over the party’s voters.

Trump has adopted a populist stance on various issues, such as free trade and foreign policy, emphasising an “America First” approach. Additionally, he has embraced far-right rhetoric, particularly targeting immigrants and Muslims. During his presidency, Trump primarily governed following traditional Republican principles, with his most notable legislative accomplishment being a series of tax cuts that predominantly favoured the affluent.

In May, Ron DeSantis, the governor of Florida and widely perceived as one of the leading contenders to challenge Trump for the 2024 nomination, officially announced his presidential campaign.

DeSantis has gained significant traction within conservative circles by advocating for right-wing causes in Florida, notably addressing issues such as abortion, education, and COVID-19 mitigation measures. His stance on these matters has helped elevate his profile and generate support among conservative voters.DeSantis has characterised the conflict in Ukraine as a “territorial dispute” rather than a primary national security concern for the United States.

Recent public opinion polls indicate that Trump holds a substantial lead over DeSantis both on a national level and in early primary states. Trump’s popularity among voters surpasses that of DeSantis by a significant margin.

Mike Pence, the former vice president who served under Trump, has expressed his contemplation of a

presidential run in 2024. Pence was previously a steadfast advocate for the former president but experienced a fallout with Trump when he declined to utilise his ceremonial responsibility overseeing the electoral college count in Congress to overturn the results of the 2020 elections. Among the Republican presidential contenders, Pence has emerged as one of the most vocal advocates for U.S. assistance to Ukraine.

Throughout his political career, Pence has prominently integrated his Christian faith and has been an outspoken supporter of the anti-abortion movement. In April, he expressed his intent to remove the abortion pill Mifepristone from the market in an effort to safeguard the rights of the unborn.

With a longstanding career in South Carolina politics, Senator Tim Scott joined the race in May with a significant advantage of nearly $22 million in cash on hand, surpassing his competitors. As the sole African American to have served in both houses of Congress, the 57-year-old has represented South Carolina in the Senate since 2013. Scott’s background includes being the grandson of a cotton field labourer and the son of a single mother.

He often shares the inspiring story of his family’s journey “from cotton to Congress” within a single generation. Upon launching his bid for the 2024 presidential campaign, he pledged to reverse the nation’s perceived decline and revive America’s “culture of greatness.”

Nikki Haley, who formerly served as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has been relatively re-

strained in her criticisms of Trump but has staked her claim on the grounds that it was time for a new generation of Republican leaders to take the lead. She has advocated a confrontational approach towards Iran and displayed staunch support for U.S. allies in the region, particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Vivek Ramaswamy, a 36-year-old Indian American biotech entrepreneur, emerged as an unexpected candidate for the White House in late February when he announced his bid during an appearance on the Fox News channel.

Despite lacking prior political experience, he gained visibility as a regular guest on Tucker Carlson’s widely watched program, formerly the top-rated cable news show in the U.S. Ramaswamy, a graduate of Harvard and Yale, argues that the nation is currently grappling with a crisis of national identity, which he attributes to a decline in faith, patriotism, and meritocracy.

Asa Hutchinson, the former two-term governor of Arkansas, officially declared his candidacy for president in April during an interview with ABC News. Hutchinson boasts an impressive career as an attorney, businessman, and public servant.

He held the distinction of being the youngest federal prosecutor in the nation during the Ronald Reagan administration. Additionally, he served two terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, where he acted as a prosecutor in Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial. Presenting himself as a “non-Trump” candidate, Hutchinson emphasises his extensive experience and consis-

DESANTIS OR TRUMP IN 2024?

Share of Republican voters who would choose the following candidates for the 2024 nomination (in %)

tent conservative approach. He aims to bring forward a common-sense approach to governance and leadership.

Larry Elder, a conservative talk show host, made a bid for California governor in 2021, advocating for the repeal of mask and vaccine mandates.

With a background in law, the 71-year-old Elder has been vocal in criticising the “woke” agenda of Democrats and rejecting the concept of systemic racism. In announcing his campaign, he took to Twitter, stating, “America is in decline, but this decline is not inevitable.”

Glenn Youngkin’s victory in the 2021 Virginia governor’s race delighted the Republican Party. Despite being a political newcomer with a background of 25 years in the private equity firm Carlyle Group, he triumphed over a longstanding Democratic politician.

He campaigned on a platform emphasising bipartisanship. However, since assuming office, the 55-year-old governor has delved into contentious subjects, ranging from rescinding Covid-19 restrictions to implementing a ban on teaching critical race theory in schools.

Although he initially stated that he would not enter the 2024 presidential race, reports indicate that Mr Youngkin is reconsidering his decision due to growing donor interest in a non-Trump candidate. Perry Johnson, a 75-year-old businessman who was previously disqualified from running for Michigan governor last year,

entered the race again in March. His campaign focuses on a proposal to reinvigorate the economy by implementing an annual 2% reduction in federal spending.

Other probable candidates, too, include Chris Sununu, a moderate Republican. He has been a popular governor for New Hampshire since 2017 and commented that he is exploring avenues to mount a viable campaign. Doug Burgum, the former software executive and current governor of North Dakota, has already produced television advertisements for a potential presidential campaign.

Francis Suarez, the mayor of Miami and a Cuban-born politician, is considering a bid for the presidency. He gained attention for being the first U.S. politician to receive a salary in cryptocurrency and believes he needs greater recognition nationwide.

Will Hurd, a former congressman from Texas who retired in 2021, views a 2024 rematch between Donald Trump and President Joe Biden as a contentious and undesirable scenario that few Americans want to witness.

Liz Cheney, the daughter of former vice-president Dick Cheney, was once seen as a rising star within the party but lost her seat in the House of Representatives in 2021 due to her staunch opposition to Mr Trump. Greg Abbott, the governor of Texas, frequently engages in national discussions on immigration, abortion, and gun rights.

Source : Global Times

The 2024 campaign will likely be influenced by several significant factors, including the accessibility of abortion, ongoing indictments involving a leading candidate, and the decision to elect or re-elect an octogenarian to the White House.

Social security and Medicare remain contentious friction points among the list of regular issues plaguing the man on the street. In the State of the Union address, President Biden criticised Republicans for their past suggestions to sunset or modify eligibility criteria for Social Security and Medicare programs. This critique takes place amidst the ongoing debate surrounding the nation’s debt limit and the Republicans’ persistent demand for spending reductions.

Education is emerging as a prominent topic among potential Republican candidates for the 2024 election. Glenn Youngkin, the Governor of Virginia and a potential presidential contender in 2024 has prominently highlighted education as a crucial aspect of his platform.

He has specifically focused on opposing critical race theory (CRT) and advocating for increased parental involvement in shaping the school curriculum. Critical race theory, is an academic framework taught at the graduate level, which asserts that racism is deeply ingrained in various U.S. institutions and the government.

Abortion continues to be an important sticking point. The Democratic Party attributes their stronger-than-expected performance in the November midterm elections to the issue of abortion. They believe this topic played a significant role in their success, allowing them to secure a true majority in the Senate while narrowly losing control of the House of Representatives. In important races this year, Democrats are actively prioritising the issue of abortion, aiming to bring it to the forefront again.

While immigration and the situation at the southern border have been longstanding concerns for Republicans during election campaigns, it does not diminish the likelihood of these issues taking centre stage in various campaigns and debates.

Mr Trump’s anti-Mexico/ anti-immigrant stance has won him the majority of his supporters in the right-wing dominated mid-west America. However, the more liberal Democrats have refrained from taking drastic steps on the issue. The Title 42 policy, initially implemented in 2020 under the Trump administration and maintained by the Biden administration, has been a persistent challenge for officials in the Biden administration.

While the issue of crime is not novel, it is one that many Republicans perceived as effective during the November midterms. They argued that topics such as abortion and the economy diverted attention from crime-related concerns, hindering its desired impact. Conversely, some assert that highlighting crime helped keep crucial races competitive. The emphasis on crime

played a crucial role in securing key House districts for several New York Republicans, ultimately contributing to the GOP’s majority in the House.

A high voltage issue this time is anticipated to be foreign policy against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. In recent months, certain Republicans have voiced concerns regarding the extent of security assistance the United States should offer Ukraine without jeopardising its ability to wage long-duration wars. Another issue being debated is whether the U.S. should invest in the security of former members of the USSR who are now in the orbit of the West.

The increasing hostility with China is one foreign policy issue with a bipartisan response. Of course, the tone and tenor of dialogue differ, with Mr Biden restricting his utterances to diplomatic niceties.

Both sides have tried to raise the spectre of legal action against their star candidates. Both Trump and Biden are facing federal investigations concerning their handling of classified information. In Biden’s case, documents were found at his office and residence, and his legal team emphasised their cooperation with authorities.

On the other hand, Mr Trump has resisted attempts to retrieve materials he brought to his Florida estate. However, this is just one of many legal challenges he is confronting. Recently, Trump pleaded not guilty to 34 criminal charges related to hush money payments to a porn star.

He also faces investigations into his efforts to overturn the 2020 election, a trial regarding a rape accusation, and a civil lawsuit concerning his business affairs.

Assessment

U.S. elections 2024 promises to be a nail-biting contest with the world watching. There is much at stake for both the issues within the states as well as on the international front. While the battle in Ukraine will keep CenterStage on the international front, issues of inflation and local concerns on abortion, education and crime will dominate the domestic landscape.

It isearly days yet, as can be seen from the long list of possible candidates emerging to take a long shot. While the penultimate race could be fought between old rivals Biden and Trump, there are new and some serious challenges to this rivalry.

The Republicans promise an exciting contest with a new set of youngsters challenging the ‘older generation.’ It will be interesting to see the impact on issues and ideologies due to this diverse battleground.

TURKIYE: NO LONGER THE SICK MAN OF EUROPE?

As the 19th largest economy in the world, with a GDP of roughly $906 billion, Turkey is a major geopolitical player. Its strategic geography, which bridges Asia with Europe and controls some of the most crucial sea lanes, makes this successor to the Ottoman Empire relevant in current geopolitical competitions.

It is a member of the OECD and the G20 and an increasingly important donor of Official Development Assistance, and its writ runs large in the Middle East. After the U.S., Turkey fields the largest military contingent in NATO, an organisation with which it often has serious differences.

Turkey has historically harboured ambitions of regaining its global status as the successor to the Ottomans ever since the fading Empire was eviscerated by the victorious Triple Entente powers after the Great War.

AT HOME AND ABROAD

2016 was a watershed year that witnessed the resignation of Davutoglu as PM, followed by a coup attempt. Turkish foreign policy witnessed a remarkable evolution under Erdogan, which was particularly significant concerning the Kurdish issue in both its internal and external dimensions.

Erdogan is facing challenges stemming from a struggling economy and a chaotic initial response to the earthquake that occurred in February. The government acknowledged its errors in the rescue operation and issued an apology to the public. Critics of Erdogan have also highlighted the lax construction standards overseen by the ruling AK party, which contributed to the high death toll. They argue that the earthquake response exemplifies Erdogan’s alleged erosion of government institutions as he consolidated power.

Furthermore, the Western response to the failed coup attempt added to Erdogan’s grievances against Turkey’s traditional Western allies and prompted him to seek closer collaboration with Russia.

According to Turkish scholars, this marked the replacement of the Davutoglu doctrine with the “Erdogan doctrine.” Essentially, the “Erdogan doctrine” embodied a more assertive and aggressive foreign policy, where Turkey employed proxy forces and direct military power.

The situations in Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean served as striking examples of Turkey’s pow-

Dragged down by a struggling economy, Turkey, under Erdogan in his third term, faces an uphill task. RESEARCH TEAM

er projection. Turkey’s Achille’s heel has been its economy which has put the brakes on its power aspirations and its burning desire to join the EU.

The country pursued ambitious reforms and enjoyed high growth rates between 2006 and 2017, propelling it to upper-middle-income status, and abject poverty became rare.

In the last decade, however, productivity growth has slowed as reform momentum waned despite resorting to measures to sustain credit booms and demand stimulus.

High private sector debt, persistent current account deficits, high inflation, and high unemployment have been exacerbated by macro-financial instability since August 2018.

In an extension of the strong COVID-19 pandemic recovery, the economy grew at 5.6 per cent in 2022. However, the economy has been losing momentum amidst a deteriorating external environment and heterodox monetary policies.

Two devastating earthquakes struck on February 6th, 2023; beyond the human tragedy, physical damage in 11 provinces accounted for 16.4 per cent of Turkey’s population and 9.4 per cent of its economy. Direct losses are estimated at $34.2 billion, but the reconstruction needs could be double.

The earthquakes added pressures to an increasingly fragile macro-financial situation. Pre-election spending and reconstruction efforts are expected to support growth, forecast at 3.2 per cent in 2023 and 4.3 per cent in 2024.

THE ERDOGAN EFFECT

In the recently concluded elections, Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerged victorious in a run-off election, securing another five-year term as Turkey’s President.

With just over 52 per cent of the vote, as indicated by near-complete unofficial results, President Erdogan garnered the majority of support. However, it is important to note that nearly half of the electorate in this deeply polarised country did not endorse his authoritarian vision for Turkey.

Erdogan is facing challenges stemming from a struggling economy and a chaotic initial response to the earthquake that occurred in February. The government acknowledged its errors in the rescue operation and issued an apology to the public.

Critics of Erdogan have also highlighted the lax construction standards overseen by the ruling AK party, which contributed to the high death toll.

They argue that the earthquake response exemplifies Erdogan’s alleged erosion of government institutions as he consolidated power.

The country’s financial crisis, marked by a sharp decline in the currency value and soaring prices, is partially attributed to Erdogan’s policies. Critics argue that his suppression of interest rates has allowed inflation to spiral out of control.

During an interview with CNN’s Anderson last week, Erdogan expressed his determination to continue his unconventional economic policies, asserting that interest rates and inflation were positively correlated.

The President is confronted with evident challenges that require immediate attention, with the soaring inflation rate being the most significant issue. Inflation, reaching an annual rate of nearly 44 per cent, permeates citizens’ daily lives.

The cost of essential commodities such as food, rent, and other everyday goods has skyrocketed, exacerbated by Mr Erdogan’s rejection of conventional economic policies, including the reluctance to increase interest rates. As a result, the Turkish lira has plummeted to record lows against the dollar while the central bank grapples to meet the escalating demand for foreign currency.

While Mr Erdogan once fervently favoured Turkey’s accession to the European Union, his current rhetoric revolves around the concept of “making Turkey great again.” This vision has led him to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy.

Over the years, he has cultivated highly transactional relationships with all of his allies, prioritising pragmatic interests and outcomes above all else.

GEOPOLITICAL BALANCING

Turkey has long been recognised as a crucial link between Europe and the Middle East. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has significantly transformed Turkey’s geopolitical status, making its global strategic importance more pronounced.

This is evident in the notable roster of world leaders who swiftly congratulated Recep Tayyip Erdogan on his election victory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was leading the pack, who wasted no time making his presence known. A noteworthy policy that has caught Russia’s favour is Mr Erdogan’s steadfast refusal to isolate the Kremlin following its Ukraine adventure.

While Turkey’s NATO allies-imposed sanctions and reduced their dependence on Russian energy, Mr Erdogan remained undeterred, strengthening trade ties between Turkey and Russia. Surprisingly, bilateral trade has witnessed a significant upswing since the commencement of the Ukrainian conflict.

Furthermore, Mr Erdogan emphasised the special nature of his relationship with Russian President Putin and expressed his intention to persist in blocking Swe-

den’s entry into NATO, despite facing criticism from the West for hindering a united front against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Not only Russia but also President Joe Biden and his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron joined in the chorus of praise for Erdogan’s victory.

Despite their reservations about Mr Erdogan’s cosy relationship with the Kremlin and his suppression of free speech and democratic principles within his own country over the past two decades, they recognise Turkey as a crucial albeit challenging and unpredictable ally of the Western world.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Mr Erdogan has emerged as a significant power broker, skilfully navigating a delicate balancing act between the opposing sides.

This approach, often called “pro-Ukrainian neutrality,” has positioned Turkey as a crucial player in the conflict.

Turkey, a crucial member of the NATO military alliance, actively engages in all its missions. While maintaining strong ties with Russia, Mr Erdogan has also extended military support to Ukraine.

A notable achievement was brokering a deal that ended Russia’s blockade on Ukraine’s grain supplies, ensuring their distribution to regions heavily dependent on them. By averting a potential global hunger crisis,

this initiative demonstrated Mr Erdogan’s impact and contribution to resolving critical issues arising from the conflict.

A WARY WEST?

Erdogan’s foreign policy has been crafted on the pedestal of “standing up to the West.” During his tenure, Mr Erdogan’s constant refrain has been to make Turkey relevant as a regional power and a global geopolitical player, entirely on its own economic and military capacity without the crutches of the West. Obviously, this has appealed to the conservatives at home.

Currently, Ankara takes centre stage as NATO leaders, including the U.S. President, try to cajole President Erdogan to relent on Sweden’s NATO membership without further delay.

However, the seasoned campaigner that he is, Erdogan will extract the last drop of advantage from the impasse before ultimately giving consent for Sweden’s NATO membership.

Sweden has an important role to play in the new Cold War with Russia as Swedish bases would enable extensive maritime domination of the Baltic Sea, Russia’s lifeline.

The carrot of attractive foreign investments has been dangled in front of President Erdogan to come to an early decision. Once Turkey relents, Hungary, the other outlier would be isolated and follow suit.

"It's not just earthquake-resistant paint - it's also that earthquakes hate this particular shade of pink."

Accusing Sweden of sheltering Kurdish terrorist organisations, President Erdogan has linked Stockholm’s entry into the alliance with the condition of extraditing wanted individuals.

Turkey has made multiple requests for the extradition of individuals it considers terrorists. At the same time, Sweden maintains that the matter falls under the jurisdiction of its judicial system, emphasising that the decision can only be made by Swedish courts.

Additionally, after a period of hesitation, Mr Erdogan officially endorsed Finland’s membership in NATO, despite its proximity to Russia.

In Europe, the dynamics work around migration. President Macron, in particular, is concerned about migration to the European Union and seeks prompt assurances from President Erdogan.

During the migration crisis of 2015, over a million refugees and asylum seekers, primarily from Syria, undertook perilous journeys across the Mediterranean in smugglers’ boats to reach the EU.

Subsequently, Brussels reached a deal with Turkey. In exchange for a substantial financial sum and the promise of visa-free travel for Turkish citizens into the EU (although this aspect was not fully realised due to EU objections concerning Mr Erdogan’s imprisonment of critics and political opponents), the Turkish President committed to making concerted efforts to prevent undocumented migrants from leaving Turkish waters and reaching the European bloc.

In Turkey’s parliamentary elections, every political party competing has made commitments to address the pressing “migrant issue.”

However, the European Union is deeply concerned about the potential consequences of Turkey pushing refugees back into Syria, risking their safety.

There is also apprehension about the possibility of Turkey allowing unrestricted activities of people smugglers, resulting in the influx of asylum seekers and other migrants crossing the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, Brussels finds itself in a defensive position due to ongoing disputes between EU member Greece and Mr Erdogan over several islands in the Aegean Sea.

Additionally, EU member Cyprus remains highly resentful following Mr Erdogan’s proposal for a two-state solution, advocating for Greek and Turkish divisions to resolve the long-standing conflicts that originated from a Turkish invasion nearly five decades ago.

FROM AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Turkey, since the creation of India and Pakistan, has aligned itself very closely to Pakistan militarily and geopolitically.

Both countries share strong Islamic ties, a tradition of an overbearing military (that has been corrected by President Erdogan) and a history of military pacts in the cold war era under American tutelage with fringe benefits in terms of free access to U.S. weaponry.

Turkey has been very vocal in support of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and was one of the few Muslim countries that actively tried to corner India on the issue of abrogation of Article 370. It absented itself from the recent G-20 Tourism Summit in Srinagar.

On the other hand, India has always made efforts to improve the relations and its spontaneous response during the recent earthquake received much appreciation from the influential Turkish media.

Turkey aspires to play a leadership position in the Islamic world (remember the role of the Khalifa during the dying days of the Ottoman Empire and the Khilafat movement in British India in protest against its dissolution by the Western powers), and this could explain its zealous efforts to echo the Pakistani narrative on Kashmir.

While on bilateral trade, both New Delhi and Ankara would continue to indulge where it is mutually beneficial (the trade between the nations crossed US$ 10.70 billion in FY 2021-22), the Kashmir issue will always remain the elephant in the room.

Assessment

In his new avatar, Erdogan finds himself confronted with difficulties arising from an economy that is grappling with various challenges and an initial response to the February earthquake that was marked by disarray and confusion. Inflation has surged to an annual rate of nearly 44 per cent, significantly impacting the daily lives of citizens across the country.

Global events have pivoted Turkey to centre stage as the world looks on anxiously to see how the conflict in Ukraine will pan out. Mr Erdogan has skilfully positioned himself as a major power broker, effectively navigating the complexities of the conflict and adopting a delicate balancing act between the opposing sides. This strategy, commonly known as “pro-Ukrainian neutrality,” has solidified Turkey’s role as a crucial player in the ongoing conflict.

Erdogan’s victory will likely result in a further consolidation of his power, a more assertive foreign policy, and a further polarisation of Turkish society. It remains to be seen how Erdogan will utilise his third term in office, but he will certainly remain a significant political force in Turkey.

A NEW AGE OF INDECISIVE WAR

Armed forces will still be useful in an age of indecisive warfare. They can be used to achieve limited war objectives against an unprepared adversary and for deterrence by denial.

Major General Christopher R. Smith, Australian Army, is the Deputy Commanding General (Strategy and Plans), U.S. Army Pacific. He has served on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Golan Heights and Rwanda. Major Ben Flores, USA, currently serves as the Executive Officer for the Deputy Commanding General (Strategy and Plans), U.S. Army Pacific.

On 24 February 2022, massive Russian formations crossed the Russia-Ukraine border along multiple axes with the intent of a rapid victory. Given the brazenness and disjointed nature of the invasion, the Russian high command surely assumed a fait accompli, much like they experienced in Crimea in 2014. Over a year later, however, the war continues— with little end in sight. While a decisive victory has proven elusive on the battlefield in Ukraine, the war has not prevented the world’s militaries from drawing lessons about the changing character of warfare.

The intensity of the past year in Ukraine, combined with the events of smaller wars over the past several decades, has revealed six major emerging features of warfare: (1) warfare is taking place among bigger and denser populations; (2) populations resist occupation at least as vigorously as at any time in the past, even when faced with a stronger and more advanced adversary; (3) there is greater restraint in the use of force, especially in the West; (4) the costs of maintaining armed forces and waging war have become oppressive; (5) reconnaissance strike complexes—the combination

Despite advancements in military technology and the promise of decisiveness in war, we appear to be entering an age of indecisive warfare. Demographic and military changes over the past several decades have led to an environment that benefits defensive warfare more so than any time since at least 1917.

of far-reaching sensors and long-range precision weapons—has made movement and manoeuvre especially deadly; and (6) there seems to be a pronounced advantage to the defender, particularly if the defender possesses advanced reconnaissance strike capabilities. The implications for each of these features combine to suggest that we are entering a new age of indecisive warfare, akin to that of the era of Frederick the Great and the Duke of Marlborough, in which only limited war objectives are possible. While limited warfare is nothing new, these emerging changes to warfare run counter to some prevailing narratives about contemporary and future warfare, including rapid single campaigns, grand fait accompli and high-tech, knock-out blows culminating in a decisive victory. These changes might lead nations to reconsider the relative utility of war.

That said, war is unlikely to be entirely without utility, despite the presence of ingredients for stalemate and indecisiveness. Modest war objectives, including limited surprise attacks that turn the tactical defence

to the advantage of the aggressor, might still prove useful. The main implication for these changes might be to make war more a part of complex ongoing negotiations for relative advantage between great powers and their supporting blocs. Perhaps Russian military planners should have paid closer attention to the various wars of recent decades in order to avoid the predicament they are currently in—one resembling the conditions of 1916, albeit with the technologies and demographics of the 21st century.

BIGGER AND DENSER POPULATIONS

There is no separating warfare from the environment where people live, which is increasingly in urban spaces. In 2018, according to the United Nations, an estimated 55 per cent of the world’s population—over 4 billion people—lived in urban areas; that number is projected to increase to 60 per cent by 2030. Under this projection, one-third of the global population will be living in cities with at least half a million inhabitants by the end of the decade. People are increasingly living in bigger and denser populations, which, in turn, has affected where wars have been fought. The cities of Kyiv, Mariupol, Kharkiv and Kherson became the epicentres of Russian assaults and Ukrainian counter-assaults last year, while scores of smaller Ukrainian cities and towns saw their own share of intense urban combat. The conditions of these battles were not much different from the earlier 21st-century urban battles of Mosul, Aleppo, Fallujah and Grozny. In all of these cases, changes in demographics ran headfirst into changes in warfare.

Bigger and denser populations mean that combat, ground combat, in particular, will find its way into urban areas. Throughout history, major cities have served as key terrain for opposing armies, even if the military benefit of capturing such cities has been questionable. The challenge for the attacker today is that these cities are much larger, and there are more of them. A small village that might have been easily bypassed or seized in 1950 may now consist of hundreds of thousands of people and tens of square miles of dense urban terrain. Expanding further, try to imagine what an assault on a mega-city like Dhaka, with its 22 million inhabitants, would look like.

The size and complexity of these cities make them attractive to defenders, which, in turn, draws out the attention of the attacker—even if that attacker wishes to avoid a prolonged urban fight. If either side is looking for a fairer fight, urban terrain greatly mitigates the advantages of 21st-century weaponry and reconnaissance platforms and belies an adversary’s optimistic timelines. Urban terrain draws in large numbers of troops, particularly for the attacker. Forced to fight block by block, stalemate and indecisiveness become all the more likely.

More important, large and dense populations are hard to bring to heel. Even absent a major urban battle, they require enormous armies just for occupation. At the height of the Iraq War, the U.S.-led coalition dedicated an entire division out of four—Multi-National

Division Baghdad—to the occupation of the Iraqi capital. The demands of occupying a city of some six million people, which included a fair share of pitched street battles, drew forces away from insurgent sanctuaries in the countryside and prevented significant reinforcement of troubled areas like the Sunni Triangle. Ultimately, the challenges associated with the occupation of a city are in direct competition for resources with the challenges that would wage a battle to achieve overall war aims. Serious occupation of any major city will be a major draw on resources, increasing the overall cost of waging a war, making indecisiveness and costly stalemate all the more likely.

POPULATIONS TEND TO RESIST OCCUPATION

If the old Cold War adversaries, the United States and Russia, have experienced anything in common in the past 20 years, it would be active and vigorous resistance to their occupying forces. Bigger and more advanced militaries, backed by larger GDPs and populations, have not deterred popular armed resistance to foreign occupation, nor have they stopped civilians from providing the necessary support to sustain such resistance. In the case of the United States, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the corresponding initial defeats of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime were, in a sense, quite easy.

The challenge came from the ensuing occupations, which dragged each war out far past what military planners had anticipated. In fact, the occupations became the wars themselves, where the high-tech American war machine faced off against lightly armed insurgents. Backed by segments of the population, the forces of resistance fought the United States to a virtual draw in Iraq and to defeat in Afghanistan. American cash, firepower, gadgets and altruism were not enough to overcome the stalemate brought about by popular armed resistance.

Russia’s circumstances have provided a case study of what happens when popular resistance joins forces with a competent and well-equipped military. It seems that Russia developed portions of its strategy under the assumption that Ukraine’s will to resist would quickly collapse in the face of a major Russian assault, which, in turn, would prevent any opportunity for a response from the collective West and NATO.

Despite the resistance they have experienced in the Donbas since 2014, Russia failed to recognize the tendency of the contemporary citizenry to vigorously resist occupation and aggression. And, unlike the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Russian military is being ground down in its occupation of Ukrainian territory by a conventional force that is defending its homeland. Also, the abundant aid provided by NATO cannot be discounted; however, the use of such aid is only made possible by the Ukrainian determination to defeat Russia. The big lesson for smaller nations the world over is that mobilizing the popular will to resist is a sound adjunct to any strategy when facing a stronger

military. Popular resistance draws resources away from an adversary, extends conflict, invites stalemate and lessens the chance of decisive victory in warfare. The prevalence of larger and denser populations combined with the sheer costs of occupation make the effectiveness of popular resistance all the more likely.

RESTRAINT IN THE USE OF FORCE

Restraint in the use of force in war is not a new phenomenon, but, despite the heavy reporting of civilian casualties in recent wars, restraint by armed forces has arguably never been greater than it is today. These heightened levels of restraint are principally due to moral and ethical expectations of Western peoples, but even countries that are willing to terrorize civilian populations seem to be more restrained these days than they have been in the past. Russia’s current and seemingly deliberate targeting of civilians is actually quite restrained when compared with the historical prevalence of such tactics.

Whereas the Russians have shown through their actions in Ukraine and Syria at least some willingness to use terror against the civilian population to achieve their objectives, the West is not as willing to utilize such tactics. While U.S. military operations during the Global War on Terror led to civilian deaths, such deaths were never the direct goal of U.S. policy. On the contrary, the mitigation of such collateral damage was a serious and comprehensive consideration for every operation—and adversaries used this to their advantage in Iraq and Afghanistan by staging and fighting from among civilian populations in both cities and villages.

In these cases, the added complexity of separating combatant from non-combatant prevented decisive manoeuvre and led to more deliberate and methodical operations. The moral restraint of almost two decades’ worth of counter-insurgency operations in these two countries was a significant factor that contributed to the long stalemate experienced in both of them. The advent of precision-guided weapons has served only to accentuate restraint in warfare. The growing precision of modern weapon systems has been met by a commensurate growth in public expectations of more discerning targeting that limits the unnecessary deaths of both combatants and non-combatants alike. Gone are the days of carpet-bombing urban areas. Popular expectations for “clean” and “surgical” strikes have made the death of innocents all the more unacceptable. While these developments are, without exception, positive, one of their consequences is a contribution to the indecisiveness of contemporary warfare.

The last point notwithstanding, while ethical and moral factors have limited military forces in what they can bring to bear in a conflict, these factors have had much less effect on insurgents, who seem just as willing to use terror to achieve their war objectives as at any time previous. While this exception runs counter to the general trend of greater restraint in warfare, the exception also serves to reinforce the conditions for a stalemate in contemporary warfare.

THE COST OF MAINTAINING ARMED FORCES

Waging war aside, the cost of maintaining a professional military that is capable of waging war has greatly increased. Personnel costs have gradually risen over the last several decades. The United States commits roughly one-quarter of its over $800 billion defence budget to personnel costs to maintain its all-volunteer force. While this has largely been a net positive for the standard of living for service members and their families, it naturally and unavoidably affects budget decisions. Any cuts to the budget, or increased investment in modernization programs, will have to come from somewhere; cost-cutting will likely come at the expense of the size of the force.

The U.S. Army has already experienced this phenomenon, seeing its end strength cut to 452,000 Soldiers in the most recent National Defence Authorization Act. Similarly, other professional militaries have seen their personnel end strength decrease over the past decade. South Korea, for example, despite the ever-present threat to its north, downsized its active duty force from 618,000 to 500,000 from 2018 to 2022. Even China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cut its active force by 300,000 personnel over the last decade in order to invest more in modernization efforts. Paying military personnel is expensive, and it is becoming increasingly expensive, particularly for advanced societies.

As technology advances, military equipment has also become more expensive, which further stresses defence budgets. There is no doubt that new technologies bring new capabilities to the battlefield—often decisive capabilities under the right circumstances—but they come at a literal cost. A single hypersonic missile, estimated to cost as much as $10 million, comes with quite a price tag. The same amount of money could buy approximately 5,000 155mm shells. Such a comparison does not even consider production times associated with the two munition types. Examining the potential technological advantages, it becomes a matter of quality over quantity; the most common assumption is that advanced systems, platforms and exquisite munitions will win the day.

Even so, the amount of advanced hardware on hand will be depleted in the early stages of an extended conflict, potentially increasing the likelihood of indecisive warfare. During stalemate on the battlefield, a combatant’s military-industrial base, and not any particular exquisite munition, could prove to be the decisive factor—but a robust industrial base readied for the production of large quantities of modern conventional munitions and materiel is also expensive to sustain. Arguably, the combination of expensive troops, expensive equipment and expensive sustainment costs is the cause for smaller armies. Combined with a reluctance to risk the destruction of expensive, advanced armed forces, the great costs of maintaining modern armed forces bear some similarity to the age of limited and indecisive warfare that we saw in the 18th century. Regardless of the Ukraine War’s eventual result, Russia has a tall task

ahead of it to rebuild its decimated military—it has already tapped into war stocks dating back a half-century. Even if it achieves victory on the battlefield, Russia will be paying the bill far into the future, especially given the costs of occupying any territory it manages to retain. Realistically, one stalemate might lead to another.

RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE COMPLEXES

Advances in sensors, drones, satellites and other surveillance platforms, combined with long-range precision weapons, have made movement, manoeuvre and the protection of forces (especially in open terrain, be it on land or sea) much more difficult. Upon first glance, these reconnaissance strike complexes appear to be the decisive component of warfare because anything caught in the open can be easily discovered and seemingly just as easily destroyed.

U.S. dominance in the First Gulf War, its targeted killings of individuals during the Global War on Terror and, more recently, Azerbaijani success against Armenian troops caught in the open lend support to this assertion, at least on the tactical level. On closer examination, however, the effects of reconnaissance strike complexes are not much different from the “dumb” shells and bombs that adversaries have been lobbing at each other for centuries. They shape battlefield calculus at the tactical, operational and even strategic level, but they are not the solution to waging a successful war or even to deterring an adversary. They set the parameters from which forces, particularly ground forces, have to operate. The key difference is that there is much more unsafe space than ever before.

Reconnaissance strike complexes have arguably created a new “no-man’s-land” in the modern era, stretching across hundreds or even thousands of kilometres rather than the hundreds of meters that we saw in World War I. As seen in Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian forces operating in the open have been destroyed both by precision-guided weapons and by conventional artillery supported by drone and satellite reconnaissance. The war has entered a stalemate, with trench systems popping up across the front to provide protection, resembling something straight out of 1915.

Merging with these trench systems are towns and cities. Resembling images of Stalingrad, they provide similar protections against sensors and missiles. The challenge for both the Russian and Ukrainian commands is similar to the one faced by the warring powers of the Great War: how do you get across such a vast no-man’s-land and have enough forces to be decisive? Added to this challenge in the 21st century is that the once-safe logistics nodes in the rear now sit inside the new no-man’s-land and are no longer safe from attack, as evidenced by the successes of Ukrainian HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) strikes. Moving to the Pacific region, in a more hypothetical scenario, the massive anti-access/ area denial bubble that is spreading from the coast of mainland China provides a significant challenge for any forces wishing to cross into it. During any conflict, the PLA Rocket Force and its

multi-domain sensors arrayed across the region would turn vast swaths of the Pacific into no-man’s-land for traditional surface combatants and support vessels. Perhaps “no-man’s-sea” will become a more appropriate term. Ironically, the land would likely prove to be safer than the open seas under these circumstances, given the potential to exercise sea denial (or even sea control, in some instances) from the land.

In a cross-strait invasion, for example, Taiwan’s best chance for survival might be to draw the PLA into the dense urban terrain and underground fortresses, as a recent article from the U.S. Naval Institute argues. One can imagine an epic island-wide battle that looks like a cross between Stalingrad and Iwo Jima. Urban terrain will provide the best protection against any advanced reconnaissance strike complexes of the PLA, especially if an amphibious landing were to prove successful. Additionally, cities like those on the Taiwan coast offer a non-linear front that could vex an attacker more than any trench system ever could. To that end, the tendency to stalemate and indecisiveness in warfare would likely and markedly favour the defender.

ADVANTAGES OF THE DEFENCE

While the defender has tended to have a tactical advantage over the attacker for most of the history of warfare, the advantage to the defender seems to be at a peak in this age. Combat in the open is not ideal when drones and satellites can pick up movement for longrange precision strikes. The destruction of Russian targets deep behind the front in the recent war is evidence of this phenomenon. Urban terrain provides ample cover and concealment— and there is more of it than ever before in human history. It is not enough to have a sensor and fire superiority when land still must be seized from a determined opponent who is using the terrain to its advantage. For example, it took the Iraqi Army nine months of close combat to retake Mosul in 2017, despite the support from a U.S.-led and largely Western coalition with unchallenged air supremacy, constant surveillance, and precision munitions. The Ukrainians have similarly taken to their cities to moderate the effects of Russia’s advanced capabilities.

The holdout in Mariupol is a good example. Looking at these recent battles, it is not far off to compare the deliberate and bloody seizure of cities to the Pacific island-hopping of World War II. The cities are akin to the islands that were fortified by the Japanese, and the open spaces both on land and at sea are like the oceans in between. The difference these days is that open spaces are arguably the most dangerous places to be. The advantages of the defence can also serve as a spoiler for any belligerent hoping for a short war. Stalemate may very well be the strategy. By forcing an adversary into close combat, likely in urban terrain, the defenders can buy time for everything from increased aid to intervention from an outside power, preparations for a counterattack, or a more favourable political settlement. Prolonged wars also change the tactics used as war stocks are depleted, lives are lost, and populations feel the strains of war. While the advantage to the defence

is nothing new, its re-emergence as a major feature of warfare flies in the face of discourse that triumphs offensive manoeuvres and the massing of lethal and nonlethal effects for a rapid victory.

Defensive war is indecisive by nature, and its increasing prevalence may lead an aggressor nation to pause in its use of overwhelming force. If the current state of the Ukraine War is any indicator, the future of warfare will be less about missile exchanges complimented by space and cyber effects (though they will play a role) and more about old-fashioned, close-quarters fighting.

CONCLUSION

Despite advancements in military technology and the promise of decisiveness in war, we appear to be entering an age of indecisive warfare. Demographic and military changes over the past several decades have led to an environment that benefits defensive warfare more so than any time since at least 1917. While advancements in sensors and long-range precision fires have made it much easier to find and kill, they remain incapable of seizing, occupying and holding terrain. Spirited defenders, inspired by massive popular resistance and possessing advanced sensors and long-range systems, will inevitably use this terrain to their advantage, challenging an aggressor to fight on the ground for it.

When this terrain is a city, the attacker will have to approach the city across open spaces that are constantly under threat from attack from accurate long-range fires, fighting at close quarters where the advantages of the attacker’s fires and sensors are greatly inhibited. If we look at Aleppo, Mosul or even Bakhmut, we see that fighting over such terrain takes time; this only serves to frustrate an aggressor’s hopes for a quick and decisive victory.

A protracted stalemate creates additional challenges. As we are seeing in Ukraine in real time, popular will, munitions stocks and industrial bases still matter in the conduct of warfare, just as they did one hundred years ago. The massive rate of artillery fire in Ukraine alone is forcing nations the world over to re-examine stockpiles and production capacity for a potential war. Stalemate, a term that at least the United States has avoided since the Korean War, is back in vogue. What we are seeing is more continuity than change.

Despite the use of cyber warfare, drones and exquisite munitions, the war in Ukraine resembles 1917 more than it does some futuristic war out of a video game or science fiction. And so, too, did the fight against ISIS— and perhaps also any other war of the past 25 years. So, what are the implications of this indecisive warfare? For starters, armed force as a tool of foreign policy has potentially diminished.

Nations might think twice about waging war if there is a high potential for a costly battlefield stalemate like we see in Ukraine, or a drawn-out insurgency like the United States experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, or

both. All the high-tech weaponry in the world cannot easily solve such scenarios. That weaponry will continue to exist and provide distinct advantages to the countries that can afford it, but it will likely only fulfil the role of providing a new context for close combat rather than supplanting it.

The diminished utility of armed force as a tool of foreign policy does not mean armed force has ceased to be useful at all. Just as in the age of limited warfare of the 1700s, where European leaders like Frederick the Great used their expensive armies to achieve limited objectives for significant worthwhile ends, so too can modern armed forces achieve important results with limited war objectives.

Channelling the ethos of the 1700s, a nation of today can still use its military force to rapidly seize and occupy a small piece of territory at little cost in order to use it as a bargaining chip for a larger political objective or negotiation. The victim of such an attack will have to decide whether or not to take back the territory against an aggressor using the immense advantages of modern tactical defence.

It invites the victim to ponder whether a relatively small objective is worth the cost of a potential protracted war—hard to say. The United Kingdom’s counterattack to recapture the Falkland Islands after Argentina’s surprise attack in 1982 is an example of a government deciding that the objective is worth the risk.

On the other hand, the Ukrainians, despite the success they have had in beating back large portions of Russia’s 2022 invasion force, have yet to regain the territory lost back in 2014. Limited objectives, seized quickly from an unprepared or poorly prepared victim, are potentially low risk and low cost when protracted war and stalemate are the alternatives.

Given the potentially important advantages available to a side that is able to rapidly seize poorly defended territory, the challenge of deterring attacks by denial becomes important. To deter rapid surprise seizures, defenders will either have to be prepared to use retaliatory punishment as a threat or must have sufficient and properly prepared forces that are disposed to defend any valuable territory that might be vulnerable to a fait accompli seizure.

A military that is capable of prolonging a war, particularly on the defence, is likely to cause an aggressor to reconsider an intention to attack. But the cost of maintaining ready forces of sufficient size in forward fortified positions to deny an aggressor a limited objective (or forces ready to rapidly occupy prepared forward positions) is likely to be very high indeed. If there is indeed a new age of indecisive war for limited objectives, there is also a need for some new thoughts on strategies for dealing with it. While the functions of rapid seizure of limited territorial objectives and its counter, deterrence by denial, are joint tasks, land forces will inevitably play a decisive and essential role, even if those objectives are islands.

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