INSIGHTS AUGUST DIGITAL

Dear Friends:

Greetings from the Synergia Foundation!

With the turmoil in Manipur stubbornly resisting a solution, we thought it appropriate to make the security situation in our North Eastern states the cover story of the August issue of the Insight. The challenge in our “Seven Sisters and One Brother” is one of striking a balance between development and security, the threat coming from a volatile mix of interrelated compulsions. We draw on a panel of experts with hands-on experience in our beautiful but often neglected North East.

In our Neighbourhood scan, this time, our focus rests on two picturesque island nations that are favourite holiday destinations for Indians- Sri Lanka and Maldives. Sadly, behind all the tropical beauty lies a tragic tale of ethnic violence, radicalisation, and bloodletting.

With centrifugal forces acting on the domestic politics of the Maldives, it is not surprising that since the heydays of the late 1980s, the IndoMaldives relationship has been on a roller coaster ride. As regards Sri Lanka, we need to look beyond the traditional construct of the Tamil issue and our security vis a vis the Chinese footprint.

Another major story we are covering is the sword of terrorism hanging over South Asia, as highlighted by the resurgence of the ISPK in Pakistan. A panel of experts from Sri Lanka take on the subject, using the 2019 Sri Lankan Easter Bombings as a

Sincerely yours

template to study this complex problem. In our technological segment, we take on our favourite subject, that of A.I. Generative image models that are dominating cyberspace as the war of narratives reaches a crescendo.

In this segment, we also highlight the discussion held at Synergia Foundation with the articulate U.S. Technology and Cyber Ambassador Nathaniel Fick. He has provided an excellent keyhole view of the much-hyped Indo-U.S. technological partnership dynamics.

Economic sanctions have become a geopolitical weapon of great import wielded by the rich and powerful. How effective have they proved to secure Russia’s capitulation in Ukraine? This is something we have endeavoured to unravel in this edition.

Since the Ukraine war has greatly impacted the tone and tenor of India’s G-20 presidency, we have also tried to do an exhaustive analysis of the hits and misses of this year’s biggest show stopper-the G20.

As usual, we end with a healthcare story, this time on E Consultations, something we all have indulged in at one point or another.

We hope our esteemed readers will continue supporting us as we strive to further evidence-based research on strategic issues with global resonance.

Maj. Gen. Ajay Sah Chief Information Officer

SCAN THE QR CODE TO SUBSCRIBE

SCAN FOR FEEDBACK

INDIA’S NORTHEAST: A SECURITY PUZZLE

When reimagining Security in India’s Northeast, the challenge is to strike a balance between development and security.

THE CHALLENGES OF MANIPUR

Fulling comprehending the complex problems of Manipur demands a much deeper insight into its history and culture besides its political makeup.

INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD

INDIA- MALDIVES: A NEW ERA OF SYNERGY

Increased international interest in the Maldives threatens to make it yet another arena for big power contestations on India’s doorstep.

SRI LANKA: FRIENDS IN NEED…

To ensure a better future, India and Sri Lanka must look beyond the Tamil minority and Sri Lanka’s strategic location- a historic thumb rule that has been the template so far.

SECURITY

TERROR SHADOW OVER SOUTH ASIA

33

TECHNOLOGY

CLICK TO SHIELD!

Ai Generative image Models and their antidotes will dominate cyberspace as the war of perceptions reaches a crescendo. There is undeniably strategic competition/ tension between nations in emerging technologies. The world is starting to balkanise into blocks on these new technologies.

TECH DIPLOMACY: A US PERSPECTIVE

EVALUATING INDIA-US DIGITAL PARTNERSHIP

Technology innovation has become foundational to national and coalition power and influence in the world.

ECONOMICS

DO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK?

Economic sanctions, a geopolitical weapon of great import wielded by the rich and powerful, failed to secure Russia’s capitulation. Do they remain relevant?

“E-SSENTIAL MEDS & VIRTUAL VISITS’’ G20-INDIA’S REPORT CARD

With virtual medical health care on the rise, it is high time a reality check be taken on India’s Telemedicine Milestones and Missteps.

As the capstone event of the G20 draws closer, we do a quick appraisal of India’s G20 presidency.

GLOBAL SCAN

ANOTHER ELECTION & THE SAME RESULTS!

Elections have failed to be the panacea for Zimbabwe’s political pains, as accusations of election fraud further complicate the situation.

Is South Asia turning into a breeding ground for terrorism?

HEALTH CARE

GEOPOLITICS

SPOTLIGHT STORY : INDIA’S NORTHEAST

INDIA’S NORTHEAST: A SECURITY PUZZLE

When reimagining Security in India’s Northeast, the challenge is to strike a balance between development and security.

Colloquially called the Seven Sisters (Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya) and the ‘eighth brother’ Sikkim, North-eastern India is precariously connected with the heartland by a narrow stretch of land- the Siliguri Corridor. India’s Northeast is home to a charming mix of ethnically, linguistically, and culturally distinct groups, traditional tribes and languages. It is also resource-rich, with limestone, coal, oil, gas, uranium, and copper supplies.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

The North-eastern states are India’s forward sentinels sharing borders with China, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan. The borders stretch over 5385 km, almost one-third of India’s total land frontiers (15200 km).

The Siliguri Corridor (Chicken’s Neck) is the primary road, rail and air connectivity gateway. With a width of approximately 22 km and a length of 60 km, the corridor is highly vulnerable to security threats.

The Siliguri Corridor’s proximity to China, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh further adds to its geostrategic significance.Chinese territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh referred to as ‘South Tibet’, concern India’s security. The rugged terrain, inadequate socio-economic

The rugged terrain, inadequate socioeconomic development and factors such as tribal rivalry, different ethnicity, illegal migration and percieved feeling of alienation have resulted in a fragile security situation in the North-Eastern states. This has resulted in sporadic violence and diverse demands by various Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs).

development and factors such as tribal rivalry, different ethnicity, illegal migration and percieved feeling of alienation have resulted in a fragile security situation in the North-Eastern states. This has resulted in sporadic violence and diverse demands by various Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs).

GETTING OWN HOUSE IN ORDER

The reasons for alienation amongst the NE states are manifold, some perceived while others justified.

Identity Politics. The politics of identity and self-determination in a region home to diverse ethnic groups, traditional tribes, and languages has led to tensions and inter-tribal conflicts, the latest being the ongoing Meitei-Kuki conflagration in Manipur.

The tendency for ethnopolitical assertion is naturally high, primarily owing to the political boundaries not

Lt Gen G A V Reddy AVSM, SC, VSM (Retd) is the former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defense Staff, DG-DIA and Strategic Advisor at Synergia Foundation.

KEY PEACE DEVELOPMENTS IN NE INDIA REGION

Assam-Meghalaya Inter State Boundary Agreement, 2022

(Agreement for closure in six disputed sectors).

Karbi Anglong Agreement, 2021

(Agreement ended insurgency in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam).

Bodo Accord, 2020

(Agreement ended Bodo insurgency in Assam).

Bru-Reang Agreement, 2020

(Agreement to end the Bru-Reang refugee crisis in Tripura).

NLFT-Tripura Agreement

(Agreement to end the insurgency in Tripura).

coinciding with the existing social boundaries. Many ethnic groups bordering the international boundaries have more in common with the population living across the border than with their co-nationals.

The sense of support (both material and non-material) they derive from across has had security implications.

The traditionally open borders add to the challenge, despite India fencing off its border with Bangladesh. However, fencing off Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, China etc., is neither physically practical nor diplomatically possible.

NE Insurgencies. Long before the proxy war in J&K and the Khalistan movement raised their ugly head, the NE was the scene of armed insurgencies waged with a ferocity that left the nascent Indian Army staggering.

Even the British Raj had very tenuous control over these fierce and proud communities, using a very flexible system of political residents to more or less allow autonomous rule by tribal chiefs.

In the heady days immediately after independence, New Delhi was in a hurry to amalgamate the Indian Union into one solid entity and in the process, ethnic and cultural specificities were ignored in the delineation of state boundaries in the 1950s, giving rise to discontentment and forceful assertion of ethnic identity.

Admittedly, the rate of economic progress has been nowhere close to what has been achieved in the mainland, for whatever reasons, triggering widespread discontent that simmers with varying intensity even today.

The insurgents point to the lack of investment in the region and perceived or real ‘injustices’, and these continue to dog New Delhi’s efforts to turn its NorthEast into its Gateway to SE Asia.

Narcotics Fuelling Crimes. The sub-region joining Thailand, Laos and Myanmar is called the “Golden Triangle” - a major source of illegal drugs. Drugs are a major source of income for insurgent groups and a means of cooperation with their partners outside India.

Thus, to deal with the problem of separatism effectively, a systematic and multi-pronged approach must be adopted to cut off the links of local armed separatist groups with Myanmar, China and other countries.

Boundary Disputes. Boundary disputes, particularly with China, have been a longstanding concern in the North-eastern region.

These disputes have, at times, escalated tensions and affected the overall security situation. Hostile neighbours are extending moral and material support owing to porous international borders.

Governance Deficit. Indigenous people feel that they have little share in political and economic structures at the central level, depriving them of determining the nature and context of the problem, thereby frustrating their aspirations.

Inadequate Infrastructure. Without a doubt, the region has underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, lack of connectivity and inadequate health care and educational facilities.

The migration of people from the Indian mainland and across the porous border is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as an economic, cultural and political threat by the locals.

Political Representation., The ‘Seven Sisters and one Brother’ send only 24 Members of Parliament to the Lok Sabha, out of which Assam alone sends 14 members. Clearly, compared to the North Indian states (Bihar 40, UP 80, MP 29), this is a small number, thus

exacerbating the sentiment of being treated as stepsisters by New Delhi.

THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION

India’s neighbours -China, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal-are involved in the region by political backing, economic assistance, logistic support, military training and arms supplies.

This external involvement seriously impacts the security situation in India’s Northeast.The China Connection. China’s logistical and moral support to separatist groups in India is not new.

Since the 1950s, China has been fanning the flames of separatism in India’s north-eastern states - Nagaland, Manipur, and Assam, as part of Beijing’s effort to contain India.

In the early 1960s, it was routine for insurgent Naga ‘gangs’ to trek to the Chinese mainland for a dose of indoctrination, military training, arms and ammunition replenishment and much-needed funds.

China’s links with Cox Bazar in Bangladesh, a hub of illegal arms trade, are well established. Cox’s Bazar effectively supports insurgencies in NE India and even deeper into the heartland.

Instability in Myanmar. An ethnically and politically volatile Myanmar on India’s doorstep is a cause of concern for the stability of NE India.

Ever since its independence in 1948, the instability fuelled by disparate insurgencies fomenting concurrently in various corners of Myanmar has created much anxiety in New Delhi.

Since the coup in February 2021, the situation has only quantitatively escalated. Myanmar’s military—the Tatmadaw- is busy fighting dozens of separatist and anti-military, anti-regime armed tribal groups with a spillover impact on the Indian security situation.

Bangladesh. While Bangladesh denies it vehemently, the presence of an overwhelming illegal immigrant population, mostly Bangla in origin, along the border between the Indian states of Assam, West Bengal and Bangladesh is a reality.

Indian intelligence agencies have been on record drawing attention to Pakistani operatives working from their High Commission in Dhaka to unite various IIGs and coordinate their anti-India operations more effectively.

Nepal. Similarly, Nepal is a favourite point of entry for Pakistani agents/non-state actors trying to infiltrate India to make mischief.

While remaining dormant, the Pakistani ISI has tried to bring better coordination into forging a common strategy for the IIGs. The string of madrasas,

mushrooming at a rapid rate along the unguarded Indo-Nepal border, have an insidious role to play, something the Seema Suraksha Bal, responsible for the Indo-Nepal border and respective state CIDs, have been cautioning for years.

A STATUS CHECK

Arunachal Pradesh. The insurgency-impacted regions are primarily Tirap, Changlang and Longding. The IIGs are getting trained in camps opposite this area by the Chinese. Extortion is also on the rise.

The GovernmentGovernment should intensify its efforts to contain spillover insurgency activities from neighbouring states into Arunachal Pradesh and strengthen the cooperation and interaction between the police and other security forces of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh to reduce incidents in the border areas.

Assam. The NRC issue (The National Register of Citizens, a register of all Indian citizens whose creation was mandated by the 2003 amendment of the Citizenship Act, 1955) in Assam is vitiating the environment; the central Government must conclude the issue expeditiously.

The collusion of NSCN(KYA) with ULFA results in rampant extortion from tea estates, coal mines, oil and construction companies.

The Government should closely monitor the activities of recently surrendered groups in coordination with the state government.

Manipur. The Hill versus Valley disturbances in Manipur started in March 2023. It accounted for the maximum violent incidents in the entire north-eastern region, with extremely high civilian casualties.

The state is home to the maximum number of insurgent groups, including PLA, UNLF, ZUF, NSCM(IM) etc. The valley-based insurgent groups are also target-

PEACE AND SECURITY IN NORTH-EASTERN REGION THE TRIUMVIRATE OF DIALOGUE, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

Development Multipronged Strategy

Security Dialogue

ing non-locals in the state. The Government should intensify the pace of engagement with both groups to arrive at a settlement.

The development projects got stalled due to recent unrest, and impetus is needed to ensure recommencement and completion.

Nagaland. The delay in concluding the Naga Peace Process (NPP) resulted in growing unrest and frustration among the Naga Tribals.

The Government should conclude peace talks at the earliest and prepare a generous rehabilitation-cum-settlement scheme for the insurgent outfits, who will surrender as a part of the agreement. This will avoid the emergence of any splinter rebel groups.

Mizoram. Repatriation of the Brus community (ethnic tribe) to Mizoram by offering financial and rehabilitation packages to ensure their peaceful rehabilitation and instituting security measures in the areas Brus are to be rehabilitated is still not completed.

The Chakma issue in Mizoram must also be resolved earliest to ensure lasting peace in the stable but sensitive state.

DIALOGUE

• Ensure inclusive peace accords with insurgent groups, ensure enforceability and address the enduring ethnic tensions for long-term stability.

• Indian Government should conclude the ongoing dialogue with NSCN and other Naga groups, and all parties must sign the long-delayed accord.

• Promote Inter-State boundary agreements to resolve boundary disputes and prevent conflicts.

• Engage neighbouring countries - Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar- to address cross-border

security challenges. Diplomatic initiatives pertaining to security-related issues should be taken to strengthen the security situation.

• Political and social awareness is necessary to foster inclusivity and change the perceptions of neglected, misgoverned regions into a dynamic soft power.

DEVELOPMENT

• The geostrategic location and natural resources make it a potential powerhouse for development. A comprehensive approach should be adopted to make the region a preferred investment location by improving the limited entrepreneurial base and capacity building for local entrepreneurs.

• Economic development with initiatives to uplift the region aimed to provide job opportunities for the local youth and reduce the appeal of insurgency.

• Enhance connectivity to Improve transportation infrastructure, including road, rail and air links, and enhance connectivity within the region and with the rest of India.

Connectivity drives commerce and countries such as Japan are willing to be partners in the development of the North-East and connectivity to Southeast Asia.

• Digital connectivity is necessary to move towards digital inclusion in the Northeast.

• Higher Education infrastructure is grossly inadequate, with many students migrating to other parts of the country for education, emphasising the need for setting up centres of excellence for professional and higher education.

• Tourism development is another facet with huge potential to channel the region into mainstream development.

GOVERNMENT’S INITIATIVES FOR THE NORTH EAST

Infrastructure:

• Bharatmala Pariyojana

• Cottage & Micro Industries

Connectivity:

• Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS)-UDAN

• Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project

• India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway

Tourism:

• Swadesh Darshan Scheme

Digitisation:

• Digital North East Vision 2022

• Promote sports. The Northeast is fast emerging as a major sport hub, with some of India’s iconic sportspersons acting as role models for the youth of Northeast.

SECURITY

• Tackle Insurgency, the root cause of regional unrest movements, by addressing feelings of exploitation and alienation from other Indian states.

• AFSPA should continue in insurgency-affected areas; steps should be taken to address the genuine demands of ethnic groups for development and for autonomy in managing their affairs.

• Strengthen security measures to improve the security situation in the region through effective law enforcement and specific intelligence-based counter-insurgency operations.

CONCLUSION

Comprehensive implementation of the ‘Act East’ policy is relevant to the entire country but particularly important for the long-term growth of the Northeast. To be effective, New Delhi has to make all stakeholders a partner in this endeavour and not run it remotely from South Block. Its success can achieve lasting peace and security, fostering development and strengthening ties with neighbouring countries.

Assessment

India’s internal security challenges in the northeast are not just about law and order but are inter-related challenges; state-sponsored insurgency, drug trafficking, illegal arms smuggling, human trafficking and natural resource exploitation.

The central and state governments must find a sovereign remedy to deal with these challenges, ensuring a balance between security and development.

India must Act East from the North East by linking its north-eastern states with South East Asia and bring these states to the forefront of developmental discourse in India.

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH LT GEN SANGWAN

Within the vibrant, vivacious and lively India lies another enthusiastic, effervescent and energetic region called the Seven Sisters of the northeastern region.

This region, unfortunately, though, has remained engulfed in a haze that needs to be unravelled by all of us.

The NE India could be the pivot for promoting India’s Act East Policy. This should be the fulcrum on which India needs to hinge its journey towards Southeast Asia and, in the bargain, strengthen its security architecture.

India’s multifaceted interests do not blend as much as the country’s Northeast. However, the identity crisis and the feeling of neglect have led to internal and external security challenges in the Northeast.

And there has been a gross under-development in all its manifestations. The affection and affinity that the people of the Northeast radiate in terms of love and immense warmth when you interact with them is infinite.

CRITICAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND GEOSTRATEGIC POLICY

To understand the barometric realities of the pressures that our Northeast has undergone through all these years, we need to understand the national security dynamics there. The northeastern region has traditionally been witness to prolonged insurgencies.

These insurgencies have been aided and abetted by the inimical state and non-state actors in India’s neighbourhood.

Connected with this is the challenge of vast open land borders along the Indo-Myanmar 1643 km borders, which are both porous and inaccessible. The geography, the geology, and the climate further compound the security challenges in this region.

The Burma campaign during the Second World War, the 1962 War, and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, all

bear testimony that the Northeast is an extraordinarily vital part of the nation’s geostrategic architecture, crucial for the furtherance of regional groupings, such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technology and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), for ASEAN, for SCO engagements (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), etc.

There is a need to comprehensively review the security in all its manifestations, whether along the borders or internally within the state borders.

A scrupulously honest and exhaustive effort needs to be made to carve out North East-specific security policies, and they should be within the overall ambit of national interest and national security strategy.

The fact cannot be disregarded that the Northeast has other dynamics in terms of sharing international borders with four other nations.

These nations geographically may not boast of the vastness of area, but they play a crucial role in the security architecture of not only the Northeast region but the entire Southeast Asia.

A comprehensive, all-inclusive, and cogent policy for this region’s border management and strategic security is needed.

It should also address the free movement regime along the Myanmar border, the border haats, the border trade, and the ethnic and tribal dynamics. They all need to be integrated into the security paradigm.

UNDERREPRESENTED IN THE NATION

Assam Rifles, the oldest paramilitary force and earmarked as the border guarding force for guarding the Indo-Myanmar borders, must be assigned a larger role in the National Security Council calculus.

It has an established credential as sentinels of the Northeast, having played a significant role during the battles of Kohima and Imphal in the Second World War and guarded the northern frontiers during the 1962 war.

The force with nine year’s experience in the United peacekeeping operations is sonably poised to further Act East policy.

It can strengthen bonhomie at the borders

with Myanmar and provide the pivot to facilitate the government’s initiatives at furthering its Act East Policy.

The connectivity in all modes of transport plays a crucial role in the overall development of any geographical region. This connectivity necessitates the requisite impetus to infrastructural development.

This deficit in the Northeast is the outcome of two factors. Firstly, there is a lack of awareness about the potential of the Northeast Region. Secondly, there is poor representation in the national politics through parliament.

Inadequate electoral representation is a direct fall out of the population-based representation wherein population alone is the deciding factor in determining the number of parliamentary constituencies in any state or region.

It does not give any weightage to geostrategic importance, the geographical dimension, the overall development of the state, and the role it can play in the larger security dynamics of the country.

SOCIO-CULTURAL LINKAGES AND EXTERNAL VULNERABILITY

The region is a conglomerate fusion of diverse societies. This complex plurality adds its dynamics to the internal and external environmental veracities, which contribute directly or indirectly to national security concerns.

The political boundaries of most of the northeastern states do not correspond to the existing social boundaries. These social connects transcend the national frontiers in a manner that coaxes the population on either side of the borders to feel connected through social-cultural linkages and heritage.

The tribal affinity is so strong this bonding and tribal and traditional connect drives them to defy the established international conventions.

Some neighbours have proactively manipulated the volatile situation by covertly and overtly rendering political support, economic assistance, logistic backing, military training, arms, supplies, and drugs.

They have also resonated with the illegitimate and unjustified demands of misguided elements. All insurgencies in the Northeast enjoy tacit support from the neighbours.

PVSM, AVSM, SM & Bar (RETD) former General Officer of the Indian Army. He last served as the 20th Director General of the Assam Rifles.

FUTURE OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN NE INDIA

Northeast India has seen externally inspired insurgencies since the time of India’s independence. The Nagas in Nagaland and surrounding areas launched the first insurgency in the 1950s till peace talks commenced in 1998.

Illegal recruitment, illegal taxation, etc., continue unabated in Manipur and Nagaland as the talks are said to be in an advanced stage of finalisation in the near future.

The Mizo insurgency that was ignited in the mid1960s (and the subject of a renewed debate today for the use of air power against the insurgent MNF) was successfully concluded in 1986 with a political solu tion that brought the MNF to power through the ballot box.

Manipur saw a large-scale insurgency move ment in the 1980s. Most of the stronger rebel groups in Manipur have yet to agree to talks with the authorities. Kukis belonging to Ma nipur started their own insurgency movement in the backdrop of the Naga-Kuki clashes in 1992-93.

The assertion of Kuki-Chin_Zo groups, active on both sides of the international border with Myanmar, has of late turned into ethnic conflicts in many parts of the region.

Assam, too, has seen violent insurgencies by various ethnic groups like Assamese, Muslims, Dima Hasaos, Bodos, etc., from the mid-1980s and is simmering even today. The Garos and Khasis in Meghalaya, too, have been taking up arms to fight for what they perceive as their rightful claims.

At various times, almost all the above movements have been supported directly or indirectly by external forces inimical to India- namely China, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The 1986 Mizo Accord had a calming influence as it seemed like a harbinger of peace over all the NE states. Most political unrests/insurgencies saw a period of relative inactivity post the Mizo Accord.

This period also coincided with the then non-interference attitude of Chinese premier Deng Xi Ping in the late 1980s as well as friendly regimes in our neighbourhood-Myanmar and Bangladesh. As we look at the future under the shadow of the ongoing turmoil in Manipur, we need to ask how today’s internal and external dynamics impact India’s national security. Do we have a congenial atmosphere for our national security objectives, especially in the context of NE India? The answer is a resounding “No.”

NEGATIVE FACTORS (SHORT AND LONG TERM)

Bangladesh elections at the end of this year may or may not see the return of a friendly Government. If an unfriendly Govt comes to power in Dhaka, we should be prepared for renewed and greater instability in the NE Region.

The rise of Muslim Fundamentalist Organisations (MFO) could be a direct outcome of a non-cooperative regime in Dhaka, especially in Assam and Manipur, sooner rather than later.

It is reported that the weapons looted during the recent violence in Manipur have already found their way to MFO sleeper cells in NE states.

The Chin National Army (CAN), one of the many rebel groups active in Myanmar, has reportedly taken an inordinate interest in the recent ethnic clashes in Manipur, allegedly alongside the Kuki cadre.

CAN, which operates under the tacit control of Beijing, has been reported to have played some part in the recent ethnic clashes in Manipur alongside the Kuki militants.

CAN is a part of the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the armed wing of the so-called National Unity Government formed by pro-democracy activists after the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar.

Reports indicate that large consignments of weapons continue to flow into the states of Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram even today.

With the open support for a “separate administration for Kukis” by powerful forces in Mizoram, the idea of a Zomi Re-unification, including ethnic groups in Manipur and Assam, not to speak of parts of Myanmar, could raise its head again. This would be an extremely dangerous security situation for the entire NE India.

It is well known that most of the illegal weapons in the region are sourced from Yunnan in China. The present tensions in Indo-China relations could be exploited by these anti-national forces with that country’s support. ULFA(I) leaders are also reported to be in Ruili in Yunnan.

Agitations against NRC a few years back saw placards in Mizoram such as “Go Back India: Welcome China”. Clearly, the Chinese hand cannot be ruled out.

Recent violence in Manipur is likely to re-energise the relatively dormant Valley Based Insurgent Groups (VBIGs) who were reportedly in collusion with the military in Myanmar. Chinese activities in Doklam,

Arunachal, and Bhutan are well known. But PLA’s effort to dominate the Jhampheri ridge is something that will have extremely serious ramifications even during the No War No Peace situation.

Given the demographic status of the Siliguri Corridor, already under intense illegal migrations, security concerns multiply manifold.

India’s Act East Policy is lagging far behind the intended objectives. Questions are being raised about the success of the same in light of the geo-political realities in the Near East as well as the internal dynamics.

SOME SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

The Golden Triangle shift towards NE India and money from a proliferation of poppy plantations and drugs amounting to over 50 to 80 thousand crores annually in international markets is a serious challenge.

Part of the proceeds is bound to find ways to fund the ethnic war/insurgencies. The Golden Triangle should not be further allowed to shift towards Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram.

The mostly porous border with Myanmar resulted in large-scale illegal migrations from Myanmar into Mizoram and Manipur. Smuggling activities result in the loss of state revenue by a few thousand crores a year.

Interstate and intra-state boundaries where separate ethnicities claim and counter claims over land. All the states bordering Assam have some issues with Assam regarding the border.

Impact/fallout of a possible Naga/ NSCN Accord in Manipur/Assam in particular. Any political re-arrangement affecting the state of Manipur as part of the solution arrived at will likely be challenged by the state of Manipur. This could be a tightrope walk for New Delhi.

Meitei-Kuki clashes over territory are bound to deepen the security concerns in the region if the crisis snowballs into other states and ethnic groups.

THE WAY AHEAD

Illegal activities along Indo-Myanmar borders in the garb of the Free Movement Regime be curbed by enforcing identification-based documents for people concerned.

Due to some unknown reasons, some people have been opposing identity passes for the cross-border movements in the Indo-Myanmar border.

The use of identity cards is part of the agreement. Enhance border management architecture. The present arrangement is certainly inadequate.

Assam Rifles with a limited number of units may not be able to take on twin roles of Border Guarding and Counter-Insurgency unless there are more units and additional infrastructures in place. As of now, only 10 Kms of 1642 Kms are fenced.

Identification of illegal migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh be carried out similarly to NRC in the remaining states.

The free-for-all type of cross-border movement in the past and even now in some places has played havoc with the region’s demographic profile.

NEC should activate the Security Advisor in the system. Earlier, DG AR was acting as the Advisor. With the changed dynamics, one of the Governors, preferably an ex-military man, should oversee and advise MHA/MOD in security matters.

Review identity concerns of all communities in the region within the law of the land and NOT under some non-existent and uncodified customary laws.

Targeted intelligence-gathering efforts should be enhanced in sensitive ethnic fault lines in the region. Intelligence agencies to work within a framework of all the above issues.

Greater engagement with Myanmar military junta, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal as part of the Neighbourhood First policy.

Any patronage of drug smuggling and poppy plantation-related activities in the region be ruthlessly curbed. Greater political intelligence focus by the centre on the extant issues is a pre-requisite.

A dedicated administrative cadre should be considered for the region to ensure a greater understanding of the complexities. This cadre should ensure governance with real delivery on the ground, not on rhetoric alone. Quality leadership will help in national security matters in the region.

LT GEN K HIMALAY SINGH, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, YSM (RETD) the first Lt General hailing from Manipur, is a visiting faculty at Manipur University, Chairman Board of Governors, IIT, Agartala and a former Chairman of the Manipur Public Service Commission.

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH JAIDEEP SAIKIA

NE

INDIA:

A FRESH VISION IS NEEDED

The differences between communities of different states in NE India are very apparent, giving the impression that it is an artificial construct that has been clubbed together in a way that is not working.

So, there has to be some reworking done by New Delhi to rectify this. Every ministry and every important department in New Delhi has a Northeast desk. The Northeast is not working because of the way these eight states are governed by one entity. The needs and the requirements are absolutely different.

The other important challenge pertains to the NSCN. Certain very impossible demands like a sepa rate flag, a separate constitution, and a parliament are being demanded by the grouping in return for signing a peace accord.

Notwithstanding the seemingly obstructionist demands, a resolution has to be found. Some concessions could be agreed to, like a separate flag, as long it is subservient to the national flag may be allowed, but a separate constitution is certainly a No-No.

Such impossible demands by the NSCN make it the longest-running insurgency and allow entry of political powers like China or other nations who are inimical to India, which would certainly derail the peace process. There have been some mistakes by New Delhi.

It is very important to first have back channelling in camera talks and not publicise these things every so often the way the government of India or the NSCN does.

Manipur is a unique example. Two communities that were staying cheek by-jowl for hundreds of years are now in a civil war, literally at each other’s throats. This further reinforces the theory that the artificial construct has not been taken very well.

It is time that New Delhi begins to view the Northeast afresh and not through the simple lens of homogeneity. The larger concern is that there might be spillover effects onto Mizoram, Nagaland or Assam, which also have ethnic fissures.

NE India is a strategically encircled region. 98 per cent of its borders are international, while only two per cent connect to the Indian mainland through the Siliguri Corridor or the Chicken’s Neck. Speaking hypo-

thetically, without the five countries on the periphery of NE India (China, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan), 99 per cent of the insurgency and the unrest will also disappear as a result.

China is known to have helped the Naga movement, the PLA and other insurgent groups in Manipur and continues to help them. Even Myanmar, after the military takeover of 2021, has got an agreement with the insurgent groups.

Security, or even traditional security, has various facets; it is a factor of development and social welfare and has an emotional component. The emotional quotient surrounding the Northeast and the rest of India is a very important security challenge. In some sense, India is still in its infancy; after all,, 76 years do not define the lifetime of a nation.

Therefore, there is, unfortunately, a somewhat huge conspiracy in the Northeast that has not come to terms with the concept of Indian hood or Indianness. Simply speaking, integration remains an incomplete agenda.

The Northeast has not yet become a comprehensive or able partner in India’s nation-building exercise, a very important national security challenge. This sentiment is reflected in the ordinary ‘Northeasterner’ people of rural districts and far-flung areas. This may not be representative of people in urban areas of Guwahati or in the metropolitan towns and cities, but the far-flung areas close to the borders.

Going back in history, Assam and the Northeast became a part of the Indian political entity in 1826 when the British entered this region after concluding a treaty with the Burmese. They came here for particularly commercial reasons and left the hills to their own devices. That’s why they were excluded or partially excluded.

Nationalism was introduced thanks to leaders like Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi’s call really brought many people of the Northeast together. But after independence and of late, over the last decade or so, some sort of an alien super imposition has happened or is happening in this region, which has been resisted, as we have seen in the case of Manipur recently. Perhaps the best way to per mit integration is to give space to the people of the Northeast and avoid superposition from mainland India.

JAIDEEP SAIKIA

renowned conflict analyst and author of several bestselling books on security and strategy

Internationally

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH SABYASACHI DUTTA

A SENSE OF OWNERSHIP

We have we have been interacting with a lot of tribes, you know, a lot of constituencies in the Northeast. Whenever we talk about the larger vision of the region, say the Northeast, as part of reaching to the Bay of Bengal or a larger idea of the Northeast getting connected and creating value chains, there has been a unity of purpose there. I have not seen any time people have opposed an idea that would see our goods go through Myanmar or Bangladesh to the Bay of Bengal for export, or we would not like to have an export hub or trading hub in the Northeast. So that narrative, which has also been a part of the ‘Act East’ policy or the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, still holds true.

THE INTERNAL DIVIDE

The issue is how we bring in the big picture and reconcile the differences on the ground. We need to bring people together to act on certain big-ticket ideas that can benefit the people, the communities, and the lives and livelihoods of the people of NE India. A commonly asked question is when will the connectivity to Bangladesh or via the trilateral highway happen? We need to form narratives that increase that level of participation and ownership of those big-ticket ideas India has been pushing for through the region.

A sum total of it is -more engagement on the ground, more dialogues, and more reconciliations at micro levels to forge together some kind of a consensus of where, as a region, we are going. As somebody has said, the word Northeast itself is very amorphous- we are eight states very different from each other. What do we really get out of it when we club it all under one construct? That needs internal cooperation between the states, communities, and more and more dialogues. And then, of course, engagement with our external neighbours. The whole security paradigm will be dictated by how it is developed.

There is a need to ramp up governance in the entire region. What has happened so far (for whatever reason it happened) need not have happened if the governance factor could have been up. This is true not only for Ma-

In the case of Manipur and some other states, the divide has been a historic problem. The Kukis and Meithei have always coexisted;

why these fissures have become so deep is a historical problem. And the solution also must be looked at in that context and initiated.

The problem today is, yes, we have a stalemate, but who will initiate a dialogue whereby the parties will start talking to each other? A catalyst for talks is needed, maybe people from outside the state or acceptable peacemakers appointed by the Centre.

Concurrently, civil society organisations (CSOs) must take the initiative to initiate micro-level dialogues at various community levels, at the village, and the various district levels. It is not only people going to Delhi and saying their views and expecting Delhi to come back with some kind of solution.

I don’t think that will bear much fruit because the solution has to come from within the communities. However, there is a silver lining. Every Independence Day, there would be a bandh called in the Northeast, and the people would all be on tenterhooks on what would happen next. This time in Shillong, I saw the people from rural areas everywhere carrying flags on their cars.

This was a scene that we had not witnessed for many years. So, while we are having challenges, I would also like to inform that this is also a trend; the spirit of Indianness, being part of the country, is increasing.

THE EXTERNAL FACTOR

There is, of course, an external dimension of security. What happens across the borders in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal, or China, affects the region. China is the elephant in the room always. But I think we have to watch closely what is happening in Bangladesh right now with crucial elections coming up next year.

Also, how the military junta in Myanmar and India cooperate; many bordering areas with Myanmar are out of the control of the military and entirely dominated by ethnic tribes. So how do we engage with these groups since it is in our national interests, in the interests of safer borders for us?

We want ‘thin borders’, where value chains can happen between India and Bangladesh, but there is also the security angle. So, how do we reconcile these two viewpoints? We have to get out of this Jekyll and Hyde situation and come to a new paradigm of security where we act as a region. To rejuvenate the entire ecosystem, much closer cooperation between the central agencies, the state governments and civil society is needed.

SABYASACHI DUTTA Co-founder and Executive Director, Asian Confluence, India East Asia Center, Shillong, India

THE CHALLENGES OF MANIPUR

Fulling comprehending the complex problems of Manipur demands a much deeper insight into its history and culture besides its political makeup.

Maj. Gen. Moni Chandi is the CSO at Synergia Foundation & a former Inspector General of the elite National Security Guard.

In this first Part, of the 2-Part series, the article traces the three-millennia history of the Meithei people, the disastrous Anglo-Manipur War of 1891 and the post-independence armed struggle of the Naga people. It also dwells on the existence of the Deep State and the fear & necessity with which, local people, deal with the extortion. The conclusion deals with the Paradox of Protective Discrimination, in Manipur.

EARLY MANIPUR HISTORY

Manipur is an ancient Hindu Vaishnava kingdom, with a reported history dating back 3,500 years. Several ancient chronicles, written in archaic Meitei script, have recorded the reigns of more than 108 Meitei kings, during this three millennia span.

Nigthou Kangba (1500 BC) is regarded as the first king of Manipur. The Meitei kingdom was home to the game of Horse-Polo and the Manipuri School of classical dance. The Meitei kingdom developed and flourished in the Imphal Valley; while, the surrounding hill areas, were dominated by tribal people (Naga & Kuki-Zo).

The history of the Naga community, also dates back several centuries and finds mention in the records of the Ahom Kingdom. The Naga tribes led an isolated ex-

What we have witnessed in recent weeks, in Manipur, is the complete surrender of the state administration to machinations of underground armed insurgent groups.

istence from the outside world, with some even practicing head-hunting. In the 19th Century, the British dispatched several expeditionary forces, to solidify their control over these areas. However, the British were only able to establish fragile ceasefires and there were periodic skirmishes, with violent Naga tribes.

Also, during the 19th Century, the British granted missionary rights to American Protestant movements. The missionary movements, notably the Baptist Christians, were successful in converting the tribesmen, weaning them away from ancient malpractices (such as head-hunting) and providing modern education. Today, more than 95 per cent of Naga people are Christian, mostly belonging to the Council of Baptist Churches.

The Kuki-Zo, who are a primary party, to the current civil war, are tribes of Burmese descent. There is evidence to suggest some Kuki tribes may have settled in the region, as early as the 11th Century. Kuki-Zo communities are found in parts of Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, Assam and Tripura.

ANGLO-MANIPUR WAR, 1891

The seat of the Meitei Kingdom was Kangla Fort, located in Imphal; and dates back to 33 AD. At the time of

the British Empire, the British Agent occupied the Residency, which was outside the Fort, and probably on the site of the present-day Governor’s House. In September 1890, there was a palace coup and Maharaja Surchandra, was displaced by his younger brother Tikendrajit, popularly called Senapati.

Surchandra was exiled and he appealed to the Viceroy Lord Landsdown, to regain his lost throne. Lord Landsdown directed the Commissioner of Assam Mr. JW Quinton, to appoint Kulachandra (another Royal sibling) to the throne and deport Senapati.

In March 1891, the Commissioner arrived at Imphal with a contingent of the 42nd Gurkha Regiment. The negotiations failed and a skirmish arose between the Meitei soldiers in Kangla Fort and the British contingent, in the Residency. Soon, a ceasefire was proposed, and seven British officials proceeded to Kangla Fort, for negotiations.

None of the seven British officials returned; they included Mr. JW Quinton, Lt. Col. C McDowel Skene, CO 42nd Gurkha Regiment; Mr. St. Clair Grimwood, Political Agent; and other civilian & military personnel. According to the personal account, by Mrs. Ethel St. Clair Grimwood (wife of the Political Agent), a junior officer informed her that as the senior officers had not returned, the British Contingent, were to conduct a fighting withdrawal, back to Calcutta, through Silchar. Mrs. Grimwood and the remnants of the contingent, finally returned to Calcutta.

Army of Retribution. By April, 1891, the Viceroy had ordered three columns of the British Indian Army, into Manipur; one from Silchar, a second from Kohima and a third from Tamu. The Manipuri Army was no match for the superior British Indian Army, who within weeks captured Kangla Fort and the leadership

of the Manipur Army. Five Manipuri Leaders were publicly hung; including Senapati Tikendrajit and Thangal General. 23 others were deported to Kaalapani (Cellular Jail in Port Blair, Andaman). Kangla Fort was occupied, initially by the Garhwal Rifles and later by the Assam Rifles.

The defeat of Anglo-Manipur War of 1891, continued to have an impact on the psyche of the Manipuri people, with some critics saying, “India’s Independence in 1947, only saw the Union Jack in Kangla Fort, being replaced by the Indian Tricolor”.

In 2013, (122 years later) the Union Government, formally returned Kangla Fort, to the custody of the State Government of Manipur.

THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE NAGA PEOPLE.

To the credit of Christian Missionary movements, the Naga Tribes of the 19th Century, were converted from savage natives, to the modern educated community, they are today.

There are 35 Naga Tribes (17 in Nagaland, 15 in Manipur & 3 in Arunachal Pradesh) recognized in our Constitution, as Scheduled Tribes.

Each tribe is ethnically different and local inhabitants are able to differentiate Naga people, based on physical features. The more important tribes (by population) are Angami, Ao, Konyak, Lotha, Phom, Poumai and Tangkul.

In 1947, at the time of Independence, the Naga tribes united under Angami Zapu Phizo and launched an armed struggle, for national identity. Over years, the Naga National Council (NNC), evolved into the Na-

tional Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which supported the Naga Federal Army and the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN); both of which were underground organizations, waging war against the Indian Government.

Since 1953, the Indian Army has been involved in insurgency operations, dealing with the armed Naga rebellion.

With grudging respect, we need to concede the military prowess of the underground movement, for they have sustained operations against the Indian Army, for more than 70 years! In August, 2015, the Naga Peace Accord was signed between the GOI and the NSCN.

The accord was signed by RN Ravi on behalf of GOI & late Isak Chishi Swu & TH Muivah, on behalf of the NSCN. The agreement was signed in New Delhi, in the presence of PM Narendra Modi. The exact details of the accord have NOT been made public; but, for the time-being a fragile truce exists between the Indian Army and the armed cadres of the NSCN.

A STATE WITHIN A STATE

India is the largest Democracy in the World, and our Constitution guarantees the indestructible nature of the Union. In NE India and J&K, as policy, we have conducted elections & formed governments, even while the armed forces continue with operations, against insurgent & militant movements.

There is fundamental contradiction here; when underground movements are still so significant, as to necessitate, the continued use of the Armed Forces, is the state government really effective?

In Manipur, for many decades the local people have recognized and supported underground movements, out of fear & necessity. The writ of armed underground movements runs concomitant with the state administration. However, while the state administration is bound by the constitution & answerable to the Union Government, there are NO checks or balances on ‘underground power’.

What we have witnessed in recent weeks, in Manipur, is the complete surrender of the state administration, to machinations of underground armed insurgent groups.

The fact of the matter is, there can be no lasting peace in Manipur, until the underground move ments are exposed & systematically disman tled.

The people of the state, need to be liberated from this ‘Deep State’ and the only recognized power, should be that of the Indian State, which is regulated through the Indian Constitution.

India is the land of ‘Protective Discrimination’, which is provided under Article 15 (Prohibition from Discrimination) of our Constitution.

Eminent Indian Jurists have pointed out, this uniquely Indian provision, is based on the Aristotle Principle, “Equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally”. Article 15(4) of the Constitution, empowers the state to make special provisions for socially & educationally backward classes of citizens, including Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes.

Naga & Kuki tribes have amongst the highest literacy levels, in India. While the Constitution recognizes 698 Scheduled tribes, it is difficult to draw comparison between, say the Jarawa Tribe of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and the Kuki & Naga tribes of the NE.

It is logically absurd, that Naga & Kuki tribes, continue to be provided with state assistance, on the basis that they are unequal! However, for the Meitei community (who are Vaishnava Hindus), the prospects for removal of the special status of Naga & Kuki tribes, was so remote, they preferred to also be declared scheduled tribes, which, is the immediate reason for the current conflict in Manipur.

For Dr. BR Ambedkar, the Father of our Constitution, Reservation was envisaged to be a temporary measure, to bring equality to unequals.

However, after 75 years of Independence, we now have 59.5% reservation in central government institutions, for education and employment. The figures become even higher, when state quotas are included.

For a moment, imagine you are a teacher in Manipur, and you have a Meitei, Naga and Kuki student, in your class.

There may be no tangible differences between the children, in terms of equality (as perceived in Article 14: Right to Equality, of our Constitution). However, the Kuki and Naga students are entitled to Schedule Tribe privileges, which the Meitei student, is not.

By NOT dismantling the system of protective reservation, after its purpose has been served, the system is now fragmenting society, on the unnecessary basis of

This fundamental challenge in Manipur society, is reflective of a larger challenge, to the ‘Idea of India’. There is a need to evolve a fair & rational mechanism, to dismantle protective discrimination, after its purpose has been served, despite its obviously unpopular consequences.

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH SAMUDRA GUPTA KASHYAP

A VEXING ISSUE

The flare-up between the Meiteis and the Kukis is not something that happened suddenly overnight; it must have been simmering for a long time. All of us, including the intelligence agencies, security agencies, government agencies, civil society, and the democratic setup, have collectively failed to identify that something was happening in that corner of Manipur.

The Meiteis and the Kukis have lived in peace for over two centuries. Since the arrival of the British in 1826 in Assam and Manipur, there is no history of any major flare-up between the Meiteis and the Kukis. Rather, they were friendly to each other; they had taken part in the anti-colonial resistance movements together; they had been to the First World War when there was a massive labour supply from the northeastern re gion to Mesopotamia, France, and other plac es.

And even in the 1990s, 1993 onwards, when there was a major rift between the Nagas and the Kukis, the Meiteis have re mained untouched.

Regions bordering Myanmar, whether it is in Mizoram, Manipur or Arunachal Pradesh, are very sensitive, and things are not the same on the ground as we are often being told or made to believe.

There have been very serious allegations that there has been a steady flow of population from across the border into Manipur through Mizoram and the porous border between Manipur and Myanmar.

Videos are available showing large-scale cultivation of poppy. Poppy cultivation is a big issue in the entire NE, including in parts of eastern Assam at one point in time and even at present on the temporary Thar area of the Brahmaputra where the immigrant Muslims dominate, in the eastern part of Arunachal Pradesh and all around the Myanmar border.

If we look back, we find that there was a major issue between the Nagas and the Kukis in the period between 1993-1996. Now they are at peace. How did this come about?

This needs to be probably examined. Next, there was huge friction between the Assamese and Bodo communities in Assam from 1988 onwards, and it continued for more than two decades. Today, there’s not a single issue there.

They’re all united. A common enemy has been identified: the illegal migrants eating into their development, intruding upon their territories and bringing down the entire average of the development indicators in the region. We generally come into a state of com-

placency after a ceasefire, a peace agreement, is signed with a particular group. We tend to believe that once the government of India or the state government signs a peace treaty with a particular armed group, the entire community will be at peace. But the so-called armed groups, insurgent groups or whatever we call them, do not necessarily represent a particular community from where they come.

For instance, the ULFA does not necessarily represent the Assamese community. Likewise, the NSCN does not represent all the Naga communities. Two years later, we find that certain new groups have propped up. How did they prop up? Because we have not been able to clear up all the arms stored or kept hidden.

Except in the case of the Mizo National Front - not a single bullet, it is said, has been left out – all was surrendered and deposited. But in other cases, we have not been able to do this.

So many insurgent groups or armed groups in Manipur - you will find that groups have so many names of similar abbreviations or acronyms, simply splinter groups. This has happened so often; even with ULFA from one large group in the Brahmaputra Valley, they now have two or three factions.

The external neighbourhood around the NE States has non-security aspects, too-business, transboundary trade, etc., which provides livelihood to the border populations on both sides.

The integrated check posts are not functioning very smoothly; the benefits of the trans-border trade between India and Bangladesh are not happening as they should have happened.

Youths from NE India have contributed far more to India’s international sports glory, proportional to their population size. When we talk of integration, we talk of emotional, national, and mental integration. During the Amrit Mahotsav of our freedom movement, we failed to glorify the heroes from the Kuki community, the Naga communities, and other communities of the region to the national audience.

We have not celebrated these events, we have not celebrated the martyrdom of these great heroes, we have not celebrated the heroic deeds that they had done in the course of resisting the British expansion in the Northeast.

And when these communities say that we have been neglected, we try to find out; we try to measure how we have not neglected them by looking at the central allocation of funds. Central allocation of funds alone, or certain roads, bridges, highways, railway stations, and airports alone, cannot bring about all-round develop-

ment and welfare. Look at Guwahati, the most important urban centre in the Northeast. Look at the young population from all these remote areas.

They all descend in Guwahati post-high school, post-class 10, because there is no proper facility or arrangement for higher education elsewhere. When I mean higher education, I’m just talking about good colleges - good engineering colleges, medical colleges, etc. I’m not talking about rocket and space science.

But these are not being met in those areas. Even today, travelling to Guwahati involves walking for two days, reaching the road, jumping into a tractor or a truck going to the highway, then hitchhiking to Imphal, then flying to Guwahati to pursue a BA or BSc or Bcom course! Take drinking water, primary health care, etc., these are all lacking.

If you look at Arunachal Pradesh, for instance, in the 1050-kilometre-long border that we have with Tibet or China, there is a huge influx of people from there

to the urban centres at Itanagar, Tawang, Bomdila, and Pasighat. Even the BSNL network there doesn’t work. While the presence of the army and security forces is important, the representation of the civil society is equally important.

We need to increase the interaction between the “mainland communities” and other communities. At the moment, I look at different layers of people-the geographical status of the people.

People of each state in the seven states live in their respective states and live in a neighbourhood comprising seven states of the Northeast.

There is very little interac tion, especially civil society interaction among the states, except that people pass through Guwahati because they must come for health care and education.

SAMUDRA GUPTA KASHYAP Chancellor, Nagaland University Renowed Author and Journalist

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH J N CHOUDHARY, IPS (RETD)

MANIPUR TODAY

Of the 16 districts in Manipur, about eight are affected, some moderately, some worse and some marginally. However, there has been a downward trend in violence in May, June and now.

It is true that 180 people have been killed and 50,000 or 60,000 people displaced and significant number of houses and vehicles burned and government/ private property destroyed.

A buffer zone has been created by deploying a huge number of security forces, and there is currently a stalemate. Violence seems to have been contained.

It could be because the communities have shifted to their own areas. But in terms of violence, it seems to be in a stalemate.

The next challenge is getting the communities to talk to each other. How do you restore governance?

One way of moving forward is to ensure that the relief camps are better run than they are now.

When Assam faced the problem of a large number of people forced to move to relief camps, the administration made a very clear effort at that time to ensure that these camps were well run.

There were schools for the children, and there was proper drinking water. People contributed to ensuring some modicum of basic facilities across the country.

You cannot leave it to the church and the government alone. The people who have been affected have to feel that the rest of India also is there for them.

It’s not a problem of Manipur alone; it is for all of us. Three things need to be done. Number one, make sure that the violence is contained.

Number two, start restoring governance by running the relief camps. And number three, figure out how to get the communities to talk to each other.

J N CHOUDHARY, IPS (RETD)

Former DG of National Security Guard (NSG), he also served as Additional director of the Intelligence Bureau

TECH DIPLOMACY: A US PERSPECTIVE

There is undeniably strategic competition/ tension between nations in emerging technologies. The world is starting to balkanise into blocks on these new technologies.

Technology innovation has become foundational to national power and coalition power and influence worldwide. Traditional measures of strength, such as GDP or military capacity, are increasingly downstream of a nation or a coalition’s ability to innovate in key technology areas. And so, tech innovation is more like geography, demography or natural resources than traditional influence measures. And that is a seismic shift.

And that recognition is behind the creation of the Technological Ambassador in the United States. Many governments have ministers representing their governments on the G7 and the G20 tracks on digital issues. The U.S. does not have a digital minister. The portfolio is split in many ways across different parts of the government, defence ministry, foreign ministry or commerce department. Within the State Department, the ambassador for cyberspace and digital policy is an effort to pull together, elevate and integrate the approach to technology diplomacy around the world.

KEY U.S. TECHNOLOGY POLICY AREAS

The U.S. has identified four broad policy areas.

The first is cybersecurity policy. Globally, something like a billion devices connect to the Internet every year, and as a trendline, it’s only accelerating. All that

The U.S. does not have a digital minister. The portfolio is split in many ways across different parts of the government, defence ministry, foreign ministry or commerce department. Within the State Department, the ambassador for cyberspace and digital policy is an effort to pull together, elevate and integrate the approach to technology diplomacy around the world

infrastructure and the data travelling through it need to be secured.

The second big bucket is Information and Communications Technology (ICT). This pertains to telecommunications, which is, in essence, the gut of the Internet. It encompasses all the architectures that bring the Internet into homes or phones, i.e., cable, fibre, satellites, wireless networks, and data centres. All these things cross international boundaries; thus, there is a diplomatic component.

Then there is digital regulation; it is incumbent upon governments around the world to safeguard these emerging technologies to safeguard their citizens to put guardrails in place governing the responsible use. And this needs to be done in a way that does not stifle innovation. This must take care of emerging technologies like AI, quantum computing,

This article is based on an interaction with the U.S. Technology Ambassador Nathaniel Fick at the Synergia Foundation.

The fourth bucket is the digital freedom and human rights agenda.

GEOPOLITICS IN TECHNOLOGY

There is undeniably strategic competition/ tension between nations in emerging technologies. The world is starting to balkanise into blocks on these new technologies. This must be balanced with a strong sentiment in many countries that do not want to choose or be forced to choose to go with one side or the other.

A new realisation is now dawning upon leading tech powers like the U.S. that having all the globally dominant tech businesses in one country makes it very hard to develop any kind of balanced ecosystem, even across like-minded partners.

For example, the five leading global providers in cloud computing are all American companies. But that is not necessarily the most beneficial outcome to the United States.

Therefore, as humankind looks to the next generation of critical and emerging technologies, it needs to think more holistically about innovation, partnerships, and ecosystems across borders.

It is not just about rewiring global supply chains in one country but rewiring global supply chains across like-minded innovation economies. We should aim for a world where leading quantum businesses, leading AI companies, and leading AI security companies are being built in multiple economies worldwide, united in a commitment to rights-respecting technology development, deployment, and use.

A MULTILATERAL APPROACH

Geometric progression comes from the bilateral flow of innovation and trade. There is an exact historical example ofof technology innovation across different countries’ ecosystems. Thirty years ago, there were a small number of countries that had what felt like an unassailable advantage in telecom technology. You had the United States with Motorola and Bell Labs and Qualcomm, Finland with Nokia, Sweden with Ericsson, Japan with Panasonic and Sony and South Korea with Samsung.

A relatively small number of countries had a huge, dominant global position in trusted Telecom. We lost that shared advantage through a combination of factors, but coming back to a lack of coordination among these countries and between these companies. Through a couple of decades of IP theft and subsidisation of Huawei and ZTE, the PRC has reached a top position across much of the world and telecom tech. If you fast forward to the current day, cloud computing is perhaps the next example.

The Westphalian system is not up to the challenge of the AI age. If we bring our traditional state-based responses to bear in building a governance approach, we will fail because we will not move quickly enough, and we will not build a seamless enough system.

There will be enough leakage in it that it will not work. We need to re-conceptualise many of our international organisations. The UN Security Council is the club of victors of World War Two. What legitimacy does that have today, with young people around the world? It is fundamentally faulty and needs to be recast.

The most important issue we face is building the right global structures to work together on the challenges of this new technology era. The structures that we currently have are unlikely to be up to the task, but how do we rebuild them? Or how do we build it anew? It is maybe the challenge of this generation.

AMBASSADOR NATHANIEL FICK

US Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy.

Source : Chappatte

TERROR SHADOW OVER SOUTH ASIA

Is South Asia turning into a breeding ground for terrorism?

This article is based on the 148th Synergia Forum on “South Asia and IOR Region Security Challenges and Future Prospects”

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a Salafi-jihadist militant group that emerged in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. Its genesis can be traced back to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004. AQI was responsible for several high-profile terrorist attacks in Iraq, including the 2005 al-Askari Mosque bombing and the 2006 Baghdad bombings.

In 2013, AQI rebranded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It proceeded to seize control of large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, declaring a caliphate in June 2014. During its active days, the ISIL attracted thousands of foreign fighters from around the globe, both men and women, including from India.

After being crushed in Iraq with the support of Western coalition forces and in Syria with the help of the Russians, today the remnants are scattered over Nigeria, Mozambique, the Sahara and Somalia. Closer home, they remain active in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan.

THE SOUTH ASIAN EDITION

The South Asian derivative of ISIS calls itself the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). ISKP claims as its jurisdiction South Asia and the adjoining nations of Central Asia. Borrowing heavily from the ideology, organisational structure, and tactics of ISIS, the ISKP

Political and economic conditions and a varied ethnic mix make South Asia an attractive breeding ground for terrorism. When religion, in its extreme form, is added to the mix, the cocktail is even more volatile.

tries to mimic its actions in its campaign for an Islamic state in South Asia.

There are varying interpretations of the area historically called Khorasan as the borders of such an entity shifted with a change of rulers/ merging of nations with time. Broadly, it could be said that it was a part of the Sasanian Empire (modern-day Iran) and stretched to modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISKP vows to create a pure Islamic caliphate of Khorasan if need be, by the sword.

The ISKP owes its lineage to breakaway elements of disparate Islamic fighters, including the Pakistani Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), survivors of Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban. It first surfaced in Afghanistan in 2014 and subsequently received the recognition of ISIS chief Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. Hafiz Khan Saeed (originally from TTP and killed in 2016 in a U.S. airstrike in Afghanistan) was the first ISKP emir. In 2019, the Islamic State formally announced the inclusion of Pakistan and India as part of ISKP.

During the presence of Western coalition forces in Afghanistan, ISKP conducted numerous hit-and-run

attacks, including suicide bombings. As the American forces withdrew from Kabul in 2019, the ISKP grabbed global headlines with their spectacular suicide bomb attack outside Kabul airport, killing many U.S. service persons. More recently, they sent in a suicide bomber to attack a political rally of Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa bordering Afghanistan, killing over 60, including a large number of women and children.

As per the UN estimates, the ISKP consists of a core element of around 1500 to 2000 fighters based in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces of Afghanistan, an area so remote that Kabul has a tenuous hold over it. They operate in small autonomous cells that can congregate at a time and place of choosing to conduct hit-and-run attacks with devastating effects. However, they do not yet possess the capacity to control significant territory to claim as their own Caliphate.

Some notable terror acts purportedly carried out by ISPK in South Asia are listed below:-

• Sri Lanka: On 26th April 2019, a series of deadly terror attacks were carried out by local Islamist extremist groups with links to ISIS, including bomb blasts in several churches on Easter Day.

• Afghanistan and Pakistan: ISIS Khorasan Province (ISK) has carried out several attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including suicide bomb ings, assassinations, and targeted killings.

• Bangladesh: Several attacks have been linked to ISIS or Islamist extremist groups, including the 2016 Dhaka attack.

• Maldives: ISIS has recruited several Maldivians, and there are concerns about the group’s expanding influence in the country.

SOUTH ASIA: A MAGNET FOR TERROR

Political and economic conditions and a varied ethnic mix make South Asia an attractive breeding ground for terrorism. When religion, in its extreme form, is added to the mix, the cocktail is even more volatile. Several factors have contributed to this phenomenon.

Rise of Extreme Ideologies. In the modern connected global village, it was inevitable that the ISIS ideology would flow into the fertile incubator of South Asia, just as it has done with so much violence in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, and African Sahel, to name a few. When ideological extremism grows, a section of society diverges to seek solutions through terrorism. It is attributed to ineffective governance, resulting in deviance from the publicly acceptable norm.

Fall of the ISIS. Some analysts claim that after being defeated comprehensively in the Levant, many foreign fighters of the group gravitated towards Afghan-

istan, known to harbour Islamic militants. Here, they were successful in expanding their cadre with local recruits. In addition, ISIS fighters from South Asia have also returned to their native places and were quickly absorbed by ISKP.

A Fertile Breeding Ground. The AfPak region has proved itself as a nursery for militancy of all hues -from Al Qaeda to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jemmaah Islamiyah. This has created a competitive environment where ISKP and other groups compete for influence and recruits.

The presence of these groups (whose members are constantly switching alliances), along with their mobility and adaptability, has created a fertile ground for the expansion of ISKP.

One also has to look at the history of the region in inspiring Islamic-motivated insurgencies in response to actual or perceived grievances.

Once such sentiments are disseminated over a large Muslim population with low literacy rates and high unemployment, groups like ISKP tend to thrive.

Weak Governance and Institutions. Weak governance and institutions create an environment conducive to the expansion of radicalisation. Corruption and ineffective law enforcement allow extremist groups to operate and recruit without significant hindrance.

Lack of Credible Counter Strategy: There have been several high-profile terrorist plots in the region, primarily linked to violent Islamist extremist networks.

But South Asian countries have not taken adequate concrete steps to counter the threat of ISKP, including strengthening law enforcement agencies, countering extremist ideologies, and enhancing regional cooperation in intelligence sharing and law enforcement efforts.

Existing counter strategies are imbalanced and disharmonised. Counter-terrorism groups are only 10 per cent of the fight; the combined efforts of the military, law enforcement and intelligence agencies contribute to 90 per cent of strategic success. But, excessive pressure on the military to perform, underutilisation of intelligence and oversight of the law destabilise the delicate balance of operational efficiency.

A SYSTEMS APPROACH

The ISIS threat needs to be dealt with holistically by combined efforts of governments and the public alike with common processes.

First and foremost is strengthening law enforcement agencies. Governments in South Asia should strengthen their law enforcement agencies by provid-

ing them with better training, equipment, and resources to investigate and prevent terrorist activities. Concurrently, the narrative espoused by extremist ideologues needs to be countered by a counter-narrative to promote tolerance and understanding.

Terror recognises no sovereign boundaries; hence, international cooperation is key to a successful counter-strategy. Sadly, while some South Asian countries willingly pool their resources, others treat terror as an instrument of state policy.

Unless the governance issues are tackled at the foundational level, extremism will always find willing volunteers. Corruption must be weeded out from the roots, and strong state institutions must be created that infuse confidence.

Poverty and rebellion have been handmaidens for as long as there have been rulers and ruled. Democracy, freedom, and constitutional rights are all empty words without jobs, food, basic education, and shelter. As a region, South Asian governments should promote economic growth, create jobs, and address poverty and inequality.

Law Enforcement, the kinetic approach, is equally important and must travel parallel to the soft approach. This must have an all-of-government approach and a regional commitment that does not differentiate between ‘bad terrorists’ and ‘good freedom fighters.’ Sharing of intelligence of impending terror attacks, like India did before the Easter Bombings in Sri Lanka, should be the norm and not an exception.

All religions preach peace and harmony between mankind; the twisted narrative of the clergy and radicals spews venom and inspires hatred.

A convincing counter-narrative that cuts across caste, creed, colour and religion can only work along with action on the ground, not mere postulations or empty words. Society as a whole, cutting across gender

divides, must be targeted as women play a critical role in the upbringing of potential terror recruits.

INDIAN VIEWPOINT

While ISPK has not carried out any significant attacks in India, there have been reports of the group’s presence and recruitment activities in the country’s southern states.

Intelligence Agencies have reported that the group has been trying to establish its influence in India since the early 2000s. Several existing terror groups in India have been maintaining their links with ISIS/ ISPK.

The poor governance in some parts of India provides an environment conducive to the expansion of ISPK, which has the potential to negatively impact the country’s stability and economy and lead to a decline in tourism and foreign investment.

The counter strategy by India, including enhancing inter-agency cooperation in intelligence sharing and monitoring vital indicators, needs a serious relook.

Assessment

ISIS expansion in South Asia is a reality, and cognisance of this larger threat should serve as a wakeup call to the region – necessitating political will to counter the threat.

South Asian regional cooperation is a must to counter the threat by sharing intelligence, resources and experts working together to disrupt terrorist financing, recruitment and expansion.

Counter-terrorism strategies must be based on constant monitoring, analysis and concurrent responses by multi-agency processes.

Source : 9GAG

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH ROHAN GUNARATNA

COMBATING TERROR IN SOUTH ASIA

Time to build a regional alliance to counter-terrorism.

The threat of terrorism seems to be shifting from the Middle East with the dismantling of ISIS or the Islamic State Network to the Asian region.

Taliban is in power in Afghanistan and is itself suffering violent attacks from Islamic States Khorasan Province (ISKP) and al Qaeda.

In the Doha Accord, they have assured that no foreign terror groups would be allowed to use Afghan territory for launching terror attacks, but last year, Dr Ayman al Zawahiri was tracked down and killed in a drone strike by the U.S. in the heart of capital Kabul. So, Al Qaeda itself has created its headquarters in Afghanistan.

A Sri Lanka detainee told me his main aim was to go to Nangarhar, a province in Afghanistan, to seek pure Islam. The ISKP produces its magazine in Afghanistan, and a recent issue featured Zawahiri as a shahid. It is time for the countries in this region to build an alliance to counter-terrorism.

THE EASTER SUNDAY TRAGEDY

Sri Lanka suffered a catastrophic attack on April 21, 2019. Sri Lanka has seen terrorism for nearly 30 years, but no single attack against civilians killed so many as were killed on that dreadful Easter Sunday of 2019- 275 citizens and foreign nationals.

This catastrophic attack crippled Sri Lanka and paralysed its tourism industry. Its reserves dried up, and Sri Lanka could never recover. In the period that followed that attack, Sri Lanka suffered again from the global pandemic.

So, the impact of the Easter Sunday attacks snowballed. That is why we call it a catastrophic attack. It damaged the social, economic and political dimensions of the country. If we look at the Easter Sunday attack, it also polarised the Muslims, the Sinhalese, and the Tamil communities.

Governments worldwide must do everything possible to pre-empt such future attacks not only through their law enforcement, military and intelligence services but also prevent the attacks at the grassroots level by regulating the religious space.

If the religious space is not regulated, and foreign ideologies take root, extremism followed by terrorism will be inevitable.

The key lessons learnt from the Easter Sunday tragedy are one pre-emption, and the other is prevention. The third dimension is how to shape the outcome of an attack, as they generate deep suspicion, prejudice, resentment, hatred, anger and violence. So, to prevent a recurrence of events such as the Easter Sunday attack, governments and community leaders must do much more to take steps to prevent that from recurring.

For instance, those who have been arrested with the same ideology and belief system as the perpetrators will mount another attack. For this, we must develop rehabilitation programmes that should be mandatory for all perpetrators.

Without rehabilitation, three things will happen. One is that the terrorists who are radicalised and those who are in detention will go and mount another attack at the first opportunity. Second, they will infect others with that ideology.

Third, when the perpetrators are hailed as ‘heroes’ and become a part of terrorist iconography, some part of the community will continue to venerate and revere them. This link has to be broken through rehabilitation.

Prior to the attack, high-grade, high-quality intelligence was provided by India through Tamil Nādu intelligence. Officers from RAW and Indian IB briefed the Sri Lankan SIS at the director and top levels.

However, due to a political angle, the Sri Lankan government did not act upon the intelligence, not taking the threat seriously enough.

In the past, the government of Sri Lanka - the National Security Council, the highest national security body in Sri Lanka - had received 337 reports from its security and intelligence community about Zaharan, Muslim radicalisation, and Islamic State or ISIS.

These came from the police Special Branch, Naval intelligence, Army intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, etc. Reports also came from SIS, the state intelligence service, one of the premier intelligence services, the military intelligence service, and the Western Province intelligence service, which is a police service and also from the intelligence structure of the special task force.

So, in my view, the Easter Sunday attack was not an intelligence failure; it was what you call operational failure, the failure to act.

Governments must take firm action when they receive intelligence. It is very rare that any foreign government will receive such high-grade, high-quality intelligence. It is shameful that Sri Lankan authorities did not act based on this information.

FORCES AGAINST TERROR

The important lesson emerging from the sad experience of the Easter Sunday bombing is that the entire region has to work together. In general, there is a suspicion between this region’s security and intelligence services.

It is no longer a secret that from 1983 until 1987, India’s foreign intelligence service had armed, trained, and financed various terrorist groups. All these events create a tremendous suspicion of security and intelligence services because security and intelligence services traditionally have used their authority to work against inimical powers. Today, we don’t have to do that. Today, we can all work as a world striving for peace and harmony.

We should now move beyond what happened in history and create an intelligence alliance in the Indian Ocean region and the Indian Ocean region countries, similar to Five Eyes in which the United States, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand pool their respective intelligence resources.

In the build-up to the Easter Sunday attack, the Five Eyes coalition provided some intelligence about one Jamil who would attack Hotel Taj Samudra.

Beyond this, they had nothing more on the coordinated multi-attack. The time is right for the Indian Ocean region to build a new intelligence alliance, learning from Mumbai in 2008 and the Easter Sunday attack 2019. If there is no intelligence alliance, we can again share or exchange information or intelligence, and more attacks will occur.

There needs to be alliances built not only for security Intelligence but also for criminal intelligence. I had built a similar intelligence alliance for ASEAN at the request of the Indonesian Minister of Defence.

Think tanks like the Synergia Foundation can work with Indian and other regional governments to create a model like the Five Eyes for South Asia.

Such an alliance should have common databases, exchange of personnel, joint trading, joint operations, sharing of experience, resources and technology, and sharing of mostly what we all know because we have developed our mastery in our domains. And it is time for us to build a very robust system.

Another important step is to counter fake news. Recently, I was told that Zaharan is not a Muslim or that ISIS or the Islamic State is an organisation that is only in cyberspace. All countries should pass laws to ensure

that online falsehoods and manipulations do not produce an ignorant generation. People must base their opinions on evidence.

Necessary legislation is necessary to combat this threat. The first law is against fake news: online falsehoods and manipulations. The second law we need is an intelligence Act to empower our intelligence officers.

Then, we need a National Security Act because national security is not just fighting against crime and terrorism. It is about economic and financial security, energy security, security of supply chain, information security, cyber security, etc.

We also need a Harmony Act. Zaharan could not have been arrested before the crime because he was preaching hatred against other religions, against his faith, and the Sufis, local and traditional Muslims. But he should have been arrested a long time ago. We need a harmony act to prevent insults against religions and ethnic groups.

Sri Lanka also needs a counter-terrorism bill with rehabilitation as a principal component because eight organisations have filed cases against rehabilitation. If terrorists are not rehabilitated, there will be other attacks.

Religious organisations should also be held accountable for spreading extremist ideologies in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was a peaceful space between Muslims and non-Muslims until we had ideologies from Saudi Arabia. The Salafi Wahhabi Islam and the Jamaat e Islami version came to Sri Lanka.

We have to ensure that local and traditional Islam, which is a very peaceful and a very beautiful form of Islam, is promoted.

These foreign ideologies are very closely monitored, and no foreign preachers or extremist books are allowed. Muslims are a very peaceful community in Sri Lanka; they have participated in the fight against LTTE terrorism.

A specialist counter-terrorism centre should be created in Sri Lanka, which draws experts from the seven intelligence services.

Sri Lanka won global praise for defeating the LTTE but could not stop the Easter Sunday attack. We must also create a national security

PROFESSOR ROHAN GUNARATNA International Terrorism Expert & Founder of ICPVTR at Nanyang Tech University, Singapore

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH ASIF FAURD

The centre of gravity of ISIS operations has now shifted from its traditional physical domains to online domains. So, the key focus should be mainly on the Islamic State’s ideology, the apocalyptic, bigoted ideology, which is essentially based on an exclusivist agenda. ISIS has been facing stiff resistance, and to a great extent, they have been dismantled and destabilized, and they are not in that position where they were having their former glory.

But right now, we need to think of how this group has been able to thrive and has been able to revive itself despite facing military setbacks, losses of leaders and losses of combatants. As strategists, policymakers, or even practitioners and intelligence officers, we need to focus on how this particular type of terrorism has survived or thrived despite such setbacks. We all need to understand that ideology plays a key part.

But it is not its ideology alone. It is also the fact that they can engage in hybrid forms of warfare. It is not only asymmetric warfare; they can also exploit non-kinetic means of warfare. For instance, they can influence certain instruments of power; they can alter and create a new breed of lone wolf-type attackers.

One of the reasons they could attract so many foreign terrorist fighters is because of this hybrid form of warfare they are engaging in. How do we counter this hybrid threat creating new forms of foreign terrorist fighters, lone wolf and inspired networks?

We must examine how Zaharan (the perpetrator or mastermind of the Easter Sunday attacks) operated. Initially, he was mainly focused on spreading Wahhabism or his extremist, exclusivist ideology within that particular traditional Muslim community, especially in the eastern province of Sri Lanka.

He was taking advantage of the ethnic enclaves with a predominantly Muslim population to enforce his ideology. He created a system where you are either with us or against us.

If you are a Sufi Muslim or a traditional Muslim, or you are not adhering to his radical ideology, you are branded as a traitor. Most terrorist organizations or extremist groups will operate similarly. But in this particular post-war climate, we could see that they were not targeting the state directly. They were targeting the community directly by trying to enforce their ideology.

In 2009, I interviewed the Easter Sunday suicide bomber Zaharan, who explained why he was enforcing his ideology; he was trying to purify Islam. In his view, traditional Muslims were not following the correct path.

Therefore, he took it upon himself to use force, coercion or certain attacks on some of these mosques that did not adhere to their Wahhabism or Salafism. They were able to coerce some of these in local communities. We can see the evolution of Zaharan with the advent

of the Islamic State’s Caliphate-building exercise or its ideology of building a pan-Islamist State.

So, while this ideology was there, we also saw, to a great extent, exclusivist and ultra-nationalist groups emerging in Sri Lanka in its post-conflict context. There was a convergence between the two, which essentially paved the path for individuals like Zaharan to conduct his holy war. He was able to radicalize many Sri Lankans through his lectures and propaganda channels, through these Wahhabi madrasahs.

The ideological side of it is one side of the coin. The other side is how local issues have now become transnational. We can see this quite clearly with the rise of ISKP.

Even though ISIS essentially does not have the operational capability that it initially had during the reign of terror when Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was its leader, we can see quite clearly how ISKP is able to not only revive itself but also thrive, especially amidst the chaos in Afghanistan.

In terms of regional security, what kind of implications do we have as IOR states? Afghanistan poses an existential threat because of the rise of ISKP and has emerged as a hotbed for jihadist militancy.

When we look at the sequence of events or the trajectory that ISIS have been following, they have used nationals from various geographies to conduct their attacks. So why are they using foreign nationals instead of nationals from the regional states or ethnic Afghans rather than using former ISIS combatants that have migrated into Afghanistan due to loss of territory and combatants in Iraq and Syria? They are trying to create a kind of narrative of prejudice, capitalize on whatever ethnocentric politics may have emerged in the regional states or capitalize on this narrative of Muslims within the region being persecuted to attract to radicalize and recruit a number of suicide bombers. This is quite an alarming and dangerous trend.

Conventional thinking in terms of national security needs to change because we are facing what we call hybrid threats. The online space can empower non-combatants to become radicalized suicide bombers or combatants. So, here, we can see the shift in how combatants are being radicalized.

Then, apart from rethinking how national security needs to be structured, another area that we need to rethink is having effective laws to deal with these, such as the National Security Act and the Information Sharing Act.

As regards joint intelligence-sharing capabilities, this may sometimes have certain challenges and geopolitical implications. But if you are fighting a war against an enemy using non-kinetic means or hybrid methods,

then we need to rethink how we need to use joint intelligence-sharing mechanisms. There needs to be some form of a joint intelligence-sharing mechanism where these threats can be nipped in the bud before becoming a terrorist attack.

The main focus should be on how ISKP is reviving itself. With the rise of the Taliban and the focus being on al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent, we can quite clearly see the potential for more radicals.

We are faced with a setup where most of these groups are decentralized in some form, so they maintain some form of operational autonomy.

Rethinking not only national security strategy but also re thinking how regional states will be able to cooperate should be a key area of focus.

ASIF FUARD

Defence Analyst specializing in counterterrorism, counter intelligence, strategic communications, transnational threats and hybrid warfare. He is a visiting lecturer on counterterrorism for General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, Sri Lanka.

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH ADIL RASHEED

A TURF WAR WITHIN RADICAL GROUPS

The whole region, especially South Asia, is facing new crises when it comes to violent extremism. In some ways, we may not be having the kind of spectacular terrorist attacks that hog the limelight in some of the Western media.

But if you look at the ecosystem of the region, it is turning into one that is causing great fissures in society. And if you look at Pakistan and Afghanistan, we just heard the news that Pakistan is against making airstrikes in Afghanistan against the Taliban while ISK and TTP are attacking that country.

It is disturbing that once the U.S. forces have withdrawn from both West Asia and Afghanistan, the terrorists have stopped thinking of the issues they were thinking about earlier; their concentration has moved towards South Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean region.

They have become politically very ambitious, fighting and trying to get into turf wars. They have a lust for political power now.

There is also a normalization of terrorism. Many countries are now trying to take the Taliban on board. There is a greater acceptance of that entity, if not a formal recognition. And now we find many jihadi groups even participating in the Russia-Ukraine war.

There is almost a free kind of dealing by governments with the former jihadist groups, which is

DR ADIL RASHEED

We find the Chinese leaders and foreign Minister talking to Taliban leaders; we find al Qaeda training many TTP forces. And we also find a greater conflict between the Salafis and the Deobandhis, which is spilling over into Pakistan.

So, within the terrorist force, a turf war is going on between the Deobandhi Taliban and the ISKP. Things are getting quite muddled. And it is because the government is not running in vast expanses of the region.

Whether it is Yemen or Somalia, or even at the societal level in other countries, such as Maldives, from Myanmar to Manipur, we are facing inter-sectarian, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious clashes and conflicts because the centre cannot hold and things fly apart. Institutionally, we will have to become much stronger. We need a very comprehensive view at an institutional level to fight these tendencies. We also have to look at the kinds of policies which we have.

The whole liberal narrative, the whole idea of liberal democracy, and our cherished constitutional values are coming under question as global institutions are getting weaker-the UN and the world economic institutions-they are unable to perform the functions as they were supposed to.

It has become increasingly difficult for the Global South to continue on its way to progress. We are finding many failing states around us, and as the states become weaker, we find these non-state actors having free rein in carving their spheres of influence around, which is a huge challenge.

Distinguished Research fellow, IDSA, New Delhi, he was researcher and political commentator in various international think tanks and media organizations for over 17 years, both in the United Arab Emirates and India.

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH PUNSARA AMARASINGHE

BOOK REVIEW: SRI LANKA’S EASTER

SUNDAY MASSACRE BY DR ROHAN GUNARATNA

As the review of this book, rather than focusing on the security insights of South Asia and the Islamic fundamentalism threat, which has been spreading across the region, I would be dealing with the book’s content.

I want to highlight why this book should be evaluated and appreciated as a classic work in the post-Easter attack context.

This book itself has provided an amazing answer to the conspiracy theories that came in the post-Easter attack context in Sri Lanka.

Once Zaharan and his gang perpetrated the Easter attacks, most of the critics in Sri Lanka tended to formulate many stories and conspiracy theories.

You would be surprised to believe some critics were coming up with a theory suggesting that the Indian external intelligence service, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), was behind the attack.

They were connecting when the attacker, who could not explode himself in the Taj Samudra hotel, when he stepped away from the hotel; they were theorizing that since it was a hotel owned by the Indians, he deliberately avoided exploding himself.

Many fake theories came in the aftermath of the Easter attacks, but Professor Gunaratna’s book is an ideal answer to that. He has refuted and rebutted all these nonsensical political contentions based on political prejudices through his classic writing.

This book has unfolded the development of Salafi Wahhabism and how it affected and finally became the catalyst of manufacturing a terrorist like Zaharan. The Sri Lankan Muslim society is rather peaceful.

They have been living in Sri Lanka for centuries. As clearly illustrated in the book, it was after 1977, after Sri Lankan workers went to Middle Eastern countries - that was the starting point of the Wahhabi Salafi trend in the

Gradually, it began to develop across the island. The funding came from Saudi Arabia to nourish the Wahhabi

ideology. The book’s first half depicted how the Salafi Wahhabism ideology countered and outnumbered most Sufi Muslims in the Eastern Province, which paved the path to forming a terrorist like Zaharan.

There were two main factors, which Professor Gunaratna has well articulated. The first one is the influence of the Muslim preacher called PJ, who happens to be a South Indian Muslim preacher.

He came to Sri Lanka several times, and his preaching and his articulation style attracted many Muslims in the eastern provinces.

Most Wahhabis and their followers were obsessed and infatuated with his preaching. The establishment of the Islamic Centre for Religious Studies in the Eastern Province was another one of the pillars of the expansion of Wahhabism in the country.

Both these events can be taken as core-related factors behind the nourishment of Islamic extremism and radicalization in the country, which Professor Gunaratna has clearly unfolded in the book.

When you read this book, you will realize how Zaharan and his gang began propagating this extremist ideology. It is interesting to observe that this ideology was mainly attracted not by the marginalized community the marginalized or poor Muslims in the country.

It tremendously impacted the middle-class Western-educated Muslims in Sri Lanka. For instance, even before the Easter Attack, there was a software engineer, a young Sri Lankan Muslim, who was responsible for creating an online platform, a network that caused havoc and created lots of pro-ISIS and pro-jihadis.

He had certain links with ISIS supporters in South India, who were planning to commit an attack on a synagogue.

But, as Professor Gunaratna pointed out, it could have been nipped in the bud and prevented if the government and security forces had taken measures on time. As he stated, it was not a failure of the intelligence but simply an operational failure.

I must say that it’s not entirely an academic book. Any general reader or anyone interested in knowing what South Asia is facing today, what the region is facing today, can easily comprehend what he has presented.

DR. PUNSARA AMARASINGHE Lecturer, Faculty of Law, General SJK Defense University, Srilanka, he is a visiting fellow at Center for Global Legal Studies in Wisconsin University , Madison in the USA.

INDIA- MALDIVES: A NEW ERA OF SYNERGY

Increased international interest in the Maldives threatens to make it yet another arena for big power contestations on India’s doorstep.

The most enduring image of Maldives that most Indians of Generation X and Millennials will have is of a beautiful island paradise surrounded by crystal clear water, with every island in the archipelago a veritable abode of luxury. Not surprisingly, the largest group of foreigners that flock to this idyllic destination (as per Maldives Ministry of Tourism data for 2022) are Indian, with nearly 1.4 lahks visiting in 2022. The numbers are expected to go up even further this year.

But for ‘Baby Boomers’, there is a different image - of maroon bereted Indian Army paratroopers flying thousands of km into the vastness of the Indian Ocean with scanty information of an ongoing coup by Tamil mercenaries. Within hours, they restored the democratically elected government and sent a message to the world of a rising India, not hesitant to use military force to further its interests in its region. This was underscored by the cover story in Time magazine of April 1989 titled, “Super India-the Next Military Power!”

Like many smaller nations on India’s periphery, the Maldives also struggle to navigate the treacherous path of economic well-being and national security. Therefore, with many centrifugal forces acting on the domestic politics of the Maldives, it is not surprising that since the heydays of the late 1980s, Indo-Maldives relationship has seen many Ups and Downs!

Like many smaller nations on India’s periphery, the Maldives also struggle to navigate the treacherous path of economic well-being and national security. Therefore, with many centrifugal forces acting on the domestic politics of the Maldives, it is not surprising that since the heydays of the late 1980s, IndoMaldives relationship has seen many Ups and Downs!

DELVING INTO HISTORY

India was among the first nations to recognise Maldives’ independence from British rule in 1966. Since the election of Mohamed Nasheed in 2008, India-Maldives relations have shot up.

These were underscored by a military relationship that included installing a chain of surveillance radars on all the atolls, which enhanced maritime situational awareness of the Indian Navy and the Maldives National Defence Force.

This incited a reaction from China and its supporters within the island nation. The relationship saw a difficult period when Mohammed Waheed Hassan and Abdulla Yameen were in power, as both were inclined to lean towards Beijing.

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

India-Maldives relations have been on an upward trajectory since the incumbent President Ibrahim Solih Government came into power in 2018. The relationship has reached new heights with high-level visits and increased cooperation. Both nations have developed close strategic ties. A special mention must be made of India’s spontaneous support during the pandemic when the sudden closure of tourist flights spelt economic disaster for the country.

It is widely acknowledged in the Maldives, as the defence minister Mrs Mariya Didi told the author last September, the Indian COVID vaccines (100,000 doses were airlifted in Jan 2021 when India itself was suffering) came as a ‘booster shot’ for Maldives tourism industry, its primary source of foreign exchange.

With its tourist industry personnel protected on priority by these vaccines, the Maldives was one of the earliest to open for business, while its competitors took many more months. India is also the favourite location to fly seriously ill citizens for high-quality yet affordable medical care in case the Indian-supported Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital in Male cannot cope.

THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION

With 26 atolls covering an area of nearly 90,000 square miles in a central location of the Indian Ocean dominating important sea lanes of communication, it is hardly surprising that it attracts the sometimes-unwanted attention of global giants like China, the U.S., UK, and of course, India, jostling for geopolitical space in the Indian Ocean Region.

Maldives offers immense opportunities for China (whose citizens earlier formed the largest tourist group till ousted by Indians) as its priorities in the IOR

increase due to the Maritime Silk Road Initiative, the maritime portion of the BRI. From time to time, reports surfaced of Chinese plans to construct military installations in the Maldives, like the 2018 scare that a Joint Ocean Observation Station was being constructed in Makunudhoo. Thankfully, from India’s perspective, the project did not take off.

Given the uncertain dynamics of Sino-Indian relations, China’s strategic presence in Maldives is a perpetual hurdle for India. Maldives has emerged as an important ‘pearl’ in China’s “String of Pearls” construct in South Asia.

China has recognised the strategic value of Maldives and increased its footprint in India’s neighbourhood, which remains a security concern for India. Maldives reportedly owes a large amount of debt to China, and its reliance on China for income means it cannot afford to alienate Beijing. This economic influence of China in the Maldives impacted India-Maldives economic cooperation.

Even the U.S. is a significant player in this part of the world with its Diego Garcia military base close to Maldivian waters. In 2020, Washington and Male signed a Defence Agreement, a move India had welcomed.

INDIA’S ‘NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST’ OUTREACH

Maldives occupies an important position in India’s vision of ‘SAGAR’ (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and ‘Neighbourhood First’. India recognises the strategic location of Maldives in the Indian Ocean and its significance for India and other nations with common maritime interests and threats. The Maldives have responded with their own “India First’ policy.

Source : CartoonStock

Through its positive actions, India has vindicated the role it can play in the interest of the Maldives. India’s proximity to the Maldives has allowed it to provide timely assistance in times of distress. Incidents in 1988, 2004, and 2014 demonstrated India’s capacity to come to the Maldives’ rescue in times of crisis.

This has established the advantages of India’s strategic role in the region and is widely acknowledged by both the government and the people of Maldives.

India and Maldives have maintained friendly and close cooperation in strategic, economic, and military aspects. India and Maldives have supported each other in multilateral forums like the UN and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

This demonstrates their shared strategic interests and commitment to regional cooperation. Both sides regularly consult each other at apex levels to strengthen their strategic cooperation and foster closer ties.

The economic cooperation between the two countries has grown, with India providing crucial commodities to the Maldives, even during the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Maldives was hit very hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, with its economy contracting significantly. This impacted India-Maldives’ economic cooperation.

While India is the second-largest trading partner of the Maldives, the trade balance is heavily skewed in India’s favour. This can be a challenge for the Maldives, as it can lead to a dependence on Indian imports and a lack of diversification in its trade.

Indian exports to Maldives include agriculture and poultry produce, sugar, fruits, and other essential commodities. Indian imports from the Maldives are almost negligible.

THE MILITARY DIMENSION

There is no denying the Indo-Maldives relationship has a strong military underpinning. India continues to contribute to maintaining security on the island nation. The maritime border shared by both countries further emphasises the importance of their security cooperation.

The various defence cooperation agreements cover a wide scope and include a permanent helicopter base maintained by India for surveillance, radars on all 26 atolls for seamless coverage of approaching vessels and aircraft, Indian Coast Guard surveillance aircraft permitted to overfly Maldivian airspace and territorial waters on maritime awareness missions, setting up tri-services teams of Maldivian defence force to monitor/carry out surveillance of the critical island chain etc.

Of special significance is Ekuverin, an annual joint military exercise between India and Maldives, aiming to enhance the interoperability between the Indian Army and Maldives National Defence

CHALLENGES AHEAD

India asserts that its relationship with the Maldives is free of any politically contentious issues. However, internal politics cause India’s large footprint to be cited as a disrupter for Maldives’ security and other interests.

The return of Abdulla Yameen, jailed for corruption, to the country last year after years of self-imposed exile spurred an anti-India campaign, “India Out.” Mr Yameen has called for cancelling all defence-oriented agreements with India and the removal of all Indian military personnel. Indian analysts point to a Chinese hand in all this.

More worrying is the narrative being played out in Western media, and Al Jazeera, that democratic institutions are weakening in Maldives and basic human rights are under threat. If true, this does not bode well for an enduring Indo- Mauritius relationship.

Another area of concern has been the growing presence of radical Islamic elements. In the past decade or so, the number of Maldivians drawn towards terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) and Pakistan-based jihadist groups has been increasing.

This gives rise to the possibility of Pakistan-based terror groups using remote Maldivian islands as a launch pad for terror attacks against India and Indian interests.

As a November 2022 article by Carnegie’s South Asia Programme states, “At present, the opposition’s singular fixation on India’s security presence has not attracted significant blowback.

But if things escalate to an unmanageable level, punctuated by an outbreak of violence against Indians, the opposition—not to mention the government and the ordinary citizens of the Maldives could pay a high price.”

NAVIGATING THE FUTURE

A large segment of the Maldivian population recognises the “very special bond” that both countries enjoy. India’s prompt actions in responding to any emergency that strikes this remote island nation have garnered a great deal of ground-level support. However, Indian diplomatic efforts should constantly aim to reinforce these sentiments with even greater vigour. Some areas where this can be achieved are listed below.

Diplomatic Cooperation: Indian and Maldivian leaders must focus on continued high-level contacts and consultations on regional issues. Both nations are founding members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the South Asian Economic Union and signatories to the South Asia Free Trade Agreement.

India-Maldives strategic cooperation to remain strong, both countries must support each other in multilateral forums like the UN and SAARC.

Defence Cooperation: Maldives holds a significant position among India’s vital maritime neighbours. Indian active engagements must enhance the bolstering of the security infrastructure in Maldives through capacity development and capability building. Working closely with the Maldivian authorities, the Indian Navy has conducted joint exercises, provided training to personnel, aided in infrastructure development and facilitated the transfer of equipment. These collaborative initiatives emphasising India’s crucial role as a security provider in the region must be pursued by close monitoring.

Indo-Pacific Security: India must play a key role in Indo-Pacific security space to ensure regional security in South Asia and surrounding maritime boundaries. This space has to be developed as a response to the growth of extra-regional powers (particularly China’s) in India’s maritime sphere of influence. The QUAD has a place in the security of Indian Ocean island nations like the Maldives.

Infrastructure Development: In August 2021, an Indian company, Afcons, signed a contract for the Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP), the largest-ever infrastructure project in the Maldives. The project connects the capital city of Male with three neighbouring islands through a bridge-and-causeway system. More such investments would be needed to counter the deep pockets of Beijing.

Economic Aid: India must provide liberal economic aid to the Maldives to support economic growth and development. In 2021, bilateral trade between India and Maldives registered a growth of 31% over the previous year, overcoming pandemic-related challenges.

Tourism: Tourism is the mainstay of the Maldivian economy. The country is now a major global tourist destination and a job destination for others. Tourism joint ventures and collaborations will mutually benefit both nations. Indian tourists, whose numbers have already overtaken China, can act as true ambassadors for their nations.

Drug Detoxification and Rehabilitation. Growing drug trafficking and consumption in the Maldives is a cause for worry. To eradicate this threat, India must work closely with the Maldivian government. India should invest in creating more facilities, such as the detoxification and rehabilitation centre in Addu, one of 20 high-impact community development projects.

Handling ‘India Out’ campaign: Presently, the campaign has support from a limited population, but this cannot be taken for granted by the Indian government.

If the issues raised by the supporters of the ‘India Out’ are not handled carefully, the campaign may change the domestic political situation in the Maldives and may set ripples in India’s currently favourable relationship with the country.

Assessment

Indian foreign policy should ultimately aim at ensuring that, regardless of which party is in power, the Maldives’ official India First policy does not change. This is underscored by the fact that Mr Yameen, spearheading the ‘India Out’ campaign today, was in power when he signed the Defence Action Plan 2016 with New Delhi! Only persistent diplomatic, cultural, economic and military efforts by New Delhi can make the relationship an enduring one.

China’s involvement has added complexity to the India-Maldives relationship and has led to challenges in the areas of security and politics. But if India wishes to play in the big league, this is a challenge it should be prepared to face and deal with. Maldives, on its part, will balance its relationships with both India and China to maintain its economic and political stability.

SRI LANKA: FRIENDS IN NEED…

To ensure a better future, India and Sri Lanka must look beyond the Tamil minority and Sri Lanka’s strategic location- a historic thumb rule that has been the template so far.

Arelationship that spans a canvas of over 2500 years, encompassing cultural, religious, intellectual and people-to-people exchanges, cannot be a transactional one. However, as our mutual experience has exhibited, despite the long legacy, at times, the relationship appears anything but enduring!

The ocean that bears India’s name and makes up for a vast swath of its immediate neighbourhood remains critical to India’s security and well-being. The emerald island of Sri Lanka sits like a sentinel atop this ocean’s vastness. It is the natural gateway to the heavily travelled sea lanes of communication between the oil wells of West Asia and the nations of Indo- Pacific, including China. Naturally, when geopolitical contestations creep in, they give rise to mutual suspicion and bitter recriminations and unfounded fears. This, too, has been a hallmark of the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship.

As all good neighbours, India and Sri Lanka have their differences- some small and insignificant and others big and intransigent. However, in the ultimate analysis, a groundswell of mutual goodwill exists due to shared cultural ties.

While India has shown no inclination to create an its own version of the ‘Monroe Doctrine,’ as a self-respecting nation, it cannot ignore what is happening in its backyard.

While India would like Sri Lanka to act as a buffer against potential sea-borne threats emanating from the Southern Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka may have its own reservations acting as an Indian outpost. The shadow of China naturally falls large on the smaller nation, a reality that is hard to ignore.

The silver lining is that both sides are sincerely making amends- New Delhi with its “Neighbourhood First” policy and Colombo with its “India First” approach.

The near-total economic collapse of Sri Lanka in a perverse way helped to dispel some stereotyped impressions on both sides. India’s spontaneous and no-strings-attached response to the SOS call from its neighbour has been much appreciated across the Palk Straits (its $ 4 billion loan was nearly double the loan that Pakistan has been pleading to IMF to grant for nearly a year!). New Delhi was the first creditor to extend a letter of support for Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring, a crucial move to open the doors to a $ 3 billion IMF bailout package. That President Ranil Wickremesinghe, placed on the chair to troubleshoot the nation out of its economic morass, chose India as the first nation for a state visit is ample proof of this sentiment.

A GEOGRAPHICAL REALITY

As mentioned earlier, India cannot afford to ignore

Sri Lanka because of geography. More so, with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) becoming a theatre of power play as a resurgent People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) flexes its newly acquired blue water muscles as it ventures into the region and builds naval bases on its periphery. Deep water ports, including Colombo, Galle and Trincomalee, present attractive options to all naval powers interested in the IOR, including India, despite its peninsular geography. Inimical forces operating out of Sri Lankan ports can make not only the Northern Indian Ocean treacherous to Indian sea-borne trade but also our trade to the Pacific through the Southern Indian Ocean. The same goes for Sri Lankan airspace to maintain maritime domain awareness over the Indian Ocean by land-based aircraft and long-range drones using Sri Lankan airfields for refuelling/ emergency bases.

As an island nation, Sri Lanka stakes claim to a vast EEZ, where there is considerable scope for joint exploitation of maritime resources, including the rich fishing fields, always a point of disharmony between the two countries.

THE SOUTH ASIAN ANGLE

Sri Lanka is an important player in the South Asian regional framework. From India’s perspective, together they can stitch together a common security umbrella for the Indian Ocean, ensuring freedom of navigation without fear or favour. Other areas of common interest include counter-terrorism (The Easter bombing incident being the most recent example) and maritime security. While India would like Sri Lanka to act as a buffer against potential sea-borne threats emanating from the Southern Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka may have its own reservations acting as an Indian outpost. The shadow of China naturally falls large on the smaller nation, a reality that is hard to ignore. Balancing a superpower (with deep pockets) and a large next-door neighbour is not easy; it gets even more complex when you bring Pakistan into the equation! Pakistan’s military aid is much appreciated in Colombo during the dark days

of the civil war when India shied away from supplying lethal weaponry.The economic domain is obviously the most non-controversial one where real progress can be made. Despite SAARC’s failure to create a South Asian Free Trade Zone like the EU, India- Sri Lanka commercial relations have blossomed. India is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner in South Asia, with India being its third-largest export destination. More than 60 per cent of Sri Lanka’s exports enjoy the benefits of a Free Trade Agreement. Sri Lanka has the potential to become a hub for trade and commerce in the IOR with its deep-water ports, strategic location and skilled workforce, an ideal economic and trading partner for India.

THE JOURNEY SO FAR

It would be illuminating to briefly recapitulate the path of the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship, which has been at best rocky. Sharing a common colonial past, both became independent nearly together (Sri Lanka 4th Feb 1948), and post-independence ties revolved around four principal issues- the Sri Lankan Tamils, the coastal fishing areas, development assistance to Colombo, and lastly, the elephant in the room-China.

A confident (‘An Awakening Asian Power’ as labelled by the Times Magazine in a cover story of that period) India took a plunge into big-time politics by signing the 1987 Peace Accord under which Colombo agreed to a devolution of powers to the Tamil-dominated provinces with its troops back in barracks while the Tamil rebels were to surrender their weapons (even if the LTTE was not a signatory) to the IPKF. As they say, the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and the consequences of such a poorly crafted deal involving peace enforcement upon the toughest guerrilla organisation of modern times, are now history. The resultant rancour between New Delhi and Colombo was to last over two decades till the LTTE was unambiguously wiped out in May 2009 by Mahinda Rajapaksa. That India had a strictly ‘hands-off policy’, choking off LTTE supply lines from peninsular India after the tragic assassination of Prime

Source : The Mercury News

Ministerial candidate Rajiv Gandhi by a female Black Tiger suicide bomber was much appreciated in Sri Lankan military circles.

The India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) of 1998 was a definite turning point when relations began a northward climb. India’s spontaneous reaching out to its neighbour during its devastation by the 2004 tsunami added to the overall goodwill. The 2012 Sampur Power Plant agreement has further helped cement the ties.

Now in the 2020s, both nations are trying to cope with security, economic, social and political challenges. Sri Lankan President’s recent visit to India has paved the way to review the bilateral relationship and leverage the strengths of geographical and historical ties.

CHALLENGES

The “Neighbourhood First” and “India First” policies notwithstanding, there are composite problems due to domestic and external factors; the list of potential ‘pitfalls’ is long.

Sri Lankan Perception. For the most part, the asymmetrical nature of interactions play an important role in shaping India-Sri Lanka relations. The perceived threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty from India, highlighted by whichever party is in opposition in Sri Lanka, always acts as a dampener whenever some progress is made in the economic and security domain. India’s known sympathy for Sri Lanka Tamils aggravates this fear factor.

Fishermen Issue. The issue of fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) has been a long-standing issue. Sri Lanka’s proximity to Indian territorial waters has often blurred the line for fishermen on both sides in pursuit of fish stock. Way back in 1921, British colonial authorities from India and Sri Lanka calculated the risks that could arise from the over-exploitation of marine resources and demarcated the waters as a ‘fishing line’. Demarcation of waters through IMBL Agreements signed in 1974 and 1976 and India’s decision to cede the Katchchathivu Island to Sri Lanka in 1974 under the maritime agreement, much to the disappointment of the Tamil Nadu government, could not stop the fishermen, particularly the Indian fishermen from crossing the line, because, for centuries, the waters between India and Sri Lanka were considered traditional waters for the community.

Illegal crossing of IMBL and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing continues, and domestic politics of Tamil Nadu is a factor when New Delhi approaches this sticky issue with Colombo. The Sri Lankan Navy frequently arrest Indian fishermen for crossing the IMBL seizing their boats which are seldom released, leading to tensions between the two countries.

The Tamil Issue. Historically, India has advocated the just rights of the Tamil minority. The associated secu-

rity angle shadowed bilateral issues, and even with the LTTE fading into the dustbin of history, the tensions persist. Having won the war, until Sri Lanka wins the peace in its Tamil-dominated provinces, the hangover of the past will continue to blight the relationship. Around 58,543 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees live in camps across Tamil Nadu and Odisha. During the peak years of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, from 1983 to 2012, over three lakh Sri Lankan refugees entered India-few have returned home. India is a natural choice for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in times of distress. Thus, internal stability in Sri Lanka has always been indispensable to India’s security.

The China Factor. China has a large footprint in the island nation, which is only growing. The latest bone of contention was Sri Lanka’s decision to allow China to build the Hambantota port which has commenced berthing PLAN electronic warfare vessels and submarines, a move India considers a credible threat to its strategic interests. While Sri Lanka is not the only country in the Indo Pacific cooperating with China to expand its influence over the IOR, from the Indian perspective it is the most important one.

The Pakistan Factor. While not as visible as China, Pakistan (along with China, India and Russia) was a factor in Sri Lanka’s 2009 victory. This Colombo has publicly acknowledged, and it always makes India uneasy. The latter, on its part, had dealt with the internal war situation in Sri Lanka through the “troika” mechanism (2008-2009), which would take decisions on behalf of their respective governments to deal with India-Sri Lanka relations amidst the war. Both humanitarian as well as security concerns were addressed simultaneously through this mechanism.

Economic Issues. Sri Lanka is facing a severe economic crisis, and India has provided financial assistance. However, there have been disagreements between the two countries on how to use the assistance and the overall Sri Lankan government’s economic strategy.

Domestic Politics. Domestic politics in both India and Sri Lanka affect bilateral relations. The election of a new government in Sri Lanka often has led to a change in the country’s foreign policy, which impacts relations with India. India would seek stability in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy cutting across party lines.

THE JOURNEY AHEAD

Regional Cooperative Approaches for enhancing maritime security, such as ‘MILAN’, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA), are important in securing India’s maritime interests. Project “Mausam” and Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) deepen the economic and security cooperation with regional states, especially with India’s maritime neighbours and island states. India’s outreach to ASEAN and investments and connectivity initiatives must get a fur-

ther boost, and this would have spillover benefits for Sri Lanka.

Common Security Umbrella. Many are advancing their interests in the IOR through multiple alliances, including China, the U.S. and India. Japan and Australia have also shown keen interest in engaging with the region in the larger Indo-Pacific framework. The region is becoming a secondary arena for great power competition in Asia, particularly between India and China. For the powers present in the IOR, securing Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) is vital for the uninterrupted flow of trade and energy. India is building a new naval base in Sri Lanka, which will help to strengthen India’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean. India is already an effective member of the QUAD and should encourage Colombo to join, provided its neighbour is willing to risk the wrath of China.

Direct Security Cooperation. India must continue to promote Sri Lanka’s military capacity-building, increase training cooperation and assist in an indigenous military industry in Sri Lanka as per their specific needs. Such initiatives will reduce Sri Lanka’s dependence on others for defence imports and promote a closer relationship with India.

The Tamil Issue. From an Indian perspective, the issue is still miles away from a satisfactory culmination. Only mature political patronage at the apex level and the building of consensus among the majoritarian Buddhist political forces and the clergy can bring about real changes. However, Indo -Sri Lanka bilateral relations should no longer be held ransom to the lingering Tamil issue. On Colombo’s part, a fair and transparent closure of the alleged war crimes and their accountability would be the only path to lasting reconciliation and fostering inclusive governance in Sri Lanka.

Economic Diplomacy: Economic diplomacy and competition are emerging as potential prospects to cope with the challenges emanating from social and political issues. Sri Lankan President’s recent visit to India has provided an opportunity to review the bilateral relationship and leverage the strength of geographical and civilisational ties. Amidst the crisis, India stood as a reliable partner for Sri Lanka by extending moral and material support. By mid-2022 alone, India provided financial support of nearly $4 billion. It was used to supply fuel, medicines and essential food items. The Tamil Nadu government has also gifted essential items worth US$ 16 million as part of larger Indian assistance. After the 9 July 2022 developments, India assured that “it stands with the people of Sri Lanka as they seek to realise their aspirations for prosperity and progress through democratic means, values and constitutional framework.”

Developmental Assistance. India has been providing developmental assistance to Sri Lanka by investing heavily in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure, including roads, railways, and ports. The scope for future cooperation is vast and must focus on IT and other industries.

Energy Cooperation. India is helping Sri Lanka to develop its renewable energy resources, such as solar and wind power. The two countries are also working together to import oil and gas from the Middle East.

Water Resources Cooperation. India is helping Sri Lanka to develop its water resources, such as dams and reservoirs. The two countries are also working together to manage their shared water resources, such as the Mahaweli River.

Cultural Cooperation. Cultural Exchange Programmes (CEPs) between the two countries are signed and implemented to cover performing arts, visual arts, libraries, museums, archives & cultural documentation, archaeology, handicrafts, sports and youth affairs, publications and professional exchanges and mass media. India is also committed to the restoration of important icons of the cultural heritage of Sri Lanka. It is setting up an Indian Gallery at the International Buddhist Museum in Kandy and working on restoring the Thiruketheeswaram Temple in Mannar.

Education. The scholarship programme would benefit regular undergraduate studies and provide opportunities for higher research. Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Scheme and the Colombo Plan offer nearly 200 slots annually to Sri Lankan nationals for training courses in a wide variety of technical and professional disciplines.

Tourism. India is the largest source market for Sri Lankan tourism, with every fifth tourist from India. Sri Lankan tourists, too, are among the top ten sources for the Indian tourism market, especially the Buddha Pilgrimage circuit.

Assessment

While the relationship has had its ups and downs, there are prospects for the two countries to strengthen their relationship through economic diplomacy and building a common security umbrella.

Undoubtedly, the political and economic stability of Sri Lanka is a security concern for India. This brings in extra-regional powers. Refugee and fishermen issues need pragmatism to resolve, and India’s financial assistance to Sri Lanka to revive the economy must be a continuing process. India must maintain a balance between its own interests and the interests of the island nation.

India and Sri Lanka should enhance their strategic and economic cooperation by offering viable alternatives to Chinese investments and strengthening their mutual trust. India, in the fast-changing geopolitical and security dynamics of the region, must pragmatically handle the strategic pulls and pressures in bilateral relations with Sri Lanka.

CLICK TO SHIELD!

Ai Generative image Models and their antidotes will dominate cyberspace as the war of perceptions reaches a crescendo.

In the era of social media with a global reach, that too in near real-time, a few photos or a couple of MegaBytes of smartphone videos or some carelessly drafted WhatsApp messages can spell the end of a lifelong career or a decade’s worth of relationship.

We see this happening daily, with the celebrities and the rich and powerful on global media and our friends and relatives, though with much less publicity but equally tragic consequences. The time-worn defence given, in almost all cases, is “This is not me- the image has been photoshopped!”

To be fair, there is a degree of truth in this defence. Generative AI image generation models are available across the shelf today. They can craft alternate images from original data with a degree of accuracy that makes it extremely difficult to distinguish between the real and the counterfeit. When this software is mated with artificial intelligence (AI), the combination can turn deadly, as we realise with every passing day.

THE FAKE FACTORY

The numbers that experts are presenting are staggering. In a 2022 report by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation titled “Law enforcement and the challenge of deepfakes,” it is stated that the number of deepfake videos on popular streaming websites is doubling every six months. In fact, as per Sensity, a company based in the Netherlands that tracks

The greatest danger lies when responsible sovereign states stoop down to the level of producing fake images and videos to bolster their own national narrative. This is frequently seen in the war of perception being waged over Ukraine, where it has become almost impossible to distinguish what is true and what is false.

deepfakes on the Internet, there were 85000 fake videos on the net in 2020. The picture only gets scarier because, as per the same Europol report, by 2026, almost 90 per cent of online content could be created or edited using AI generative tools.

Advanced models can produce ‘hyper-realistic images’ with the minimum input giving almost limitless power of delusion to any reasonably skilled software engineer.

As these models are improved and placed on the Internet for use by all, to make them better through crowd-sourcing, even inexperienced commoners are getting to the point that by merely describing a scene, they can create/ manipulate images. Of course, the sky is the limit and potential damage infinite for those who intend to make a career out of it.

Midjourney and Stable Diffusion are opening new doors in digital art and manipulation. These models can edit existing images, adding new areas via inpainting, or cutting out objects and remixing them into others, like taking a person’s face and overlaying it on another image.

Tobby Simon is the Founder and President of the Synergia Foundation and a member of the Trilateral Commission.

However, as these tools become more powerful and accessible, the potential for misuse increases. One recent example is the Ron DeSantis’ election team using AI-doctored images of former President

Trump embracing Dr Fauci. This event demonstrates early signs of the challenges that might arise as generative AI becomes an increasingly commonplace tool. Recently, the media world went into a tizzy for a few hours as images of the Pentagon exploding went viral.

The explosion of generative AI tools has made image manipulation quicker and easier than ever before. It’s a double-edged sword, capable of enhanc ing creativity and innovation but also opening doors to fraud and deception, blackmail in dividuals, or even creating nonconsensual deepfake pornography.

The greatest danger lies when responsible sovereign states stoop down to the level of pro ducing fake images and videos to bolster their own national narrative. This is frequently seen in the war of perception being waged over Ukraine, where it has become almost impossible to distinguish what is true and what is false.

This has been superbly described by Hadi Salman, an MIT graduate student and quoted by the MIT Technology Review. Salman says, “Consider the possibility of fraudulent propagation of fake catastrophic events, like an explosion at a significant landmark.

This deception can manipulate market trends and public sentiment, but the risks are not limited to the public sphere. Personal images can be inappropriately altered and used for blackmail, resulting in significant financial implications when executed on a large scale.”

However, everything is not bad about these AI image generative models. A historian or a museum curator can recreate historical scenes with far greater accuracy by feeding the available facts linked to that era, making the entire experience more fulfilling and educative.

With Digital Art gaining prominence rapidly, it has catapulted modern art to even greater heights and created a niche market for such products, where a healthy art business exists parallel to conventional rare art.

Take, for example, DALLE2, which can create original art just from a text description, combining concepts, attributes and styles. However, so far, the legal world remains divided on whether existing copyright rules can protect such digital art.

UNMASKING FAKES

Reputed images vendors have resorted to watermarking their products, but this is a reactionary step and not a pre-emptive one. Such watermarking tools are also available to common users.

Still, these are so basic in nature that they stand no chance against the AI image generative models recreating fresh overlays by deleting the originals.

Google, Adobe, Microsoft, and Getty Images now use metadata, watermarks, and other technical embeds to clearly distinguish their original contents for the discerning user. In fact, Google wants the authors of all AI-generated images to attach a copyright notice like done by DALL-E, which adds a stripe at the bottom of all its images as a sort of watermark.

In a recent declaration, Google said its own AI systems would mark its images in the original image file. So when you click on a Google search image, it will have the tag “AI generated by Google.”

Researchers at MIT have come out with a tool trademarked as PhotoGuard. This tool works as a protective shield by altering photos in tiny ways that are invisible to the human eye but prevent them from being manipulated.

If someone tries to use an editing app based on a generative AI model like Stable Diffusion to manipulate an image that has been “immunised,” the result will look unrealistic or warped.

The MIT scientists also created what could be likened to a protective mask for images, capable of preventing these models from manipulating photos.

The masks are invisible, but when interacting with a generative AI image model, they cause the output to appear distorted.

This innovative technology changes the economics and incentives for attackers by making AI misuse more difficult. It is claimed that the MIT tool is a complementary technique to watermarking.

Source : CartoonStock

ChatGpt is the Most Tried AI Tools & Users Stick to it

Share of U.S. respondents who have used the following AI tools in the past 12 months

1,237 U.S. respondents (18-64 y/0) survey 2023

While the protective mask aims to stop people from using AI tools to tamper with images, watermarking uses similar invisible signals to allow people to detect AI-generated content once it has been created.

These approaches, in tandem, offer a robust defence against both the creation and distribution of AI-manipulated content.

VOLUNTARY PLEDGES

Leading AI companies such as OpenAI, Google, and Meta have recognised the urgent need to find ways to detect and stop AI-powered manipulation. In a voluntary pledge with the White House, they committed to developing methods to prevent fraud and deception.

OpenAI has pledged to continue researching ways to determine if a piece of audio or visual content is AI-generated. This research follows their recent shutdown of a text detection tool due to poor performance. Despite the technical challenges involved, their ongoing efforts underline the persistent pursuit of enhancing AI safety.

THE WAY AHEAD

While tools like PhotoGuard are a significant step forward, they do not protect completely against deepfakes. Users’ old images may still be available for misuse, and other methods can produce deepfakes.

The technology behind generative AI models is continually evolving, and new models might be able to override existing protections.

There is also a practical challenge in widespread adoption. In theory, people could apply a protective

shield before uploading images online. However, a more effective approach would be for tech companies to add it to images automatically when people upload them to their platforms.

As AI models advance, so too must our methods for protecting and securing the content we share online. The best scenario would involve companies developing AI models to provide ways for people to immunise their images in tandem with every updated AI model.

Assessment

The development of protective measures showcases the growing awareness of the importance of digital rights, security, and privacy. But it’s an arms race. As technology advances, so do the techniques for misuse.

The complex landscape of AI image manipulation presents a constant challenge for researchers, policy-makers, and technologists. The task ahead involves not only keeping pace with rapid technological advancements but also crafting responsible policies and creating ethical guidelines.

The task of securing our digital lives is a shared responsibility, requiring collaboration between researchers, companies, governments, and individuals. The battle for image integrity is an ongoing one, but it is a fight that is crucial for maintaining trust and safety in our increasingly connected world.

Source : Statista Consumer Insights

EVALUATING INDIA-US DIGITAL PARTNERSHIP

The growing rhetoric around the U.S.-India technological partnership raises concerns regarding the feasibility of putting such a partnership into practical usage when so much of the tech industry in the U.S. is under the control of Big Tech. How can a partnership between unequal’s endure? Will the U.S. Congress permit some relaxation on the strict U.S. IPR protocols to accommodate India as a credible tech partner? Also, in some quarters in the U.S., concerns are being expressed whether India could become another China, having prospered and advanced through the generous sharing of American technology.

PUTTING INDIA’S CONCERNS TO REST

The technology companies have power and influence in a way that no private companies have ever had on public policy. The U.S. government is in a totally new world on this account. However, there is a growing realisation amongst U.S. policymakers that there is a need to build multi-stakeholder governance regimes, particularly for AI.

The route to this goal would be in a way that is unlike anything that has been done before in public policy. Remember, today Big Tech companies have seats at the high table, almost like governments-a concept that makes some people deeply uncomfortable.

There is a broad sense in the U.S. that India is fundamentally different from China - a much more imperfect but much more representative government. A much more intrinsically vibrant, multi-stakeholder entrepreneurial nvironment, much more grassroots and bottom-up, much less authoritarian top-down. It looks a lot more like the innovative ecosystems that have developed successfully in the United States

Take, for example AI, the U.S. government has decided to start with voluntary commitments from seven leading AI developers about how they will govern and self-govern the technology around safety issues. The decision to start with voluntary is for two reasons. First, by definition, it will not stifle innovation. It is not considered very risky to put too heavy a regulatory burden on the businesses early in the process. Secondly, things must move fast as there is not much time; taking into account the speed at which technology is advancing, companies need to be involved from the start.

As regards a partnership without equality, the United States has a vibrant technology ecosystem. India has a vibrant technology ecosystem with all the ingredients in place now with several decades of proven performance, such as vibrant tech innovation, foundational

Technology innovation has become foundational to national and coalition power and influence in the world.

R&D investment, places of higher education, tax and regulatory policies to encourage business creation and growth, IP protection, a culture that is tol erant of honest failure so that people can go try again. These things exist in ecosystems like Silicon Valley or Boston, and they exist here in Banga lore. Therefore, when we talk of a technology part nership between India and the U.S., it is much closer to a way that can be and should be mutually beneficial.

As per the U.S. Technological Ambassador Fick, with respect to technology transfer, there is no skittishness from U.S. businesses about India. In fact, there is a broad sense that India is fundamentally different from China in this regard, a much more imperfect but much more representative government.

A much more intrinsically vibrant, multi-stakeholder entrepreneurial environment, much more grassroots and bottom-up, much less authoritarian top-down. It looks a lot more like the innovative ecosystems that have developed successfully in the United States. Of course, the concern should not be underplayed, and it is something that requires attention on both sides.

DEFENCE INNOVATIONS

Private defence companies in India feel that, as a na-

tion, India has yet to invest in a defence innovation ecosystem. Indian companies would like to seek access to the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), an advanced technology branch of the U.S. Department of Defence.

This agency tries out new technologies and makes them operationally ready, if possible, to reach beyond current military technology to do something new.

The U.S. Defence Industrial Base (DIB) caters for Small Business Unit brands, but companies outside the U.S. are banned from participating. This must be opened, especially for specific emerging technologies like cybersecurity and AI.

The U.S. creates task forces for specific purposes; for example, recently, Task Force Lima was announced by DoD for generative AI and NATO announced a Task Force for AI Machine Learning. For all such task forces, talent from outside the coalition is not invited, even if they understand the technology well.

This naturally restricts the exchange of ideas and inhibits momentum. While, as nations, these myopic distinctions stymie true collaboration, the threat actors, on the other hand, do not respect such bounds and collaborate more effectively. Within the U.S. itself, a lot is going on to accelerate the connections between the entrepreneurial economy and the defence industrial base

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH LT GEN PANNU

I think this is where the industry, technology and the trade come together. India and U.S. are now poised to demonstrate collaboration, which was more demonstrative rather than part of an understanding.

If we can demonstrate that we can bring to the table something tangible that is of mutual benefit and respect between the two countries, I think we can do a lot together. We must make it more convenient for people to understand that we have more of a partnership of equals.

And rather than, you know, the technology flow from one direction, we need to make sure that this is science and geography becomes one ecosystem.

If the U.S. industry can trade with Bangalore, Bangalore should be able to do trade with the American industry, and all barriers need to be brought down. We will find that we will be able to grow in a geometric progression

rather than the way we have done in the past. How do we close the gap between the talk and the walk? A beginning can be made with common protocols and standards for the Indian industry and the U.S industry on how we can inter operate.

And then later, when the same application goes into the AI, what data can we share? And what are the common data that we can put together?

It will go a long way in making sure that at some point, for interoperability, we have the norms and the procedures, even for the militaries to work together.

We must have a clear understanding of what data can be shared and what cannot be shared. And I think we can be very forth right here outside the govern ment.

LT GEN PANNU PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD) is former Deputy Chief of Indian Integrated Defence Staff and Strategic Advisor, Synergia Foundation.

(DIB). Left to its own devices, the DIB has gravitated toward building huge, expensive, exquisite systems.

In a system with 535 members of Congress spread out across 50 states and 435 congressional districts, those supply chains are, for political reasons, not innovation or economic reasons, spread across all those political districts.

DARPA has existed for a long time, but now entities like the Defence Innovation Unit have been a powerful force for accelerating adoption inside the intelligence community.

The war in Ukraine combines the effects of World War One, World War Two and World War Three, being fought side-by-side. There is attritional style trench warfare along with armour manoeuvre warfare.

And the proliferation of commercial off-the-shelf distributed autonomous systems that are being repurposed for innovative defence uses.

And they are all happening within kilometres of each other. This demands that innovative exercises in the DIB should happen outside the system for which new mechanisms are to be created.

DIGITISATION OF GOVERNANCE

Governments worldwide feel the imperative to connect their people with government services via digital means. Eliminate the middleman, reduce corruption,

and make the provision of services cheaper, easier, and more equitable. You see effort along those lines in the India Stack. You see it in other places, too – Albania made a big push in digitising their Digital Albania. And then, they were attacked by Iran, and Iran took down Digital Albania.

With the digitisation of these government services, cybersecurity becomes an imperative so that citizens are not exposed to vulnerabilities while digitising.

One of the more interesting facets of the Ukraine war has been the development by the Government of Ukraine of their DIA, a digital government application, which was developed during the war. DIA is quite a remarkable platform or application. It is easier to get a driver’s license in Kyiv than in Washington DC.

Estonia because of Russian cyber-attacks in 2007, through public investment, government leadership and vision, went from being a net importer of security to being a net exporter of cybersecurity over 10 years.

What if Ukraine could do the same with digital governance? And what if this DIA application could become a revenue-generating opportunity after the conflict? They are already focused on trying to sell it and monetise it. Estonia has become the first customer for DIA.

The same can be said for the India Stack as well. Can it become one of the examples of what good provision of government services to citizens looks like? Can it be done securely? And can it be a model for others?

EXCLUSIVE CONVERSATION WITH AMB NATHANIEL FICK

“The United States has a vibrant technology ecosystem. India has a vibrant technology ecosystem. And all the ingredients are in place now (in India) with several decades of proven performance.

We know what it takes to build vibrant tech innovation, foundational R &D investment, places of higher education, tax and regulatory policies to encourage business creation and growth, IP protection, a culture that is tolerant of failure so that people can go try again.

Those things exist in ecosystems like Silicon Valley or Boston. They exist here in Bangalore.” “I don’t hear the same skittishness from US businesses about India.

I think that that there is a broad sense that India is fundamentally different from China in this regard, a much more imperfect, but much more representative government.

A much more intrinsically, kind of vibrant, multi stakeholder entrepreneurial environment, much more grassroots and bottom up, much less authoritarian top down.

It looks a lot more like the innovative ecosystems that have developed successfully in the United States. So, I appreciate the concern.

I don’t want to underplay it. I think it is something that requires attention on both sides. But I don’t hear American business leaders or government officials equating the two (China and India).”

AMBASSADOR NATHANIEL FICK

US Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, author, and former United States Marine Corps officer. He was the CEO of cybersecurity software company Endgame, Inc.,

DO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK?

Economic sanctions, a geopolitical weapon of great import wielded by the rich and powerful, failed to secure Russia’s capitulation. Do they remain relevant?

For centuries, economic sanctions have served as a strategic tool during conflict. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, nations engaged in war frequently employed economic sanctions as part of their war strategies. These measures encompassed trade embargoes, the blockading of enemy ports, and the prohibition of specific commodity trading. In contemporary times, economic sanctions remain significant in addressing terrorism, nuclear proliferation, armed confrontations, and other crises within foreign policy.

Sanctions are intended to discourage undesirable conduct, apply economic pressure and compel rehabilitation or modified behaviour from the target nation. The effectiveness of sanctions hinges upon their enforcement and impact. Prominent manifestations of economic sanctions encompass trade impediments, asset freezes, travel restrictions, arms embargoes, and limitations on financial transactions. However, the degree to which sanctions achieve their intended objectives remains a topic of ongoing debate.

Since 1966, the UN Security Council has established 31 sanctions regimes, in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the Former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti (2), Angola, Liberia (3), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,

Even more concerning, sanctions are at times criticised for their potential to backfire. In the targeted nation, sanctions might inadvertently bolster the legitimacy of the governing leadership and leave the population more susceptible to radical ideologies. These measures could exacerbate the plight of civilians, impacting their access to essential necessities like medical care, basic food, and vital services. Moreover, they could give rise to an underground economy, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable segments of society. Cuba is a good example of this phenomenon.

Côte d’Ivoire, Iran, Somalia/Eritrea, ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, Iraq (2), DRC, Sudan, Lebanon, DPRK, Libya (2), the Taliban, Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali. Even today, the UN maintains 15 ongoing sanctions regimes that focus on supporting political settlement of conflicts, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. Each regime is administered by a sanctions committee chaired by a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

There are 11 monitoring groups, teams and panels that support the work of the sanction’s committees.

Suchitra Padmanabhan is the Policy Research Associate at Synergia Foundation and has Post Graduate Degree in Social Policy & Planning from the London School of Economics

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL

The South African sanctions present the strongest argument in favour of such a regime. Imposed under Resolution 1761 of the UN General Assembly in November 1962, these economic sanctions were to last for more than three decades when they were lifted by UN Resolution 919 once the first democratic elections had been conducted in South Africa in 1994, bringing Mr Nelson Mandela to power.

Consequent to the UN resolutions, a worldwide initiative of economic sanctions was enforced against South Africa in condemnation of the apartheid system. These measures encompassed restrictions on arms transactions, suspension of investments, and prohibition of imports of goods from South Africa.

The international sanctions on South Africa were effective as these were observed with a great deal of sincerity by a majority of members of the UN. In fact, till 1994, all Indian Passports had a message stamped stating “Not valid for South Africa.”

The decades of international sanctions generated such immense economic pressure that, ultimately, the apartheid regime wilted under it. While Johannesburg continued to cock a snook at the world at large, sustained as it was by oil it bought clandestinely through the grey market and by coal conversion and building the strongest military on the continent with Israeli help; the economy was slowly being starved of investments. As the rest of the world benefited from globalisation, South Africa floundered as foreign capital inflows reduced to a trickle. Even in the non-political sports arena, the athletic South Africans, both white and black, remained persona non grata.

In 1990, then President FW de Klerk finally admitted defeat, recognising the economic unsustainability of defiance, and set the ball rolling for dismantling the apartheid structure by releasing Mr Mandela from Rob-

ins Island. When interviewed by Time Magazine in 1993 about the efficacy of the sanctions, Mr Mandela famously said, “There is no doubt!”

Obviously, the sanctions played a pivotal role in dismantling apartheid and facilitating the emergence of a democratic governance structure in the nation.

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS

Since South Africa, we have seen economic sanctions in Iran (since 2015) and Russia (2014 post Crimea and 2022 post Ukraine). In addition, economic embargos have been placed unilaterally by countries like the U.S. in Cuba (In February 1962 by the Kennedy Administration after facing the debacle of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, which remains in place till date).

The UN website confesses that “sanctions do not operate, succeed or fail in a vacuum.” The measures are most effective at maintaining or restoring international peace and security when applied as part of a comprehensive strategy encompassing peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace-making. Contrary to the assumption that sanctions are punitive, many regimes are designed to support governments and regions working towards peaceful transition. The Libyan and Guinea-Bissau sanctions regimes all exemplify this approach.

In 2015, an alliance of nations introduced economic sanctions against Iran to compel the country to forsake its nuclear pursuits. These sanctions encompassed limitations on oil exports, financial dealings, and trade activities. The sanctions effectively compelled Iran to engage in negotiations, culminating in the attainment of a nuclear agreement in 2015.

In 2014, the annexation of Crimea by Russia prompted the United States and the European Union to institute economic sanctions. These sanctions encompassed trade limitations, investment restrictions, and curtailed access to financial markets. The resultant consequences

Source : ocregister

have been substantial for the Russian economy, leading to a contraction in GDP and a devaluation of the Ruble.

At the other end of the spectrum, the outcomes of sanctions led by the United States have yielded varying degrees of success. The extensive and rigorously enforced global sanctions imposed on Iraq and the former Yugoslavia have generated outcomes that are, at most, modest and uncertain. The effectiveness of unilateral sanctions, even when instituted by the world’s largest economy, encounters notably formidable hurdles, particularly within an increasingly interconnected global economy. In instances involving relatively small and susceptible nations like Haiti and Panama, attaining American objectives eventually necessitated the application of military force.

Comprehensive empirical investigations into the efficacy of economic sanctions in modern times indicate that the outcomes observed in these two instances are not uncommon. Examining data from this century, it becomes evident that unilateral sanctions implemented by the United States have achieved foreign policy objectives in a mere 13 per cent of the cases where they were enforced since 1970!

The sanctions are not entirely painless, even for the imposer. For example, recent research underlines that economic sanctions are incurring an estimated annual cost of $15 billion to $19 billion to the United States in potential exports. Consequently, this translates into losing 200,000 or more jobs within the relatively well-compensated export sector.

Numerous factors contribute to these outcomes, yet a significant portion of the explanation can be attributed to the influence of globalisation. The United States’ previous level of dominance in the global economy has waned, consequently reducing its leverage. As these trends have persisted throughout the 1990s and

potentially even accelerated, there exists limited justification to anticipate an enhancement in the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions in more recent times.

While the advantages of economic sanctions remain uncertain, the associated drawbacks tend to be more apparent. Trade sanctions result in the United States missing out on the advantages of trade and frequently impose penalties on exporting companies that represent some of the most advanced and efficient in the U.S. economy. Over the last two decades, the escalating scope and prevalence of American sanctions have additionally sparked heightened tensions between the United States and its global allies and trade counterparts.

Certainly, numerous American entrepreneurs contend that the repercussions of even modest unilateral sanctions extend far beyond their intended sectors and persist even after their removal, as U.S. companies can be perceived as “unreliable suppliers.”

Even more concerning, sanctions are at times criticised for their potential to backfire. In the targeted nation, sanctions might inadvertently bolster the legitimacy of the governing leadership and leave the population more susceptible to radical ideologies. These measures could exacerbate the plight of civilians, impacting their access to essential necessities like medical care, basic food, and vital services. Moreover, they could give rise to an underground economy, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable segments of society. Cuba is a good example of this phenomenon.

The ramifications of sanctions can also reverberate within the enacting countries themselves. They may trigger retaliatory counter-sanctions, as exemplified by Russia’s current targeting of European nations. Furthermore, if sanctions are mutual, they could put companies within those implementing countries at a disadvantage and bestow competitive advantages upon their

counterparts that refrain from such measures. Notably, both China and India presently enjoy significant discounts on Russian oil, while European enterprises contend with elevated fuel costs.

SUBSTITUTE FOR MILITARY ACTION?

The concept of employing economic tools to influence political goals can be traced back to ancient times. However, it was only after the conclusion of the First World War that sanctions were formally enshrined in the Charter of the League of Nations. The victors of the First World War believed that such measures could serve as a deterrent and contribute to maintaining peace by avoiding armed conflicts.

The military intervention by Russia in Ukraine and the subsequent series of sanctions imposed by Western powers (including the United States, the European Union, etc.) have reignited discussions surrounding sanctions. Fundamental questions arise: What are the underlying political motives behind sanctions? Can they truly achieve their intended effects? In a globalised economy, can the targeted nation circumvent their impact? What pre requisites are necessary for sanctions to yield success?

For centuries, economic sanctions were designed to complement military strategies during the 20th century, a paradigm shift occurred with the notion that sanctions could serve as a viable substi tute for military actions, as exemplified in the League of Nations Charter (Article 16). John Maynard Keynes asserted that the world greatly underestimated the influence of economic sanctions.

Nonetheless, history has demonstrated Keynes’ miscalculation; for instance, the League of Nations’ sanctions against Italy or Japan on the eve of the Second World War failed to prevent the global conflict.

Following the Second World War, the concept of sanctions as an alternative to armed conflicts gained momentum, leading to their prolonged use. The 1990s witnessed a resurgence of sanctions, a stark contrast to the Cold War era when they were less frequently employed, resulting in the era being dubbed the “decade of sanctions.” However, concerns arose, challenging their efficacy and highlighting the suffering endured by civilian populations. This prompted the emergence of the notion of targeted sanctions in the early 21st century, often referred to as “SMART” sanctions (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound).

While ascribing a singular objective to sanctions is customary, the actual situation is far more intricate. Multiple objectives exist -primary objectives, aiming to influence the behaviour of the targeted nation; secondary objectives, catering to domestic political dynamics; and tertiary objectives, promoting the defence of specific values.

Hence, sanctions also serve as a means of penalising actors whose conduct is deemed “deviant” from the established moral order, reflecting a desire to extend national sovereignty, as illustrated by extraterritoriality laws like those of the United States.

LESSONS FROM RUSSIA

The inquiry into the efficacy of sanctions holds contemporary significance, particularly in the context of Russia. In response to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, the European Union has sanctioned the nation across six consecutive phases. The initial four rounds targeted Russian trade yet excluded energy products and energy-sector-affiliated banks. This shifted with the fifth phase in April 2022, which prohibited EU import of Russian coal and solid fossil fuels from August. The sixth phase includes a complete cessation of Russian oil imports within six months, followed by a halt to refined product imports by year-end. Russia has responded with counter-sanctions, obliging foreign creditors to pay in roubles and suspending gas deliveries to some European countries via the Yamal pipeline.

In terms of effectiveness, it remains early to gauge the impact on the Russian economy, but the interim assessment offers a blend of outcomes. The IMF’s October 2022 projection forecasts a 3.4 per cent contraction in Russian GDP for 2022, more favourable than the 6 per cent foreseen in July. While half of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves are frozen, major banks face international payment disconnections, and Ural crude oil trades at a $20 per barrel discount.

The Russian economy seems to have weathered the situation better than anticipated. Capital controls and increased interest rates by the central bank have elevated the rouble, and improved trade balances stem from elevated oil and gas prices compensating for the “Russian discount.” Heightened sales to China and India offset EU export declines. In a globalised context, the presence of neutral third-party countries significantly dilutes the potency of sanctions and raises queries about their relevance. Certain nations, Turkey, for instance, play a pivotal role in evading sanctions, evident in the gas hub project involving Putin and Erdogan, aimed at supplying Russian gas to European countries via Turkey.

Furthermore, the EU’s substantial reliance on Russian oil and natural gas introduces scepticism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions. Transitioning suppliers might be feasible for oil, considering the ease of oil transport, albeit involving trading network revisions at a cost. However, the nature of the transport infrastructure for natural gas limits substitution options, given Europe’s significant reliance on Russian-sourced gas through a pipeline network. Geographically, Europe’s eastern countries seem most exposed. Russia’s response of sharply reducing gas deliveries to the EU could significantly impact the region’s growth. If the

cost to the implementing country surpasses that borne by the sanctioned country, the sanctions turn counterproductive. The challenge for the implementing country is to minimise domestic economic repercussions, possibly by offering robust support to the entities directly affected by the sanctions.

Despite the economic sanctions imposed by Western democracies in response to Russia’s audacious invasion of Ukraine, the war continues unabated, along with the indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Nevertheless, these sanctions have complicated Russia’s conduct in the conflict and its ability to exploit its significant advantage in manpower and military resources against a smaller yet more resolute and resourceful opponent. The sanctions have led to a notable reduction in Russian imports, compelling the military and industrial sectors to seek more expensive and less efficient suppliers domestically and internationally. Additionally, they have slowly begun to exert pressure on Russian government finances. Russia’s attempts to sidestep the sanctions have met with only limited success in rerouting goods via Middle Eastern and Asian countries, making it heavily reliant on the Chinese market. With time, the cumulative impact of sanctions-imposed costs will increasingly burden the Russian economy and curtail its capacity to pursue conventional warfare.

MAKING SANCTIONS BITE

Prescribing the exact conditions for successful sanctions is challenging, as each case demands specific analysis. Nevertheless, several favourable conditions enhance their efficacy. Although studies show differing success rates between unilateral and multilateral sanctions, the presence of a single grievance or orchestration by an international institution tends to favour multilateral sanctions’ success. An international institution like the UN curtails the ability of individual implementing nations to reach side agreements with the targeted country, thereby heightening the target’s seriousness and encouraging compromise. This is exactly what happened to White South Africa. Multilateral sanctions also confer greater political legitimacy.

Aligning the ultimate political objective with intermediate economic goals fosters confidence in maintaining sanctions over time. Additionally, sanctions should concentrate on the most effective measures, disallowing the use of display-oriented sanctions whose effectiveness isn’t substantiated. Notably, the highest success rates are tied to sanctions focusing on a key export sector of the targeted country, with minimal impact on the implementing country. In conclusion, a clear final objective is vital to prevent perceptions of imperialism and counterproductivity through unintended reinforcement of rulers’ legitimacy in the sanctioned country’s population.

Major powers like Russia or China are deeply enmeshed in global markets for commodities (such as Russian oil, gas, and fertilisers, as well as Chinese rare earths), goods, critical materials, and finance (including Chinese megabanks). Their substantial economic

and political/military influence renders them less susceptible to economic pressure. They possess significant resources to offset the economic repercussions of sanctions, implement countermeasures against the countries imposing sanctions, and wield political leverage to garner international support. From these assessments and recent developments, the following lessons come to the fore:

In conflicts involving major powers, sanctions initially generate only modest disruptions in the target’s access to goods and capital; however, their erosive effects intensify over time. Consequently, the application of sanctions necessitates a long-term commitment to their enforcement and utilisation.

The costs associated with countermeasures instituted by a targeted major power as retaliation for the initial sanctions can be considerable, exemplified by Russia’s blocking of European access to its oil and gas exports. These retaliatory actions, which impact G7 consumers and industries, are designed to undermine domestic political support for sanctions. Hence, Western policymakers need to mitigate these costs through domestic support mechanisms or tax relief to ensure sustained political backing for sanctions during major power conflicts.

Sustaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against the targeted nation is pivotal for the potency and longevity of the strategy. This demands ongoing cooperation to align the strategic interests and priorities of G7 nations, accompanied by contingency planning for potential future scenarios requiring sanctions.

Assessment

Economic sanctions have been used over time with varying degrees of success against errant countries. The effectiveness of economic sanctions is dependent on multiple factors, as sanctions potentially cover trade limitations, investment restrictions, and curtailed access to financial markets, to name a few. Success is fleeting and never assured.

The jury is still out with respect to the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia. Nonetheless, these sanctions have added intricacy to Russia’s engagement in the conflict, hindering its ability to fully capitalise on its notable superiority in manpower and military assets over a smaller yet determined and resourceful adversary.

As the history of sanctions against Russia remains a work in progress, it is essential for policymakers to evaluate and assimilate the lessons gleaned from this experience. Acknowledging that economic sanctions operate in conjunction with political, military, cyber, and covert actions, Ukraine provides valuable insights into the effectiveness of sanctions in conflicts involving major powers.

“E-SSENTIAL MEDS & VIRTUAL VISITS’’

With virtual medical health care on the rise, it is high time a reality check be taken on India’s Telemedicine Milestones and Missteps.

In our rapidly digitalizing world, no sector remains untouched by the internet’s transformative power, and healthcare is no exception. With the advent of telemedicine, people can now access medical services online, drastically changing how healthcare is delivered. But, like every other innovation, online medicine has its merits and pitfalls.

COUNTING THE COSTS AND GAINS

Just like ‘work from home’, telemedicine has given another option to modern citizens to avoid the long queues of India’s perpetually overcrowded hospitals and seek consultations of top-notch experts from the comfort of their homes at a relatively low cost. The sheer accessibility to medical advice, enabled by the deep penetration of high-speed internet into the daily lives of urban citizens, has ushered in this revolutionary change. With the Internet coverage fast extending over India’s vast rural landscape, online medicare will be of special benefit to citizens living in remote rural areas where medical facilities are few, and the patients are forced to head to the nearest urban centres.

The latest generation of software and applications has changed the face of remote care. Telemedicine appointments can be scheduled at a time that suits the patient, eliminating the long wait times commonly associ-

“Google Doctors” refers to individuals seeking medical information through Google searches. This is a dangerous trend in which almost everyone with a smartphone regularly indulges.

ated with traditional healthcare services. This proved to be very effective during the pandemic when physicians were reluctant to expose themselves to non-critical patients, and the patients, in turn, were chary of visiting hospitals for ailments that were not life-threatening but could turn lethal if they caught the virus in the hospital premises.

More importantly, the consultation costs are coming down, also eliminating the price of travel, fuel costs and parking, which in our clogged cities are higher than the actual consultation fee. Moreover, telemedicine can reduce hospital readmissions and unnecessary emergency room visits, thus ensuring that only the most serious come to the hospital for traditional face-to-face consultations. Generally, online consultations and pharmacies offer medications at lower prices, which is a big attraction to a common citizen grappling with the rising cost of living in big cities. Online medical consultation is available 24/7, ensuring prompt medical advice to patients at the click of a button. This can prove crucial at times of a medical emergency. All health experts are not entirely taken up by this remote style of medical check-up. Certain medical conditions require hands-on examination, which online medicine cannot provide. The effectiveness of an online consultation largely de-

Sambratha Shetty is the COO at Synergia Foundation and holds a Masters’ in Science from the University of Greenwich, UK.

pends upon the ability of the patient to articulate his/ her symptoms clearly to the doctor on the other side to enable a reasonable diagnosis and line of cure. Sick patients, especially the elderly, may be unable to navigate online healthcare platforms dexterously. The speed and reliability of the internet connectivity would also be critical factors. More worrying is the risk of a misdiagnosis or a mistaken assumption of the patient’s condition, which could lead to catastrophic outcomes. This is a risk that few online doctors care to take and decline to give online prescriptions or opinions based only on a remote consultation.

However, in the future, when sensors available at home with patients that could carry out ECG, USG or even MRI could make remote medical consultation more accurate and speedier. However, we are still a long way from reaching that stage of technological advancement. Increasingly, data, especially related to health care, is being monetized by commercial entities and hackers. This is perhaps the greatest challenge to consultations, where the risk of data breaches and violation of patient confidentiality is a credible concern at all levels.

Last, but not least, the patient-doctor relationship is one of the factors that encourages good healthcare and well-being. With their impersonal nature, remote consultations could potentially weaken the doctor-patient relationship. Not surprisingly, elderly patients do not put much trust in these types of consultations and prefer the long wait in a doctor’s waiting room, anxiously awaiting the calling out of their names. However, with a penchant for conserving time and energy, the younger generation constitutes the largest constituency who make online consultations, at least for their initial diagnosis.

SOME LEGAL GUARDRAILS

In 2020, the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare took a significant step by releasing the Telemedicine Practice Guidelines. These guidelines permit doctors to conduct their first consultations with patients located in any state through teleconsultations. They also mandate that doctors display their registration number in all patient-related communications, prescriptions, and fee receipts. In its first-ever guidelines for practising telemedicine, National Medical Commission (NMC) has stated that doctors can only prescribe drugs for common ailments available ‘over the counter’ (OTC) during telemedicine consultations. For certain types of medications like antifungal agents or antibiotics for specific conditions, prescription over video consultation has been recommended. These guidelines also mandate that e-prescriptions should contain complete details of the doctor and the patient. Drugs like anti-cancer medications, morphine, and codeine, which are regulated under Schedule X of the Drug and Cosmetic Act, are not allowed to be prescribed via telemedicine. Various medicolegal issues, such as establishing a doctor-patient relationship, informed consent, patient rights, and the potential for malpractice, need to be addressed. According to the NMC guidelines, insisting

telemedicine when patients request an in-person consultation could be considered professional misconduct. In the United States, the Ryan Haight Act requires a prior in-person consultation for dispensing controlled substances via telemedicine. This exemplifies how countries are cautiously embracing online medicine while putting checks and balances in place.

THE INCREASING TRIBE OF “GOOGLE DOCTORS”

“Google Doctors” refers to individuals seeking medical information through Google searches. This is, by all accounts, a dangerous trend in which almost everyone with a smartphone regularly indulges. Although Google can provide a plethora of information, consulting qualified healthcare professionals for an accurate diagnosis and treatment plan is essential. Relying solely on search engines can result in misinformation. It could be dangerous as it increasingly leads to a tendency towards self-medication in a country like India, where purchasing drugs across the counter is far easier than in the West.

Unfortunately, there is little that law enforcement agencies can do today to discourage or deter this kind of behaviour. Even more dangerous is that fake medicines are often suppled online services with little attributability, even by well-established e-commerce sites. Global statistics reveal a growing awareness of online medicine, though actual usage is still low. In India, platforms like Practo, 1mg, and Lybrate have gained popularity, but public awareness remains low, particularly in rural areas. Legal frameworks like the Telemedicine Practice Guidelines have been implemented, but there is still much to be done concerning consumer education and addressing ethical concerns.

Assessment

Online medicine is an inevitable progression in our increasingly digital world. Its benefits in terms of accessibility, convenience, and safety are undeniable. However, it’s essential to approach it as a complementary service rather than a replacement for traditional medicine.

The future of healthcare will likely involve a blend of online and traditional services. The key is to strike the right balance. Patients should weigh the nature of their ailment, their comfort level with technology, and the availability of services when choosing between online and in-person consultations.

Both patients and healthcare providers must remain aware of the limitations of telemedicine. By balancing the advantages with the challenges and using the best of both worlds, we can ensure that patient care is efficient and effective. In the end, the measure of any healthcare system is the well-being of its patients.

G20-INDIA’S REPORT CARD

The Indian presidency of the G20 was a much-awaited event, and as the events rolled out, it was evident that a great amount of effort had been put in place to make the presidency unique. Prime Minister Modi was personally involved at every stage right from the onset; therefore, it is unsurprising that this remains the most significant event in showcasing India to the world for 2023.

The capstone event, the G-20 Delhi Summit, is scheduled from September 9th to 10th, during which the Delhi Government has declared public holidays with the closure of schools, colleges, banks, financial institutions, etc., with elaborate traffic arrangements, turning the heart of Lutyens’s Delhi into a veritable fortress.

GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS

Presiding over a high-profile event like the G20 is a significant opportunity for India. The stakes have been high, and many are the expectations from India’s presidency for several reasons. As the fifth largest economy in the world, India is viewed as a key player, capable of contributing to international politics. With its positive economic growth trajectory, India is expected to make a sizeable contribution to the world economy.

It is an opportunity for India to exercise its diplomatic skills at a global level and act as a catalyst for in-

While there may have not been any spectacular outcomes, India did negotiate the pathway in a markedly different way from previous presidencies. It has made the G20 into a year-long series of events nationwide. As G20 chair, it has held more than 200 meetings across more than 50 cities with the participation of ministers, officials, and civil society, culminating in a final summit in New Delhi in September.

terchange in key areas, including as a proponent of the Global South. Through the past months of its G20 presidency, India has encouraged alliances and connections with other countries and encouraged international collaboration, trade, and investment. India’s presidency of the G20 has seen it play a more active role in global decision-making and engage with diverse stakeholders in important areas.

Although the G20 may not solve the global population’s multiple challenges, its member states account for 67 per cent of the world population, around 85 per cent of global GDP, and more than 75 per cent of world trade. Its central position in global governance gives it the potential to revive faith in multilateral approaches.

In addition to being a leading nation in the regional sphere, India also seeks to bridge developing country problems with global solutions and bring them before global fora. Therefore, it stands to benefit from devel-

As the capstone event of the G20 draws closer, we do a quick appraisal of India’s G20 presidency.

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

oping alliances and relations with multiple countries and fostering networking between experts and other stakeholders.

Organising high-profile events like G20 meetings could help India gain a seat on the global high table. It also improves its chances of being invited to join other forums, such as the G7 and the United Nations Security Council.

GLOBAL SOUTH CONCERNS

India is positioned to bring together the interests and needs of both developing and developed countries. With its presidency sandwiched in the middle of the troika of Global South presidencies - Indonesia, India, and Brazil - it has been well-placed to voice Global South concerns.

While India’s focus areas for its G20 agenda represent global concerns, they particularly resonate with developing countries. These focus areas include green development, progress on the Sustainable Development Goals, climate finance and technology, inclusive and resilient growth, technology-led transformation, digital public infrastructure, and women-centric development.

Although the Ukraine war has naturally taken up space in discussions, India has continued to emphasise issues that are pertinent to developing countries such as rising inflation, debt stress, health architecture, and energy security in developing countries. Its call to make the African Union a member of G20 has resonated well in the African continent, long the subject of neglect.

HANDLING CHANGE & DISRUPTION

India’s G20 presidency has come amidst several challenges facing the international community. Eco-

nomic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic continues to be a concern, exacerbated by the economic and geopolitical fallout of a senseless war in Eastern Europe-a food and energy crisis, widespread economic distress, and inflation. The war has polarised the existing world order with the chasm between the U.S. and most of the West and Russia and China widening dangerously.

Additionally, differences between the realities of the Global North and the Global South have been accentuated in light of widely differing responses to Ukraine and many Global South countries refusing to condemn Russia’s invasion or join sanctions against Russia. These issues formed the backdrop to the G20 and presented a unique but delicate situation in which India had to take the helm.

Under such difficult circumstances, while there may have not been any spectacular outcomes, India did negotiate the pathway in a markedly different way from previous presidencies. It has made the G20 into a year-long series of events nationwide. As G20 chair, it has held more than 200 meetings across more than 50 cities with the participation of ministers, officials, and civil society, culminating in a final summit in New Delhi in September.

This has enabled it to showcase the diverse strengths and opportunities in different regions of the country. It has also tried to consult all the Global South countries about their interests and convey concerns on their behalf.

India has emphasised areas critical to developing countries, such as green growth, debt, and digital development. Although Ukraine is concerned that it has not been invited to present its case at the Summit, this has tactfully avoided a slanging match between the two

opponents at the forum. Through the course of its G20 presidency, India has succeeded in playing a balancing role between the West and Russia on the Ukraine issue. Given the magnitude of the conflict and its impact on global diplomatic ties, hosting over 200 meetings for G20 delegates has been a feat. India has managed to maintain its neutral stance between the two opposing sides. However, one of India’s diplomatic challenges has been that the polarised situation has made it difficult to reach a consensus in G20 meetings between the different groups with opposing agendas.

It has navigated this by striving for agreement where possible (such as over concerns that are common across the board), concluding meetings with minimum convergence, and deferring contentious aspects where no agreement can be reached at all.

The G20 meetings have provided a platform for people-to-people contact, promoting exchange and interaction between experts, companies, and government representatives in India and outside.

The events in different states have also promoted local markets and companies, encouraging trade, investment, collaboration, and joint ventures in different domains, which would generate employment and boost exports and technology acquisition. Further, India has complemented its diplomatic efforts with soft power efforts, such as showcasing its culture, cuisines, and art forms during the G20 events.

A DIGITAL FOCUS

India has made digital technology governance the centrepiece of its G-20 presidency, which signals its aspirations as a global digital leader and its intentions to harness digital diplomacy and cooperation for longterm benefits. With one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing digital markets, India’s digital sector is one to reckon with. It is in India’s interest to encourage investment in it. Digital governance and the digital economy are important not just for inclusive growth and improved connectivity but also for its aspiring global stature.

The G20 Digital Economy Working Group held meetings at Lucknow, Hyderabad, Pune, and Bangalore to develop a consensus on three identified priority areas: Digital Public Infrastructure, Security in the Digital Economy, and Digital Skilling.

The last meeting at Bangalore in August witnessed over 100 delegates from G20 members, nine invited countries, and five international organisations – the OECD, ITU, UNDP, World Bank, and UNESCO. The working group meeting was followed by the Digital Economy Ministerial Meeting, which featured over 200 foreign delegates. The U.S. Ambassador at Large for cyber security and digital policy was one of the attendees in Bangalore. In an exclusive session with Synergia Foundation, the Ambassador emphasised the importance of cross-border approaches to securing data, data infrastructure, and information and communication

architecture (such as satellites, cables, and wireless networks). He highlighted the critical need for digital regulation to place guardrails around emerging technology without stifling innovation.

There was also a G20 Digital Innovation Alliance Summit in Bangalore, featuring an exhibition of startups, incubators, accelerators, corporates, and state governments with over 110 startups from 24 countries.

HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR THE SEPTEMBER SUMMIT

India will have to find a way to ensure that the final Summit in Delhi in September (when the G20 Leader’s Declaration is adopted), contributes to a lasting legacy for its presidency. On the one hand, to be recognised at a global level, India has to offer global solutions acceptable to multiple countries.

Yet, to benefit from the troika of developing country presidencies, India must emphasise policy areas that connect to the priority issues highlighted at the previous G20 chaired by Indonesia, namely – global health architecture, digital transformation, and sustainable energy transition.

Further, it must bring forward a few select policy areas instead of many to ensure that its G20 legacy is clear and not convoluted. Finally, it must highlight the demands of the post-pandemic reality and prioritise action in those areas that have been revealed to be severely lacking in 2020.

Assessment

Presiding over the G20 in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has allowed India to act as a mediator between the West and Moscow. Given its stance on the conflict, it was well-placed to handle the G20 presidency and has maintained its diplomatic stand throughout the year.

Through its novel approach to the presidency, India has showcased numerous states and cities and the opportunities they offer foreign experts, governments, and companies – whether for collaboration, investment, or trade. This has paved the way for diplomatic, economic, technological, and social benefits.

For the final Summit in September, India must bring to the fore policy areas that connect with the previous declaration under Indonesia’s presidency but also resonate beyond this year and can be continued in Brazil’s G20 presidency. While the policy focus must be pertinent to developing countries, it should represent challenges that capture the concern of nations worldwide.

ANOTHER ELECTION & THE SAME RESULTS!

Elections have failed to be the panacea for Zimbabwe’s political pains, as accusations of election fraud further complicate the situation.

In a world fraught with conflict and disorder, Zimbabwe is yet another grim reminder of failed politics and challenging economic conditions.

Once renowned as the region’s breadbasket, Zimbabwe has faced substantial challenges since 2000, including severe droughts and the repercussions of a land reform initiative that involved the redistribution of white-owned farms to landless Zimbabweans, resulting in significant declines in agricultural productivity.

MUGABE’S SUCCESSOR

Mnangagwa assumed the presidency in 2017, succeeding Robert Mugabe, who was finally ousted in a coup following massive street protests. Prior to their falling out, Mnangagwa had a close working relationship with Mugabe, holding prominent government positions such as vice president and minister of state security. He was re-elected as president in 2018.

Upon initially assuming the presidency, Mr Mnangagwa, often nicknamed “The Crocodile” due to his reputation for toughness.

In August 2023, Mr. Mnangagwa, now 80, was re-elected in an election that international observers criticized for not meeting local laws and global standards. He secured 52.6 per cent of the valid votes, with

The outcome of last week’s contested elections has left Zimbabwe’s political prospects uncertain. An analyst suggests that the likelihood of a coup in Zimbabwe could significantly increase during President Mnangagwa’s contentious second term.

his opponent, Nelson Chamisa, coming in second with 44 per cent. Mr Chamisa contested the results.

NOT EXACTLY FAIR AND TRANSPARENT

The recent election encountered significant issues, necessitating an extension of voting into Thursday. A shortage of ballot papers, particularly in the capital and other urban areas that traditionally support the opposition, prompted this delay. People even spent the night at polling stations to ensure they could cast their votes.

International human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have alleged a crackdown on the opposition in the lead-up to the election. They have accused Mnangagwa’s administration and the ruling party of weaponizing the police and the courts to arrest opposition figures, prohibit and disrupt opposition party rallies, and intimidate its supporters. Over 40 local election monitors were arrested during the election, with government critics claiming that these charges were fabricated. Zimbabwe’s primary opposition party, the Citizens Coalition

for Change (CCC), has demanded fresh elections supervised by neighbouring countries, standing firm in rejecting the recent polls. Opposition spokesperson Siziba did not rule out the possibility of seeking legal recourse, asserting that the party “will employ all necessary measures” to ensure a fair election. Taking the matter to court would repeat the 2018 scenario when Chamisa launched a legal challenge after narrowly losing to Mnangagwa. The Constitutional Court dismissed Chamisa’s challenge.

Questions have arisen regarding the speed at which the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is announcing presidential results, made public two days earlier than expected.

Mnangagwa’s officials reacted vehemently to reports from African and Western observer missions, which stated that the polls did not meet international democracy standards. Mnangagwa argued that some observers had exceeded their mandate by ques tioning laws passed by Zimbabwe’s parliament in the lead-up to the election.

A COUP IN MAKING?

The outcome of last week’s contested elec tions has left Zimbabwe’s political prospects un certain. An analyst suggests that the likelihood of a coup in Zimbabwe could significantly increase during President Mnangagwa’s contentious second term. A factor delaying the possibility of a coup is the “deep ties” between the military elite and the ruling ZANU-PF party, both of which may benefit from the election irregularities.

Certain observers propose that the opposition’s challenges might resolve through Zimbabwe’s judicial system, which they consider “the most peaceful among all available options.” Other experts warn that courts are ‘a waste of time’. They see no hope in the country’s judicial system. There is also a very serious chance of chaos and disorder if the matter is taken to the courts. Others view a second election supported by a new electoral and constitutional order as a more viable option.

Rashweat Mukundu, a researcher with the NGO International Media Support, said the political standoff is not likely to be resolved “anytime soon. What we are likely to see is a continuation of the Zimbabwean political crisis. The region has taken a position, and we hope that they will insist on some resolution, some political dialogue,” he said.

A CRUMBLING ECONOMY

Emmerson Mnangagwa’s tenure has proved to be an economic disaster for Zimbabwe- the second tenure could be a catastrophe! Many Zimbabweans had thrown their support behind opposition leader Nelson Chamisa in the hope that he could instigate change and revive the struggling economy. Zimbabwe’s economy has crumbled under the weight of years of economic mismanagement by Zanu PF, the ruling party, since

the end of white minority rule in 1980. The economic crisis has forced 90 per cent of Zimbabweans into the informal job sector as the local currency continues to plummet and prices soar. Once a prominent agricultural hub in southern Africa and home to one of the continent’s advanced manufacturing sectors, the nation now stands as a mere shadow of its former self. During Mnangagwa’s tenure, the local currency sharply depreciated against the United States dollar due to rampant money printing. Soaring prices of essential goods have rendered them unaffordable for ordinary citizens, pushing most Zimbabweans into low-paying jobs just to make ends meet.

The nation has accumulated a $12 billion debt to foreign creditors along with an additional $6 billion in domestic debt. Economists emphasize the necessity for macroeconomic adjustments, trimming non-productive expenditures, and implementing monetary policy reforms to establish fiscal discipline and control the expansion of the money supply. Experts anticipate that a new government would also have to undertake “institutional reforms” within state-owned enterprises and ensure that the business environment is not excessively burdensome.

GLOBAL REACTIONS

International human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have alleged a crackdown on the opposition leading up to the election. They accused Mnangagwa’s government and the ruling party of manipulating the police and the judiciary to apprehend opposition figures, prohibit and disrupt opposition rallies, and intimidate its supporters. Over 40 local election monitors were arrested during the election, with government critics claiming that these charges were fabricated.

Foreign election observers reported on Friday that the elections did not meet regional and international standards. The leader of the European Union’s observer mission noted that the vote occurred in an atmosphere of fear. The Southern African regional bloc SADC’s mission raised concerns about voting delays, issues with the voter register, bans on opposition gatherings, and biased state media coverage. The United States has joined the growing chorus of criticism against last week’s general election, which the opposition has described as fraudulent. The U.S. government cited systemic bias against the opposition and highlighted credible reports of monitors being compelled to alter certain election result forms.

The UK has maintained a stance that aligns with the preliminary statements of the Election Observation Missions, which indicate that both the pre-election environment and election day itself did not meet regional and international standards. Concerns include the electoral commission’s limited transparency, an uneven playing field, the enactment of repressive legislation, significant delays in the opening of certain polling stations, and reports of voter intimidation.

UPCOMING FORUMS: