INSIGHTS APRIL 2024 EDITION

Dear Reader:

Greetings from the Synergia Foundation!

In our endeavour to comprehensively analyse India’s extended neighbourhood, we have been spreading our wings. This time, we unravel the tiny but influential Gulfdom of Qatar, which has been much in the news in the recent past. Few will deny that Qatar has carved out a unique regional and international geopolitics position despite its unconventional approach. Of course, predictably, we must also give our discerning readers insight into the recent outcome of elections in Pakistan. As you will observe, we have gotten the intelligent views of some top experts from either side of the Radcliffe Line!

Warfare is a dynamic beast that changes shape, size, and tenor with every iteration. This is what makes its study so captivating. In this issue, we look at the recent phenomenon of weaker powers and non-state actors manipulating the wide spectrum of new-age warfare to their advantage; Ukraine and Gaza reflect this paradox.

Why the Indo-Pacific matters to the world and India is a question that is heavily debated in security circles in India. We take this debate to another level by presenting a thought-provoking piece by our naval expert with inputs from subject matter doyens from amongst India’s diplomatic community.

Synergia has always been closely associated with advanced technologies. Recently, we have been advocating the case of Free Space Optical (FSO) Networks, which can play a critical part

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in implementing India’s ambitious Smart Cities Mission. An article on the subject endeavours to highlight the potential of this technology. Synergia, which has been associated with Africa for more than five decades, has been looking at individual nations on the continent. This time, the spotlight is on Kenya, where a quiet technological revolution is underway, rapidly evolving as a dynamic hub of innovation.

Terrorism continues to run unabated globally, and the heart-rending massacre in Crocus Music Hall only emphasises how non-state actors leverage ongoing conflict to further their own dark agenda. Staying with Russia, we look at the prospect for the Russian Federation after Mr Putin was once again put back on the driving seat in the Kremlin with a thumping margin.

Our economic expert, this time, delves into the complex subject of AI, venturing into the diverse field of economics raising concerns about this convergence of technology and economics. The green advocates in the Synergia research team try to lay down a map for India’s green energy security anchored on its domestic manufacturing. Staying with the environment, we touch upon a subject that is sorely impacting the lives of all Bangloreans this year- rich and poor- India’s hydrosphere security.

We hope our esteemed readers will continue supporting us as we strive to further evidence-based research on strategic issues with global resonance.

Maj. Gen. Ajay Sah Chief Information Officer

CONNECTING THE DOTS: THE FABRIC OF SMART CITIES

A positive movement in the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan will await the conclusion of Indian elections and formation of a new government..”

-Amb Sharat Sabharwal Page 11

SEEKING GREEN ENERGY SECURITY

To make its goal of green energy security a reality, India must accelerate the domestic manufacturing of its essential sub-systems.

INDIA’S HYDROSPHERE SECURITY

Water security in India needs to be equated with India’s national security discourse.

SMALL BUT RESILIENT

Despite its unconventional approach, tiny Qatar has carved out a unique regional and international geopolitics position.

WARS OF ATTRITION & RESILIENCE

Wars have always been about strategy, tactics, and technology, which holds true even now.

INDIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC

Why the Indo-Pacific matters to the world and India.

PAKISTAN: PDM 2.0 PROSPECTS

Pakistan Democratic Movement an alliance of more than a dozen parties.

CONNECTIVITY IN FUTURE CITIES

FSO can play a critical part in implementing India’s ambitious Smart Cities Mission

A SILICON SAVANNAH?

Kenya - An evolving hub of innovation?

India’s policymakers have never aspired to be a net security provider for the Indo-Pacific or the Indian Ocean Rim countries.”

-MK. Narayanan Page 19

CARNAGE IN CROCUS

PUTIN’S RUSSIA –POST 2024 POLLS

The need to deal decisively with a resurgent threat has become even more urgent after the Crocus Hall massacre. Putin’s therapy to invigorate Russia emphasises statism and anchored Soviet themes.

AI’S ECONOMICS ANALYSED

AI ventures into the diverse field of economics, raising concerns about this convergence of technology and economics.

SMALL BUT RESILIENT

Despite its unconventional approach, tiny Qatar has carved out a unique regional and international geopolitical position.

Tarini Dhar Prabhu, Research Associate in Synergia Foundation

Qatar is a small country wedged between bigger states in a tough neighbourhood. It has adroitly capitalized on its resource strengths to become financially independent and developed a network that helps it stay resilient.

From being an outlier amongst its Gulf neighbours, it has become a regional mediator and a world-leading natural gas exporter.

RESOURCES AND STRENGTHS

Qatar’s small population, desert climate, and limited ground and surface water make it less conducive for agriculture or industry. It is geographically sandwiched between two regional heavyweights, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran, both vying for control of the region.

However, Qatar does have physical assets that can contribute to its strength and make it geopolitically important. Its leading natural resource is abundant natural gas: with vast swathes of gas fields, the Emirate has the third largest natural gas reserves after Russia and Iran. It is a leading liquified natural gas (LNG) exporter. In this way, it differs from other Gulf states, whose main source of income is oil and which do not have as much export capacity for natural gas. Qatar’s strategic location at the convergence between East and West, between Asia, Africa, and Europe, enables it to participate in international markets, expand the scope of its exports, and develop trade connections with other countries.

Qatar’s strategic location at the convergence between East and West, between Asia, Africa, and Europe, enables it to participate in international markets, expand the scope of its exports, and develop trade connections with other countries.

It has made the most of its geography through robust transportation infrastructure. Its range of ports, airports, and logistical centres has enabled it to enhance its trade links. It has a marine transport line through Hamad Port, a strategic window in maritime navigation and Qatar’s portal to global trade.

Additionally, its modern shipping fleet and LNG carriers have contributed to boosting the spread of its exports to markets across the world. Its ports, like Hamad Port and Ras Lafan Port, boast global quality infrastructure.

This, combined with its proximity to channels of global communication, has made it a focal point in trade, particularly energy and gas trade. Its national flag carrier, Qatar Airways, was rated the second-best airline in 2023 by Skytrax. Qatar Airways serves more than 150 key business and leisure destinations worldwide, with a fleet of over 200 aircraft.

Its infrastructure facilities have also helped it attract leading economies as strategic partners like China, the United States, and Europe, as well as foreign direct investment. Qatar Airways, in particular, has helped bring in more tourists and allowed the private sector to reach

foreign markets through its extensive network that covers places like Africa, Central Asia, Europe, South Asia, the Middle East, North America, and South America.

With the Ukraine war having hiked energy prices and Europe turning away from Russia for its natural gas supplies, Qatar stands to become a major energy supplier for Europe.

It is worth pointing out that Qatar’s assets have enabled it to become financially independent as a small state and helped it maintain political autonomy vis a vis its larger neighbours. Financial independence was an important factor that enabled Qatar’s new ruling elite to adopt an independent foreign policy.

REGIONAL CHALLENGES

Qatar has faced its fair share of challenges with its regional brethren. In the most severe diplomatic crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) block, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar from 2017 to 2021. The GCC is a political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman.

The embargo and severing of ties were the culmination of years of tensions building as Qatar’s neighbours were convinced that it was too independent and non-conforming in its foreign affairs. The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings had set several governments on edge, with GCC states alarmed by threats to dynastic rulers. Most GCC nations backed rulers like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, but Qatar tried to build ties with some opposition members, particularly groups connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, a controversial political Islamist group in the Arab world. Qatar’s neighbours were also irked by the positive depiction of the Arab Spring protests by Qatar-linked media, notably Al-Jazeera.

However, the three-and-a-half-year blockade did not have the desired effect, and Qatar seemed to emerge stronger. According to a Brookings article (January 19, 2021), it pushed Qatar to grow more self-reliant and

boosted its economy. Qatar also strengthened ties with countries like Turkey, another supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood.

It developed closer commercial ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s rival since Iran’s airspace became an essential channel for Qatar to access the rest of the world. Qatar was compelled to forge alternate supply routes, boost domestic production, and expand the capacity of its Hamad Sea Port as it grew new trade links. The boycott failed to accomplish its key aims, like pressuring the tiny nation into conformity or driving it away from Iran and Turkey. It came to an end with a GCC agreement, bringing about a Gulf reconciliation.

Since then, GCC rapprochement has proceeded steadily, through diplomatic and economic channels, including efforts to jointly enter into Free Trade Agreements (as a regional bloc) with other countries and groups.

QATAR’S REGIONAL ROLE

Qatar’s foreign policy from 1995 has looked to overcome structural limits such as its geographical position between two major regional powers with an ongoing fierce rivalry.

However, this had met resistance from the Saudi kingdom, which backed two coups to overthrow the government in 1996 and 2002 and opposed gas pipelines carrying Qatari gas to Kuwait and Bahrain. Such security challenges pushed Qatar’s government, led by Sheikh Hamad, to build alliances and soft-power tools such as conflict resolution, media and culture. For instance, Qatar launched Al Jazeera, the first Arab satellite news channel.

Qatar has played mediator and intervened in several regional crises, such as in Lebanon after Hezbollah invaded Beirut and between the Houthis and the Yemen government. More recently, it has played an active role in Ukraine, Sudan, Iran, Gaza, and Afghanistan between the U.S. and Taliban, most notably in 2020 towards the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

While other Middle Eastern countries aspire to don the mediator’s hat, like Egypt and Oman, Qatar’s image as the regional conflict resolver seems most widely accepted. Its ties with controversial outfits like the Taliban and Hamas enable it to broker tense situations involving such actors.

This role helps it maintain ties with the international community and protect itself from unwanted interventions from neighbours like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

Doha’s efforts to minimize its risk in the tumultuous region seem to have paid off. For instance, when Iran retaliated against the U.S. for killing its general Qasem Soleimani, it targeted U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan, but not Qatar. This is despite Qatar’s two major U.S. bases and the fact that they would be easy to hit.

Qatar’s negotiator role in the Gaza crisis has made headlines and released hostages as well as aid to Gaza. This is enabled by its contrasting connections with Western powers like the U.S. on the one hand and Islamist groups on the other hand. Qatar’s ties with Hamas and Iran have helped it gain a prominent position with global powers that is often described as indispensable. However, Qatar is also aware of the bad press it’s getting in the West for its ties with Hamas, which has led it to tread more carefully.

Qatar has deftly managed its relations with the U.S. and China, taking advantage of both big powers. It created waves when it opened a Chinese Renminbi clearing facility in 2015, and in 2022, amidst the Ukraine war, it sealed a lucrative contract with China for the supply of LNG.

QATAR AND INDIA

India and Qatar established formal diplomatic ties in 1973, and since then, their bilateral relationship has expanded to cover a range of aspects, including defence, counterterrorism, and energy trade. A significant diplomatic visit in 2015 featured the signing of five MoUs during the Emir’s visit to India.

Qatar’s exports to India have been mainly in the hydrocarbon sector, including LNG, LPG, petrochemicals, chemicals, plastics, and aluminium articles. Qatar is India’s largest LNG supplier, accounting for 50% of India’s LNG imports in 2023. QatarEnergy and India’s largest LNG importer, Petronet LNG, recently signed a long-term mega deal as India increases its use of the fuel to reduce its emissions.

The bal ance of trade remains sig nificantly in Qatar’s favour, although In dia’s exports to

Qatar have sizably grown in the last few years. India is among the top three export destinations for Qatari goods and is also one of the leading exporters to Qatar. Its exports to Qatar cover a range of products like copper, iron and steel articles, cereals, vegetables, machinery, electronics, and textiles.

The Indian diaspora in Qatar makes up one of its largest expatriate communities. This makes India-Qatar ties all the more important and adds a sociocultural element to their relationship. For Delhi, the condition of Indian expatriate workers in Qatar continues to be a priority, with labour mistreatment being a prevalent issue.

The amicable settlement of the case of seven ex-Indian Navy officers sentenced to death for alleged espionage in Qatar has done a great deal in strengthening relations between the two countries.

Going forward, the two nations are likely to strengthen LNG trade as India looks to increase the natural gas component of its energy mix in a bid to turn to cleaner fuels. They would also do well to expand renewable energy cooperation, as Qatar looks to diversify its exports to keep up with the green energy transition, and both countries are looking to diversify their energy sources.

The two nations could also cooperate in the area of education. Western universities in Qatar are an attractive option for Indian students looking to access quality education abroad without the high costs associated with the West.

Indian students could also offer a potential talent pool for employers in Qatar. The two nations could engage in human resources cooperation through training programs and skill-building. On the other hand, perceived anti-Muslim sentiment in India could prove to be an obstacle to ties between India and Qatar.

Assessment

Qatar emerged from the Gulf crisis as a significant player that navigated regional pressure without compromising its sovereignty and independent foreign policy. By maintaining and expanding ties with diverse states and non-state actors, it has created a niche for itself as a legitimate regional and global mediator.

In the context of the Gaza war, the Red Sea crisis and heightened regional tensions, Qatar stands to play a useful role in offering a communications channel with actors like Iran and its proxies Hamas, Hizballah and the Houthis to broker a potential peace agreement.

India and Qatar stand to benefit from energy cooperation through trade, investment, technology exchange, possible joint endeavours, and cooperation in areas like education and human resources.

PAKISTAN: PDM 2.0 PROSPECTS

The coalition may have to make tough economic and foreign policy decisions even while its standing is in question.

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

RESEARCH TEAM

The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of more than a dozen parties, ousted Imran Khan in 2022 to form the Government.

A similar coalition, referred to as PDM 2.0, was recently formed to sidestep Mr Khan’s party and form a government in Pakistan.

Yet not only are its legitimacy and longevity in question, but it also faces sizable challenges on the economic, security, and foreign policy fronts.

ELECTIONS A SOAP DRAMA

In a surprise result, jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s party won the most seats in Pakistan’s parliamentary elections earlier this year.

Mr Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (P.T.I.) gained more seats than the military-backed Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (P.M.L.N.) led by the three-time former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif.

The surprise PTI victory upturned the military’s expectation of an easy win. Not only was it preceded by generals jailing Mr. Khan and candidates allied with his party, but it also came amidst accusations that the incumbent military-backed Government had engaged in rigging.

Pakistan is in a poly crisis with its volatile economy, in the midst of a multi-year crisis, topping the list. As per the Economist, Pakistan’s GDP shrank slightly in 2023 amid high debt, a balanceof-payments crisis and inflation that peaked at nearly 40 per cent before falling back to its current rate of 23 per cent. With wildly fluctuating foreign reserves, Pakistan is burdened with an external debt of $ 30 billion.

However, the tables soon turned: since the PTI fell short of a majority, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) reached a power-sharing consensus with the PML-N to stitch together a coalition government.

Mr. Khan, a populist leader, was ousted from power in 2022 through a no-confidence vote, convicted for multiple crimes, and banned from contesting the elections. The previous PMLN-led coalition or PDM that replaced him was unpopular and came under flak for being unable to address the economic crisis and record-high inflation.

In PDM 2.0, Shahbaz Sharif, brother of Nawaz Sharif, was appointed prime minister of Pakistan. His Government faces a stagnant economy grappling with double-digit inflation and steep debt.

WILL THE GOVERNMENT LAST?

Despite its military backing, the Government is already on a shaky footing, given Imran Khan’s popularity and allegations of election irregularities. However, political longevity aside, the new Government has urgent economic issues on its plate.

Mr Imran Khan has refused to be cowed down. In fact, the surprisingly good performance of his dismantled party, the PTI has encouraged him to wage a movement to “recover the peoples’ mandate that was stolen from him.” They intend to take recourse not only to legal actions but also gradually ratchet up public pressure through social media-generated street protests, a skill at which the PTI excels.

The country can expect more political turmoil in the coming months, especially as Pakistan goes for a fresh deal with the IMF and is compelled to enforce its directives at the cost of the common man’s economic health, already under severe duress.

There has been considerable clamour internationally on the fairness of elections in Pakistan. Expatriate Pakistanis in the U.S. and Europe have been spearheading the cause of Mr Imran Khan and have succeeded in getting considerable traction.

This has caused a dilemma for Army Chief General Munir, who calibrates the ebb and flow of political activities in the country from his GHQ in Rawalpindi.

It will be a hard sell to attract investments from discerning foreign investors if the most popular political leader remains incarcerated on charges that may not stand proper legal scrutiny in any independent court of law. Also, a total lack of political consensus between the opposition and the ruling dispensation will impede the economic agenda’s rollout.

ECONOMY IS THE KEY

Pakistan is in a poly crisis with its volatile economy, in the midst of a multi-year crisis, topping the list. As per the Economist, Pakistan’s GDP shrank slightly in 2023 amid high debt, a balance-of-payments crisis and inflation that peaked at nearly 40 per cent before falling back to its current rate of 23 per cent. With wildly fluctuating foreign reserves, Pakistan is burdened with an external debt of $ 30 billion.

During the 18 months of PDM 01, Mr Sharif managed to avoid default by the skin of his teeth when, after much haggling, the IMF released a $3bn stand-by emergency loan. With the robust backing of the Army Chief, the military-appointed caretaker government that followed cracked down on illegal foreign market trade, smuggling and black marketing of commodities to deliver a primary fiscal surplus. However, what was not so openly spoken of was that this was at the cost of imports (which affected manufacturing), and there was little or no progress in deeper reforms like privatising resource guzzling state enterprises and the shrinking tax base. Clearly, it has been left to the current dispensation to deal with these hot potatoes.

Pakistan has no option but to knock at the doors of the IMF for its 25th bailout, a task for which Mr Sharif has selected the Wharton educated Muhammad Aurangzeb, the suave CEO of Habib Bank. There is little doubt that the IMF package will come through, albeit with more arm twisting, as the international community is aware of the consequences if a nuclear armed nation is allowed to fail.

The Army-steered Special Investment Facilitation Council had been desperately trying to muster investments from Gulf nations. While the Army’s ability to convince Gulf investors to put their money into Pakistan’s faltering economy has generated much optimism,

dollar flow has yet to flow. However, during a recent visit to Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince assured the prime minister of an early $6 billion investment.

It is worth pointing out that external remittances, Pakistan’s largest source of foreign reserves, are falling. Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emir ates (UAE) are the top remitters, but they have held back in the face of political uncertainty, a fraught elec tion, and economic fragility.

SECURITY

It is suffice to say the picture on the internal security front looks extremely grim. The recent killing of Chinese work ers, the frequent attacks on security forc es and CPEC assets and the faceoff with the Taliban regime in Kabul have thrown questions on the ability of state security organs to protect the investments of for eign businesses. This has to be tackled as a priority before even staunch friends like Chi na and the Gulf nations risk their billions.

In the West, Pakistan grapples with tense borders with Taliban-led Afghanistan. The outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Pakistan accuses of numerous militant attacks on its soil, continues to hide out in Afghanistan. A recalcitrant Taliban regime refuses to rein in the TTP.

The situation has got worse as Pakistan has repatriated nearly half a million Afghans back to their country and is gearing up to despatch the remaining one million or so in the coming few months. Most Pakistani security analysts are of the view that the much-vaunted ‘strategic depth’ philosophy for Afghanistan advocated by the Pakistan military for decades lies in tatters.

GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE

On the diplomatic front, the PDM 2.0 has to manage tense ties with neighbours and mend fraying relations with its longtime ally, the United States (US). Pakistan’s close ties with China amidst significant U.S.-China tensions and U.S.-India strategic ties have contributed to this. Pakistan’s influential military leaders, who have hitherto steered its foreign policy, have expressed an interest to patch up with the U.S. However, Mr Sharif will have to avoid getting mired in Mr Khan’s campaigning allegation that the opposition (and the Army) colluded with the U.S. to oust him.

While China, a major ally, has substantially invested in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the corridor’s viability is uncertain as it faces hurdles like security risks and delays. The recent IED attack killing five Chinese nationals created serious rifts between the two “Iron Brothers’ and the prime minister had to rush to the Chinese Embassy to cool tempers. The new Government will have to address Chinese concerns to sustain the project as China becomes increasingly reluctant and cautious with its fi-

nancial overtures. Closer home, ties with India strained further under Mr Khan’s Government. Despite pressure from top military leaders who have opposed normalising ties with India, Nawaz Sharif has historically been more conciliatory towards India and appeared to enjoy a measure of rapport with Mr Modi in his last tenure. It remains to be seen whether his brother, Mr Sharif, will follow suit. However, the new Government has indicated intentions to reopen trade with India, which was suspended in 2019.

The Daily Dawn of 24 January opines that in its relations with India, the incoming Government is expected to focus on diplomatic engagement, prioritising economic stability over political tensions.

The Government is likely to open doors for regional trade and investment with India. This may involve backchannel diplomacy and dialogue at various levels, aiming to address critical issues like the Kashmir dispute while avoiding escalatory actions. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are advocating for a paradigm shift in South Asian politics.

They are encouraging Pakistan to explore avenues for normalisation with India, urging a move away from military standoffs and a step back from conflict in general. This is to be expected from investors with Big Bucks investments lined up to safeguard their funds.

Assessment

The new Government will have to take economically and diplomatically uncomfortable measures to steer Pakistan through troubled waters. If China, the only reliable lifeline remaining, follows the route of Western investors and turns away from the unstable Pakistani regime due to recurrent security lapses, a dark economic abyss will confront the Pakistani economy.

Economically, fiscal discipline and other stringent reforms may be the only way to secure another lease of IMF funding and keep the economy afloat. Of course, the common person on the street will suffer, but this has been the case in most nations of the Global South.

Diplomatically, overtures like repairing ties with the U.S. and reopening trade ties with India may be key steps in PDM 2.0’s foreign policy action. However, will India, now in the driving seat, respond positively, or will it allow nuclear-armed Pakistan to slide into economic ruination? This is a decision that New Delhi may have to take sooner rather than later.

Critical Challenges: In my view, the three critical challenges for the new Government are in the domains of politics, internal security and foreign affairs. As far as the economy goes, given our accord with the IMF, it will be guided towards stabilisation and, hopefully, revival together with support from IMF and our friends like China, Saudi Arabia, UAE plus USA and EU, a process on which we are already embarked. In politics, especially after the flawed elections, there’s a need for a healing touch: releasing all political prisoners and bidding goodbye to the politics of vendetta, vengeance and victimisation. In internal security, crafting an effective counter-terror strategy, given the recurring terror attacks in Pakistan’s provinces bordering Afghanistan & Iran. And there’s a need for a Regional Reset in relations with our neighbours.

Political Landscape: Today, Imran Khan is Pakistan’s most popular politician, and his Party, although officially denied its trademark symbol of the Cricket Bat in the February polls, received 37 per cent of the popular vote, with PML-N getting 23 per cent and PPP 13 per cent. In any likely election, PTI willer. In Pakistan, -

EXPERT COMMENT

It seems the government’s top priority is to clinch another IMF “bailout”, which should help inject some stability into the economic system.

However, it remains to be seen if IMF conditionalities would be politically sustainable. In parallel, the Government is also working to get more and swift investments from China and Gulf countries.

Pakistan is unfortunately caught in a proverbial vicious economic circle, and to address massive economic chal-

ten debarred, exiled or imprisoned, but their political future is not determined by administrative or judicial diktat but by popular will. Pakistan is undergoing three transitions simultaneously: ( a) with 65 per cent of Pakistanis under 35, a youthful leadership, new generation, is already taking over two of the three major parties (Bilawal in PPP, 36, & Maryam Nawaz, 49, in PML-N); (b) the two major parties that dominated the national political landscape for the last 30 plus years have been overtaken, for the first time, by Imran Khan’s PTI; (c) traditional politics of clans, candidates & constituencies have been overtaken by popular mobilisation based on issues disseminated via IT/Social Media platforms, a more modern, creative expression of Pakistani-style populism in which youth, women, the ‘silent’ middle class & the Diaspora are key pillars!

Prospects for Indo-Pak Relations: I expect forward movement after the Indian elections, especially on low hanging fruit like Cricket, Culture, & Commerce, plus the resumption of Ambassadorial level relations, which will provide an enabling environment for a better Pakistan-India rapport. Post-polls, Mr Modi would want to follow the Vajpayee path towards Pakistan for several reasons: because of India being a loner or standing out alone on SAARC, fear of a China-Pakistan gang-up, pressure from the U.S. to ‘behave’ better with Pakistan, and no longer guided by domestic political considerations of weakening his Hindutva base.

SENATOR MUSHAHID HUSSAIN SAYED

Member of the Senate of Pakistan and Information Secretary of the Pakistan Muslim League.

lenges, it needs a stable and predictable political environment. Unfortunately, I don’t see any well-defined economic strategy. The weak coalition government will continue to experiment on different fronts.

I think there is a possibility of restoring full diplomatic relations and bilateral trade once the new Government is in place in New Delhi.

AMBASSADOR ABDUL BASIT

Ambassador to Germany from 2012 to 2014 and High Commissioner to India from 2014 to 2017.

Mr Ihsan Ghani is a former naval officer and a retired Inspector General of Police. He has also been Chief Security Officer to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in the Intelligence Bureau and as Minister Coord at PHC London. He also served as provincial Inspector General of Police, DG National Police Bureau, National Coordinator, National Counter Terrorism Authority and DG IB from where he retired in August 2018.

Synergia: How is the new government planning to tackle the challenges, especially those posed by the economy?

Mr Ihsan Ghani: For many decades, Pakistan’s governance has remained militarised. While this is dangerous, more dangerous is that it has resulted in the “civilianisation” of the military. The military never had as prominent a role in the country’s economic affairs, not even during direct military rules as it has now. The aim of this strategy was that while the economists would make policies, the military would guarantee the implementation and sustainability of these policies. While it sounds good on paper, on the ground, the political leadership, knowingly or otherwise, feel absolved of the

responsibility if the economy doesn’t pick up as envisaged. In my little knowledge, “economy is too serious a business to be left to the Generals”.

Synergia: What is the prognosis for the India-Pakistan relationship - in the next five years?

Mr Ihsan Ghani: Whereas political governments, with a few exceptions, have favoured cordial relations with all their neighbours, especially where trade is concerned, the overbearing military for the fear that it will not be able to sell its best-selling commodity that is fear in case the fear of India is gone, and thus have always torpedoed such efforts. Now that the military has committed to shoulder the responsibility of economic revival, a window of cooperation can be created. The effort could be civilian-led, supported by the military for longterm gains.

EXPERT COMMENT

Very few governments in Pakistan have completed their full five-year tenure. Usually, fast-moving developments overtake the usefulness of governments to the military in Pakistan, leading to changes or the overthrow of governments. In all probability, this same fate will befall the current Shahbaz Sharif government.

Imran Khan continues to remain a force in Pakistan’s politics. He could make a

not go together - don’t expect any change in India’s handling of Pakistan or bilateral India - Pakistan relations.

WHAT IS THE MAIN TAKEAWAY FOR US IN INDIA?

Given India’s position on dealing with terrorism and -

It was the Pakistan army or what is often referred to as the Pakistan establishment, which did not want any kind of peace breaking out between the two neighbours. The reason for that was simple: the very pre-eminence, influence in domestic affairs, authority and legitimacy of the Pakistan army would be called into question if there was peace. Therefore, efforts by previous Pakistan prime ministers such as Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari were always shot down.

GAUTAM BAMBAWALE,

Former Indian Ambassador to China and Bhutan, Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

Former Naval Officer and a Retired Inspector General of Police

MR IHSAN GHANI

A creation of the army, the new government will last till it enjoys their trust. However, it will be a weak government subject to pulls and pressures from three sources: the army; the coalition allies, especially PPP, which supports the government from outside; and PML(N) leader Nawaz Sharif, who, though not in the government will continue to exercise considerable influence on governance issues. Being weak, the government will not be able to handle effectively Pakistan’s myriad intractable problems.

It will, in particular, depend on the army’s support to implement several unpopular measures necessary to stabilise the economy.

Though his immediate future seems bleak because of the bad blood between him and the army chief Asim Munir, Imran Khan and his party cannot be written off for all times to come. PTI received considerable public support in the election despite all the machinations of the army to put it down. It has managed to retain power in Khy-

ber-Pakhtunkhwa. Therefore, both Imran Khan and PTI will remain a political force to reckon with. A positive movement in India-Pakistan relations will be contingent upon two factors: (a) the extent of attention and political capital the new Pakistan government can devote to the India relationship while attending to several internal problems. (b) the army’s attitude under Asim Munir. His thinking on the subject is still not clear.

The new Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, who is close to Nawaz Sharif, has spoken of a review of the suspension of trade with India since 2019. A large segment of trade and industry supports the move.

However, it has powerful opponents in the form of hardliners in Pakistan who oppose any normalisation with India, but more importantly, sectors like automobiles and pharmaceuticals that make fat profits in the absence of imports from India. Therefore, we will have to wait and see if the above announcement results in anything positive.

In any case, any positive movement in the bilateral relationship will have to await the conclusion of Indian elections and the formation of a new government.

AMB SHARAT SABHARWAL

Former Indian Ambassador to Pakistan.

WARS OF ATTRITION AND RESILIENCE

Weaker powers and non-state actors can manipulate the wide spectrum of new-age warfare to their advantage; Ukraine and Gaza reflect this paradox.

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

RESEARCH TEAM

Wars have always been about strategy, tactics, and technology, which holds true even now. However, new-age conflicts seem to be forging some novel and fascinating ways of waging war. For instance, asymmetric parties to a conflict are using disruptive technologies to prevent the stronger power from attaining its political and military objectives.

With weaker powers privileging quantity over quality, or `cheap mass` as Kelly Greico, a Washington-based analyst, argues, we can well imagine what future wars might look like.

Wars driven by first-person view drones, low-tech missiles and garage-assembled rockets, when used in large numbers, demonstrate how a weaker party to a conflict can blunt a sophisticated force with expensive platforms on the battlefield.

Whether these disruptive capabilities can cause prohibitive attrition to a stronger power in asymmetrical conflicts of long or indeterminate duration remains the moot question. And what impact these new-age wars might have on future force structures, designs, and war-fighting concepts are issues to ponder.

These and many other new war-fighting trends and technologies are legitimate questions on the evolving character of war.

From the war-fighting trends observed so far in Ukraine and Gaza, it seems prohibitive attrition could be a way to prevent or deter stronger powers from attaining their military objectives. Hopefully, adequate evidence exists to conclude that weaker powers can inflict prohibitive battlefield losses through innovative military action

RETURN OF ATTRITIVE WARS

Wars in Israel and Ukraine signal the return of attritive wars. In fact, they symbolize the new-age wars. For Ukrainians, the Hamas October 7 assault on Israeli civilians bears stark similarities to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year. Earlier, Ukraine suffered the wrath of Russian strikes targeting towns and cities and the local infrastructure, leading to mass displacement and suffering. Israel is now fighting a wily adversary in dense terrestrial and subterranean environments. Possibly a war far more difficult than any other conflict in recent history, be it the tunnels of the Vietnam War or battles in Mosul, Aleppo or Fallujah.

Recent events in Gaza and Ukraine also remind us of what happens when wars turn brutal. Both wars demonstrate how the populace becomes victims of wars of attrition, and when laws of armed conflict take a backseat, vengeance rules action, and violence escalates to horrific levels. As these new-age wars of attri-

tion play out, collateral damage on population centres, hospitals, and schools is internalized as a normative outcome of the war. As the real fight ensues in Ukraine and Gaza and the wars evolve, the warring side narratives in the form of lies, mistruths and accusations only grow, obscuring the real purpose and human cost of the war.

From the war-fighting trends observed so far in Ukraine and Gaza, it seems prohibitive attrition could be a way to prevent or deter stronger powers from attaining their military objectives. Hopefully, adequate evidence exists to conclude that weaker powers can inflict prohibitive battlefield losses through innovative military action that compels a stronger military to miscalculate or re-think and that such ideas lead us to find new and resilient ways of waging wars.

THREE CONTEXTS

Three aspects assume importance in asymmetrical contexts: resilience in war, innovativeness in war, and the ability of a weaker power to cause prohibitive attrition in war.

Resilience in War: Russia took Ukraine by surprise in February 2022 and, as a stronger military power, was expected to liberate Kyiv in quick time. A weaker Ukraine, however, stalled the Russian offensive with fewer and borrowed resources at hand. Whether such outcomes are a simple function of superior men, machines, or material, which Ukraine did not possess at the beginning, and Russia did, or it has more to do with a state’s will to fight, its societal resilience and innovativeness on the battlefield is a question that seeks an answer.

As a weaker party to the conflict, Ukraine has successfully leveraged the intangible attributes of state resilience to match up with Russia. Everything else,

including political and military leadership, doctrines, organizational structure, and technology, comes next. In fact, Ukraine’s ability to community-ise its war effort to produce war outcomes, which its stronger opponent could not deliver, is a lesson on conflicts between asymmetrical powers.

Innovativeness in War: History tells us that technology favours the strong rather than the weaker side in battle. This is fast changing, with weaker parties to a conflict leveraging inferior technology in more innovative ways. Ukraine’s use of borrowed military equipment and innovative exploitation of low-cost disruptive technologies highlights this point.

While the West has lent a major part of this war effort, Ukraine’s ability to train and absorb these borrowed technologies on the run has been remarkable. Killer drones pioneered in Ukraine are reshaping the balance between humans and technology in war.

The fact that a war-fighting effort can be `corporatized` through your allies and partners, in case one lacks the military capacity, is a new learning from this war. The horrific Hamas strike in southern Israel is yet another example.

A banned and reckless outfit lacking material resources to make war with a powerful state has delivered the most unthinkable outcomes. Employing cheap and simple-to-use technology, Hamas squarely used a technology-laden approach to secure the Israeli state. Both wars highlight that military boots matter more than the machine in war and that innovative minds with `cheap mass` can deliver disproportionate outcomes in asymmetrical conflicts. Innovative use of `cheap mass` is achieving near-mythical status on the battlefield.

Prohibitive Attrition in War: Brutality comes at a great human cost, and both wars demonstrate this fact.

A favoured strategy is to rely on prohibitive attrition to drive decisive outcomes in war. At the tactical level, wars of attrition are about bitter battles of control over contested territory and urban rubble, while at the strategic level, these are about shaping perceptions, mistruths or half-truths, and about who is the aggressor or the victim. Ukraine has done well in capitalizing on this idea and keeping Russia embroiled. The more Russia tries to achieve a decisive victory, the more successful the Ukrainians have been in inflicting heavy losses on the Russians.

While Russia might possess the logistical stamina for a long war, the prohibitive costs imposed by Ukraine have been impactful. Elsewhere, Hamas leveraged the tunnel labyrinth to impose caution and attrition on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Despite its recent successes in degrading Hamas in Gaza, a long and risky battle confronts the IDF. An urban landscape compounds the effect of attritive battles, and how the IDF might maintain operational momentum and achieve its war objectives, including the repatriation of the hostages, remains to be seen. As expected, Hamas’s allies have jumped in to open new fronts and are trying hard to overwhelm Israel’s capacity to re-generate reserves and military wherewithal.

That would be a big challenge, but given its reputation for innovation and fighting against all odds, we can expect IDF to come out undefeated in this war.

SOME LESSONS

Clarity in Knowing Your Capacity: Wars are often started, fought, and progressed over various assumptions, some with misplaced optimism. Policy-makers sometimes assume that diplomacy can deliver on national security needs without developing its war-fighting capacities.

Elsewhere, they assume that the resident military power can deliver on any politico-military objectives that a state desires to achieve. Both policy positions are fraught with biases and intolerable strategic risks, which can result in a mistaken view of a state’s real diplomatic influence or war-waging capabilities. Here lies the importance and significance of building state resilience and clarity in national security concepts, policies, guidance, structures and deliverables.

Sustainability and Endurance: War-fighting resilience’s real intent and purpose is to develop the capacity to sustain higher intensity of conflicts and endurance to impose prohibitive losses to the aggressor, particularly in asymmetrical conflicts.

Resilience in such conflicts requires a state to systematically convert its limited or inferior economic, industrial, financial and technological resources into `attritive` war-fighting capabilities within a defined period.

In other words, the ability of the state to `innovatively` convert its assets and industry to sustain conflicts of long or indeterminate duration and at levels higher than what threats the adversary can bring to bear upon the state.

LESSONS FOR INDIA

For India, national security resilience could provide the state with the framework and ability to field an indigenous and sustainable deterrent capability for asymmetrical conflicts. India’s military challenge is to develop resilient war-fighting requirements to achieve a stalemate in a possible asymmetrical conflict with China.

From a policy perspective, the key question is, how can the North’s threat be contained or attrited?

What are the main lessons from the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, and how and what war-fighting capabilities are deliverable through innovative or new technologies and disruptive methods to cause prohibitive attrition that could stall a stronger power?

What could be the force design for causing prohibitive attrition, and can an `attritive` military action possibly be developed as a preferred operation of war for our northern borders?

For any war-fighting capabilities to build and take shape, the policy lines of effort must first be doctrinal rather than structural. More doctrinal than structural. But then, the Indian military establishment is caught up in an endless theatre-isation debate. Simply put, this debate serves a narrow structural requirement, not the doctrinal purpose of India’s attritive war-fighting capabilities. This requires both correction and pragmatism.

INDIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC

Why the Indo-Pacific matters to the world and India.

Rear Admiral Monty Khanna AVSM, NM, (Retd) is the former Deputy NSCS in New Delhi as the Assistant Military Adviser and Strategic Advisor at Synergia Foundation.

Assigning names to vast expanses of the globe is primarily a function of geography. Our continents and oceans have been named with such contiguity in mind. The sole exception to this rule is the bifurcation of the vast Eurasian landmass into the continents of Asia and Europe. Linkages between these distinct continents and oceans have existed for millennia for reasons varying from trade to migration, sometimes voluntary and more often than not forced, as was done during periods of slavery and indentured labour.

The geography of the Indo-Pacific is now playing an increasingly critical role in geopolitics. The region and its resources house a wealth of geo-strategic challenges for maritime security forces. The Indian Ocean, the third largest , and relatively peaceful ocean complements the Pacific, the largest, and most contested ocean. Together, they host two of every three island nations and seven of the ten largest continental nations. The maritime orientation of the region is highly interconnected.

RISE OF A REGION

Over the last century, as globalisation gathered steam, these inter-linkages have become even more pronounced and have extended from the physical to the virtual domain. Supply chains in both domains have be-

Insofar as India is concerned, we too have welcomed the Indo-Pacific concept, and the terminology has been mainstreamed through numerous policy statements made by the Ministry of External Affairs. It has been seen as a vehicle in consonance with our Act East Policy that could be leveraged to enhance our strategic relations with West Asia and ASEAN.

come increasingly intertwined to leverage the comparative advantage that even distant nations have had to offer. This has resulted in a steady increase in the purchasing power for most goods and services, thereby increasing affordability and consumption, which in turn has led to an exponential improvement in quality of life.

Enhanced trade dependencies, particularly in a competitive environment, have given way to enhanced strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. As some nations have been more efficient than others in creating the necessary environment to leverage their comparative advantages for economic benefit, trade has also resulted in power shifts, the most notable being China’s phenomenal rise over the last four and a half decades.

The re-industrialisation of Japan preceded China’s rise post World War II. This was followed by the concurrent rise of the Asian tigers, i.e., Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. Finally, the accelerated growth of India, as well as the rest of Southeast Asia,

has resulted in the economic fulcrum of the world having perceptibly shifted eastwards.

Given the stakes involved, challenges to global hegemony are invariably accompanied by pushback by the established power. The U.S., therefore, has resisted China’s rise in multiple dimensions, including the strategic, economic, and technological arenas.

TWO OCEANS ONE STRATEGY

Insofar as the strategic dimension is concerned, one tool that the U.S. has used is the articulation of the Indo-Pacific concept, wherein the Indian and Pacific oceans and their littoral nations are construed to be conjoined into a single geopolitical construct.

From a U.S. perspective, such a step has several perceived advantages. It serves as a vehicle for enhanced military, economic, and strategic ties between the U.S. and Indian Ocean littoral nations, the key being India. It encourages stronger bonds between the U.S. Asian allies and Indian Ocean Region countries. It provides a fillip to the QUAD and similar security constructs in the region. It serves as a counterweight to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its subsequent avatars, these being the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Cultural Initiative (GCI). It demonstrates the U.S.’s continued commitment to the region and serves as an instrument for reassuring smaller nations which have occasionally shown tendencies to hedge geopolitical risks by forging closer ties with China. In a way, it has the potential to be a key building block in an effort towards containing the rise of China and preserving the current geopolitical order.

From a security perspective, the shift has been relatively easy for the U.S. as the erstwhile Pacific Com-

mand (PACCOM) ‘s Area of Responsibility (AOR) always included a sizeable part of the Indian Ocean. Its new name, the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACCOM), just provides greater visibility to its tasking in the IOR, a responsibility it was already entrusted with.

Countries in the region have reacted differently to the salience given to the Indo-Pacific construct. China has clearly identified it as a tool for containment. Russia sees it as a means of isolating them, as expressed in no uncertain terms by the Russian foreign minister, Mr. Sergei Lavrov, during the 2020 Raisina Dialogue.

Australia, a U.S. ally whose landmass washes the shores of both oceans, has not surprisingly embraced the Indo-Pacific. It serves their strategic interests well, for while their security interests lie with the U.S., their economic interests are oriented towards Asia. Seeing the two oceanic regions as a unified strategic construct is something they have been doing for decades. Japan, another U.S. ally, has also found favour with the concept.

Their motivations, however, appear to be more China-centric. Given their testy relations coupled with proximity to China, any attempt to broad-base the pushback against the rise of China is welcome. The enthusiasm from most Southeast Asian nations has been more tepid. The region has walked a fine line over the past decade, balancing a rising and more assertive China with the existing pre-eminent power, the U.S. They would not like to be drawn into either choosing sides or, worse, into a potential conflict, should a situation so develop.

THE INDIAN DILEMMA

Insofar as India is concerned, we too have welcomed the Indo-Pacific concept, and the terminology has been

mainstreamed through numerous policy statements made by the Ministry of External Affairs. It has been seen as a vehicle in consonance with our Act East Policy that could be leveraged to enhance our strategic relations with West Asia and ASEAN.

It reemphasises freedom of navigation and the preservation of a rules-based order at sea in accordance with the UNCLOS. Given our unsettled borders and China’s adoption of a more belligerent stance in disputed regions, it serves as a tool for messaging and moderating China’s behaviour.

It facilitates enhanced interoperability with like-minded powers, thereby allowing the rapid coming together of security forces in the event of a contingency while remaining outside an alliance structure.

That being said, we need to remain conscious that the Western Pacific has complex geopolitical disputes related to Taiwan, the Senkaku, Paracel and Spratley islands, and the now re-articulated Ten Dash Line. Each of these has the potential to rapidly transition into a conflict that we would be wise to be highly calibrated in our involvement.

We have a large trading relationship with China and share an over 3,000 km long border that needs to be managed deftly, both militarily as well as politically, to avoid unnecessary escalation that will be detrimental to both nations.

We must also assess how our long-enduring strategic relationship with Russia will be impacted if we are seen to be increasingly aligned with nations inimical to their security interests. Further, our responsibilities in the IOR are large, and we do not have the necessary military wherewithal to execute extended operations in

the Pacific on a scale that could influence a potential conflict. We, therefore, need to temper our rhetoric on the Indo-Pacific in keeping with ground realities and our larger strategic interests. Thus, while we encourage conceptual articulation about the Indo-Pacific, we need to remain conscious that our security interests fundamentally lie in the IOR and its littoral nations.

Assessment

History records the Indo-Pacific maritime domain as crucial for establishing new and emerging powers and shaping regional dynamics. With great powers influencing the larger security architecture of the region, strategic competition is at its highest. India cannot afford to be left out of the shifting power dynamics that characterise the region.

India is fast emerging as a net security provider in the region, which will come at a considerable cost in terms of investment in the Indian Navy, a capital-intensive service. The opportunity cost of doing so may come under scrutiny as India’s principal security threats lie first on land and then at sea, from a realistic perspective.

Nations within the geography have their navies and maritime security agencies working towards keeping the region secure. No single nation, not even the U.S., can dominate the vast waters of the Indo-Pacific. Forging collaborative frameworks is an important element of any commitment to the region.

The term first appeared in academic use in oceanography and geopolitics. Scholarship has shown that the “Indo-Pacific” concept circulated in Weimar Germany and spread to interwar Japan. German political oceanographers envisioned an “Indo-Pacific” comprising anti-colonial India and republican China as German allies against “Euro-America”.

Since the late 2010s, the term “Indo-Pacific” has been increasingly used in geopolitical discourse. It also has a “symbiotic link” with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad”, an informal grouping between Australia, Japan, India, and the United States.

It has been argued that the concept may lead to a change in popular “mental maps” of how the world is understood in strategic terms. Remarking on overlap-

ping older terms for the region, the political scientist Amitav Acharya stated that as a concept, “’Asia’ was built by nationalists, ‘Asia-Pacific’ by economists, ‘East Asia’ by culturalists, and ‘Indo-Pacific’ by strategists’”.

In its widest sense, the term geopolitically covers all nations and islands surrounding either the Indian Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, encompassing mainland African and Asian nations who border these oceans, such as India and South Africa; Indian Ocean territories, such as the Kerguelen Islands and Seychelles; the Malay Archipelago (which is within the bounds of both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific); Japan, Russia and other Far East nations bordering the Pacific; Australia and all the Pacific Islands east of them, as well as Pacific nations of the Americas such as Canada or Mexico. ASEAN countries (defined as those in Southeast Asia and the Malay Archipelago) are considered to be geographically at the centre of the political Indo-Pacific.

The term Indo-Pacific is ambiguous and amorphous, with each member of the so-called Quad having its own understanding of the strategic space.

The current coinage has been main-streamed by the USA: as Rear Admiral Khanna has observed, “Insofar as the strategic dimension of its contestation with China is concerned, one tool that the U.S. has used is the articulation of the Indo-Pacific concept, wherein the Indian and Pacific oceans and their littoral nations are construed to be conjoined into a single geopolitical

sole littoral representative whose shores are washed only by the Indian Ocean. The aforesaid three countries are constituents in a U.S.-led military alliance; India is not.

The other three countries’ biggest security challenges emerge from the maritime domain; India’s concerns are primarily territorial.

As the Quad is an informal security construct without any commitments for mutual assistance, the answer to India being a party to a conflict involving any of the other three is speculative.

Prime Minister Modi has articulated the Indo-Pacific as a ‘free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity’ ; a formulation that has universal application for all the countries in the region.

KRISHNAN SRINIVASAN

Retired Indian diplomat, historian, author, and former Indian Foreign Secretary.

EXPERT COMMENT

Synergia: By trying to extend its maritime influence beyond the Indian Ocean into the Pacific, is India overextending its capacity?

MKN: It is a mistaken belief that as India emerges on the regional scene as a potential ‘net security provider’, it is anxious to project power beyond the Indian Ocean. There is no Indian Naval Doctrine that suggests this as a realistic option today. The Prime Minister has, on occasion, referred to the ‘Open Seas’ concept. The West has unilaterally chosen to interpret this as if India has endorsed the U.S.-driven ‘Open Seas Policy’ in the Pacific, particularly in the seas around Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan. Certain Naval Commanders speak loosely about India’s role in the Indo-Pacific, but this is not tantamount to a Policy Statement. The U.S. would no doubt like India to firmly endorse its concept of an ‘Open Seas Policy’ in the Pacific, but this has yet to happen. India is clearly hedging its bets and is unwilling at present to enter into a confrontation with China on this count.

Synergia: India has no history of participating in military alliances in actual combat. Therefore, being a member of QUAD or any other demi-military alliance in the Indo-Pacific region, does it mean that in case of open hostilities in the Pacific, India will also become a party to the conflict?

MKN: India does not believe in the idea or concept of Military Alliances. This has been an entrenched belief as far as its State and Military Doctrines are concerned. Hence, it has been extremely careful in delineating the role of QUAD. From India’s standpoint, it is essentially a platform for a security dialogue and

nothing beyond this. QUAD, in this respect, is vastly different from AUKUS (the Security alliance between Australia, the UK and the US in the Pacific), which is a military alliance intended to safeguard the interests of these nations against, primarily, China.

Synergia: How real is India’s perceived role as a net security provider for the Indo-Pacific, considering the competing demands on the Indian Budget by the Army and the Air Force?

MKN: India’s policymakers have never aspired to be a net security provider for the Indo-Pacific, or for that matter, the Indian Ocean Rim countries. Many military leaders and some itinerant policy analysts do loosely mention the idea of India extending its security canvas to embrace the Indo-Pacific Region, but there is no substance to this idea or belief. Even in the Indian Ocean Region, India’s Naval doctrine does not endorse the idea of India being ‘a net security provider’ to countries in the region. Rather, while seeking to defend and protect India’s core interests from an external attack by sea, India has chosen to encourage a string of friendly countries in the Indian Ocean Rim to side with India against an external threat from the sea by nations outside the region. A well-defined mechanism is already in place for this purpose. This is, however, very different from a military alliance. By and large, India’s defence posture does not include any kind of military alliance, whether on land or the sea. This has been the case ever since India became independent.

MR. M.K. NARAYANAN

Former National Security Advisor, India

CONNECTIVITY IN FUTURE CITIES

FSO Networks can play a critical part in implementing India’s ambitious Smart Cities Mission

TRitika Simon is a Strategic Policy Adviser in Synergia Foundation. She has Masters degree from LSE in Economics & Risk and Society.

he Indian government initiated the Smart Cities Mission on 25th June 2015. Its goal is to foster sustainable and inclusive cities that offer core infrastructure, a clean and sustainable environment, and the application of smart solutions, thereby enhancing the quality of life for its citizens. The mission emphasizes implementing novel and innovative approaches at a small scale, which can be scaled up and replicated nationwide. This approach, known as the “lighthouse” strategy, aims to expedite the development and successful operation of such zones, promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in urban areas.

The goal of converting Indian cities into smart ones can only be achieved by leveraging the latest technologies, which reduce the time and resources needed to create the infrastructure. In pursuit of this vision, freespace optical (FSO) communications have emerged as a promising technology for delivering high-speed, secure, and reliable connectivity between future cities and their surrounding infrastructure.

SMART CITY PRIORITIES

The concept of future cities is rapidly gaining momentum as urban areas worldwide aspire to become more interconnected, sustainable, and technologically advanced. A smart city’s fundamental infrastructure

Free Space Optical (FSO) networks offer high-speed wireless communication with built-in security features but face challenges during implementation and operation. Atmospheric conditions like fog, rain, and snow can cause signal attenuation, reducing data rates or causing communication failures. Redundancy systems and optimized network design can improve reliability.

encompasses various essential components to enhance urban living standards. These include efficient water management with smart reservoirs and distribution systems to ensure access to clean water, reliable electricity supply, and comprehensive sanitation solutions covering solid waste management.

Additionally, the infrastructure extends to facilitating efficient urban mobility and transport systems, robust IT connectivity, and digital ecosystems.

Moreover, a smart city infrastructure incorporates provisions for affordable housing, promotes good governance practices such as e-government and citizen participation, ensures a sustainable environment, and fosters education and public health initiatives.

It also emphasizes the safety and security of citizens, with particular attention to vulnerable groups like women, children, and the elderly.

In implementing these initiatives, the program sets achievable benchmarks and selects suitable systems and structures to modernize planned cities. Employing a blend of retrofitting, redevelopment, and greenfield development approaches, the initiative identifies approximately 6 to 10 cities across various densely populated states.

FSO NETWORKS A GAMECHANGER

The concept of Free Space Optical (FSO) networks was first introduced in the 1960s, utilizing high-powered lasers to transmit large volumes of data through the air as a medium. However, being a Line of Sight (LOS) technology, it had many challenges to overcome.

The biggest advantage of using the optical spectrum in FSO networks is that no licenses are required, unlike other wireless Radio Frequency (RF)- based technologies. This results in significant cost savings on spectrum licensing fees.

FSO networks are also immune to interference from electromagnetic fields, making them highly suitable for co-existence with existing wireless deployments. The current hardware used in FSO networks can mitigate interference between multiple light sources with the same specifications.

Additionally, FSO networks offer advantages over RF-based technologies, such as higher data transmission rates, lower cost, and increased security.

In addition to their rapid deployment and cost efficiency, FSO communications offer various other benefits for future cities. They boast high security, as the light beams used for data transmission are challenging to intercept or disrupt. Furthermore, they are environmentally friendly, as they eschew the necessity for cables or other physical infrastructure.

HIGH-SPEED INTERNET: A MODERN BASIC NECESSITY

The World Bank’s assessment reveals a stark contrast in broadband high-speed internet accessibility, with 80 per cent of the population in advanced economies having access compared to only 35 per cent in developing nations. In this context, “broadband” denotes internet speeds faster than dial-up connections.

FSO communication holds promise for enhancing wireless communication for both those already equipped with broadband access and those lacking it. Optical communication offers bandwidth enhancements ranging from 10 to 100 times that of radio frequency (RF) wireless communication while demanding lower input power.

Additionally, the costs associated with establishing ground-based radio stations to receive FSO signals are notably lower than those of laying new optical fibre connections due to reduced labour and excavation expenses. In certain scenarios, utilizing FSO communication between ground locations proves more cost-effective than deploying optical fibre cables.

WHY FSO?

Topography: The distinctive geographical layout of Indian cities presents a challenge for network planners and engineers, often leading to concerns about network dead zones. These dead zones, areas with poor or no network coverage, are common in such environments. FSO lasers offer a solution to overcome the challenges posed by the unique topography of Indian cities. FSO technology can bridge network dead zones and enhance connectivity in areas where traditional network infrastructure may struggle to reach by providing a longrange, high-speed connection without needing physical cables.

Network Resilience: Smart cities, inherently reliant on data, necessitate strong digital connectivity. Free Space Optics (FSOs) offer a level of redundancy and primary access that align well with the demands of a smart city infrastructure. Recent assessments of FSO technology have demonstrated high-speed capabilities per link exceeding 100 Mbps, even in challenging atmospheric conditions where FSO technology historically faced limitations. These findings highlight the significant potential of FSO technology in enhancing the efficiency and reliability of smart city networks.

Security: Smart cities rely on sensors and interconnected devices to generate substantial amounts of data, which cybercriminals can target, potentially disrupting access to essential resources and even illegally accessing security cameras. For instance, in February 2021 in Florida, hackers manipulated the water supply by increasing the level of sodium hydroxide, which could have resulted in a significant public health crisis if not promptly detected and rectified. Free Space Optical (FSO) technology provides inherent security features by design, preventing unauthorized interception and control of signals, thereby enhancing the security of smart city networks and safeguarding against potential cyber threats.

CHALLENGES

Free Space Optical (FSO) networks offer high-speed wireless communication with built-in security features but face challenges during implementation and operation. Atmospheric conditions like fog, rain, and snow can cause signal attenuation, reducing data rates or causing communication failures. Redundancy systems and optimized network design can improve reliability.

Additionally, FSO networks require line-of-sight (LOS) connectivity, which can be limited in urban areas with tall buildings. Combining FSO with LAN or WLAN networks can overcome this limitation. Precise pointing accuracy is also essential for FSO networks due to

laser-based communication, achievable through tight mechanical tolerancing and steering mechanisms.

FSO networks may experience scintillation, causing rapid signal variations due to atmospheric conditions or ground location differences. To mitigate this, highly sensitive optical systems and tailored algorithms can improve signal reception. Additionally, deploying and maintaining FSO networks, especially in rural or remote areas with limited infrastructure, can be costly.

Assessment

At its core, the Smart Cities Mission (SCM) and its related initiatives represent an ambitious urban renewal and revitalization agenda. The primary goal of retrofitting existing cities is to align with the evolving needs of urban residents and enhance the capacity to address future challenges centred around sustainability, equity, and resilience. FSO can play a critical part in implementing India’s ambitious Smart Cities Mission

Despite the apparent challenges, the advantages of FSO networks, including high-speed data transmission and built-in security, often justify the expenses. Recently, this technology has demonstrated its capabilities as a viable competitor to existing commercial solutions. With the capability for gigabit throughput rates, it is positioned to be a key player in linking future cities.

Recent advancements have led to the commercialization of this technology, with numerous equipment manufacturers and service providers developing products and services that leverage the advantages provided by free space optics (FSOs), including a few in Bangalore.

SILICON SAVANNAH IN THE MAKING

In the heart of East Africa, a quiet technological revolution is underway with Kenya rapidly evolving as a dynamic hub of innovation.

KDiya Celine Simon Research Associate in Synergia Foundation

enya serves as an economic hub in East Africa due to its strategic location, well-developed infrastructure, and vibrant economy. It is a key player in regional trade and commerce, with a diverse economy that includes sectors like tourism, agriculture, manufacturing, and finance. Kenya’s Vision 2030 initiative aims to position the country as a globally competitive and prosperous nation, further solidifying its economic significance in the region.

In the last decade, this popular tourist destination has undergone an impressive rise in tech and innovations, making information and communication technology (ICT) the key growth driver. East Africa has a young and well-educated population, so it is a great place to look for skilled developers. Established tech giants like Microsoft, Google, VISA, and PwC have already recognised its potential.

THE LARGER PICTURE

Kenya gained independence from British rule on December 12, 1963, after nearly 80 years of colonial rule. Since then, Kenya has made tremendous progress. However, British colonial rule which was characterised by unfair labour practices, structural racism, and forced resettlement, needed structural reforms post-independence.

Over 60 major Indian companies have invested in various sectors, including manufacturing, real estate, pharmaceuticals, telecom, IT & ITES, banking and agro-based industries, creating thousands of direct jobs for Kenyans. More recent investments by Indian corporations in Kenya include Essar Energy (petroleum refining), Bharti Airtel, Reliance Industries Ltd. (petroleum retail), and Tata (Africa) (automobiles, IT, medicines, etc.).

Kenya’s political stability in an otherwise volatile region, contributes to its geostrategic importance. Since independence, the country has been a relatively stable democracy with regular elections and peaceful transitions of power. This stability makes Kenya an attractive destination for foreign investment and a key partner in regional peace and security initiatives.

Kenya plays a significant role in regional politics and diplomacy, exerting influence beyond its borders. It is a key member of regional organisations like the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), contributing to regional integration and cooperation. Additionally, Kenya’s involvement in peacekeeping missions and diplomatic engagements on the international stage en-

hances its strategic importance in East Africa. Recently, it offered its services to resolve the growing dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over port access in the breakaway region of Somaliland.

THE INDIAN CONNECTION

Kenya has a long Indian connection, although not always pleasant. For the construction of the railway line from the Kenyan coastline to the Ugandan interior to enable the exploitation of the wealth of Africa, the British colonists brought around 32000 Indian indentured labourers between 1896 and 1901. Over 2500 labourers died, many devoured by the notorious man-eating lions of Tsavo, a death rate of four per mile of track laid.

Many of these labourers stayed behind and called in their relatives and family to create a new life in the African savannah. By independence, most non-agricultural businesses were in Indian hands in most major urban centres. After independence and until the early 1970s, there was resentment against South Asians, and thousands who possessed British passports migrated to Great Britain while those not as fortunate returned to India. From a high of nearly 200,000, the South Asian population in Kenya dwindled to a low of 78,000 in 1979. Today, approximately 80,000 Kenyans (including an estimated 20,000 Indian citizens) are of South Asian origin, making them less than one per cent of the population. In 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the late Jomo Kenyatta, declared the Asian community Kenya’s 44th tribe in recognition of their contribution to the nation since its independence.

PROSPECTS FOR CLOSER INDO-KENYA TIES

The 1981 India-Kenya Trade Agreement accords the Most Favoured Nation status to both. It led to the establishment of the India-Kenya Joint Trade Committee (JTC) at the Ministerial level in 1983.

Trade Prospects: Kenya is one of East Africa’s fastest-growing economies, with GDP growth averaging 6 per cent annually from 2010 to 2017. The country’s significant political, structural, and economic reforms

have contributed to its steady economic growth. Kenya’s economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of recent shocks, including the long-term fiscal ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global consequences of the war in Ukraine, two consecutive years of drought, tight monetary policy, and currency devaluation. The Kenyan government has taken significant initiatives to create a more business-friendly climate, jumping 12 places in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings from 92nd to 80th in 2017.

During the last 27 years, the Kenyan exports to India have increased at an annualised rate of 6.66 per cent, from $14.6M in 1995 to $83.1M in 2022. Main Kenyan exports to India include soda ash, vegetables, tea, leather and metal scrap. In 2017, during President Uhuru Kenyatta’s visit to India, MoU was signed on cooperation in the agriculture sector and allied sector, and LoC for US$100 million for agricultural mechanisation.

According to the Kenya Investment Authority KenInvest, Kenya’s second-largest investor is India. India had a high net trade with Kenya in 2022, with exports of Mineral Products ($556 million), Chemical Products ($541 million), and Machines ($321 million). Kenya had a high net trade with India in 2022, with exports of chemical products ($37.8 million), vegetable products ($16 million), and metals ($9.75 million).

Private Investments: Over 60 major Indian companies have invested in various sectors, including manufacturing, real estate, pharmaceuticals, telecom, IT & ITES, banking and agro-based industries, creating thousands of direct jobs for Kenyans.

More recent investments by Indian corporations in Kenya include Essar Energy (petroleum refining), Bharti Airtel, Reliance Industries Ltd. (petroleum retail), and Tata (Africa) (automobiles, IT, medicines, etc.). Several Indian companies, including KEC, Karuturi Ltd., Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd., Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd., Kirloskar Brothers Ltd., Mahindra & Mahindra, Thermax, WIPRO, Jain Irrigation System Ltd., Punj Lloyd, VIL Ltd., Emcure, Dr Reddy, Cipla, Cadila, TVS, and Mahindra Satyams, as well as the Bank of India and the Bank of Baroda, have a presence in Kenya.

Security Partnership: In December last year, both countries issued a joint statement at the highest level to cooperate in capacity building of defence industries, particularly in shipbuilding and shipyard development, in co-development and construction of defence equipment like maritime surveillance equipment, offshore patrol vessels, fast attack crafts, and other arms and ammunition. On this occasion, Prime Minister Modi said that being two Indian Ocean nations, Kenya and India had a “shared priority of strengthening maritime security and combatting piracy and drug trafficking.”

Technology: The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has extended support to Kenya in space exploration. Discussions have been held on establishing space infrastructure, sharing knowledge and satellite data, and the application of space technology in Kenya. Given the growing importance of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and data analytics in various sectors, these technologies are part of the ongoing collaboration between the two countries. Kenya is called Africa’s Silicon Valley or “Silicon Savannah”. This is owing to the Kenyan government’s significant Information and Communications Technology (ICT) push, the M-Pesa mobile payments revolution, and the establishment of iHub. This startup incubator has converted Nairobi into a technology epicentre.

POSSIBLE ROAD BUMPS

Kenya faces significant market issues, including corruption and inadequate governance, as evidenced by its score of 128 out of 180 in Transparency International’s Global Corruption Perception Index 2021. Kenya continues to face enormous hurdles to sustainable and inclusive economic growth, worsened by the economic disruptions caused by COVID-19 and long-standing issues such as corruption and economic inequality. Another difficulty that has a detrimental impact on the economy is decreased consumer spending, which has led to increased unemployment and poverty. Lower public investment, budgetary austerity, and political uncertainty exacerbate the Kenyan market’s issues.

India’s market challenges also act as a deterrent to mutual trade. These include high tariffs and protectionist policies, often causing exporters and investors to face non-transparent or unpredictable laws and tariffs. Indian customers are also price-sensitive, reflecting many consumer-packaged good trends like smaller packages and fewer product features. Infrastructure is another pain point. Several Indian initiatives to enhance trade and connectivity efficiency offset this issue; however, the impacts of an inefficient infrastructure follow the same polarised growth.

WAY AHEAD

Economic Opportunities: India is best seen as an aggregation of very varied state economies, each expanding at various rates, powered by different strengths, led in different ways, and likely to continue to progress unevenly. Kenya’s growth is expected to average 5.2 per cent between 2024 and 2026, primarily driven by the

private sector as business confidence grows and the public sector shrinks. Kenya’s growth is also expected to gain from implementing recently agreed trade accords such as the African Continental Free Trade Area and the European Union Economic Partnership Agreement.

Technology Partnership: Some potential future collaborations could include working out innovative water solutions. Building on the success of startups like Majik Water in Kenya that employ ground-breaking methods for generating clean water using condensation and solar thermal energy, India and Kenya could collaborate on developing and implementing innovative water solutions to address water scarcity and ensure water security for all. Another area for collaboration could be the textile industry. Future collaborations could focus on technology transfer, skill development, and modernising the textile value chain. Given the success stories of Indian tech startups in Africa and the symbiotic surge in innovation and growth, future collaborations could involve deeper engagement in sectors like artificial intelligence, machine learning, data analytics, and tailored tech solutions.

People-To-People Contact: Several Kenyans of Indian origin have distinguished themselves as lawyers, judges, doctors and academics. India is the third largest source (besides neighbours) of inbound tourists to Kenya. Many Kenyans visit India for medical treatment. There are about 3,500 Kenyan students currently studying in 50 Institutions throughout India. In 2018-19, over 400 Kenyan nationals received training and scholarship programmes in various fields under the Indian Technical & Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, India-Africa Forum Summit and Aid to Africa Programme.

Assessment

future collaborations between India and Kenya align with the shared goal of sustained and inclusive development. Both countries have a strong base to build upon, including a British colonial past, the English language, a love for cricket, and a similar democratic political system.

By leveraging each other’s strengths and expertise in economic and technological domains, India and Kenya can create a mutually beneficial partnership that propels both countries towards a brighter future. Both nations enjoy huge resource pools and thus can contribute to the regional and global common interests in securing the future.

As India looks at an ‘extended neighbourhood’ stretching up to the Eastern coastline of Africa and aspires to be a net security provider for the IOR, Kenya assumes increasing prominence in India’s geopolitical calculus. India has to match up to its rival China, which has already made deep inroads into Kenya.

Potential

CARNAGE IN CROCUS

The need to deal decisively with a resurgent threat has become even more urgent after the Crocus Hall massacre.

This Article was written by Rohan Gunaratna, Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

The recent carnage in Moscow should galvanise nations to come together to face a common threat. To fight transnational terrorism and its vicious ideological driver – extremism – the key levers are international security and intelligence cooperation. The ongoing geopolitical competition between rival powers should not compromise our safety and security.

A GHASTLY TRAGEDY

Allegedly, four citizens of Tajikistan mounted a devastating attack on the Crocus City Hall complex in Moscow on 22 March 2024, killing at least 144 and injuring more than 145 concert-goers. The intensity and magnitude of the attack shocked the international community. The carnage demonstrated that the terrorist threat posed by jihadists has neither disappeared nor diminished. As we take in the scale of the tragedy, another terrorist attack somewhere is likely to be in the making.

The official news agency of the Islamic State (IS), Amaq, issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack. Graphic video footage of the killings recorded by the attackers, as well as a selfie pledging allegiance to the leader of IS, were also released.

Rejoicing after the attack, jihadists, individually and in groups, congratulated IS and hailed its return to international infamy. Although the attackers were

The horrendous attack on the Moscow concert hall serves as a wake-up call not only for Russia but for all countries and a reminder that terrorism is a common challenge faced by humanity. Complacent after the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, countries both in the West and in the East have allowed its remnants to evolve into deadly threats. To prevent these threats from consolidating and expanding, like-minded governments should systematically combat and root out the ranks of IS branches, both on and off the battlefield.

captured and confessed to their roles, the leadership, organisation and ideology that drove the attack are still very much intact.

The U.S. government had warned Russia of an impending attack, and its embassy in Moscow had also warned U.S. citizens to avoid public places 48 hours before it happened. It looked as if the Russians did not take the warnings seriously because of its geopolitical rivalry with the United States. To fight a resurging threat that many believed had gone into remission, strong global leadership is needed.

THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAMIC STATE

Five years after the world had declared its defeat in Baghuz, a town in Syria, the Islamic State has trans-

formed itself into a global movement and has struck Russia with a vengeance. Although the roles of Russia and Iran had not been adequately highlighted in the Western media, they, together with Western forces, had contributed to the defeat of IS. In making a comeback, Islamic State is bent on striking back at its enemies.

The attack in Moscow coincided with the re-election of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin on 21 March 2024. IS supporters depicted the attack as a congratulatory message for Putin. One of the worst terrorist attacks perpetrated after 9/11, it ranks among the top five attacks mounted by IS outside Iraq and Syria, including Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday attack on 21 April 2019 and the Paris attack on 13 November 2015.

THE MOSCOW ATTACK

The organisation that carried out the attack was a Tajik cell of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Investigations following the attack revealed that the terrorists travelled from Tajikistan to Moscow in November 2023 to set up an operational base. The pre-attack surveillance of the concert hall was conducted by 25-year-old Fariddun Shamsuddin, one of the four terrorists involved.

Shamsuddin’s co-attackers were 19-year-old Muhammad Sobir Fayzov, 32-year-old Dalerjon Mirzoev, and 30-year-old Rachabalizoda Saidakrami Murodali. Their mission was to kill as many people as possible at the Crocus City Hall. The fact that they received their weapons from a dedicated safehouse suggests the existence of a larger compartmentalised network and the likelihood of further attacks.

The jihadists stormed into the concert hall, shouting “God is great” as they went on a shooting spree. They fired randomly at men, women, and children, not hesitating to shoot the injured and those praying for their lives. The attackers recorded a propaganda video in typical IS style, raising their index fingers symbolising

tawhid, “the belief in the oneness of God”. Following a fierce firefight, the terrorists attempted to flee but were caught after a police chase. Subsequent investigations revealed that religious and financial motivations lay behind their attack and shed light on the radicalisation and recruitment tactics employed by extremist groups.

ISLAMIC STATE KHORASAN PROVINCE –AN EXPANDING THREAT

Directed by IS-KP leader Sanaullah Ghafari alias Shahab Al Muhajir, the Moscow operation was supported by his cells in Baluchistan, Dushanbe (Tajikistan) and Istanbul (Turkey). The strength of his forces had increased from about 1,900 at the time of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 to between 3000-4000 fighters today. Most of his recruits, including the Moscow attackers, did not have previous links to terrorism. Drawing recruits from Turkey to Xinjiang (China) and from Afghanistan to Pakistan, IS-KP has the potential to radicalise not only their territorial communities but diasporic communities as well. From its core in Afghanistan, IS-KP is expanding to Central Asia and South Asia.

As the Taliban is in control of Afghanistan and ISKP has sanctuary there, it is critical to eliminate the threat at its core. The threat posed by IS-KP is clear from recent memory of how Al Qaeda used Afghanistan as a base to mount attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the USS Cole in 2000, and New York’s World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in Washington, DC., on 9/11. As evidenced in the attacks from 2021 to 2024, IS-KP’s range and lethality have expanded. A lean and mean organisation, IS-KP is turning itself into a potent external operations wing of the Islamic State. The next phase of the threat will become more deadly if the movement is not eradicated.

HOW THE WORLD SHOULD RESPOND

The horrendous attack on the Moscow concert hall serves as a wake-up call not only for Russia but for all

countries and a reminder that terrorism is a common challenge faced by humanity. Complacent after the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, countries both in the West and in the East have allowed its remnants to evolve into deadly threats. To prevent these threats from consolidating and expanding, like-minded governments should systematically combat and root out the ranks of IS branches, both on and off the battlefield. While IS central has been weakened in its capabilities, IS-KP has significantly expanded and developed longrange, deep-penetration capabilities. Following lethal attacks in Afghanistan, Iran, and now Moscow, IS-KP has emerged as one of the most powerful branches of IS globally.

The Moscow attack has emboldened IS-KP and its affiliated groups, increasing the likelihood of future mass casualty attacks unless the group is incapacitated. Besides Israel and Jews worldwide, IS-KP’s targets include the West (particularly the US), China, Russia, Iran, and their allies. The Moscow carnage will likely inspire similar entities, groups, networks, cells, and individuals to carry out copycat attacks.

In addition to securing highrisk targets, such as hotels and malls where people congregate, there is a ational and behavioural ners should collaborate

with governments to fortify vulnerable venues and increase security measures. Governments should engage with Muslim leaders and elites to dismantle exclusivist and extremist ideologies that fuel violence and terrorism.

Failure to address these radical ideologies will result in more attacks and a rise in Islamophobia. The international community must pre-emptively combat the ideologies that drive radicalisation. Despite the denial among some religious leaders that their faith is being distorted to incite hatred, violence and fear, communities and religious leaders must take decisive action against hate preachers and errant mosques, madrasahs and associated groups. To shield communities from online radicalisation, Muslim leaders should actively counter propaganda and other radicalising forces. In addition to condemning the Islamic State and similar groups, they should uphold local and traditional Islamic values, promoting moderation, tolerance, and coexistence within their communities.

CONCLUSION

The tragic events in Moscow serve as a stark reminder of the persistent threat posed by terrorist organisations and the necessity of a coordinated global effort to address this challenge. Just as previous tragedies have prompted international alliances to strengthen security measures, the attack calls for collective action and vigilance in ensuring the safety and security of people worldwide.

PROFESSOR ROHAN GUNARATNA

Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

CROCUS CITY HALL: WHAT WE KNOW & DON’T

The terrorist attack in Moscow does not appear to fit the typical modus operandi of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

This Article was written by Andrey

Kortunov, Director general of Russian International Affairs Council(RIAC).

The overall picture of the Friday’s largescale terrorist attack in a Moscow’s suburb is finally acquiring some clarity. The attack on the Crocus City Concert Hall in Moscow’s satellite town of Krasnogorsk was conducted by four men of Central Asian origin, who were heavily armed with automatic rifles and incendiaries. The attackers started shooting when they stormed through the entrance killing unarmed security personnel and then proceeded through the lobby to the music room itself.

There were no political statements or demands; as it later turned out, terrorists were not even sufficiently fluent in Russian. No hostages were taken, the goal of the attackers was quite simple – to kill as many people as possible and to inflict as much damage as possible to the concert hall itself. With more than 6200 unarmed people caught in the building, this task was easy enough. The attackers were shooting at pointblank range, reloading their rifles and throwing incendiary checkers in all directions. After having put the building on fire they departed through the same central entrance and left the scene in a closely parked car.

Many people were killed by the shooting, many suffocated by the smoke in condensed rooms and hallways, yet others perished when the glass-and-steel roof of the concert hall finally collapsed. With rescue operations and fire-fighting efforts still under way, the num-

With more than 6200 unarmed people caught in the building, this task was easy enough. The attackers were shooting at pointblank range, reloading their rifles and throwing incendiary checkers in all directions. After having put the building on fire they departed through the same central entrance and left the scene in a closely parked car.

ber of deaths was climbing over the weekend going to 133, including small children. More than a hundred and fifty victims remain in hospitals and the odds are that the final death toll will be higher. The attackers tried to escape in the direction of Russia’s border with Ukraine, but their car was intercepted by special forces and all the four men were arrested. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin declared March 24 a day of national mourning.

However, even now, there are still some essential parts of the story that remain unclear and open to public discussions. The most important question is about who really stands behind the Friday attack. It is hardly possible to imagine that a few terrorists could have acted on their own, without a strong institution or a network behind them. In course of the first interrogations, they actually confessed that they were essentially nothing more than disposable ‘guns for hire’, that is to say that they were paid to do the job. By the way, the offered price was not that huge – slightly more than US$ 5.000

per person. However, the detained terrorists turned out to be incapable or unwilling to properly identity their alleged employers and customers.

One of the most popular versions regarding the latter, which is now in broad circulation in the West, links the terrorist attack to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This version is based on the assumption that ISIS or, more specifically, ISIS-K (the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan) has very many reasons to be unhappy with Moscow’s activities in places like Syria, Libya or even with Russia’s cautious support for the Taliban regime in Kabul. In September of 2022, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the suicide bomber attack of the Russian Embassy in Kabul, which fortunately produced no victims. The terrorist organization demonstrated its operational capabilities in early January of 2024, when two ISIS–K attackers carried out twin suicide bombings in Kerman, Iran, during an event mourning the US assassination of Quds Force leader Qassim Soleimani.

This version of who stands behind the atrocious terrorist attack is particularly convenient for the United States and its NATO allies since it points at the Western long-term enemies and rules out any, even hypothetical Western responsibility for the tragedy in Moscow. However, there are some apparent soft spots in this narrative. First, the pattern of the attack in the Crocus City Hall was very different from the ‘standard mode’ of ISIS operations. The Friday attackers were not religious fanatics, suicide bombers, or indoctrinated shooters ready not only to kill, but also do die pursuing their ‘holy mission’.The ultimate and uncompromised ISIS fanaticism has been demonstrated on many occasions, for instance, during a large-scale terrorist attack in Paris on the 13th of November, 2015. But this was not the case in Moscow last Friday – the attackers desperately tried to escape and to save their live.

Second, it would be somewhat counterintuitive for ISIS to target Moscow at this particular moment, when Russia has taken a clearly pro-Palestinian position on a very sensitive for everybody in the Moslem world issue of the Israeli military operation in Gaza. It would be more logical to look for targets among the staunch advocates of Benyamin Netanyahu. Even if ISIS decided to stage a terrorist operation in Moscow, they would have probably targeted one of local synagogues, as they have already tried earlier.

The alternative version, which is floating around in Russia, is that the real sponsors and instigators of the attack should be looked for in Kyiv. The version implies that since Ukraine is currently losing to Russia on the battlefield and has no opportunities to reverse the course of the conflict in its favor, terrorist attacks remain one of the very few remaining options that are still open for the Ukrainian leadership to make its case in an ‘asymmetrical’ way. This version can be also regarded as self-serving, since it unquestionably destroys

the international reputation of Ukraine. Still, it should not be dismissed without consideration. After all, the terrorists tried to escape Russia through the Russian-Ukrainian border and were captured only a hundred miles away from the border. It seems that they should have at least secured some advance arrangements with appropriate partners in Ukraine, who would allow them to enter the Ukrainian territory safely and find shelter on the Ukrainian soil.

Moreover, in Russia they consider a ‘Ukrainian involvement’ in the recent terrorist attack to be a logical continuation of what Ukraine has already been doing for a long time. On many occasions, Moscow accused Kyiv of sponsoring and even of directly organizing diverse terrorist activities deep in the Russian territory, including acts of economic sabotage and assassination attempts against prominent politicians, journalists and opinion leaders.

The ongoing investigation should help clarifying the issue of the customers and instigators. However, it is clear that even if a Ukrainian trace is finally confirmed and proved by the Russian side, the West will still continue to deny any connections between Kyiv and the terrorist act in Moscow. The odds are that the Western leaders will continue to reject any piece of evidence that the Russian side might bring to the table. If so, the terrorist attack in Moscow will remain an open file for a long time – just like the file of the Nord Stream pipeline explosions in September of 2022.

Another important question that remains unanswered is about the warning of the terrorist act that the United States sent to Russia a couple of weeks ago. In Washington they now claim that they did their best having informed Moscow of a high probability of a largescale terrorist attack on the Russian soil a couple of weeks ago. However, in Russia they argue that the information from Washington was very general, unclear and therefore not really usable.

There are thousands and thousands of popular public spaces in Moscow, and if the warning did not contain any reference to specific probable targets, the net value of the warning was limited at best. Moreover, in Moscow they accuse the United States and NATO of assisting Ukraine with planning its own sabotage and reconnaissance operations, including multiple strikes against civilian targets, which are defined in Russia as acts of state terrorism.

This indirect polemics between Washington and Moscow raises a bigger question: is an efficient international cooperation in fighting against terrorism possible in the era of intense geopolitical competition? Is there any hope for success, when this competition in itself turns out to be a fertile soil for terrorism?

The current trends are not very reassuring. Though the world has not recently witnessed terrorist acts similar to 9/11 events in New York and in Washington, hundreds of civilians died in the massive attacks in Paris and in Madrid, in Bagdad and in Berlin, in Beslan and

over Sinai, in Gamboru (Nigeria) and in Mumbai (India), with new names added to this tragic list every so often. Large-scale terrorist attacks are now few and far between in the United States, but there have been more of them in Europe, let alone in the Middle East and in Africa. Why, then, is the goal to wipe out terrorism not achieved so far?

In the first place, the international community has failed to agree on a common definition of terrorism’s origins, driving forces and character. What some actors explicitly dub as “terrorist” may look like a national liberation struggle for others.

Bring up the issue of terrorism in Kashmir in a conversation with Indians and Pakistani, only to see there can hardly be a common denominator in this matter. Talk to Israelis and to Palestinians on how they define terrorism, and you will find striking differences as well.

The United States routinely accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of sponsoring terrorism, but looking from Tehran you are likely to define the above-mentioned US assassination of Genal Qassim Soleimani as an unquestionable act of international terrorism. Throughout history, many self-confident leaders have attempted to draw a line between ‘bad’ terrorism and ‘good’ terrorism, aspiring to manage and to use terrorists as convenient foreign policy tools. However, this arbitrarily drawn line between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ terrorists has always got blurred, and former seemingly obedient and efficient servants have again and again revolted against their short-sighted masters.

Second, any success in the fight against terrorism entails a high level of trust between the interacting parties—simply because they would have to exchange a lot of sensitive and confidential information. In today’s world, trust is thin on the ground. An apparent and mounting deficit of this resource is not only present in the relations between Moscow and Washington; it also takes its toll on the relations between Beijing and Tokyo, between Riyadh and Teheran, between Cairo and Addis Ababa, between Bogota and Caracas, and the list goes on.

It would be tempting to try to somehow ‘insulate’ the fight against international terrorism, separating it from the overall geopolitical competition. However, it is practically impossible since any international cooper ation on terrorism is inextricably linked to the very core dimensions of national security.

Third, international terrorism is far from an issue that is set in stone. It is gradually changing and evolving

to become more resilient, sophisticated, and cunning. The recent events at the Crocus City Conference Hall is a clear indication of how much damage can be inflicted by a relatively small, but well-armed and well-prepared group of militants. Similar to a dangerous virus, the terrorist threat is mutating, generating ever new strains. Another lesson that we should learn is that the modern highly urbanized and technologically advanced post-modern civilization – be it in Russia, in China, in Europe or in the United States – is extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Rapidly changing and increasingly complex social and economic infrastructure, especially in large metropolitan areas, is an enabling environment for hard-hitting terrorist attacks.

Besides, international and civil conflicts—like the one raging in Ukraine—drastically heighten the accessibility of modern arms for would-be terrorists. Such conflicts inevitably generate large numbers of trained fighters with a lot of combat experience, access to sophisticated weapons and, sometimes, with severe mental problems. These fighters are easy prey for recruiters from international terrorist networks, or they turn into dormant ‘lone wolves’, who could go hunting at any moment. One should not dismiss the kind of terrorism bred by anonymous mavericks and amateurs rather than the sort represented by well-known transnational extremist movements—individualists are the hardest to track and neutralize, while plans of amateurs are harder to reveal.

The current progress in military technology, coupled with other trends in the contemporary international arena, portend a new spike in terrorist activities in the coming years. Add to this a comprehensive setback in the resilience of global economy, which may be fraught with more social tensions and an inevitable rise of pollical radicalism and extremism in a broad range of countries.

An obvious foretelling: In this “nutrient broth”, the virus of terrorism, which has not been wholly eradicated, stands all the chances for an “explosive” growth. Taking terrorism off the agenda is only possible if humanity effects a transition to a new level of global governance. It is either that the leading powers are wise and energetic enough for

ANDREY KORTUNOV

Director general of Russian International Affairs Council(RIAC)

PUTIN’S RUSSIA –POST 2024 POLLS

Putin’s therapy to invigorate Russia emphasises statism and anchored Soviet themes.

VLt Gen G A V Reddy AVSM, SC, VSM (Retd) is the former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defense Staff, DG-DIA and Strategic Advisor at Synergia Foundation.

ladimir Putin secured a fifth term in office in the March 2024 Russian presidential election with a victory by a huge margin. The outcome was widely expected, and his popularity is now highest despite allegations of vote rigging and limited opposition. Clearly, Putin’s win solidified his grip on power and is seen as a sign of support for his policies, particularly the war in Ukraine.

Some interesting, albeit trivial, facts are connected to these elections. Since Mr Putin himself passed an amendment in the Duma in 2018 extending the Soviet-era tenure of the President from four to six years, he will continue in power at least till 2030. After that, he may seek yet another tenure as he will be only 77, an age at which Mr Trump is contesting for his second stint at the White House.

Taking into account his tenures as the country’s prime minister (1999-2000 and 2008-2012), Mr Putin has already overtaken Catherine the Great’s record, who ruled for over 34 years! If he opts for another tenure post-2030, he will be the longest-ruling Russian since Peter the Great.

The Western actions to disturb polls in Russia failed despite drone attacks preceding polls and an attempted elite strike forces operation. Putin’s call for nation-

The Western concern is about Putin’s ability to tilt the global strategic balance towards cementing the multipolar world order of the 21st century. Putin’s victory is seen as leading to the consolidation of Russian society with a victory in the Ukraine war as a plausible reality. Putin’s victory will have implications for the U.S. foreign policy and NATO expansion, in turn shaping international perceptions of Russia’s political landscape and influencing diplomatic relations.

al unity and the emphasis on overcoming challenges suggest a continued focus on consolidating power and navigating Russia through difficult times. This does not seem out of place as, looking ahead, Putin’s post-election course of action remains uncertain. While he has seemingly “sanction-proofed” the Russian economy and bolstered military production, challenges such as demographic decline, the economic impact of the war and the fragility of one-person rule persist.

A MAGICAL VICTORY OR A FOREGONE CONCLUSION?

Putin’s long-standing rule and consolidation of power over the years, coupled with a national unity and stability narrative, played a crucial role in securing such

a high percentage of votes. His image as a strong leader and promises of continuity resonated with a significant portion of the electorate. Putin’s victory with over 87 per cent of the vote, was facilitated by the absence of any credible political opposition- potential challengers like Alexei Navalny were either banned, jailed, exiled, or deceased. The voter turnout was high at 77.5 per cent which is surprising for an election with little drama. The election took place in a tightly controlled environment where dissent and criticism of Putin were stifled. Independent media faced restrictions, and public criticism of Putin or his policies was suppressed. Not surprisingly, the results were as expected.

The government invested heavily in propaganda efforts, spending around €1 billion on promoting Putin ahead of the elections. Putin’s campaign included increased media appearances, visits to various locations, and promises of government programmes until at least 2030.

Key Promises made during the election campaign by Vladimir Putin strengthened his domestic legitimacy. Putin pledged to allocate billions of Roubles to modernise schools, improve infrastructure, fight poverty, protect the environment, and boost technology. This included promises to modernise the tax system for fairer treatment of Russian families and provide incentives for economic growth. Emphasising a national unity and stability narrative, Putin positioned himself as a strong leader capable of ensuring continuity and addressing the challenges facing Russia. This message resonated with many voters. Despite concerns about rising prices and economic instability due to the war, Putin highlighted the resilience of the Russian economy in the face of heavy sanctions. The economy’s performance, with an expected growth of 2.6 per cent in 2024, was a significant factor in Putin’s campaign.

INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS

The reactions to President Vladimir Putin’s victory reflected international perspectives on the larger role of Russia in the international arena. Russia’s friends were quick to reiterate their bonds with Mr Putin. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Putin and said he would look forward to working together to further strengthen the time-tested special and privileged strategic partnership between India and Russia. The Chinese President Xi Jinping promised support for Russia’s future achievements, emphasising the importance of China-Russia relations. Leaders from countries like North Korea, Honduras, Nic aragua, and Venezuela, all members of the pro-Russia camp, also joined in the congratulations. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, a staunch ally of Mr Putin, saw the election results as a counter to the West against destabilising Russia.

Western nations responded along equally expected lines. The European Union, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.,

called the election “undemocratic, lacking legitimacy, and characterised by repression and intimidation.” They condemned Russia’s efforts to hold elections in occupied Ukrainian territories.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy denounced Putin as a dictator and called for his trial in The Hague, emphasising the lack of legitimacy in the election. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister highlighted the absence of freedom in the election process, stating that elections without choice cannot be considered legitimate.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg labelled the elections as “neither free nor fair”, especially highlighting the organisation of elections in occupied parts of Georgia and Ukraine. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s spokesperson described Russia as a dictatorship. Former UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron described the entire exercise as a “stark illustration of repression under Putin’s regime”, highlighting the removal of political opponents and control of the media.

THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

A judicious mix of domestic stability, economic reforms, foreign relations strategies, and support for scientific advancement will likely shape Putin’s agenda in his upcoming term as Russia’s President.

Making Russia Great Again: There is no deviation from Putin’s well-known vision to regenerate and resurrect post-Soviet Russia and bring back the nation to the centre stage of global affairs. He reiterated this goal in his post-poll address from Red Square on 18 March 2024, promising a blueprint for economic and social development agenda for the future.

Stability and Order: Putin aims to introduce more stable, predictable, orderly governance, policies, and society.

Economic and Social Reforms: Putin is likely to address prevalent corruption and the excessive influence of oligarchs while maintaining privatisation and economic stability. However, the extent of reforms in economic structure remains uncertain.

Foreign Policy: While pursuing Russian national interests, Putin is not expected to seek hegemony over former Soviet republics. His foreign policy approach is likely to balance national interests with international rela-

Support for Science: Despite challenges faced by Russian science due to global isolation, Putin promised support for research initiatives domestically. Efforts to revitalise Russian research and bring it back into the international fold are crucial for the future of science and technology in Russia.

Democratic Processes: While emphasising stability, Putin is not inclined towards a return to the Soviet system. However, there are concerns that some democratic processes may be compromised to maintain order and policy execution.

POSSIBLE CHALLENGES

Domestic Opposition and Unrest: Putin faces challenges from domestic opposition despite his easy victory in the polls. The death of Alexei Navalny and the crackdown on dissent indicate ongoing challenges in managing internal opposition.

The prolonged one-person rule with false pride and ideology will likely persist and pose challenges to Putin’s long-term governance, with the future vision for Russia still being blurred. The aftermath of the war in Ukraine has led to a significant brain drain in Russia. Emigration trends among young and educated individuals leaving for opportunities abroad could weaken Russia’s growth potential in the long term.

International Relations: Putin’s actions post-election will influence Russia’s standing in the international community. Key challenges include managing relationships with Western countries, testing NATO’s resolve, and potential escalations in neighbouring regions like Moldova.

War in Ukraine: The conflict in Ukraine remains a significant challenge for Putin. Public fatigue with the war, concerns over the cost of lives and resources, and the need for a peace agreement pose ongoing challenges. Russia also faces demographic decline, with a falling fertility rate.

Putin’s pro-war mobilisation efforts and emphasis on traditional values are shaping domestic narratives and fostering a sense of unity around the war effort. This internal mobilisation will have implications for Russia’s domestic stability and external relations.

Economic Sanctions and Resilience: Putin’s ability to navigate Western sanctions and maintain economic stability is crucial. The impact of sanctions and economic resilience presents a challenge for his administration. It is widely believed that the sanctions are hurting the West far more than Russia, owing to the huge oil reserves and the earnings thereof, despite the G7 price cap. The inflation of over 7.5 per cent appears to be manageable.

Government Stability and Reforms: Questions arise about potential government shake-ups, policy changes, and the need for reforms post-election. Putin’s ability to address internal governance issues and implement necessary changes will be a critical challenge.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Putin’s 5th term is expected to lead to a continuation of aggressive foreign policies, deeper divides in the

West through disinformation and propaganda, and repression against opposition. This could further strain relations between Russia and Western nations.

The Western concern is about Putin’s ability to tilt the global strategic balance towards cementing the multipolar world order of the 21st century. Putin’s victory is seen as leading to the consolidation of Russian society with a victory in the Ukraine war as a plausible reality. Putin’s victory will have implications for the U.S. foreign policy and NATO expansion, in turn shaping international perceptions of Russia’s political landscape and influencing diplomatic relations.

Putin’s emphasis on traditional values and the export of “Putinism” may lead to increased tensions with the West. The impact of Putin’s policies on the Russian economy, including sanctions and defence spending, could have broader geopolitical implications. The reorientation of the economy towards defence spending at the expense of living standards may affect Russia’s economic relationships with other countries.

The election outcome, characterised by limited opposition, a controlled environment, and allegations of electoral irregularities, raised concerns about the state of democracy and human rights in Russia. The increased scrutiny and diplomatic tensions with countries advocating for democratic values will persist.

Putin’s victory is likely to solidify existing alliances with countries like China, India and those in the Global South, reinforcing the message of his firm control over Russian politics. The breakdown of collaborations with Western countries has prompted Russia to seek closer partnerships with India and China. This shift in alliances could reshape geopolitical dynamics and influence future global partnerships.

Assessment

Russia was adrift in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Putin has consolidated the Russian spirit. Putin will vigorously pursue his goal of resurrecting and regenerating Russia, albeit with numerous challenges, even at the cost of continuing to challenge the West led by the U.S.

Time and again, Mr Putin has flashed the nuclear card. As the NATO forces inch closer to Russian borders, Putin’s unease could compel him to react violently – increasing the risk for the West.

Domestically, by all measures, Mr Putin seems to be firmly in the saddle with little political opposition to unseat him, at least for the next five years. However, Russia is well known for the unexpected Byzantine ‘palace coups’, which can never be discounted. While the challenge from the Wagner’s Group was swiftly and adroitly handled, there is always a simmering opposition under Russia’s seemingly placid political surface.

Vladimir Putin’s coming to power in 2000 was a sign of hope and relief for Russia. After a decade of domestic socio-economic turbulence and international humiliation the country saw an energetic and ambitious leader. At the time Putin’s idea “to make Russia great again” was based on two pillars: putting thigs in check at home – of prime importance in this regard were fixing a broke economy and eradicating the terrorist threat in the Caucasus – and seeking a mutually beneficial relationship with the West.

In April 2000, a month before his inauguration, Vladimir Putin paid his first big international visit to the U.K. in an effort to convert the British from being a part of virtually every major problem Russia had to face at the time to a part of a solution.

Putin made another West-friendly gesture in 2001: following the 9/11 atrocities Putin appeared to be the first international leader to call then president George W. Bush to express condolences and offer Moscow’s support for U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan.

America embraced the opportunity only to announce few months later that it would withdraw from the ABM treaty which was a cornerstone of the Cold War arms control politics. From there on the U.S.-Russia disagreements would keep piling up: from the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to the fomenting of “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine.

President Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007 marked an ending to the era of Russia’s pursuit for peer-like relations with the West of 1990s – early 2000s. The Russian warning

about the dangers of the unipolar world fell on deaf ears which ultimately peaked in the five-day war in South Ossetia in August of 2008.

A year later, the fresh faces in politics – President Obama and President Medvedev – made an effort at the “reset policy” which initially focused on Russia’s further economic integration with the West and left the thorny issues of the post-Soviet politics outside the equation.

That policy, however, would instead crash against the wall of Middle Eastern politics of the Arab Spring. Inspiration for a democratic change across the Middle East would soon give place to desperation over inability to reach it through violent means. As ISIS was mounting its empire of death, fear and opportunism became the dominant driver of international politics.

Western military intervention in Libya in 2011 and support for the domestic protest activity in Russia ended the short-lived honeymoon between Moscow and Washington and prompted Putin’s return to the third presidential term.

The developments didn’t change Putin’s grand idea of finding a modus operandi with the U.S. Following the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the formation of the Joint Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, a collaborative Russia-U.S. mechanism to deal with the crisis, was a sign of the ability of both parties to work constructively with one another.

Yet Putin’s intent to build on it and forge an anti-ISIS coalition, the proposal he announced at the UNGA in September 2015, turned out to be unaccept-

able with the U.S. and its allies who deemed the fall of the Assad presidency as a short cut to the geopolitical success in the region. Russia’s military campaign in Syria eventually turned the page on the aspirations for a reset with the West of 2010s.

By the time Ukraine had been lingering in the background. What started as a peaceful protest for Ukraine’s return to the association agreement with the E.U. turned into violent civil clashes throughout Kiev and some other major cities of the country.

Coupled with back-stage diplomacy of Western leaders it essentially led to the ousting of President Yanukovich which to this day Moscow continues to qualify as a “West-supported coup” and continues to see the roots of the current crisis in Ukraine in that very act.

The nine-year hostilities in Donbass that predated what President Putin pronounced as the “Special Military Operation” are therefore seen as a failure of the Ukraine authorities to deliver on its commitments of the Minsk Agreements and the West’s deliberate policy of subverting the agreements by enhancing militarization of Ukraine and flaming anti-Russian nationalism in the country.

The Trump presidency didn’t make things any better as some in Moscow hoped and many in Washington feared. In fact, it put the state of the conflict on a trajectory which ultimately ended the U.S.-Russia on again-off again mode that framed the relations in the post-bipolar era.

The final breath of that policy came with the Putin-Biden summit in June of 2021 and the prolongation of the New START treaty (which would later be suspended).

The Ukraine crisis may not necessarily be a final chapter in the decade long Russia-West showdown but is definitely a major one.

It followed the same pattern as previous crises: countless attempts for diplomatic solutions turned sour, while Putin’s ideas for a political framework peppered by Russia’s signaling and deterrence would ultimately get rejected and prompt a war.

Ukraine. With a serious amendment that Ukraine has a much deeper emotional, cultural, historic, geopolitical and socio-political element than anything that Russia and the West sparred over before.

Against this crisis the contemporary world sees a third major attempt at establishing of a new world order. The post-World War II order that lasted for about half a century was dictated by the winners of the war and shaped around the bipolar confrontation.

The world of the post-bipolar order which lasted for some thirty years was made possible because of the dissolution of one of the poles – the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc – and the dominance of the other.

The parties in the present-day confrontation seem to want to use it to return each to the moment of their highest global influence: for Russia it is the times of the first iteration of the world order of the end of WWII, for the West – late 1980s – mid 1990s.

To do this, Russia needs to negate the outcome of the Cold War where the West enjoyed the unchallenged omnipotence – hence the idea of multipolarity as an anthesis to U.S. hegemony – while the West seeks to correct the outcome of World War II and declass Russia as a global power.

Both sides are probably aware that neither is possible in its entirety in the modern-day world. But it doesn’t mean they won’t give their respective endeavor its full try.

In this respect, President Putin seeks to operate not as an ordinary politician but someone with a self-sense of a historic leader: he sees his new presidential term as a chance to establish a legacy that would leave country strong and sovereign for decades to come.

The West is doing its best to prove him the opposite. All of this is bad news for the rest of the world as the space for neutrality in international politics is shrinking dramatically – information warfare and secondary sanctions seek to eradicate the very idea that one can be “above the fray”.

At the same time there’s now, perhaps, a historic opportunity for emerging powers to promote a different set of organizing principles for the international system.

It won’t be painless and will take a long time. But this is much needed as the current ones have led the world to the dead end.

DR. MAXIM A. SUCHKOV

Director of the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO-University.

AI’S ECONOMICS ANALYSED

AI ventures into the diverse field of economics, raising concerns about this convergence of technology and economics.

ASuchitra Padmanabhan is the Policy Research Associate at Synergia Foundation and has Post Graduate Degree in Social Policy & Planning from the London School of Economics.

rtificial Intelligence (AI) is reshaping business operations and, in the process, revolutionising the economy. With the ability to swiftly analyse immense data sets, detect patterns, and forecast future trends with precision, AI profoundly influences economic dynamics. This transformative power not only generates fresh avenues for employment but also enhances productivity levels across industries.

Several countries are already leveraging AI. China’s technological prowess rivals only America’s, thanks to its tech expertise and the financial muscle of its internet giants.

CHANGING FACE OF BUSINESSES

In a rapidly transforming global order, AI has become the change maker, yielding multiple benefits across a broad spectrum covering productivity, process, and end-user benefits. As a starting point, AI has the capacity to automate repetitive tasks and streamline business operations, thereby boosting productivity and efficiency. For instance, it can optimise inventory management, curb waste, and enhance profitability.

In order to facilitate better decision-making, AI can sift through extensive data sets, furnishing valuable in-

As AI becomes more entrenched in the economy, its impact on various sectors must be assessed. For example, in finance, AI adoption can bolster fraud detection, improve financial forecast accuracy, and promote economic stability. In healthcare, AI can enhance medical diagnosis precision, decrease healthcare expenses, and enhance patient outcomes, positively influencing the overall economy.

sights that empower businesses to swiftly make well-informed decisions.

AI can deliver improved customer experience by personalising the shopping experience for customers by analysing their preferences and suggesting products accordingly. This can increase customer satisfaction and loyalty, increasing business revenue.

AI can also reduce costs in various industries, such as healthcare, by automating tasks and reducing errors. For example, AI can assist in drug discovery, accelerating the process and reducing costs.

When assessing artificial intelligence through an economic lens, we inquire about its impact on cost reduction, much like any other technological advancement. AI can be viewed as driving down the cost of a

fundamental input crucial to numerous business and daily life activities: prediction.

To comprehend the profound transformations that occur when technology slashes the cost of a valuable input, we can examine the example of another innovation: semiconductors. Semiconductors decreased the cost of arithmetic, triggering three significant outcomes. Firstly, there was a surge in the utilisation of arithmetic for tasks that already relied on it as an input. Initially, this primarily encompassed government and military applications in the 1960s.

Subsequently, we expanded the use of arithmetic for functions such as demand forecasting because it became more accessible and economical. Secondly, the reduced cost of arithmetic led to its application in solving problems not conventionally framed as arithmetic issues. For instance, we traditionally addressed the creation of photographic images using chemistry (filmbased photography).

However, as arithmetic became more affordable, we began employing arithmetic-based solutions in camera design and image reproduction (digital cameras). Thirdly, the decline in the cost of arithmetic altered the value of other components—the value of arithmetic’s complements increased while that of its substitutes diminished.

In the realm of photography, the complements were the software and hardware utilised in digital cameras, whose value surged due to increased usage. Conversely, substitutes’ value, such as film-based cameras’ components, dwindled as their usage declined.

As the cost of prediction continues to drop, we will use more of it for traditional prediction problems such as inventory management because we can predict faster, cheaper, and better. At the same time, we’ll start using prediction to solve problems that we have not considered prediction problems historically.

As AI becomes more entrenched in the economy, its impact on various sectors must be assessed. For example, in finance, AI adoption can bolster fraud detection,

improve financial forecast accuracy, and promote economic stability. In healthcare, AI can enhance medical diagnosis precision, decrease healthcare expenses, and enhance patient outcomes, positively influencing the overall economy.

AI IN ECONOMICS

Economists already leverage machine learning, a subset of AI, for data analysis and economic projections. However, genAI, which underpins tools like ChatGPT, is a distinct technology that is advancing rapidly. Anton Korinek of the University of Virginia anticipates its transformative impact on research, enabling better and more productive solutions to societal economic challenges.

Beyond research, genAI aids in teaching economics and forecasting inflation, likely empowering economists rather than displacing their jobs—at least in the near term. Korinek’s paper highlights how large language models, a type of genAI, can aid economists in various research tasks, including ideation, writing, data analysis, coding, and mathematical derivations.

GenAI tools commonly include ChatGPT, New Bing, Bard, Claude 2, and LlaMA 2. These tools assist in brainstorming research ideas, copy editing, summarising text, and even coding tasks. While genAI enhances productivity, its mathematical capabilities are still developing, occasionally producing inaccurate information.

Regarding forecasting, a recent working paper indicates that genAI, exemplified by Google’s PaLM, outperforms traditional economists in predicting inflation. This suggests that large language models may offer a cost-effective and accurate alternative for inflation forecasting compared to conventional methods.

As for its impact on employment, while genAI initially enhances economists’ productivity, it may eventually lead to job losses, particularly in fields like software development. Svenja Gudell, Indeed’s chief economist, acknowledges that while genAI could create better jobs, transitioning to this state might be turbulent.

Ultimately, economists will still require a human touch, especially in teaching and public presentations, despite the integration of genAI into their workflows.

AI STRATEGY AND BUSINESS MODELS

The shift of AI from decision-making to prediction has the potential to reshape business strategies. For example, consider Amazon’s shift from “shopping-then-shipping” to “shipping-then-shopping” if AI accurately predicts consumer purchases. This transformation, driven by AI’s higher prediction accuracy, underscores an unprecedented convergence of technology and economics, shaping global economies profoundly. There are some key areas in which AI can reshape business models and economics.

Data-Driven Decision Making: Data-driven decision-making in economics leverages advanced analytics and AI algorithms to extract insights from vast datasets, enhancing precision and effectiveness in economic strategies.

Predictive Analytics: Predictive analytics utilises machine learning algorithms to forecast future outcomes based on historical data, finding applications across industries such as finance, healthcare, and marketing.

Financial Modelling and Algorithmic Trading: AI streamlines financial modelling and enables algorithmic trading, providing nuanced market insights and maximising returns through automated trade execution.

Automation of Routine Tasks: AI-driven automation enhances efficiency by handling routine tasks with unmatched precision, though it necessitates workforce upskilling to address job displacement concerns.

Enhanced Resource Allocation: Advanced algorithms optimise resource allocation by analysing data

and making informed decisions, ensuring efficient economic distribution.

Personalised Economic Experiences: AI tailors economic offerings to individual preferences and behaviours, revolutionising marketing strategies and financial services to enhance consumer engagement and empowerment.

THE FLIP SIDE

Job Displacement: While AI offers benefits, it’s crucial to acknowledge its potential to replace humans in specific tasks. As AI algorithms advance, they can automate tasks previously handled by humans, such as data entry, customer service, and decision-making processes. Integrating AI into the economy can result in job displacement, particularly in sectors where AI can automate repetitive tasks. AI adoption may lead to job displacement in certain sectors, impacting the labour market and economy. Short-term effects may include increased unemployment and reduced consumer spending. However, long-term benefits may include enhanced productivity, cost reduction, and efficiency, fostering economic growth and generating new job opportunities in emerging fields. The emergence of new roles may necessitate a shift in required skills, increasing demand for creativity, problem-solving, and emotional intelligence.

Bias: AI systems may develop biases if trained on biased data, potentially resulting in discrimination and unequal treatment of individuals.

Data Privacy and Security: AI systems rely on vast data sets to function, raising concerns regarding data privacy and security.

Dependence on Technology: Increasing reliance on AI in the economy may lead to a lack of diversity in decision-making and a higher risk of system failures.

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC

The advent of new technology brings both the promising prospect of enhanced prosperity and the daunting fear of being left behind. Many innovations, like online education courses, have stirred more excitement than tangible economic growth in emerging economies. There is apprehension that generative artificial intelligence (AI) might similarly disappoint the global South, with the primary beneficiaries thus far being Western early adopters and San Francisco startups, alongside America’s leading tech firms, collectively boosting their market value by an astounding $4.6 trillion since ChatGPT’s launch in November 2022.

Nevertheless, AI holds the potential to revolutionise lives in the emerging world as well. As its reach expands, this technology could elevate productivity and narrow human capital gaps at a pace previously unseen. Developing nations need not merely receive AI passively but can actively shape it to align with their requirements. Most significantly, it could help bridge income disparities between developing and affluent nations.

The potential of AI in developing countries is enticing. Like in the West, it will serve as a versatile tool for consumers and workers, facilitating easier access to and interpretation of information. While some jobs may be displaced, new opportunities will arise. Due to fewer white-collar workers in emerging economies, the disruption and gains for existing firms may be less pronounced than in the West. According to the IMF, a smaller proportion (a fifth to a quarter) of workers in these nations face the risk of replacement, compared to about a third in wealthy countries.

However, one of AI’s potentially transformative benefits lies in improving and expanding public services. Developing economies have long grappled with a shortage of educated, healthy workers. For instance, primary school teachers in India contend with twice as many pupils as their American counterparts without adequate resources. Similarly, Africa needs more doctors, especially well-trained ones. Consequently, many children grow up inadequately educated and in poor health, unable to realise their potential in an increasingly competitive global job market.

Policymakers and entrepreneurs worldwide are exploring how AI can address these challenges. In India, for example, large language models are combined with speech recognition software to assist illiterate farmers in applying for government loans. Meanwhile, Kenyan students will soon be able to ask chatbots questions about their homework, with the chatbots refining and enhancing lessons based on feedback.

In Brazil, researchers are testing medical AI systems to aid undertrained primary care workers inpatient treatment. By leveraging medical data globally, AI could enhance diagnostic accuracy. If AI can make people in poorer countries healthier and better educated, it could eventually facilitate catching up with the developed world.

Furthermore, AI can be customised to suit local requirements. Few indications exist that AI is subject to winner-takes-all effects, which benefited American social media and internet search firms. This suggests that a variety of approaches could thrive. In India, some developers are already adapting Western models with local data to provide efficient language translation services, circumventing the hefty capital costs of model creation.

Another emerging concept gaining traction in the West is the development of smaller, more affordable models tailored to specific needs. Rather than aiming to process all available information, these models focus on a narrower set of capabilities. For instance, a medical AI wouldn’t need to generate whimsical limericks like ChatGPT, but it could require computing power and specialised data sets to adapt AI in diverse and practical ways.

India’s outsourcing industry might face disruption as generative AI assumes some back-office tasks, yet it boasts a thriving startup ecosystem, millions of tech developers, and a government eager to enhance its digital infrastructure using AI. Countries in the Gulf, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, are determined to cultivate an AI industry as they transition from oil dependency. With existing capital and talent imports, they’re well-positioned for innovation and adaptation.

Each country will shape AI according to its unique needs and priorities. Chinese chatbots, for instance, steer clear of discussing sensitive topics like Xi Jinping, while Indian developers concentrate on breaking language barriers. Meanwhile, the Gulf region is constructing Arabic language models. While the global South may not displace America’s leadership in AI, it stands to gain substantially from this wealth of expertise.

Assessment

The influence of AI on the economy is nuanced, encompassing various aspects. While there’s potential for AI to displace human workers in certain sectors, it can also enhance productivity, lower expenses, and improve efficiency, thereby fostering economic expansion and generating fresh employment prospects.

As AI advances, its influence on the future of economics grows, presenting fresh frontiers and opportunities. Guiding this transformative journey with ethical considerations ensures AI’s responsible application for societal welfare.

As AI develops, public policy has a clearly defined role. Such a big structural change would necessitate a strong government role to enable policy so that the benefits are well dispersed across society.

SEEKING GREEN ENERGY SECURITY

To make its goal of green energy security a reality, India must accelerate the domestic manufacturing of its essential sub-systems.

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

RESEARCH TEAM

The U.S. Trade Administration, in a web article, very succinctly defined the vast canvas of India’s energy scene. It says that India is the third-largest consumer of energy in the world, the third-largest consumer and fourth-largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and the world’s third-largest net importer of crude oil and petroleum products.

According to the Indian Ministry of Power, the country’s peak demand reached a record high of 223 gigawatts (GW) in June 2023, a rise of 3.4 per cent from the highest level in 2022, and consumption is projected to continue rising. Over the past decade, India has achieved an installed capacity exceeding 400 GW, supported by industrial growth, urbanisation, government policies, and favourable geopolitics. The Indian power sector employs a wide range of fuel sources, including traditional sources such as coal, oil, and gas, alongside environmentally sustainable sources such as solar, wind, biomass, industrial waste, and both large and small hydro plants. With a population of approximately 1.4 billion and one of the world’s fastest major growing economies, India’s energy demand matches pace.

However, all this growth has come with a price for carbon emissions. As per Statista, India has seen its share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions rise to more than seven per cent, making it the world’s third-largest GHG polluter, behind the United States

India recognises that global efforts to control GHG are doomed to fail without its participation. Therefore, it was welcomed globally when the Prime Minister announced the “Panchamrit”, the five-point agenda to fight global change at the 2021 COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow.

and China. Nevertheless, India has the lowest per capita emissions in the G20, at just 1.9 tCO₂ per person, or roughly an eighth of what the average American emits yearly. Its contribution to historical cumulative CO₂ emissions is also far lower than that of other major polluters, at just three per cent. At the current rates, conservative estimates suggest that India’s emissions will reach between 0.56 and 1.0 billion tons of CO2 by 2070.

IS INDIAN OIL SECURE?

The question arises of whether such a transformational change to its energy policy is optional or if India has little choice. Faced with the daunting possibility of a severe crunch in its fossil energy supplies, India must seek alternative sources.

The signs are clear that the energy market will be tightly calibrated by oil producers who would like to milk it to its maximum until the bottom finally falls off the fossil fuel market. The formation of the OPEC Plus and shifting global dynamic currents reflect on energy

demand and supply. The price fluctuations play havoc with carefully crafted domestic budgets. While oil may be the most popular news item, traditional formats such as coal and natural gas are also not immune to market forces.

We have seen that despite all talks of strategic oil reserves and growth of renewables, recent supply disruptions like the Ukraine war and the Gaza have had detrimental effects on the economy, globally and nationally, impacting the lives of individuals.

With the world’s oil consumption hitting record highs, calls for a green transition in economies through renewable energy sources are gathering pace. While dependence on mainstream energy sources is predicted to decline, oil demand is estimated to peak before the end of the decade.

India has successfully negotiated unstable oil markets by carefully regulating oil imports and investing in the refining industry. Geopolitical instability has sometimes favoured India, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This has allowed India to overcome a lack of strategic oil storage availability.

India has built a sizable oil industry through strategic planning and investments in the refining sector despite the country’s small oil reserves. With 5.33 million metric tonnes of strategic petroleum reserves, the nation can meet its net oil import needs for 9.5 days. As the 23rd Standing Committee Report recommends, India is looking into other options to increase its strategic petroleum reserves, such as constructing modest, ground-level storage tanks at state-run refineries.

INDIA’S GREEN ENERGY TRAJECTORY

India recognises that global efforts to control GHG are doomed to fail without its participation. Therefore, it was welcomed globally when the Prime Minister an-

nounced the “Panchamrit”, the five-point agenda to fight global change at the 2021 COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow. The five ‘nectar’ elements presented by the Indian government included:

• Increasing non-fossil fuel capacity by 500GW by 2030.

• Fifty per cent of its energy requirements will come from renewable energy by 2030.

• The total projected carbon emissions will be reduced by one billion tonnes from now to 2030.

• Reduction of the carbon intensity of the economy by 45 per cent by 2030, over 2005 levels.

• Achieving the target of net zero emissions by 2070.

However, this necessitates the comprehensive development of numerous technologies in India’s Energy basket. Coal is expected to remain the primary fuel source of the energy sector for the next two decades. Therefore, achieving net zero by 2070 will require significant nuclear power and large-scale renewable energy production; decarbonisation will become paramount well before 2070.

India cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that energy security for the nation is essential, particularly affordability for its masses. However, there is a silver lining, too—by lowering reliance on fossil fuels, the green transition is anticipated to have a net beneficial impact on energy security. India is projected to become dependent on imports for 41 per cent of gas, 84 per cent of oil, 60 per cent of coal, and 55 per cent of its energy supply by 2047, posing geopolitical risks.

India is focusing on sustainable development through green energy systems. The primary mechanism includes solar, green hydrogen, and windmill repowering to gain net zero emissions by 2070. However, the crux lies in boosting domestic manufacturing capacity, education, and technical assistance. The country encourages manufacturing by enforcing solar rooftop regulations and decentralising power generation. Clean, green energy may be realised with the help of ProClime, the largest private climate initiative in India.

The transition will not come cheap, and if the developed world wants India to succeed in its Panchamrit strategy, it must loosen its purse strings to help India achieve it. Even if Western governments set aside $100 billion a year to aid disadvantaged nations, their budgetary constraints keep them from supporting climate transitions. On its part, the Reserve Bank of India has advised setting aside 2.5 per cent of the GDP annually to renewable energy projects.

The solution lies in using public-private partnerships and blended finance and creating local supply chains for renewable energy sources like solar power and green hydrogen. This will help fill funding gaps and reduce dependency on borrowed finances from international investors/ donors. India might become a green superpower if it implements a comprehensive climate plan, uses renewable energy sources, and maximises access to affordable capital for green energy projects.

India has tried sincerely to implement the principles it has laid down for itself in Panchamrit. Some practical steps taken include electrifying our vast railway network and phasing out diesel locomotives, the International Solar Alliance, and a massive pan-India LED bulb campaign that has reduced emissions by over 40 million tons annually.

ENABLERS OF DECARBONIZATION

Coal remains a primary fuel, accounting for more than 40 per cent of energy-related emissions, despite renewable energy’s significant growth in India’s power industry. Accelerating renewal bids, guaranteeing

quicker site allocation and clearance, and boosting India’s national manufacturing capacity will aid India’s green transition. The government might lift trade restrictions until a domestic supply chain is in place. For India’s net-zero goals to be achieved, India might have to import more hydropower from Bhutan and Nepal.

India’s green transition relies primarily on industrial decarbonisation if we have to 30 per cent of energy-related emissions. Steel, cement, aluminium, and fertiliser are major contributors to these emissions. Different strategies are available for each sector, depending on scalability, economics, and technical viability.

There is a 10-15 per cent reduction potential in energy efficiency measures. Companies are shifting to renewable energy for sustainability and cost advantages. Green Hydrogen has found its purpose in multiple industries such as fertilisers, refining steel production, and transport. India’s manufacturing sector contributes 27 per cent of value addition and employment, but 74 per cent of emissions.

Policy initiatives must highlight electricity cost reductions, developing ecosystems, and adoption of innovative funding.

IS NUCLEAR A GREEN OPTION?

If India intends to achieve 200 per cent electrification to reduce carbon emissions, nuclear-powered electricity generation may have to take the lead in its energy mix. Studies reflect that the contribution of nuclear power to climate change is very limited, avoiding only 2-3% of global greenhouse gases. However, Chornobyl and Fukushima have their own stories to tell! Nuclear power is viable only when more energy is produced than is required for mining and enrichment. Public opinion does not favour or support nuclear power development in India; however, increasing grid outages coupled with awareness might boost support.

France’s extensive dependence on nuclear power plants would be a successful case study to replicate in India but toned down to Indian conditions.

ESSENTIALS OF A GREEN ENERGY STRATEGY

Several factors contribute to India’s green energy security-economic growth, accessibility, availability, affordability, and supply and demand. A multi-dimensional strategic green energy security approach will avoid India’s dependence on coal and environmental concerns.

Integrated Approach: India’s state-dominated planning will ensure that the state has its best interest in mind while considering effective green energy strategies. The current five-year plans have not yielded the best results. A clear vision and division of labour will ensure India’s improved green energy management approach.

Altering Energy Mix: Hydrocarbons with private investments, overseas assets, oil diplomacy, and transnational pipeline projects must be prioritised. Natural gas should certainly be preferred, and a differentiated sourcing plan should be implemented.

Self-Sufficiency: The Indian political discourse on self-sufficiency could be applied to the oil industry. Green energy independence is vital for a secure Indian future. A breakthrough in solar and nuclear energy, along with foreign participation, will lead to self-sufficiency.

Restructuring, Rationalisation, and Reform: A restructured and liberalised energy structure is paramount. The private sector should consider greater investments. Privatising public ventures and undertakings like ports and pipelines to access capital, technology, and skills could be a start.

‘ATMANIRBHAR’

IN GREEN ENERGY

Building on battery storage capacity and improving local manufacturing is vital for India to develop its renewable green energy security.

Manufacturing industries provide high-wage jobs to skilled and unskilled workers, further enabling economic growth.

This growth is required in the green energy sector, especially to influence more investment. Good policies for manufacturing industries can create jobs that will eventually improve the living standards of many citizens.

Improving local manufacturing can reduce carbon emissions, especially for fossil fuel imports and exports, further allowing for a smooth green energy transition.

Policies that promote domestic manufacturing of solar panels, lithium storage batteries, wind turbines, etc., will contribute to achieving sustainable development despite scepticism from the general public.

Assessment

The initiative needs collaborative efforts from central governments, state governments, industry experts, and key players to implement a swift green energy transition.

The manufacturing industry has to be encouraged through initiatives like the Production Linked Incentive scheme to promote manufacturing and adoption of renewable energy. The government must take measures to enhance India’s manufacturing capabilities and exports, increasing green jobs overall.

India must actively campaign to attract funding from international investors/ donors. Towards this end, the Climate Finance Leadership Initiative launched by India and the United Kingdom to generate more resources for climate and green energy projects is a good template to emulate.

INDIA’S HYDROSPHERE SECURITY

Water security in India needs to be equated with India’s national security discourse.

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RESEARCH TEAM

No continent is spared from the modern Water scarcity crisis. Around 1.2 billion people are living in physical water scarcity, and 1.6 billion are teetering on the edge of a future with little or no water. With the global population expected to bloom to 9.4-10.2 billion by 2050, water requirement is estimated to increase by one per cent yearly, spurred by more mouths to feed and growing industrial development.

As the most populous nation on earth, India faces a serious challenge in ensuring a potable water supply to each of its citizens; by 2030, the demand is likely to outpace the supply by almost 100 per cent!

India, having only four per cent of global water, is well on its way to becoming a water-scarce country housing 18 per cent of the global population.

By 2030, experts predict that 40 per cent of the Indian population will lack access to clean water sources. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that India’s water security is crucial for its national security.

What we see in Bangalore today, a relatively pampered metropolis, with no rains for over 140 days and a shrinking water table, would become the norm for the bulk of the country, barring a few isolated patches blessed with excess water.

An integrated framework can address India’s water security, taking into consideration national energy, health, and multilateral efforts. Securing water and developing innovative technology will equip India to combat water scarcity in the future.

WHY IS INDIA RUNNING DRY?

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), agriculture is both a major cause and a casualty of water scarcity.

Farming accounts for almost 70 per cent of all water withdrawals and up to 95 per cent in some developing countries. The choice of crop greatly impacts the amount of water needed. The table appended below will give an idea.

Extreme urbanisation, industrialisation, inefficient agriculture, excessive groundwater extraction, climate change, poor water management, and inadequate infrastructure have significantly intensified India’s water scarcity.

On top of all this excess demand, there is the additional burden of wastage at a colossal scale—India maxed out its sewage capacity by producing 61,753 million litres of sewage water daily, with around 80 per cent of household water being wasted. 92 per cent of rainwater is wasted as current facilities and infrastructure for water are inadequate in India.

The scarcity is further aggravated by the fact that, like a herd of water-starved African elephants that trample water holes into an undrinkable sludge, Indians feel no guilt in polluting existing water resources, especially through religious rituals on a grand scale. Other factors include oil spills, industrial discharge, atmospheric deposition, mining activities, and much more.

Climate change has contributed to a mean temperature rise of 2.4°C to 4.4°C, deterring monsoons and disrupting freshwater availability and food security. Increased temperatures have also caused the rapid melting of snow caps, affecting soil moisture.

Expanding cities attract real estate mafias who ruthlessly seek out unoccupied land that can be converted into lucrative housing estates. Bangalore is a sad example of this.

Writes Dipanker Khasnabish, Founder of the School of Governance Management, “While IT/ ITeS parks like Bagmane and Ecospace had their fair share of violations, the real encroachments of lakes and connecting drains (Raj Kaluves) started in the late 1990s/ early 2000s. Buoyed by higher personal disposable incomes and an outlook of ever-increasing compensation, people started buying dwellings much beyond their present earnings, and demand exploded. And so do the violations. As a result, the entire water storage and flow ecosystem was destroyed.”

Coal-based thermal energy conversion is a highly water-intensive industry, and India is heavily reliant on it. Water is required in large volumes for washing

Indian coal, containing high amounts of ash, and as a coolant. Economic progress leans on a country’s ability to offer a continued supply of adequate energy at reasonable costs. But this situation puts India in a predicament since conversions from present and indigenous resources become more challenging, widening the gap between the supply and demand of energy. Among the primary causes of this condition is inadequate water supplies, and with such large disparities, economic power and progress are rattled.

India’s annual rainfall, totalling around 4000 billion cubic meters, accounts for less than half of the country’s water resources. Unaccounted water resources are used up through evaporation, evapotranspiration, deep percolation, and sub-surface flows to oceans. 19.25 per cent of India’s land is covered by forests, and two-thirds of cultivated land is rain-fed.

Deep aquifers are included in India’s ‘unaccounted’ water resources. Farmers in Gujarat are using groundwater mining to draw water, causing dysregulation in the hydrosphere. Maintaining a higher hydraulic head at the aquifer-ocean interface is crucial to prevent seawater intrusion.

INDIA’S WATER SECURITY

Water security in India needs to be equated with India’s national security discourse to ensure that the government or administration is not taken by surprise when the crisis hits. An integrated framework can address India’s water security, taking into consideration national energy, health, and multilateral efforts. Securing water and developing innovative technology will equip India to combat water scarcity in the future.

However, the most important approach is to have fresh and innovative thoughts on water security and management essentials, including updating the National Water Policy.

A comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach at all levels is absolute for water security. The convergence of multi-layer stakeholders like governments, academia, experts, the private sector, NGOs and international organisations could formulate a transparent mechanism for strengthening India’s water security systems.

SOME IMMEDIATE MEASURES

Shift from Grey to Green Infrastructure. Traditional human-built infrastructure dominates the current water management approach in India. Shifting from the city’s grey infrastructure to green infrastructure could augment the water supply by capturing and treating runoff water to replenish the depleting groundwater sources in Indian cities.

This approach can potentially reduce pollution by contacting waterbodies through separate sewer systems. Side effects include enhanced water availability, improved water quality, and reduced waterborne diseases and contamination. Green and grey infrastructure could work in tandem, provided the balance between human intervention and natural processes is an organic and appropriate blend. This infrastructure will also require green and grey investments to increase benefits and system efficiency, simultaneously reducing costs and trade-offs.

Reducing Losses: Evaporation, drainage, percolation, and excessive groundwater usage cause significant water loss in India. Increasing irrigation efficacy will greatly aid in water security. Governments and organisations should make city infrastructure conducive to a green approach.

Ensuring underground water tables do not deplete, promoting rainwater harvesting in cities, and reusing treated surface waters could contribute to a holistic shift from grey to green infrastructure, ensuring water security. Chennai prides itself on being the first city to recycle wastewater while simultaneously reducing its freshwater consumption.

Combating over-exploitation of water has been adopted by the World Bank through the Atal Bhujal Yojana, enabling India’s rural population to budget the

water availability and their usage to budget their consumption.

WATER DIPLOMACY

In the west, India is an upper riparian for rivers Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Teesta on the east, while some rivers originating from China, Nepal, or Bhutan classify India as their lower riparian state. Collaboration is important to utilise South Asian countries’ hydro-resources.

The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 oversees the Indo-Pakistani water relations and sharing agreement. India is allocated a very restricted amount of water from these three rivers, with a concession for non-consumptive and agricultural use without exceeding the permissible maximum. The IWT treaty has remained stable, promoting economic prosperity despite conflicts.

The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna megabasin is the world’s second-largest hydraulic region. It is also one of the more densely populated areas. Within this basin, fifty-four rivers separate upstream India from downstream Bangladesh. In addition, the Brahmaputra River flows from the east into Bangladesh. It is worth noting that the Ganges Treaty of 1996, which allows the two countries to share surface waters at the Farakka Barrage, is their only bilateral agreement. India and Bangladesh have been at odds over river water issues.

For example, the Teesta conflict is a significant issue between two countries. According to the interim agreement signed in 2011, India and Bangladesh will receive approximately 42.5 per cent and 37.5 per cent of the water from the Teesta River, respectively. However, West Bengal rejected it.

Conversely, China is the upper riparian, and its unilateral decisions have ripple effects on the lower ripari-

an state’s economic growth. These rivers could also be used as a weapon, causing large-scale damage to India’s water-harvesting infrastructure and economics. Yangtse and Huang He (Yellow River), both major rivers in northern China, have decreased water availability, rippling the crisis. In response, China is attempting to divert water from the Brahmaputra River near the Great Bend in Tibet to help restore water in these starved rivers.

NATIONAL WATER DISTRIBUTION APPROACH

The idea of moving flood waters from the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin to water-starved basins in western and peninsular India has long existed.

The Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin, which comprises 33 per cent of India’s land area, supplies more than 60 per cent of the country’s water. Similarly, catchments of west-flowing rivers cover only 3% of the land area yet account for 11% of water resources. It began in the late nineteenth century when Sir Arthur Cotton devised a scheme to connect rivers in southern India for inland navigation.

The concept was partially executed but abandoned over time as inland navigation lost territory to railways. Dr. K.L. Rao, the then-Union Minister for Irrigation, suggested the Ganga-Cauvery link in 1972, and Captain Dinshaw Dastur invented the word ‘Garland Canal’ in 1977. While his concept was eventually rejected, the catchy phrase captured people’s imagination and continues to be popular.

In 1982, the Government of India (GOI) formed the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) to assess basin-specific surpluses and deficits and look into storage, connectivity, and transfer options. It envisioned two components of a major river-linking plan: Himalayan and Peninsular, with 14 and 16 connections, respectively.

In response to the court order, the government established a (now-defunct) high-powered task force tasked with completing an analysis of how the project will unfold by December 31, 2006, and then completing the project by 2016, which will cost approximately US$120 billion and connect 37 Himalayan and peninsular rivers.

Between 1999 and 2004, an ambitious effort to interlink rivers received new impetus. It focuses mostly on rivers that connect sub-basins within a larger basin or nearby basins rather than distant inter-basin river links.

The National Commission on Integrated Water Resources Development (NCIWRD) envisions India in 2050 by calculating agricultural water use based on four important variables: food production requirement, non-food production requirement, water use efficiency, and land productivity.

The commission anticipates that India will maintain food self-sufficiency and a steady ratio of land under food and non-food production. The commission’s estimates of additional irrigated lands to feed the expanding population serve as a fundamental basis for the National River Linking Project (NRLP 26).

The vision also contains a framework for ‘water future’ research, emphasising the significance of developing alternative policy scenarios and sensitivity studies for India’s water crisis in 2050.

A potential downside of a national water distribution system is the high infrastructure development, maintenance, and operation costs.

Environmental concerns may arise due to interlinking initiatives that change natural river flows and habitats. There may also be difficulties resolving water disputes between states or regions over shared resources.

However, inter-basin water transfers are required to address water scarcity issues in the regions/basins. These transfers are required to improve water efficiency and reduce water waste in water-surplus locations.

Assessment

Without government intervention, the situation is bound to get worse. Subsidies, policies, and implemented programs need to be seriously reassessed with the adoption of efficient technologies. The uncomfortable marriage between politics and legislation interrupts water security in India, reducing the ability for conservation. Decisions need to reflect the cooperation of transboundary waters within and outside India.

Establishing good rapport and relations with India’s neighbours is paramount to ensuring regional water security. Understanding the full potential of water sources and creating sustainable mechanisms to reach the sources is also vital for planned water security in India.

The entire hydrospheric cycle, from rainfall to water percolation into the deep groundwater aquifers, should be considered when strategising for India’s Water Future. A comprehensive accounting of regional and temporal availability of quality and quantities of fresh water for both local and decentralised needs should be developed, owing to changing water cycles. Any further developed systems must achieve harmony between humans, terrestrial ecosystems and the biosphere.

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