GLOBAL FUTURES, MAPPING ASIAN TRAJECTORY AND INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD

GLOBAL FUTURES, MAPPING ASIAN TRAJECTORY AND INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD

SYNERGIA CONCLAVE

2023

Synergia is an independent and strategic think tank whose purpose is to augment decision-making at the policy level, while enriching individual discourse and public dialogue. With fact based insights, the Synergia provides impactful solutions that challenge the status quo, turning risks into opportunities.

Conclave 2023 - Inaugural Ceremony

Lt Gen Hiroe Jiro - Commanding General, TERCOM - Japan

Ambassador P S Raghavan - Chairman - National Security Advisory Board, India

Mr M K Narayanan - Former National Security Advisor, India

Synergia

Mr G Parameshwara - Hon Home Minister of Karnataka

Air Vice Marshal John Finbar Monahan – Director DCDC, MOD, UK

Mr. Tobby Simon, Founder & President - SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

Synergia Conclave 2023

We would like to thank all our sponsors and partners:

PLATINUM SPONSORS

Tata Consultancy services

PARTNER

National Security Advisory Board, Government of India

STATE PARTNER

ITBT, Government of Karnataka

Home Department, Government of Karnataka

Minister for Large & Medium Industries and infastructure Development, Government of Karnataka

SPONSORS

AiShield BHARAT FORGE

ISRO Anant Technologies

L&T Qubix

KEY INSIGHTS

Foreword from Synergia

Tobby Simon, Founder & President, Synergia

Distinguished guests on the dais, friends, ladies and gentlemen.

A very good morning and welcome to Bengaluru

I have immense pleasure in welcoming you all to the 9th Synergia conclave being held in the city from 17th to 19th November 2023. Let me first thank Ambassador P.S. Raghavan, Chairman and members of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) for their extending their support and partnership to the conclave.

I would also like to thank our principal sponsors, Tata Consultancy Services, which for the second time have supported the Synergia Conclave, Bharat Forge, L&T, The Department of IT & BT, the Department of Industries and the Department of Home, and the Government of Karnataka.

As we step into the third decade of the millennium, our future teeters on uncertainty: rapidly melting artic ice, the twin conflicts in Gaza and Europe, the threat of an accidental nuclear war, legal pathogens that can outpace any modern innovation that we do, and heightened digital vulnerabilities paint an obvious portrait of challenges that lie ahead of us.

The Synergia Conclave is the flagship event of the Synergia Foundation, which draws about 250 strategic leaders from all over the world to ideate, validate, suggest intervention tools, and formulate policies to build inclusive societies and improve global governance.

The objective of the conclave has always been to turn spotlight on some of the most pressing problems that the world will face and forge the most appropriate solutions by facilitating nonpartisan dialogue between stakeholders including national security experts, diplomats, technocrats, academicians, media and industry leaders.

Since our genesis in 1989, the focus has been on providing thought leadership on issues that are complex and need in-

terdisciplinary thinking. Our credo has been to look around the curve and outline scenarios and possible outcomes. Thought leadership is vital. We in India must constantly ideate on what the future holds for us and those around us and be able to act on these insights. Else we may find ourselves always behind the curve, catching up, laggards at best, and reacting to events rather than trying to shape it.

We are humbled to submit that in the past two decades, we have made close to 20 predictions and 14 of them have already happened. The most recent one was the epochal. Synergia was the first to speak about the pandemic as a national security threat in the year 2009. We simulated the impact of an avian flu pandemic attack on government, industry and civil society at IIM Bangalore. Eight months later, avian flu hit the world.

We were the first to speak and demonstrate the threats of the deep and the dark web at the Munich Security Conference in 2014. Most people who attended the Synergia 2015 conclave was privy to the session on the dark web.

IN 2018 , we convened several round tables in Bangalore and Delhi inviting senior functionaries s from several department of the Government of India to develop a road map for 5G.

Our nonpartisanship, convening strength, understanding of deep security issues, comprehension of advanced technologies and submission of a timely policy report played a significant role in enabling one of India`s largest companies seated in the room to adopt and deploy a home grown 5G technology in India.

We are constantly challenged, and our focus now is on advanced technologies and its impact on Global Diplomacy and National Security. We believe that advanced technologies will play a crucial role in defining national resilience and helping in creating wealth.

I believe that at the end of the conclave, powered by profound insights, the horizon ahead will emerge with greater clarity and understanding.

I thank you for taking the time to attend and support the Synegria Conclave.

GLOBAL FUTURES 2035

BASELINE DOCUMENT

‘‘The old is dying, and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear”

- Antonio Gramsci

MODERATOR

Major General U Suresh Kumar, YSM, VSM (Retd.)

The year 2035 beckons a future defined by unprecedented challenges and opportunities, urging a collective examination of the forces shaping our global landscape. A comprehensive understanding of the prevailing dynamics and what lies beyond the horizon is paramount for policymakers, businesses and citizens alike.

This baseline document, which is based on previous studies at Synergia Foundation, existing international papers on the subject and synthesised views of subject matter experts during the session on ‘Global Futures 2035’ at the Synergia Conclave 2023 serves as a compass outlining the key elements that will mould the contours of the future.

We have attempted not to fall into the cognitive trap of focussing too much on high-profile events and instead concentrated on long term trends and interdependencies.

As we embark on this exploration, it is crucial to recognise the interconnectivity of various domains of geopolitics, security, economy, energy, environment and technology. We have adopted a cross-domain cum reductionist approach to scan the horizon.

Aim

To identify and analyse key drivers of global change and plausible global scenarios, covering the period up to 2035.

Global Trends

In this era of rapid transformation, a multitude of factors will converge to influence the trajectory of international affairs. From geopolitical shifts to technological breakthroughs, the world is poised at a crossroads. Increasing geopolitical polarisation, power shifts, realignments based on National Interests, widening conflicts, unequal economic growth, growing centrality of digital technologies and a looming environmental crisis has been the dominant trend over the last few years.

Geopolitical Trends: Today, the world is at a stage of transition between an existing world order in decline and the emergence of a new world order. As Antonio Gramsci had averred, the said ‘morbid symptoms of the interregnum’ seem to be playing out around us today making forecasting and understanding of the future even more complex. There has been a pronounced power shift from the Global North to Global South and from developed economies to emerging economies.

There also seems to be an emerging trend of shift in power from state entities to BigTech Corporations. While Globalisation in addition to being securitised is fragmented and Multilateralism is on the wane, there is also a strong global sentiment for the revival and strengthening of these two pillars. International organisations and institutions have been slow in adapting and transforming to meet the emerging global and regional challenges, leading to questions about their relevance and a shift towards alternate groupings. Countries are prioritising National Interests over values and focussing on preserving their strategic autonomy to retain flexibility to make policy decisions in their National Interest. The resultant shifts in issue-based cooperative mechanisms driven by evolving geopolitical interests and regional dynamics is increasingly becoming the norm.

Security Trends: Warfare of the future will continue to address both ends of the spectrum of conflict, as is evident from the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas confrontations. Conflicts are going to be characterised by grey zone, hybrid, information and technological warfare with increasing focus on cyber, space and cognitive domains. While conflicts along traditional fault lines cannot be ruled out, the an increasing

Strategic Advisor, Synergia

competition for influence in the Indo-Pacific region makes it the potential flash point of the future.

Economic Transformation: The global economy will continue to be a crucial driver, with nations closely intertwined through trade, investment, and financial systems. Economic dynamics will be characterised by a delicate balance between interdependence and nationalist impulses.

Global supply chains will face disruptions, prompting a reevaluation of resilience strategies. With all countries prioritising economic growth as their core National Interest, the economic growth differential between countries, especially between USA, China and the emerging economies, will be a decisive factor in the global power shifts. The ascendancy of the digital economy will not only reshape markets but also redefine economic power structures.

Energy Transition: In view of the growing global realisation of the existential threat posed by fossil fuels, the transition to renewable energy sources is a given. This will challenge traditional energy geopolitics, and nations will vie for control over strategic resources, vital for production of renewable technologies. Simultaneously, ensuring smooth transition without adversely impacting the economic growth of countries will be critical for stability in the short and mid-term.

Technological Innovations: The relentless march of technology in the domains of Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, blockchain technology, metaverse, synthetic biology and aerospace will usher in a new era. Strategic competition in the development and application of artificial intelligence and quantum computing, ethical and geopolitical implications of rapid advancements in biotechnology, the politics of data governance and control impacting national sovereignty, and global debates on privacy and data protection are some dominant narratives.

Continuities: The following continuities in global trends are clearly established and can be taken as the starting point for

analysis:-

Demographic Shifts: Population dynamics, including aging populations in some regions and youth bulges in others, will influence economic productivity, social stability, resource availability, and migration patterns, contributing to geopolitical shifts.

Climate Change: The consequences of climate change persist, with rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and resource scarcity becoming more pronounced. These environmental challenges will amplify existing geopolitical tensions or force the world to unite to meet the existential threats.

Key Drivers of Global Change

Having analysed the dominant and emerging trends, Synergia believes that the future will be largely driven by the global quest for power, fear of common threats and the realisation of the potential of technological innovations. Having studied the cross-domain relationships and clubbed together the interrelated trends the distilled key drivers of change that will shape the future in 2035 are as follows:-

Diffusion of Power: There is clearly an irreversible trend of increasing diffusion of power, which has been enabled by a combination of demographic dynamics, economic growth differential and globalisation. The future will be decided by how the West responds to the loss of power and how the emerging powers assume and execute global responsibility. This has clearly established a future road map to transition from a unipolar to bipolar a multipolar world order. If we go back to the first principles, it will be about the tension between decentralisation of the emerging order and recentralisation of the old order and how much the global south will be incorporated as a partner in global decision making.

Global Challenges: There is a growing realisation of the need for a holistic global approach to address the common existential threats of climate change, widening conflicts, technology disruptions, diseases and financial crises. The global consensus in addressing environmental degradation and preventing conflict escalation, which is evident in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflict, validates this trend. However, the future is going to see intense contestation in three critical areas: gaining influence in the Indo-Pacific, leveraging resources for alternate energy, and in the domain of technology.

Tech Innovations: The relentless pace, digital interconnectedness, and convergence of technological developments and increasing centrality of technology as a measure of power is changing geopolitical dynamics. Technological innovation is the solution to addressing most of the world’s challenges and it has the potential to transcend the space and time constraints that circumscribe the future. The global ‘will’ to harness this force-multiplier constructively and collectively

rather than using it to compete against each other will, in many ways, decide our future trajectory.

Alternate Plausible Scenarios

Based on the key drivers of change, the following are the possible global scenarios of the future:-

The Eagle Soars Again: This Scenario envisages a return to the unipolar world with the resurgence of the USA along with its democratic allies and a decline of China and Russia. This is characterised by an economic revival and explosion of technological innovations in these conducive open societies of USA, Europe and its democratic allies.

Simultaneously, China faces overwhelming headwinds due to its economic decline, the pandemic, and the resultant breach of social contract with its people, leading to social unrest and political disunity.

It also leads to inconsistency and aggressiveness in its relationship with other countries. Russia is drained out by the stalemate of the Ukraine war and the consequent political instability.

Technological Cold War: A scenario where the world moves towards a bipolar contestation in which a technological Cold War takes centre stage, with major powers engaging in intense competition for dominance in emerging technologies. This could lead to the fragmentation of the global technological landscape, posing challenges to cooperation and standardisation. Simultaneously, the military jostling for power in the Indo-Pacific intensifies, sparking fears of a flashpoint.

The Great Divide: This scenario envisages the rapid rise of China and Russia while the USA is slowed down by its internal politics and fortress mentality. This preoccupation reduces its focus on world affairs, facilitating China’s creation of an alternate economic and technological ecosystem through its BRI, GSI, GDI, GCI, and Standards 2035 initiatives. China strengthens its hold over the Indo-Pacific region by integrating Taiwan and leveraging its Economic heft. The world is segregated into two silos with impermeable ecosystems leading to a fragmented approach to addressing the common threats.

Multipolar Equilibrium: In this scenario, power is distributed among multiple major players, including the Global South and multilateralism takes centre stage. This could foster a

more balanced and collaborative international system, albeit with its own set of challenges in managing diverse interests. It would also envision a renaissance in global governance, marked by effective international cooperation to address shared challenges.

United Response to Crisis: This depicts a world that, after facing a grave existential environmental crisis, discards its differences and comes together to face common challenges and threats.

This would include transformation to more representative global and regional institutions, a cooperative approach in leveraging technological innovations, ensuring equitable economic growth and focusing on sustainable development.

Key Takeaways

India’s core strategy will address the common elements of all scenarios, its basic strategy will be aligned to the preferred scenario, and its contingency strategy needs to address the other alternate scenarios. From amongst the array of possible futures, it is quite clear that the most preferred scenario for India is ‘United Response to Crisis’.

We need to look at how we can backcast this scenario and take steps towards achieving the preferred scenario while monitoring the global shift towards any other alternate scenarios to facilitate agility in adopting the relevant contingency strategy.

The world order is in the transition process, and the future, in many ways, will depend on the path the world charts out for itself today. It is also quite evident that Asia and the Global

South will spearhead the changes of tomorrow. It is therefore important for India to increase its focus on building relationships in Asia, improving connectivity & trust in its neighbourhood and championing the cause of the Global South.

In this rapidly transforming world the key to our success is going to be ‘Diplomatic Agility and Internal Resilience’. In the short term we need to continue to focus on our economic development and national interests with a view to building our ‘National Power’. We need to leverage opportunities through a flexible foreign policy for which we need to preserve an optimal amount of strategic autonomy.

India’s macroeconomic success is going to depend on its ability to change its traditional uneven growth into a high and stable one, its ability to leverage its window of demographic dividend and its ability to ensure equitable growth for its population.

To have the required gravitas to be at the high table, it will need to have a sustained GDP growth rate of above 6.5% till 2035 and also have to find innovative ways to leapfrog over conventionally established models of economic growth.

We also need to focus on health, education, skill development and employment generation for the population. This tailor-made approach to sustainable economic developement that India follows could also provide the guardrails for the trajectory of the Global South.

In view of the key role of technology, India needs to craft a National Technology Strategy that identifies technological gaps to be addressed indigenously, and those who need foreign collaboration.

It is also mandatory to synergise the efforts of academia, R&D organisations, users, and manufacturers through greater integration and information sharing.

Conclusion

In navigating the uncertainties of Global Futures 2035, stakeholders must remain vigilant, adaptive, and cooperative. The outlined key drivers and alternate scenarios provide a framework for anticipating and responding to the multifaceted challenges that lie ahead. By embracing a holistic approach to global dynamics, we can collectively strive for a resilient, equitable, and forward-looking future.

GLOBAL FUTURES 2035

Ambassador P S Raghavan, Chairman - National Security Advisory Board, India

Global Futures: I’ve been seeing the Synergia Conclave grow in reach and influence and the quality of participation and with every passing chapter of this country. And it’s really fantastic for us to be here as members of the NSAB and to both contribute to the discussions at this forum, as well as absorbing the learnings from this vast experience that this forum represents.

And to talk about, I mean, this session is on the future of global geopolitics. It’s fair to say. But let me start by taking issue with this term global geopolitics because I think that is a contradiction. A century ago, the, uh, the geographer Harold McKinter and Admiral Mahan Hum, who, of course, is the chief of Naval staff had referred to, both of them drew attention to the importance of geography in the way nations behave in how nations see the world and what they do with the world.

Now, in its broadest sense, geography actually includes not only the physical landscape but also climate, demographics, and, in many ways, natural resources. And this also shapes the historical experiences of countries. It shapes the cultural perspective, therefore it shifts their strategic ambitions and their responses to external developments. Therefore, when you talk about geopolitics, it makes sense to talk about the geopolitics of South Asia the geopolitics of West Asia, not global geopolitics.

I think we got into this global geopolitics because much of IR theory was developed in the West and therefore is from

a Western perspective of geopolitics. So this actually is not a trivial quibble because it is needed today to explain the behavior of nations to the developments taking place around them, and not recognizing this is what causes strategists and media, and sometimes even governments, to misunderstand and misrepresent the behavior of nations today.

So, if you look at the post-Cold War period, the transformations that have taken place in the post-Cold War era, globalization and the technology, have actually created and enabled countries to leapfrog stages of development and to get to a state that they believe that they have sufficient political clout, economic strength, influence in their neighborhood, military strength as well, in order to exercise greater influence on global development, in order to expect to have their national interests and their national aspirations accommodated in what we like to call an international order.

And that is what is manifested in a number of events if you like, that we see around us. We saw this in the responses to the conflict in Ukraine. We have seen this in the way countries are reacting to the crisis in West Asia and, of course, the US-China standoff also and the way countries are responding to it. I think today it is safe to say that the so-called middle countries, some of them or the new nonaligned, I think the idea simply is not nonaligned; it’s not a grouping.

The idea is to privilege their interests over what would be expected of them from the great powers. So today, in the behavior of nations, I would say interests score over values. Though they may not, they may look to explain it otherwise. The narrative of democracy versus authoritativeness, I don’t think invoked by many countries around the world if you look at it.

I mean, it is, I think, some examples of the behavior of the Saudi insistence, for example, on oil production cuts in spite of pressures to do otherwise. You could. This also explains, if you look at it, the way Countries stampede to join BRICS. It is not only Chinese influence, it is basically, I think, a move to express their autonomy of action or autonomy of policy making and the behavior of countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

So we have a situation where the so-called middle powers, believe they should have a greater frame, a greater role in framing, interpreting and administering the rules of a new international order, whenever that will eventually evolve. The US National Security Strategy, which they broke out in

November 2022, acknowledges this, and it actually says that all nations supporting universal rights and freedoms should have the opportunity to participate in shaping the rules of an international order, whatever their political system. Of course, translation this principle into action in US policy requires changing habits that have grown over many years of being a sole superpower.

Also, we see globalization, which has been securitized and fragmented. The WTO no longer oversees the rules of the road for trade. Multilateralism is virtually dead. We see that all around us. The Russia-Ukraine war, has sharpened polarization along one axis, the West Asian crisis along another axis, the US and China standoff on yet another axis.

Talk about a liberal international order, which we often hear. Again, that is rather hollow because even the most liberal democracies have now introduced illiberal elements into their functioning. So, if you look at this dismal report card, it follows that we do not have a functioning international order today.

Sometime in the 1930s, the Italian political philosopher Antonio Gramsci talked about a crisis following from the old that is dying and the new that cannot be born, and in the interregnum, morbid symptoms appeared.

I think that describes perfectly well the situation that we have today. You have an international order created during the Cold War, which, because of developments after the Cold War, is actually dying.

The situation of today, you’re talking about a dominant US, a sulky Russia, a truculent China, a directionless Europe. I don’t entirely believe Europe is directionless but I think Europe has to do a lot more to express its identity in today’s world.

And in addition to these many middle powers, they tend to jostle for influence. These are not the ingredients of a sustainable rules-based order. So, there is no sign, in what is going on, of moving towards an international order.

So if you look at what happened after Gramsci wrote what he wrote, there was a World War and after the World War and order emerged. I don’t think today we can afford it. We cannot afford a war of any kind or any catastrophe or cataclysmic event in order to impose a new order. But you can say that what you need eventually to move towards some kind of an

order is addressing an attitude of zero sum, which is not prevalent in political and political, technological, economic interactions around the world. We need to recognize the need for a European security architecture which is sustainable in the current circumstances. We need, as the conflict in West Asia is showing, a similar kind of a security equilibrium in West Asia which we ignored after the Cold War and the Indo-Pacific is similarly still operating on Cold War templates and have to move beyond..

So if you look at it today, I think there is, as they said, there is no sign of an emerging new order. I think the best that we can do is management of conflicting trends and forces and pulling back before they get into open and unmanageable conflict. So I think they’ve talked about the future trends, I don’t think one can really identify anything in terms of the future from here.

GLOBAL FUTURES 2035

Dr Andrey Kortunov, Director General of Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow

Global Futures: When we are thinking about the world today and the world of 2035, I think it would be appropriate to use an analogy from nuclear physics. As you know, there are two ways to extract a lot of energy from the elementary fossils. The first way would be described as fission and the second one is a fusion. Fission implies you have heavy molecules, mostly molecules of uranium or plutonium that you can split into smaller ones and you can release a lot of energy.

In doing so, you launch a chain of action and the chain of action will release this energy. The second way to get energy is, uh, fusion, which means that you take very light molecules

like deuterium and merge them into larger combined pieces - nuclear. And these processes also release this energy, even more energy than fission. I think that right now we are at the stage of international relations that can be compared to fission.

We see a very rapid disintegration of the old international order, and this process has already acquired the features of a chain reaction. I don’t know when that started. I think that experts debate whether we should get back to the global financial crisis of 2008 or should we refer to the US elections of 2016, with Donald Trump taking power in the White House. But it is clear enough that the Russian and Ukrainian conflict, which started almost two years ago, was an important turning point, and one can say that it was a point of no return. It’s not a regional crisis. We see the global implications of these fission processes. Arms control is almost dead, at least in the format we used to know. And there’s not much going on between Moscow and Washington and not a lot at the multilateral level. We see a very rapid complication in relations between China and the United States.

And we can hope that the recent meeting between Chairman Xi and President Biden will have a positive impact on the stabilization of this adversarial relationship. However, I think that some negative trends in relations are already irreversible and may translate into other regional crises. And we can talk about events in the South Caucasus. We can talk about very dangerous events in Africa, especially in the area of Sahel.

And finally, we all observed a sudden and dramatic escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, I think that it is not in our power to stop these chain reactions. And it is extremely difficult, if possible, to reverse the trends that we observe right now. However, that does not mean that we can do nothing to limit the damage of this disintegration, and I think it will take a couple of years to alleviate the damage and to pave the way for a new stage, maybe three years, maybe five years.

But I would like to give a very concise laundry list of how, in my view, the international community might go through this very dangerous period in the international system. I think that we should take not a top-down but a bottom-up approach. We should take a bottom-up approach to think about specific incremental ways to fix problems that can be fixed today. That implies that we should base our potential agreements on mutual interests rather than on common values. Common

values, I’m afraid are not attainable at this given moment, and it might be counterproductive to focus on common values, especially given the crisis of liberal political thought that we witnessed today. I think it would be also fair to say that we should preserve the ambiguity.

Ambiguity is not always bad. Ambiguity might help us to avoid issues that cannot be resolved at this particular juncture. I think it is also fair to say that we should try to explore opportunities for multilateralism. I agree that multilateralism is in crisis. Many multilateral institutions turned out to be not very efficient.

But I don’t think that there is an alternative to multilateralism. And even in its reduced form, I think it is a major asset that we should preserve and nourish. Having said that, I would like to argue that this stage of the international system is not going to last forever. And I am sure that we will see a new dawn of globalization.

Why am I so confident about that? First of all, I think globalization will be a result of increasing common pressures on all the nations of the world. Of course, we can talk about climate change, about biodiversity, about the deficit of resources, about uncontrolled migrations, and many issues that call for common action. And I think that these pressures will increase over time.

Second, it is important to note that the advances in technology will create new opportunities for cross-border cooperation. Geography is important, but the relative importance of geography is likely to go down over time, and this is something that we should keep in mind. Finally, I think that no nation is really interested in an uncontrolled arms race in an uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons of war in multiple crises.

So, there’ll be pressure on national governments to get back to the diplomatic table and to restart efforts and provide for multilateral solutions to common problems. And let me just add that the new wave of globalization, which I think might become a reality in a couple of years from now, maybe by the end of this decade already. The new wave of globalization will be very different from what we witnessed during the turn of the century. First of all, it will have different drivers. It will be not just about global finance or about global business. It will also be about global civil society. It will be about social movements that acquire a transnational and transborder character. Second, I think we should also keep in mind that

the agenda of the new wave will be different from what we saw 20 years ago.

Twenty years ago it was mostly about individual freedoms. These days, it’s likely to be more about social justice. So I’m very bullish on left movements all over the world, including the East and the West to the North and the South. Finally, let me say that the main problem that has to be addressed over the new stage of globalization is not likely to be the problem between the East and the West, not the problem between Russia, China and the United States.

It’s likely to be a much more fundamental challenge of how to fix relations between the global North and the global South. That would require a major redistribution of global resources, major development in all countries in the global South and a major changes within the international ecosystem, including both security and development dimensions will have to go through this very difficult period.

But I’m sure that at the end of the day, we will be in a position to climb to a new level of global governance.

GLOBAL FUTURES 2035

Global Futures: In Dante’s Inferno of 1472, the inscription over the entrance to hell runs ‘Abandon all hope ye who enter here’.

Confronted with the question of what the future will be like in a dozen years, 2035. Well, I can be forgiven for fearing what awaits us. Even if hell is not quite the only possibility, whoever tries to forecast surely faces a hellish task already.

Prof Mats Karlsson, Former VP of World Bank

Now, recall a dozen years ago, we had just managed a seismic financial crisis of 2008, but we did not see the consequences of the austerity programs nor the ensuing underinvestment in public services and infrastructure for which we will have to pay for years to come.

We had not yet seen the full consequences of the Iraq invasion in 2003. It was a breach of the global security order. The surging migration fueled the disruptive rise of far-right populism in Europe and the US. We had not yet seen the now evident economic consequences of climate change, although predicted in the 1950s and now making reinsurers and financial regulators nervous.

We had not had COVID, although pandemics would have been on any government’s top ten list of serious, unexpected risks. We had to recommit to basic science, public health, and institutions. A.I. was still only in its laboratory infancy. Drones were toys, and fake news had not yet torn our communication asunder.

Globalization was still a strong locomotive with rising income that would follow stronger institutions and democracy, many of us thought. We can no longer see a solid relationship. Instead, populists and autocrats of different views are gaining ground, supporting each other, whether they have common interests or not.

There was a serious dialogue between the global powers with the assumption that international law and multilateralism were useful. Today, it is increasingly replaced by a sense of power rivalry, fragmentation, and hyper-dangerous conflicts.

And once this genie was out of the bottle, it is now taking on a life of its own in unexpected places. Those signs were visible a dozen years ago. We did not prepare for the consequences, either geopolitical or geoeconomic.

The implications of not having had foresight on each of these issues and more are dire. What is the point of scenario writing if the willingness of strategic policy planners to seize the possible is not acted upon? The poor scenario writer to whose Writers Guild I belong likely mapped his choices onto a spectrum from hope to fear.

Sometimes with headings like The Good, The Bad and the Evil. Over the years, it seems to me that with every iteration, the set of scenarios has shifted in the direction of fear, even

despair; such in my view, is our planetary predicament and the nature of today’s politics in many nations and in international relations.

So, how to avoid the same mistake, how to bring the set of narratives about the future in a direction of hope while still being a hard-headed analyst? Instead of only adding more weight to the accelerating deterioration, which is what I usually do for a living, I should focus on what we should hold on to, be aware of, now, to build the case for hope in this time of uncertainty. I believe it is close to a moral duty to try to see elements be they geopolitical, geoeconomic or indeed technological, as I believe you discussed yesterday, that could make strategic policy planning for the better. More likely, security is built broadly.

In order to do so and to be of interest to India’s strategic policy choices and our discussion this morning, let me here in these short minutes just make five points or rather questions and then end with a few more memo items for the strategic planning. I use the current lens of what space for current choices there might be in China, the US, the Global South, global economic governance, and Europe. What might change? What can be nourished now in the next couple of years in common interest so that we will move the set of scenarios on the spectrum in the direction of hope? Where the outcomes in these five perspectives will determine likely scenarios on the spectrum as far ahead as 2035.

First, China’s economic challenges may not be solvable within their current model. In every economic way - Macro, micro, demography, green transition - China’s challenges will not go away easily or rapidly. The party state is going to have to focus on these issues for a very long time and seriously. Is this societal model really adapted to the world? In 2035, profound changes can and may come to China too; however remote the possibility might seem, this is likely behind the San Francisco detente with the US this week.

This is good news as far as it goes, but China is far from a sustainable path, and what is sustainable won’t be sustained, and something must be given to something else. The question is how. Two, the US is today in its deepest political crisis since its civil war, which well will it break. Outsiders are complacent at their peril.

The dangers that Trump unleashed are deeply unsettling. They are existential for the US as we know it. Trump’s party

shows no sign of halting the self-harm it is inflicting on the country’s social fabric. Yet the institutions are there. And importantly, the economy is hugely resilient. On all counts - inflation, growth, employment, green investment, innovation, health, the rational policy side is winning ground.

If that political path can heal the societal rifts and rebuild social cohesion internally, then and only then can the US uphold its role a leader and adapt its role as a partner in the world. No country can be stronger externally than it is strong internally, and the current internal weakness simply is why the US keeps missing the opportunities to be bolder on more open and wider trade and economic relations.

Third, the global South has emerged. What will its diverse nations make of it? I’m not sure what the term global South to note, but here you are; I just used it. Its emergence is hugely welcome for the countries themselves, of course, but also for the world. The global South now stands to overtake the rise of China as the most important current economic phenomenon of our time.

Country after country self-identifying with the Global South, that keeps its eye on the ball and builds institutions, open freedom for its people, respects rights and laws, is moving down the path of rising productivity and prosperity. It starts at home.

There will be many models. Developmental paths will differ. India will choose its way. The Indo-Pacific has huge potential. So do links to Africa. I came just a few hours ago from Addis Ababa. Africa’s rise is underway. Complex as it is, the world’s population growth will come to a halt at 14 billion this century, when Africa reaches 4 billion large which is than India and China.

The young in Africa must be brought into the mainstream. Given a chance, they take it. If the world is to be a secure place and those parts sustainable, then there are a few things that matter, as I do for all parties. Each country’s choices impact others. We must, therefore, care about each other, look out for each other, and be honest with each other.

It may interest you that in the European Union, by way of a treaty, each country’s economic policy is the business of others. The rise of the global South will transform international cooperation and global economic governance. The question is whether the multitude of institutions we have and those

being formed can work coherently and provide real added value through norms building, finance, and shared public goods.

A case in point might be the current discussion on international tax. It is certainly a 2035 issue. It should not be an issue of which institution leads. It should be an issue of effectiveness so that global economic governance can be built credibly. That is with clout. Predictability and law are in the highest interests of institutions and corporations of the global South. Global and regional economic governance should support each other.

Keeping the national flag waving to a minimum might seem like a wish and a dream, but stronger institutions in different geographic constellations and groupings can emerge to deal with climate, trade, finance and many specific sectors. The field is huge, and there is no one model. Fragmentation is a threat. But I put my money on that effectiveness and coherence will weed out what is empty politics and strengthen what is useful if rational minds prevail.

Europe, as in the European Union, will become larger and stronger for reasons inherent to itself. Europe is usually said to punch below its weight, and I’m usually on the frustrated side, worried about the lack of joint-focused political developments in different member states, its belated focus on defense and defense industry, and obviously how Europe is going to handle its multitude of socio-economic challenges.

But from a distance, I believe that one should rather recognize Europe’s lasting strength. The EU has not backslid. The war in Ukraine has transformed the resolve for strategic integration. It took Germany less than a year to overcome its dependency on Russian energy. There are governments such as Hungary, which are spoilers, but they carry no clout in the EU.

On the contrary, countries in the East and in the Balkans who want to become members are now on an accelerated track to accession. Expect the coherent agenda that you could read in Ursula von Der Leyen’s State of the Union a few weeks ago to strengthen over time. Expect Britain to work more closely with the EU again and watch the elections to the European Parliament in June next year.

In a 2035 perspective, much could happen. No one could imagine Brexit a dozen years ago, and Britain regrets it today. But my money is on a stronger Europe. When you look

Meaningful dialogues once prevailed among global powers under the premise that international law and multilateralism served as valuable frameworks. Presently, these exchanges are progressively giving way to a discernible shift characterised by power rivalries, fragmentation, and the emergence of highly precarious conflicts.

China’s economic challenges, encompassing macroeconomic, microeconomic, demographic, and the imperative shift towards sustainability, are unlikely to dissipate swiftly.

The United States, on the other hand, faces a crucial juncture wherein a political reconciliation must address societal divisions and reconstruct internal social cohesion for the nation to effectively sustain its leadership role and evolve as a collaborative global partner.

~ Prof Mats Karlsson

“

at the international tables and graphs, beware of not seeing the whole category of EU, not only its major members. When you compare it with other powers such as India, the US, China, and others.A word in this context about Russia is needed. Let me say something with 2035 in mind. Russia has a lot of work to do domestically. It has a decreasing aging population of 145 million and an economy just larger than Spain or Scandinavia. Unlike every major country of the global South, it produces next to nothing of value in terms of innovation for the global market.

Its chosen war will leave an investment gap at home to be paid for over decades. Russia’s current international influence stems from its military projection, including its command over false news, and is, therefore highly overrated in economic terms. I expect President Putin to suffer a strategic defeat sooner or later in this war on Ukraine and on international law. Russia’s European neighbors all choose the EU and democracy any day. This will not change. In time for 2035, change in Russia is also possible, and though scars will last, new perspectives might become conceivable. Russia’s choice at that point may not be as important for Europe or the world as it is for its own people. So, with these brief reflections, do we learn anything about scenarios for 2035 on our spectrum between fear and hope?We now have more to fear, and more

is demanded to achieve what we could hope for. The span between realistic, good, bad, and evil scenarios has widened. Let me then end with some brief advice on what our fearless strategic and policy planning ought to hold on to when dealing with trade today and in the years to come. Faced with uncertainty and downside risks as never before, and if our 2035 hope goal is prosperity, security, and sustainability, then these objectives can only be achieved if our sense of justice informs the social contracts that underpin economic life.

Low level equilibria exist among social contracts. Countries carry different histories, but rights, including human and economic rights, are fundamental to sustainability, which in turn can only be found through deliberate, deliberative processes in good faith. That mostly goes under the name of democracy, and the objectives can only be achieved if a willingness to comply the law permeates economic life. Corruption is the opposite driver. No scenario writing can be done without assumptions of degrees of corruption. We know that corruption is fiendishly adaptable also to democracies. But the way in which economic and political elites have pursued interests at the expense of justice, law, rights and truth, is perhaps the single most important obstacle to what could be possible.

The objectives are only achievable if our understanding of economic change puts productivity at the center. Productivity, because better than many other measures; thinking productivity will lead you to the binding constraint facing economic improvement and competitiveness. And it is also far more likely to lead to shared growth scenarios. And if we let the potential of female empowerment continue its breakthrough and inexorable rise - improving productivity, community building, early childhood development, and rational societal choice to boot.

And if we are to have the courage to test our best choices against false choices. What are our blind spots? When are we fooling ourselves? When are we just repeating or being self servicing or denying our weaknesses? Future scenarios can indeed be analyzed by likelihood, but they grow in science as what drives choice is essential, rational, or irrational. And lastly, will we stand a chance if we have the courage to put wellbeing at the core of our understanding of prosperity rather than the usual economic measurements? Well-being, too, can be measured scientifically and operationalized to strategy, but only if it is articulated and agreed. Given our track record, hope might seem elusive, but it exists.

GLOBAL FUTURES 2035

Mr Nobuo Tanaka, Former Executive Director Emeritus of IEA,

Global Futures: I will talk about the vision in terms of energy and sustainability, and I will touch upon nuclear power a little bit. And I use a very provocative title because the winners and losers of this are a very critical key to the issue that we are now facing. The IEA was created 50 years ago during the first oil crisis.

We used the release of stockpiles five times in history. And the most recent one is the Ukraine situation. A strategic stockpile of oil is a key element of energy security at the beginning. But now it’s not only oil but gas, coal, and electricity. And we are facing the global energy crisis for the first time. Fifty years ago, this was the structure of energy, but now it grows much faster in the energy market and in a very well diversified way. Oil was the major part of energy in 1973, but now the market has grown much faster in the emerging economy and diversified.

The biggest expansion happened in electricity. It moved more than five times, and AI and data centers put up enormous demand in the future. The forecast of energy security suddenly changes accordingly. Henry Kissinger, the founding father of the IEA, advised me to get China and India into the IEA to making the institution a relevant forum for future energy security, as well as climate change and sustainability.

The IEA surprised the oil market with the release of oil stocks, but two years ago it surprised OPEC and oil majors with the publication of NetZero by 2050 Roadmap, saying that no new oil and gas field development would be needed. I call it the IEA shock. A couple of weeks ago, IEA surprised us again with

the New World Energy Outlook 2023. Due to the slowdown of the Chinese economy in the future, their fossil fuel demand will peak out sooner and which triggers the peak demand of all fossil fuels by 2030.

Expansion of the solar boom could reduce the gas and coal demands further if net zero happens. Investment in fossil fuels slowed down further; while investment for clean energy will grow much faster, it must be accelerated much, much more to achieve net zero by 2050. IEA is concerns that green technology supply chains will be concentrated to a very limited number of countries.

But it must be true that China, in fact, is controlling the major part of the processing and production of batteries, EVs, solar cells, and electrolyzers. Energy security paradigm will be very different in the net zero 2050.

The IEA’s net zero scenario shows that 47% of the energy trade will be critical minerals and 35% hydrogen in 2050. How to secure the supply of lithium, cobalt, and copper is already a major concern of G7, and MCH may replace the strategic stockpile of petroleum with hydrogen strategic stocks.

Hydrogen will play a major role. Japan introduced a liquid natural gas supply chain 50 years ago. Now Japan leadsestablishing a supply chain for creating green hydrogen by three technologies of transportation and storage, namely liquefied hydrogen, MCH, and ammonia. The golden age of hydrogen is around the corner. This chart shows the import dependency of oil and gas for countries. The blue segment means the importer of both oil and gas.

Japan and Korea are very vulnerable because of importing 100% of oil and gas now and in the future. The United States achieves energy independence by fossil fuel. There will be winners and losers.

Russia seems to be least prepared for this climate shock. Russia lost the status of an energy superpower of the invasion of Ukraine and faced Western sanctions on technology and self withdrawal of investment, expanding military expenditures, and increasing brain drain. They may hurt its ability to adapt. Europe may well be a winner by accelerating decarbonization and de-Russia-nization together.

Hydrogen is a key tool together with renewable energy. Carbon border measures could force other European countries

“

The establishment of a strategic stockpile of oil has traditionally been a cornerstone of energy security. However, contemporary considerations extend beyond oil to encompass gas, coal, and electricity. Presently, the world is confronted with an unprecedented global energy crisis, marking a shift in the dynamics of energy security.

In order to attain the goal of achieving net zero emissions by the year 2050, there is a compelling need to double nuclear capacity, particularly within developing economies. It is imperative to address the cost implications associated with reactor construction as a significant factor in this pursuit.

~ Mr Nobuo Tanaka “

to share the burden of transformation. Dr. Fatih Birol, the current executive director of the IEA, said that the United States Inflation Reduction Act is the single most important energy and climate action by any country since the Paris Accord in 2015.

Supports for EVs, hydrogen infrastructure, carbon capture ,and storage are enormous. The U.S. will definitely be a winner. Another big oil producer, Saudi Arabia, plans to generate green and blue hydrogen to avoid stranded assetisation of its oil and natural gas. China and India will aim at a renewable superpower. How can Japan and Korea survive? Maybe hydrogen and nuclear power.

Another winner is a group of corporations like big tech firms who demand their supply chain carbon free by 2030. Sony may move out of Japan to stay in the supply chain of Apple. A nation state may be a loser if she doesn’t move quickly. Demand side driven transformation has come. Hydrogen cost will determine the cost of green steel production.

India will be a winner against Japan. Future investment in energy intensive industries is likely to favor regions with outstanding green electricity and CCS. U.S. potential in particular.

In Japan, the semiconductor companies, as well as datacenters seek to build their new plants in Kyushu, where solar is abundant and in Hokkaido where wind is abundant. And Japan’s steel industries may be forced to seek their future production sites out of Japan.

Nippon Steel Interests to invest in India. One country cannot achieve energy security by itself. The collective security in the military sense is also true in the energy sector, as well as sustainability. The grid Connectivity of Europe as an Energy Union is the case. It further strengthens the hydrogen pipeline system. Yesterday I learned a lot. There are lots of different ideas of connecting grid lines with India and its neighbors, and this is very encouraging development.

Many countries have been very positive about nuclear power recently for the sake of security as well as sustainability. To achieve net zero by 2050, nuclear capacity should be doubled, especially in the developing economies.

Cost of reactor construction is an issue. Delays and cost overruns have destroyed Areva, Westinghouse, and Toshiba. Building a new reactor is very expensive, but extending the life of a running reactor is competitive relative to solar and wind power for the new build.

Flexible models, small modular reactors will be the choice. It is not the size but the modularity and standardization that reduces total cost and risk in nuclear technology.

Not only cost but there are four additional conditions for nuclear to be sustainable. First, there is a small modularity with passive safety feature. Second, radioactive waste disposal plan. And the third proliferation of registrants and the final point - the socio political acceptability and sustainability in the locality.

One of the models that satisfies these conditions is an integral fast reactor of the Idaho National Laboratory of the United States.

Nuclear power cannot be separated from the issue of the weapon.

Proliferation risk has been increased by continuous geopolitical mistakes by leaders. We are in the middle of the nuclear crisis. President Obama’s Libyan invasion.

President Trump’s rejection of the JCPOA with Iran and handshake with Kim Jong UN convinced North Korea to develop and hold nuclear weapons. President Putin is threatening the world by using the tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Now Israel and Gaza, some minister mentioned about the use of nuclear bombs.

It is quite natural that some non weapon states may wish to develop their nuclear weapon capability. I propose that Japan, USA and Korea Leaders who met at Camp David should work together on a sustainable and peaceful nuclear reactor system. Integral first reactor, which I mentioned, could be the one. Also North Korean denuclearization.

Three countries can cooperate and also develop nuclear propulsion submarines. This is a North East Asian version of AUKUS. Japan needs a nuclear submarine to deploy tomahawks.

We are not interested in building the weapon, of course, but there are 50 countries in the world who may potentially build weapons, but only nine of them have. And Japan and Korea should join the nuclear weapon ban treaty to renounce the weapon.

I wish India would join this league by giving up it’s weapon. The permanent seat of the UN Security Council is monopolized by weapon states measures to stop further proliferation Non-weapon states must be given a prominent role in the United Nations.

Let’s ask together for the permanent seats as leaders of the non weapon states. Ambassador Raghavan mentioned the Cold War template, which must be revised, and I wish Andrei Kortunov agrees with me.

Yuvak Noah Harari, author of the Sapiens, calls for political leaders with global identity to address the challenges of the current situation. The three challenges he mentioned are nuclear war, ecological crisis and the tech destruction by algorithms. I miss Shinzo Abe, the former prime minister of Japan who created the Innovation Class Forum, which I chair now, and he is a unique Japanese politician with global identity.

Another point which I want to make is the role of women and the younger generation in addressing different challenges. Women can play much more of a role of peacebuilding than UN WOMEN set. In the pandemic, the women leaders did a better job than men. In climate change mitigation, the same thing. There is a positive correlation of climate change mitigation and women’s participation in the countries in the business. Finally, I believe that if the president of Tokyo Electric were a woman in 2011, she could have avoided that horrible nuclear accident in Fukushima.

GLOBAL FUTURES 2035

Dr K Radhakrishnan, Former Chairman, ISRO

Global Futures: I thank Mr. Tobby Simon and NSAB, led by Ambassador Raghavan for this major event. And it is my privilege now to share a few thoughts on the technology future. Essentially, it’s an aggregation of key technology drivers and plausible trajectories, though it is a tricky matter to do currently, such projections for technology. And in this process, I also acknowledge the literature that has been created by several thought leaders and also my young co-learners.

What is the big picture? Essentially, technology is advancing exponentially. If you see from the first industrial revolution, which was mechanization, then electrification, automation, digitization, all these are over now - we are in the fifth Industrial Revolution by 2020.

Our predecessors had a half life of 50 years for the skills, but today the World Economic Forum says through a survey that it is five years or even less on certain types of skills. So this is one of the challenges that we have.

The second thing, what we are looking at, the various domains that are developing.

There are about seven domains we can talk about today: Artificial Intelligence. Mobile communication - 6G, Blockchain Technology, Quantum Technology, Metaverse, Synthetic Biology, and Aerospace.

And one thing, if you look at all of this, they are connected. It is a convergence. And each one develops along with the other and hence the speed at rapidity of the development for the future.

“

Technological progress is experiencing exponential growth. Following the initial stages of mechanization, electrification, automation, and digitization, we now find ourselves amidst the fifth Industrial Revolution, which commenced in 2020.

Quantum computing represents a significant domain poised to enact substantial transformations over the next two decades. Its capabilities to tackle complex problems, provide cloud-based access to quantum computers, and facilitate the scaling up process are anticipated to render fault-tolerant quantum computing a ubiquitous phenomenon.

Disruptive technologies possess the potential to revolutionize global systems through decentralization and democratization of data.

~ Dr K Radhakrishnan

“

While we saw in the last decades, the moment from Industrial Revolution 4.0 to 5.0, you might see two more in the next ten years. It’s also imperative to reinvent otherwise we will not become relevant. And also proactively regulate for a secure world.

Now let us come to each one of those areas - the age of A.I. Couple of days ago we learned from the newspaper that Amazon is laying off a major group that is Alexa and they are going to focus more on what is called generate AI.

Now if you look at the way AI has moved from the artificial narrow intelligence to the artificial general intelligence of today. And the way it is moving to super intelligence. Another way - machine learning to machine intelligence to machine consciousness.

So this is going to be a major change, and it is envisaged that by 2040, these machines will be able to compete and compare with the best 25% humans of the world.

So this is something that we have to see. And AI obviously is pervading every aspect of daily life: finance, healthcare, logistics etc. And data security regulations are all important to protect user’ data, to counter the growing inequality, to strengthen software standards and to provide a fair equita-

ble expansion across the society. Yesterday we had a young engineer talking about A.I. security and 40 patents that they already gained in this area.

We thought, Mr. Ganapahy Subramaniam will talk more about mobile communication, but this is something which is happening we are at 5G today, and it is also important to learn that India has made inroads into a select group called 3GPPP and essentially the people who make the decisions and we have got into that group through 5Gi standards that are more relevant for countries like India.

Today, we are going to have a similar situation with blockchains, private blockchains, consortium blockchains, or enterprise blockchains. And we talk about asset tokenization, smart contracts and such things are happening. So, when we talked about neighborhood diplomacy through technology, this is something that we should keep in mind. So, 6G is going to unite three worlds: the physical world, the digital world, and the human world.

Essentially, we are also looking at Web 3.0 with the principles of decentralization, trustlessness, semantic web, and interoperability. And this is going to create a disruption in the way we do e-commerce today.

IoT is known by everyone today, but it is evolving, especially if you look at healthcare for aged people. Four years ago I was in a guest house, doctor who was in the hospital. The monitors were somewhere else, but I was monitored for a week and certified okay.

But today it is going to be practice. And when we talk about AI and IoT, we are going to see edge computing and Generative AI come into the picture again. Blockchain. This was associated with cryptocurrency, but in the future, this is going to be the key enabler for the future digital economy and also Web 3.0, the last leg.

And one thing that is going to happen is the enterprise blockchains. I’m reminded that in the eighties when we introduced satellite communication on a national level which the government supported, but we had the corporates having their own satellite networks.

Quantum computing, that’s another major area which is going to make a lot of changes in the next two decades. It is expected that quantum computers will complement classic

computers, and they will solve complex problems and the cloud access to quantum computers and the scaling up will make fault-tolerant quantum computing commonplace.

Of course, when you talk about the developments that are going to happen, scaling up and the reliability of the q-bits, and then cryptography.

When we talk about quantum-safe cryptography, that is a major area for future developments. Convergence of AI and ML is of course, accelerating material things. But neuromorphic or brain inspired computing is going to be important in robotics.

This is one of the major areas. Even in space, should we send humans or can we do that with space robotics? What we are looking at is that cognitive capability, whether it can be built into the robot like this, and then if you can send a robot instead of a human being, life is far, far better. Let me talk about 2D materials, the graphene transistor - these are all going to happen.

But one important thing, it is a tectonic shift is the software 2.0 software writing itself and sustainable computing. These are going to be coming up in the future. Many of you have used virtual reality for training. Now augmented reality came into the picture, and we can immerse ourselves into that virtual reality.

Two major ideas are developing. One is in the health sector and the other one is in the industry sector. So if you look at the therapeutic activity, the interface technologies to augment social and emotional connections through ultrasonic waves and non-invasive neuro technologies. So this is something coming up, especially after the COVID situation and it is known that there are several people with mental health problems.

You see that even in academic institutions, there are a lot of opportunities and needs for this kind of technology. In the past we have seen people in the International Space Station preparing things based on the instructions on the ground or surgeons doing surgery from advice from an expert. But now this is going to become a reality. The last one, of course, is synthetic biology.

And essentially the designer phases that is engineering viruses and spatial omics. So that is going to be a major area of

activity. And then we get to the aerospace which has already stirred up. We have the cislunar economy. That means servicing of satellite systems on refueling of satellites which are in the earth moon area. You talk about the heavy lift launches by USA and China coming up.

In space manufacturing, whether it is Moon or Mars is going to be important. Asteroid mining is happening already elsewhere. Space tourism is now emerging. Hypersonic aviation was talked about by the CDS. Drone is coming in a major way, drones with automatic capabilities and how to counter thatthat’s going to be another major area.

And this is the conclusion - game changing technology is capable of global disruption, and decentralization and democratization of data.

Expect a plethora of use cases powered by AI/ML operations on data flowing through fast and intelligent networks running on significant energy efficient computation capacity with applications extending beyond earth to space and dynamic policy-making for equitable expansion of technologies for societal benefit.

GLOBAL FUTURES 2035

Global Futures: First of all, many thanks for having been invited by Tobby Simon and his great Synergia team.

I would like to address simply three issues in particular concerning future challenges for Europe. One is on security. The

Mr Paul Revay - Former Director, Trilateral Commission, EU

second one will be on the future of multilateralism, and the third one will be linked to issues pertaining to institutions. Is Europe fit, for example, on the future enlargement.

Turning to security, much has already been said here at conclave, so I will not add too much but there are certainly diverse threats and risks that are on the rise now.

These risks are particularly heightened on the European continent, obviously, with wars now coming back to our continent. And don’t forget that the European project at its origin after World War Two was to build a continent of peace.

And of course development. But basically a continent. No more wars on our continent. So we’re back now of having mega wars, mega traditional wars on our continent, where I don’t need to define their location.

It is true that one forgets that war did come back during the Yugoslav wars of succession, if we may call them that, but today we are at a much higher intensity. So this implies of course, we need to strengthen and defend our defensive priorities. The problem will be that it’s still very much nationally molded, so building a common European defense is increasingly becoming urgent.

But of course, in different countries around, it’s not a new issue. Let’s be honest. It’s been being discussed now for more than 20 to 30 years. But of course, today here again, it has to be heightened, which is actually the case with the new European Defense Initiative.

And you will have seen the recent war of aggression by Russia on Ukraine, that Europe has been present at the core and will continue to make sure that this cooperative agreement continues.

There was a mention of Brexit actually in the past discussion. It is interesting to note that military and security cooperation between Britain and Europe continues very much as before, so that there is clearly no ongoing Brexit outcome, if I may say so.

Now we have to also maintain efforts for greater European cooperation, and here this implies what type of cooperative relationship we want to have, for example, within NATO, what type of cooperative relationship, where we have also at the transatlantic level so there challenges are found.

“The upcoming challenges facing Europe will predominantly revolve around security, the future of multilateralism, and institutional issues. However, the current landscape also witnesses the emergence of substantial security concerns within the region.

The present multilateral system is facing significant strain and requires modernisation. The European Union is committed to collaborating closely with the United Nations to ensure that, in a multi-polar world, multilateral mechanisms are well-equipped to address the challenges of the 21st century.

~ Mr Paul Revay “

But at least there seems to be a common approach today that is now geared to overcoming maybe past challenges such as those often exemplified by my country. I’m a Frenchman, and France sometimes has that difficult relationship with NATO, which is no longer the case. The second point in my remarks is on multilateralism.

Now you will know that Europe has been one of the forebears of the multilateral system. It has been fighting very much on many fronts to make sure that multilateralism remains in play. But obviously the multilateral system of today is under great strain.

It obviously needs to be modernized, and the European Union will continue to work closely, especially with the UN secretary general, to make sure that in a multi-polar world, the multilateral mechanisms are made fit to fit the challenges of the 21st century. Here, a good example would be how Europe is helping out the WTO, which is going through also very difficult moments.

So, I think that you have a European Union that is bringing ideas and fortitude to these institutions, which are being heavily battered.

Then we need finally a stronger Europe through stronger partnerships in different areas to make sure that this cooperative nature of countries continues. To conclude from this little chapter of multilateralism, we need to recognize that globalization has fundamentally changed and is fundamentally challenged.

But all these challenges to globalization show that this model is now coming under strain. As you know, we have to find a new way ahead in the globalization model and maybe find that here, with the help of India, has been at the forefront.

So we look forward to these partnerships and discussions with India on how to define a new global architecture in one way or another.

And also, my final point will be on the institutional aspect. I think it will be interesting to note for those who do not stem from Europe that we have, of course, institutional problems in the European Union, but these are not new, so we should not overdo and exaggerate them. Still, there is a big, big challenge ahead, which will be how to make enlargement right, how to make sure it is the Europe that we want.

As you are aware, the European Commission brought out a few days ago its decision to formally recommend enlargement with candidate stature to Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

But all this implies that ten new members ought to come into the European Union by 2030. I mean, there is no final date. This is true, but still. And in this context of enlargement, increasing domestic problems have arisen which you know and have seen on the political level. European citizens are increasingly wary of these tsunamis of enlargement the European Union has fielded since now the big bang of 2004.

So that will be an issue that politicians will have to address. Don’t forget that two founding members of the European Union in 2005 through referendums, France and the Netherlands, voted down the Maastricht Treaty.

So it’s not a different European project. It changes, but it has to be defended and fought every day, by our leaders which increasingly are also sometimes less committed to this very European project.

So what are the four strategic challenges that Europe faces on enlargement? It’s basically how to make candidates ready for the progressively moving target of European membership - how do we manage this moving target? How do we imply all this? How do we make Europe ready to absorb and benefit from ten new members joining the European Union?

And finally, how do we manage the EU enlargement and partnerships given these current challenges that we face today?

So all these issues show that the challenges ahead for Europe are very much in flux.

We need to overcome these challenges. We need to find cooperative solutions. But we are democracies, so our politicians will have to sell the products straight to the citizens.

So, it’s understandable to them that they do not fear yet another announcement in the future and to conclude we are in India. I read again the conclusions of the New Delhi G20 summit.

It’s quite impressive. It’s very long, it’s very exhaustive. But looking to the future and to 2035, we would hope that the leaders of the G20 simply implement many of the issues that were discussed here in Delhi a few months ago, And I hope very much that we will see this coming forward.

Richard Cockett, British historian and journalist

I have a question for Mats Karlsson. You said China is not on a sustainable trajectory. Explain that a little more in detail. And if it’s not on a sustainable trajectory, what are the alternatives ahead of China? I think you also said that you were more impressed by the rise of the global South than China. I always imagined China was a part of the Global South. So do you now see China in competition with the global South?

Prof Mats Karlsson, Former VP of World Bank

Well, I’m not sure what the global South will mean as a term. It’s all used to replace a lot of old style language that we don’t use in the long term. What meaning would be added to the

global South? I’m not so sure. I think it is much more useful for specific geographic categories of countries, but as a shorthand for a new phenomenon I think Global South does it. What I said was that the rise of China has already happened.

The global South is taking place in global governance and global economic institutions. And so more and more the future in a way, is a transition point. We all read and we don’t quite know where we are going, but I just came from Africa, so I’m impressed by the rise in and the transformation in so many African countries.

And they are certainly more part of the global south than China is. China is China. So that’s kind of the nuance around this term we don’t know where it’s going to lead. Coming back to China, I am very worried about their macroeconomic situation. I’m worried about their situation, their housing market, and what it can trigger domestically.

We can go through all of these things with demography. China’s population will start to decline. They have an age profile which is going to be difficult to maintain socially. I think that’s important. I think that China needs to face what all aging and modern societies have faced, namely, the social-based health system.

There was a discussion here earlier. Liberalism is no longer alive. That’s absolutely not true. The challenges that economies face are very similar. They might find different solutions to it, but as societies mature, you’ll have to a create certain structure that protects people. It is possible that China has exhausted what migration can give with the first stage of urbanization. They have to create more stable perspectives for the demographic profile they have for the profile of knowledge that the Chinese will have.

So, I just think I use the term that what is not sustainable will not be sustained. And I don’t think it adds up when you look at China. And it would be frightful if China went back to the old ways of changing the social model. But maybe the positive would be if they find ways of reforming, while they still have time.

Ambassador P S Raghavan, Chairman - National Security Advisory Board, India

How can you name an organization that is split across so many axes? You know, if you take a look at the United Nations Security Council, which is supposed to have the ultimate responsibility for peace and security in the world, can you tell me one action that it has taken over the last ten years that has actually promoted effectively, peace and security to the world?

So what are we talking about now? The United Nations can work as part of an international order that a large majority of countries subscribe to. I don’t think we are there right now. When we talk about the post-Cold War situation. We are not in a place where it is a functioning international order recognized by a sufficiently large number of countries.

So you need to reinvent the United Nations. I don’t think the UN as it exists functionally is of much use to the world. I’m sorry for being so strongly negative, but one has to be practical!

QUESTIONS FOR EXPERTS REVIEWING THE BASE DOCUMENT

Dr Andrey Kortunov,Director General of Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow

Are you in agreement with the Key Drivers identified? Would you like to add/delete any driver or further substantiate why these drivers are important?

Ambassador

I generally agree with the outlined drivers though each of them may need further clarification. For instance, when we speak about the diffusion of power in the international system, we should keep in mind that this process is likely to go beyond nation states and that we are likely to see a new rise of non-state actors.

Question

Raghavan, kindly give your perspectives on strengthening the United Nations organization. Thank you.

Speaking of global challenges, I would distinguish between challenges emerging within the system itself due to the changing balance of powers, challenges resulting from the progress in technologies and challenges reflecting contradictions between economic imperatives ad global resource limitations.

Are you broadly in agreement with the scenarios developed based on the key drivers of change? If not please elaborate.

The proposed scenarios look logical and generally plausible. My only footnote to the list is that these scenarios are not mutually exclusive; some elements of each may coexist within the same system

(e.g. a new US hegemony is likely to include a technological war between Washington and Beijing, which China is supposed to lose). If I were to draft scenarios, I would arrange them along two axes – the number of major players (one, two, a couple, may) and the nature of the relationship between them (confrontation, competition, cooperation, collaboration).

Which of the scenarios in your opinion is the ‘preferred’ scenario for India?

I would divide India’s interests into mid-term (till 2030) and longer-term. Over the next couple of years Idia will remain mostly deal-taker in the international system gaining from the existing international environment generally conducive to India’s development needs.

However, later India will have to take more responsibility for the state of the system and “United Response to Crisis” is something that New Delhi should seriously consider.

Based on the scenarios, what are the three most vital strategic policy imperatives for India?

- Exploiting opportunities that the existing system offers; - Avoiding steps that could limit India’s freedom of maneuvering;

- Preparing itself for a new international role in 2030s.

Mr Nobuo Tanaka, Former Executive Director Emeritus of IEA,

There are very well formulated global trends and scenarios. And yet, it is surprising that “nuclear” is not mentioned anywhere.

Yuval Noah Harari says there are three global challenges for humans in 21st century. They are nuclear war, ecological challenge and Algorithm. Russia is threatening NATO by possible use of tactical nuclear weapon in Uklaine, Israeli Minister suggested the use of weapon to Gaza, and North Korea is shooting missiles. There is an eminent risk of proliferation. NPT and UN system are not working.

On the other hand, nuclear power can be a sustainable solution for global climate change mitigation. Is there a nuclear technology which can address both proliferation and safety and radioactive waste risks? Yes, there is a technology called Integral Fast reactor and Pyro processing. Fusion is another possibility. How can India contribute to the peaceful use of nuclear power through strengthening the global governance of nuclear weapons as well as developing a sustainable nuclear technology.

I think the best scenario for India as well as any human on earth is “United Response to Crisis”.

Three vital policy recommendations for india are;

• Build Green Economic Transition consensus among indian population and lead Global South to the direction,

• Commit to becoming a peaceful user of nuclear power and commit to the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons by asking other weapon states to follow India. India should eventually join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons together with Japan. Then, the two have to become permanent seat holders status of the UN Security Council.

• Promote Democracy as a solution for the Yuval Noah Harari’s three global challenges : AI risk, climate change and nuclear war.

Prof Mats Karlsson, Former VP of World Bank

Global Futures: First of all, you use the terms “trends” and “drivers” is very good, but how do we really address “aims”? Maybe I am too focused on what to do, rather than having a good analytical base. I understand that this is the framework for a conclave, but I believe that “we” are in a very difficult situation, to say the least. And even if this conclave doesn’t lead to conclusions on what to do, that is what is on my mind.

I very much appreciate the geopolitical framework that was apparent as a basis for our conclave. Whether this is called Indo-Pacific or something broader, perhaps more complex, I don’t know.

But the character of your invitations leads us into a geopolitical reflection. In that context, I, for my part, do not believe that “the Global South”, denotes much useful. It cannot even be geographically defined, much less economically or poliically, I would advise to stay clear of the concept of the “Global South”. Maybe the term can be used to challenge thinking, but fundamentally, I fear that the term will lead into bad territory.

Which brings us back to what the”aim” is. Is it not reason based on two paradigms: science and rule of law? Both in which of India has a stake. Is India’s aim not to uphold these practices with centuries of expericence? It is not for me to say, but India has roots for this grounding since a millennia and should be a champion for the global future. We are living in a period when some national forces are reducing our national interests downwards. We know, I believe, that trade, migration, supply chains, multilateralism are positives, let alone responses to the emerging climate catastrophe, whereas “national interest” can become a cover for reductionism.

India has progressed, profited and has a mega future interest in global leadership, I can hardly imagine any country, except perhaps the EU - if it does its work well - that can have such an impact, thinking 50 years ahead. China looks into itself, India is global, the US is troubled, Europe is slow, but in my view, it is building itself. The EU knows it will be 500m in a global, equally capable world of 11 bn. What a 1.5bn India

can do long term is something that is more powerful than any perhaps other geo-political force seen from a long-term perspective.

What is that path? First of all, the accumulated body of international law. Secondly, what is democracy going forward? What are human rights? The document stays clear of these subjects. Corruption is what undermines logical thinking of what political economy needs to face. In my view and experience, I look to India to be a vocal leader on these issues.

The “West” has issues, and, in that, we are without global leadership. But leadership has to be for a purpose with shared values. Being from the “West”, aside from having spent most of my career being “global”, I can tell you that the “West” is nothing along the lines it has been perceived to be. Those who aspire for the rule-of-law and human rights need allies.

In my view, there will come a moment within the next ten years, when we need to reconfirm, redefine and move ahead. Will India lead? I am not sure.

Therefore, is “equilibrium” a good term? Yes, to multilateral respect. But not to any larger aims.

Your focus on technology, again, is appropriate. India, surely, will be a leader. You must have read the articles in the global press recently, criticising India on how it holds its mega-technological science back. I don’t know. But I know that in comparison regions, India is but a short step from leadership. But then, it must not be a “cold war” but a positive sum game. Is that not the “aim” that our AI-orientated conference could aim at?

“Prefered scenario for India”?

India must be a global leader. But one cannot be a global leader unless one trusts the universality of one’s objectives. Therefore, China excludes itself. Russia happens to have territory but nothing else. It will give no leadership.

The US can return, but only under a new internal social contract. No one can be stronger externally than it is itself. Europe, however, is building that social contract slowly but surely.

MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF ASIA 2035 MODERATOR

Major General Paul Naidu (Retd.) Strategic Advisor, Synergia

Background

Is the Asian Century still relevant? The idea of the ‘Asian Century’ argues that the 21st century international order is going to be defined by Asia’s pre-eminence, the way the US pre-eminence defined the international order in the 20th century and Europe in the 19th century. Asia’s economic revolution - stimulated by many countries on the continent— over the past 60 years is unprecedented. However, given the transformational events that have occurred in the recent past, does the concept of an Asian Century still hold true? Is economic heft sufficient for Asia to claim the century? This session addressed this concept by trying to understand how the past and present will shape the future of Asia over the next, say 15 years.

Aim of the Session

To develop scenarios for Asia by 2035 by identifying the Key Drivers or factors which will impact the trajectory of Asia.

Key Drivers

The Key Drivers that were identified are as follows: -

US-China Strategic Competition. In the medium term, Asia (and the Indo-Pacific Region in particular) will be an arena of strategic rivalry and great power competition between China and the US, affecting the continent in every domain.

This driver will have both a high impact and a high degree of certainty.

Shared Global Challenges. This driver is likely to manifest more frequently and intensely in almost every region and country of Asia. Two major challenges that were clearly identified were Climate Change and the need to understand and regulate Big Data and AI.

Emergence of the Global South. By 2030, it is projected that three of the four largest economies will be from the Global South. This economic shift will go hand in hand with enhanced political visibility, which is likely to manifest even further given the increasingly dynamic geo-political challenges.

Trade for Peace. Trade and peace were promoted as two sides of the same coin. But, several global economic trends (powered by US-China competition) including de-globalisation & de-coupling, employment disruptions, a complex and fragmented trading environment and the continued rise of powerful firms are likely to shape relations within and between Asian countries.

Leaders of Key Actors. The emergence and continued appeal of strong nationalistic leaders who are not reluctant to take pro-active, bold decisions in pursuit of ‘national interests’ will be important in determining relations between key players in Asia. The results of elections in US and India in 2024 and Xi Jinping’s continued dominance of the Chinese power apparatus will assume importance in this context.

Asian Scenarios - 2035.

The Dragon Dominates. This scenario is characterized by China’s continued assertiveness in Asia and US’s unwillingness to challenge China. Driven by economic interests, a turbulent domestic landscape and pre-occupation with other flash points in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the US seeks a diminished role in the Indo-Pacific. This drives other Asian states (including India, Australia and Japan) to adopt a hedging strategy. As a result, Beijing has taken a more active role through its military presence, trade and investment. China emerges as the undisputed leader of the Global South and regional groupings and alliances such as RCEP, BRICS, SCO, etc are controlled and dominated by the Chinese state. BRI will be given a new lease of life. Simultaneously, China and her allies will attempt to replace existing international organizations, systems and standards with alternatives with Chi-

nese characteristics. There will be some global cooperation to address the common challenges such as climate change but with Beijing in the forefront. Consequently, most Asian governments conclude that Chinese ascendency in Asia is inevitable and seek greater economic and technological alignment with China. India and Japan will attempt to resist and offer an alternative to a unipolar Asia but in the absence of USA wholehearted support, they will be on the defensive. China’s soft power will soar while her demographic profile could emerge as a cause of concern.

Likelihood: Medium to Low (Worst case scenario for India)

The Dragon Reflects.

This scenario is marked by China’s assertiveness becoming counterproductive. An internal power struggle to ease President Xi Jinping out of the office and China’s declining demographic dividend could sap its economic and geopolitical vigour. This would prompt Asian states backed by a resurgent US to develop greater cooperation to resist Beijing. This forces China to tone down its stance and adopt a more approach, be it in its territorial claims, pursuit of technology, or expansion of markets and trade.

New global supply chains based on Indo-Pacific states have come up to reduce China’s dependency, triggered in part by India’s decoupling from China is forced to adhere to new/existing international regulatory norms and will work with the Global South and West to address common global challenges. India and China will be locked in competition to play the leading role in the Global South. US resurgence in Asia will be welcomed in many Asian countries affected by China’s aggressive behaviour. This leads to a credible regional balance. This scenario predicates the weakening of the Chinese economy and substantive US initiative to regain its lost strategic space. China remains powerful but more accommodative and cautious.

Likelihood: Low to Modest (Best case scenario for India)

Winter is Coming:

An Asian Cold War. In this scenario, the US and China develop even more confrontational stances, pushing them further down the road to a new ‘Cold War’, with increasing risk of hostile outbreaks. China moves swiftly to establish new institutions or expanding existing ones, incorporating regional

actors in SE and South Asia into its sphere of influence. The US responds by building its own Asian institutions and a number of countries concerned with Chinese hegemony prefer Washington over Beijing. India faces a few critical strategic choices in such a scenario. Any attempt by India to position itself as a neutral player has been thwarted by China’s naked aggression against India (with Galwan being a case in point). India may have no option but to subscribe to the Indo-Pacific strategy promoted by the US. Recent and long-term trends point to an intensification of geopolitical competition between China and the US together with significant toughening of Washington’s stance. Simultaneously, Chinese leadership believes that it has created adequate military and economic power in Asia to contest and counter a US-led challenge in Asia. The contours and duration of this Cold War will be dictated by how China shapes its strategic space, leverages BRI/BRICS/SCO and how, in turn will the US and its allies be able to cooperate and maintain pressure to contain China. The role of countries like India, Japan, Indonesia and other middle powers in such a scenario will be critical.

Likelihood: Medium to high.

Conclusion

The identity of Asia is an issue which is often overlooked. While it is a common perspective to focus on East Asia, there are multiple Asia’s which need to be considered while mapping the trajectory of the continent. The Asian century could well turn out to be the Chinese century. The case of a unipolar Asia is what Indian planners need to address. The role and nature of the relationship between India and China will be crucial in all the scenarios. These scenarios are not intended to be predictions but are merely an assessment of the possibilities and combinations that could play out.

Major General Paul Naidu,(Retd.) Strategic Advisor, Synergia

In light of the recent transformational events that have taken place, does the concept of the Asian century still hold true? Is economic heft sufficient for Asia to claim the century? And more importantly, what are the key drivers or factors that will impact the trajectory of Asia over the next 10 to 15 years? And finally, what are the plausible scenarios that could emerge for Asia, say, by 2035.

The year 2035 is not very far away by historical standards. It’s just 13 years away from now. If you recall that in the last 10 years, India’s GDP has doubled. So a 10-12 year period is not a particularly long period. So it’s not really a question of gazing too far into the future.

In my opinion the base case scenario for the Asian century is an Asia that is dominated by China. Any other scenario would actually be an aberration and somewhat of a black swan event. Despite the difficulties that the Chinese economy faces, almost all predictions about the growth and the GDP of China are pretty uniform, putting China at a GDP of about $50 trillion by 2035, the United States at $36 trillion, and India at about $10 trillion. So this is the kind of a trajectory which we are seeing already unfold before our eyes, and which is taking

shape as we speak. So the question then becomes whether we are talking of an Asian century or a Chinese century, and that is something which those of us who live in Asia have to actually address almost on a daily basis. What we might actually see unfold is possibly for the first time a global power that is resident in Asia and not in Europe or the US. And this will have its own major implications for the kind of security architecture.

Which brings me to the question about the identity itself of Asia. Is Asia amenable to a security architecture in the form that we have seen in Europe and in the transatlantic alliance or earlier during the Soviet times of the Warsaw Pact? The prognosis for an Asia Security Architecture is still highly bleak. There are serious identity issues. And one of those I would like to highlight particularly is that it is a common perspective and a common impression that when we talk of Asia, our focus automatically shifts to East Asia. But the fact is that there are multiple Asias that are going to continue to impact the kind of security architecture we have in Asia and I would basically mention two or three of these which are critical. First obviously is West Asia, Central Asia and South Asia. And the question is whether with a China dominated Asia what will be its influence over the non-East Asian parts of Asia and whether we will see convergence of security perspectives within Asia or we will continue to see fragmentation with West Asia looking at global issues and at integration and at the rest of the world through different eyes.

One of the other features of the future trajectory of Asia is going to be the rise of India. The most important issue here today is how India and China handle each other and live with each other in such an Asian century or an Asian context. There are challenges that India faces. There are challenges that China faces. But how much of this will lead to unipolar or multipolar Asia is also a question that we need to ask ourselves. Clearly, if we go by the base case scenario of an Asia dominated by China, then we are heading towards a unipolar Asia. This is the kind of scenario which I think Indian planners need to work upon.

If that is the case, then the question arises as to what should be the kind of responses both from within the residential powers as well as powers outside Asia. And here, a critical question is going to be the nature of the US-China contestation. We have gone through different phases of the US-China contestation. But as time goes by, we will see more and more of a peer relationship between the two powers. We have to

MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF ASIA 2035

Ambassador Pankaj Saran, Former Deputy National Security Advisor, India

remember that it was not long ago in 2017 when the United States national security strategy for the first time referred to China and in the last six years the US national security approach to China has been informed by this new paradigm of major power relationships.

We will also see, as a consequence of this, a certain degree of hedging and uncertainty among the middle powers of Asia on how they cope with this contestation. And this is where the role of India could become critical in terms of offering choices to other Asian countries in terms of both values, systems, institutions, et cetera. But for me also, it is important, and we should discuss this, that if we are heading in the direction that we are, the question is the nature of the major power that China will be.

Will it be an interventionist power of the kind we have seen from the United States or from the erstwhile Soviet Union or will it take a different shape and form in terms of global institutions and so on and so forth. I think the BRI and its successor programs of the Chinese indicate that we are witnessing an alternative approach, both to consolidation of power within, as well as consolidation of power without.

Clearly, markets and technology are going to play a critical role in this region, largely because of the great population centers that exist here. India will be a huge market by 2035. The question is whether we can democratize production and manufacturing centers outside of China and create more than a non-China manufacturing hub within Asia. Technology clearly is going to be a critical driver of influence.

We will see, as we have seen in the morning, clearly, there is a technological race that is underway that will impact Asia as it will impact the rest of the world. But the question is, why But the question is why are we talking about an Asian century at all? If China is to emerge as this dominant major global power, then the lines between Asia and Europe or Asia and other continents, these are going to disappear.

Because you will have global contestation being played out in the geographical territory of Asia, but it will be a different perspective in how the world looks and deals with each other and how Asia then responds to these different dynamics. So this is broadly the way we see the future, I see the future in the next 12-13 years. It is a challenge that we face. It is an opportunity that we face. A lot of it is going to depend on China’s behavior, how it manages its own successes and how it

deals not just with its proximate neighbors but also in terms of integration with the rest of the world. I have deliberately not mentioned the issue of Taiwan. I would say that there are many fault lines in the region. I personally do not see any conflagration in Taiwan till 2035. But there will be tensions in the air.

Any breakout of kinetic war in the region is going to be extremely disruptive and extremely detrimental to China and to other parties who might actually be forced into such a conflict. So these are some broad remarks which I wanted to make. I do find that when we discuss Asia, the tendency is to focus excessively on how we are looking only at one part of Asia. And I would only say that when we look at Asia we need to look at all parts of Asia and not just East Asia.

MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF ASIA 2035

Talking about the Asian Century, if you focus on what the Western pandits will tell you, they will assume that Asia will be a cauldron of war, conflicts and tensions. And yet, despite that, I am confident that in Asia the century will be peaceful. So, my goal today is to explain why I have this confidence and what the underlying forces are that have created 44 years of peace in Asia, with no major war having been fought here? But let’s begin first with what I hope should become over time a truism in geopolitics. And this is what should be the truism. Wars reflect geopolitical incompetence.

Peace reflects geopolitical competence. So today, for example, the war in Ukraine reflects many things. It also reflects

Prof Kishore Mahbubani , Former Singapore Permanent rep to UN

European geopolitical incompetence. Similarly, the war in the Middle East also reflects the geopolitical incompetence of the region and of the great powers involved in that region. And so, at the same time, peace reflects geopolitical competence. The long peace that we have had through most of Asia, and here I’m talking primarily of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and to some extent also South Asia, is a result of a very high degree of geopolitical competence.

Now, the story, let me emphasize, is a complex one. There have been many factors at play here. For example, the strong United States presence in East Asia has been a stabilizing factor. During the Cold War, the very close alliance and partnership between the United States and China also helped to create bridges of understanding in this region. But the most important factor is one, that unfortunately is ignored by many people, and that is the role of ASEAN and what it has done to bring about peace in Asia. And here, it is quite shocking that most people are not aware that Southeast Asia is the most diverse region on planet Earth. Among its over 640, 660 million people, 250 million Muslims, 150 million Christians, 150 million Buddhists, Mahayana Buddhists, Hinayana Buddhists, we have Taoists, Confucianists, Hindus, and yet, ASEAN has emerged as one of the most peaceful regions in the world.

Equally importantly, it has shared its culture of peace with the rest of East Asia, too. So how did ASEAN do it? And I can tell you, as someone who’s attended ASEAN meetings for 33 years, from 1971 to 2004, I can tell you that ASEAN didn’t begin with great reservoirs of trust or goodwill. In fact, when I attended my first ASEAN meetings over 50 years ago in 1971, the room was full of tension and distrust within countries like Malaysia and Singapore, which had just separated. Indonesia and Malaysia were just at a confrontation. Philippines and Malaysia, where the Philippines claimed a state in Malaysia and Sabah. And you can carry on. Lots of distrust. You could sense it in the room when you walked in. But today the ASEAN meetings are full of trust. What happened? What lessons can we learn from this? And I would like to suggest that there are at least three lessons you can learn from the ASEAN experience.

The first, which I’ve hinted at, is to be inclusive. Include everybody. In your neighborhood, they’re going to be part of your destiny. So include everyone. But we’ve been inclusive, not just in Southeast Asia. We’ve also been inclusive for the neighbors of Southeast Asia. So if we set up the ASEAN Regional Forum, we included the United States and Russia. We

included India and Pakistan. We included South Korea and North Korea on the simple assumption that if they’re going to be part of our geography, we have to work together in one way or another. And by contrast, just look at the European Union. It remains a Christian club. And even though one Muslim country, Turkey, has been knocking on his doors for decades, it has no prospect of coming in. Because the European Union works on the principle that to join our club, you must be like us. In ASEAN, we have the exact opposite principle. It’s precisely because we are different, we have to come together. So the rule of being inclusive in our world, which is becoming far more diverse, is therefore a very critical one. The second rule is to be open to trade. I know geopolitical strategies scoff at trade. They think that’s all about money. No, it’s not. Trade is what? Engenders peace in the long run. And one reason why the ASEAN region is so peaceful is because against all our earlier protectionist instincts, we opened ourselves up to trade. And there have been some spectacular results in our region.

Let me give for example the relationship between ASEAN and its two greatest great power partners, the US and China. In the year 2000, US trade with ASEAN was $135 billion. China’s trade with ASEAN was $40 billion. One third of $135 billion of US trade. But by 2022, while US trade with ASEAN had gone up from 135 to 440 billion, an increase of three and a half times, China’s trade with ASEAN had grown from 40 billion to $975 billion. It’s the world’s largest trading relationship. And guess what this trade does? It creates a whole environment of trust and coming together. And even two neighbors, like China and Vietnam, which have had tensions for 2,000 years, are now engaged in this kind of trade. That’s why trade is extremely critical. And the third rule is, in ASEAN, we continue meeting. Yes, we have differences. From time to time, neighbors in ASEAN have had skirmishes, misunderstandings, disagreements, but we carry on. We never stop our meetings. And I can tell you that sometimes, when our neighbors have a breakdown in their relationship, when China and Japan, for example, cannot meet because of a bilateral squabble, the leaders cannot find a face-saving way of meeting; guess what they do? They come to an ASEAN plus three meeting, and then they engineer a bilateral meeting.

Among the ASEAN countries, we have 1,000 meetings a year in all areas, right? Economics, politics, culture, health, you name it, sports. And the net result of this, these continuous meetings, is that we build up reservoirs of trust in each other. Now these are three very simple rules, right? They’re not dif-

ficult to duplicate, but yet in many regions, it’s sometimes now inconceivable for countries to sit together and talk to each other. But that’s one of the oldest lessons of diplomacy. It begins with us sitting together and talking to each other as you are doing so in this great meeting in India. So I wish you great success and I hope that all of you will make an effort to understand the remarkable contributions that ASEAN has made because if you study those contributions they will help to guarantee a peaceful Asian century and also be useful to the rest of the world.

MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF ASIA 2035

Asian Century, I would say the key driver would definitely be US-China relations. There are many other issues of relevance, but I try to focus on US-China relations and the possibility of a US-China war. And also who is going to be the winner, who will be the loser, and finally, what contributions India will make if something happens. These are the key drivers of the future of 2035.

Let’s assume there won’t be a war before 2035, so there won’t be any winner or loser, and the free and open Indo-Pacific concept will continue. Basically, it’s a status quo. That means there’s no century of Asia. We like the status quo. Or else, war breaks out.

There are three possibilities. Scenario A, B, C. Scenario A: Means Americans will win. Scenario B means China will win. Scenario C means somewhere in between. Americans may win, but they will be deeply, deeply weakened. So these three scenarios are. I’ll try to be a strategic thinker; I will not try to represent my government.

If America wins and China’s badly defeated, something will happen to China. In either direction. Will they be democratic? Or will they become further, much more dictatorial.

There are two possibilities. If China wins, Americans may leave the stage, and that would create a huge vacuum, and China may dominate, and that’s why I said India’s contribution is extremely important.

If scenario C happened, Americans may win, but Americans will be deeply, deeply weakened in that battle. There have been enough wars already in Ukraine and Gazathe Bay of Port, the Third War, for example. In that case, the East Asia would be extremely unstable. It’s so difficult to predict what’s gonna happen.

We need more Indian contributionm to re-stabilise the situation. I may sound too pessimistic, but there’s a reason why. I have only ten more minutes to go, so I have to talk about history now. There are some maxims or lessons from history. I’d like to introduce you to two maxims.

Number one. The fool learns from experience. The wise learn from history. You know that. India has such a long, long history. So you should be wise enough.

The second maxim, which is more important, is that history doesn’t repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes. I know it rhymes sometimes. Not always.

When I talk about rhyming of history, I compare the history in the 1930s with the history of the 2020s now. Just imagine, close your eyes and imagine. In East Asia, Indo-Pacific region ,there is a new rising power- very powerful, very nationalistic, sometimes very xenophobic.

Considering that the status quo is wrong. And because it is wrong, it should be changed. It can be changed. It should be changed even by force.

The new rising power says America is in decline. It’s time for us to establish our own international order of our liking. Then, the rising power, challenges, American maritime hegemony in the Western Pacific and militarily.

That’s exactly what we did. Japan did. Sorry to say this, General, but we did. We made a huge strategic mistake in the 1930s. We went to Pearl Harbor in 1941. I worry. I hope I’m wrong. My worry for the past ten years is that China may be

Mr Kunihiko Miyake, Former Advisor to Japanese Prime Minister

repeating the same kind of mistake we made in the 1930s by challenging the status quo by forces.

Many friends of mine, including my Chinese friends, say that we are not that stupid, unlike the Japanese. I hope so. I hope so, but looking back on the past 10 years or 20 years, I was posted in Beijing, and I followed the history, all the history of China for the past 20 years. I prefer to say that sometimes history rhymes.

So how do we prevent that from happening?

Big question. I do not want to go into detail as I want to keep my presentation as short as possible.

Finally, before I close. General Paul asked me to talk about the domains, and I think there are four domains: geopolitics, security, technology, and economy. And I invite you, they are not all separate, domains independent from each other. And there’s a big gap between the thinking of the strategic thinkers and the economists. Sorry to say this. Because the previous session was on the economy. Economists, I may offend many, but I have to say this. Economy is not a drivers; economy is a result - in my view. Why? Because, without any stable national security situation, there will be no economic activity.

In order to have security, sometimes we need an economy, but the economy is the result of perfect security arrangements. In order to have successful security arrangements, well, you need some kind of dominance by, or geopolitical dominance, I would say, by a lesser evil. I’m not talking about Americans, but they could be lesser evils because they are all evils, including myself. But there are some lesser evils who should control and dominate to stabilise the situation on Earth.

So in order to have security, we need geopolitical dominance, but in order to do that, we need technology. So, disruptive technologies are extremely important. But having said that, technology doesn’t guarantee you that you’ll be a dominant geopolitical element. No.

Look at my country. We were a highly sophisticated, advanced country of technology in the 60s, 70s, especially the 80s and 90s. Did we become a dominant geopolitical power? No. We might have done that. We don’t have any intention to do that. The biggest element is this. State-of-the-art technology should be applied to the battlefield. See, even if you have AI technology or whatever. Quantum computing, whatever

you have. We can talk about it, but if they are not applied to the battlefield, a real weapon system, you can never be a dominant power. Japan never tries to do that because we are a peaceful nation. Our engineers or inventors have no idea how to apply those state-of-the-art technologies to military applications. Look at Israel for example. When I visited Israel, they’re talking about technological innovations every day and night to their exact weapon systems they use every day. So this is the difference. So in my personal view, technology comes first to be a dominant power, but in order to do that, you should be able to apply those disruptive technologies to the battlefield. Then you stabilize the situation to reach a comfortable level of security then we can enjoy economic prosperity.

Prof Lawrence Lau, Professor of Economic, University of Hong Kong

Regarding Asian Century, Let me start with a slide showing the shares of China, India, and the US of world GDP in the year 1820. This is from the database sampled by the late Angus Pedersen, a very distinguished economic historian. And this is based on purchasing power parity internationally. You can see that in 1820, two centuries ago, China supposedly had accounted for more than 30% of world GDP. And in India, the green line actually accounted for perhaps between 20 and 25 percent of GDP.

And the U.S. being a new country at the time, less than 3 percent. What has happened over the years is that by 1960, the blue line with U.S, accounted for over 30%. And in the meantime, both China and India have declined. Around the 60 or 70 where at the bottom is patching much less than 10%. But there’s a turnaround. You can see that by 2015, China in pur-

MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF ASIA 2035

chasing power parity terms has reached parity with the US. This is a finding confirmed by both the IMF and the World Bank. India, it’s also come up, but not by as much. Now, the next thing I’m going to show you is to compare the role of the US, China, and India.

In this chart, you have three lines. The blue line is the GDP of the United States, the red line is the GDP of China, and the black line is the GDP of India. One thing I want you to observe is that even though the red columns are the annual rates of growth, the red columns have been higher than the blue columns with a US rate of growth for many, many years.

From the beginning of 1978, it would take actually until 2033, according to my projections, before Chinese GDP and market prices and market exchange rates will catch up to the US. That’s how long it takes. Even though China has been growing faster than the US for about half a century, you know, it wouldn’t draw attention to the black line.

India actually has been doing really well in terms of GDP growth, especially in the last decade or so. You can see the big columns, which is Indian growth rates, and they have actually in the last 10 years, sometimes even higher than Chinese growth rates, and the projection in this chart might assume that India will grow at 8.5%. But you can see even at these rates, it’s not going to get, you know, the Indian GDP is rising, and it will not coming too close to either the Chinese GDP or the US GDP. Now, this one, the next chart, actually I assume 10% for India from now to 2035. And you can see that even that would not make much of a difference. What I actually want to say is that I’ve always thought India to be a promising country with Indian GDP coming at par with US and China’s GDP.

In terms of per capita, the gap is big even for China. Even when China has reached parity with US GDP, for per capita China was only one quarter that of US GDP and I think it would take at least until the end of this century, if at all, for Chinese GDP per capita to surpass that of US GDP.

And India, there’s a similar story, just a little bit further displaced in terms of time.

India will become a huge economy, I think, probably sometime around 2060, maybe 2060, 2070, it will take time. But India’s time will come, it will come. Now, the next thing I want to show you is the share of East Asia, China, EU, India, Japan,

and US world GDP. And I think that this actually are useful. Look at this chart. The blue line is much higher, the US share is around 40 to 50 and then coming down, thus moving and then coming down. And the Chinese share the red line is actually going up. Now notice the Japanese share, the yellow line, Japan reached its peak, about 18% somewhere in the early 90s and has since been actually coming down. India, the black line at the bottom, is rising although not enough to make a difference right now.

Think about East Asia. East Asia is actually higher than the USA now. I’m going to tell you that East Asia plus India/South Asia is going to be a relatively small percentage by 2040-50. In 2070, China and India together would have the GDP exceeding perhaps half of the world’s, their world GDP.

This is, okay, let me go back to the, this is world trade. And you can see more or less the same, East Asia is huge in terms of world trade. But you can see that in terms of world trade in goods, China has already surpassed the US and the EU is a major player. Japan is in the yellow line and India is in the black.

What about manufacturing?

East Asia has a huge manufacturing share. The green line up there. China is the red line. The US is the blue line and black line is the EU, Japan is the yellow line and then ASEAN as well as India is down below. So you can actually see that not much change in this relative standing will occur before 2035.

And I think that if you want to talk about the Asian century, you really need to talk about China and India together. I actually don’t think that Chinese GDP will constitute more than 50% of world GDP.

So anyhow, that is basically why I want to show you these charts. Now, next I want to come and look at a few geopolitical factors that are relevant.

The other thing I want to say is that I’m talking about India. I think India has very very fine economic fundamentals. No shortage of primary inputs, tangible capital, labor and human capital.

The Indian savings rate is actually quite healthy, around 30% because it should be quarter in 1978 when China started its economic reform and opened up the world. The Chinese savings rate was only around 35%. So India has enough savings

with finances and investments. Labour supply in India should not be a problem. India is now the world’s largest population and has a younger population than China. And it has a highly educated labor force and ample supply of engineers and scientists. And like China, India enjoys tremendous economies of scale, learning by doing. And because its large population, you know, has a very, very large number of very, very smart people.

It’s not a very long table in the distribution of abilities. Now, then what India needs to do is to construct an infrastructure to link the whole country together so as to realize its economies of scale. It should therefore invest in development leading infrastructure, and as infrastructure that will create its own demand.

We should also have an export promotion strategy. So as you expand this manufacturing, creating employment and boosting trade.

India does not have a single unified language, but it can rely on English for communication. Now one thing that we should say is the following, is that corruption per se should not be an obstacle in itself. Even now, I think, you read about it in papers, that corrupt senior officials are found in China almost every day. So even when people complain about possible corruption in India. I think that alone should not be an obstacle for growth. Now let me raise an idea that might actually be very positive not only for India but for entire South Asia. And that is a South Asian Free Trade. You take India, Pakistan, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh - put them together. Total population is 1.9 Billion- a quarter of world population. And if you can form SAFTA, there’s basically a mini form of economic globalization that will benefit every member of the world.

Just like Ambassador Pagokini, you know, trade and that is helpful, but in addition, I think SAFTA will be able to do the same for South Asia as the European common market did for post-world war 2 western europe. That is, maintain peace and prosper together. For instance, Germany fought three wars in the nineteenth and twentieth century. And the common market actually provided the bond that tied them together. I think economic interdependence is a great way to prevent conflict between nations. So these (SAFTA) can be used for all kinds of investments, especially infrastructure investments. Now just some geopolitical factors to list them. Peace in South Asia is positive. Lack of peace is negative.

Peace in Taiwan’s straits is positive. Lack of it is negative. China-U.S. strategic competition, it is negative and it continues. Despite what Graham Addison said, I think there will not be a war between China and the US because there will not be any winners. Both countries will be losers. And the former Soviet Union and the US realized that in the last century, they never went to war. They even had strategic arms control treaties.

The same would eventually happen in China and the US. I think there will be a revival of the Bretton Woods system of settlement of international transactions in each country’s own national currencies.

Finally, I think the globalization, decoupling, and de-risking, they will all be initially difficult. Okay, but ultimately possible because of increased competition among supply chains. So the competition will actually lower prices for all. So I am reasonably positive but want to say that there will be an Asian century, which is still a way off and will require the cooperation of both China and India. Let me stop here.

MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF ASIA 2035

The background, we’re looking at 2035 as one of the milestones on the pathway to the Asian century - 21st. There is little evidence of Asians having a geopolitical concept of Asia, such as Europe and America have had for their continental regions. East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, were different geopolitical theaters, sometimes overlapping, sometimes there were conquests between one and the other, but there was never one single overarching connection.

Ambassador Ranjan Mathai, Former Foreign Secretary of India

Henry Kissinger in his book on world order even claims that until the arrival of modern western powers, no Asian language had a word for Asia.

The popular use of the term Asian Century is recent and we’ve been told about the fact of China vs Asia. Despite the fact that many other parts of Asia have risen rapidly in the World Economic Order for decades - Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, 1955 to 1950.

In the 1970s, the Shah of Iran actually envisaged his country emerging as the fifth economic power in the world in the next two decades. We know what happened to that. World-beating economic growth is not enough to become the driver of a century. As with Europe in the 19th or US in the 20th century, when there is potential to alter the distribution of power across the entire world. It involves comprehensive national power, military technology industry, global diplomatic leadership, global trading and preponderance in soft power - also a leading role in the institutional structures of world order and rule making. All of this rests on one key foundation, the economy. It is the phenomenal growth of China from the 1990s and joined on a lesser scale from India in the 2000s that made the expression Asian century a projection that entered popular lexicon by around 2010.

Professor Lau saved me the need to delve into Angus Maddison by showing us his chart. Just remember one thing - in 1800-1820, Angus Maddison does not describe Asia as the Asian century. He just showed us an economic chart. China’s role in reviving world growth after the 2008 financial crisis in the West, its technological and military strength, and the thrust of its Belt and Road Initiative have now made the talk of an Asian century essentially one of a Chinese century with other actors playing lesser roles. We in India have different ideas. Caveat 3, there are too many unknowns, including some known unknowns and some which will come along, also some unknown unknowns. The biggest known unknown, I would say, is the direction of internal politics within some of the major actors because of the extent of polarization we see among all the Asian countries as well as the United States and Europe.

We’ve been asked to identify the key actors in Asia. The ADB did a 2011 study realizing the Asian century, 2050, and they listed seven- China, Japan, Korea, RoK, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. I would add Iran and Saudi Arabia, perhaps Turkey. Now, Vietnam and Philippines, or maybe we

should say ASEAN as a whole. I would also add that Russia and Australia and the US will be key actors in the Asian trajectory. Russia, Australia, and France, for that matter, are physically present in Asia. And the US is getting entrenched in the island chains of the Asia-Pacific. If you look at what’s going on in Guam now I don’t think the US is that far away.

We have to start with the economy, GDP. Asia continues to be one of the fastest growing regions of the world, and the IMF describes the region as a key driver generating over 66% of global growth at around 4.6% per annum. The post pandemic recovery has been generally impressive, though some questions have recently arisen about statistical data on growth rates, particularly the growth rates from China, but not only China. So we’ll start with China. Since about 2015, through the pandemic and after, it appeared that China’s rise to global supremacy was just a matter of time. Since 2022, Chinese growth has slowed and I’m indebted to Professor Mats Karlsson to have introduced this.

It now seems stuck in a property-related slump. The high U.S. interest rates are weakening its currency, but at the same time, the trade and tariff problems it is encountering have not increased, but they have slashed its usual trade surpluses. The People’s Bank of China has tools to stop the currency slide, but raising interest rates to match the Fed would exacerbate problems in the housing sector as well as its debt repayment. China’s phenomenal growth till now has been powered by exports, infrastructure investment, local government expenditure and state-owned enterprises.

All four are facing serious headwinds and household consumption which could have compensated remains stuck below 40% of GDP as against 50 to 60 in most other Asian major actors. Despite attempts at stimulus, household debt remains a serious problem.

One known unknown is whether China’s surge in advanced technology despite the US efforts to stall it and green technology will spur a wave of new growth. It’s uncertain at this point. Incidentally, while we were talking about rules, the UK’s hosting of the first really big conference on artificial intelligence suggests that while there’s a lot of technology here, the West is still trying to lead the rule-making process. Some recent data suggest that the Yuan is enlarging its role in global trade payments and international finance. It’s presently the most active for global payments but it is 3.7% of the total in the world according to SWIFT data.

It is only the fifth largest among the currency reserves held globally. Will this continue to grow till 2035, given that the current dilemmas of the Chinese policy makers have already led to capital controls and capital flight? Chinese citizens can take only $50,000 abroad. It’s a known unknown.

Has the Belt and Road Initiative achieved by 2023 what it set out to do? That is, the transformation of both land-based and sea-based routes. It seemed to be geopolitically transformative at one stage. China emerging as the world’s largest creditor for development, but recent trends suggest that BRI debt management with rollovers rather than repayment might lead to debt trap.

China runs surpluses selling consumer, manufactured and infrastructure goods and buying largely commodities and other items that feed back into its own export machine. This leads developing countries to be largely tied to other markets. Take Sri Lanka for an example.

We were told about how China has overtaken us as the largest exporter to Sri Lanka. But where does Sri Lanka sell? It sells to the EU, it sells to India, and it sells to the US. China ranks way down. So when these countries want to make friends to sell, they have to go back to the West. The most recent US-China Leaders Summit, about which we just read, suggests that the 2024 elections in the US could be a major factor in determining China’s trajectory till 2035.

There is increasing consensus in the US on treating China as a strategic competitor, but there are differences over the extent to which trade and financial decoupling should proceed. And also, we know now that the BRI was the first attempt to really dominate what the geopoliticians call the world island, Eurasia as a whole. And that is not going to happen without serious competition.

Look at Japan. It’s growing slowly, but it has growth nevertheless, and it remains a global trading power. It is now investing in initiatives rivaling the Belt and Road Initiative. It still holds huge external reserves.

It’s at the cutting edge of many new transformative technologies. And now it is developing massive deterrent missile forces, though it remains demographically negative. India’s growth is expected to remain steady around 6%-7% which means that it should overtake Germany and Japan to emerge as the third largest economy well before 2035.

India has demonstrated the potential to play a greater role in international finance, bailing out Sri Lanka is a great example. But our flip flops on trade policy are not helping us expand our influence. The rupee is still not a player abroad. And energy remains like a ball in chain on our right foot. Yet we have demonstrated a strategic economy. Whether the 2024 elections in India will impact our trajectory is another known unknown.

Politico-military: The status of Asia in 2023 is believed to be encouraging as Europe and the Levant are bogged down in Asia’s actual war, while the rest of Asia is not. But despite what Prof Mahbubani said, military expenditures remain very high, including in ASEAN. There are tensions on the Taiwan Straits in the South China Seas and Northeast Asia. The standoff between India and China in Ladakh continues. And in all these situations, the central actor is China.

Then there is Pakistan, domestically turbulent, but still sponsoring terrorism. Their border with Afghanistan is also volatile, and there are too many unknown unknowns in the trajectory of our Western borders. Now the possibility of Iran getting into a conflict with Israel persists. And to me, the trajectory of Iran-US-Israel relations is the biggest unknown because of oil.

Oil and gas will in 2035 still be the dominant energy sources for Asia, and a crisis in the Gulf could derail energy management and trade balances across Asia, just as the 1973 oil shock slowed down Europe. Today, four out of the five top world’s oil importers are Asian, China, India, Japan, South Korea. All five top LNG importers till last year were AsianJapan, China, India, South Korea and Taiwan. And the US is sitting pretty in this situation as the world’s largest oil and gas producer.

Now the forecast of drivers and factors, one is political change. Will China’s political direction remain as it is? One simple signal. The sentiments expressed over Li Kequiang’s death had shades of the mourning when Prime Minister Zhou Enlai died. Does it mean something?

Growth. Can growth in Asia continue on the same path it has given that the financial situation in the world is changing? Military strength. There are military industrial complexes and they are growing rapidly in all the key countries and that will be one factor but still not one Asian country has made a success of getting a jet engine, whether commercial or military.

My stones and scenarios. My analysis suggests that 2035 will not mark the milestone of the Asian century. So what are my two scenarios? One is plausible for China to define the Asian century- domination over Asia is essential.

But historically, China never had domination except for parts of East and parts of SouthEast Asia. And apart from that Japan and Korea, India, and I believe also Iran, as well as Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, etc. will not go along with a Chinese dominated order.

And the US is not standing still and it is determined to retain global preponderance in Asia. The best-case scenario, the Chinese trajectory gets redefined either through internal change or through a G2 light with the US coexisting with the free and open Indo-Pacific, the Quad and a cold peace in China.

The most likely- China does not change course, but reaches some temporary modus vivendi with the US. Japan, Korea, Australia remain closely tied to the US. ASEAN continues a hedging strategy. The growth of India, Indonesia, Vietnam proceeds in a way that makes Chinese dominance less likely though China will have the largest weight in Asia.

We have a number of black swans, we heard about them- Taiwan, another war in the gulf, the PLA deciding to push India around, North Korea out of control, another pandemic etc.

Do I have any recommendations for India? Economy, economy, economy! Domestic first and regional integrations. Get other Asians to make a push for United Nations Security Council reform.

I still hope the UNSC will have some relevance, despite my colleague having expressed skepticism and in multilateral development banks. And then I think we need to build Asian dialogues.

And when I talk of dialogues I don’t mean just talking. I am talking about a situation like dialogue lead on to institutional structures like Europe was able to build with the organization of security and cooperation in Europe once detente started.

And why do I end on a peaceful note? Because I am an ex-diplomat. And as an ex-diplomat will tell you, what is the definition of a diplomat? He is one that when he tells you to go to hell, he tell it to you so nicely that you ask him for the way!

MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF ASIA 2035

Dr. Henry Huiyao WANG, President, Center for China and Globalization

Talking about Asian Century, We know the world is undergoing tremendous challenges and also the world is in a much more dangerous place than it used to be. We have experienced prosperity and peace largely for the past seventy seven years since the Second World War.

The Bretton Woods system has built a world that has really kept us for so long but that system seems to not be able to function effectively. Now we’re facing crises in the Europe continent, we have the Russia war in Ukraine and we also have this Palestine/Israel conflict that is happening.

So what I would like to share today is that I appreciate the organizers for inviting me to share and also I would like to say that because I am traveling for other previous commitments I am unable to come but I would really like to share some of my views.

First I think the trend that is internationalization and globalization will continue because globalization is the product that actually kept us for the last 77 years without having a third world war. Trade has gone up several hundred times since the Second World War. And actually now we are all better off than we used to be.

And China will be a good example, it has lifted 800 million people out of poverty. And India is a great country, now a big south, global south countries- China and India can really work together. So I think on the globalization, trend that is really happening, we need to work together. We need to have all the global south countries that represent 80% of the global

population - we have to really become a new important pole in this multipolar world. Unipolar world is gone and the multipolar world is here. So I think this is really important that we work together. I was very pleased to see the doubling of the BRICS countries from 5 to 11. And China, India, and other countries are playing a leading role in BRICS organization.

Which is important because that is an economic organization that drives economic development with neo-development banks, Asian infrastructure investment banks. In that, the largest recipient is India. So we hope that BRICS countries can really work together.

Plus the BRI that China is having now is really openly inclusive, welcoming other economic frameworkers to collaborate - for example with B3W, EU Global Gateway, and India’s IMEC. I think all those infrastructure that are common consensus now should really work together.

I would say that the next big mega trend is that BRICS countries, global south countries will emerge, will have an infrastructure revolution, that is going to shape our world for better connectivity, better understanding, and preventing future conflict. This is the first observation that I have.

Number two is that I think that climate is our next biggest challenge for the whole mankind. We should first de-risk us out of the climate threats. This is imminent and it’s really happening.

And so I think this is really important and China, India, and particularly also US and EU which will all work together to fight climate change and let’s support that. Because we all have a moral responsibility as big countries to really work together. To prevent our Earth, our global village, from falling apart - threatened by this climate change danger.

And the third observation I have is that we have to really work on the digital, on the AI and meeting all those challenges. We are having the technology war now and digital, AI, data flows, and privacy, and public goods really have no governance models there - we need to work together to talk about the next generation of global governance in different spheres of the world. The digital revolution is happening, but also the AI is happening. And this is a double-edged sword for the AI. We have to harness the good side of it. But also prevent the bad side - let’s not have an AI arms race but work on the benefits for the mankind.

So this is really three biggest trends that we see. That the brics will emerge, global south will emerge, climate will be the biggest threat we have to face with, and digital AI revolution is taking place.

As far as the three recommendations I can give you, I think first we really should work together to strengthen the multilateral system. We have a unipolar world now but that is not functioning properly. We need a multipolar world but there’s not yet a multipolar system to support that.I think it is very important that China, EU, US, India, and Global South should work together. And use the platform of G20 and BRICS and other platforms to strengthen our communication and standing and dialogue. Lets have more dialogue, that is really vital.

Number 2 is that we need more people-to-people exchanges. We should really boost tourism. China has 150 million people touring around the world before the pandemic. And China is now still sending a lot of tourists and student exchanges.

Let’s have more of that. We welcome Chinese students going around the world and also international students studying in China. We have about, before the pandemic, 20000 students from India studying in China which is great and we need more of them! And also we need more tourism, we know that India and China share a lot of cultural heritage at their roots.

And we need to strengthen this. So culture is the bond for countries. We cannot break it. So culture and tourism, I’m glad to see more flights from China to India, and India to China.

Thirdly and finally, we need to continue to strengthen economic globalisation. We need to really push for trade and investment and all those benefits because in the last 78 years since World War II, since the Britain Wood system, trade has kept us all together.

The connectivity has kept us together, the infrastructure building has kept us together, lets continue to do that. That’s the best was to prevent a future conflict or a major world war.

And I think economic globalisation, which I think China is really focused on, especially with the Belt and Road initiative. China has also launched ASEAN and wants to join the CPTPP, which is a higher standard of free trade agreement. China also had an economic summit with Africa, with Latin Ameri-

ca, with Central Asia, with Arabs and ASEAN of course, so we hope we have an economic sub-region. Let’s do India-China economic cooperation because we all have one point to consider, India is one of the largest and most populated countries in the world, and I think there are so many complimentary and supplementary roads now, that we can really contribute to each other.

So I think economic globalisation is the best way to go, trade, investment, connectivity, and we have to use that to prevent future conflict. Work on transparency, work on people-to-people exchange, work on investment and infrastructure, and surely by doing that, we can bring a better world together.

Ambassador Ranjan Mathai, Former Foreign Secretary of India

Q1. Are you in agreement with the Key Drivers identified? Would you like to add/delete any driver or further substantiate why these drivers are important?

I am responding to the queries seriatim:

• No major observations.

• Broadly in agreement.

I would add that ensuring energy security-adequacy & affordability-would be a key driver; as that affects the trajectory of economic growth towards Asia 2035.

Q2. Are you broadly in agreement with the scenarios developed based on the key drivers of change? If not please elaborate.

• Broadly in agreement with the scenarios. However consideration must be given to internal polarization over foreign policy outlook in many of the key actors. This could affect the way key actors proceed in the international arena, in case of political transition at home.

• Covered in 2&3 above

• Is economic heft sufficient to claim the century ? In my presentation I answered that it is not.

• Key Drivers: Trade for Peace:- I believe there is a variation I hinted at. While global economic trends are powered by US-China competition,there is also a possibility of some collaboration ( which will be kept low key) on global financial movements driven by mutual interests of significant financial interest groups in both countries. The internal situation in both countries must be amenable to influence of these interest groups for this kind of collaboration to go ahead, so we have to watch internal political developments closely.

Q3.Which of the scenarios in your opinion is the ‘preferred’ scenario for India?

• Section-”Dragon dominates’:- I do not think that in the period to 2035 there is great possibility of US “seeking” a diminished role in Asia-Pacific. What it may seek is a modus vivendi with China to keep competition within guardrails. (Extending this to what I termed “G-2 lite” is a more remote possibility). In this scenario of competition within boundaries, some reference to Russia and the evolution of strategic weapon competition and arms control may be relevant.

• Dragon reflects: Apart from internal power struggle and end of demographic dividend, China’s economic growth could be seriously slowed by its property slump, excessive debt and loss of external markets and technology. China will face problems in trying to be leader of the Global South: Apart from India, Iran would not accept it. And the present rolling over of BRI loans- threatening to overtake the issuance of new loans in volume terms, suggests limited room for using the BRI as the platform for leading the South.

• Black swans were asked for, in the format suggested to me: I suggested war over Taiwan, war in the Gulf involving Iran, a financial crisis, and another pandemic- any of which could upturn calculations.

• Nevertheless the Conclusion is in order- with the caveat on China: The Asian century could be a Chinese one only if a number of parameters (spelt out in the discussion-one of which is a new wave of technological growth) work in its favour. Even if this were to happen it will be sometime after 2035!

INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD & TECHNO DIPLOMACY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATION MODERATOR

India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy has renewed the impetus for strengthening relations with its neighbours. The policy aims to ensure peace, prosperity and tranquillity in the sub- region. India is aiming to forge sustained relations with neighbours with numerous advantages of geo- proximity, historical, cultural and religious bondages.

Indian concerted efforts to shape the enduring, long-term strategic convergence on mutually benefiting relationships are highly appreciated by the neighbourhood. The recent initiatives towards strengthening bilateral ties and integrating the region are steps in the right direction in the era of interdependence.

Aim

The aim of the session is to ideate mutually beneficial strategy to fortify India’s neighbourhood as a resilient and integrated region.

Scope

The discussion will encompass the imperative factors for integrating the region with a view to: Recognise the combined strength of nations in the form of opportunities, identify impediments to corroboration and integration.

Craft a strategy to focus on building strategic partnerships, integrating economies, facilitate techno-diplomacy and ensure regional security framework.

Context

The topic has been chosen to deliberate the explicit need to leverage the region’s ability to alter the geo-pol landscape of Asia. The region Is blessed with vast resources and domain expertise, including the geo- proximity, sustained economic growth, technology prowess including technology-savvy aspiring youth, historical, cultural bondages backed by common values & interests. Yet, why is it the region is tagged often by some quarters as the least integrated region in the world, lacking a common vision to shape enduring and longterm strategic convergence on mutually benefitting relations.

Thus, we need regional solutions to regional problems. No nation ever has all the resources they need. Hence, leveraging collective strengths, wisdom, interests and also common concerns is a must to benefit teeming millions of the region.

Key Note Address:

Ambassador Pankaj Saran, Convenor NatStrat, MemberNSAB and former Deputy NSA, India

Special Address:

Ambassador P S Raghavan – Chairman, NSAB, India

Moderator: Lt General Reddy, Former Director General Defence Int Agency & Deputy Chief – IDS, India

Panellists

Bangladesh: Lt General M A Hossain- Commandant, National Defence College, Dhaka.

Maldives: Brigadier General Ahmed Nilam - Former Head of Military Intelligence, Maldives Defence Force.

Myanmar: Major General Ngwe Thein - Vice President, Central, Executive Committee - War Veterans.

Nepal: Mr Minendra Rijal - Former Defence Minister, Nepal

Sri Lanka: Ambassador Milind Moragoda - Founder, Pathfinder, Sri lanka

Lt General Reddy, AVSM, SC, VSM (Retd.) Former Director General Defence Int Agency & Deputy Chief - IDS

Sri Lanka: Mr Ahmed A Jawad – Director, Pathfinder, Sri Lanka

Thailand: Air Chief Marshal Saisak Kanpachai - Royal Thai Armed Forces.

India: Mr Alok Joshi - Member, NSAB & Former Secretary of R&AW.

India: Mr A B Mathur - Member, NSAB & Former Special Secretary- R&AW.

India: Mr.PM Heblikar, Member, Governing Council, Centre for National Security Studies (CNSS) Bangalore.

Techno-Diplomacy:

Mr. Vikas Khitha, Vice President & Head, L&T Defence

Mr. Neelesh Tungar, President Defence, Bharat Forge Ltd, Pune.

Mr. Sunil Gupta – CEO & Co-Founder of QNu Labs.

Mr Manoj Parmar – Founder & CEO AI Shield

Conduct.

The discussions were held in two sessions of two hours each, followed by Q & A, a Presentation by Tech CEOs, a summation by the moderator, and finally, Closing Remarks by the Chairman.

Neighbour’s Perception of India.

Indian neighbours view enjoying a geopolitical sweet spot, a peer competitor to China in the Indo-Pacific region, and enjoying close relations with both USA and Russia, retaining strategic autonomy.

India is seen as a stable democracy with strong democratic Institutions, aspiring tech-savvy youth, the sustained economic growth with rapid capability building to become a self-reliant nation. The neighbours also have apprehensions of Indian dominance, subsuming economic and cultural activities. The huge differential between the Indian economy, military and technical domains is another concern for the neighbourhood of India. India is often seen as meddling in their internal affairs and also not delivering on the promises made to the neighbours

Challenges

Lack of Regional Security Framework. The complex security situation in the region with no common umbrella arrangement to allay fears of the neighbourhood is a major challenge. The geo-political situation is uncertain owing to external players in regional politics such as China, USA, Pak, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and growing anti- India sentiments fuelled by China and Pakistan. The traditional security issues have broadened to non-military issues of human security concerns, including water, food, energy, climate, terrorism and refugees.

Growing Chinese influence in the region including establishing military bases, the economic adverse influence of the debt trap policy, Blitzkrieg dubious infrastructure development in Indian neighbourhood such as BRI projects, energy pipelines, etc., having a huge presence of Chinese personnel closer to the border region is posing security of hegemonism and power politics in Indian neighbourhood.

Lack of Political Stability and balanced political perspective has been leading to frequent regime changes in the sub-region. China is also he internal politics of the neighbourhood with the vested interest of expanding influence in the region leading to the pro-China

Economic Turbulence and numerous hurdles in economic integration owing to lack of free trade and transit agreement, levying of import taxes, persistent trade imbalance and nontariff barriers. The Chinese huge loans for BRI projects and over dependence on Chinese economy are factors leading to debt trap of neighbours. Radicalisation and Social Dissonance is being spread by certain inimical elements in Indian neighbourhood supported by China and Pakistan, fuelling anti- India propaganda, accusing of human right violations, housing ANEs on their soil and carrying out social media influence operations targeting India is a major challenge.

Access Denial to India by certain countries is hampering seamless connectivity in the region. The perceived insecurity of Indian military power and dominance is precluding access/ transit. The enormous potential for regional trade is sub-optimally utilized due to the lack of road, rail, inland water, ports and airport connectivity and integration in the logistics chain. Border Disputes remain unresolved despite numerous attempts amongst Indian neighbourhoods, leading to major differences in bilateral relations, holding other important fac-

ets of cooperation to grinding halt. Non-accommodative, rigid nature of negotiations by each party to the border dispute has been common thread of continued disputes.

Opportunities

Sub-Regional Cooperation Framework. The logic of geo-location is unrelenting to have a stable, peaceful neighbourhood to reduce political, economic and military burdens. Thus, India should build political consensus on regional security, resurrect her credibility and image in the region as a Net Security Provider. India’s ability to alter geo-political landscape of South Asia should be leveraged for the benefit of the neighbourhood.

Connectivity.

India’s neighbouring countries, either landlocked or Island nations need multiple connectivity options to facilitate smooth economic integration, trade, investments, logistics movement and exploit tourism potential in the sub-region. The impetus to projects such as BBIN, Trilateral highway, Kaladan multi-modal project, trans-border rail links, port construction, and air connectivity will tremendously boost the prosperity of the region.

Economic Integration.

India’s vast domain expertise in banking, insurance, telecom, digitized services, joint ventures /start-ups will help neighbours in enhanced bilateral trade and sustained economic growth. India should increase the FDI in the neighbourhood to enhance their export base and assist in the commonality of goods and services of the neighbourhood.

Similarly, India has received over one lakh crore worth of FDI proposals from countries sharing land borders with India, and only 50% are cleared by the Government of India while the balance is yet to be processed. Optimising trade through MFN status, SAFTA and CEPA will reduce the non-tariff barriers and open opportunities as also reduce huge trade imbalance in the long term. The trade needs to be more diversified and expanded to be enduring in competitive business environment.

Regional Diplomacy.

The Gujral Doctrine, assuring unilateral concessions to

neighbours without seeking reciprocity, should be the guiding neighbourhood policy of India. India should engage on proactive but non-intrusive diplomacy, to inspire confidence to treat India as a friend and not a regional power-seeking maximizing of influence at neighbour’s cost. India should focus on bilateral priorities, concerns and aspirations, creating a balance in the power differentials. The diplomatic engagements between SAARC members needs to be revisited and sustained.

Soft Power.

The plural culture of India and its historical linkages offer opportunities for enhanced people-to-people contact and exchange of ideas. The border region has common links which will further strengthen the relationship. The tourism sector generates employment, inspires local artisans, support services and the transport sector by opening a gateway. The pool of language experts of neighbouring countries will facilitate better people to people contact, education, trade and create long friendship bridges.

Military Diplomacy.

India should strengthen strategic military relations with neighbours, as a net security provider of the sub-region capable of tackling growing security threats.

Indian engagements with neighbours in the military domain should focus on helping their capacity building, joint training including anti-terror training, sharing intelligence, maritime cooperation, sharing technology in guarding their land borders and coasts, joint border patrolling, supply of military weapons, equipment, ammunition, sharing intelligence on drug trafficking, piracy, smuggling to increase interoperability in the region. The Indian expertise in Disaster management will be of great help to neighbours.

Techno-Diplomacy.

There are technologies taking shape in India, including quantum computing, quantum communication, AI, Space and manufacturing sectors. These technologies are firmly on Indian radar, as are spatial language technologies more applicable to mosaic warfare, which mostly exists in theory today. These are technologies being developed and tested. The manufacturing industry has also seized the opportunity for growth and India is replicating the success in other sectors

like the defence and space sectors. In space sector, India has moved ahead faster, and the successes are visible. Indian AI technology is also fast growing in scale and scope, having already built the defensive measures. The product is protecting many organisations across the world in banking, health care, telecom, manufacturing and public infrastructure.

India has its own next-generation Cyber Security Platform. The idea is that quantum technology will protect critical infrastructure, optical fibre networks, and the Internet, implemented in several sectors. India can extend this technology through satellites, optical fibres and wireless networks. This will allow an extended cyber security platform. Thus, there is vast scope for techno diplomacy as an effective tool for mutual benefit and development.

Energy Cooperation.

The initiative taken recently by allowing the Indian Public Sector as well as private participation in energy export to Bangladesh can be replicated, including the Indian power grid utilised by others The ever-increasing energy needs of neighbours for manufacturing industries necessitates sharing resources for mutual benefit and economic prosperity.

Capacity Building.

Indian development assistance to neighbours for capacity building, including community development projects, skilling the youth/women to get jobs and providing basic civic amenities in the border areas will be highly rewarding. The necessity of provisioning of higher education institutes viz; IITs, IIMs along with initial faculty staff to establish and stabilise the facilities is a dire need. In the health sector, the Indian government and private corporations establishing special medical facilities akin to AIIMS in at least each national capital will reduce neighbours’ medical tourism. The language training of employable youth will provide abundant opportunities to seek jobs.

Key Take aways

• Having deliberated in detail with free-flowing frank views and valuable recommendations by all the panellists and other participants, the following issues emerged:

• Craft a strategy to build strategic partnerships, integrate economies, facilitate techno-diplomacy and ensure a region-

al security framework.

• With its human resources, geographical location dominating the Indian Ocean, and the crucial sea lanes to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and the markets of SE Asia, we need to leverage the region’s ability to alter the geopolitical landscape of Asia.

• Attaining common goals of peace, prosperity and security in the Indian neighbourhood region is only feasible by focusing on convergence and working on a process-based approach to resolve contentious issues.

• India is a bright spot in Asia and the Global South amid geopolitical churning de-coupling and de-risking despondency. The neighbours, therefore, must leverage Indian strengths, expertise and resources to build capacities and ride the development wave along with India.

• India should be mindful of the sovereign sensitivity of each neighbour, bridge the trust deficit with political hierarchy without being the dominant power and invest in long-term enduring relationships

• India should strive to meet demand-driven, people-friendly, and mutually beneficial aspirations of the neighbourhood.

• Integration of region based on transparency and equity for all stakeholder nations serves as the foundational blocks. Thus, it is imperative to create a conducive environment for pursuing shared vision for future and attaining common goals.

• The opportunities are only possible to be exploited the strong political will of India and its neighbours to cooperate with the aim to benefit humanity of the entire sub-region.

• Recognise the combined strength of nations in the form of opportunities and identify impediments to corroboration and integration.

• We need regional solutions to regional problems. No nation ever has all the resources they need. Hence, leveraging collective strengths, wisdom, interests and common concerns is a must, to benefit millions of the region.

• India should strengthen strategic military relations with neighbours, as a net security provider of the sub-region capable of tackling growing security threats.

The tabulated views of panellists of Indian neighbours is as under: -

COUNTRY & PANELIST

CHALLENGES OPPORTUNITIES

NEPAL BANGLADESH

Mr. Minendra Rijal, Former Defence Minister of Nepal

Lt General MA Hossain , Commandant, National Defence College, Bangladesh

• India should respect sovereign Nepal’s aspirations.

• India not granting landing rights to use Nepal airports close to Indian border

• Agniveers released after 04 years need to be employed by India.

• Border disputes in 606 sqkm needs resolution through dialogue.

• Nepal must ride the wave of Indian growth

• Exploit centuries old strong linkages

• India, China & USA are important development partners of Nepal

• Economic: hydropower, petroleum pipeline, trade incl border HAATS & HR development.

• Infrastructure and Connectivity projects

• 54 common rivers – water sharing agreements overdue.

• Border Agreement success to be emulated in water sharing agreements

• Security – focus on Intelligence sharing, maritime coop, Anti-terror coop, joint training and confidence building measures (CBM).

• Impetus to connectivity projects – Roads, water ways, ports & BBIN

• Economic: Diversify trade, expand basket & trade imbalance to be addressed

• Energy: Indian private companies to increase power export, transfer technology and train Bangladesh personnel

COUNTRY & PANELIST CHALLENGES

Major General Ngwe Thein , Vice President, Central Executive Committee, Myanmar War Veterans Organisation

• New forms of non- traditional threats including cyber, IT from developed nations

OPPORTUNITIES

• Security coop – To minimise impact on trade, food security and other domains

• Economy: Forge stronger coop based on historical bonds

Brigadier General Ahmed Nilam , - Former Head of Military Int, MDF, Maldives

• Decolonisation, Rising powers like China impacting Maldives adversely

• Militarisation of IOR

• Eight Degree channel – Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC), maritime crimes on the rise

• Techno-Diplomacy, Nonstarter since 2005

• Economic Coop – maricultural, maritime commerce, establish economic institutes/structures

• Security coop – Maritime coop, navigation, rescue, and logistics support

• Technology: share critical technology, train and maintain assets

• Impetus to ongoing infrastructure projects, construct bridges to link islands and walls to prevent tides

SRI LANKA

Ambassador Milind Moragoda, - Founder, Pathfinder, Sri Lanka.

• Indian size – fear of dominance

• Sri Lanka’s political instability affects economy

• Narrow economy – only 3% growth till 2033

• Economic coop – Address trade imbalance by scale and volume of trade

• Connectivity -road, rail &ports integration

• Energy – RE30,00MW potential exists in Sri Lanka

• Develop Trincomalee port as oil hub

• Minerals – India to develop with environment consciousness

• Telecom – Scope for numerous joint ventures

COUNTRY & PANELIST

SRI LANKA

Mr Ahmed A Jawad Director, Pathfinder, Sri Lanka.

CHALLENGES

• Presence of extra regional powers – Chinese submarines / research vessels, Indian concerns

OPPORTUNITIES

• FTA – good step but further boost is a must

• FDI – Invest in container terminal and wind energy projects

• Tourism and connectivity projects offer opportunities

THAILAND

Air Chief Marshal Saisak Kanpachai, Royal Thai Armed Forces.

• Influence by China & US- major rival powers

• SCS – constant concern

• Different concerns of India and Thailand – geo-location different

• Frequent regime changes in Thailand – inconsistent foreign policies

• Security coop – MOU since 2012, scope for further strengthening including maritime patrols, joint combined training exercises, additional vacancies for training in India

• Share Indian expertise in counter terrorism & counter insurgency domain and military medical cooperation

The Indian panellist views and recommendations are tabulated as under: -

PANELIST

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Changing world order- need to analyse in present context

• Rule based International order – ineffective owing to self-centred agenda of nations

• Asia-pacific need to address lacunae in dealing with global order

• China-India: Inevitable for big neighbours to compete for strategic space

• US – China competition: Technology divide is a major concern

Ambassador Pankaj Saran, Convenor NatStrat, MemberNSAB and former Deputy NSA, India

• India – Genuinely Eurasian or Central Asian power

• Victim of 03 lines: Durand Line, Macmohan Line and Radcliffe Line – fragmented the region

• Extended neighbourhood – must focus beyond narrow sliver of territory to CAR & west Asia

• Neighbours anxiety- to differentiate them from the Indian mega-narrative.

• Leverage – cross border connectivity, Hydro power, trade, rupee acceptance in region, security concerns including terrorism and proxy to external powers.

Mr Alok Joshi - Member, NSAB & Former Secretary of R&AW.

• Need to focus on close economic cooperation

• Impetus to connectivity projects in the region

• Address cyber and Internet threats of the region

• Build critical infrastructure & enhance capacity

Ambassador P S Raghavan Chairman, NSAB, India

PANELIST

Mr A B Mathur - Member, NSAB & Former Special SecretaryR&AW.

Mr PM Heblikar, Member, Governing Council, Centre for National Security Studies (CNSS) Bangalore

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Indo-Bangladesh border issues resolved, paved way for better economic integration

• Present Govt of Bangladesh cooperation on Anti-terror and counter insurgency with India

• Focus on regional non-traditional threats – water, climate, health, cyber and supply chains

• India to be thought leader of non-traditional security issues

• Blue economy – Minerals, climate change, RE, blue bio-tech needs focus in region

• Indian MSMEs – must collaborate with neighbours in Hydro power & RE

The Tabulated views of Technology CEOs regarding huge potential and opportunities for technodiplomacy is as under-

PANELIST

Mr. Vikas Khitha, Vice President & Head, L&T Defence

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Indian manufacturing industry seized the opportunity for growth, hope to replicate the success in defense and space sectors

• Focussing on supply chains beyond borders, Semi-conductors eco system, R&D, military industrial complex & quantum technology

• Frugal engineering based technological solutions

PANELIST

Mr. Neelesh Tungar, President Defence, Bharat Forge Ltd,

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Challenge is how to have Indian IP and Indian technology

• Creating Indian IP - critical in defence diplomacy

Mr. Sunil Gupta

CEO

& Co-Founder, QNu Labs

• India must have own next generation cyber security platform

• Quantum technology will protect India’s critical infrastructure

• Already implementing in several banks, can be extended through satellites, optical fibres & wireless networks.

• It allows extended cyber security platforms.

Mr Manoj Parmar

Founder

& CEO, AI Shield

• AI and AI security -Built technology and the defensive measures.

• Product is protecting 40 plus organizations across the world in banking, health care, telecom, manufacturing, and public infrastructure.

• Vision: secure AI systems of the world

Ambassador P S Raghavan, Chairman - National Security Advisory Board, India

Speaking about neighborhoods, we need to recognize the world has changed. Much of the analysis of global relations is along Cold War templates. We are not yet ready for a new order. Everyone talks about a rules-based international order, which for each country means the rules they want to follow and little else. We see this in the breakdown of European security architecture, such as in the Ukraine war and the breakdown of relationships in West Asia – which is what the latest conflict in West Asia is about.

Are we not a part of Asia-Pacific? We talk about Indo-Pacific because our neighbourhood has as much interest in the Indian and Pacific Oceans as the group of countries collected in San Fransico. We need to recognize this lacuna in dealing with the global order. In addition to objective affinities and reasons for us to collaborate, we also need to recognize domestic politics that colours our relations.

About China – it’s inevitable that two big neighbours will compete for space. We need to bring maturity to this competition. Globalisation is moving towards securitization. Assistance to us is going to be far more difficult as people look to assist war-torn countries. In our neighbourhood, some of us are maritime countries, some continental. India is both.

US-China

Much of our current dynamics are shaped by US efforts to keep us away from China. We have to be very careful about how we navigate this in our neighbourhood. One of the

dangers is the technological divide. We will get caught in it. Whether it’s military cooperation, telecom, or cyber security, a technological divide or competition between the US and China will impact us and our regional dialogue has to include this. We need to look at this far more than we are doing in a bilateral sense with our neighbours.

AN EXPANDED VISION NEEDED

India must again expand its horizon when we talk of the ‘Indian Neighbourhood.

Our neighbourhood occupies a central position in Indian foreign and strategic policy. When we look at the history of our region, one of the things we need to recall is that till a few hundred years ago, India was effectively a genuine Eurasian or Central Asian power. India’s borders were contiguous with Iran, the Russian heartland, and Tibet. Only after the British came did we find artificial lines bound us.

We have been a victim of three lines in our security policy: The Durand Line, McMahon Line and the Radcliffe Line. These lines, without any consensus of Indian public opinion, fragmented our region, a contiguous landmass going right up to Mongolia and the Russian heartland. So, today, we have fragmentation in the form of Pakistan and Bangladesh. While this fragmentation is only a recent chapter in the relatively long history of the Indian subcontinent, it is what we have grappled with for most of the last 75 years.

It is no accident that in the first few decades of the drawing of the Radcliffe Line, India had to fight four wars. These were all

Ambassador Pankaj Saran, Former Deputy National Security Advisor, India

a part of the turbulence of this fragmentation that we were subject to. The Indian neighbourhood could probably be sub-categorised into five sub-regions. The first is the western frontier, which is Pakistan and Afghanistan. And perhaps the most troubled in terms of the relationship. The second is the Himalayan buffers, which are Nepal and Bhutan. The third is the Bay of Bengal states, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The fourth is the Indian Ocean region littorals – including Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius. Finally, the extended neighbourhood stretching from the Suez Canal to the South China Sea comprises interconnected regions, including West Asia/the Gulf, Central Asia, SE Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Beyond a Closed Subcontinental Context

The trend over the years has been to shrink the strategic space and forge policies for a closed subcontinent ecosystem from a purely sovereign geographical territorial context. This mindset has to change.

Therefore, while respecting the current geopolitical realities, India’s neighbourhood outreach must not ignore what the subcontinent used to be, including India’s historical boundaries.

This gives a tangible shape to India’s ‘Immediate Neighbourhood’ and the ‘Extended Neighbourhood.’ Unfortunately, for various reasons, the Indian strategic elites and policymakers have been compelled, and their attention was forced on a very, very narrow sliver of territory around the Indian landmass.

India must again expand its horizon when we talk of the Indian Neighbourhood. Fortunately, a drift in that direction has occurred in the last few years, where this concept has been reviewed and, to an extent, revised. For example, the ‘Look East’ policy was put in place in 1992, driven by exogenous events- the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Indian financial collapse of 1991. A turn of events compelled us to re-establish our linkages with East Asia.

However, we continued to lag in so far as Central Asia was concerned, allowing a great deal of time to waste in not giving Central Asia the attention it merits; remember, this was another one of the immediate contiguous neighbours! Today, Indian foreign policy has tried to make the necessary corrections, and there is a much more focused thrust towards Cen-

tral Asia. Towards India’s West, the Gulf and the Arab world is another area where India is focussing fairly significantly; the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) would be the most notable outcome of this policy once it matures, provided it survives the ongoing turmoil of the October 7th Gaza attack. Last but not least, India sees its boundaries expand in the maritime domain, particularly the littorals of the Indian Ocean region.

Only with this broad canvas of India’s neighbourhood etched in our minds can the right decisions to shape the right response be taken in New Delhi.

Learning to Live with Neighbours

It’s axiomatic for any large country to rise. In this natural process, the first order of business is to ensure that it has good or healthy relations or at least normal relations with its immediate neighbours.

Now, this is not easy, as many other large countries have discovered - whether it is the United States, China, Russia, or even a country like Iran or Israel, as we are noticing. Living with your neighbours is not easy; it requires a lot of effort, lots of skill and deep understanding.

Just because we may share language, food and culture, we may assume that we understand our neighbours; this is the surest way towards grave errors in judgement and policy. Another reality, hard to ignore, is the history of ‘highs and lows’, which makes it imperative to share this uneven relationship again. What must be studied closely is whether these highs and lows have been inevitable or were a consequence of mistakes made only by the Indian side. To understand this perspective, it is important to look at ourselves through the eyes of our neighbours.

How do India’s Neighbours see it?

Here, the issue of identity becomes critical. The fact is that many of India’s neighbours have had to define their identity in relation to India. The historical narrative underpinning their nationalisms has often been derived from their anxiety to differentiate themselves from the Indian mega-narrative. If India is a civilisational construct embracing unity amid vast diversity, each of its neighbours has to accentuate its particularism. If separateness is not established, what distinguishes these countries from the Indian state? These are some of

the elements that also impact how India and its neighbours interact.

There is also this feature of the desire of India’s neighbours to engage in the policy of external balancing. They seek extra-regional intervention because Indian hard power far outweighs the collective power of all its regional neighbours, making external balancing an important element of policy choices made by the smaller neighbours.

Lastly, given the history and geography of this region, India is confronted with a generally fragile neighbourhood. In this sense, the fragility of the state structures in the neighbours and the neighbourhood is also a fact of life. And then dealing with such fragile states with limited capacities is a challenge for them and as how India deals with such smaller neighbours.

Forging a Neighbourhood First Policy

This brings us to the main issue: the principal characteristics of the neighbourhood policy that India has pursued. One of the more recent aspects has been the transition from regionalism (SAARC) to sub-regionalism (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India Nepal Initiative or BBIN and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation or BIMSTEC) to bilateralism.

The SAARC experiment was a new idea that Bangladesh initiated. We lived with it for many years, through its several challenges, largely on account of the tensions between India and Pakistan.

But at some stage, because of various events, SAARC was put on the back burner by India. India then decided to proceed with the principle of the ‘coalition of the willing’; those countries willing to participate in the integration and neighbourhood projects, India decided to go along with them, giving birth to organizations such as the BBIN and the BIMSTEC.

The fundamental building block of each Indian neighbourhood policy is the bilateral approach. Therefore, the Indian bilateral relationships with each of the neighbours proceeded at different paces, in different forms, and each has its own peculiarities.

This will continue because the fact is that each of our neighbours commands and demands different approaches.

Secondly, India seems to be now emerging as an effective and credible first responder to the neighbourhood, not just in terms of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), in terms of natural disasters or natural calamities, but also more recently in terms of stepping in when there is an economic crisis. For example in Sri Lanka or Nepal. The Indian role in the Covid pandemic and, more recently, in the last few years, how the Indian state has contributed to the evacuation of nationals of many of the neighbouring countries from conflict zones is well acknowledged not only in the neighbourhood but also in the larger global context.

Forms of Integration

A common narrative doing the rounds in India and particularly the West is that South Asia is the least integrated; its factuality can be debated.

How do you define integration? The hub and spoke model is one way to look at how integrated India is with each of its neighbours. But if you look at how integrated, for example, Nepal is with Bhutan or Sri Lanka or how integrated Bangladesh is with Afghanistan, you get a different picture.

The question is whether the objective realities of these smaller countries allow the kind of integration we would desire. For example, how much can Bangladesh trade with Afghanistan? How much can Nepal trade with Sri Lanka? So, we have to keep these realities in mind. However, in the Indian approach to integration, multiple forms of integration have been developing very rapidly.

This integration covers physical cross-border infrastructure at the minimum and the base level. India is taking measures to develop this physical cross-border infrastructure for trade. It is still a work in progress - it is highly unsatisfactory in some regions and some borders. In some, there is a move to improve infrastructure and energy, whether it is oil pipelineswe see them now in Bangladesh and Nepal. We are seeing power lines coming up between India and Bangladesh, India and Bhutan, India and Nepal.

And, of course, hydropower is something that we have lived with for many years in Bhutan. We are hoping that this model will begin with Nepal as well. Integration is also taking place in trade, finance, the increasing use of the rupee, and, of course, in the cultural field such as Buddhism, a real common thread that runs across the subcontinent. The peo-

ple-to-people relationship continues at different paces, but it is in fairly substantial numbers. The biggest example is in the case of Bangladesh.

The Challenges for the Future

Lastly, the nature of threats. When we look at India’s relationships with neighbours, it is worth considering and analysing why a certain relationship is more successful than others. When a neighbour of India acknowledges and takes into account India’s security interests invariably pave the way for a much healthier overall bilateral relationship. So, sensitivity to each other’s security concerns is actually a critical aspect and an essential condition for the flowering of relationships between India and its neighbours.

The kind of threats that India has faced vis-a-vis its neighbours include, of course, terrorism. Unfortunately, the use of India’s smaller neighbours as proxies by external powers or inimical powers, export of internal instability from those countries into India, threats to India’s social fabric and all this is manifested through aspects such as insurgencies, movement of refugees, illegal migration, human and drug trafficking. And in the coming period, we will all face the threat of climate change and global warming, which will impact all of us. But when we talk about the Indian Neighbourhood First Policy, the principal thesis is that India will do whatever it takes to improve its relations with its neighbours, number one. Number two: India believes it offers the neighbours an opportunity to ride the wave of Indian growth.

Here, it would be appropriate to take a leaf from the Chinese playbook; as the Chinese put it, in terms of their neighbourhood, when the wave come and the big boat is sailing, we would like the smaller boats to sail along with us. The same applies to India; when India is a stable entity growing well, it offers a natural opportunity for its neighbours to grow along with it.

RIDING THE WAVE OF INDIA’S GROWTH

Nepal and India’s past, present and future are connected!

How can Nepal ride the wave of India’s growth and impress India to partner with it in helping it realise its potential in many areas – especially hydropower and tourism?

Nepal appreciates India’s Neighbourhood First policy. As its next-door neighbour, Nepal, is happy to work closely with India. They share centuries-old traditions of social, cultural, religious, spiritual, and economic linkages and close people-to-people contacts.

A Rich History of Collaboration

India has also been the largest foreign aid provider for Nepal and an important development partner of Nepal. India’s assistance in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake and the COVID-19 pandemic remains crucial for Nepal to navigate difficult times.

The Nepal-India Economic Cooperation Development Partnership has gained momentum in recent years, particularly in infrastructure development, cross-border connectivity, power generation and trade. Nepal- India cooperation in air, road and railways connectivity, cross-border petroleum products pipeline, hydropower and transmission lines development, integrated check posts and human resource development help remain significant. Nepal and India’s past, present and future are connected. Friendship and collaboration should be further strengthened for shared progress and prosperity.

Mr. Minendra Rijal, Former Defence Minister of Nepal

Other International Partners

To the north of Nepal is China. Nepal has enjoyed a close and good, friendly relationship with China. It has been receiving bilateral foreign aid in various areas since 1953 from China. Nepal has identified nine projects in BRI, but only on a grant basis. The reason is that Kathmandu still has a potentially unused concessional loan window with the ADB and the World Bank, which would be cheaper than the BRI alone. Recently, China has also started providing direct assistance to non-government actors in Nepal, just like India, which has been practising this for about two decades. The practice of providing bilateral assistance to non-government actors is useful to an extent, but if a political angle starts evolving in it, then it might defeat the basic purpose of development assistance itself.

Nepal has enjoyed a long and friendly relationship with the U.S. They have been a very important development partner in Nepal’s endeavours. The support has gained some momentum in the recent past. The Millennium Challenge Corporation Nepal Compact, a $500-million grant from the United States for electricity transmission and road development projects, after five years of keeping it on hold, is a substantial one to be spent on the transmission line and road projects that Nepal had carefully selected. Besides, Nepal receives foreign aid from other bilateral donors and international development partners. This international attention is useful for Nepal to get out of the rise of India and China in global politics.

Nepal is mindful of making the right calls to benefit from both China and India. Of course, there is immense potential benefit from being neighbours to two giant nations growing as economic powers at an impressive pace.

We also need to learn lessons from them about what they have done right to make steady in socio-economic development. India deserves to be congratulated on its successful G20 presidency, under which the group made substantial achievements. We also appreciate the leadership role taken by the Government of India in forming the International Solar Alliance, W.H.O., Global Centre for Traditional Medicine, and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure.

Vast Scope for Collaboration with India

Nepal can find many useful best practices from developing

hydropower in Bhutan. In October, it could not sell nearly 500 megawatts of surplus electricity that went unused despite there being a demand in India and Bangladesh. Some progress is being made on this account based on a trilateral understanding between Nepal, India and Bangladesh on the export of electricity from Nepal to Bangladesh. Nepal needs to do more on this as its power surplus will increase with an additional 2000 megawatts of electricity produced next year. There are opportunities in Indian states bordering Nepal- Uttarakhand, Bihar, UP and West Bengal- on this front.

Nepal is an attractive tourist destination that can make significant strides in fully realising its tourist potential by attracting hordes of tourists from its giant neighbours.

Buddhism is a common link connecting Nepal to many Asian countries. A new airport has come up close to the birthplace of Buddha, and it is hoped that it will attract a greater tourist rush. However, there are issues with India on landing rights, etc. There is a concern that the airport, close to the Indian border, was built with Chinese assistance. This is incorrect; it was built with the ADB’s support based on the SASEC project. And India also is a partner in this SASEC project with the ADB. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that without help from our neighbourhood, our new two international airports cannot be properly utilised.

It goes without saying that the Nepal-India relationship is unique. It goes back to the beginning of human civilisation in the region; it is extensive and deep-rooted. There always are issues that need to be addressed and resolved. One would be the Agneepath scheme.

One of Nepal’s concerns is how these youths can be productively employed or absorbed in Nepali society in just four years after their premature retirement. Second, we are mindful that Gurkha recruitment is based on the tripartite agreement of 1947. The other concern would be that Nepal and India have disputed areas in 71 different places in 23 districts, totaling 606 square kilometres. The main issue is over the source of Kali River and the claims over 335 square kilometres in that region.

The idea of a common border was tossed around earlier. It is possible that something could be put to use so that nobody loses but at the same time, India’s strategic interests are not compromised. Nepal should also be able to say to the world that despite having a large and powerful neighbour, Nepal,

too, got a deal to its satisfaction. Seeking solutions through open talk, addressing each other’s concerns, and diplomatic assistance to guarantee peace, security and development in the region as a whole should be the key to resolving any outstanding issue.

Another outstanding issue is how to best use the joint EPG report (Eminent Persons Group on Nepal-India Relations). Nepal and India formed an eight-member panel of eminent persons in 2016 to review bilateral relations in their entirety and suggest the way forward. Both countries should be flexible enough to understand each other’s genuine interests and work together towards sustainable peace. To sum up , no other country can replace India as far as Nepal is concerned. But at the same time, India also has to understand Nepal’s aspiration as a sovereign nation.

CHALLENGES IN BILATERAL COOPERATION

Bangladesh is an effective partner in India’s Look East policy

Bangladesh and India share a common history, language, culture, food, music, literature, and values. 1971 saw the peak of bonding with the Indian Armed forces, shedding blood with the freedom fighters of Bangladesh.

Bilateral relations are paramount regarding political, economic, cultural and security dimensions. Cooperation is bilateral, regional and beyond the region as far as Bangladesh and India are concerned. Regarding India’s Neighbourhood Policy, Bangladesh is an effective partner within India’s Look

East policy, incorporating connectivity, security, and the development of its northeast states close to Bangladesh, formerly known as Seven Sisters. We have tried to find answers to three questions: What are the major areas in Bangladesh and India in terms of bilateral cooperation? What are the major challenges, and what steps can be taken to improve bilateral cooperation to chart our future in a predictable positive course?

Border Management

Bangladesh and India share a 4000-plus km land border and successfully concluded the boundary agreement in 2015. It was a colossal effort, but even individual maps were exchanged. The exchange of over 160 land enclaves was a hanging issue right from the British period going back to the legacy of playing chess between two zamindars of the North and Rampur areas. We have also settled the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and India as per the UNCLOS.

The security cooperation between our two countries is spread over intelligence-sharing, combating terrorism and maritime cooperation. We intend to have a crime-free, incident-free border. The border forces, security agencies, and law enforcement agencies have taken various confidence-building measures. The cooperation is wonderfully working at every level and improving as the days pass.

Cooperation and Connectivity

We have real connectivity, which is on the rise in multiple areas, including rail links between different areas. Waterways are open from West Bengal and also the Seven Sisters. Road links have increased with multiple border points for transporting cargo and goods. Air is also connected. More than 100 flights are going in a week between India and Bangladesh. Port facilities are also available for connectivity, and we aspire to take it to the regional level, including Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, for the mutual benefit of these countries.

Trade and Economic Cooperation

Bangladesh is India’s biggest trade partner in South Asia, and India is the second biggest trade partner of Bangladesh in Asia. Informal trade that takes place along the border is almost double that of the formal trade that takes place. This is a significant improvement that has occurred recently, and we encourage that. Though we import more things from India, I

Lt General MA Hossain , Commandant, National Defence College, Bangladesh

think our export are also on the rise. We have to diversify and look for other means to increase it.

Energy and Power Cooperation

Bangladesh imports about 1160 megawatts of power from India. Indian companies are working to produce 3600 megawatts in Bangladesh. India is also providing technical assistance and training for a nuclear power plant, which has been commissioned recently.

Cooperation During COVID 19

We received the first batches of COVID-19 vaccines from India, a wonderful manifestation of India’s Look East Policy.

Major Challenge

Bangladesh and India share about 54 common rivers. We had an agreement in 2011 about water sharing, but it did not occur due to political differences between the West Bengal and Central governments. This is affecting the livelihood of the northern region of Bangladesh, which is drying up.

Mr A B Mathur, Member, NSAB & Former Special Secretary-

R&AW, India

The security issue was a major issue, and once it was resolved, the relationship between India and Bangladesh immediately flourished.

Immediately after independence, certain dissatisfied groups of Northeast India revolted and were given shelter and support in what was then East Pakistan. However, even after liberation, between 1976-96 and 2001-2008, these elements continued their activities in Bangladesh. But after 2009, the scenario changed.

The government of Sheikh Hasina took firm steps against them. Almost all of them were sent back to India to face due process of law. The action taken by the Bangladesh government in controlling terrorism also deserves compliments. There is tremendous security cooperation between the two countries. The resolution of security concerns has resulted in goodwill between the two nations that is unprecedented and growing by the day.

THE EXTENDED NEIGHBOURHOOD

Air Chief Marshal Saisak K , Royal Thai Armed Forces, Thailand

Thailand published its 20-year national strategy in 2017, which gives a comprehensive way forward for the future of Thailand. The highlight of defence cooperation is integrating security cooperation within the ASEAN region and among foreign countries, including related governments and non-government organizations.

Widening Sphere of Defence Cooperation

The MOU on defence cooperation between Thailand and India was signed by the ministers of defence of both countries on 25th July 2012. According to the MOU, both armed forces have been conducting defence cooperation in some major areas.

Thailand and India have been exchanging military attaches for a long time. These attaches are points of contact. Both armed forces have been exchanging students at military academies and military institutes. Both armed forces have had several bilateral and multilateral exercises. Both armed forces are conducting joint and combined exercises among all services. The ‘Cobra Gold’ exercise is the largest multilateral exercise in the Asia Pacific region, co-hosted by Thailand and the US and conducted in Thailand annually.

More than 20 countries are participating in all parts of the exercise. Indian Armed Forces are participating in the exercise as a HADR participant. One of the key areas of defence cooperation is in the field of maritime security. The two countries have been conducting joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea to enhance their capabilities to deal

with piracy and other maritime threats. Thailand and India have actively participated in UN peacekeeping missions. India is one of the largest troop-contributing nations and has an international-level UN peacekeeping pre-deployment training centre.

Challenges for Defence Cooperation

The MOU on defence cooperation provides a broad range of defence cooperation. However, defence cooperation has yet to be developed at the pace it is supposed to be. The possible causes of limited cooperation are given in succeeding paras. First, the two countries are located in different geographical locations.

There is no concrete common interest for each country in the surrounding areas of the other countries. Each country tends to pay more attention to its neighbouring countries.

Second, even though Thailand acts as a gateway for India to ASEAN, the world superpowers, have conflicts and influence in the region.

Therefore, Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries tend to focus more on the problems in the region, such as land border conflict and maritime conflict in the South China Sea. Global superpowers, i.e., the U.S. and China, have been directly or indirectly involved in these conflicts. These factors have affected the development of defence cooperation between the two countries.

Third, frequent changes in the country’s leadership, especially in Thailand, can cause inconsistency of policy in international relations. This affects the progress of defence cooperation. Major areas that need to be enhanced include joint maritime patrols, maritime cooperation, regular joint exercises, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and regional cooperation.

The Way Ahead

First, there should be more cooperation on maritime security in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea to counter piracy and other maritime threats.

Second, there should be an initiative of counter-insurgency cooperation. India can share experiences with Thailand to counter insurgency in southern Thailand.

Third, as a co-host of the exercise, Thailand should support

India’s participation in the COBRA GOLD exercise.

Fourth, cooperation on intelligence sharing between the two countries should be enhanced.

Finally, there should be more cooperation on military medical collaboration, which both countries already have capability.

NEIGHBOURHOOD

First of all, Maldives and India have shared a good relationship for many decades. A lot of help in military and economic development, especially in finance and others. India has responded very well and timely as a first responder. The establishment of the trijunction maritime border was an achievement.

We are badly affected by post-colonial policies implemented during these years. Rising powers like China or recent incidents like what is happening in Ukraine and Russia will have an impact and bad implications for our area.

Indians are one of the best in the region for technology. Smaller states like the Maldives would like to benefit from India’s products, especially from its technology.

A major shipping highway passes through common areas –especially Sri Lanka, Maldives and India. It must be made safer for people to travel and transport goods.

I hope we can bring out something new with the new leadership in the Maldives.

Regarding technological diplomacy, we started it in 2005, but it could have worked better. So we need to understand a few things and have a common language.

Brigadier General Ahmed Nilam , - Former Head of Military Int, MDF, Maldives

NEIGHBOURHOOD

Security is the feeling of being physically and mentally safe and secure.

The growing global situation and developments have led to more complexity in traditional and non-traditional security fields - the line of distinction between them is no longer clear and differentiated.

The definition of international law of war and warfare is becoming more complex. The scope of impact of modern warfare is expanding to non-military affairs. Security challenges have an impact on economic and food security.

The definition of national security has been revised and changed a lot.

The development of information technology has an impact on national security. It is difficult for countries in the regionmostly developing countries- to tackle information technology challenges alone.

Therefore, we need constructive cooperation for our regional countries to face the cross-border nature of information technology challenges, organized crime, and fake news. We look forward to further development of security and defence cooperation between India and Myanmar.

It is necessary to maintain our tradition of cooperation and peaceful co-existence. The two countries are trading partners with a good history of economic cooperation.

As Ambassador Shankar Menon put it some years ago, the best way to define Sri Lanka is as an unsinkable aircraft carrier positioned 14 miles south of India.

However, it would be better for the region to convert it from an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ to a cruise ship, cargo carrier, or something like that vis a vis India. If we can achieve that, many other strategic considerations will be over.

There are bigger geopolitical concerns in India, but it would be better to look forward rather than backward. Firstly, India intervened in Sri Lanka with $4 billion last year and helped to stabilise the economy at a point of crisis.

It was an intervention that all Sri Lankans appreciate. India also took the lead in speaking with the IMF on the debt restructuring side. India has performed a critical function in bringing this current stabilisation package together.

A Shrinking Economy

Sri Lanka’s economy shrank eight and a half per cent last year; it is expected to shrink around three and a half per cent this year. And if you look at the most optimistic forecast for the next ten years, it will only grow at about 3 per cent.

Sri Lanka’s economy is a very narrow one; its main source of income is remittances, which this year will be about $6 billion, from Sri Lankans working in the Middle East and elsewhere.

INDIA-LANKA: A CATALYST FOR SOUTH ASIA

Major General Ngwe Thein , Vice President, Central Executive Committee, Myanmar War Veterans Organisation

Amb. Milind Moragoda , - Founder, Pathfinder, Sri Lanka.

The second source of income is parallel exports - about $5 billion this year, of which about 30 per cent of value is added domestically and about 70 per cent is imported.

Tourism would be around two and a half billion. And that is our great hope. And interestingly, the tourism that comes in, about 25 per cent, will be from India. That is the biggest chunk.

Tea is about one and a half to $2 billion, and IT Services around $1 billion. This is the length and breadth of our economy. Unless we broaden this and push harder, we cannot go over the 3 per cent mark.

A Case of Economic Integration

If you look at Sri Lanka’s economic size, we are an $80 billion economy. You take a parallel; for example, Kerala is a $140 billion economy. If you look at our population, it is 22 million. Kerala is around 33 million.

We need the Indian state to understand our scale, and we need to understand your scale. For example, if you look at our installed capacity for power in the country, it is about 4300 megawatts. If you look at NTPC, one of your larger power producers, it has an installed capacity of around 75,000 megawatts.

So, when you look at it in context, Sri Lanka is relatively small. Therefore, economic integration between India and Sri Lanka is the key for us to move forward. Now, if you look at our exports to India, we are at around $900 million, and our imports from India are around four and a half billion dollars!

So clearly, there is something to be done there. We need to look at economic integration to come out of this crisis. And there you look at different sectors. We can start with the port sector, for example.

Colombo port is our largest port. Nearly 80 per cent of Colombo port business is trans-shipment business, of which around 75 per cent goes to India.

Interestingly, of the 75 per cent that goes to India, around 35 per cent goes to Adani ports. So, this integration between our ports and Indian ports will be one of the key areas where we can really move forward. And recently, for example, with the Adani investment in Colombo Port, the US Development

Finance Corporation also came in with $500 million in that investment. We have a situation where India, Sri Lanka, and the U.S. cooperate to develop Colombo port. That is an interesting model.

Airports are the next: Sri Lanka potentially should become the Netherlands, if you will, of this region, in other words, a distribution centre where airports, ports, and, of course, road connections can make us the gateway into the subcontinent, into India especially.

Then comes the land connectivity between India and Sri Lanka. This is something that has been long spoken about. There has been much political debate in Sri Lanka as well. If we can look at a highway and railway connecting the two, automatically, we take the first step because our port then can become much larger, can go faster because you will have land connectivity also and the people-to-people movement and in every facet, we would have connectivity.

Then comes the power grid: As I indicated, if you have a power grid connection between India and Sri Lanka, the installed capacity is 4300 megawatts in Sri Lanka.

We are told that we have wind energy capability off the northwestern coast of Sri Lanka of nearly 30,000 megawatts. We can invest in that together or bilaterally, as we have seen with the US-India cooperation here. In that case, we can also see the surplus power being exported to India.

Then we have the oil pipeline idea because we have oil storage facilities in Trincomalee port. Trincomalee is a deep-water harbour also strategically important in this region. If you can develop that into an energy hub with access to India, part of it would be the oil pipeline idea mentioned in the joint statement between our president and Prime Minister Modi.

Then, of course, we have mineral resources in Sri Lanka. We have phosphate, graphite/graphene, which is supposed to be of high quality, and limestone. But most of this still needs to be developed, and we need to start developing it in an environmentally friendly way.

Many environmentalists have been concerned about this in the country, so there will be a debate, but our graphene quality is supposed to be of a very high standard. The phosphate is also of very high standard but needs to be exploited.

Then lastly, telecom also provides a great scope for integration. We could establish joint ventures between India and Sri Lanka if this connectivity occurs quickly. The port model is the best model we have at the moment.

Challenges

Many in Sri Lanka fear that India will swallow us up. But equally, I think people realise now that the way forward for us is integration because we cannot get our economy out of the current situation without some way of catalysing growth and integrating with any other global economy will not work as fast as with India; it is a golden opportunity.

The other area we should focus on is the trilateral cooperation area between India-Sri, Lanka-U.S., or India-Sri Lanka-Japan but also from the Middle East because we have the potential to become a better petroleum hub.

One challenge is political stability, which is affected by economic pressure. The biggest challenge is implementation, which does not match dialogue, vision, and goodwill. Building trust is also a big challenge. Maintaining dialogue at the highest levels is the only way to resolve it.

Mr. Ahmed Jawad , - Director, Pathfinder, Sri Lanka

Like all other South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has a historical connection that goes back into the mists of time. Like all other South Asian countries, they are conjoined at the hip, as it

were, with very strong religious, cultural, and ethnic ties with Sri Lanka. India’s current Neighbourhood First policy has laid a strong foundation for reaching out to neighbouring states, reflecting at a practical level in India-Sri Lanka relations.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement has resulted in an all-time high in trade volumes, amounting to 5.4 billion. India is Sri Lanka’s third largest export destination after the US and the UK. Of course, Sri Lanka would like to see more of its exports reaching Indian shores, and I think there is a lot of work to be done at the state-to-state level where the entry of its goods is concerned.

FDI (foreign direct investment) is another significant area where large-scale Indian investment has been evident. Some of the key investments are the Colombo West container terminal and the wind power projects by the Adani Group. Tourism and connectivity are important areas Sri Lanka considers a must for development.

Development assistance from India has been readily forthcoming in education, health, housing, and transport, among others.

In the context of what is happening in the Indian Ocean, our ongoing maritime security cooperation and defense cooperation between the two countries have been most useful in our bilateral ties.

The icing on the cake of Indo-Lanka relations has been the magnanimous gesture following Sri Lanka’s economic crisis to come up with a mixed bag of assistance, with no questions being asked, to the tune of US dollars 4 billion. It was a lifeline in helping Sri Lanka cope with the tremendous strains of the crisis on its economy.

Bilateral relations obviously have to be nurtured. It cannot be left without being tended. And this is especially so in the context of the presence of extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean. In this area, there has been a bit of strain regarding Indo-Lanka relations.

There have been Indian concerns expressed over the visit of Chinese submarines and research vessels.

INDIA-LANKA: A CATALYST FOR SOUTH ASIA

SYNERGIA INSIGHTS : ARTICLE ON INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES

“INDIA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS IS NEITHER TRANSACTIONAL NOR A ZERO-SUM GAME”

General

India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy has renewed impetus on strengthening relations with its immediate neighbours. The policy aims to ensure peace, prosperity and tranquillity in the sub-region.

India is struggling to forge sustained relations with neighbours despite numerous advantages of geo- proximity, historical, cultural and religious bondages with the neighbours. India has yet to shape the enduring, long-term strategic convergence on mutually beneficial relationships.

However, recent initiatives towards strengthening bilateral ties are steps in the right direction in the era of interdependence.

Neighbour’s Perception of India. Indian neighbours view India as a strong regional power enjoying a geopolitical sweet spot, a peer competitor to China in Indo-Pacific region, and enjoy close relations with both USA and Russia, retaining strategic autonomy. India is seen as a stable democracy with strong democratic institutions, aspiring tech-savvy youth, and sustained economic growth with rapid capability building to become a self-reliant nation.

The neighbours also have apprehensions of Indian dominance, subsuming economic and cultural activities. The huge differential between the Indian economy, military and technical domains is another concern for the neighbourhood of India. India is often seen as meddling in their internal affairs and also not delivering on the promises made to the neighbours.

Challenges

There are certain irritants in India’s bilateral relationship with her neighbours. The foremost being the regional security framework. The region is seen as the least integrated, having complex security challenges.

The geopolitical situation is uncertain owing to external

players in regional politics such as China, USA, Pak, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and growing anti-India sentiments fuelled by China and Pakistan. The traditional security issues have broadened to non-military issues of human security concerns ,including water, food, energy and refugees.

Growing Chinese influence in the region, including Blitzkrieg infrastructure development in Indian neighborhood such as BRI projects, military bases, energy pipelines etc, having a huge presence of Chinese closer to the border region is posing security of hegemonism and power politics in Indian neighborhood.

The lack of political stability and balanced political perspective has led to frequent regime changes in the sub-region. China is also interfering in the internal politics of the neighbourhood with the vested interest of expanding its influence in the region leading to the pro-China leaning of most of the neighbours.

The region is facing economic turbulence and numerous hurdles in economic integration owing to a lack of free trade and transit agreement, levying of import taxes, persistent trade imbalance and non- tariff barriers. The Chinese huge loans for BRI projects are leading to a debt trap of neighbours.

Radicalisation and Social Dissonance are being spread by certain inimical elements in the Indian neighbourhood supported by China and Pakistan, fuelling anti- India propaganda, accusing of human rights violations, housing ANEs on their soil and carrying out social media influence operations targeting India is a major challenge.

The access denial to India by certain countries is hampering seamless connectivity in the region. The perceived insecurity of Indian military power and dominance is precluding access/ transit. The enormous potential for regional trade is sub-optimally utilized due to lack of road, rail, inland water, ports and airport connectivity and integration in the logistics chain.

Opportunities

Sub-Regional Cooperation Framework: The logic of geo-location is unrelenting to have a stable, peaceful neighbourhood to reduce political, economic and military burdens. Thus, India should build political consensus on regional security, resurrect her credibility and image in the region as a Net Security Provider. India’s ability to alter geo-political landscape of

South Asia should be leveraged for the benefit of the neighbourhood.

Connectivity: India’s neighbouring countries, either landlocked or Island nations, need multiple connectivity options to facilitate smooth economic integration, trade, investments, logistics movement and exploit tourism potential in the sub-region. The impetus to projects such as BBIN, Trilateral highway, Kaladan multi-modal project, trans-border rail links, ports construction and air connectivity will tremendously boost the prosperity of the region.

Economic Integration: India’s vast domain expertise in banking, insurance, telecom, digitized services, joint ventures / start-ups will help neighbours in enhanced bilateral trade and sustained economic growth. India should increase the FDI in the neighbourhood to enhance their export base and assist in the commonality of goods and services of the neighbourhood. Optimising trade through MFN status, SAFTA, and CEPA will reduce the non-tariff barriers and open opportunities and as also reduce huge trade imbalance in the long term.

Regional Diplomacy: The Gujral Doctrine, assuring unilateral concessions to neighbours without seeking reciprocity, should be India’s guiding neighborhood policy. India should engage in proactive but non-intrusive diplomacy to inspire confidence and encourage its neighbors to view India as a friend, rather than a regional power seeking to maximize influence at neighbour’s cost. India should focus on bilateral priorities, concerns and aspirations, creating a balance in the power differentials. The diplomatic engagements between SAARC members need to be revisited and sustained.

Cultural Exchanges: The plural culture of India and historical linkages offer opportunities for enhanced people-to-people contact and exchange of ideas. The border region has common links, which will further strengthen the relationship. The tourism sector generates employment, inspires local artisans, and support services and the transport sector by opening a gateway. The pool of language experts from neighbouring countries will facilitate better people-to-people contact, education, trade and create long friendship bridges.

Military Diplomacy: India should strengthen strategic military relations with neighbours, as a net security provider of the sub-region capable of tackling growing security threats. Indian engagements with neighbours in the military domain

should focus on helping their capacity building, joint training including anti-terror training, sharing technology in guarding their land borders and coasts, joint border patrolling, supply of military weapons, equipment, ammunition, sharing intelligence on drug trafficking, piracy, and smuggling to increase interoperability in the region. The Indian expertise in Disaster management will be of great help to neighbours.

Energy Cooperation: The initiative taken recently by allowing Indian Public Sector, as well as private participation in energy export to Bangladesh, can be replicated, including the Indian power grid utilised by others.

The ever-increasing energy needs of neighbours for manufacturing industries necessitate sharing of resources for mutual benefit and economic prosperity.

Capacity Building: Indian development assistance to neighbours for capacity building, including community development projects, skilling the youth/women to get jobs and providing basic civic amenities in border area will be highly rewarding. The necessity of provisioning of higher education institutes viz; IITs, IIMs along with initial faculty staff to establish and stabilise the facilities is a dire need.

The Indian government and private corporations are establishing specialty medical facilities akin to AIIMS in at least each national capital in the health sector, which will reduce medical tourism from neighboring countries. The language training of employable youth will provide abundant opportunities to seek jobs.

The opportunities are only possible to be exploited with strong political will of India and neighbours to benefit humanity of the sub-region.

Assessment

• India should focus on convergence and defer contentious issues with the neighbours for now.

• Strive to meet demand-driven, people- friendly and mutually beneficial aspirations.

• Bridge the trust deficit with political hierarchy without being seen as the dominant power, investing in long term enduring relationships.

SYNERGIA INSIGHTS: INDIA NEPAL RELATIONS

Bilateral relations are neither transactional nor part of a zero-sum game.

• Nepal being a strategic neighbor, enduring bilateral relationship is imperative for peace and progress of both nations.

• Serious concerns about India exist regarding both internal and external affairs of Nepal.

• Considering prevailing politico-economic and social conditions in Nepal, huge potential exists for enhanced progress of both nations.

• Opportunities for India: Health sector, Infrastructure Development, Education, Community Development projects and Trade.

General.

India and Nepal enjoy excellent bilateral relations based on comprehensive, multi -dimensional and age- old connections of history and culture. As early as June 17 1947, both countries established diplomatic relations with an unwavering commitment to principle of coexistence.

Presently, based on the Indian policy of Neighborhood First, there is an imperative need to review and recalibrate India - Nepal relations, primarily exploring untrodded path of opportunities for development and mutual benefit of both nations.

Strategic Importance of Nepal to India.

Nepal is a strategic neighbor with vast implications for India. Nepal is a buffer state between two major powers, India and China.

• Nepal’s proximity to the most sensitive Siliguri Corridor is a very crucial aspect of the security of India.

• The increasing influence of China, Pakistan and Turkey in Nepal’s affairs is a matter of concern to India.

• The long-pending border disputes between both nations are a constant irritant in bilateral relations.

• Nepali shares a border with five Indian states: of Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand.

• The rivers originating in Nepal feed perennial rivers in India, impacting, besides ecology and agriculture, the hydropower potential of India.

• The prominent pilgrim sites of Hinduism and Buddhism are in Nepal.

India’s Concerns Regarding Nepal.

There are certain perpetual and long-standing concerns for India.

• The first and foremost concern is the long pending border disputes between the two nations. Disputes related to encroachment, illegal land usage, and water sharing remain unresolved, despite several treaties and agreements signed between both nations over a period.

• Claiming of Kala Pani territory, an integral part of Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, since 1997, is a major issue of dispute, leading to sporadic violence in the entire region.

• Lipulekh dispute cropped up in May 2015. Nepal primarily alleges a violation of the treaty between Nepal and India.

• Radicalization in the Terai region, with more than 25 Islamic organizations, mushroomed in recent years around the India-Nepal border, posing a security threat to the Indian Siliguri corridor. Numerous Madrasas along the border area have also come up primarily funded by Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are likely involved in converting the Hindus of Nepal into Islam.

• Nepal territory is also being misused by elements inimical to India, exploiting the concept of Frontier without Restrictions.

• The rapid infrastructure development by China in Nepal including the Chinese initiatives leading to north- south road and rail connectivity projects poses serious security challenges to India. The proposed industrial park at Dhamak and the hydroelectric projects requiring the permanent presence of Chinese nationals close to the Indian border, especially in the Terai region, add to India’s security risk.

• The BRI projects, apart from the construction of airports/ airfields and helipads closer to the border, are a matter of concern.

• Military Domain: The Chinese have embarked upon huge military cooperation, including supply of Armored Personnel Carriers, arms, ammunition and equipment and have been training Nepal Army personnel in China. Chinese are also training Nepali youth in Mandarin language, in the garb of making them tourist guides. But the intent to exploit the Mandarin language, qualified Nepali youth to be eyes and ears in the border areas of India and Nepal.

Current Situation of Nepal

Political Landscape: In December 2022. Pushpa Kamal Dahal [Prachanda] assumed the high office of Prime Minister of Nepal and soon visited India on 31st May 2023. His first overseas visit underlines the importance of bilateral relations between India and Nepal. The hope is the spirit would continue. The basic issue is the trust deficit between the political hierarchy of both nations, India, as seen as interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal is a serious blockade of political bonhomie between both nations. The political instability in Nepal also precludes any meaningful and long-term vision for enhancing the relations between the two nations.

Economy: India is a key development partner of Nepal, the largest trading partner, and the highest source of foreign direct investment in Nepal. However, the concern is that Nepal is moving towards the debt trap of China with serious economic consequences, akin to Sri Lanka and Pakistan in recent years. Though Nepal’s GDP forecast has been pegged at 4.1% in the financial year 2023, it has been seeing a downward revision since October 2022. But Nepal’s economy is likely to face further turbulences in financial year 2023 due to a high inflation rate of 7.8% with higher taxation rates, which is also posing a challenge to the Nepal economists

Social Aspects: Nepal has a population of 30.8 million with

64% of the population is youth. The factor of unemployment is approx 12% as of this date. About 08 million people live and work in India, including about 60,000 soldiers in the Indian Armed Forces, and roughly 80,000 soldiers of Nepal receive Indian pensions. The poor health care, lack of basic civic amenities for communities in remote areas and COVID-19 impact still being felt in rural region are social challenge the nation faces. The education standard in rural areas is lacking due to poor school infrastructure and inadequate/lack of well-trained teaching staff. Also, the potable water access is limited or lacking in most provinces.

External Affairs: There are several external factors impacting the relations between India and Nepal. Nepal established diplomatic relations with China only in August 1955, but they gradually drifted away from India, as China considers Nepal a key partner in development, including BRI. Invested huge funds in infrastructure development of Nepal. China is also offering lump sum aid to Nepal for development projects. They are also undertaking the skilling of the youth to better their chances of obtaining jobs. In addition, of late, USA is also pursuing comprehensive outreach to checkmate Nepal by investing in the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

Prognosis: Bilateral relations are neither transactional nor part of a zero-sum game. India, therefore, should enhance existing focus on multi-faceted engagements manifold with the aim of advantage Nepal and India. Nepal being a strategically important neighbor, it is imperative for India to focus on this aspect proactively. India should also resolve the border disputes diplomatically by shedding past baggage of history quietly through dialogue to achieve mutual convergence. India should avoid meddling in the internal affairs of Nepal, as perceived by Nepal. Also, avoid rhetoric and focus on convergence and defer contentious issues. India should be a generous and sensitive partner by avoiding imposition and an equal relationship. India should undertake more proactive engagements in the economic and social domains of Nepal. Specific recommendations include enhancing development assistance to Nepal, at grassroot level.

Health: India should construct Emergency and Trauma Centers in Province number 01 [Biratnagar], Province02 [Janakpuri]. Province 05 [Lumbini] and Province 07 [Sudurpaschimi]. Providing medical specialists particularly in the diagnosis and treatment of COPD, TB, Ischemic heart diseases and cerebro vascular diseases, are the four most important ailments in Nepal. India should also undertake the provision of potable

water in the provinces of one to five and seven, along with the provision of basic health.

Infrastructure Development: India should focus on enhancing connectivity, construct roads in the Terai region for smooth movement of goods and services, as Nepal is a landlocked nation, also called India’s locked nation The development of inland waterways for cargo move will be a great economic booster in the region.

Education: Training of trainers by Indian Institutes to skill teachers of Nepal is a dire need by the country. They will also require the provision of tools/aids/software for teaching and student assessment. We can share the best practices of the Indian education system, which is time tested.

Community Development: Capacity development must be undertaken to enhance job opportunities for unskilled youth and women alike by Indian IITs and the private sector Facilitate seamless tourists movement in Buddhist and Ramayana circuits in both nations, enhance people-to-people contact, and explore soft power considering the vast 80,000 Ex-servicemen of Nepal, including timely redress of their grievances/ pensionary benefits.

Trade Integrated check posts: Two ICPs were constructed in 2018 in Birgunj-Raxaul and in 2020 at the Jog Bani-Biratnagar area to facilitate bilateral trade. More such ICPs will certainly boost trade between the two nations.The FDI is approximately 30% in over 150 Indian ventures as of date. However, we certainly need to increase both FDI as well as our startups in telecom, tourism, banking, insurance and services sectors, which would greatly help provide employment to Nepalese youth. We should also open our services sector to Nepali unskilled youth. Pegging of Nepal and Indian currencies, which has been a long pending demand, also merits consideration on priority.

Conclusion: The contribution of India to Nepal’s peaceful growth has been substantial, though sometimes it is accused of ‘Big Brother’ attitude towards Nepal. The recent initiatives between nations have huge potential for sustained and further expansion of cooperation in critical areas of mutual benefit. Both sides need to pragmatically approach issues with the aim of finding lasting solutions in a time-bound which impacts lives on either side positively.

SYNERGIA INSIGHTS: INDIA – BANGLADESH RELATIONS: OPTIMISTIC FUTURE

General

Bangladesh is a valuable neighbour and strategic partner of India. India Bangladesh share history, heritage, culture and linguistic bond apart from a 4096.7 km long international border. Bangladesh wholeheartedly recognises India’s contribution during the Liberation War of 1971.

Indian efforts to build greater trust by projecting and utilising commonality are enhancing integration in multiple sectors. significant progress has been achieved in 03 thematic areas - dispute resolution, cooperation and connectivity. Indian neighbourhood’s concerns about being submerged in Indian economy and culture needs to be addresses sensitively by India by demonstrating mutuality of benefit.

Significance of Bangladesh to India

Regional Security: Bangladesh is a middle power and a major developing nation. In the new strategic milieu, great powers are allying with littoral states in Indo - Pacific region. Bangladesh is an important component of regional security calculus.

Geo-strategic Location: Considering Bangladesh’s geo-strategic location coupled with economic and political strength, the consistency in Indo-Bangladesh relations is inevitable, irrespective of which regime remains in power in Delhi and Dhaka.

Connectivity: Bangladesh can facilitate greater integration of Indian mainland and the North East region by providing access to road, rail and waterways including movement of military vehicles and aircrafts over her airspace.

China Factor: Bangladesh can facilitate greater integration of the Indian mainland and the North East region by providing access to roads, rail, and waterways, including the movement of military vehicles and aircraft over her airspace.

Economic Opportunities: Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia, and there is huge potential for further growth. Indian investments exist, considering Bangladesh’s rapid GDP growth.

Energy Co-operation: India is exporting more than 600 MW

of power to Bangladesh and has opened tremendous prospects for Indian PSUs and private energy companies to further invest in the power sector.

Regional Co-operation: India and Bangladesh are deeply engaged in regional cooperation through multilateral forums such as SAARC, BIMSTEC, and IORARC, which are aligned with aligned to the goals of security and prosperity of the region.

Current Impediments in Indo- Bangladesh Bilateral Relationship

River Water Sharing: Teesta River is an important river for both India and Bangladesh, being a vital source of water for irrigation, fisheries, and drinking purposes.

The equitable distribution is the essence of contention with Bangladesh seeking 50% of water between December and May, while India is asking for 55% the of water supply. Water is a state subject in the Indian constitution, and West Bengal does not agree to sign the treaty with Bangladesh. The Teesta River Dispute is seen as a long-lasting pain brought on by India.

Boundary Dispute: Out of the 4096.7 km border between India and Bangladesh, 180 km is along the river. However, the 6.5 km stretch of the boundary near Comilla on the Tripura border is yet to be delimited leading to often border killings.

The land border between endpoints between both nations was only resolved after the UN Tribunal award. In addition, the smuggling of drugs and fake currency through the Bangladesh border is another serious concern for the Indian government.

Anti-India Islamic Groups: JMB [Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen], an assembly of Mujahideen in Bangladesh, is a terrorist organisation still active, carrying out anti-India propaganda regarding the alleged ill-treatment of minorities in India. The increased radicalization in Bangladesh, coupled with violent extremism, has Pakistan’s backing and is spreading across the border in the Indian states of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura.

Defence Co-operation Agreement: Bangladesh and China. The agreement covers supplies of Chinese submarines, fighter jets, tanks, missile boats and equipment to the Bangladesh armed forces by China. The agreement also involved joint training of the Bangladeshi military with China, which is a se-

curity concern for India. Turkey also supplies military equipment to Bangladesh.

Denial of Access to North Eastern Region of India: Bangladesh holds the key to India’s overland connection with its Northeast region linked by the tenuous 21 km wide Siliguri corridor [chicken neck]. Access to the sea for Indian northeast states is easier through Bangladesh. Operationalizing and stabilizing these links is still pending.

Trade imbalance: Bangladesh incurred a trade deficit of $ 14 bn in 2021 -22 with India. Indian exports to Bangladesh are growing at 11% per annum, but Bangladesh is levying a 25% peak import tariff, which acts as an impediment to Indian Exports; the trade agreements between both nations are still a work in progress.

The Way Ahead

Connectivity:

Road: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal [BBIN] Motor Vehicle Agreement-2015 needs to be expedited by finalizing the protocols, including insurance, banking guarantees, freight carrier’s size and frequency into each country. The Tri-lateral Highway between India Myanmar and Thailand is excellent opportunity for Bangladesh to join the mega project.

Rail: Rs. 862.58 Cr Agartala - Akhaura link is yet to be commissioned, with 85% of work in Indian side and 73% of work in Bangladesh already completed.

It will reduce the travel time between Kolkata and Agartala to only 10 hours. PIWTT. Protocol on Inland Water Transit & Trade exists; however, protocol routes are not yet finalised.

Power Supply to Bangladesh: Adani Power in Jharkhand has agreed to supply power to Bangladesh, further enhancing its energy security, which will have a lasting impact on replacing liquid fuel-generated costly power. Bangladesh’s additional requirement of power necessitates early signing of tripartite power trade agreement enabling Bangladesh to import power from Nepal through India’s grid. This will boost reshaping sub-regional cooperation between all three nations.

Economic Integration: Firstly, ensure stability in economic policies on both sides on a long-term basis to make progress in SAFTA & CEPA. India should further reduce tariff barriers to

boost trade. The trade imbalance needs to be corrected, with India’s West Bengal, North East states and Bangladesh acting as a Compact Hub in boosting trade with Southeast Asia by utilising ports, road and rail links of both nations. The Indian FDI in Bangladesh is only $ 310 Mn compared to the Chinese $ 940 Mn.

Cooperation in Water Sharing: Teesta water sharing agreement signing is due for long and time is right now to sign before the present regimes will face polls in December 2023 in Bangladesh and May 2024 in India, lest it would be deferred forever.

The sharing of 06 joint rivers [Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla and Dudh Kumar] should also be finalised now. China has exploited the situation by proposing to dredge and embank a portion of Teesta. The presence of Chinese in the Chicken’s Neck area will have security repercussions for India.

Defence Cooperation: India holds no conceivable security threat to Bangladesh, thus greater transparency in Bangladesh defence posture, procurements & defence cooperation with China, will add to a better understanding between Bangladesh and India. Tri-services bilateral training exercises, additional vacancies for Bangladesh officers in premier defence institutes of India will enhance the trust factor between both armed forces.

Enhanced Development Assistance: Bangladesh needs Indian help in capacity building measures. Initiatives such as medical courses in Bangla language, collaboration in Therapeutics, setting up orphanages, educational Institutes and cultural centres besides signing MOUs for Disaster Management Corporation by India will meet current aspirations of Bangladesh.

Conclusion: Pertinent challenges need to be carefully addressed to ensure sustainable relationship. Positive development in recent initiatives in political, economic and security domains have to be progressed in time bond manner - prior to the poles in Bangladesh in December 2023.

In the era of growing interdependence and sharing there is no alternative but to further strengthen bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh by exploring all possible opportunities.

SYNERGIA INSIGHTS: INDO – MYANMAR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

Myanmar, as a stable neighbour and reliable partner, is in India’s interest.

India lacks the luxury of viewing Myanmar through only a “Democracy Lens” as the West has opted to.

India and Myanmar share a long and complex history, dating back to the ancient kingdom of Magadha. The two countries have been closely linked by trade, culture, and religion for centuries. The two countries share a long land border of 1,643 kms and a maritime boundary of 593 nautical miles in the Bay of Bengal. In recent decades, India has sought to strengthen its ties with Myanmar as part of its “Act East” policy, which aims to increase India’s engagement with Southeast Asia and connect and develop India’s Northeast.

The relationship between India and Myanmar was strained during the military rule in Myanmar from 1962 to 2011. However, in 2015, India and Myanmar signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement to boost their ties. India and Myanmar have signed a number of agreements on trade, investment, energy, security and infrastructure development. India’s interests in Myanmar are primarily, that Myanmar is a strategically located country in Southeast Asia. It shares a border with China, India’s main rival in the region. Myanmar is a Buddhist-majority country that shares religious heritage which has helped to strengthen the ties between the two countries. Myanmar has a large population and a potential market for Indian goods and services.

Hiccups Galore in Bilateral Relations

The relationship between India and Myanmar is more dominated by geo-strategic interests rather than identity, domestic politics, or economic interests. This suggests that there are some underlying geo-political tensions that are affecting the bilateral relations between the two countries.

Political Turbulence: The military coup in Feb 2021 by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing leading to the imprisonment of Ms. Aung San Sui Kyi and subsequent civil disobedience, clashes and killings of civilians by security forces along with sanctions imposed by west has caused major dilemma for India. The violence in Myanmar that has intensified since the military took power in February 2021, poses growing risks to Indian

interests. Meanwhile, ethnic violence has flared in the Indian state of Manipur, which borders Myanmar to the west. The unrest has pitted the majority Meitei community against the minority Kuki group, which has ethnic ties to the Chin group in Myanmar.

Porous Border: The unfenced Indo- Myanmar border is highly vulnerable, as the provisions of the Free Move Regime agreement are being blatantly misused by arms traffickers, gold smugglers and drug peddlers alike to the discomfort of India.

Countering Terrorism and Insurgency: The presence of insurgent groups on Myanmar soil along the Indo-Myanmar border and their efforts to continuously create instability in Indian border states is an issue persisting for decades.

Rohingya Crisis: The relationship between India and Myanmar has been strained in recent years due to the Rohingya crisis. Myanmar’s military crackdown on the Rohingya minority has been widely condemned by the international community, including India. India has called for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and has provided humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya refugees. India is providing shelter to over 40 lakhs of refugees on humanitarian grounds to ameliorate the plight of the Rohingyas as well as ensure the tense relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar do not spiral out of control. But some are being exploited to carry out anti-national and criminal activities in India.

China’s Expanding Influence: China plays an important role in all of New Delhi’s foreign policy considerations. Hence, the relations between India and Myanmar cannot escape the shadow of the giant neighbour to the North. With the Beijing-financed construction of a harbour in Kyauk Phyu, Myanmar has become part of the so-called “String of Pearls” of Chinese deepwater ports around the Indian Ocean. This encirclement with harbour facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar is viewed with much scrutiny and suspicion in India. It is feared that these ports might someday be used not only economically but also for military purposes. Of late, Chinese ships visit the Bay of Bengal to monitor Indian activities, including satellite launches.

Connectivity: The improvement of the exchange mechanism between the two nations and a better connection from India to Southeast Asia through Myanmar as a transit country – is crucial to India. The inordinate delay in Indian sponsored

projects in Myanmar such as Kaladan multi modal project is largely affecting both nations economic integration. The tri-lateral highway of India- Myanmar-Thailand is far from fructification.

Trade: The growing interdependence of the economies of China and Myanmar in the border region and the close trade relations between Myanmar and Yunnan Province serves as a hurdle in Indo-Myanmar trade. The Chinese debt trap of Myanmar is leading to erratic foreign exchange rates. Bilateral trade between the two countries has, for long, remained only at around $2 billion. Chinese, Singaporean, Korean, Japanese, Thai and Vietnamese businesses have actively seized business opportunities in Myanmar.

Prognosis

Myanmar, as a stable neighbour and reliable partner, is in India’s interest. Indian support for democratization could bring long-term stability and secure friendship of future governments. However, backlash under a continued military regime, possibly a new diplomatic ice age should be considered by India. Also, the co-existence of India and China in Myanmar is definitely possible as long as New Delhi is able to avoid direct competition and a power struggle with Beijing. The Indo-Myanmar relations have been strengthened in recent years by a number of high-level visits between the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi must continue to engage Myanmar’s military ruler, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and discuss ways to strengthen cooperation through new initiatives on a range of issues, including trade, investment, and security.

Trade: Economic cooperation has developed, but it still stays at a sub-optimal level. India is Myanmar’s fourth-largest trading partner and second-largest export market and the two countries had set a target of achieving $3 billion in bilateral trade by 2022. India must liberally provide economic assistance, loans, share Indian expertise in mining, processing precious stones and Indian businesses could invest in the power, steel, automobiles and even textile sectors in Myanmar. More border trade points (HAATS) are necessary to accelerate trade between two nations.

Security: India and Myanmar have close security cooperation. The two countries should conduct more tri-service joint military exercises, share intelligence on terrorism and other transnational threats, help enhance maritime capacity and

coastal security and provide equipment and weapon platforms as needed by Myanmar. India may also increase vacancies to train Myanmar’s military, provide Myanmar military and police with assistance to help it combat terrorism and insurgency. India must ensure the Myanmar military’s cooperation in preventing Northeastern militants, most notably Naga insurgents, from using Myanmar as a safe haven. India and Myanmar should further continue with scaled-up annual bilateral naval exercises in tune with the SAGAR vision of India.

Connectivity and Infrastructure Development: India has invested in a number of projects in Myanmar, including the development of the Sittwe port and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. The shipping facilities between Kolkata, Visakhapatnam, Chennai and Myanmar’s ports will ease the move of men and materials and boost trade too. Air connectivity between border cities on both sides will help enhance people to people contact. India could invest more in Myanmar to develop infrastructure, including roads, railways, and ports. India must provide additional assistance to Myanmar in the development of its telecom and IT sectors.

Energy: India and Myanmar have signed a Memorandum of the move of men and materials, to promote the development of energy infrastructure in Myanmar and provide access to Indian energy resources. India should bid more in Myanmar oil and gas blocks, which is open to international companies. Indian Investment in Petroleum Refinery Project in Myanmar’s Yangon aims to enhance cooperation in the energy sector and reduce Myanmar’s dependence on energy infrastructure development from China. Myanmar aims to achieve a conditional annual target of avoiding 144 million tonnes of carbon emissions by 2030. To meet its electrification goals, Myanmar is shifting towards renewables. Strengthening the India-Myanmar electricity grid connection and accessing the large Indian power market can provide Myanmar with a reliable supply of electricity. India has conducted the fifth training program for Myanmar’s power sector professionals under the ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation) Program. These recent developments highlight the opportunities between India and Myanmar in the energy sector, including investments, renewable energy initiatives, and capacity-building programs.

Agriculture Research: The Indian agricultural sector has a lot to offer to Myanmar in securing food security by increasing their crop yield and diversification of crops including commercial crops. The Advanced Centre for Agriculture Research

and Education set up in collaboration with India’s ICAR is a fine example of pooling research efforts on pulses and oilseeds.

Health: India has provided significant humanitarian assistance to Myanmar including covid vaccines, medical supplies, food aid and shelter. India may help Myanmar in preventing mortality, HIV/AIDS and provide advanced medical facilities by establishing such facilities in Myanmar.

Capacity Building: The capacity building initiatives by India such as INDIAN Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), Indian Council for Cultural Affairs (ICCR) offering scholarships and training facilities should be scaled up to meet Myanmar’s aspirations in skilling youth. Indian help in banking, insurance and digital technology will provide ample job opportunities in Myanmar.

Soft Power: India and Myanmar share close cultural and religious ties. There is a large Indian community in Myanmar, approx. 25 lakhs, many Indians visit Myanmar for Buddhist pilgrimage and vice-versa. India has provided scholarships to Myanmar students to study in India, and the two countries have signed a number of agreements on cultural cooperation. India and Myanmar have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of education and a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of disaster management. Considering the cultural and religious heritage that India and Myanmar share, there is a “natural” familiarity China cannot offer, particularly regarding a common Buddhist tradition. Therefore, Buddhism as an important link between the countries will foster people-to-people contacts and serve as a foundation for generally improved relations.

Assessment

• The India-Myanmar relationship is complex but also a vital one. The two countries share a common interest in maintaining peace and stability in the region.

• India must acknowledge Myanmar’s military primacy and engage, lest China will further exploit the situation to cause security concerns for India.

• India should build an economic and security relationship that prevent Myanmar from slipping completely into the orbit of China.

SYNERGIA INSIGHTS: SRI LANKA: FRIENDS IN NEED…

To ensure a better future, India and Sri Lanka must look beyond the Tamil minority and Sri Lanka’s strategic location- a historic thumb rule that has been the guide so far.

A relationship that spans a canvas of over 2500 years, encompassing cultural, religious, intellectual and people-to-people exchanges, is not a transitionary one. However, as our mutual experience has exhibited, despite its long legacy, at times, the relationship appears anything but enduring!

The ocean that bears India’s name and makes up for a vast swath of its immediate neighbourhood remains critical to India’s security and well-being. The emerald island of Sri Lanka, which sits like a sentinel atop this ocean’s vastness, is the natural gateway to the heavily traveled sea lanes of communication between the oil wells of West Asia and the nations of Indo-Pacific, including China.

Naturally, when geopolitical contestations creep in, they give rise to mutual suspicion, and bitter recriminations and unfounded fears. This, too, has been a hallmark of the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship.

As all good neighbours, India and Sri Lanka have their differences- some small and insignificant and others big and intransigent.

However, in the ultimate analysis, a groundswell of mutual goodwill exists between the two historically due to shared cultural ties. While India has shown no inclination to create an Indian version of the ‘Monroe Doctrine,’ as a self-respecting nation, it cannot ignore what is happening in its backyard.

The silver lining is that both sides sincerely make amendsNew Delhi with its “Neighbourhood First” policy and Colombo with its “India First” approach to improving the present and the future.

The near-total economic collapse of Sri Lanka has surprisingly helped to dispel some stereotyped impressions on both sides. India’s spontaneous and no-strings-attached response to the SOS call from its neighbour has been much appreciated across the Palk Straits (its $ 4 billion loan was nearly double the F loan that Pakistan has been pleading to IMF to grant for nearly a year!). It also led by example by being the first creditor to extend a letter of support for Sri Lanka’s debt

restructuring, which was crucial for the following $ 3 billion IMF bailout package. That President Ranil Wickremesinghe, selected to troubleshoot the nation out of the economic morass, chose India as the first nation for a state visit is ample proof of this sentiment.

A Geographical Reality

As mentioned earlier, India cannot afford to ignore Sri Lanka because of its geography. Sri Lanka’s location at the crossroads of major shipping lanes makes it a critical point of control for India.

More so, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a theatre of power play with the growing blue water capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as it ventures deeper into the region and seeks naval bases on its periphery.

Deep water ports, including Colombo, Galle and Trincomalee, present attractive options to all naval powers interested in the IOR, including India, despite its peninsular geography.

Inimical forces operating out of Sri Lankan ports can make not only the Northern Indian Ocean treacherous to Indian sea-borne trade but also our trade to the Pacific through the Southern Indian Ocean.

The same goes for Sri Lankan airspace which keep an airborne overwatch over the Indian Ocean by land-based aircraft using Sri Lankan airfields for refueling/ temporary bases. With its vast and undisputed EEZ, there is considerable scope for joint exploitation of maritime resources, including the rich fishing fields, which are always a point of disharmony between the two countries.

There is a great deal of goodwill for India amongst the people of Sri Lanka, both by the majority Sinhala (due to the Buddha connection and a fascination with Indian culture, especially Indian silk saris!) and minority Tamils who have maintained a strong connection with their Tamil ancestral land.

The South Asian Angle

Sri Lanka is an important player in the South Asian regional framework. From India’s perspective, both can potentially construct a common security umbrella for the Indian Ocean, ensuring freedom of navigation without fear or favour. Other areas of common interest include counter-terrorism (The

Easter bombing incident being the most recent example) and maritime security.

While India would like Sri Lanka to act as a buffer against potential sea-borne threats emanating from the Southern Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka may have its constraints acting as a southern outpost for India. The shadow of China on these issues naturally falls large on the smaller nation, for which there is really no answer.

Balancing a prospective superpower (with deep pockets) with a large next-door neighbour is not easy. The situation turns even more complex whenever Pakistan joins in, as it frequently happened during the quarter-century-long Sri Lanka civil war whenever Pakistan provided military support to an embattled Sri Lanka military.

The economic domain is obviously the most non-controversial one where real progress can be made, as has been recently experienced. Despite SAARC’s failure to create a South Asian Free Trade Zone like the EU, India- Sri Lanka commercial relations have blossomed.

India is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner in South Asia, with India being its third-largest export destination. More than 60 per cent of Sri Lanka’s exports enjoy the benefits of a Free Trade Agreement.

Sri Lanka is also important to India because of its potential to be a hub for trade and commerce in the Indian Ocean region. With its deep-water ports, strategic location and skilled workforce, Sri Lanka has the potential to become a major economic and trading partner for India.

The Journey So Far

It would be illuminating to briefly recapitulate the path of the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship, which has been anything but smooth and linear.

Sharing a common colonial past, both became independent nearly together (Sri Lanka 4th Feb 1948), and post-independence ties revolved around four principal issues- the Sri Lankan Tamils, the coastal fishing areas, development assistance to Colombo, and lastly, the elephant in the room-China. A confident (‘An Awakening Asian Power’ as labeled by the Times Magazine in a cover story of that period) India took a plunge into big-time politics by signing the 1987 Peace Ac-

cord under which Colombo agreed to a devolution of powers to the Tamil-dominated provinces and recalling its troops to their barracks while the Tamil rebels were to surrender their weapons (even if the LTTE was not a signatory). Despite the good intentions, the consequences of such a poorly crafted deal are now history.

The resultant rancour between New Delhi and Colombo was to last over two decades till the LTTE was unambiguously wiped out in May 2009 by Mahinda Rajapaksa. That India had a strictly ‘hands-off policy’ after the tragic assassination of Prime Ministerial candidate Rajiv Gandhi by a female Black Tiger suicide bomber was much appreciated in Sri Lankan military circles.

The India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) of 1998 was a definite turning point when relations began a northward climb. India’s spontaneous reaching out to its neighbour during its devastation by the 2004 tsunami added to the overall goodwill. The 2012 Sampur Power Plant agreement has further helped cement the ties.

Now, in the 2020s, both nations are trying to cope with security, economic, social and political challenges. The Sri Lankan President’s recent visit to India has paved the way to review the bilateral relationship and leverage the strengths of geographical and historical ties.

While the relationship has had its ups and downs, there are prospects for the two countries to strengthen their relationship through economic diplomacy and building a common security umbrella.

Challenges

The “Neighbourhood First” and “India First” policies notwithstanding, there are composite problems due to domestic and external factors; the list of potential ‘pitfalls’ is long.

Sri Lanka’s Perception: For the most part, the asymmetrical nature of interactions played an important role in shaping India-Sri Lanka relations. The perceived threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty from India, highlighted by whichever party is in opposition in Sri Lanka, always acts as a dampener whenever some progress is made in the economic and security domain.

India’s known sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils aggravates this fear factor.

Fishermen Issue: The issue of fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) has been a long-standing issue between India and Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Navy has often arrested Indian fishermen for crossing the IMBL, leading to tensions between the two countries. Sri Lanka’s proximity to Indian territorial waters has often blurred the line for fishermen on both sides in pursuit of fish stock. Way back in 1921, British colonial authorities from India and Sri Lanka calculated the risks that could arise from the over-exploitation of marine resources and demarcated the waters as a ‘fishing line’.

Demarcation of waters through IMBL Agreements signed in 1974 and 1976 and India’s decision to cede the Katchchathivu Island to Sri Lanka in 1974 under the maritime agreement, much to the disappointment of the Tamil Nadu government, could not stop the fishermen, particularly the Indian fishermen from crossing the line, because, for centuries, the waters between India and Sri Lanka were considered traditional waters for the community.

Illegal crossing of IMBL and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing continues, and domestic politics of Tamil Nadu is a factor when New Delhi approaches this sticky issue with Colombo.

The Tamil Issue: Historically, India has advocated the just rights of the Tamil minority. The associated security angle shadowed bilateral issues, and even with the LTTE fading into history, the tensions persist. Having won the war, until Sri Lanka wins the peace in its Tamil-dominated provinces, the spillover effects of the past will continue to blight the relationship. Around 58,543 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees live in camps across Tamil Nadu and Odisha. During the peak years of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, from 1983 to 2012, over 03 lakh Sri Lankan refugees entered India. India is a natural choice for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in times of distress. Thus, internal stability in Sri Lanka has always been indispensable to India’s security.

The China Factor: China has a large footprint in the island nation, which is only growing. The latest bone of contention was Sri Lanka’s decision to allow China to build a port in Hambantota, a move India considers a credible threat to its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. While Sri Lanka is not the only country in South Asia cooperating with China on its bid to expand its influence towards IOR, from the Indian perspective, it is the most important one.

The Pakistan Factor: While not as visible as China, Pakistan (along with China, India and Russia) was a factor in Sri Lanka’s 2009 victory. This is a fact that Colombo has publicly acknowledged, and it always makes India uneasy. India, on its part, dealt with the internal war situation in Sri Lanka through the “troika” mechanism (2008-2009), which could make decisions on behalf of their respective governments to deal with India-Sri Lanka relations amidst the war. Both humanitarian as well as security concerns were addressed simultaneously through this mechanism.

Economic Issues: Sri Lanka is facing a severe economic crisis, and India has provided financial assistance. However, there have been disagreements between the two countries on how to use the assistance and the overall Sri Lankan government’s economic strategy.

Domestic Politics: Domestic politics in both India and Sri Lanka affect bilateral relations. The election of a new government in Sri Lanka often has led to a change in the country’s foreign policy, which impacts relations with India.

The Journey Ahead

Regional Cooperative Approaches for enhancing maritime security, such as ‘MILAN’, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and the Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA), are important in securing India’s maritime interests. Project “Mausam” and Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) deepen the economic and security cooperation with regional states, especially with India’s maritime neighbours and island states. India’s outreach to ASEAN and investments and connectivity initiatives must get a further boost, and this would have spillover benefits for Sri Lanka.

Common Security Umbrella: Many are advancing their interests in the IOR through multiple alliances, including China, the US and India. Japan and Australia have also shown keen interest in engaging with the region in the larger Indo-Pacific framework.

The region is becoming a secondary arena for great power competition in Asia, particularly between India and China. For the powers present in the IOR, securing Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) is vital for the uninterrupted flow of trade and energy. India is building a new naval base in Sri Lanka, which will help to strengthen India’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean. India is already an effective member of

the QUAD and should encourage Colombo to join, provided its neighbour is willing to risk the wrath of China.

Direct Security Cooperation: India must continue to promote Sri Lanka’s military capacity-building, increased training cooperation and assist in an indigenous military industry in Sri Lanka as per their specific needs. Such initiatives will reduce Sri Lanka’s dependence on others for defence imports and promote a closer relationship with India.

The Tamil Issue: From an Indian perspective, the issue is still miles away from a satisfactory culmination. Only mature political patronage at the apex level and the building of consensus among the majoritarian Buddhist political forces and the clergy can bring about real changes. However, Indo -Sri Lanka bilateral relations should no longer be held ransom to the lingering Tamil issue. On Colombo’s part, a fair and transparent closure of the alleged war crimes and their accountability would be the only path to lasting reconciliation and fostering inclusive governance in Sri Lanka.

Economic Diplomacy: Economic diplomacy and competition are emerging as potential prospects to cope with the challenges emanating from social and political issues.

Sri Lankan President’s recent visit to India has provided an opportunity to review the bilateral relationship and leverage the strength of geographical and civilisational ties. Amidst the crisis, India stood as a reliable partner for Sri Lanka by extending moral and material support. By mid-2022 alone, India provided financial support of nearly $4 billion.

It was used to supply fuel, medicines and essential food items. The Tamil Nadu government has also gifted essential items worth US$ 16 million as part of larger Indian assistance. After the 9 July 2022 developments, India made a statement that “it stands with the people of Sri Lanka as they seek to realise their aspirations for prosperity and progress through democratic means, values and constitutional framework.”

Developmental Assistance: India has been providing developmental assistance to Sri Lanka by investing heavily in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure, including roads, railways, and ports. The scope for future cooperation is vast and must focus on IT and other industries.

Energy Cooperation: India is helping Sri Lanka to develop its renewable energy resources, such as solar and wind power.

The two countries are also working together to import oil and gas from the Middle East.

Water Resources Cooperation: India is helping Sri Lanka to develop its water resources, such as dams and reservoirs. The two countries are also working together to manage their shared water resources, such as the Mahaweli River.

Cultural Cooperation: Cultural Exchange Programmes (CEPs) between the two countries are signed and implemented to cover performing arts, visual arts, libraries, museums, archives & cultural documentation, archaeology, handicrafts, sports and youth affairs, publications and professional exchanges and mass media. India is also committed to the restoration of important icons of the cultural heritage of Sri Lanka. It is setting up an Indian Gallery at the International Buddhist Museum in Kandy and working on restoring the Thiruketheeswaram Temple in Mannar.

Education. The scholarship programme would benefit regular undergraduate studies and provide opportunities for higher research. Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Scheme and the Colombo Plan offer nearly 200 slots annually to Sri Lankan nationals for training courses in a wide variety of technical and professional disciplines.

Tourism: India is the largest source market for Sri Lankan tourism, with every fifth tourist from India. Sri Lankan tourists, too, are among the top ten sources for the Indian tourism market, especially the Buddha Pilgrimage circuit.

Assessment

• Undoubtedly, the political and economic stability of Sri Lanka is a security concern for India. This brings in extra-regional powers. Refugee and fishermen issues need pragmatism to resolve, and India’s financial assistance to Sri Lanka to revive the economy must be a continuing process. India must maintain a balance between its own interests and the interests of the island nation.

• India and Sri Lanka should enhance their strategic and economic cooperation by offering viable alternatives to Chinese investments and strengthening their mutual trust. India, in the fast-changing geopolitical and security dynamics of the region, must pragmatically handle the strategic pulls and pressures in bilateral relations with Sri Lanka.

SYNERGIA INSIGHTS: India- Maldives Relations: A New Era of Synergy

India-Maldives bilateral relations have been friendly and close, encompassing strategic, economic and military cooperation. India was one of the first nations to recognize Maldives’ independence from British rule in 1966 and both countries established diplomatic relations thereafter.

India-Maldives relations have been on an upward trajectory since the incumbent Ibrahim Solih Government came into power in 2018. The relationship has reached new heights with high-level visits and increased cooperation. Both nations have developed close strategic ties.

Strategic Cooperation between India and Maldives

India-Maldives relations continue to be strong and multifaceted, with both countries maintaining close cooperation in various areas and sharing common interests in the region.

Strategic Location: Maldives occupies an important position in India’s vision of ‘SAGAR’ (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and ‘Neighbourhood First’. India recognizes the strategic location of Maldives in the Indian Ocean and its significance for India and other nations in the region with common maritime interests.

No Politically Contentious Issues: India’s relationship with Maldives is free of any politically contentious issues, indicating a positive and stable state of bilateral relations.

Proximity and Assistance: India’s proximity to the Maldives has allowed it to provide timely assistance in times of distress. Incidents in 1988, 2004, and 2014 demonstrated India’s capacity to come to the Maldives’ rescue in times of crisis. This has established the advantages of India’s strategic role in the region and is widely acknowledged by both the government and people of Maldives.

Security Cooperation: India and Maldives have maintained friendly and close cooperation in strategic, economic, and military aspects. India continues to contribute to maintaining security on the island nation. The maritime border shared by both countries further emphasizes the importance of their security cooperation.

Multilateral Support: India and Maldives have supported each other in multilateral forums like the United Nations and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This demonstrates their shared strategic interests and commitment to regional cooperation.

Trade and Economic Relations: India has emerged as one of Maldives’ largest trade partners. The economic cooperation between the two countries has grown, with India providing crucial commodities to the Maldives, even during the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

High-Level Contacts and Consultations: Indian and Maldivian leaders have maintained high-level contacts and consultations on regional issues. This regular engagement has helped strengthen their strategic cooperation and foster closer ties.

Challenges

India-Maldives strategic cooperation faces challenges that need to be addressed to strengthen their bilateral ties further.

China Factor: The Chinese factor has been impacting India-Maldives its strategic cooperation in several ways.

Security Concerns: China’s strategic presence in Maldives is a perpetual hurdle for India, given the uncertain dynamics of Sino-Indian relations. Maldives has emerged as an important ‘pearl’ in China’s “String of Pearls” construct in South Asia. China has recognized the strategic value of Maldives and increased strategic footprint in India’s neighbourhood, which remains a security concern for India.

Economic Influence: China is the largest source of tourists to Maldives and a key market for the recovery of its tourism sector after the pandemic. Maldives owes a large amount of debt to China, and its reliance on China for income means that it cannot afford to alienate Beijing. This economic influence of China in the Maldives impacted India-Maldives economic cooperation.

Pro-China Political Rivals: Maldives’ pro-China political rivals have criticized the current Solih administration’s close ties with India. Maldives tries to balance its pro-India stance while maintaining ties with China.

Anti- India Sentiments: Maldivians generally regard Indians and India as a friend and trusted neighbour in the economic, social and political fields, although there has been a strong anti-India stance taken by some sections of the society expressed under the ‘India Out’ campaign, which is motivated, malicious and increasingly personal.

Radicalisation: In the past decade or so, the number of Maldivians drawn towards terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) and Pakistan-based jihadist groups has been increasing. This gives rise to the possibility of Pakistan based terror groups using remote Maldivian islands as a launch pad for terror attacks against India and Indian interests.

Drugs

Economic Challenges: Maldives has been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, with its economy contracting significantly, impacting India-Maldives economic cooperation. While India is the second-largest trading partner of the Maldives, the trade balance is heavily skewed in India’s favour. This can be a challenge for the Maldives, as it can lead to a dependence on Indian imports and a lack of diversification in its trade. Indian exports to Maldives include agriculture and poultry produce, sugar, fruits, and other essential commodities. Indian imports from Maldives is almost negligible.

Domestic Political Grievances: Democratic institutions in the Maldives have been weakened and there are concerns about the country’s human rights record.

Way Ahead

India and Maldives share a “very special bond,” and India has been the first responder every time the Maldives has had an emergency. Indian diplomatic efforts should constantly aim to strengthen ties with Maldives.

Diplomatic Cooperation: Indian and Maldivian leaders must focus on continued high-level contacts and consultations on regional issues. Both nations are founding members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the South Asian Economic Union and signatories to the South

Asia Free Trade Agreement. India-Maldives strategic cooperation is important for remaining strong, and both countries must support each other in multilateral forums like the UN and SAARC.

Defence Cooperation: India and Maldives should further their cooperation in the field of defence and security to maintain peace and stability in the region. Maldives holds a significant position among India’s vital maritime neighbours. Indian active engagements must enhance the bolstering of security infrastructure in Maldives through capacity development and capability building.

Working closely with the Maldivian authorities, the Indian Navy has conducted joint exercises, provided training to personnel, aided in infrastructure development and facilitated the transfer of equipment. These collaborative initiatives emphasizing India’s crucial role as a security provider in the region must be pursued by close monitoring.

Indo-Pacific Security: India must play a key role in Indo-Pacific security space to ensure regional security in South Asia and surrounding maritime boundaries. This space has to be developed as a response to the growth of extra-regional powers (particularly China’s) in India’s maritime sphere of influence.

Military Relations: India started the process of bringing the island country into India’s security grid. The move comes after the moderate Islamic nation approached New Delhi earlier in 2009 over fears that one of its island resorts could be taken over by terrorists given its lack of military assets and surveillance capabilities. India has also signed an agreement

Which includes the following:

India will permanently base two helicopters in the country to enhance its surveillance capabilities and ability to respond swiftly to threats. Maldives has coastal radars on only two of its 26 atolls. India will help set up radars on all 26 for seamless coverage of approaching vessels and aircraft.

The coastal radar chain in Maldives will be networked with the Indian coastal radar system. India has already undertaken a project to install radars along its entire coastline. The radar chains of the two countries will be interlinked, and a central control room in India’s Coastal Command will get a seamless radar picture. The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) will carry out regular Dornier sorties over the island nation to look

out for suspicious movements or vessels. The Southern Naval Command will overlook the inclusion of Maldives into the Indian security grid. Military teams from Maldives will visit the tri-services Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC) to observe how India manages security and surveillance of the critical island chain. Ekuverin, an annual joint military exercise, is held every year since 2009 between India and Maldives. The exercise aims to enhance the interoperability between the Indian Army and Maldives National Defence

Infrastructure Development: In August 2021, an Indian company, Afcons signed a contract for the Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP), the largest-ever infrastructure project in the Maldives. The project connects the capital city of Male with three neighbouring islands through a bridge-and-causeway system.

Economic Aid: India must provide liberal economic aid to Maldives to support its economic growth and development. In 2021, bilateral trade between India and Maldives registered a growth of 31% over the previous year, overcoming pandemic-related challenges.

Tourism: Tourism is the mainstay of the Maldivian economy. The country is now a major tourist destination for the globe and and a job destination for others. Joint ventures and collaborations in tourism will mutually benefit both nations.

Drug Detoxification and Rehabilitation: India should invest in creating more facilities, such as the centre in Addu, one of 20 high-impact community development projects. Investments in areas of healthcare, education, fisheries, sports and culture would positively impact Maldivians for a long time.

Handling ‘India Out’ campaign: Presently, the campaign has support from a limited population, but this cannot be taken for granted by the Indian government. If the issues raised by the supporters of the ‘India Out’ are not handled carefully, the campaign may change the domestic political situation in the Maldives and may set ripples in India’s currently favourable relationship with the country.

Bilateral Talks: The Indian Prime Minister has been discussing with Maldivian President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, ways to strengthen the India-Maldives relationship. The two nations must provide impetus to defence and security, economic ties and regional cooperation.

Assessment

• China’s involvement has added complexity to the India-Maldives relationship and has led to challenges in the areas of security and politics.

• Maldives will balance its relationships with both India and China to maintain its economic and political stability.

• India must not grow complacent over its position and must continue to engage with the Maldives to strengthen the relationship to deepen their strategic partnership.

India - Maldives Agreements

• Cybersecurity

• Capacity Building

• Housing

• Disaster Management

• Infrastructure Development

SYNERGIA INSIGHTS: AFGHANISTAN: A BITTER SURVIVOR

Two years after the hasty, disorganised exit of the Americans and their allies, Afghanistan, though isolated, seems to be holding out and surviving rather well!

Cut off from the global village and diplomatically, not formally recognised by any nation except China ( 13 September 2023), Kabul, under the phlegmatic Taliban, seems to be holding out quite well for itself if you, for a moment, ignore the human rights situation. It claims to have its Afghani stronger than the Pakistani Rupee trading around Afghani 80 to a dollar (in comparison to nearly Pak Rs 300 per dollar!)

The reasons are not far to seek. As Conrad Schetter describes in a paper titled “The Bazaar Economy of Afghanistan,” published by the Centre for Development Research over the decades of war, Afghanistan has developed an informal economy, which can be called a ‘bazaar economy.’ The general framework of the Afghan ‘bazaar economy’ is that the capitalistic, free-market economy regulates all economic activities in the absence of any state regulation. Private trade constitutes the most important economic activity, while the production of real goods and the influence of a public sphere almost completely disappear. Furthermore, the ‘bazaar econ-

omy’ on the Afghan territory is not contained by its national borders but interwoven with the world market through an informal transnational network that is linked to Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian countries through smuggling networks, working openly under benign and corrupt government officials.

Diplomatically, Kabul is not as isolated as one would imagine. While it may be true that only China has so far recognised the Taliban regime and its closest mentor, Pakistan is yet to recognise it; the Kabul regime is conducting the business of all state with its three closest ‘friends ‘- Pakistan and Russia. The diplomatic missions of the previous Ghani regime have been taken over by the Taliban in 15 countries, which are now functioning.

India had closed its Kabul embassy in August 2021 after Taliban forces entered the capital, which was later ransacked by mobs. One year later, the embassy was reopened, which was marked by India sending a Technical Team with humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

A Strategic Location

As we all know from our geography lessons, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a landlocked country located in the heart of South-Central Asia bounded by Iran in the West, Pakistan and India in the South and East, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan in the North, also shares a short border with Xinjiang, China in the extreme Northeast. Any ambitious invader knows that once the Afghans have been crushed, the fruits of the fertile river plains of India are there for the taking.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Afghanistan has been the gateway for all land invasions of the Indian subcontinent. Only once the British Empire had spread its wings right up to the gates of Kabul did the invasions finally stop in the 18th and 19th centuries until the USSR came to a calling, with tanks to boot, in 1979. No country has fought out more invaders of all hues than the stoic Afghan- from Alexander the Great’s phalanxes to the modern marvel of the US Army. The country’s recent history has seen it ravaged by the Soviet invasion in 1979, the Civil War, the rise and fall of the Taliban, the US invasion in 2001, and the resurgence of the Taliban now. As a result of these traumatic events, Afghanistan is now attempting to address the devastation that constant warfare has created. Afghanistan has been governed by nearly every system

of government over the past century, including a monarchy, republic, theocracy and communism.

Navigating the Maze of Afghanistan

Never an easy country to govern, riven by fierce tribal fractions, today’s Afghanistan faces an uphill task as the Taliban try to get a grip over their country and make it work. Right up there is the issue of security. While conflict has been a part of the daily life of every Afghani for centuries, the injection of modern and more lethal technology has meant that no part, however remote, can feel secure from the fighting. While there is no external player or clear adversary today, the inherently suspicious and conspiracy-prone Afghans have always looked for enemies even when none existed! One just has to look at their current state of relations with Pakistan, once their greatest supporter, to get an idea of their naive way of dealing with external diplomacy.

A loosely controlled state becomes a haven for non-state actors- look at Somalia and even the sub-Sahara states in Africa. Afghanistan is threatening to go in the same direction. The internal situation remains delicate for Kabul, which enjoys only a tenuous hold over its remote outlying districts. Taliban, a loose conglomeration of various allied groups, during the early years of 2001 to 2005, was effective only in South and Southeast Afghanistan because of the non-presence of security forces there. However, from 2006 onwards, the Taliban expanded all over Afghanistan. The other groups include Al Qaeda, LeT, ISIS and IMU. The alliances existed with religious groups and criminal gangs, including the drug mafia, funded largely by narcotics and extortion.

The recent epoch of violence has mainly been associated with the phenomenon of the rise of Islamic militancy, whose effects have transcended Afghanistan’s borders. The ISPK, TTP and a host of other radical militant groups continue to take shelter within Afghan territory despite the promises made at the Doha Accord. Situated at the crossroads of South, Southwest, and Central Asia, the conflict in Afghanistan has ramifications throughout the region, especially the escalation of religious extremism, which threatens peace and stability in the entire region. In fact, one could pin the rise of religious fundamentalism in Pakistan, Xinjiang in China and Uzbekistan in some ways to Afghanistan’s own conflicts. This is a real danger that every one of its neighbours fears the most. The recent spurt of violence in Baluchistan, KPK province and the Chitral region of Pakistan is an indication

of things to come. Till the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a progressive state with aspirations of joining the rest of the world in equality of genders and a liberal, secular outlook despite a deep belief in Islam as the national religion. However, the Taliban phenomenon, with its roots in the extreme form of Deobandi Islam, changed all this, driving the country back into the medieval ages.

With the country fractured into various factions according to tribal affiliations, whatever state organs and institutions had taken root rapidly collapsed and were mingled with the dust of destroyed cities. Poor governance with no accountability and no strong national institutions to act independently of political influences has long become a reality in modern. Devoidance of incorporating indigenous knowledge into policymaking is an important handicap towards addressing some of Afghanistan’s challenges. To exacerbate the situation, the Taliban is failing to engage with the international community and demonstrate flexibility in improving the livelihoods of millions of Afghans.

The biggest concern of the global community, including that of Kabul’s few friends (Pakistan, China, Russia), is the sheer violation of human rights, especially those of women and children, that remains a constant plank of Taliban policy, whatever its cost. Every day, a fresh fatwa is issued, imposing one restriction after another upon the women- in social behaviour, in dressing, in education, and in employment. No amount of international outcry or outrage makes the slightest difference to the ruling clergy.

All the aforementioned factors collude to impact most severely on one particular aspect of governance- the economy. It is little surprise that the country grapples with an array of formidable challenges such as a tenuous security environment, overwhelming dependence on foreign largesse, deplorable economic growth, widening social and ethnic divide, and most importantly, a fundamentalist regime now at the helm of affairs.

All these challenges point toward an uphill task for Afghanistan to sustain itself as a stable and peaceful state. No one can deny the tangible progress that Afghanistan achieved during the presence of a US-led mission in Afghanistan, yet the return of the Taliban as the de facto regime is reversing these gains. Afghanistan is back into an abysmal scenario resembling the chaos and disorder during the previous Taliban regime and the preceding civil war years.

The Great Game Continues?

The two-decades-long international intervention to bring stability (destabilise!!) in Afghanistan was, at best, a poorly thought out and even less efficiently carried out enterprise. There was no vision with diverse approaches; the military alliance had its own national caveats and goals with differences amongst troops, the aid delivery was ineffective, including diversion of funds; hence, there was no unity of command in peacekeeping or war-fight efforts. Therefore, it is not surprising that the international interventions, conducted at a high cost of lives and treasure, failed to democratise or stabilise Afghanistan. Regional competition by Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and CAR - all playing proxy games in Afghanistan- added to an already volatile mix.

Economically, the country is a basket case but miraculously continues to trundle along as the hardy Afghan has learnt to survive on his own with the basics of life without the aid of the state. Being naturally innovative, the Pashtun have energetically exploited the porous borders of Pakistan and Iran to run thriving smuggling rings selling goods being transited through Pakistan in the grey markets of Pakistan itself and hoarding huge reserves of dollars illegally picked up from the informal currency markets of Karachi and the frontier provinces of Pakistan. Even sugar is being smuggled in huge quantities from Pakistan into Afghanistan and beyond into CAR at enormous profits. Afghani grey market enterprises are playing havoc with the already crippled Pakistani economy. As a result, it is commonplace in Pakistan to put all the blame for their economic woes on their Afghan guest who have long overstayed their welcome.

China understands the economic potential of Afghanistan and is keen to incorporate it as a part of its CPEC project in Pakistan. For this to fructify, peace between Kabul and Islamabad and stability along the tumultuous Durand Line (not recognised by Kabul!) need to be achieved. China’s engagement with the Taliban is to prevent it from becoming an arena of geopolitical competition, falling back into the orbit of the West and preventing the spread of terrorism, separatism, and extremism to the vulnerable Xinjiang province. China is wielding soft power by fostering diplomatic alliances, aims to position China as a responsible global power, and to counterbalance the influence of the United States in the region.

Today, Pakistan finds itself in a unique position- its decades of investment in the Taliban appear to be sinking as rapidly

as the Pakistani Rupee because Kabul has decidedly shown a very independent mind that goes contrary to Pakistani interests. The status of TTP within Afghanistan and the immunity they seem to be enjoying is just one of the irritants bedevilling AfPak relations.

From the Indian Perspective

The geolocation of Afghanistan is crucial for a long-term strategy of India, which implies ensuring stability in the region and preventing extremist Taliban from entering J&K. A democratic Afghanistan with sustained peace and stability is in the Indian interest. India’s economic interest includes Afghanistan forming the land bridge to CAR, which has huge reserves of minerals and oil. India’s efforts at developing the Chabahar Port in Iran are based on the fact that it provides India with the most viable option for gaining access to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan, which has on many occasions refused to provide land transit to Indian goods bound for Afghanistan. Militarily, a stable Afghanistan acts as a counterweight to Pakistan in the region.

The fall of the Taliban regime and the subsequent establishment of interim authority in December 2001 led to the upgradation of Indian representation in Afghanistan from the liaison office to the Embassy in March 2002. Besides a mission in Kabul, India had four consulates at Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. India’s role and active engagement in the Bonn Conference of 2001 was positively received. Since then, India has followed a policy of high-level engagement with Afghanistan, ranging from humanitarian, financial and project assistance in terms of building the country’s shattered infrastructure, capacity building and participation in international efforts aimed at reconciliation and economic rebuilding of Afghanistan.

Political support in terms of the Panchayat Raj system in rural Afghanistan and capacity building in remote areas was the focus of Indian support. The economic support included trade investments, projects construction such as roads, railways, Parliament building, and hospitals for the citizens of Afghanistan. The social support in Afghanistan predominantly included women empowerment and child development in the education and health sectors. India emerged as Afghanistan’s largest regional aid donor in the post-9/11 era. Till 2021, India had spent almost $3 billion on various developmental and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. In a bid to carve a niche in the ‘new’ Afghanistan, New Delhi employed the winning

hearts and minds (WHAM) strategy and insulated itself from military matters. As a result of its civilian-centric policies, India was perceived by Afghans as a friendly neighbour committed to Afghanistan’s peace and development. While some would call all this effort and investment as so much money down the drain, the fact is that India’s good intentions are well appreciated by the Afghan people, and even the Taliban would recognise the honesty in India’s efforts. The fact that the current Taliban regime is interacting with New Delhi on various issues is indicative of that acceptance.

As long as the Western coalition secured Afghanistan, India opted to deal only with the democratically elected government in Kabul. Not having engaged with the Taliban over the last two decades invariably meant that when the Afghan state collapsed in 2021, India faced its 1996 Afghan moment once again. In a panic, India brought the shutter down on its Kabul embassy and flew the staff home, a move that was severely criticised in India. There is no alternative for India to regain a semblance of strategic presence in Afghanistan other than to engage with the Taliban. Indian timely initiatives will pave the path for opening formal communication channels between the Taliban and the Indian government. Taliban is on record stating, “None can change one’s neighbours or region; we must accept this reality and have peaceful coexistence.”

Indian food aid to Afghanistan has created an opening to begin its direct engagement with the Taliban regime. Keeping with its civilian-centric strategy, India must continue liberal food aid to Afghanistan, as per the MoU signed with the UN World Food Programme (WFP) to arrange food supply distribution. Afghanistan still faces an uphill task of managing the shortage of medicines and healthcare facilities; India can step in more concertedly and lay the foundation for a renewed strategic footing under the auspices of the Taliban regime. This would certainly help India to preserve the goodwill it has earned in Afghanistan over the last two decades.

India needs to move beyond these assistance-driven measures and carve herself a strategic niche in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s deteriorating ties with Pakistan may be an apt entry point. India and Afghanistan’s other regional neighbours must influence the Taliban to form an inclusive government to gain diplomatic recognition. India must facilitate dialogue with SAARC and SCO so that enough leverage is exerted on the Taliban for the inclusion of representatives belonging to minority ethnic factions within its government.

Synergia Conclave 2023

Synergia Conclave 2023

Synergia Conclave 2023

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