10 b STRATEGIC VISION
SLOCs owing to their high levels of international trade, but all the countries in this area also require SLOCs to enhance their economic development and national prosperity. SLOCs, nevertheless, are often hampered by littoral insecurity. In March 2010, Chinese officials declared to the Americans that the South China Sea is Beijing’s core interest. It was the first time that Beijing so nakedly asserted its clear determination and willingness to use military force to protect its South China Sea claims. The assertion made waves throughout the region, upsetting maritime stability in the South China Sea and raising the specter of disrupting the SLOCs. Although freedom of navigation, piracy, natural disasters, and climate change are not as pressing as the three issues depicted above, they are important in non-traditional security terms and can still have a devastating impact from time to time. The March 11, 2011 tsunami and subsequent nuclear disaster, for
instance, represented the most severe maritime threat the Japanese had ever experienced. This suggests that natural disasters can be securitized and conceived of as potential threats to the maritime defense of regional countries in general, and to Japan in particular. One takeaway to be gleaned from this event is that most threats to maritime defense cannot be resolved by a single country alone.
Different national interests This is also true for such issues as piracy and climate change, in spite of the fact that piracy—especially in the Malacca Strait—is far less serious in terms of human lives lost, and climate change is not immediately felt even when the pace of development is high. Yet what is essential is how we see the problem of maritime defense and how we deal with threats to littoral security. This is a difficult problem, because each
photo: Rodney Furry Two Vietnamese border policemen communicate with port authorities in preparation for the arrival of USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) to Danang, Vietnam.