Strategic Vision, Special Issue 7

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Special Issue

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Summer, 2023

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ISSN 2227-3646

Like-Minded Partners for Peace Masafumi Ishii

Taiwanese Unafraid During Crisis Zane Zhang

Preparations for Blockade Tom Yang

Czech response to a Taiwan Strait War Jan Feryna & Kristyna Drmotova

Regional Security Cooperation Chang-Ching Tu

One Year Later:

Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Special Issue

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Summer, 2023

Contents Seeking like-minded partners in first island chain peace..............4 Masafumi Ishii Taiwanese unafraid during Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis..............10 Zane Zhang Preparations to endure Chinese blockade.................................... 15 Tom Yang Czech responses to a Taiwan Strait contingency......................... 20 Jan Feryna & Kristyna Drmotova Regional joint security cooperation needed.................................26 Chang-Ching Tu

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From The Editor

Editor Fu-Kuo Liu Executive Editor Aaron Jensen Editor-at-Large Dean Karalekas Editorial Board Chung-young Chang, Fo-kuan U Richard Hu, NCCU Ming Lee, NCCU Raviprasad Narayanan, JNU Hon-Min Yau, NDU Ruei-lin Yu, NDU Osama Kubbar, QAFSSC Rashed Hamad Al-Nuaimi, QAFSSC Chang-Ching Tu, NDU STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Special Edition Number Seven, published August 2023, under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.

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I

t has now been a year since then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, prompting a military show of force from China that has come to be known as the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. While Pelosi’s visit was an important milestone, reiterating Taiwan’s de facto independence and highlighting Taipei’s close ties with Washington, the security situation in the Taiwan Strait has only become tenser. PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have expanded exponentially, and Beijing’s pressure against Taiwan has ramped up—as much an effort to influence Taiwan’s upcoming elections as to establish a new normal regarding the close proximity of PLA assets around the island.

This special issue of Strategic Vision is devoted to an examination of various elements of this new normal as we look back at the watershed Pelosi visit and the aftermath now, a year later. We begin with a piece by Masafumi Ishii, former Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia, who looks at the need to rally like-minded partners as allies in the effort to maintain peace and security in the first island chain.

Next, Zane Zhang, an officer in the ROC military who studies at the Graduate Institute of International Security (GIIS) of the ROC National Defense University, offers his analysis of the causes behind the apparent low perception of threat of attack by China among the people of Taiwan, examining the effects of social polarization and the media framing effect.

This is followed by an exploration of the potential avenues of response that Taiwan could take to a PLA blockade of the island, provided by Tom Yang, a captain in the ROC Air Force and also a student at GIIS. The effects of the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis were felt not just in the region, but the world, with several European countries now waking up to the possibility that a cross-strait war might become a reality. Drs. Jan Feryna and Kristyna Drmotova, researchers at the Institute of Intelligence Studies in the University of Defence in Brno, Czech Republic, offer the Czech perspective on the likely impacts of such an eventuality, and look at the potential for a multi-dimensional response pattern.

Finally, Strategic Vision editorial board member and associate professor at the GIIS, Dr. Chang-Ching Tu, analyses the rising security crisis and identifies the need for a joint security cooperation initiative in the democratic First Island Chain.

The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis brought with it a new status quo across the Taiwan Strait, and its effects will be felt for years to come. We hope this look at the continuing impact of the crisis is of value to our readers, and we look forward to providing ongoing analysis of the events shaping our region and impacting our security.

Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic Vision

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Strategic Vision, Special Issue 6 (Summer, 2023)

Like-Minded Partners Wider range of allies needed to bolster first island chain peace and security Masafumi Ishii

photo: Matt Navarra US Marines train with Philippine Marines during exercise Kamandag 2 in the Philippines, strengthening both forces’ tactical and warfighting skills.

The Democratic First Island Chain Union and Joint Security Cooperation Initiative proposed by Taiwan is a good place to start discussions on how to deter a potential Taiwan Strait contingency from becoming a reality. For that purpose, in addition to closer US-Taiwan coordination, solid planning under the framework of the Japan-US alliance, and quiet communication among the three, are essential. It is necessary to go beyond that, however, and touch upon

last year’s missile exercise, conducted to coincide with the visit of then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, represented only the latest step in this escalation. To make sure that deterrence works, a wider range of like-minded partners should be brought in—wider than just those nations in the first island chain, and even those countries which may not, in the strictest sense, be democracies. Moreover, ways should be found to engage these partners in the form

the importance of networking among other likeminded partners.

By any reasonable metric, China is becoming increasingly aggressive in its actions in the region, and

of a network that is custom-made for each partner and more flexible than a one-size-fits-all kind of approach.

Firstly, deterrence is the foremost priority. Once

Masafumi Ishii is the former Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia, having also served in Washington DC, London, Belgium, and NATO. He can be reached for comment at msmm.ishii@nifty.com

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deterrence fails, there will be no winner. Nobody wants to see a huge loss of life and destruction of the national infrastructure of the sort that direct military conflict between the United States and China could bring about. Moreover, bad feelings and mistrust among neighbors can last for over a century.

Secondly, the best way to secure the success of deterrence is to be prepared for the contingency, and to let the other side know it, so that they understand that there is a risk of failure. For that purpose, the more like-minded partners that can be involved, the better.

Thirdly, many countries have legitimate concerns about what might happen in a Taiwan Strait contingency simply because it would inevitably have a huge impact on free and safe navigation in the world’s most important sea lines of communication (SLOC). They are not limited to the countries in the region.

First of all, this means our approach should not be confined to those nations in the first island chain. It should include such like-minded partners as those in Europe now that the new NATO Strategic Concept identifies China as posing systemic challenges to

NATO. A series of joint exercises with France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have sent the right signals of a stronger deterrence. We should also never forget India. As we have learned in the Ukraine war, what India does will have a substantial impact on the direction of global consensus.

“Leaders must be selective in deciding with whom they might work more closely together, bearing in mind the realities on the ground.”

Second, they do not have to be limited to democratic countries, either. The recent National Security Strategy of the administration of US President Joe Biden has made it clear that the new global coalitions that the United States wants to build include “countries that do not embrace democratic institutions but nevertheless depend upon and support a rules-based international system.” This reflects the lessons that the Biden team has learned from their experience dealing with Asia. It appears that they have sorted out their

photo: Kaitlyn Oiler Visitors stand ready for a flag raising ceremony marking Finland’s accession to the NATO alliance at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on April 4, 2023.

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Graphic: USDOD

priorities in dealing with their biggest challenge. This subtle change means, for example, that Vietnam can be a part of such a team.

Third, having said all this, leaders must be selective in deciding with whom they might work more closely together, bearing in mind the realities on the ground, such as the geostrategic situation each partner faces in relation to its biggest neighbor and trading partner.

Member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, always resent feeling that they are being forced to choose between the United States and China. According to the results of an annual survey of ASEAN countries conducted by the Japanese government, however, they may already have chosen, at least in their hearts. In fact, there are only three countries where the results put Japan over China as the country on which they would rely more in the future. They are Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In other countries, the

results swing back and forth between Japan and China, based largely on the transfer of power between administrations, or those which always put China first. Singapore is the exception: the public of the city-state has consistently said they would rely on China more than any other country, even while the government has been hosting the US Navy and Air Force since the 1990s.

A word of caution is in order: Japan’s main ASEAN policy is to put ASEAN first, and this will never change. So, Tokyo should be careful not to overdo its prioritization if it looks as if it might be promoting division. This also means that there is not a one-size-fitsall model for cooperation. It will have to be custom-made for each partner, and reflecting the limitations that each partner has. This is where the formation of a network is fundamentally different from a union or coalition.

In more concrete terms, this means that a broad consensus must be created among core partners like the United States, Taiwan, and Japan about who the priority like-minded partners are; what they expect from each like-minded partner; and what they can do to achieve that end. There are several potential candidates for these like-minded partners, with different expectations attached to each.

The Philippines The Philippines is one of the two treaty allies of the United States in Southeast Asia. The current administration of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos has adopted a stance that is much closer to the United States than that of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, even in relation to his government’s potential role in a Taiwan

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contingency. Taiwan is geographically situated close to the northern tip of the Philippines, and is also within proximity of the US bases in Okinawa. That means that the Philippines can be a place where US military equipment and personnel could be prepositioned before a crisis, as well as serving as an operational hub.

The recent visit of US Vice President Kamala Harris to the Philippines, where she discussed the accelerated implementation and potential expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), shows the future direction of their cooperation. In addition to US-Philippines planning and coordination, trilateral coordination involving Japan may also be useful.

Singapore As for Singapore, it is widely expected that Singapore would maintain the current level of US presence even during a Taiwan contingency. Singapore can also play the role of logistical hub as a crisis becomes immi-

nent. Maintaining reasonably safe navigation in the Strait of Malacca is another task for Singapore that requires support from the United States and other partners, including Europe. To this end, regular joint exercises based upon likely crisis scenarios involving major players like the United States, Japan, and European aspirants are essential.

Indonesia Indonesia would make another natural like-minded partner. In the event that a Taiwan contingency renders not only the Taiwan Strait unavailable for free and safe transportation, but the Bashi Channel and the Malacca Strait as well, then the only other option that is both physically possible and economically viable would be a route through the straits of Lombok and Makassar in Indonesia. The best outcome, and perhaps the most we can expect from Jakarta, would be to keep the straits open for free and safe navigation.

Indonesia is a major regional power with enough potential to achieve this end. Countries like the

photo: Dominique Pineiro High-ranking officers from the United States and Singapore during the Shangri-La Dialogue. Singapore already has a strong relationship with Washington.

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United States and Japan should step up their support for capacity-building of both manpower and equipment for Indonesia’s coast guard and navy. Exercises designed for that purpose should be set up on a regular basis. In this regard, it was announced after a meeting between Biden and Indonesian President Jokowi on the sidelines of the recent G20 Summit in Bali that the US has decided to help the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, or BAKAMLA, to procure drones, train pilots, and increase maintenance skills to enhance the agency’s capabilities in maritime domain awareness. This represents an important move in the right direction. Additional assistance may be required as crises become imminent, however. Allies should be ready to support Indonesia, while always being mindful about who is in charge.

South Korea The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a major regional power, and the current administration of ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol understands its capability and responsibility as such. They also know that with

all the US troops stationed in South Korea, the country will inevitably be involved in some capacity if a Taiwan crisis arises. With the present state of bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea still difficult though improving, this is where trilateral coordination involving the United States as a pivot becomes useful and crucial. Taiwan must continue to be on the agenda of US-Japan-ROK meetings for that purpose.

Vietnam As already mentioned, Vietnam would be invaluable as a like-minded partner, even though it is not a democracy. Vietnam is one of the few countries to have fought and won wars against both China and the United States. Though in recent years, China has emerged as Hanoi’s most serious security challenge, the Vietnam government has maintained a careful balancing act among the major powers. The “Four Nos” principle of Vietnam’s defense policy—no alliances, no seeking third-country support in combat, no use of its bases or territory for a third-party conflict, and no use of force—is typically Vietnamese.

photo: Jason van Mourik American and Vietnamese military officers oversee a joint disaster management activity being held in Hanoi, Vietnam.

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photo: Sara Medina Exercise Ssang Yong is conducted annually to enhance interoperability between US and South Korean forces for sea-based power projection in the Pacific.

This “Four Nos” approach means that there would be no direct Vietnamese involvement in a Taiwan contingency. However, Hanoi is concerned about a possible Chinese insurgence in the South China Sea during or before a Taiwan crisis, and has been trying to make itself ready to repel such actions. That would de facto help allied operations. A closer intelligence exchange with Vietnam during peacetime, for example, would be useful for the entire region.

India India has the clear potential to become a global power. As the world has learned from the Ukraine war, where New Delhi stands has a major influence in consensus-building. China has become India’s primary challenger, and so New Delhi has become a strong member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, alongside the United States, Japan, and Australia. But things are not as simple as they appear. Though the Quad is perfect for India in dealing with maritime security concerns, India has other security challenges such as Pakistan, as well as disputes on its contiguous land border with China, for

which India does not believe the Quad can make a meaningful contribution. That is why New Delhi is not willing to completely sever its longtime relationship with Moscow.

To deal with this situation, the United States and Japan should step up their support to the Indian Army by organizing more joint military exercises to show the readiness to help India’s efforts in dealing with the northern border issues. The best-case scenario, as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) starts its move against Taiwan, would be for the Indian Army to deploy assets northward, giving Beijing another potential front to worry about. Although this may not be likely, more joint exercises involving the Indian army may at least make the calculation of the other side a bit more complicated, which means more deterrence.

These are just a few examples of what allied leaders need to pursue in the coming months. The process of coordination may require a longer rather than a shorter time. It is to be hoped that many of these actions have started already. It can never be too early to make sure that deterrence does not fail the way it did in Ukraine. n

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Strategic Vision, Special Issue 6 (Summer, 2023)

Perceiving Risk

Polarization, media framing affected views of Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Zane Zhang

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he leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) see it as their historical mission to effect the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, with the “reunification” of Taiwan being one of the main objectives of this campaign. For a sovereign state like Taiwan, this goal is a source of threat.

Disinformation, diplomatic and economic pressure, and intimidation by threat of arms have long been tactics used by the PRC to achieve its goal of annexing Taiwan. As the world slowly wakes up to the fact that Beijing has grander ambitions than to join the international arena as a responsible player, many see Taiwan as the natural next target for People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aggression. Many assume

that the Taiwanese people should be seriously unsettled by the China threat, and yet parachute journalists, sent to document the panic of a threatened population, have often commented that the people of Taiwan seem unusually cavalier about the imminent attack from across the Taiwan Strait.

This may be explained, at least in part, by the historical context. Such threats are not new. The Taiwan Strait has been the epicenter of three crises in the post-World War II era: the September 3 artillery battle in 1954, the August 23 Artillery Battle in 1958, and the 1996 missile crisis sparked by Taiwan’s decision to hold its first direct presidential elections, which to some extent increased regional tensions and rattled the public’s nerves.

photo: ROC MND ROC soldiers assist in clearing operations after a typhoon. Such missions put military personnel in full view of the public, increasing their profile.

Zane Zhang is an officer in the ROC military who studies at the Graduate Institute of International Security of the ROC National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at taftnn@gmail.com

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photo: ROC MND An ROC soldier with the K-9 unit takes part in a training exercise. The public went on with their lives during the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.

However, the last of these was 27 years ago, and last August, after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, the PRC conducted several days of live-fire drills in the airspace and waters around Taiwan. Economic sanctions were also imposed on Taiwan’s agricultural and fishery products. As a result, the world officially witnessed the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Comparative calm In Taiwan, although the live-fire drills were frontpage news and remained a hot topic on political programs, the public seems to be going on with their lives—it was business as usual. The drills were apparently treated as a normal incident, rather than a crisis of escalating tensions. Despite worries that the maneuvers might be a pretext for a blockade, there was comparative calm in Taiwan. Contradicting the expectation of international observers, there was not much panic-buying, scrambling for bomb shelters, or a mass exodus of people. It raises the question of just how afraid are the Taiwanese of a PLA attack?

How much did the Taiwanese people perceive the

PRC as a threat in the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis? In a survey conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF), after the drills, Taiwanese adults (above 20 years old) were asked whether they were scared, or in any way felt afraid because of the situation, and up to 78.3 percent of respondents answered that they were “not really scared” or “not at all scared,” which is consistent with observations. In the same survey, when the respondents were asked whether they thought the PRC would start a war at any time, 52.7 percent said it was “not possible” or “not at all possible,” and 39 percent choose “possible” or “very possible.”

Comparing the statistics before and after the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, it can be seen that there was a discernable shift from the middle options (“possible” and “not possible”) to the extreme options (“very possible” and “not at all possible”). This may indicate that, under the severe condition of external military threat, the initial inclination of Taiwanese people may become extreme, potentially leading to a more polarized society.

In another survey conducted by TPOF in September 2022, the respondents were asked if the Ministry of

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National Defense (MND) is too weak in responding to the threats and intimidation from the PRC. The result shows an almost even split, with 43.6 percent agreeing and 42.4 percent disagreeing. Additionally, in a further analysis of this survey, there was no correlation between the respondents’ preference of political parties. On this topic, the attitudes of similar political party supporters also diverge.

The phenomenon of Taiwanese people reacting moderately to a severe external threat may be explored from the angles of public inattention, the media framing effect, and the preference for maintaining the status quo.

Inattention toward China According to Timothy Rich, a professor of political science at Western Kentucky University who focuses on public opinion and electoral politics in East Asia, Taiwanese people exhibit something of an inattention toward China. China did not come to the mind of

66.4 percent of respondents at all in the week prior to the poll. While the survey was conducted in May 2022—before the crisis—the results match with a survey Rich conducted in South Korea in the face of the external threat from North Korea, and shows that many South Koreans pay little attention to North Korea.

One theory to explain this is that people are desensitized by the saturation of threat information. It is reasonable to assume that public tension is positively correlated with the severity of the threat, or the extent of information exposure. However, as the childhood story of The Boy Who Cried Wolf teaches us, there is a threshold to the extent to which it matters. Generations of Taiwanese are well aware of the PRC’s assertiveness and the potential for cross-strait military conflict. This, along with the oversaturated media coverage of the threat, has made it a normal state of affairs for the Taiwanese public.

The public weighing more strongly on domestic and livelihood issues that do not involve cross-strait

photo: ROC MND ROC soldiers practice hand-to-hand combat. Surveys suggest that the public has become desensitized to the threat of attack from China.

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photo: ROC MND The framing effect of the media’s coverage may also serve as an important factor in shaping Taiwan’s threat perception toward China.

dynamics may also be the source of the inattention.

Last August, most of the media coverage and public discourse seemed to be focused more on a plagiarism scandal of a mayoral candidate than the livefire drills.

Adding to the level of desensitization, the framing effect of the media may also serve as an important factor in shaping Taiwan’s threat perception toward the PRC. Taiwan has its own unique political spectrum, in which the people are scattered from panblue supporters to pan-green supporters; as well as those who are pro-China, to others who are more pro-America. This political landscape is vastly different from the Western categorization of right-wing to left-wing, along with an even more unique media culture that favors sensationalism, and which panders to specific groups of people. This political structure and the media effect may lead to a more polarized and domestic-oriented society.

As mentioned earlier, the TPOF survey indicates a trend of polarization in attitudes. In two other surveys conducted in May and October 2022 by Professor Rich, he asked the same question: “How concerned are you about China invading Taiwan?”

The questions were asked in three different ver-

sions: the original one, considering China’s military capabilities, and considering Taiwan’s defense capabilities. The feedback was categorized into two groups: pro-Kuomintang (KMT), and proDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP). It is curious that after the crisis, attitudes of the pro-DPP group shifted to the “not at all concerned” side, and the pro-KMT group shifted to the “extremely concerned” side.

Ideological differences The result fits the essential ideological differences between KMT and DPP supporters. The KMT has long been supportive of continuing Taiwan’s business relationship with the PRC and promotes the idea of economic engagement through the “1992 consensus.”

As such, one might assume their supporters would be less afraid of the China threat. Conversely, the DPP is more pro-localization, and sees the key to Taiwan’s long-term survival being in the US orbit, rather than that of China. Basically, KMT supporters are likely to blame the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis on the ruling DPP government, faulting the government for not maintaining good relations with Beijing. On the other

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photo: ROC MND An ROC serviceman trains in combat first aid. Many in Taiwan still remember the days of martial law, and they put a high value on freedom of speech.

hand, the DPP supporters will speak in defense of the administration, lauding it for having good diplomatic relations with the United States and other countries, and blaming China for China’s actions.

The media framing effect may well be the catalyst for attitudinal and group polarization, for it gathers people into similar ideological groups and strengthens their beliefs by serving as a platform for groupthink.

Additionally, the media often fall into the hands of political elites and other power holders in society, to be exploited as a tool to manipulate information and frame people’s worldview.

Freedom of speech

the hardship and sacrifice that it took Taiwan’s people to achieve the nation’s current status. Hence, when facing the option of becoming a province of the PRC, and when military force is threatened as a means to achieve this goal, most of the public would prefer to keep the status quo and seek other solutions.

But how long can the status quo be maintained? The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis may come to be seen as one of the PRC’s steps toward shaping a “new normal” in the region—specifically, normalizing the routine incursion of fighter jets and warships into Taiwan’s territory.

The status quo in the Taiwan Strait is shifting with the PRC’s increasing military activities that aim to

In Taiwan however, this siloing of opinion and political polarization is not as pronounced as it is in the West. In Taiwan, people may hold opposite opinions, but they also cherish and respect freedom of speech.

As a relatively young democracy, there are still those who remember the days of martial law, and they value

normalize its presence near Taiwan. The “current status” that many Taiwanese desire to maintain may actually be a slippery slope toward hostility and vulnerability. Moreover, Taiwan’s particular political spectrum and media landscape may foster further polarization due to framing effects that shape threat perceptions. n

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Strategic Vision, Special Issue 6 (Summer, 2023)

Under Siege

Exploring potential avenues of response to Chinese blockade of Taiwan Tom Yang

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ensions across the Taiwan Strait have been high in the year since then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. While Beijing used that visit as a pretext to flex its military might, using its missiles to warn against any further high-level meetings between leaders from the United States and those from Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC) President Tsai Ingwen remained unbowed, taking part in a face-to-face confab in California with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy on April 5. Predictably, Beijing initiated military drills on April 8, and issued an aggressive military response that reverberated throughout the world.

During the three-day military exercise, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) simulated a blockade of Taiwan by sending an aircraft carrier and 12 naval ships to encircle the island, as well as flying over 100 fighter jets into its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). These actions only fueled concerns that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is getting ready to move against its democratically governed neighbor.

In the estimation of ROC Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, China appeared “to be trying to get ready to launch a war against Taiwan.”

Moreover, on April 10, PLA warships and aircraft, including nuclear-capable H-6 bombers armed with live missiles, staged drills to “form a multi-directional

photo: ROC MND A serviceman with the Taiwan military takes part in airborne parachute training.

Tom Yang is a captain in the ROC Air Force who studies in the Graduate Institute of International Security of the ROC National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at Jumperjoke199@gmail.com

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photo: ROC MND The ROC government said it would improve combat readiness and monitor China’s missile forces and aircraft carrier Shandong.

island-encompassing blockade situation,” according to Chinese state television. In response, a statement from the ROC government said that Taipei would “never relax” its efforts to improve combat readiness and would closely monitor China’s missile forces and the aircraft carrier Shandong’s movements. The ROC military repeatedly stated that it will not start a war when China conducts drills.

The military leaders of the United States, Japan, and Taiwan are beginning to openly discuss the possibility of a PLA attack on Taiwan prior to the end of the Biden administration as China’s routine fighter jet intrusions across the Strait wear down Taiwan’s air force and its new carrier group conducts sweeps along the coast. Sadly, it appears that there is little awareness of China’s likely strategies and the desperate state of Taiwan’s situation. As opposed to guarding Taiwan from a D-Day-style assault, Taipei and its partners should get ready for a potential blockade, one that will place the island under siege for months or even years, and which will open the way to an air crusade that ultimately

forces the island to acquiesce.

Taiwan is very susceptible to a blockade because of the importance its economy places on imports.

In terms of food supply, Taiwan is the world’s 16thlargest importer of agricultural products, representing more than two-thirds of its annual caloric intake, according to researchers Gustavo Ferreira and Jamie Critelli. A 2020 estimate by the Ministry of Economic Affairs reveled that the island nation maintains enough of a reserve to keep the population of 23.5 million fed for between one and three months.

Clearly, more must be done to improve food resiliency, domestic agricultural production, and emergency operations for food resupply in the event of a prolonged blockade. The fuel situation is even worse, with obligations on the government to store a mere 30 days of petroleum stocks.

As much as a Chinese blockade of Taiwan, the seizure of an offshore island would likewise be considered an act of war. While President Tsai has been clear in her calls for harmonious cross-strait relations, the subtleties of what Taiwan would consider

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an assault justifying a military reaction have, by and large, been left implied, opening the door to numerous potential scenarios.

After Pelosi’s visit last August, the military drills staged by China included the firing of missiles and plans for a blockade. China has since proceeded with similar tactical exercises, albeit at a more limited scale. People in Taiwan and the capitals of friendly nations like the United States and Japan have been paying close attention to how any conflict with China might play out and how Taiwan and its allies might respond. Given how close the southern Japanese islands are to Taiwan, Japan has long been concerned about China’s military activities in the area.

Okinawa is host to a significant US air force base, and when China launched missiles in various zones surrounding Taiwan after Pelosi’s visit, five of those missiles landed in waters within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

According to a senior ROC security official, “A blockade is an act of war; seizing an offshore island

is an act of war. Their only purpose to seize [offshore islands] is to force us to negotiate or surrender. But we will not surrender or negotiate.” Numerous military strategists, including those in the ROC defense ministry, have stated that China could attempt to seize some of Taiwan’s offshore islands located just off China’s coast, such as the Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos, as an alternative to an outright invasion.

“Those are military actions,” the official said, adding “There is no room for ambiguity.”

Pretext for blockade In the years to come, Beijing can be expected to announce that it will begin exploiting and enforcing its EEZ around Taiwan in preparation for unification, likely using the results of a future Taiwanese election as a pretext. Like China’s occupation of Whitsun Reef, this will likely quickly develop into organized, massive penetrations of Taiwan’s seas by unarmed or lightly armed vessels. Given the absence of custom-

photo: ROC MND In a blockade, the PLA Navy will stop and search ships entering Taiwan’s waters, releasing them only if their officers affirm Chinese sovereignty.

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ary military power in these entrances, the ROC Navy will not be able to stop them, as a show of violence will be politically unthinkable.

The PLA Navy will stop and search ships entering Taiwanese waters, releasing them only if their officers affirm Chinese sovereignty. It is possible that other navies, such as the United States and Japan, will attempt to prevent their ships from entering Taiwanese ports, but this will require an effort that cannot be sustained. As shipping insurance costs rise, eventually it will become financially untenable to continue attempting to service Taiwanese ports, making China’s blockade easier for them to enforce, and slowly starving out the people of Taiwan.

Eventually, as the island state of Taiwan withers as a result of its inability to defend its industries and infrastructure against attack, or even to obtain outside assistance, Taipei will have to accept a political solution that amounts to surrender. Only time will tell if the Taiwanese will wait six months or three years.

There will be no doubt about the outcome.

This blunt assessment raises questions about the sufficiency of ROC military preparations for such a scenario. Taipei has announced it is increasing its combat readiness by extending the mandatory military service period from four months to a year, as well as accelerating the development of its indigenous

other announcement: talks between Taiwan and the United States are underway to establish a “contingency stockpile” of munitions on Taiwan soil. Speaking in front of the Legislative Yuan in March, ROC Minister of Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng revealed that the military was discussing the stockpiling readiness plan with their US counterparts, facilitated by the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

While this simple act of forward thinking might not be as exciting or newsworthy as weapons production or conscription, stockpiling necessities is a force multiplier, with an outsize potential to help the island and its population weather the most likely form of attack by the PLA. This is especially true because Taiwan does not have land borders like Ukraine does, and so any supplies to the besieged island would have to come in by air or sea, making them highly vulnerable to interception by the PLA enforcers of the blockade.

“It is therefore vital for Taiwan to stock up ammunition on the island before any conflict begins. Having a war reserve stockpile is crucial and meaningful for Taiwan. Even if the United States does not want to intervene directly with military force, those kinds of stockpiles can still be very effective for our defense,” said retired Admiral Lee Hsi-min, who served as Chief of the General Staff for the ROC military between 2017 and 2019.

Taiwan urgently requires a supply of smaller, more mobile weapons that would be more likely to withstand the first wave of a Chinese attack in an all-out conflict, Lee explained. In his best-selling book that came out in 2022, titled Overall Defense Concept, Lee argued that Taiwan should shift away from a focus on

weapons program. Currently, the Sea-Air Combat Power Improvement Plan of the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology is working on delivering approximately 1,000 missiles next year, including Wan Chien air-to-ground missiles, Hsiung Feng II-E (HF-2E) land attack cruise missiles, and others.

Receiving less media attention, however, was an-

fighter jets and destroyers, as its military assets were already vastly outnumbered by China’s and could easily be destroyed by long-range missiles. Instead of matching battleship for battleship or fighter jet for fighter jet, Lee argued, Taiwan ought to adopt an asymmetric warfare strategy that places an emphasis on the acquisition of smaller weapons, such as por-

“The people of Taiwan have fought hard for their democratic rights, and they do not wish to be governed by an authoritarian state like China.”

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photo: ROC MND Talks are underway with Washington to establish a stockpile, wherein the Pentagon can store weapons in Taiwan in the event of a conflict with China.

table missiles and mines that are difficult to detect but are efficient at halting an enemy advance.

“Asymmetric weapon systems will allow us to maintain our combat capabilities. That is because if our enemies want to destroy them, they will need to get closer to us, which makes them vulnerable to our attack,” Lee explained. “If we can establish a good enough asymmetrical capability, I believe China won’t be able to take over Taiwan by force, even without the United States’ intervention,” he added.

Taiwan will be eligible to receive up to US$1 billion in weapons and munitions from the United States to counter China’s growing military threat under this year’s NDAA, which was approved by the US Congress and signed by US President Joe Biden. Additionally, the act permits the establishment of a regional contingency stockpile, allowing the Pentagon to store weapons in Taiwan for use in the event of a conflict with China. The defense ministry clarified that the move is not intended to prestock munitions, but only to meet Taiwan’s defense requirements.

Admiral Lee suggested that the Javelin could be stockpiled; a US-made portable anti-tank weapon

system that has been widely used to target Russian tanks by the Ukrainian military. Other weapons that should be considered include the loitering munition—a so-called suicide drone that can be carried by a single soldier and is capable of destroying highvalue targets—as well as other anti-armor and antiship weaponry.

“If you have a high enough number of these kinds of asymmetrical weapon systems that survive the initial attack, you can keep most of your fighting capabilities intact and stop the enemy from conducting a landing operation,” Lee explained.

Taiwan is currently getting ready for its democratic presidential elections next year—exactly the sort of event that Beijing likes to protest by launching missiles and running large-scale military exercises. It is therefore all the more crucial to increasing deterrence. The people of Taiwan have fought hard for their democratic rights, and they do not wish to be governed by an authoritarian state like China, notwithstanding Beijing’s promises of autonomy in the style of Hong Kong. According to the government of Taiwan, only Taiwanese citizens can decide their future. n

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Strategic Vision, Special Issue 6 (Summer, 2023)

Multi-Dimensional Response Czech perspective of potential impacts and responses to a Taiwan Strait war Jan Feryna & Kristyna Drmotova

photo: Makoto Lin Markéta Pekarová Adamová, the speaker of the Czech parliament’s lower house, speaks to ROC President Tsai Ing-wen during a March, 2023 visit.

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he Czech Republic, as a country heavily dependent on Asia, has a vital interest in the regions of the Western Pacific and IndoPacific remaining free and open. The Czech economy is not immune to a potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait. As a European nation with relatively little influence over international relations, there are few options to potentially helping Taiwan and resolving a possible contingency. The Czech government will have to consider not only the geographical distance to Taiwan and the limited options it has in international relations, but the economic and military

impacts of the war in Ukraine and the acute threat the Russian Federation poses to NATO countries in Europe.

Already, Prague is revising its China policy, and while the nation is still a member of the “14+1” platform for Chinese trade and investment in central and eastern Europe, Czech leaders are re-examining the benefits their country derives from that participation.

Just this past June, the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2023 was released in which, for the first time, China is directly mentioned as a “challenger to international order.” Because the Czech economy, as well

Dr. Jan Feryna is researcher at the Institute of Intelligence Studies, University of Defence, in Brno, Czech Republic. He can be reached for comment at jan.feryna@unob.cz Dr. Kristyna Drmotova is also a researcher at the Institute of Intelligence Studies, University of Defence, in Brno, Czech Republic. She can be reached for comment at kristyna.drmotova@unob.cz

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as its security and political stability, are dependent upon said international order, Beijing’s efforts to supplant it (efforts that would certainly include a hostile move to annex Taiwan) give Prague an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait.

The responses that are realistically available to Czech leaders in the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency can be examined within four key domains, commonly known as the DIME scheme: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. In general, the Czech Republic will be affected mainly in the diplomatic, information, and economic domains. It is therefore within these domains that leaders in Prague could respond as well. The military domain is not likely to have a direct impact, and any Czech response in the military domain would be rather long-term. It is assumed that the Czech government seeks to maintain the status quo of non-violent cross-strait relations, and find a peaceful resolution to any conflict.

In the diplomatic dimension of a Taiwan Strait contingency, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could attempt to force Prague to cease its support for

Taiwan, and label the Czech Republic as a country that is supportive of “Taiwan secessionists.” This could trigger not only a diplomatic response from CCP allies and partners such as the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is possible, in a very extreme case, that the CCP will declare Czech diplomats personae non gratae, and force them to leave the country and effectively shut down their embassy in Beijing and consulate in Shanghai. CCP activities in the diplomatic dimension during a Taiwan Strait contingency would depend largely on the Czech attitude to Taiwan prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

The diplomatic dimension is also linked to the information dimension discussed below.

In the information dimension, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could exploit the difference of opinion in the Czech Republic on PRC activities in global affairs. According to analyst Richard Turcsanyi, the Czech public is ambivalent in their feelings on China.

This ambivalence is particularly evident across domestic party lines, ranging from those whose political views align with the anti-communist revolu-

photo: Dean Karalekas Police officers of the Czech Republic confront pro-Tibet independence activists protesting Xi Jinping’s visit to Prague in 2016.

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photo: Caleb Barrieau A soldier with the Czech Republic Army takes part in Unified Land Operations training at Hohenfels Training Area with the US 173rd Infantry Brigade.

tionary Václav Havel, and those more sympathetic to the policies of China-friendly former President Miloš Zeman.

In the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, the PRC will attempt to exploit those Czechs who view China in either a positive light or neutrally, as well as exerting its influence over the Chinese diaspora living in the Czech Republic. It would doubtless use proxies affiliated with the Association of Chinese in the Czech Republic, the China Council for the Promotion of peaceful National Reunification in the Czech Republic, and the Czech Qingtian Hometown Association to push the CCP narrative about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and how Taiwan is a Chinese internal affair in which third parties have no business meddling. The aforementioned organizations are part of the United Front Work Department, or are linked to the CCP’s united front efforts as a whole. It is highly likely that Czech public space will be flooded with PRC narratives pushed in cooperation with disinformation websites and entities linked

to the Russian Federation as well. Their modus operandi will likely be similar to how China and Russia have simultaneously been pushing narratives about US-sponsored biological labs and biological weapons being found and destroyed in Ukraine.

Emboldening Russia While a PLA attack on Taiwan would not pose a direct military threat to the Czech Republic, it would embolden further action by Beijing’s strongest ally in the region, Russia, and ratchet up the risk to all of Europe. Moreover, it would distract the attention and resources of Europe’s security guarantor, the United States. For decades, European defense has been reliant on US capabilities, and the fact that the United States has had an interest in defending European soil.

However, in recent years, Washington has been shifting its attention and capabilities to the Indo-Pacific region to address the threat posed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The latest National Security

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Strategy and National Defense Strategy both refer to the CCP as a “pacing threat” and consider the PRC as the only state competitor that has the will and the capabilities to change the current rules-based international order. This has dire implications for the Czech Republic and other European countries, especially those already impacted by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

It is highly likely that not only the United States, but France and Great Britain as well would shift some of their Navy and Air Force assets to the Indo-Pacific in the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, mainly to support US operations. This could decrease European defense capabilities in the short term, which could all too easily be exploited by the Russian Federation to invade smaller NATO countries on the eastern flank, such as the Baltic states.

According to the latest study by the Rhodium Group, a global economic crisis linked with armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait will cause global losses of approximately US$2.5 trillion. The economic impact

of a potential Taiwan Strait contingency on the Czech Republic is the gravest of all those that Rhodium covered. The Czech Republic is heavily dependent on imports from China. In 2021 alone, the Czech Republic imported up to US$50 billion worth of goods from China. A possible import cut-off is almost certainly going to harm the Czech economy and cause turmoil on the domestic political scene. However, the Czech economy is not dependent only on China, but on Germany (mainly in the automotive industry) and the EU as a whole. Import cut-offs to Europe and their possible rerouting to India or elsewhere could have a devastating impact on the European market and possibly force European governments to cease their support for Taiwan.

Corporate impact A Taiwan Strait contingency, and Czech support for Taiwan, would impact not only companies in the Czech Republic, but Czech companies in China as

photo: Jamie Titus The Czech Republic has no influence over the PRC, so its diplomatic response to a Taiwan Strait war would have to be asymmetrical.

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well. The PRC government could force them to leave the Chinese market, which would cause these companies to incur additional losses.

As stated above, the Czech Republic is not an important player in the international order and has no influence over the PRC. This means that not only its diplomatic response, but any information, military, or economic response from the Czech government would highly likely have to be asymmetric. Prague is able to diplomatically respond to Chinese aggression by condemning the use of force in the international arena, and working along with its allies and partners in the EU and NATO. In the diplomatic dimension, the Czech government will express solidarity with Taiwan and emphasize the need for peaceful crossstrait relations, and their importance not only to the region itself and affected countries, but to the whole world because of the economic importance of the region. Support for Taiwan in the Czech Republic is growing every year. For instance, Czech President Petr Pavel had a phone call with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, and the speaker of the Czech House

of Representatives, Markéta Pekarová Adamová, recently visited Taiwan.

The information dimension is closely linked with the diplomatic dimension discussed above. The Czech Republic could respond in the information dimension by cooperating with allies and partners to countering Chinese narratives by expressing support for Taiwan in a similar way that the Czech diplomatic service and the Czech public do for Ukraine, as well as by debunking propaganda and disinformation created by entities linked with Russia. There is also an increasing need to carefully study Chinese cognitive operations and be prepared to respond to these when necessary.

Rethinking modernization There is no short-term response in the military dimension. On the other hand, in a mid- to long-term response to a Taiwan Strait contingency, the Czech Republic has to consider the shift of US, French, and British military assets and capabilities and rethink the

photo: Dennis Henry Jr. Members of the Czech Air Force train on an Afghan Air Force Mil Mi-17 helicopter during a mission from Kabul, Afghanistan, International Airport in 2012.

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photo: Joseph LeVeille A Czech Special Forces operator provides ground support during exercise Emerald Warrior 22.1 at Hurlburt Field, Florida in May 2022.

modernization of the Czech armed forces (CzAF).

Apart from replacing older weapons and equipment, CzAF should focus on building strong conventional capabilities and acquiring new capabilities in the field of advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, offensive weapons systems such as long-range air-launched cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles, advanced artillery systems such as HIMARS and advanced Ground-Based Air Defense systems. The Czech Republic should learn lessons from the current war in Ukraine and acquire NATO-standard systems that can be linked with other NATO countries’ weapons and command-and-control systems.

There are ongoing modernization efforts in the CzAF mostly aimed at the Air Force and land forces. CzAF is seeking to acquire fifth-generation fighter jets (the F-35), Leopard 2 tanks, and CV-90 infantry

an over-dependence on the Chinese economy. That is why Prague needs a long-term approach that should include a decoupling from the Chinese economy, to decrease the Czech Republic’s dependence on it.

The first and possibly leading example could be the European Chips Act, and the attempt to bring hightech industry back to Europe. There are already a few examples under the initiative of the European Chips Act consisting of facilities in Spain and Germany. The Czech companies are also actively discussing cooperation with their Taiwanese counterparts.

The Czech Republic needs a free and open Western Pacific, without any contingencies or armed conflicts. As illustrated above, the Czech Republic would be gravely impacted by any contingency, especially one in the Taiwan Strait, though the Czech ability to respond is rather limited. Prague needs to act in

fighting vehicles. There are also efforts to modernize and bolster the air defense and artillery units.

A potential Czech short-term response in the economic dimension could include sanctions on the PRC in cooperation with allies and partners in the EU and NATO. On the other hand, the Czech government should reconsider the economic impact of

cooperation with the global community of democratic nations, as well as those with a stake in defending the international rules and norms of the current world order. Prague, and the world, must not rely on short-term solutions, but rather focus on long-term resilience and capacity-building to insulate ourselves from threats to that order. n

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Strategic Vision, Special Issue 6 (Summer, 2023)

Rising Security Crisis Joint security cooperation initiative needed on democratic First Island Chain Chang-Ching Tu

photo: James McCann

T

Attendees pose for a photo at the Chiefs of Defense Conference, at which military leaders discuss regional challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

he security situation in the Indo-Pacific region has escalated rapidly. In August 2022, Xi Jinping ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct its largest-scale military exercises targeting Taiwan following military reforms.

These exercises have elevated cross-strait tensions to their highest point in decades. These maneuvers included missile launches traversing the Republic of China’s (ROC) airspace and establishing seven exercise zones encircling Taiwan’s maritime areas and airspace, encompassing virtually all of Taipei’s flight information regions. Consequently, these military exercises disrupted 18 international flight routes, affecting a minimum of 650 flights daily. Furthermore, the significance of the Taiwan Strait as a vital international waterway in global supply chains increased

in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and since the onset of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict.

China’s aggressive four-day military exercises encircling Taiwan nearly disrupted international maritime and airspace transportation, impacting global supply chain stability.

Similar scenarios have occurred in the past as well.

Since 2013, China has embarked on unprecedented land reclamation activities in the South China Sea on seven reefs and islands under its control. It continued to deploy missiles, radars, and communication facilities on features such as Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi reefs, posing a severe threat to the security of shipping routes in the South China Sea. In August 2023, China’s release of the 2023 Edition of China’s Standard Map sparked international controversy. This

Dr. Chang-Ching Tu is an associate professor at the ROC National Defense Univerity’s Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies. He can be reached for comment at altus0501@hotmail.com

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map not only incorporated Taiwan and disputed islands in the South China Sea that are not considered part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but it also claimed sovereignty over the Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh, the Doklam Plateau, and the disputed Aksai Chin region in the western section of the Sino-Indian border. These actions, which led to strong protests from neighboring countries, underscored the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of military exercises, gray zone tactics, and hybrid warfare to gradually encroach upon and violate the territorial sovereignty of its neighbors. China’s efforts to establish a CCP-style international order have raised international concern.

A New Era China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has repeatedly asserted China’s commitment to not ruling out the use of force to annex Taiwan. In the political report delivered at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022, he presented a

Comprehensive Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Issue in the New Era. Notably, this report placed Taiwan at the forefront, along with the Hong Kong issue, underscoring Taiwan’s status as one of China’s most pressing core concerns. With Xi securing a third consecutive term during the 20th Congress, his internal power consolidation is expected to enable more substantial progress in military reform and the establishment of a disciplined PLA under the Party’s command, making it a crucial instrument for realizing the “Chinese Dream.” However, China’s recent economic recovery, following the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic challenges such as the real estate crisis, has been weaker than anticipated. The likelihood of economic stagnation may hinder external military expansion. Michael Beckly, a consultant to the US Department of Defense, has described China as suffering from “peaking power syndrome,” facing a dual pressure of internal anxiety and external self-confidence contradictions. To divert attention from economic crises and elevate Xi’s standing in Chinese history, there is a high probability that

photo: Kyle Gahlau Navy ships from the United States, Australia, Canada, and South Korea steam in formation during a Rim of the Pacific exercise.

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Xi may resort to aggressive military actions against Taiwan before the end of his third term.

Such concerns are not unfounded. According to statistics, the PLA currently possesses the world’s largest fleet of 360 naval vessels, surpassing the United States’ 300. Additionally, China has acquired supersonic weapons that can deny the US military access to the second island chain. Consequently, the PLA may exploit the opportunity presented by the US military’s post-global counterterrorism force realignment. Given the current partial military advantage enjoyed by the PLA, it could launch a sudden attack on Taiwan. If the first island chain is breached, this would directly threaten the second island chain, including Guam and even the mainland United States.

The CCP referred to the military exercises last August, conducted by the Eastern Theater Command, as the Seal-Island Joint Military Operation. These exercises marked a significant departure from previous drills in that they featured several provocations, including joint long-range firepower capabilities; the use of Dongfeng missiles to target areas in the western

Pacific, crossing over Taiwan’s airspace; the inclusion of anti-submarine warfare scenarios for the first time; live fire exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan’s waters; and aircraft carriers engaging in anti-access and area denial operations off Taiwan’s eastern coast.

The most provocative actions in decades align with the United Nations’ definition of state aggression.

Moreover, the PRC officially acknowledged that such frequent military exercises would become the new normal for the Taiwan Strait.

Pretext for action In April 2023, ROC President Tsai Ing-wen met with US House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. Beijing used this as a pretext to announce the execution of Island-Encircling War Preparedness Patrols and Operation Sword of Joint Defense in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait.

These maneuvers involved deploying ballistic missiles, long-range rockets, and aircraft carrier battle groups, complemented by war preparedness patrols

photo: Jaewoo Oh Missiles from Multiple Launch Rocket Systems of the 210th Field Artillery Brigade fly across the range during a combined live fire exercise in South Korea.

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photo: Arthur Rosen Captain Adam Cheatham of the guided-missile cruiser USS Shiloh (CG 67) during a bilateral exercise in the Philippine Sea in March 2023.

to simulate restraint and strike exercises against Taiwan. According to ROC government sources, the PLA dispatched 70 sorties of military aircraft to intimidate Taiwan. Subsequently, on August 19, 2023, in response to ROC Vice President Lai Ching-te’s visit to the United States, Beijing launched another round of military exercises against Taiwan, lasting only one day but involving a total of 45 sorties of military aircraft conducting activities around the Taiwan Strait, with 27 sorties crossing the centerline of the strait.

This so-called new normal by the Chinese military raises concerns about three potential timelines for a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan: 2027, when the US Department of Defense’s Chinese Military Power Report suggests that the PLA anticipates having the capability to counter the US military in the IndoPacific region; 2035, when it is presumed that the modernization process and military restructuring of the PLA will have matured; and 2049, marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC and Xi’s declared deadline for the PLA to become a “world-class military.”

It is evident that China’s new normal extends be-

yond merely demonstrating military capabilities; it serves as a political statement about China’s future expansion. Concurrent with military exercises against Taiwan, the PLA has also engaged in frequent airspace provocations (e.g., violating the air defense identification zones) of Japan and South Korea, maritime provocations (e.g., Chinese coast guard vessels firing water cannons at Philippine supply ships, and various quasi-military operations such as overflying US warships. These relentless military and non-military actions have immensely strained neighboring countries’ warning systems and defensive capabilities.

Over time, these actions will erode neighboring nations’ military strength and resources and create new established facts, gradually compressing the regions of routine training activities. Consequently, regional nations must prepare for more gray zone tactics from the Chinese military in the face of this evolving security landscape.

Given that Taiwan is the linchpin of the First Island Chain, its current geostrategic importance in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be overstated. Taiwan’s strategic value is important for several reasons. First,

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it serves as the first line of defense for democratic nations against the westward expansion of China’s authoritarian regime. This role became particularly prominent after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, emphasizing the need for unity among democratic nations in countering the expansionist ambitions of autocratic regimes. Second, Taiwan is pivotal in securing the Western Pacific’s critical Sea Lines of Communication. Third, Taiwan is a vital international hub for communication and information, hosting 14 international undersea cables and data centers for global tech giants such as Google and Microsoft. Fifth, Taiwan’s high-tech semiconductor industry accounts for 26 percent of global semiconductor production, with a dominant 64 percent share in the foundry market. If Taiwan were to fall under Chinese control, disruptions in advanced chip production and supply chain would significantly affect the global chip market.

Moreover, Taiwan’s geographical location has earned it the moniker “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” making it crucial for the defense of Japan and the United States in the Western Pacific. It is mainly instrumental

in countering China’s global hegemonic expansion.

Therefore, any Taiwan contingency would symbolize an Indo-Pacific contingency. Given the increasingly urgent threat posed by China’s expansionist agenda, if democratic nations consider the comprehensive security cooperation framework of the Indo-Pacific Democratic Alliance, Taiwan could actively participate as a contributor. For example, Taiwan’s existing radar systems, with a maximum detection range of 5,000 kilometers, could provide real-time intelligence collection on all maritime and aerial activities in the region, from the Korean Peninsula to the South China Sea. This data could facilitate multi-level security alert information exchange and sharing among regional nations regarding Chinese military exercises, missile tests, submarine movements, and aircraft carrier routes. Taiwan’s expertise in countering Chinese cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns could be shared with friendly democratic countries, contributing to developing a more robust cybersecurity framework. Taiwan’s ports could serve as alternative ports of call for neighboring countries during various exercises, such as the annual Rim of the Pacific

photo: Scott Miller The nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine USS Miami surfaces during an anti-submarine warfare exercise with the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group.

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Exercise. In emergencies, Taiwan could provide essential non-traditional security support and cooperation, including medical aid and humanitarian assistance, further contributing to the strategic security environment in the Western Pacific.

In recent years, as China has actively expanded its influence in the political, economic, and military domains, it has begun to disrupt the stability of the

Indo-Pacific region. For instance, in February 2021, China officially implemented its Coast Guard Law, which granted its armed police coast guard the authority to use weapons when encountering foreign vessels. In September 2021, China further unveiled the Maritime Traffic Safety Law, attempting to legitimize its maritime law enforcement actions in disputed areas of the East and South China seas through legal warfare—a move seen as preparing for various conflicts. Recognizing this, the democratic nations of the region need to progressively strengthen their security cooperation and raise awareness about the potential threats posed by China.

The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war on February 24, 2022, highlighted the highly irrational decisionmaking mechanisms of authoritarian regimes, leading countries in Europe and the United States to reevaluate the dangers posed by such regimes. Given

mit, the Hiroshima Agreement, and the G7 Joint Communiqué, world leaders reiterated that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are indispensable factors for international security and prosperity, collectively calling for a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues.

The world has entered the group competition pattern of US, Europe, Japan + vs. China and Russia, and the value system confrontation of freedom and democracy vs. autocracy and dictatorship. To counter the threats stemming from China’s gray zone tactics and hybrid warfare, Indo-Pacific nations have established security cooperation mechanisms such as the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) and intelligence-sharing networks like the Five Eyes Alliance.

More recently, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States formed AUKUS to enhance their military, diplomatic, and security partnership.

Despite facing increasingly formidable challenges, Taiwan has actively prepared for the possibility of a kinetic military action initiated by China, demonstrating unwavering resilience with its motto: Taiwan Will Not Surrender. Starting in 2022, Taiwan progressively implemented major defense reforms. These reforms include the establishment of the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency; the reinstatement of one-year compulsory military service; modularized training inspired by the US military; the integration of civil defense teams into the national defense system; the creation of a national drone team; and the development and procurement of asymmetrical warfare capabilities for land-based anti-access, area denial scenarios.

Taiwan will demonstrate its determination for self-

the ideological and political similarities between Russia and China, the international community has come to understand that China played a role as an enabler in Russia’s aggressive war. Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent that a Taiwan Strait crisis would have far-reaching implications for global peace and stability. In the May 2023 Japan-US sum-

defense. Regional democratic nations should also unite to defend the core values of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights through active dialogue and cooperation. Taiwan, in collaboration with like-minded partners, can assume additional security responsibilities to contribute effectively to the security of the Indo-Pacific region. n

“Taiwan has actively prepared for the possibility of a kinetic military action initiated by China, demonstrating unwavering resilience with its motto: Taiwan Will Not Surrender.”

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