In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the third element a public entity must establish to claim design immunity: (1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design. As to the third element, “substantial evidence,” as explained by the Court of Appeal, is “evidence of solid value and which reasonably inspires confidence.” The Court affirmed longstanding precedent: “‘[A]s long as reasonable minds can differ concerning whether a design should have been approved, then the governmental entity must be granted immunity. The statute does not require that property be perfectly designed, only that it be given a design which is reasonable under the circumstances.’” Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal. App.4th 931, 941. The Court further noted that its role in evaluating the third element of the design immunity, even during summary judgment, is not to provide a de novo interpretation of the design, but instead to decide whether there is any substantial evidence supporting its reasonableness. Evidence may be found in the discretionary approval of the designs themselves, the expert opinion of a civil engineer, or evidence that the design or plan complies with prevailing professional standards. Moreover, a mere conflict in the testimony of expert witnesses provides no justification for the matter to go to a lay jury who will then second guess the judgment of skilled public officials. Applying the above, the Court of Appeal rejected Plaintiff ’s first argument, concluding instead that Caltrans provided substantial evidence as to the reasonableness of the design through its expert opinion and evidence that the design complied with California’s approved standards. Specifically, Caltrans provided evidence demonstrating its civil engineer responsible for the engineering design work on the project and exercised his discretionary authority to approve the relevant pavement delineation and signage plans in advance of construction. The Court held this alone was sufficient to establish the third element of the design immunity. Additionally, Caltrans’ expert reviewed the complaint, collision reports, photos, the applicable manual on traffic control, and conducted a site inspection to conclude that the improvements that were in place at the time of the accident were done with reasonable professional engineering judgment in design and construction and complied with approved standards. Plaintiff only offered her experts’ differing opinion, which alone is insufficient evidence to defeat the reasonableness of the design. As to Plaintiff ’s second argument that the construction of the interstate off-ramp did not match the previously approved design plans, the Court held that “substantial conformance” with the design plans is all that is required in order to successfully invoke design immunity and that a minor deviation from the approved plan as designed will not preclude the application of design immunity. Since Plaintiff ’s experts failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that Caltrans did not substantially conform to the design plans, summary judgment was appropriate. At bottom, the Court of Appeal held that the normal rules governing a motion for summary judgment, requiring its denial if any triable issue of fact appears, do not apply to cases involving design immunity under Government Code section 830.6 because the statute provides immunity when there is substantial evidence of reasonableness, even if contradicted.
EMPLOYMENT CASES AND A SCHOOLS CIVIL RIGHTS CASE
Summaries provided by Neal Meyers of Meyers Fozi & Dwork, LLP CIVIL RIGHTS Manahoy Area School District v. B.L., a Minor, et. al (2021) 141 S.Ct. 2038.
Summary: Public high school student brought an action against a school district, alleging that her suspension from junior varsity cheerleading squad based on her use of profanity (for example, “F*** school f*** softball f***cheer f*** everything”) in a social media post, made off-campus and on a Saturday, violated the First Amendment. While recognizing that schools have considerable freedom on campus to discipline students for conduct that the First Amendment might otherwise protect, the court held that the special characteristics that Page 19
