As it stands in the history of our country, we believe in the acts of self-preservation by any means necessary. It is not outside of our realm of morality to act selfishly in the name of a greater (American) good. Our grand entrance into the Korean War was exactly that. Unjustly pulling all necessary strings to ensure ourselves to a power hold we neither deserved nor asked for. Throughout the Korean War the United States used Domino Theory policy in an attempt to make their occupation policy look morally necessary as well as constitutional; while it may have been constitutional, it was not justified, the reasons for which the United States used their “muscle” in the Korean War matters, the intentions matter as they always do. The States proceeded to crusade and kill for the sake of our alliances and trade connections underneath the facade of freedom. Although the US would like to consider the “fight for freedom” and the opposition of communism identical, the actions taken during the Korean War demonstrate otherwise. The Korean War was fought on behalf of South Korea through the command of the UN in opposition to North Korea, who was backed by China. 88% of the UN forces were offered on behalf of the United States, making it an American fought war. The US manipulated the compass of a moral organization to fulfill and stabilize their economic holds with their “partners”, “[This] allowed the UN to be used as a tool of American Diplomacy”, says MacDonald (264). During this ‘trailblazing moment’ of US craftiness, they also utilized the state of our armed forces to make the unnecessary defense build up look absolutely legitimate, because we were indeed at war. This build up would lead to a distorted economic and a newfound bloodlust for “patriotism”, at any cost. The moral soundness of the Korean War remains uncontested. Citizens remained “disgusted” with the actions of the war all around, says Pierpaoli. The fear of a war fought and paid for, but utterly undeclared washed over the US. During the early 1950’s the concerns of the citizens went unaddressed, which furthered the unrest expressed by Democrats and Republicans alike. American citizen didn’t ask for much, simply transparency, and even that was too much. The government claimed we were fighting for freedom when we were really only fighting for free trade.
The escalation of the war was unprecedented and the power dynamic was obvious, the US wanted to maintain control, and they did. War analyst MacDonald says, “At the height of the Cold War, Western Statesmen assumed their security interests were synonymous with the international order” (264). This statement is supported again and again by the backwards actions of the Truman Administration circa 1950. An instance of such backwardness is Truman’s Statement on the Korean War saying, “The attack on Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war,” and then goes on to list all the specific ways the United States will engage in this war with “communism”, further still Truman states, “The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law”, without displaying any regard for said law. Pierpaoli says “[The] Korean War increased the power of the presidency at the expense of congress” (9). A statement which is blatantly supported by the fact that Truman made no move to consult with Congress before this statement was made. However, President Truman’s loophole did not go unnoticed-- 20 years later the War Powers Act was passed stating that the President must consult with congress before engaging the country in any act of force. This late intervention from congress is the only intervention we see from them during the entire Cold War. Our exit of the war was nearly as theatrical as our entrance. As the main supplier of the force and weaponry of this war, we made our voice the loudest. President Truman took it upon himself to handle the negotiations between all concerned parties. On March 19th of 1951 a draft announcement was made for Truman to issue as the (American) troops marched toward the 38th parallel. This announcement contained rhetoric that both citizen and the parties involved would understand. While citizens heard of a possible cease-fire, “concerned” parties (ie; China, the UK and their subservient countries) heard “pay-off” and “trade negotiations”. The bloodshed of innocent civilians was simply a power play-- “communism” was only a threat to the American pride and trade dynamic, as the US displayed in their actions. The message sent during the Korean War was not one of freedom, it was a bloody homage to greed and gain. The effects of this “war forgotten” have outlasted their deaths and continued to disrupt the livelihoods of American citizens, and is seen by many intellectuals as the predecessor of the Vietnam War. This “occupation policy” pushed by the fear of the unknown and “unfree” was immoral and
unjustified on all counts. This unnecessarily high casualty count was rooted in the glory that international and economic alliances breed, a glory unharvested by civilians, but paid by us, with blood, in full.
Works Cited "Congress at War." Foreign Affairs. N.p., 05 Feb. 2009. Web. 24 May 2017.
"The Korean War (1950-1953)." SparkNotes. SparkNotes, n.d. Web. 24 May 2017.
Macdonald, Callum A. Korea: The War before Vietnam. Place of Publication Not Identified: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Print.
Pierpaoli, Paul G. Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War. Columbia, MO.: U of Missouri, 1999. Print.