Thinking, Believing, and the Realm of Appearances
Plato’s Epistemology of Perceptibles in the Later Dialogues
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN ANCIENT THOUGHT
Philosophical Studies in Ancient Thought
Volume 3
Béatrice Lienemann, Christian Pfeiffer, Christof Rapp (eds.)
Thinking, Believing, andthe Realm of Appearances
Plato’ sEpistemology of Perceptibles in the Later Dialogues
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Diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (Munich), 2023
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1. The co-working model:Disentangled sense-perception and disentangled belief
The man under thetree:Sense-perception, dianoetic thinking, belief-formation
Assessing the co-working model:
Acknowledgments
This book is arevised version of my doctoral dissertation, which Iwrote as aPhD candidate at the Munich School of Ancient Philosophy, submitted to the LudwigMaximilians-Universität in Munich in the Winter Semester 2022–2023 and defended in July 2023. Iammost profoundly indebtedtomysupervisor, Christof Rapp, not only for his thoughtful feedback and precious advice,but also for everything that Iwas able to learn fromhim during my PhD years at MUSAPh. I am also incredibly grateful to Peter Adamson for his kind support and insightful comments as my second reader. My deepest gratitude also goes to Laura Castelli and Andreas Anagnostopoulos for their detailed comments to many chapters of my dissertation and for the constant exchangeonmytopics, which definitely taught me alot on how to conduct academic research. Ialso wish to thank Oliver Primavesi for the inspiring conversations on Greek philology and for the engaging discussion as my third dissertation committee member.
Iwish to extend my heartfelt thanks to my colleagues and fellow PhDcandidates at MUSAPh, in particular to Caterina Pavoni, Clara Westergaard, Leonardo Chiocchetti and František Špinka,for being not only aprecious source of help and support in our academic exchanges but also good friends.
Aspecial thanks goes to Jessica Moss and Victor Caston, who very generously accepted to comment on two papers that Ipresented at the Doktorandenkolloquium and enriched my work on the Republic and the Sophist with their insightful and inspiring suggestions and observations. In this respect, Iwould also like to thank the participantsatthe Munich-Berlin Graduate Conference of December 2020 and my audience at the Early Career ResearcherConference (KU Leuven)ofSeptember 2021, for their comments and feedback on the material I presented on those occasions.
Ialso wish to thank my former supervisors Bruno Centrone (University of Pisa)and Concetta Luna (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa), for their invaluable support and advice and for also helping me in putting forth my application as a PhD candidate at MUSAPh.
My heartfelt gratitude also goes to the reviewers of this book, whose extremely valuable remarks, critiques and suggestions contributed to freeing the initial draftfrom aseries of weaknesses, and whose intelligent feedback improved the coherence and unity in structure of my original workand made some of my
key argumentsclearer, more balanced and more effective. It goes without saying that Iamsolely responsible for any mistakes and deficiencies in this book.
Iwould also like to express my sincere gratitude to the Geschwister Boehringer Ingelheim Stiftung for their generous financial support, which made the publication of this book possible.
Finally, Iamimmensely grateful to my parents,Antonino and Cristina, whose unconditional love and support have been fundamental for me to overcome any difficulty and hard time and have represented aconstant injectionof hope and determination. Last but not least, Imost sincerelywish to say thanks to Giovanni, for sharing this journey with me from its very beginning.I cannot thank him enough for his loving support and wise advice.
Introduction
When approaching the study of epistemological issuesinPlato’sphilosophy, the perceptible realm and human cognition of it are somewhatinevitably regarded as the dark side of the moon. Dismissed by Plato himself as afaint shadow of real beings, the perceptible realm enjoys aratherpoor epistemological reputation compared to the intelligibleone, especiallywhen it comes to the issue of where and how to attain knowledge. In asimilar way, the cognitive faculties and activities through which the human soul reacts to and elaborates perceptual data are usually considered weak and defective, and stand in juxtaposition with higher cognitive activities or capacitiesdealing with Ideas:this is especiallytrue in those arguments that are placed within the framework of the so-called “Two-Worlds Theory” .
It is generally acknowledgedthat Plato tried to reduce the gap which emerged in the middle dialogues between the two ontologicalrealms and the cognitive capacitiesand/or activities mapping onto them:this is an endeavour that Plato undertakes in alarge group of later dialogues.1 In this respect, scholarly reconstructions of this development in Plato’sviews on the matter tend to focus pre-eminently on the intelligibleportion of reality and on the intellectual faculties dealing with it, as well as on how innovations on this subject can impact the way the lower realm and lower cognitive phenomena are conceived of. Most of the time, it seems like Plato’ssecond thoughts on the Two-Worlds Theory almost exclusively involveda rethinking of Forms and of their connection with one another and with the sensible world, such that Plato’ snew, more optimistic ap-
1 How far this revision goes, especially with regard to its impact on the Two-Worlds picture and its main claims about the full knowability of Forms compared to the utter unknowability of perceptible particulars, is amatter of scholarly dispute (not surprisingly). In this debate between revisionists and anti-revisionists (for whose detailed reconstruction with bibliographical references see e. g. Patterson (1985)and Hampton (1990)), the present project does not want to take aradical stance, especially regarding Forms and their impact on other kinds of cognition. As far the improvement of lower forms of cognition is concerned, the point that Iwant to make here is moderate as well:while the overall Two-Worlds framework is certainly retained in the epistemological system deployed in later dialogues, its main tenets and its backbone are enriched with further implications, basically revolving around amore layered and complex epistemology, in which the lower layers are brought closer to the higher ones, thanks to achievements that cannot but be pinpointed as innovations in Plato’slater epistemological account.
proach towards human capacity to gain astable grasp of the natural world would solely depend on that.
Of course, these and similar arguments undeniably contribute to the understanding of how things changed in Plato’stheory of knowledge in the transition from middle to later dialogues. However, it is also important to acknowledge that this is just one perspectivefrom which to frame and interpret the issue. This perspective investigates the perceptible realm and human cognition of it as relative to that of Forms,and thus explains all the developments in Plato’sconception of the former through some innovations in his conception of the latter. Let us call this a “top-down” approach.2
In thepresent work, Iwish to unfold adifferent kind of reasoning, adopting the opposite approach. Iaim to inquireinto Plato’slater epistemology of perceptibles, and especially into how lower cognitive faculties, activities or capacities underwent arethinking process,byappealing as little as possible to the role played by the reworked conception of Forms and its innovated epistemological implications. Thus, Iaim to offer areconstruction of the development in Plato’ s thoughts on perceptual cognition by focusing on the activities and faculties responsible for processing sensory data, thereby setting aside as much as possible both Forms and strictly noetic cognition. Such an approach does not take the lower portion of reality and cognition as relative to the higher ones, but rather investigates them in their own right and from within. Let us call this a “bottomup ” approach, whereby more general conclusions about Plato’sepistemology of the natural world are exclusively drawn from what the dialogues tell us about this world itself and how human beings deal with it.
Let me clarify from the outset that Idonot take these two perspectives to be incompatible or to reach incompatible results. To the contrary, Iamconvinced that they are complementary:inorder to fully appreciate theturn in Plato’ s views on the perceptible realm, it is just as important to understand the innovations involvingthe cognitive items dealing with perceptibles as it is to understand the developments in the Theory of Forms that affect thelatter’sinteraction with sensible particulars.
2 In alist of bibliographical references pertaining to this approach, the items would be several. Irefer here to e. g. Gulley (1962), Turnbull in Anton and Preus (1983), 279–300 (esp. 279–284)and Nehamas in Anton and Preus (1989), 267–292, because of the very general cut that they give to their argumentation, which is particularly suitable for someone who wants to gain ageneral overview of the abovementioned approach. The argumentation developed in Cooper (1995)isnot necessarily and only partially with aview to explaining Plato’soscillating attitude towards cognition of perceptibles. Adifferent top-down approach, aiming at asserting a basic continuity in Plato’sepistemology of perceptibles rather than adevelopmental arch, is found in Crombie (2012). For arecent survey on the subject, see Benson (2019).
As Ihave just said, in order to approach the subject-matter with a “bottomup ” strategy, Ihave decided to focus on the main cognitive faculties or activities that serve the function of connecting the human soul with the external world and its sensory inputs, as well as of processing, elaborating and interpreting them. These cognitive phenomena are notoriously connected with sense-perception (αἴσθησις)and belief (δόξα). Iwish to clarify from the outset howI intend to refer to these two concepts and to translate thetwo Greek words used to refer to them (given that this is anything but astraightforward point), as well as why they are relevant to thepresent investigation:
1. Sense-perception: this is the cognitive process through which sensory inputs, in the form of more or less interconnected sensory properties, are received from the outer world and reach thesoul. It is that process through which sensible information is firstly seized and apprehended by our soul;accordingly, its relevance for my present purposes lies in the fact that it is that which has perceptual data as its proper object. We could roughly translate the Greek term “ αἴσθησις” with either “sensation” or “sense-perception”;however, Plato is not fully consistent and crystal-clear as to the scope he intends to attribute to it, whether it only embraces thefive canonical forms of sensory perception or whether it also encompasses other forms of bodily awareness, such as pleasure/pain and even some forms of affection which we would nowadays call emotions (inwhich case the word “perception” would be more appropriate). As we shall see, the transition from abroader to anarrower usage of theword marks apeculiar innovation in Plato’slater treatment of epistemological issues concerning theperceptible world, and thus will be closely investigated in the central chapters of this book. I shall from now on refer to αἴσθησις by systematically calling it “ sense-perception”.Ifnecessary, however, Ishall stress the circumstances and the extent to which aparticular Platonic usage of the term ought to be taken in abroader way and accordingly depart from the standard translation, thereby also giving an account for that.
2. Belief:this is thecognitive attitude with which our soul reacts to the sensible inputs made available through sense-perception. It also has perceptible information as its proper object, and processes it in amore elaborateway than sense-perception in that the subject actively responds to the perceptual data and fully cognizes them by taking the perceptual information to be the caseand/or to be such and such. In other words, belief is the display of human cognition when it is directedatperceptible items and aims at making sense of them. It is relevant because it represents the fulfilment of the apprehension startedbysense-perception:itisthe cognitive phenomenon about perceptibles par excellence. The Greek term “δόξα” also displays an ambiguous profile throughoutPlato’sdialogues, and especiallyinhis later ones. The English translationsusually oscillate between “opinion” and “belief”,sometimes adding to this the specification “ mere ” ,soas to qualify this cognitive state as shaky, defective and inferior to proper knowl-
edge;there are, however, anot insignificant number of cases in which it is translated by some scholars as “judgement”,especiallyinthe Theaetetus –Sophist context. Ifind this translation too narrow and specific,inadequate to systematically stand for the Greek word “δόξα”.The term “judgement” is indeed essentially connected with alogical background that is far from being relevant in the majority of Platonic occurrences of δόξα – which do not come from strictly logicalreflections – and is not entirely helpful even in those occurrences in the Theaetetus and Sophist in which logical considerations are indeed relevant, since they are always intertwined with other, purely epistemological or even metaphysical points that end up being shaded by atranslation with “judgement”,exclusively focusing on the logical side of the matter.3 Thus, Ishall here always use the term “(mere)belief” to indicate δόξα,although Iamaware of thefact that, especially in some contexts, the best translation available is “opinion”,and that sometimes the boundaries between these two English terms may be blurred, or that they may not exhaust the scope of the Greek term. In those (here very important) cases in which the usage of “δόξα” does bear aconnection with themodern idea of “judgement”,Ishall not refrain from pointing that out, though sticking to my standard translation.
So much for ageneral characterization of the two main notions at issue in this investigation. Especially starting from his most mature dialogues, as has already been said, Plato uses both of them in avery innovative way;this usage also displays, as Ishall argue, some sort of developmental arch – something which also has asignificant impactontheir overall philosophical connotation. It will be my task to study howsense-perception and belief are characterized and interact with each other, if and how they undergo any change in meaning, features and functions, and how all this could contribute to reconstructing Plato’soverall views on theepistemology of the perceptual realm.4
This having been said, however, there is afurther, fundamental component that ought to be introducedinorder to form acomplete picture of how Plato conceived of the human possibilities of understanding the perceptible realm in a proper and reliable way – acomponent which is in fact impossible to overlook: appearances and appearance-relatedcognitive activities. Plato notoriouslyconnects the perceptible, transient and ever-changing realm with the phenomenon of appearances, up to the point that the natural world is equated with “the world of appearances ” on several occasions within the Two-Worlds framework, and perceptualitems and properties end up coincidingwith “what merely appears ” , as opposed to “what really is”,i.e.intelligible Forms.Inparallel, when Plato de-
3 For adetailed and reasonable assessment of the various possible translations of the word “δόξα”in Plato’s(later)dialogues, see e. g. Lafrance (1985), Vogt (2012), Trabattoni (2016), Moss (2020)and (2021).
4 More on this developmental arch in the next section.
scribes how human beings get acquainted with “what merely appears ”,hetalks about this process not exclusively in terms of “perceiving” and “forming abelief” ; rather, he often resortstothe language of “being presented with an appearance ” , or “having an appearance that”,asifthere were athird kind of process,denoted in adifferent way but still inextricably connected to both sense-perception and belief. This third component is represented, as Isaid, by the phenomenon of experiencing an appearance, or processing it, and is usually referred to by means of the Greek verb “φαίνεσθαι” or of any co-radical term:I shall cover this set of phenomena under the heading of 3. appearance:with this term Idesignate somethingfor which Plato has neither aconsistent label nor aspecific term in his philosophical vocabulary and thereby wish to refer to the cognitive activitythat is responsible for apprehending and processing appearances,i.e “that which appears ” (tothe subject). More specifically, the class of appearances in which Iaminterested is that where “what appears ” corresponds to the way in which sensory information,concerningperceptible objects or states of affairs, strikes thesubject. The relevant appearance has this kind of information as its proper object:itisthus related to theapprehension of perceptibles and acquires from this its significance for the present inquiry. In addition,asI said, there is asense in which the whole of the sensible realm “ appears ” ,or “merely seems ”,asopposedtothe way of being of the upper realm, thus under an ontological perspective. Given that Plato himself suggests an overlapping between “what appears ” and the perceptual realm, it is clear why the cognitive activity processing them is also relevant.5 Ishall here translate the Greek “(τὸ) φαίνεσθαι” with the term “ appearance ” which, even thoughitisfar less broad in scope than the Greek term, is more effective and immediate to understand than other possibilities;ifnecessary, Ishall specify to which verbal or nominal form in the Greek text it corresponds.
As aresult of all this, Ishall not limit myself to considering the reciprocal interaction and interconnection between sense-perception and belief, but Ishall also aim to investigate how they interact with theexperience of processing “what appears ”.I think indeed that grasping how these three elements (sense-perception, belief and appearance)interact with and border on one another is crucial to
5 By no means do Iintend to claim that these three cognitive items deal exclusively with perceptible contents. To the contrary:itispretty straightforward that especially belief and appearance can tackle and process non-perceptual information. Depending on how broadly the Greek “ αἴσθησις” is taken, it becomes possible to also take the latter as capable of targeting nonperceptual contents. What Imean to claim is rather that, if we are looking for cognitive processes, faculties or activities that are capable of addressing perceptual contents, it is for one of these and these alone that we are to look, because Plato is explicit in stating that they are responsible for perceptual cognition and he establishes aparticularly strong connection between these three items and cognition of sensory information – although the connection itself never gets to be exclusive.
our understanding of how Plato came up with an innovated epistemological system and areworked set of views about how to get agrasp of the perceptible world. More precisely, it is my opinion that Plato’stake on the interconnections between the cognition of “what appears ” and both sense-perception and belief, as well as his second thoughts on this relation in the transition frommiddle to later dialogues, are key to interpreting Plato’ sown solution to the dilemmas left open by the Two-Worlds Theory on perceptualcognition.
Finally, Ithink that afinal clarificatorynote on my terminologicalchoices is in order:this remark specifically concerns the expression with which Ishall collectively refer to my primarysubject-matter, namely “lower cognitive items” . While the fact that the addressedphenomena have aproper epistemological relevance and aspecific cognitive role is clear, as is the fact that they stand as alower form of cognition contrasted with proper scientific knowledge (Greek “ἐπιστήμη”), Ithink that my appeal to the term “items” could soundsomewhat too slack and imprecise, so as to stand in need of clarification.
The fact is that sense-perception, belief and appearance build arather heterogeneous set of cognitively relevant phenomena, such that they cannot be grouped under one single label, making them eithercognitive “activities” or “ processes ” or “states”,orrather leading us into thinking of them as “capacities” or “faculties” of the soul. It is by no means granted that Plato would think of belief or appearance as related to or resulting out of aspecific capacity or faculty of the soul in aunivocal and, above all, consistent way. Thus, while sense-perception looks like the process connected to aspecific psychic faculty, the same could not be easily held of the other two “items”.And while sense-perception as well as appearance could well be described as “ processes ”,this would not straightforwardly apply to belief, on many occasions explicitlystanding as the outcome of a cognitive process or activity (that referredtowith the Greek verb “δοξάζειν”), liable to being labelled acognitive “state” ,or “attitude”,orsomething else along these lines. Last but not least, as we shall see, it is not even clear that the soul is concretely active while experiencing sense-perception or appearance:rather, it could be claimed that they look more like a passive psychic activity (!) than a properly active one.6
Thus, given the high degree of heterogeneity and diversity within thekinds of phenomena that our three main notions are supposed to pinpoint, it seems wiser to group them under avery broad label by reducing all of them to the very generical notion of “cognitive items”,sothat the reader would find this comprehensible and at the same not prone to ambiguitiesormisunderstandings. This having been said by way of premise, Ishall now move on to explain in greater
6 Dixsaut (1997), 2, states that Plato does not make clear whether things like dianoetic thinking, belief and appearance are mere “affections” (παθήματα)ofthe soul, taking place within it, or rather activities of faculties (δυνάμεις).
1. The “Aristotelian suggestion”,and an alternative
detail what the main themes and issues of thepresent project are, and what I thereby aim to achieve.
1. The “Aristotelian suggestion”,and an alternative to it
Ihave decided to structure my inquiry in such away that an assessment of the three main cognitive items and of their reciprocal interactions between the middle and later dialogues will turn out to be adecisivefactor to understandingPlato’slater views on cognition of perceptibles. In carrying out this inquiry, the most relevanttextualevidenceisthat which brings together thenotions of belief, sense-perception and appearance:this set of evidence prompts questions about their nature and functions, comparatively taken, but also about their interconnection. Oddly enough, avery interesting kick-starter, giving an insightful perspective to this discussion, lies in an Aristotelian passage inquiring into an (alleged)Platonic position:this text is aparagraph from DA III.3 in which Aristotle discusses and rejects aphilosophical view, implicitly ascribed to Plato and described through three Platonic quotations, according to which the cognitive experiencing of appearances (notoriously pinpointed by Aristotle with the Greek term “φαντασία”)isthe result of aparticular form of interaction between senseperceptionand belief:
Thus, it is clear that appearance could not be either belief accompanied by sense-perception, or [scil. belief]through sense-perception, or acombination of belief and sense-perception.
(DA III.3, 428a24–26)
The firstformulation quotedfrom Plato is δόξα μετ ’
, “belief accompanied by perception”,and is found at Tim.52A7, in apassage in which Plato is talking about how we get to grasp the realm of sensiblethings, in contrast to cognition of intelligibles. The second is δόξα
, “belief through perception”,and the third is
, “acombination of belief and perception”:they are respectively found at Soph. 264A4–6and Soph. 264B1–2.7 Unlike the quotation from the Timaeus,the other two are explicitly meant by Plato to give aformal description of something he himself calls “ φαντα-
7 To be fair, just as in Plato’stext, in Aristotle’ spassage we also have to supply the noun for the thing happening through perception. However, in contrast with the Sophist passage (asI shall argue), Idonot see any reason to doubt that the term to be supplied after οὐδέ is δόξα.I shall come back to these lines in Chapter 3.
σία”,its workings and functions, in the frameworkofa broader argument relative to falsehood in speech and analogous mentalactivities.
Thus, Aristotle himself regards the position expressedinthe Sophist as the privileged standpoint to appreciate Plato’sideas on howappearances are processed and on how this connects with both sense-perception and belief:although he does not mention him explicitly, Plato appears indeed as the main polemical target of Aristotle’sargument. Hence, criticizing the hypothesis by presenting it in Plato’ sown words seems to imply that Aristotle wants us to take it as aposition to which Plato had committed himself.8 More specifically to the main point of this investigation, it triggers the more general reflection about the reciprocal interconnections between these three forms of perceptual cognition and how these interconnections may help to make sense of Plato’ sown thoughts on the subject, as well as of their development throughout his oeuvre.
Although tempting and authoritative, Idonot believe that the “Aristotelian suggestion” could shed light on Plato’sactualthoughts on the relation between sense-perception, belief and appearance. Consequently, Idonot think that modern interpretations should be using this to reconstruct Plato’sphilosophical views on the epistemology of perceptibles.9 Accordingly, what Iaim for in this inquiry is putting forwarda different interpretation of the appearance/sense-perception/ belief triangle, with aview to offering areading of Plato’slater theory of perceptual cognition that Iconsider more effective, on ageneral level and especially with regard to its development from his classical Two-Worlds epistemology.
In the textual survey Ishall carry out to this effect, Iwish to disprove that interpretive trend according to which the relevantevidencefrom later dialogues ought to be taken as underpinning the theoretical description of appearances provided in the Sophist,which would then really mirror the actual Platonic concept of appearance, as the “Aristotelian suggestion” argues. In fact, as Ihope to show, aclose look at that textual material speaks againsta quick acceptance of
8 All the more, even the way in which Aristotle criticizes this position is reminiscent of the Platonic treatment of “perceptual appearances ”.This refutation, extending throughout 428a26–b9, resonates with clear Platonic echoes:most notably, the example of the one-foot sun works exactly like the well-known “bent stick passage ” from Book X – more on this in Chapter 1. Hence, the way in which this criticism is introduced, set up and even carried out must presuppose that, at least in Aristotle’snarration, the one who put forward the formulations presented at 428a24–26 was committed to just this conception of appearance.
9 Maybe – and Ishall argue for this idea – there never was such athing as areal Platonic commitment to this view, or it was not to be found in those places where scholars wished to look for it. Maybe Plato’smost mature epistemological system was not meant to accommodate appearance as it is envisaged in the three formulations. Maybe, when he offered those formalizations crystallized in the Sophist and in the Timaeus (?) passages, Plato was not even thinking of them as describing something that he conceived of as auseful philosophical tool, e. g. explaining how one orients oneself when dealing with the information coming from the senses.
interpretations allowing for afar-reaching match between the formalization of the notion at stake and its (alleged)concreteapplications. But besides dismissing the “Aristotelian suggestion”,according to which the interactions between senseperceptionand belief somehow boil down to some instances of appearance, the one major claim that Ishall put forth pins down adifferent interrelation between the three cognitive items, and makes it the key element to understand Plato’ s innovated views on perceptualcognition (after the Republic). In the story Iwish to tell, it is crucial to track down the process through which Plato rethinks and reworks the three notions at stake, something which Iclaim he does in the transition from the Republic to the later dialogues.
The firstimportant point Iwill be raising in my own reading of thetextual evidence concerns adiscontinuity, taken in adevelopmental sense, in Plato’ s views about sense-perception and belief – and, by way of extension, of appearance, too. By discontinuity Imean the following: as has been noticed morethan once, Plato starts off in theTwo-Worlds dialogues with two notions which he sometimes partially and sometimes more extensively reshapes in the epistemological system exemplified in later dialogues.10 The turning point, Ibelieve, is to be seen right after the dialogue whose epistemological shortcomings regarding the perceptible realm had raised the major problems for Plato:the Republic. The first step in this new direction is marked by theaporetic Theaetetus,and its problematic conclusions are followed up and finally brought to amorepositive solution by the Sophist. Finally, there are strong grounds to regard the Timaeus and the Philebus as containing practical instantiations of the views theorizedinthe other two dialogues. Put differently, all these later dialogues share aconsistent, unified picture of the profile and workings of sense-perception and belief, which in turn does not coincide with how both notions are described in the Republic, but rathershows some significant aspects of discontinuity and incompatibility.11
10 Aclarification on this point:asitwill emerge from Chapter 1onthe Republic,I believe that this dialogue is shaped by an ontological doctrine clearly distinguishing two different “kinds” of reality (corresponding to the intelligible and perceptible realm respectively), that is to say the so-called “Two-Worlds Theory” already referred to above, and onto which the basic epistemological claim opposing intellectual knowledge to sensory belief is mapped. Idisagree with revisionist interpretations (for which see Chapter 1) that deny that these “Two Worlds” exist.
11 Many scholars have already thoroughly explained the process of development and narrowing down that the Platonic notion of belief undergoes, starting from the Republic and up to the latest dialogues:therefore, Ishall simply take this point for granted. The latest related paper which Ihave knowledge of is Moss (2020), but also Moss (2014)tackles similar issues and offers adetailed developmental history of the notion over Plato’smiddle-later dialogues. The classical treatment of the “two meanings of belief” is Lafrance (1985). See also Lorenz (2006), Vogt (2012), Crombie (2012), esp. 33–34 and 93 ff., Wolfsdorf (2013), Storey (2014), Trabattoni (2016). The intuition according to which the key to overcoming the epistemological im-
Thus, the Platonic conception of sense-perception and belief apparently evolved and was narrowed down in the transition from the philosophical system laid down in the Republic to that of later dialogues. Ishall argue that, among the reasons that may have led to this discontinuity, there was one which is particularly significant for our purposes, involving the interactions of these two notions with the third one. More precisely, sense-perception and belief, as they featured in the Republic,are characterized by aclose proximity, and even ambiguity, not only with each other but also with appearance. Iwill show that such aproximity posed many and conspicuous philosophical problems,especiallyagainst the backgroundofother philosophical views, such as the ontological, epistemological and moral relativism advocated by the Sophists, most notably by Protagoras. It is my conviction that theepistemological system laid down in the Republic,inwhich theachievements of perceptualcognition are diametrically opposed to those of intellectualcognition (the one and only identifiablewith proper, scientific knowledge), is meant to be areaction to just an epistemological relativism so clearly hinging on the idea that knowledge could basically boil down to “that which appears ” to each of us – something which in turn is also conflated with both sense-perception and belief.12 By rebutting Protagoras on the point that sense-perception, appearance and belief could ever be identifiedwith knowledge, and by rather putting the latter at theopposite extreme of that epistemological hierarchy at whose bottom end we find perceptual cognition, Plato meant to show that any reliable, “scientific” reasoning or claim about perceptible realities and states of affairs would be absolutely off the table under adescription of belief and sense-perception bringing them so dangerouslyclose to “having and appearance ”,and so far removed fromproper knowledge.
passe opened by the Two-Worlds Theory lay in the disambiguation and narrowing down of the notions of sense-perception and belief is already present in M. Frede (1987), who also emphasized the central place occupied by the Theaetetus –Sophist within this disambiguation process. My own claims about the disentanglement share this idea with Frede’ s, but differ from his reading for the following reasons:(1) Idonot take the picture envisaged in the Theaetetus as a definitive turning point in Plato’sepistemology, let alone as the decisive move to solve the problems left open from Two-Worlds epistemology;(2) Idonot think, as aconsequence, that the innovative description of belief at work in the later dialogues can secure knowledge in a strict, proper sense, let alone that this involves aclear fracture with the model according to which knowledge is not to be described in doxastic terms and is strictly speaking only of the unchangeable, unperishable, unmoving realm;(3) Ideem his picture of the disentanglement incomplete, because he does not take into account the case of appearance and of its interconnection with the other two cognitive items;this lack, Ibelieve, prevents him from seeing what is maybe the most important step in the disambiguation, namely the marginalization of “what appears ”,which boosts the accuracy and reliability of both sense-perception and belief.
12 Cf. Tht. 151E–152A, reporting Protagoras’ doctrine, also quoted in Chapter 2.