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ﺗ ٔﻟﯿﻒ: ﺻﺎﺮ اﻟﻨﻔﺰاوي
ﴏاع ا ٔﺟ ﺪات ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ
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إﻫﺪاء ٕاﱃ ٔ ﲆ اﻟ ﴩ ٔﱊ و ٔﰊ ا ٔﻏﺮ
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ﺗﺼﺪ ﺮ "رﻛﺰ ﻋﯿ ﻚ ﲆ ﺑﻮﻟﻨﺪا و ّاﲡﻪ ٕاﱃ روﺳ ﯿﺎ اﻟﺒﯿﻀﺎء ،ﺳ ﺘ ﺪ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺗﻘﱰب ﻣﻦ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ وﲢﺖ روﺳ ﯿﺎ اﻟﺒﯿﻀﺎء ﺳ ﺘ ﺪ ﻧﻘﻄﺔ ﰲ ﺎﯾﺔ ا ٔﳘﯿﺔ ﻟﺮوﺳ ﯿﺎ ..إﳖّ ﺎ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ " د .ﺎﰟ ﺳﻠﻄﺎن
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ّ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻠﯿﻨﺎ ٔن ّ ﺴﲅ اﺑﺘﺪاء ﻟﺘﻮﺻﯿﻒ ا ي ٔﻃﻠﻘﻪ ”ﲳﻮﯾﻞ ﻫﻨ ﻐﺘﻮن“ 1ﺎم 1999ﰲ ﻣﻘﺎ “اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻌﻈﻤﻲ اﳌﻨﻌﺰ “ﻋﻨﺪ ﺪﯾﺜﻪ ﻋﻦ ” ٓ ﺎدﯾﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﺪدﯾﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺒ ّﯿﺔ“ﰷٕﻃﺎر ﻠﻌﻼﻗﺎت ا وﻟ ّﯿﺔ ﻣﺎﺑﻌﺪ ﺳﻘﻮط ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ،ﻓﻌﻼ ..ﻓ ﺤﻦ ٕازاء ﻣ ﺎخ دوﱄ ”ﻣﺆﻣﺮك“]ﺑﻨﺼﺐ اﻟﺮاء وﴪﻫﺎ[؛ﻗﻮة ﻋﻈﻤﻰ وﺣ ﺪة وﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻜﱪى اﻟﱵ ﲢﺎول اﻟﺘﺨﻔ ﻒ ﻣﻦ وﻃ ٔة ّ ،وﻻﺷﻚ ٔ ّن روﺳﯿﺎ ٕا ﺪى ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻌﻨﯿﺪة اﻟﱵ ﺴﻌﻰ ﻠﻌﺐ دور اﻟﻬﳰﻨﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ّﺔ ٔﻛﱪ و ٔﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺪودﻫﺎ ،وﺗ ٔﰐ ا ٔزﻣﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻃﻮت ﺎ ﺎ ا ٔول ﻟﺘﻘﺪّم ﳕﻮذ ﺎ ﺣ ﺎ ﻟﴫاع ا ٔﺟ ﺪات اﳉﯿﻮ-اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠ ّﯿﺔ ﺑﲔ ”ﺑﻮﺗﯿ ّﺔ“ ﲀﺑﺪ ﻻﺳﺘﻌﺎدة ﳾء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺮدوس ﯾﴫ ﲆ اﺳ ﯿﯿﻒ إﱃ ﻓﻠﻜﻪ. اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ اﻟﻀﺎﺋﻊ وﻏﺮب ﻣ ٔﻣﺮك – ٔي ﻣﻮ ّ ﻪ ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺎّ - ٔ ﺬ اﻟﴫاع ﲆ اﻟﻨﻔﻮذ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﰲ ﺣ ﺪاد ﻣ ﺬ ﳊﻈﺔ ﻋﺰل اﻟﱪﳌﺎن ﻠﺮﺋ ﺲ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ اﳌﻨﺘﺨﺐ ﻓ ﻜ ﻮر ﻜﻮﻓ ﺶ ،ﳁﻮﺳﻜﻮ اﺳﺘﻘ ﻠﺖ رﺳﺎ ﺳﻠﺒﯿﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺣﺼﻮل ﻣﺎ اﻋﺘﱪﺗﻪ اﻧﻘﻼ ﲆ ٕارادة ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﲔ وﲥﺪﯾﺪا ﳌﺼﺎﳊﻬﺎ ﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ إﻗﺪام اﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﲆ إﻣﻀﺎء اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ﻗ ﺼﺎدﯾﺔ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ اﳌﺜﲑة ﻠ ﺪل وﱂ ﻜﻦ ﺗ اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ اﻟﺮﺳﺎ اﻟﻮﺣ ﺪة ﺑﻞ ﺗﻠﳤﺎ رﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺳﻠﺒﯿﺔ ٔﺧﺮى ﰷن ﻣﻦ ﺑ ﳯﺎ ﳃﻊ اﳊﺮاك ﺣ ﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻘﺮم ﺟ ﻮب اﻟﺒﻼد وﺳﻦ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﳝﻨﻊ اﺳﺘ ﺪام اﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﳇﻐﺔ ﻧﯿﺔ ﰲ ﲢﺪّ واﰣ ﻟ ﺲ ﻠﻨﻔﻮذ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻓﻘﻂ ﺑﻞ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﳌﺸﺎﻋﺮ اﳌﻼﯾﲔ ﻣﻦ ذوي ا ٔﺻﻮل اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺒﻼد ،وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﺪا ﺑﺒﻮﺗﲔ ﰥ ﺷﺒﻪ ﺟﺰﺮة اﻟﻘﺮم وﻧ ُﴫة ٔﺗﺒﺎﻋﻬﺎ ﰲ ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ وﺟ ﻮﲠﺎ وذ ﻟﺘ ﳢّ ﻬﺎ إﱃ اﻟﺘﺪ ّﻞ و ّ ﻠﻤ ﺎﻃﺮ اﶈﺪﻗﺔ ﲠﺎ وﲟﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﻧﻔﻮذﻫﺎ اﻟﺘﺎرﳜﯿﺔ،ﻓﻌﻼﻗﳤﺎ و ا ٔو ﺮاﻧ ّﯿﺔ ﻣﻮ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺎرﱗ ﺣ ﺚ ﰷﻧﺖ ﯿﯿﻒ ٔول ﺎﲳﺔ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ﺣﱴ ٔﳖﺎ ﰷﻧﺖ ﺗُﺪﻋﻰ ”روﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﻜ ﯿﻔ ّﺔ“ ،وﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ اﻋﺘﻨﻖ اﻟﺮوس اﻟﻨﴫاﻧﯿﺔ ُﺷ ّﯿﺪت اﻟﻜ ﺴﺔ اﳌﺮﺟﻌﯿﺔ ﰲ ﯿﯿﻒ وﳛﻔﻆ اﻟﺘﺎرﱗ ﻠﺮوس 1
وطورھﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻛﺗﺎب ﺷﮭﯾر .. -ﺑﺎﺣث ﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ أﻣرﯾﻛﻲ]ت [2008ﺻﺎﺣب ﻧظرﯾﺔ"ﺻدام اﻟﺣﺿﺎرات"اﻟﻣﺛﯾرة ﻟﻠﺟدل اﻟﺗﻲ أﺧذھﺎ ﻋن ﻣواطﻧﮫ"ﺑرﻧﺎرد ﻟوﯾس" ّ
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ﺎﱊ 1812و 1941إذ ا ّٕن واﻗﻌﺘﲔ ْ ذاﰐ دﻻ وﻫﲈ اﻟﻐﺰو اﻟﻨﺎﺑﻮﻟﯿﻮﱐ و ﺟ ﯿﺎح اﻟﻬﺘﻠﺮي ْ ْ ﳇﳱﲈ ّﰎ ﱪ ا ٔراﴈ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ .. ﰷدت ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﲣﴪ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ إﱃ ا ٔﺑﺪ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻧﺪﻻع اﻟﺜﻮرة اﻟﱪﺗﻘﺎﻟﯿﺔ 2وﱂ ﯾﻨﻘﺬﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺗ اﳋﺴﺎرة ﺳﻮى اﺳ ﴩاء اﻟﻔﺴﺎد ﰲ ﻋﻬﺪ ﯾﻮﺷﻨﻜﻮ ﻣﺎ ﺳﺎ ﺪ "ا ﻦ روﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﺒﺎر"ﻓ ﻜ ﻮر ﲢﻮل دراﱊ ٔ ﺰ ﲆ ٔ ﻼم ﻗﻄﺎع واﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ ﻜﻮﻓ ﺶ ﲆ اﻋﺘﻼء ﺳﺪّة اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﰲ ّ اﳌﻠﻮﻧﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﲔ وﻣﻦ وراﲛﻢ ٔورو واﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،وﺗﺪور ا ٔ م و ﺴ ﺘﻌﯿﺪ اﻟﺜﻮرة ّ ﺮﯾﻘﻬﺎ ﻟﺘﺤﯿﻂ ﻧﻘﺎط ﺳ ﺘﻔﻬﺎم ﲟﺴﺘﻘ ﻞ اﳊﻀﻮر اﻟﺮوﳼ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ،وﱔ ﻧﻘﺎط ٔﺳﻬﻢ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﰲ رﲰﻬﺎ ٕﻗﺪاﻣﻪ ﲆ ﰥ اﻟﻘﺮم إذ ﺧﴪت روﺳﯿﺎ ﺑﺘ اﳋﻄﻮة ﻗ ﺒ دﳝﻐﺮاﻓ ّﺔ ﻣﻌ ِّﺪ ﺣ ﺚ ﰷﻧﺖ ا ٔ ﻠﺒﯿﺔ اﻟﺴﲀﻧﯿﺔ ﻣﻦ ذوي ا ٔﺻﻮل اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ّ ﺸﲁ ﺎﻣﻞ ﺮﺟ ﺢ ﻠﻨﻔﻮذ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﰲ ا ا ﻞ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﻓﲀن ﻟﺰاﻣﺎ ﲆ اﻟﺮوس ﺮ ﻬﺎ ﻫﻨﺎك ..ﲷﻦ ا ٔراﴈ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧ ّﯿﺔ، وﳓﻦ ﻧﻮاﻓﻖ ﲤﺎﻣﺎ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺮؤﯾﺔ اﻟﺘ ﻠﯿﻠ ّﯿﺔ ،إذ ٕاﻧ ّﻨﺎ ﻟﻮ ﺗ ٔ ّﻣﻠﻨﺎ ا ٔﺻﻮات اﻟﱵ ٔوﺻﻠﺖ ر ﻞ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻜﻮﻓ ﺶ إﱃ اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﰲ اﻧﺘ ﺎ ت 2010ﳒﺪ ٔ ّن ﻣﻌﻈﻤﻬﺎ ﻗﺪ ٔﰏ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺮم ،ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﲏ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻌﻮﺑﺔ ﲟﲀن ٔن ﺗ ﳤﻲ ٔي اﻧﺘ ﺎ ت رﺋﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﻗﺎدﻣﺔ ﺑﻔﻮز ّ ﻣﺮﴊ روﳼ اﻟﻬﻮى ،وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ٔﻛّﺪﺗﻪ ﻧﺘ ﺎ ت اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﯿﺔ واﻟ ﴩﯾﻌﯿﺔ ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ،إذ ﲤﻜّﻦ اﳌﻠﯿﺎرد ﺮ ﺑﻮروﺷ ﻜﻮ اﳌﻮاﱄ ﻠﻐﺮب ﻣﻦ ﲢﻘ ﻖ ﻓﻮز واﰣ ﲆ ﻣ ﺎﻓﺴﯿﻪ ﰲ ﺳﺒﺎق اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﺔ )ﺟﻮان ﺎم (2014ﻗ ﻞ ٔن ﲢﻘﻖ ا ٔﺣﺰاب اﳌﺸﺎﯾﻌﺔ ﻠﻤ ّﺪ ا ٔوروﰊ ﻓﻮزا ﺒﲑا ﰲ ﻧﺘ ﺎ ت اﻟ ﴩﯾﻌﯿﺔ .. ﺗوﻧس ﻓﻲ 27ﺟوﯾﻠﯾﺔ 2015 11ﺷوال 1436
-2ﺣراك ﺷﻌﺑﻲ واﺳﻊ ﺷﮭدﺗﮫ أوﻛراﻧﯾﺎ وﺧﺎﺻﺔ "ﻣﯾدان اﻻﺳﺗﻘﻼل" ﺑﻛﯾﯾف ﺑﯾن ﻧوﻓﻣﺑر 2004وﺟﺎﻧﻔﻲ 2005اﺣﺗﺟﺎﺟﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ "اﻟﺗزوﯾر" اﻟذي ﻗﯾل إ ّﻧﮫ ﺷﺎب اﻟﺟوﻟﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ ﻣن اﻻﻧﺗﺧﺎﺑﺎت اﻟرﺋﺎﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ أﻓرزت ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ اﻋ ُﺗﺑر ﺗﻣﮭﯾدا ﻟﺗﺗوﯾﺞ "اﺑن روﺳﯾﺎ اﻟﺑﺎر"ﯾﺎﻧوﻛوﻓﯾﺗش رﺋﯾﺳﺎ ﻟﻠﺑﻼد ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺳﺎب ﻓﯾﻛﺗور ﯾوﺗﺷﻧﻛو اﻟﻣواﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﻐرب ﻋﺑر ﻧﺗﯾﺟﺔ "ﻣﻔﺑرﻛﺔ"ﻣُﻧﺢ ﺑﻣﻘﺗﺿﺎھﺎ ﯾوﺗﺷﯾﻧﻛو ﻋﻠﻰ %39.87و ﯾﺎﻧوﻛوﻓﯾﺗش ﻋﻠﻰ ، %39.32وﺗﻣ ّﻛن اﻟﻣﺣﺗﺟون "اﻟﺑرﺗﻘﺎﻟﯾون"ﻣن إﺟﺑﺎر اﻟﻣﺣﻛﻣﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﯾﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ إﻟﻐﺎء ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺟوﻟﺔ اﻻﻧﺗﺧﺎﺑﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺛﯾرة ﻟﻠﺟدل ﻟﯾﻔوز "ﯾوﺗﺷﻧﻛو"ﻓﻲ ﺟوﻟﺔ اﻹﻋﺎدة وﯾﻌﺗﻠﻲ رأس اﻟﺳﻠطﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛﯾﯾف ،ﻟﺗﺣﻘق اﻟﺛورة اﻟﺑرﺗﻘﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻓوزا ﺗﺎرﯾﺧﯾﺎ اﻟﻣﻠوﻧﺔ "ﯾوﻟﯾﺎ ﺗﯾﻣوﺷﻧﻛو"اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗ ّم ﺳﺟﻧﮭﺎ ﻻﺣﻘﺎ ﺑﺗﮭم ﻟﻛن إﻟﻰ ﺣﯾن ،إذ ﺗﻣ ّﻛن ﯾﺎﻧوﻛوﻓﯾﺗش ﻣن اﻟووﺻل إﻟﻰ ﺳدة اﻟرﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻧﺗﺧﺎﺑﺎت 2010أﻣﺎم أﯾﻘوﻧﺔ اﻟﺛورة ّ ﻓﺳﺎد ...
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ﺗﻮﻃﺌﺔ ﻠﯿﻨﺎ ٔن ﺴ ّ ﻞ ﰲ ﻣﻔ ﺘﺢ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب وﺟﻮد اﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﺣﻘ ﻘﻲ و رﳜﻲ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺑﲔ ﻏﺮب وﴍق ،ﻓﻬﺬا اﻟﺒ ﯾﻌ ﺶ ٔزﻣﺔ ﻫﻮﯾّﺔ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺬورﻫﺎ اﻟﺘﺎرﳜﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﯿﻘﺔ ،ﻓﻠﻘﺮون ﻃﻮﯾ ﺣﳬﺖ روﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﻘ ﴫﯾّﺔ ﴍق اﻟﺒﻼد ﻓ ﺣﳬﺖ اﳌﻤﻠﻜﺔ اﻟﺒﻮﻟﻨﺪﯾّﺔ ﻏﺮﲠﺎ ﻟﺘ ﺪث ﺑﺬ ﺎ اﻧﻔﺼﺎﻣ ّﺔ ﲡ ّﺬرت ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺼﺎدﻗﺔ اﻟﱪﳌﺎن ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﲆ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﺳﺘﻘﻼل ﯾﻮم 24 ٔوت 1991إذ ﺻﺎرت اﶺﻬﻮرﯾﺔ اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﺎﺗﯿﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﳏﻞ ﺰاع ﺑﲔ روﺳﯿﺎ واﻟﻐﺮب .وﻗ ﻞ اﳋﻮض ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻨﺎ اﳌﻌﻘّﺪ ﻫﻨﺎك ﻣﻄﻠﺐ ﻣﳯﺠﻲ ﻠﯿﻨﺎ ﺗﻠﺒ ﻪ ﱪ رﺻﺪ ﻣﻮﺟﺰ ﻟ ﺴﻠﺴﻞ ا ٔ ﺪاث .ﰲ ﺷﻬﺮ ﻧﻮﳁﱪ 2013ﻓﺎ ٔ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﻧﻮﻮﻓ ﺶ ﻣﻮاﻃﻨﯿﻪ ﻟﱰاﺟﻊ ﻋﻦ ﺗﻮﻗ ﻊ اﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ اﻟﴩاﻛﺔ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ ﻣﻔﻀﻼ ﳔﺮاط ﰲ اﲢﺎد ﲨﺮﰾ ﻣﻊ روﺳﯿﺎ ،وﱔ اﳋﻄﻮة اﻟﱵ اﺷﻌﻠﺖ ﻓ ﯿﻞ اﺿﻄﺮا ت واﺳﻌﺔ ﰲ ﻣ ﺎﻃﻖ ﺪﯾﺪة ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﻼد وﻻﺳ ﰲ ﻏﺮﲠﺎ وﺷﲈﻟﻬﺎ وا ﺸﺪ اﶈ ﺸﺪون اﻟﻐﺎﺿﺒﻮن ﰲ ﺳﺎ ﺔ ﺳﺘﻘﻼل ﻟﻌﺎﲳﺔ ﯿﯿﻒ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒﲔ ﺑﻌﺰل ﻧﻮﻮﻓ ﺶ وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﰷن ﺑﻌﺪ ٔ 3ﺷﻬﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺎ ﺎت و ﻋﺘﺼﺎﻣﺎت ﺣ ﺚ ّﰎ ﻃﺮد اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ،وﱂ ﯾﺘ ٔﺧﺮ اﻟﺮد اﻟﺮوﳼ ﲆ ﺧﺴﺎرة ﻠﯿﻔﻬﺎ واﻗﱰاب ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔ ا ٔوروﰊ ﺣ ﺚ ﺳﺎرﻋﺖ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ٕرﺳﺎل ﻗﻮاﲥﺎ إﱃ ﺷﺒﻪ ﺟﺰﺮة اﻟﻘﺮم ﰲ اﳉﻨﻮب ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ وﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﺑﻀ ّﻤﻬﺎ ﻣﺴ ﺪة إﱃ ﺣﻘﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﱐ ﰲ ﺣﲈﯾﺔ اﻟﺴﲀن ذوي ا ٔﺻﻮل اﻟﺮوﺳ ّﯿﺔ ا ﻦ ﻃﺎﻟﺒﻮﻫﺎ ﻟﺘﺪ ّﻞ،وﺗ ٔﰐ ﻧ ﺔ ﺳﺘﻔ ﺎء ﺣﻮل ﻟﺘ ﺎق ﻻﲢﺎد اﻟﺮوﳼ –ﺗ ٔﯾﯿﺪ 96.77ﳌﺌﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺘﻌﺰر اﳌﻮﻗﻒ ”اﻟﴩﻋﻲ“ﳌﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﺻﺎﺣ ﺔ اﳊﻖ اﻟﺘﺎرﳜﻲ ﰲ ﺷﺒﻪ اﳉﺰﺮة اﻟﱵ وﻫﳢﺎ اﻟﺴﲀنّ - اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﺎﰐ ﺧﺮو ﺸﻮف ﳌﺴﻘﻂ ر ٔﺳﻪ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺎم .1954 ..وﺗ ﺴﺎب ا ٔ م وﺗﺘﺪﺣﺮج ﺮة اﻟﺜﻠﺞ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ إﱃ ّﺪ ٕا ﻼن ﻗ ﺎم دوﻟﺘﲔ ﻣﻦ ﺎﻧﺐ وا ﺪ ﴍق اﻟﺒﻼد دوﻧﯿ ﺴﻚ وﻟﻮ ﺎﺴﻚ ﲆ ٔﺳﺎس اﺳﺘﻔ ﺎء ﻦ ﺷﻌﱯ ٔﻗﲓ ﯾﻮم 11ﻣﺎي 2014 و ﺎءت ﻧ ﺠﺘﻪ ﻣﺆﯾﺪة ﻟﻼﺳﺘﻘﻼل ﻋﻦ ﯿﯿﻒ ،وﲻﺪت اﶺﻬﻮرﯾﺘﺎن اﻟﺸﻌﺒ ّ ﺎن إﱃ إﺟﺮاء ﯿﺘﺤﻮل ﺑﺬ اﻟﴫاع إﱃ ٔﻛﱶ اﻧﺘ ﺎ ت ﳏﻠ ّﯿﺔ ﯾﻮﱊ ٔ 18ﻛﺘﻮ ﺮ و 01ﻧﻮﳁﱪ ،2014ﻟ ّ 7
اﻟﴫا ﺎت اﳉﯿﻮﺳﯿﺎﺳ ّﯿﺔ ﺪّة ﺑﻌﺪ اﳊﺮب اﻟﺒﺎردة؛ وﰲ ﺧﻀ ّﻢ اﻟﴫاع ا ا ﺮ ﰲ اﶺﻬﻮرﯾّﺔ ﲤﺴﻚ اﻟﺮوس ﺑ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿ ّﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﺗﻨﻘﺪح ٔﺳﺌ ﻛﱪى ﺗﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ٔﺳﺎﺳﺎ ﺳﺒﺎب ّ وﻃﺒﯿﻌﺔ ا ٔﻫﺪاف ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ اﳌﺘﻌﻠّﻘﺔ ﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ واﻟﱰدد ا ٔوروﰊ ٕازاء اﳌﻠﻒ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ..
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اﻟﺒﺎب ا ٔول ﳌﺎذا ﳣ ّﺴﻚ روﺳ ﯿﺎ ﺑ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ؟!!!
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اﻣﺘﺪاد ]ﻣﺎ[ ﻟﻠﺼﺮاع اﻟﺠﻮرﺟﻲ ﺗﺒﺪو ﻧﺪﻓﺎ ﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ اﻣ ﺪادا ﻠﴫاع ﰲ ﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ ﰲ ٔوت 2008وﺗﺪ ّﻠﻬﺎ ﰲ ٔوﺳﯿ ﺎ اﳉﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ ﻓ ﺤﻦ ﰲ ﳇﺘﺎ اﳊﺎﻟﺘﲔ ٔﻣﺎم ر ّد ﻓﻌﻞ ﲆ ﺪث وﻗﻊ ﰲ ﻣﺎض ﻟ ﺲ ﻟﺒﻌﯿﺪ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﻘﻠّﺖ ﻮﺳﻮﻓﻮ ﻋﻦ ﴏﺑﯿﺎ ﺎم 1999ﻼل ﻋﻬﺪ ﺑﻮر ﺲ ﯾﻠ ﺴﲔ ،ﲑ ٔ ّن اﳌﻠﻒ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﻜ ﴘ ٔﳘﯿﺔ ٔﻛﱪ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻈﲑﻩ اﳉﻮر اﻟﱵ ﰷﻧﺖ ٔزﻣﺔ ” ﺎ ﺮة“ﴎ ﺎن ﻣﺎ اﳓﴪت واﻧﺘﻔﺖ. ﻓﻘﺪ ا ّﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﺪ ّﻞ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻘﻮات اﳉﻮرﺟ ﺔ ﺑﺼﺒﻐﺔ ردﻋ ّﯿﺔ ﳏﺪودة ﶵﺎﯾﺔ ا ٔوﺳﯿ ﲔ اﳉﻨﻮﺑﯿﲔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﳗﻮم ﻋﺴﻜﺮي ﺟﻮر ﻣﺴﺘﻔﺰ ﲆ ﻣﻘﺎﻃﻌﱵ ٔوﺳﯿ ﺎ اﳉﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ و ٔﲞﺎز ﰷن ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﯾ ﳤ َﻲ ﺣ ﻼل ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﻧﻔﻮذ روﳼ ﻣﻌﻠﻦ ﻣ ﺬ اﳖﯿﺎر ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ ،ﻓﲀن ٔن ﱪ اﳉ ﺶ اﳉﻮر ﲆ اﻟﱰاﺟﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺴﺨﯿﻨﻔﺎﱄ ﻓ ٔﻗﺪﻣﺖ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﲆ ﱰاف ﳌﻘﺎﻃﻌﺘﲔ دوﻟﺘﲔ ﻣﺴ ْ ﺘﻘﻠﺘﲔ ،وﱂ ﺮ وﻗﻔﺔ ٔﻣﺮﻜ ّﺔٔ -وروﺑ ّﯿﺔ ﺪﯾّﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ اﳉﻮر ﺳﺎﰷﺷﻔ ﲇ ﻣ ﻠﲈ ر ٔﯾﻨﺎﻫﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺑﻮروﺷﻨﻜﻮ ﰲ اﳊﺎ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ وذ ﻠﻄﺎﺑﻊ ﺧ ﺒﺎري اﻟﴫف ﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ اﺟ ﯿﺎح اﻟﻘﻮات اﳉﻮرﺟ ّﺔ ﻟ ٔراﴈ ا ٔوﺳﯿ ﺔ اﳉﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ إذ ﰷﻧﺖ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ٓﻧﺬاك ) ٔﺛﻨﺎء وﻻﯾﺔ ﺑﻮش ﻦ( ﺮﯾﺪ ﻗ ﺎس ﻣﺪى ﺗ ٔﻫّﺐ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ اﻟﺮوﳼ ]اﳉﺪﯾﺪ[ ﻣ ﺪﻓ ﺪف ، دون ٔن ﻧ ﴗ ﺑﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﳊﺎل ا ٔﳘ ّﯿﺔ اﳉﯿﻮﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ا ٔﻛﱪ اﻟﱵ ﻜ ﺴﳱﺎ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ﲜﻮرﺟ ﺎ ،ﻓﺎ ٔراﴈ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ﲆ ﲣﻮم روﺳﯿﺎ ﻛﲈ ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﲆ ﻣﻘﺮﺑﺔ ﻣﻦ ٔﺳﻄﻮﻟﻬﺎ اﻟﺮاﺑﺾ ﻗ ﺎ ﺷﺒﻪ ﺟﺰﺮة اﻟﻘﺮم ﰲ اﻟﺒﺤﺮ ا ٔﺳﻮد ﻼوة ﲆ وﺟﻮد ﺪد ﺒﲑ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﲀن اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻘﲔ ﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ،...وﱂ ﻜﻦ اﻧﺘﻔﺎﺿﺔ ا ب اﻟﺮوﳼ اﳌﻔﺎﺟ ﺔ واﻟﻘﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﰲ اﳊﺮب ا ٔوﺳﯿ ﺔ ﺳﻮى ﻧﺘﺎج ٔﻣﺮﻦ اﺛﻨﲔ: ٔوﻻ؛ ﱔ رد ﻓﻌﻞ ﲆ اﻧﻔﺼﺎل ﻮﺳﻮﻓﻮ ﻋﻦ ﴏﺑﯿﺎ ﺪﯾﺜﺎ] 17ﻓ ﻔﺮي [2008وﰲ ذ رﺳﺎ واﲵﺔ إﱃ ا ا ﻞ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻛﲈ اﻟﻐﺮب ﻣﻔﺎدﻫﺎ ٔ ّن ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﻟﻦ ﺗﻘ ﻞ ﻧ ﺸﺎر ﺪوى ﻧﻔﺼﺎل ﰲ اﻟﻔﻀﺎء ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ اﻟﺮوﳼ ،و ﻟﺘﺒﻌﺔ ﱔ ﻟﻦ ﺗﻘ ﻞ ﳣﺪد " ٔﻃﻠﴘ"ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ ا ٔوراﺳ ّﯿﺔ .. 10
ﻧﯿﺎ؛ ﱔ ر ّد ]ﻣﺎ[ ﲆ إﻋﺮاب اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ّﺔ ﻧ ّﳤﺎ ﻧﺼﺐ درﻋﻬﺎ اﻟﺼﺎروﺧ ﺔ ﰲ ﰻ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻮﻟﻨﺪا و ﺸﯿﻜ ﺎ ﺎم ، 2007ﻟﯿﻜﻮن "ا ﳤﺪﯾﺪ"ﻣﻮ ّ ﺎ ﰲ و ﻪ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮﻫﻪ إﱃ ﺑﻌﺾ دول ٔورو اﻟﴩﻗ ﺔ ... دون ٔن ﻧ ﴗ ﺑﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﳊﺎل اﻟﺮﻏﺒﺔ اﳉﻮرﺟ ﺔ ا ﻓ ﻨﺔ ﰲ ﺗﻄﻮﺮ اﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ اﻟﴩاﻛﺔ ﻣﻦ ٔ ﻞ اﻟﺴﻼم اﳌﻮﻗّﻌﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﺎم 2005ﲟﺎ ﻗﺪ ﳝﻬّﺪ ﻟﻌﻀﻮﯾﺔ ٔﻃﻠﺴﯿﺔ ﰷﻣ ،ﻣﺎ ﺟﻌﻞ اﻟﺘﻔﺎ ﻞ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻜﻮن ﺻﺎﻋﻘﺎ ﲟﺎ ﻜﻔﻲ ﻟ ُﯿ ﱪ ا ٔﻃﻠﺴﯿﲔ إﱃ ﲮﺐ ﺳﺆال اﻧﻀﲈم ﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ وﻟﻮ إﱃ ﲔ ،رﰬ ٔ ّن ﺗ ﻠ ﴘ اﳔﺮﻃﺖ ﰲ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻼﻗﺎت ﻋﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﻊ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻣ ﺬ ﲾﺮ اﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻬﺎ ﻋﻦ ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ ﺎم 1991ﱪ ﺑﻮاﺑﺔ ﻣﲀﲿﺔ اﻻٕرﻫﺎب واﻟﻘﻮات اﳋﺎﺻﺔ ".."OMEGA وﲠﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﺗﺒﺪو اﻟﻘﻀ ّﯿﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ اﻣ ﺪادا ﻟ ٔزﻣﺔ اﳉﻮرﺟ ّﺔ ﲆ ا ٔﻗﻞ ﰲ ﺑﻌﺾ دواﻓﻌﻬﺎ وٕان ﰷﻧﺖ ﻗﺪ ﲡﺎوزﲥﺎ ّﺪ ًة وﺧﻄﻮرة )رﰬ ﻏﯿﺎب اﳔﺮاط روﳼ ﻋﺴﻜﺮي "واﰣ"( ﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎرات ﻛﺜﲑة ﺪت ﻣﻌﻬﺎ "ﻣﺬ ﺮة ﺑﻮدا ﺴﺖ" 3اﻟﻀﺎﻣ ﺔ ﳊﺪود ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ "ﻧﻘﺸﺎ ﲆ و ﻪ ﻣﺎء" ﻛﲈ ﯾُﻘﺎل ..
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ﻓﻲ إطﺎر اﺗﻔﺎق ﯾﻘﺿﻲ ﺑﺿﻣﺎن ﺳﯾﺎدة أوﻛراﻧﯾﺎ ﺑﻌد اﻧﮭﯾﺎر اﻻﺗﺣﺎد اﻟﺳوﻓﯾﯾﺗﻲ ﻗﺑِﻠت ﻛﯾﯾف ﻋﺎم 1994ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺧﻠﻲ ﻋن ﺳﻼﺣﮭﺎ اﻟﻧووي ﻟﻔﺎﺋدة روﺳﯾﺎ ﻣن أﺟلﺗﻔﻛﯾﻛﮫ وﺗ ّم ﺗوﻗﯾﻊ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﯾﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺎﺻﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﺟرﯾّﺔ ﺗﺣت ﻋﻧوان"ﻣذ ّﻛرة ﺑوداﺑﺳت ﻟﺿﻣﺎن اﻷﻣن".
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اﻟﺒﻮﺗﻴﻨﻴﺔ" ..اﻟﻘﻴﺼﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة" ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ "اﻟﻬﺎدﺋﺔ" اﻟﱵ ﰷﻧﺖ ﺗ ﳤﺠﻬﺎ روﺳﯿﺎ ﰲ ﻋﻬﺪ ﺑﻮر ﺲ ﯾﻠ ﺴﲔ ّﻞ رﺐ ﻓﻼدﳝﲑ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ اﻟﺮ ﻞ ا ي ﻗﺎل ﯾﻮﻣﺎ ﻣﺎ إن“ ٔﻛﱪ ﰷرﺛﺔ ﺟ ﻮﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻌﴩﻦ ﱔ ﺳﻘﻮط ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﺎﰐ“ ..ﺎء ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﻟﯿﻌﻠﻦ ﺎم 2000ﻋﻦ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺔ ﺎرﺟ ﺔ ﺪﯾﺪة ﺗﻘﻮم ﲆ ﻣ ﺢ ا ٔوﻟﻮﯾّﺔ ﻟﺘﻄﻮﺮ دور روﺳﯿﺎ ﰲ ﺎﱂ ”ﻣ ﻌﺪد ا ٔﻗﻄﺎب“ﻻ ﳜﻀﻊ ﻟﻬﳰﻨﺔ ﻗﻮة ﻋﻈﻤﻰ وا ﺪة ،وﻣﻦ ب ٔوﱃ و ٔﺣﺮى واﳊﺎل ﺗ ٔن ﺗﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﳘﺔ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﺑﺘ ٔﻣﲔ ﺳﯿﻄﺮﲥﺎ ﲆ ﳏﯿﻄﻬﺎ اﳊﯿﻮي ا ي ﲤﺜ ّﻞ ﻓ ﻪ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻧﻘﻄﺔ ﻣﻔﺼﻠﯿﺔ. "ﻓﻼدﳝﲑ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ" ٔو "ﻗ ﴫ روﺳﯿﺎ اﳉﺪﯾﺪ"اﺧ ﺎرﺗﻪ ﳎ اﻟﺘﺎﱘ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ر ﻞ ﺎم 2007 ّﰒ ارﺗ ٔت ﳎ »ﻓﻮر ﺲ« ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻩ اﻟﺮ ﻞ ا ٔﻛﱶ ﺗ ٔﺛﲑا ﰲ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﺎم 2013ﻗ ﻞ ٔن ﳛﻈﻰ ﺑﻮﺳﺎم ا ّﳣﲒ ﻣﻦ ﻗ ﻞ ا ﻠﺲ ا وﱄ ﳊﻘﻮق ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن واﻟﺘﺤﻜﲓ وا راﺳﺎت اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ و ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ ﺎم ،2014وﱂ ﻜﻦ ذ اﻋﺘﺒﺎﻃﺎ ٔو ﻣ ّ ًﺔ ﻣﳯﻢ ﻓﻌﻤﯿﻞ اﻟﲄ ﰊ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﺮز ﺑﻨ َﻔﺴﻪ اﻟﺜﻮري ﲆ ﻣ ﻈﻮﻣﺔ دوﻟﯿﺔ ٓ ﺎدﯾﺔ ﳞﻤﲔ ﻠﳱﺎ اﻟﻘﺮار ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ ،ﻓﲀن ٔن زع واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻫﳰﻨﳤﺎ ﲆ اﻟﴩق ا ٔوﺳﻂ ﻣﻦ ﻼل إدارة ﻻﻓ ﺔ ﻟ ٔ زﻣﺔ اﻟﺴﻮرﯾﺔ ،وﺣﱴ وﳓﻦ ﻧﺘ ّﻊ ﺧﻂ ﺳﲑ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﳼ ﻧﻠﺤﻆ ﺗ ٓﻣﺮ اﻟﻈﺮوف ﻣﻦ ٔ ،ﻓﺎﻟﺮ ﻞ ا ي ﰷن ﺸﻐﻞ ﺧﻄﺔ رﺋ ﺲ وزراء ﯾﻠ ﺴﲔ و ﺪ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ رﺋ ﺴﺎ ﻣﺆﻗّ ﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﺳﺘﻘﺎ ﻣﻔﺎﺟ ﺔ ﳋﻠﯿﻔﺔ ﻏﻮر ﺸﻮف ﯾﻮم ﻏﺮة ﺎﻧﻔﻲ 2000ﻟﯿﺼﻌﺪ ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ ﻓﻼدﳝﲑ ﻓﻼدﳝﲑوﻓ ﺶ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ إﱃ ﺳﺪة ﻋﻦ ﻠﺮوس اﻧﺘ ﺎﺑﻪ ﻟﲑ ٔس دو روﺳﯿﺎ ﲢﺎدﯾﺔ ﻟﻮﻻﯾﺘﲔ اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﻜ ﲑ ﺑﻌﺪ ٔن ّ ﻣ ﺘﺎﻟﯿﺘﲔ ﻗ ﻞ ٔن ُﳚﱪﻩ ا ﺟﺴﺘﻮر اﻟﺮوﳼ ﲆ ﺴ ﺎب اﳌﺆﻗﺖ ﻣﻦ ر ٔس اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ وﺸﻐﻞ ﻣ ﺼﺐ رﺋ ﺲ وزراء ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ اﳌﻨﺘﺨﺐ اﳉﺪﯾﺪ دﳝﯿﱰي ﻣ ﺪﻓ ﺪﯾﻒ ﺎم 2008ﰲ ﻣﺎ اﻋ ُﺘﱪ ﲻﻠﯿﺔ "ﻣﴪ ﺔ" واﲵﺔ Dramatisationﳛﴬ ﻣﻦ ﻼﻟﻬﺎ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﻟﻐﯿﺎب ﻗ ﻞ ٔن ﯾﻌﻮد ﻣﻦ ﺪﯾﺪ رﺋ ﺴﺎ ﻠﺒﻼد ﺎم 2012ﰲ وﻻﯾﺔ ﻟﺜﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻧﺘ ﺎ ت ﻣﺸﻜﻮك ﺑﲋاﻫﳤﺎ ٔ رت ﺪﻻ واﺳﻌﺎ.. 12
ﴯﺼﯿﺔ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ اﳌ ّﳣﺮدة ٔ رت ﻗﻠﻖ اﳌﺴﺆوﻟﲔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﲔ إﱃ در ﺔ ٔ ّن وز ﺮ ا ﻓﺎع رو ﺮت ﻏﯿ ﺲ ٔﺻﺪع ﻟﻘﻮل ا ّٕن "اﻟﻘﺎدة اﻟﺮوس و ﺎﺻﺔ رﺋ ﺲ اﻟﻮزراء اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻓﻼدﳝﲑ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﺮﯾﺪون إﺣ ﺎء اﻻٕﻣﱪاﻃﻮرﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ" ! ،ﻗ ﻞ ٔن ﯾﻘﻮل راك ٔو ﻣﺎ ﺑﻠﻬ ﺔ ﺳﺎﺧﺮة ﲣﻔﻲ ارﺗﺒﺎﰷ ":ﯾﺒﺪو)ﺑﻮﺗﲔ( ﻄﻔﻞ ﲑ ﻣ ﺎل ﳚﻠﺲ ﰲ ٓﺧﺮ اﳊﺠﺮة ا راﺳﯿﺔ" ! .. ﻓﺮ ﻞ روﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﻐﺎﻣﺾ ﺑﺪا ﻟﻐﺰا ﳏﲑا ﲢ ّﺪث ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﯿﱰ ﺑﯿﻜﺮ ﺑﺼﺤﯿﻔﺔ "ﻧﯿﻮﯾﻮرك ﳝﺰ"ﰲ ﻣﻘﺎل ﳛﻤﻞ ﻋﻨﻮان" 3رؤﺳﺎء وﻟﻐﺰ إﲰﻪ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ" !.. ﺷﻚ ٔ ّن ﻣﻼﻣﺢ "اﻟﺒﻮﺗﯿ ﺔ" ٔ ﺬت ﰲ اﻟ ّ وﻻ ّ ﺸﲁ ٕا ﻼﻣ ﺎ وﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺎ ﻣ ﺬ ذ اﳋﻄﺎب اﻟﺸﻬﲑ ا ي ٔﻟﻘﺎﻩ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﰲ ﻣﺆﲤﺮ ﻣ ﻮﻧﯿﺦ ﻟ ٔﻣﻦ ﺎم 2007ﲔ ﻗﺎل : "ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ٓ ﺎدي اﻟﻘﻄﺐ؟ ﲈ ﰷﻧﺖ اﶈﺎوﻻت ﻟﺘﺠﻤﯿﻞ ﻫﺬا اﳌﺼﻄﻠﺢ ،إﻧﻪ ﯾﻌﲏ ﰲ ﳖﺎﯾﺔ اﳌﻄﺎف ﺷ ﺎ وا ﺪا :ﻟ ﺲ ﻫﻨﺎك إﻻ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ وا ﺪ ﻠﺴﻠﻄﺔ وﻠﻘﻮة وﻻﲣﺎذ اﻟﻘﺮارات ،إﻧﻪ ﺎﱂ ﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﻠﯿﻪ ﺳﯿﺪ وا ﺪ" !.. ﻣ ّﻠﺖ ﺗ اﻟﳫﲈت ﲢﻮﻻ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺎ وﻗﻄﯿﻌﺔ "ﻣﳯﺠﯿﺔ" ﻣﻊ ﺧﻄﺎب ﺑﻮﺗ ﲏ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﰷن ﯾﺪور ﺣﻮل اﻟ س اﻟﴩاﻛﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻐﺮب واﻟﺘﻘﺎرب ﻣﻊ ا ٔﻣﺮﲀن وﻻ ّ ﺷﻚ ٔ ّن ا ﰪ اﻟﻐﺮﰊ ا ي ﻟﻘ َﺘﻪ "اﻟﺜﻮرة اﻟﱪﺗﻘﺎﻟﯿﺔ" ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻗﺪ اﺳﻬﻢ ﺸﲁ ﺒﲑ ﰲ ﺗﺒﻠﻮر رؤﯾﺔ ﺑﻮﺗﯿ ﺔ ﻣﻌﺎدﯾﺔ ﻠﲋوع اﻻٕﻣﱪ ﱄ اﻟﻐﺮﰊ وﻻﺳ ّﯿﲈ ذ ا ي ﯾﺘﻮﺛّﺐ ﻟﻼﻗﱰاب ﻣﻦ ﳏﯿﻄﻬﺎ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ ..
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اﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎرات روﺳﻴّﺔ ﺿﺨﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ
ٔ ّﻗﺮ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﺑ ٔ ّن ﺳ رات اﻟﺮوﺳ ّﯿﺔ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻗﺪ ﺑﻠﻐﺖ 33ﻣﻠﯿﺎر دوﻻر ﻼل ﺎم ] 2015إﱃ ﺪ ﺷﻬﺮ ﺟﻮﯾﻠﯿﺔ[ ،ﻛﲈ ٔ ّن ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ د ٔﺑﺖ ﲆ اﺳﺘﻐﻼل ورﻗﺔ اﻟﻐﺎز ﻻﺑﱱاز ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﲔ واﻧﱱاع اﻣ ﯿﺎزات ﻠﺮﺳﺎﻣ ﻞ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ،ﻼوة ﲆ ﻫﺬا وذاك ﳚﺐ ٔﻻ ﻧﻐﻔﻞ ﻋﻦ اﺳﺘﻔﺎدة ﻗ ﺼﺎد اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻣﻦ ﺎﺋﺪات ﺑﯿﻊ اﻟﻐﺎز ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ]رﰬ ا ٔﲦﺎن ا ﻔﻀﺔ اﻟﱵ ﰷﻧﺖ ﲣﺼﻬﺎ ﲠﺎ[واﻋ دﻫﺎ اﻟﻜ ﲑ ﲆ اﻟﺰرا ﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧ ّﯿﺔ ،ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ دور اﳌﻮا ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ اﻟﻜﱪى ﲆ ﻏﺮار ﺳﺒﺎﺳ ﻮل ﰲ ﺗﻌﺰﺰ ا ٔداء اﻟﺘ ﺎري اﻟﺮوﳼ ؛ ﻛﲈ ٔ ّن اﻟﻐﺎز اﻟﺮوﳼ ﯾُﻨﻘﻞ إﱃ ٔورو ﱪ ا ٔراﴈ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ،وﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﻌﲅ ٔ ّن ﯿﯿﻒ ﻣﺪﯾﻨﺔ ﺑﻨﺤﻮ 25ﻣﻠﯿﺎر دوﻻر ﻟﻔﺎﺋﺪة ﻟﺮ ﺎل ا ٔﻋﲈل اﻟﺮوس ﻧﺪرك ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ رﺗﺒﺎط اﻟﺘ ﺎري ﺑﲔ اﻟﺒ ﻦ وﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﻨﯿﻪ ذ ﻣﻦ ﴐورة اﳊﻔﺎظ ﲆ اﻟﺘﺒﻌﯿﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ٔو ﲆ ا ٔﻗﻞ إﺑﻌﺎدﻫﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻔ ا ٔوروﰊ ..
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أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ "ﺧﺎﺻﺮة روﺳﻴﺎ اﻟﺮﺧﻮة" ﯾﺆﻛّﺪ اﳋﱪاء ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﻮن ٔ ّن ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﱔ ﺎﴏة روﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﺮﺧﻮة وﻗﻠﺐ دﻓﺎﻋﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮيْ ، ﻓﻌﱪﻫﺎ اﺟ ﺎح ﺑﻮﻟﯿﻮن ا ٔرض اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ وﻣﳯﺎ اﻧﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﻘﺼﻒ اﻟﻨﺎزي ﲆ ﺳﺘﺎﻟﯿﻨﻐﺮاد ٔﺛﻨﺎء اﳊﺮب اﻟﻌﺎﳌﯿﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﯿﺔ ،ﻓ ﺤﻦ ﲠﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ٔﻣﺎم ﻗﻀﯿﺔ ٔﻣﻦ ﻗﻮﱊ روﳼ ﻣ ﯿﺎز.. ﻓﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻫﺎ دو ٓﺳﯿﻮﯾﺔ ﺟﻐﺮاﻓ ﺎ ﻧﻈﺮا ﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ٔر ع ﻣﻦ ٔراﺿﳱﺎ ﰲ ٓﺳﯿﺎ ﻻ ﯾﺼﻠﻬﺎ ﺑ ٔورو ﺳﻮى ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ اﻟﱵ ﳣﺘّﻊ ﺑﺪورﻫﺎ ﺑﻌﺪد ﻣﻦ ّ اﳌﻤﲒات ،ﻓﻬﻲ ﺸﱰك ﻣﻊ روﺳﯿﺎ ﲝﺪود ﺗﺼﻞ إﱃ 1576ﰼ ﻛﲈ ﲢﺪّﻫﺎ ﻏﺮ ﰻ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻮﻟﻮﻧﯿﺎ وﺳﻠﻮﻓﺎ ﯿﺎ وا ﺮ وروﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﺒﯿﻀﺎء وﻣﻮ اﻓ ﺎ وروﻣﺎﻧﯿﺎ ،ﻛﺬ ﱔ ﺗﻄﻞ ﲆ اﻟﺒﺤﺮ ا ٔﺳﻮد اﳌﻤﺮ اﳌﺎﰄ اﻟﻮﺣ ﺪ ا ي ﺮﺑﻂ اﻟﺮوس ﻟﻘﺎرة اﻟﻌﺠﻮز ﱪ روﻣﺎﻧﯿﺎ وﺑﻠﻐﺎر .. ﻻﻃﺎﳌﺎ ﲢ ّﺪث اﳉﯿﻮﺑﻮﻟﯿ ﻜ ﻮن ﻋﻦ ٔﳘﯿﺔ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ روﺳﯿﺎ ،ﯾﻘﻮل ا ﻛﺘﻮر ﺎﰟ ﺳﻠﻄﺎن ...":رﻛﺰ ﻋﯿ ﻚ ﲆ ﺑﻮﻟﻨﺪا و ّاﲡﻪ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﺒﯿﻀﺎء ،ﺳﺘ ﺪ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺗﻘﱰب ﻣﻦ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ)ﻣﺴﺎر اﳉ ﺶ اﻟﻨﺎزي ﻠﺴﯿﻄﺮة ﲆ روﺳﯿﺎ و ﲆ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ(وﲢﺖ روﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﺒﯿﻀﺎء ﺳﺘ ﺪ ﻧﻘﻄﺔ ﰲ ﺎﯾﺔ ا ٔﳘﯿﺔ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ وﱔ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ! ".. 4 ودو ﻣ ﻞ روﺳﯿﺎ ﺑﻌﻤﻘﻬﺎ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ اﻟﻜ ﲑ)1 ،17ﻣﻠﯿﻮن ﰼ (2ﲢﺘﺎج إﱃ ﺗ ٔﻣﲔ ﺪودﻫﺎ ول اﳌﺘﺎﲬﺔ ﳊﺪودﻫﺎ ،ﳁﺎ ﯾﺒﺪو ﺰو ﺎ روﺳﯿﺎ إﻣﱪ ﻟﯿﺎ ﻫﻮ ﰲ ﺣﻘ ﻘ ﻪ ﺳﻌﻲ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة إﱃ ﳏﺎﴏﲥﺎ ﻻٕﺿﻌﺎﻓﻬﺎ ﲤﻬﯿﺪا ﻟﺘﻘﺴ ﳰﻬﺎ ﰲ اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ دﻓﺎﻋﯿﺔ ﺮاﻋﻲ َ ]ﳊﻈﺔ رﳜﯿﺔ ﻣﺎ[ ﺳﺘﻐﻼل اﻣ ﺪادﻫﺎ اﳉﻐﺮاﰲ وﻫﺸﺎﺷﺔ اﻗ ﺼﺎدﻫﺎ وﺗﻨﻮﻋﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﺮﰶ وا ﯾﲏ ،و ﻟﺘﺎﱄ ﺿﲈن اﻟﺴﯿﻄﺮة ﲆ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ا ٔوراﺳﯿﺎ اﻧﻄﻼﻗﺎ ﻣﻦ روﺳﯿﺎ ا و اﻟﱵ ﺴ ّﻤﳱﺎ "ﻧﯿﻜﻮﻻ ﺳ ﻜﲈن" 5اﻟﻘﻠﺐ اﻟﻘﺎري"ا ي ّ ﺸﲁ ﻇﻬﲑا ﳌﺎ ﺳﲈﻩ "ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ رﺗﻄﺎم" ) (Crush zoneاﻟﱵ ﺳ ﺸﻬﺪ اﻟﴫاع اﻟﻜ ﲑ ﲆ اﻟﱶوات واﳌﻤﺮات اﳌﺎﺋﯿﺔ ﰲ " ٔرض 4
ﺟﺎﺳﻢ ﺳﻠﻄﺎن ﻓﻲ"ﺟﯿﻮﺑﻮﻟﯿﺘﯿﻚ:ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺗﺘﺤﺪث اﻟﺠﻐﺮاﻓﯿﺎ"5 ّ -ﺻﺣﻔﻲ وﺟﺎﻣﻌﻲ أﻣرﯾﻛﻲ ]ت [1943ﯾُﻌ ّد أﺣد أھ ّم ﻣؤﺳﺳﻲ "اﻟﺟﯾوﺑوﻟﯾﺗﯾك"وأﺑرز ﻣﻧظرﯾﮫ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘرن اﻟﻌﺷرﯾن.
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اﳌﺘﻜﻮﻧﺔ ﻣﻦ ٔورو ودول اﳋﻠﯿﺞ اﻟﻌﺮﰊ و ٓﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ وﺟ ﻮب اﳊﺎﻓﺔ" )ّ (Rim Land ﴍق ٓﺳﯿﺎ ...؛ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﳉﯿﻮﺑﻮﻟﯿ ﲄ ﺷﺪﯾﺪ ا ٔﳘﯿﺔ ُﳛﺪّد ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ اﳋﺎرﺟ ﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ وﻻﺳ ﰲ ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ ا ٕﻻﻗﻠﳰﻲ ،ﻓﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ﯾُﻨﻈﺮ ٕا ﳱﺎ ﺗﻘﻠﯿﺪ ﻛﻘﻠﺐ ﻠﻌﺎﱂ ﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔي ﻗﻮة ٔن ﲢﲂ اﻟﺴﯿﻄﺮة ﲆ ا ٔرض دوﻧﻪ ،ﯾﻘﻮل ﺧ ﲑ اﳉﯿﻮﺑﻮﻟﯿ ﲀ اﻟﱪﯾﻄﺎﱐ" ﻣﺎ ﯿﻨﺪر": "6 ﻣﻦ ﳛﲂ ﴍق ٔورو ﳞﳰﻦ ﲆ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻘﻠﺐ ،وﻣﻦ ﳛﲂ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻘﻠﺐ ﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﲆ ﺑﻘﻲ ٔن اﳉﺰﺮة اﻟﻌﺎﳌﯿﺔ )ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ٔوراﺳﯿﺎ( وﻣﻦ ﳛﲂ اﳉﺰﺮة اﻟﻌﺎﳌﯿﺔ ﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﲆ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﳇﻪ"َ .. ٔﻗﻮل ﻟﲂ ا ّٕن ﻫﺬا اﻟ م ﻗ ﻞ ﻣ ﺬ ﺎم 1904ﰲ اﶺﻌﯿﺔ اﳉﻐﺮاﻓ ﺔ اﳌﻠﻜ ﺔ ﺑﻠﻨﺪن ﰲ ﺳﯿﺎق ﻋﺮض اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ اﳌﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ ٔو ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻘﻠﺐ ""Heartland Theoryاﻟﱵ ا ﱱﻟﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﻤﻼق "ﻣﺎ ﯿﻨﺪر"إﱃ ﺛﻼث ﻧﻘﺎط ﺷﻬﲑة: _ ﻣﻦ ﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﲆ ﴍق ٔورو ﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﲆ ﻗﻠﺐ اﳉﺰﺮة اﻟﻌﺎﳌﯿﺔ "اﻟﻬﺎرﺗﻼﻧﺪ". _ وﻣﻦ ﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﲆ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻘﻠﺐ ﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﲆ اﳉﺰﺮة اﻟﻌﺎﳌﯿﺔ. _ وﻣﻦ ﺴﯿﻄﺮ ﲆ اﳉﺰﺮة اﻟﻌﺎﳌﯿﺔ ّ ﯾﺘﺤﲂ ﰲ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ. ﺑﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﳊﺎل ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺮؤﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ا ﻓﺎﻋ ّﯿﺔ ُ اﻟﳫ ّﯿﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻌﲏ ﻏﯿﺎب ﰻ ﻣﻘﺎرﺑﺔ ﻠﻌﺐ دور دوﱄ ﻓﺎ ﻞ وٕان ﰷﻧﺖ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻘﺎرﺑﺔ ﺗﻄﻐﻰ ﻠﳱﺎ ﻫﻮاﺟﺲ ا ﻓﺎع ٔﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ ﺧ ﺎﻻت اﻟﻬﳰﻨﺔ ﲆ ﻋﻜﺲ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ،ﻃﻤﻮح اﻟﻘﻮة ﻫﺬا ﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﯾﺘﺤﻘّﻖ دون ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ، ﻫﺬا ﻣﺎ اﺗ ّﻔﻖ ﻠﯿﻪ ﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﳋﱪاء ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﲔ ،إذ ﯾﺆﻛّﺪ ﺮﳚ ﺴﲄ ٔ ّن روﺳ ﺎ ﺑﻌﯿﺪة ﻋﻦ ٔورو ودون ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻟ ﺴﺖ اﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ دو ٓﺳﯿﻮﯾﺔ ]دو ٔﻛﱶ " ٓﺳﯿﻮﯾّﺔ" ٔو " ٓﺳ ﺔ"[ ﻟﻜﻦ ﰲ ﺻﻮرة ارﺗﺒﺎط ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﲠﺎ ﻓﺴﺘﻜﻮن "ﻗﻮة إﻣﱪ ﻟﯿﺔ ﻋﻈﻤﻰ" ، وﻗﺪ ﺳﺒﻖ ٔن ّﺬر ا ٔﻣﲔ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﺸﯿﻮﻋﻲ ﺟ ﻨﺎدي زﯾﻐﺎﻧﻮف اﺛﻨﺎء اﳌﺆﲤﺮ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻠﺤﺰب اﳌﻨﻌﻘﺪ ﰲ روﺳﯿﺎ ﲢﺎدﯾّﺔ ﻣﻦ ا ﻄﻄﺎت اﻟﻐﺮﺑﯿﺔ ﻣﱪ ﻟﯿﺔ ﻻٕﺿﻌﺎف روﺳﯿﺎ ﻣﺮ ﻠﯿﺎ ﻣﺸﲑا إﱃ ٔ ّن اﳌﺆاﻣﺮة ﺑﺪ ٔت ﻣ ﺬ ﳊﻈﺔ ﺗﻔﻜ ﻚ ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﺎﰐ ،ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘ ﺬ ﺮ -6
ھﺎﻟﻔورد ﺟون ﻣﺎﻛﯾﻧدر ) ]( MaCkIndeRت [1947ھو أول ﻣن ﺷﻐل وظﯾﻔﺔ أﺳﺗﺎذ ﺟﻐراﻓﯾﺎ ﺑﺄﻛﺳﻔورد ،وھو ﺻﺎﺣب ﻧظرﯾﺔ:ﻗﻠب
اﻷرض HeaRtlandاﻟﺷﮭﯾرة اﻟﺗﻲ ﻣﺎزاﻟت ﺗﻠﮭم ﺑﺎﺣﺛﻲ اﻟﺟﯾوﺑوﻟﯾﺗﯾﻛﺎ إﻟﻰ اﻵن..
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ﯾﻌﻄﯿﻨﺎ ﻓﻜﺮة ]ﻣﺎ[ﻋﻦ اﻟﺘﻮ ّﺟﺲ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻮا اﻟﻐﺮﺑ ّﯿﺔ ﺎﺻﺔ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﯾﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ا ٔﻣﺮ ﺑﺒ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﲟﺎ ّ ﺸﳫﻪ ﻣﻦ ﲻﻖ اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ روﳼ ﰲ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ٔوراﺳﯿﺎ و ﱔ ﲤﺜ ّﻞ ﻫﺪﻓﺎ ﻣ ﺎﻟﯿﺎ ﻠﻐﺮب ﻟﻌﺮﻗ ٔي ﺻﻌﻮد ﳏﳣﻞ ب اﻟﺮوﳼ.. وﻟﻬﺬا ﻋﺘﺒﺎرات اﳉﻐﺮاﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﺗﺒﺪي ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﺸ ّ ﺎ ﻗﻮ ﻻٕﺑﻘﺎء ﲆ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺎرج اﻟﻔ اﻟﻐﺮﰊ ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﺳﲈﻩ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ "اﻟﺘﺤﲂ اﻟﺴﻠﱯ" اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺮﻏﺐ ﰲ إﺣﲀم اﻟﺴﯿﻄﺮة ﲆ اﻟﻄﺮف ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﺑﻘﺪر ﻣﺎ ﺮﯾﺪ ﲢﯿﯿﺪﻩ و"وﺿﻌﻪ ﺑﲔ ﻗﻮﺳﲔ" !..
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ﳕﻮذج ﺳ ﻜﲈن
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ﺗﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺜﺮوة ﻓﻲ ﺷﺮق أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ ﻟ ﺲ ﻫﻨﺎك "ﲢﺮﯾﻒ ٔو ﻣ ﺎﺟﺮة ﴩف اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ"ﰲ اﻟﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﻌﻘﻞ ﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﲔ اﳌﻮاﻟﲔ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻤﻮد اﻟﻔﻘﺮي ﻟﻼﻗ ﺼﺎد ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ إذ ﺗﻨ ﴩ ﻓ ﻪ ﻣﺼﺎﻧﻊ اﻟﺼﻠﺐ واﻟﻔﻮﻻذ واﻟﺴﯿﺎرات ، ...ﳁﻨﺎﰖ اﻟﻔﺤﻢ اﳊﺠﺮي ﰲ دوﻧﺒﺎس ﻣ ﻼ ﺗﺆ ّﻣﻦ ﺣﻮاﱄ 40 ﳌﺌﺔ ﻣﻦ إﻧﺘﺎج اﻟﻜﻬﺮ ء ﰲ اﻟﺒﻼد ،ﻛﲈ ﯾﻮ ﺪ ﰲ دوﻧ ﺴﻚ ٔوﺑﻼﺳﺖ ]وﻻﯾﺔ دوﻧ ﺴﻚ[ وﱔ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ دوﻧﺒﺎس ﳓﻮ 13ﻣ ﺠﲈ رﺋ ﺴﯿﺎ ﻠﻔﺤﻢ و 10ﻣﺼﺎﻧﻊ ﻠﺼﻨﺎ ﺎت اﳊﺪﯾﺪﯾﺔ، و ٔ ﻠﺐ اﳌﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ ﰲ اﻻٕﻗﻠﲓ ﱔ ﲆ ﻣ اﳌﻠﯿﺎرد ﺮ رﯾﻨﺎت ٔﲬﯿﺘﻮف.. ﻛﲈ ّ ﺸﲁ اﻧﻀﲈم ﺷﺒﻪ ﺟﺰﺮة اﻟﻘﺮم ﺳ ﺎ إﺿﺎﻓ ﺎ ﳣﺴﻚ اﻟﺮوس و ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ إذ ا ّٕن ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﻄﻰ اﻟﻄﺎرئ ﯾﻔﺎﰴ ا ٔﻋﺒﺎء اﳌﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﲆ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ .. وﰲ ﺳﯿﺎق ﻣ ﺼﻞ ﲡﺪر اﻻٕﺷﺎرة إﱃ ٔ ّن ﺟﺰءا ﺒﲑ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ اﳊﺮﺑﯿﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﯾ ّﱲ ﲆ ٔرض ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ اﻟﴩﻗ ﺔ اﻟﱵ ُﺮاد ﻟﻬﺎ ٔن ﲢﻤﻞ ﻋﺐء ﺮ ﻣﺞ ﲢﺪﯾﺚ اﳉ ﺶ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﰲ اﻟﻔﱰة اﻟﻔﺎﺻ ﺑﲔ 2011و 2020ﲟﺎ ﺴﺘﺪﻋﯿﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻄﻮﺮ ﻟ ٕﻼﻧﺘﺎج اﳊﺮﰊ .. ﻫﺬﻩ اﳋﺼﻮﺻﯿﺔ ﻗ ﺼﺎدﯾﺔ ﻟ ٔﻗﺎﻟﲓ اﻟﴩﻗ ﺔ ّﺗﱪر إﱃ ّﺪ ﺑﻌﯿﺪ ﺸ ّﺚ اﻟﺮوس ﺑ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ واﺳ ﳤﻢ ﰲ رﻓﺾ "ﻏﺮﺑ ﳤﺎ" وﲻﻠﻬﻢ )ﰲ ٔﺳﻮ ٔ ا ٔﺣﻮال( ﲆ ﻜﺮﺲ اﻧﻔﺼﺎل اﻟﴩق ﲨﻬﻮرﯾﱵ دوﻧﯿ ﺴﻚ وﻟﻮ ﺎﺴﻚ اﻟﻐﲏ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﲳﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧ ّﯿﺔ ،وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺪ ٔ ﯾﺘﺤﻘﻖ ٕ ﻼن ْ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﯿ ﲔ ﺎم 2014ﻣﻦ ﺎﻧﺐ وا ﺪ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻋ د ٓﻟﯿﺔ ﺳﺘﻔ ﺎء وﺑﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﳊﺎل ا ﱰﻓﺖ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻓﻮرا ﺳﺘﻘﻼل ا ٕﻻﻗﻠﳰﲔ ﻋﻦ اﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﳌﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ ﰲ ﯿﯿﻒ ،واﳔﺮﻃﺖ ﰲ دﰪ اﳌﳣﺮد ﻦ ا ﻦ ﺴﻤﳱﻢ اﻟﻐﺮب "اﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﲔ" ﳌﺎل واﻟﺴﻼح وا ﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳ ّﯿﺔ وﺣﱴ ﳌﻘﺎﺗﻠﲔ رﰬ اﻟﻨﻔﻲ اﻟﺮﲰﻲ اﻟﺮوﳼ إذ ا ّٕن ﺷﻮاﻫﺪ ﻛﺜﲑة ﺗﺪل ﲆ اﳔﺮاط ﻋﺴﻜﺮي ﻣ ﺎﴍ ﻣﻦ ذ ﻣ ﻼ ﻣﺎ ٔوردﻩ اﳌﻮﻗﻊ ﺧ ﺎري اﻟﺮوﳼ " ﺎزﯾﺘﺎ" ﯾﻮم 12ﺟﻮﯾﻠﯿﺔ 2015ﲔ ﲢﺪّث ﻋﻦ ﻓﺮار ﻋﴩات اﳉﻨﻮد اﻟﺮوس ﺧﻮﻓ ًﺎ ﻣﻦ إرﺳﺎﳍﻢ ﻠﻘ ﺎل ﰲ ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ. 19
ﯾﻌﻮل ﲆ ﺎﺋﺪات اﻟﻐﺎز واﻟﻨﻔﻂ واﻟﺴﻼح ﻧﻔﻬﻢ ﺎ ﺔ وﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﻌﲅ ٔ ّن ﻗ ﺼﺎد اﻟﺮوﳼ ّ اﻟﺮوس إﱃ اﻟﴩق ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﺑﱶواﺗﻪ اﻟﻬﺎﺋ وﺑﻨ ﻪ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ اﳌﻬ ّﻤﺔ .. و ﻼوة ﲆ ﻫﺬا وذاك ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﺘﺪا ﻞ اﳊﺪودي ﺑﲔ اﻟﴩق ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ وروﺳﯿﺎ ﳚﻌﻞ ا ٔ ﲑة ﺗﺬود ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﱪ اﺳﺘﻘﻄﺎب اﳉﻮار ،ﲿﺪود ا و وﻓﻘﺎ ﻠﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﻀﻮﯾّﺔ ﱔ ﻫﺎ واﳉ ﻫﻮ ٔﻛﱶ ٔﺟﺰاء اﳉﺴﺪ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﻟ ٔﺧﻄﺎر اﳋﺎرﺟ ﺔ ..
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ٔﱒ ﻣﺪن ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ 21
اﻟﺘﻮﺟّﺲ اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻮﺳّﻊ اﻷوروﺑﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻓ ﺌﺖ روﺳﯿﺎ ﺗﻌﺎرض اﻧﻀﲈم ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻟﻼﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ و ﺮﻓﺾ ُﻣﺨﺮ ﺎت ﳃّﺔ ﻮﳯﺎﻏﻦ ) (2002اﻟﱵ ﻗﺮرت ﺗﻮﺳﯿﻌﻪ ﴍﻗﺎ ﻓﲀن ٔن اﻧﻀ ّﻤﺖ إﱃ ﲢﺎد 08دول ﻣﻦ ٔورو اﻟﴩﻗ ﺔ ُدﻓﻌﺔ وا ﺪة ﺎم 2004وﱔ ﺑﻮﻟﻨﺪا واﻟ ﺸﯿﻚ وا ﺮ وﺳﻠﻮﻓﺎ ﯿﺎ وﺳﻠﻮﻓ ﻨﯿﺎ وﻟﯿﺘﻮاﻧﯿﺎ وﻻﺗﻔ ﺎ وٕاﺳﺘﻮﻧﯿﺎ ﻗ ﻞ ٔن ﺗﻠﺘﺤﻖ ّ ﰻ ﻣﻦ روﻣﺎﻧﯿﺎ وﺑﻠﻐﺎر ) (2007وﺮواﺗﯿﺎ ) (2013وٕاذا ﰥ ﻓ ﻠﻨﺪا ﻣ ﺬ ﺎم 1995ﻓﻬﻤﻨﺎ ﻣﻐﺰى ا ﺎوف اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻇﻤﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻗﱰاب اﺳﺘﺤﴬ ّ اﻟﺘﻜ ﻞ ا ٔوروﰊ ﻣﻦ ﺪودﻫﺎ ،وﱔ ﻫﻮاﺟﺲ اﻗ ﺼﺎدﯾﺔ ٔﺳﺎس ﺗﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ﲝﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺒﻀﺎﺋﻊ وا ٔﺳﻮاق ،دون ٔن ﻧﺬﻫﻞ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺴﺎﻋﻲ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ اﻟﻬﺎدﻓﺔ إﱃ ا ٕﻻ ﺎز ﲆ ٔ ّي ﻃﻤﻮح ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻲ ﳏﳣﻞ ﲢﺖ ﻋﻨﻮان ا ٔﻣﻦ وا ﻓﺎع اﳌﺸﱰك و ﲑﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻼﺣ ﺎت ا ﻠﺲ روﳼ ّ ا ٔوروﰊ .. و ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﲟﺎ ﲢﻈﻰ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻣ ﯿﺎز اﳌﻮﻗﻊ واﻟﱶوة ﱔ ﻣ ﺎر ﻠﻤﻄﺎﻣﻊ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ ﻛﲈ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ رﰬ ا ﳣﻠﻤﻞ ا ٔوروﰊ ]ا ي ﺳﻨﻌﻮد إﻟﯿﻪ ﰲ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب[ ،ﻓﻬﻲ ﳑﺮ ﻠﻐﺎز اﻟﺮوﳼ ﳓﻮ ٔورو وﻣﺴﺘﻮدع ﺒﲑ ﻠﻐﺬاء ﺑﻔﻀﻞ ﺮﺑﺔ ﺧﺼﺒﺔ ﺟﻌﻠﺖ اﻟﻨﺎزﯾﲔ ﯾﻮﻣﺎ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﻤﺪون إﱃ ﻧﻘﻞ ﳾء ﻣﳯﺎ إﱃ ٔﳌﺎﻧﯿﺎ ،وﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ ﻫﺬا وذاك ﯾﻨﺎم ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﻮن ﲆ ﺮوات ﻃﻨﯿﺔ ﺒﲑة ،وﰷﻧﺖ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻗﺪ درت ﺑﻌﺪ ﻋﺰل اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ اﳌﻮاﱄ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ﻧﻮﻮﻓ ﺶ إﱃ ﺗﻮﻗ ﻊ اﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ﴍاﻛﺔ ﻣﻊ ﲢﺎد ا ٔورﰊ ﺎم 2014ﻟﺘﻠﺤﻖ ﺮﺐ ﰻ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻮ اﻓ ﺎ وﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ ﰲ ا ﻫﺎب ﳓﻮ إرﺳﺎء ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﲡﺎرة ﺣﺮة ﯾﺘﺤﺮك ﻓﳱﺎ اﳌﻨﺘﺞ ا ٔوروﰊ ﲝﺮﯾﺔ ﺗﻨﺎزع اﳌﺼﺎﱀ اﻟﺘ ﺎرﯾﺔ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﱵ ﲢﺎول ﺗﻮﺳﯿﻊ ﲢﺎد اﶺﺮﰾ ا ٔوراﳼ ﺎﲠﺔ اﳌﺪ ا ٔوروﰊ ﻓﲀن ٔن ﳒﺤﺖ ﰲ اﺳ ٔرﻣ ﻨﯿﺎ وروﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﺒﯿﻀﺎء )ﺑﯿﻼروﺳﯿﺎ( ﺑﻌﺪ اﺳﺘﻘﻄﺎب ﰷزاﺧﺴﺘﺎن ،دون ﺗﻠﻐﻲ ﲤﺎﻣﺎ ﺧﻄﺮ اﺳﺘﺪراج ﯿﯿﻒ إﱃ ﻋﻀﻮﯾﺔ ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﲟﺎ ّ ﺸﳫﻪ ذ ﻣﻦ ٔن َ 22
"ﻣﺸﳫﺔ" ﺟ ﻮﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﺣﻘ ﻘ ﺔ ﺗﻮا ﻪ اﻟﻜ ﺎن ﻗ ﺼﺎدي اﻟﺮوﳼ ا ي ﲀﺑﺪ ﻠﺤﻔﺎظ ﲆ ﯾﺘﺠﺰ ٔ ﻣ ﻪ إذ ﺮﺗﺒﻂ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﳎﺎ اﳊﯿﻮي اﻟ ﺳﯿﲄ ا ي ﲤﺜ ّﻞ ﻓ ﻪ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺟﺰءا ﻻ ّ ﲟﺼﺎﱀ ﲡﺎرﯾﺔ ﻣﻔﺼﻠﯿﺔ ﻣﻊ اﳉﺎر ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ وﻻﺳ ﰲ ﻗﻄﺎ ﺎت اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺎت اﻟﺜﻘ ﰷﻟﻄﲑان... ورﰬ ٔﻋﺮاض اﳋﺼﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮة ﺑﲔ روﺳﯿﺎ و ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﺮوس ﺮﺗﺒﻄﻮن ﺑﻌﻼﻗﺎت " ﺎﺻﺔ"ﻣﻊ ﰻ ﻣﻦ ﺮﯾﻄﺎﻧﯿﺎ و ٔﳌﺎﻧﯿﺎ وﻓﺮﺴﺎ ﰲ ﳏﺎو ﻟﺘﺨﻔ ﻒ در ﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﯿﻌﺔ ﺑ ﳯﻢ وﺑﲔ دول ٔوررو اﻟﴩﻗ ﺔ وﲨﻬﻮر ت ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ "اﳌﺘ ٔرﺑﻨﺔ" وﺗﻘﻠﯿﺺ اﻟﺘﻮﺳﻊ ﴍﻗﺎ ﺪّة اﻟﺘ ﺎذب ﻗ ﺼﺎدي اﳊﺎد ا ي ﯾﻄﻔﻮ ﲆ اﻟﺴﻄﺢ ﳇّﲈ ّ ﻋﻦ ﻟ ٔروﺑﯿﲔ ّ .. ﺻﻔﻮة اﻟﻘﻮل؛ ﻣﺎ ﺮاﻩ ﲡﺎﻩ اﻟﻐﺎﻟﺐ ﰲ ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﻣﻦ ﻣﲀﺳﺐ ٔﻣ ﯿﺔ واﻗ ﺼﺎدﯾﺔ ﯾﻮﻓّﺮﻫﺎ اﻟﺘﻮﺳﻊ ﳓﻮ اﻟﴩق ﺮاﻩ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﲥﺪﯾﺪا ﻟﻼﺳﺘﻘﺮار ،وﻻ ّ ﺷﻚ ٔ ّن ا ٔﻣﺮ ﯾﺘ ﺎوز ﺪود ﺧ ﻼف ﰲ اﻟﺮ ٔي ﲔ ﯾﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ﺑ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ،ﻓﻬﺬﻩ ا و ﲟﻨﻄﻖ اﻟﺘﺎرﱗ واﳉﯿﻮﺑﻮﻟﯿ ﻚ ﻗﻄﻌﺔ ﻣﻦ روﺳﯿﺎ .. وﰲ ﺳﯿﺎق اﻟﺴﻌﻲ ا ٔوروﰊ إﱃ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ اﺳ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ وﻗّﻊ ّﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ اﺗﻔﺎق ﴍاﻛﺔ ﻣﻊ ﯿﯿﻒ ﺎم 2014وذ ﺸﻘّ ﻪ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﳼ و ﻗ ﺼﺎدي ،وﻣﻦ اﳌﻔﺎرﻗﺎت ٔ ّن اﺳﺘﻜﲈل إﺟﺮاءات اﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﰲ ﺎﻧﺒﻪ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﳼ ﰲ ﻣﺎر س 2014وا ي ﺴ ّﺐ ﰲ ﻋﺰل " ﻧﻮﻮﻓ ﺶ" ٕا ﺮ ﺣﺮاك ﺷﻌﱯ ﺑﻌﺪ رﻓﺾ إﻣﻀﺎﺋﻪ ﰲ ﻧﻮﳁﱪ 2013ﺰاﻣﻦ وﻣﺼﺎدﻗﺔ اﻟﱪﳌﺎن ﰥ اﻟﻘﺮم !.. اﻟﺮوﳼ ﲆ ﻗﺮار ّ وﻣﺎ ﺰﰩ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﺣﻘ ﻘ ًﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﻘﺎرب ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ا ٔوروﰊ ﻫﻮ ﺗﺒﻌﺎﺗﻪ ﻗ ﺼﺎدﯾﺔ اﻟﺼﻌﺒﺔ ﻠﳱﺎ اﻟﱵ ٔﻃﻠّﺖ ﺮ ٔﺳﻬﺎ ﻣ ﺬ ﺟ ع ا ٔول ﻠﺠﻨﺔ اﻟﴩاﻛﺔ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ –ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ﺣ ﺚ ّﰎ اﻟﺘﻠﻮﱖ ﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎل إﱃ ﻣ ﻈﻮﻣﺔ ﲡﺎرة ﺣﺮة ﲝﻠﻮل ﺎم ، 2016ﲟﺎ ﺳﯿ ﺴ ّﺐ ﰲ إﻏﺮاق اﻟﺴﻮق اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﻟﺒﻀﺎ ﺔ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ ،وﻫﻮ ٔﻣﺮ ﺮاﻩ اﻟﺮوس ﺪدا ﺪ ﻟﺘﻮازن اﻗ ﺼﺎد ﺑﻼدﱒ اﻟﱵ د ٔﺑﺖ ﲆ ﻣ ﺢ ﻣ ﺘ ﺎت ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﲒة ﺗﻔﺎﺿﻠﯿﺔ ﰲ ٔﺳﻮاﻗﻬﺎ ﱪ إﻋﻔﺎﲛﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺮﺳﻮم ا ﯾﻮاﻧ ّﯿﺔ ..
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وﱂ ﻜ ﻒ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﻮن ﻜ ﯿﻒ ﺑﻞ ﲻﺪوا إﱃ ﲤﺘﲔ رواﺑﻄﻬﻢ ﲁ ﻣﻦ ﺗ ﻠ ﴘ )ﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ( وﻛ ﺸ ﺎو )ﻣﻮ وﻓﺎ( ﰲ اﺗﻔﺎق ﴍاﻛﺔ ﳑﺎﺛﻞ ﲟﺎ ﯾﻌ ّﺒﺪ اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻖ ﻟﻌﻀﻮﯾﺔ ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ ﰷﻣ ﶺﻬﻮرﯾﺘﲔ ﻣﻦ ﲨﻬﻮر ت ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ .. وﰲ ﳏﺎو ﻠﺘﺨﻔ ﻒ ﻣﻦ وﻃ ٔة اﻟﺘﺤﺮك ا ٔوروﰊ اﳌﻘﻠﻖ ﰲ ﳎﺎﻟﻬﺎ اﳊﯿﻮي ﲻﺪت ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﰲ ﻧﻮﳁﱪ 2014إﱃ ﻋﻘﺪ اﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ﻠﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي واﻟﺘﻘﲏ ﻣﻊ ﰷزاﺧﺴﺘﺎن ﺴﺘﻐﺮق 5 ﺳﻨﻮات ُﲡﺪّد ٓﻟﯿﺎ 5ﺳﻨﻮات ٔﺧﺮى ،ﰲ ﺧﻄﻮة ﺷ ﳱﺔ ﺑﺘ اﻟﱵ ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﲠﺎ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻣﻊ ﰻ ﻣﻦ إرﻣ ﻨﯿﺎ وﺑﻼروﺳﯿﺎ.. ﲿﲅ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﰲ ﺸﻜ ﻞ اﲢﺎد اﻗ ﺼﺎدي ﻗﻮي ﺑﲔ ﲨﻬﻮر ت ﲢﺎدى اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ٓ ﺬ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺒﺪّد ﺴ ﺐ ﺳﻘﻮط ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ذات ال 46ﻣﻠﯿﻮن ﺴﻤﺔ واﻟﱶوات اﻟﻬﺎﺋ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﺎد اﻟﺘﻜ ّﻠﯿﺔ ..
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اﻟﺘﻮﺟّﺲ اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻮﺳّﻊ اﻷﻃﻠﺴﻲ
رﰬ وﺟﻮد ﺗ ﺴﯿﻖ ﻣﺸﱰك ﲆ ٔﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻌﯿﺪ وﻻﺳ ﰲ اﳌﺴﺎرات اﳌﺮﺗﺒﻄﺔ ﲟﻘﺎوﻣﺔ 7 ﯾﺘﻮﺳﻊ وﻫﻮ "اﻻٕرﻫﺎب" اﻟﻌﺎ ﺮ ﻠ ﺪود ﻓﺎ ّٕن روﺳﯿﺎ ﻻ ﺮﯾﺪ ٔن ﺮى ﻠﻒ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ّ ﰥ دوﯾﻼت ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﺎﰐ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ،ﲱﯿﺢ ٔ ّن اﻟﱪﳌﺎن وﯾﻄﺎل ﳎﺎﻟﻬﺎ اﳊﯿﻮي ﻣﻦ ﻼل ّ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ-اﻟﺮادا -ﻗﺪ ٔ ّﻗﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮ ﳝﻨﻊ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻀﲈم إﱃ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ وﯾﺆﻛّﺪ اﻟﱱا ﺎ ﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ ﻟﻜﻦ اﻧﻘﻼ ﲆ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﯾﺒﻘﻰ ﺎ ﺰا ﻣﱴ ر ٔت ﯿﯿﻒ ﻓﺎﺋﺪة ﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺪم ﳓﯿﺎز ّ ذ .. ﻓ ﻌﺪ اﻧﻀﲈم ﰻ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻠﻮﻓ ﻨﯿﺎ وﺳﻠﻮﻓﺎ ﯿﺎ وﺑﻠﻐﺎر وروﻣﺎﻧﯿﺎ ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ دول اﻟﺒﻠﻄﯿﻖ ] ٕاﺳﺘﻮﻧﯿﺎ،ﻟﯿﺘﻮاﻧﯿﺎ،ﻻﺗﻔ ﺎ[ إﱃ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﺎم 2004ﺻﺎرت اﻟﻬﻮاﺟﺲ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﻣﻦ ا ﳣﺪد ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺔ ﲆ ﻣﻌﻄﯿﺎت واﻗﻌﯿﺔ ﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺔ " ﺣ ﻮاء اﳌﺘﻘﺪّم" اﻟﱵ ﺗ ﳤﺠﻬﺎ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة و ﻠﻔﺎؤﻫﺎ اﻟﱵ ﺑﺪ ٔت ﺑﻌﺪ اﳖﯿﺎر ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ ﺑﻨﺤﻮ 8ﺳﻨﻮات ﻓﻘﻂ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ّﰎ اﺳ ﺸﯿﻜ ﺎ وﺑﻮﻟﻮﻧﯿﺎ وا ﺮ ا ٔﻋﻀﺎء اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﲔ ﰲ ﻠﻒ وارﺳﻮ إﱃ ا ا ﺮة ا ٔﻃﻠﺴﯿﺔ ﺎم .. 1999 وﰲ ﻗﺮاءة اﺳ ﴩاﻓ ﺔ ﳌ ٓﻻت ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺔ "اﻟﺒﺎب اﳌﻔ ﻮح" اﻟﱵ ﯾ ﳤﺠﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ زﯾ ﻐﻨﯿﻮ ﺮﳚ ﺴﲄ 8ﰲ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﻪ":رﻗﻌﺔ اﻟﺸﻄﺮﱋ اﻟﻀﺨﻤﺔ")ّ ٔ (1999ن اﻟﴫاع اﳉﯿﻮﺳﯿﺎﳼ ا ي ﺳ ﺸﻬﺪﻩ ٔورو ﻣﺴﺘﻘ ﻼ ﺳﯿﺪور ﰲ ﺗ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ ا ٔوراﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺳﲈﻫﺎ "رﻗﻌﺔ ﺳﺳت ﻋﺎم 1949ﺑواﺷﻧطن ،ﺗﺿ ّم 28دوﻟﺔ ھﻲ :اﻟوﻻﯾﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﺣدة ]،[1949اﻟداﻧﻣﺎرك ]،[1949ﻓرﻧﺳﺎ ]،[1949ﻛﻧدا -7ﻣﻧظﻣﺔ ذات طﺎﺑﻊ ﻋﺳﻛري أ ُ ّ ]،[1949ﻟوﻛﺳﻣﺑرغ ]،[1949ﺑرﯾطﺎﻧﯾﺎ]،[1949اﻟﻧروﯾﺞ ]،[1949ھوﻟﻧدا ]،[1949ﺑﻠﺟﯾﻛﺎ ]،[1949ﻛﻧدا ]،[1949اﻟداﻧﻣﺎرك ]،[1949ﻓرﻧﺳﺎ ]،[1949ﺗرﻛﯾﺎ ]،[1952اﻟﯾوﻧﺎن ]،[1952أﻟﻣﺎﻧﯾﺎ ]،[1955اﻟﻣﺟر ]،[1999ﺟﻣﮭورﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﺷﯾك ]،[1999روﻣﺎﻧﯾﺎ ]،[2004ﺳﻠوﻓﺎﻛﯾﺎ ]،[2004ﺳﻠوﻓﯾﻧﯾﺎ ]،[2004إﺳﺗوﻧﯾﺎ ]،[2004ﻻﺗﻔﯾﺎ ]،[2004ﻟﯾﺗواﻧﯾﺎ ]،[2004ﺑﻠﻐﺎرﯾﺎ ]،[2004ﻛرواﺗﯾﺎ ]،[2009أﻟﺑﺎﻧﯾﺎ ] ، ،[2009ﻛرواﺗﯾﺎ ].[2009 8
-ﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎر اﻷﻣن اﻟﻘوﻣﻲ اﻷﻣرﯾﻛﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻋﮭد اﻟرﺋﯾس ﺟﯾﻣﻲ ﻛﺎرﺗر ..
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اﻟﺸﻄﺮﱋ" ﲆ ٔن ﻜﻮن روﺳﯿﺎ ﰲ ﻣﻮا ﺔ ﻣ ﺎﴍة ﻣﻊ ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ و ﻠﻒ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ،ﻓﺎﻻﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ ا ٔﻃﻠﺴﯿﺔ ﺗﻘﻮم ﲆ "ﺗﻄﻮﯾﻖ" روﺳﯿﺎ ﱪ اﻟﺘﺤﺮك ﰲ ﳎﺎﻟﻬﺎ ﻓﺎﻟﺘﻐﻮل ،وﱂ ﻜ ﻒ اﻟﻐﺮب ﺑﺬ ﺑﻞ اﳊﯿﻮي ﺸﲁ ﺗﺼﺒﺢ ﻣﻌﻪ ﺎﺟﺰة ﲆ ا ﳯﻮض وا ﳣﺪد ّ ﲻﺪوا إﱃ إﺷﻌﺎل ر اﻟﺜﻮرات اﳌﻠﻮﻧﺔ ﰲ ﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ و ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻠﺘﻘﻠﯿﺺ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﻮذ اﻟﺮوﳼ .. اﺳ ﺸﻌﺮ اﻟﺮوس ا ﺎﻃﺮ ا ٔﻃﻠﺴ ّﯿﺔ اﶈﺪﻗﺔ ﻓﺮ ّدوا ﲆ ٕا ﻼن ﻣﴩوع ﺗﻄﻮﺮ اﻟﺼﻮارﱗ ﱰاﺿﯿﺔ واﻟﺮادارات ﲁ ﻣﻦ ﺸﯿﻜ ﺎ وروﻣﺎﻧﯿﺎ وﺑﻮﻟﻮﻧﯿﺎ ﲟ ﺎﻟﻔﺔ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ـ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﺎم 1987اﻟﱵ ّﻧﺼﺖ ﲆ إﺗﻼف اﻟﺼﻮارﱗ اﻟﻘﺼﲑة وﻣ ﻮﺳﻄﺔ اﳌﺪى ﱪ ﴩ ﺻﻮارﱗ " ٔﻟﯿﻜﺴﺎﻧﺪر-إﺳﻜ ﺪر ٓم"اﳌﺰودة ﺮؤوس ﻧﻮوﯾﺔ ﰲ ﰷﻟﯿ ﻐﺮاد اﻟﻘﺮﯾﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻮﻟﻮﻧﯿﺎ ﺎم 2013ﻟﯿﻜﻮن ذ رﺳﺎ ﲥﺪﯾﺪ ﻣ ﺎﴍة ﻟﲁ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻮﻓ ﺎ وﻓﺮﺻﻮﻓ ﺎ وﻣﻦ وراﲛﲈ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻣﺪو ﻗﺎدﻣﺎ ﻻﳏﺎ ﰲ ﺻﻮرة اﻻٕﻗﺪام ﲆ ﻧﺼﺐ ا رع اﻟﺼﺎروﺧ ﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺑ ٔ ّن ردا ّ ﺗﻘﻮل اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﴐورة ٔﻣ ّﯿﺔ ﺎﲠﺔ ﺧﻄﺮ"ا ول اﳌﺎرﻗﺔ"ﻣﻦ ﰻ ﻣﻦ ٕا ﺮان وﻮر اﻟﺸﲈﻟﯿﺔ ﻓ ﺗﻌﺘﱪﻫﺎ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﺧﻄﻮة ﺪاﺋﯿﺔ ﲥﺪف إﱃ ﳏﺎﴏﲥﺎ وٕاﺿﻌﺎﻓﻬﺎ ،ﺣﱴ ا ّٕن اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻓﻼدﳝﲑ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ّﱪ ﻋﻦ ﻗﻠﻘﻪ ﺑﻮﺿﻮح ﻣﻦ ﳏﺎوﻻت ﻟﺘﻔﺎف ﲆ ﺑﻼدﻩ ﰲ ﺗﴫﱖ ﻟﻘ ﺎة "إﯾﻪ ٓ ر دي" ا ٔﳌﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﰲ ﺷﻬﺮ ﻧﻮﳁﱪ 2014ﻗﺎل ﻓ ﻪ ﻧﺼﺎ: "ﻫﻞ ى روﺳﯿﺎ ﻗﻮا ﺪ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ﰲ ﲨﯿﻊ ٔﳓﺎء اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ،ﻓﺎﳊﻠﻒ واﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،ﳞﲈ ﻗﻮا ﺪ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ﻣ ﴩة ﰲ ﲨﯿﻊ ٔﳓﺎء اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ،ﲟﺎ ﰲ ذ ﻣ ﺎﻃﻖ ﻗﺮﯾﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺪود ،و ﺪدﻫﺎ ﰲ ﺰاﯾﺪ ﻣﺴ ﳣﺮ" !.. وﻛﺜﲑا ﻣﺎ ﰷن اﻟﻘﺎدة اﻟﺮوس ﯾﺘﺬ ّﻣﺮون ﻣﻦ ﻧﻘﺾ اﻟﻐﺮب ﻟﻮﻋﻮدﻩ اﳌﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﻌﺪم ﺗﻮﺳﯿﻊ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﴍﻗﺎ وٕاﻗﺪاﻣﻪ ﲆ ﺳﻠﺴ ﻣﻦ اﳋﻄﻮات اﳌﺜﲑة ﻠﻘﻠﻖ ﰲ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ُﻋﺮﻓﺖ ﺳﯿﻜ ﺎ ﻜﻮﳖﺎ ﻓﻀﺎء اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺎ روﺳﯿﺎ ،ﺎﺻﺔ ٔ ّن ﻧﻮا اﻟﺘﻄﻮﯾﻖ ﻻ ﺴﺘ ﲏ اﻟﴩق اﻟﺮوﳼ وذ وﻓﻘﺎ ً 26
ﳌﺎ ﺎء ﰲ ﺗﻘﺮﺮ ﴩﺗﻪ ) (Independence paperاﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﺎم 2007إذ ﲤﺖ اﻻٕﺷﺎرة إﱃ ا ﱱام ا ٔﻣﺮﲀن ﻧﺼﺐ ﻣ ﻈﻮﻣﺎت ﻣﻀﺎدة ﻠﺼﻮارﱗ ﰲ ﰻ ﻣﻦ ﰷﻟﯿﻔﻮرﻧﯿﺎ و ٔﻻﺳﲀ !.. وﻣﺎ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻧﻘﻮ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺴﯿﺎق ﻫﻮ ٔ ّن إرﻫﺎﺻﺎت اﳌﴩوع ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ اﳌﻨﺎﻫﺾ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ﱂ ﺗﱪز ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﺪ ا ٔ ﲑ ،ﺑﻞ ٔﻃﻠ ّﺖ ﺮ ٔﺳﻬﺎ ﻣ ﺬ ﺎم 1999ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ اﻣ ﻨﻊ ﻠﻒ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ﻋﻦ ﲤﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﻌﺎﻫﺪة ﺧﻔﺾ ﺮﺳﺎﻧﺔ ا ٔﺳﻠ ﺔ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﯿﺪﯾﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺮﻣﺖ ﺎم 1990ﻣﻊ ﻠﻒ وارﺳﻮ .. واﻟﯿﻮم ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ﲆ ٔرض ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻫﯿﺎﰻ ﺳﺎﻋﯿﺔ إﱃ ﺗﻌﺰﺰ اﻟﺘﻘﺎرب ﺑ ﳯﺎ وﺑﲔ ﻠﻒ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ﻧﺬ ﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺑ ﳯﺎ اﳌﻌﻬﺪ اﻟﻮﻃﲏ راﺳﺎت ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠ ّﯿﺔ ،دا ﺮة ا ٔﻣﻦ ا وﱄ ،اﳌﺮﻛﺰ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ راﺳﺎت اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ اﳌﺴﺘﻘ ،ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺘﲀﻣﻞ ا ٔوروﰊ ﰲ اﳌﻨﺎﻃﻖ ،ﻣﻜ ﺐ اﺗﺼﺎﻻت اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ،ﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ ﺷﺒﺎب "اﻟﺮادا ا ٔﻃﻠﺴﯿﺔ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ" ،دا ﺮة ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ى وزارة اﳋﺎرﺟ ﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ،دا ﺮة اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ّﺔ ى وزارة اﳋﺎرﺟ ﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ][... وﯾﻨ ﲏ "اﻟﺘﻘﺎرب"ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ﲆ ﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮ ﺋﻖ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ا ٔﺳﺎﺳﯿﺔ وﻣﻦ ٔ ﺮز ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻮ ﺋﻖ " :ﻣ ﺜﺎق اﻟﴩاﻛﺔ ّ اﳌﻤﲒة ﺑﲔ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ و ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ" ﺣ ﺚ ﻧﻘﺮ ٔ ﰲ اﻟﺒﻨﺪ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﺎ ﯾﲇ ّﻧﺼﻪ: " ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺗﺆﻛّﺪ ﻋﺰ ﺎ ﲆ ﻣﻮاﺻ اﻻٕﺻﻼح اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي وﺗﻌﺰﺰ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﺔ ا ﳝﻘﺮاﻃﯿﺔ واﳌﺪﻧﯿﺔ ﲆ اﻟﻘﻮات اﳌﺴﻠ ّ ﺔ ،ورﻓﻊ اﻟﺘﻮاﻓﻖ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺎﰐ واﻟﺘﻘﲏ ﻣﻊ ﻗﻮات اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ وا ول اﻟﴩﻜﺔ،إن اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﯾﺆﻛّﺪ دﲻﻪ ﻮد ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ ا ﺎﻻت"][... و ﻟﻨﻈﺮ إﱃ ﺧﻄﻮرة ا ﻄﻄﺎت ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ اﻟﻬﺎدﻓﺔ إﱃ ﺮﯿﻊ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻻ ﲡﺪ ا ٔ ﲑة ﺑُﺪّا ﻣﻦ ا ود ﻋﻦ ﲻﻘﻬﺎ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ اﳌﳣﺜ ّﻞ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﲁ ﻣﺎ ٔوﺗ َﺖ ﻣﻦ ٔوراق ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ 27
وﻋﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ،وﺗ ٔﰐ اﻟﺼﯿﻐﺔ اﳉﺪﯾﺪة ﻠﻌﻘ ﺪة اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺻﺎدق ﻠﳱﺎ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﺎم 2014ﰲ ﻫﺬا ّﲡﺎﻩ .. ﻓﺎﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﺴﻌﻰ ﺎﻫﺪة إﱃ إﺧﺮاج ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻈ اﻟﺮوﺳ ّﯿﺔ إﱃ ا ٔﺑﺪ ﱪ اﺳﺘﺪرا ﺎ إﱃ ﻠﻒ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ واﳊﺴﻢ ﻟﺘﺎﱄ ﰲ اﻧ ﲛﺎ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﳼ واﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ،وﯾﻨﺪرج اﻟﻘﺮار ا ي ﺻﺎدق ﻠﯿﻪ اﻟﻜﻮﻧﻐﺮس ﯾﻮم 12د ﺴﻤﱪ 2014و ٔﻛّﺪﻩ ٔو ﻣﺎ ﲟﺼﺎدﻗﺔ رﲰﯿﺔ ﯾﻮم 12ﻣﺎرس 2015ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻻٕﻃﺎر ﺣ ﺚ ّﰎ ﻓ ﺢ ب ﺰوﯾﺪ ﯿﯿﻒ ٔﺳﻠ ﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﺎﲠﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺮاﻩ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ دﻋﲈ روﺳﯿﺎ ﲑ ﳏﺪود ﻟﻼﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﲔ ﰲ اﻟﴩق ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ.. ﻧﺺ اﺗﻔـﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﺣﻠﻒ ﺷﻤﺎل اﻷﻃﻠﺴﻲ ،واﺷﻨﻄﻦ-أﻓﺮﻳﻞ ﻋﺎم : 1949 _ ّ
"ﯾﺆﻛﺪ ٔﻃﺮاف ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺪﯾﺪ إﳝﺎﳖﻢ ﺑ ٔﻫﺪاف وﻣ ﺎدئ ،ﻣ ﺜﺎق ا ٔﱈ اﳌﺘ ﺪة، ورﻏﺒﳤﻢ ﰲ اﻟﻌ ﺶ ﻣﻊ ﰻ اﻟﺸﻌﻮب ،واﳊﻜﻮﻣﺎت ،ﰲ ﺳﻼم .وﺗﺆﻛﺪ ا ٔﻃﺮافٕ ،اﴏارﻫﺎ ﲆ ﺣﲈﯾﺔ اﳊﺮﯾﺔ ،واﻟﱰاث اﳌﺸﱰك ،وﺣﻀﺎرة ﺷﻌﻮﲠﻢ ،اﻟﱵ ﺗﻘﻮم ﲆ ٔﺳﺲ وﻣ ﺎدئ ا ﳝﻮﻗﺮاﻃﯿﺔ ،واﳊﺮﯾﺔ ،اﻟﻔﺮدﯾﺔ ،واﻟﻨﻈﺎم واﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن .وﱒ ﺴﻌﻮن ﻟﱰﺳﯿﺦ ﺳﺘﻘﺮار واﻟﺮ ﺎء، ﰲ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ،ﻣﺼﻤﻤﲔ ﲆ ﺗﻮﺣ ﺪ اﳉﻬﻮد ،ﻣﻦ ٔ ﻞ ا ﻓﺎع اﶺﺎﻋﻲ ،وﺣﲈﯾﺔ وﺻﯿﺎﻧﺔ اﻟﺴﻼم وا ٔﻣﻦ ،وﺑﻨﺎء ﻠﯿﻪ ،ﻓﻘﺪ اﺗﻔﻘﻮا ﲆ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ وﱔ : اﳌﺎدة: 1
ﯾﻠﱱم ا ٔﻃﺮاف ﲟﺎ ﺎء ﰲ ﻣ ﺜﺎق ا ٔﱈ اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،ﺑ ﺴﻮﯾﺔ ﰻ ﺎ ﺰاع دوﱄ ،ﻜﻮﻧﻮن ﻃﺮﻓ ًﺎ ﻓﳱﺎ ،ﻟﻄﺮق اﻟﺴﻠﻤﯿﺔ ،و ﻟﺘﺎﱄ ﻻ ﯾﺘﻌﺮض اﻟﺴﻼم وا ٔﻣﻦ ا وﻟﯿﺎن ،واﻟﻌﺪا ﻠﺨﻄﺮ ،ﻛﲈ ﯾﻠﱱم ا ٔﻃﺮاف ٔﯾﻀ ًﺎ ،ﻟﺘ ﲇ ﻋﻦ ٔي ﲥﺪﯾﺪ ﻟﻘﻮةٔ ،و اﺳﺘ ﺪا ﺎ ،ﰲ ﻼﻗﺎﲥﻢ ا وﻟﯿﺔ، اﳌﺘ ﺪة . ا ٔﱈ ٔﻫﺪاف ﻣﻊ ﯾ ﺎﰱ ﺸﲁ اﳌﺎدة: 2
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ﺳﻮف ﺴﺎﱒ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﰲ اﺳ ﳣﺮار ﺗﻄﻮر ﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﺴﲅ ،واﻟﺼﺪاﻗﺔ ،ا وﻟﯿﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ا ي ﯾﺪﲻﻮن ﻓ ﻪ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎﲥﻢ اﳊﺮة ،وﲢﻘ ﻖ ﻓﻬﻢ اﻓﻀﻞ ﻠﻤﺒﺎدئ وا ٔﺳﺲ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻘﻮم ﻠﳱﺎ، ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺆﺳﺴﺎت ،ﻛﲈ ﯾ ﺸﺪون وﺸﺠﻌﻮن ،ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ اﻟﺘﻀﺎﻣﻦ ،واﻟﺮ ﺎء ،وﱒ ﺴﻌﻮن ﰲ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﳤﻢ ﻗ ﺼﺎدﯾﺔ ا وﻟﯿﺔ ،إﱃ ﲡﻨﺐ اﳋﻼﻓﺎت واﳌﺘﻨﺎﻗﻀﺎت ،و ﺸﺠﯿﻊ ودﰪ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﺟﲈﻋﯿﺔ . ٔو ﻓﺮدﯾﺔ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ﰻ ﺑﲔ ﻗ ﺼﺎدي، اﳌﺎدة: 3
وﻟﺘﺤﻘ ﻖ ٔﻫﺪاف ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ،ﺸﲁ ٔﻓﻀﻞ ،ﯾﻌﻤﻞ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﻓﺮادى وﳎﳣﻌﲔ ،ﻣﻦ ﻼل ﻋ د ا اﰐ اﻟﻔﻌﺎل ،وا اﰂ ،وا ﰪ اﳌﺘﺒﺎدل ،ﲆ ﲢﻘ ﻖ ﻗﻮة ﻣﻘﺎوﻣﺔ ،وﻗ ﺎ ﺔ ذاﺗﯿﺔ ،وﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ ،ﺿﺪ اﻟﻬﺠﲈت ،و ﻋﺘﺪاءات اﳌﺴﻠ ﺔ ،و ﺳ ﳣﺮار ﰲ ﺗﻄﻮﺮ ذ . اﳌﺎدة: 4
ﯾ ﺸﺎور ا ٔﻃﺮاف ﻣﻊ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ ،ﻋﻨﺪ إﺣﺴﺎس ٔي ﻣﳯﻢ ،ﺑ ٔن ﺳﻼم اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔٔ ،و ﺳﺘﻘﻼل ﺪد . ا ٔﻃﺮاف، ٔﺪ و ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﳼ، اﳌﺎدة: 5
ﯾﺘﻔﻖ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﲆ ٔن ٔي ﳗﻮمٔ ،و ﺪوان ﻣﺴﻠﺢ ،ﺿﺪ ﻃﺮف ﻣﳯﻢٔ ،و ﺪة ٔﻃﺮاف، ﰲ ٔورو ٔو ٔﻣﺮﲀ اﻟﺸﲈﻟﯿﺔ ،ﯾﻌﺘﱪ ﺪوا ﻠﳱﻢ ﲨﯿﻌﺎ ،وﺑﻨﺎء ﻠﯿﻪ ،ﻓﺎٕﳖﻢ ﻣ ﻔﻘﻮن ﲆ ٔﻧﻪ، ﰲ ﺎ وﻗﻮع ﻣ ﻞ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﺪوان اﳌﺴﻠﺢ ،ﻓﺎٕن ﲆ ﰻ ﻃﺮف ﻣﳯﻢ ،ﺗﻨﻔ ﺬاً ﳌﺎ ﺎء ﰲ اﳌﺎدة " "51ﻣﻦ ﻣ ﺜﺎق ا ٔﱈ اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،ﻋﻦ ﺣﻖ ا ﻓﺎع ا اﰐ ﻋﻦ ٔﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ ،ﺸﲁ ﻓﺮدي ٔو ﺟﲈﻋﻲ ،ﺗﻘﺪﱘ اﳌﺴﺎﻧﺪة واﻟﻌﻮن ﻠﻄﺮفٔ ،و ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،اﻟﱵ ﺗﺘﻌﺮض ﻠﻬﺠﻮم ،ﲣﺎذ اﻻٕﺟﺮاءات ا اﺗﯿﺔ ،ﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻣﻊ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ا ٔﺧﺮى ،دون ﺗ ٔ ﲑ .ﲟﺎ ﰲ ذ اﺳﺘ ﺪام ﻗﻮة اﻟﺴﻼح ،اﻟﱵ ﺮى ٔﳖﺎ ﻻزﻣﺔ ٕﻻ ﺎدة ا ٔﻣﻦ ،إﱃ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ،وﺗ ٔ ﯿﺪﻩ . 29
وﯾﱲ إﺑﻼغ ﳎﻠﺲ ا ٔﻣﻦ ،دون ﺗ ٔ ﲑ ،ﲁ ﳗﻮم و ﺪوان ﻣﺴﻠﺢ ،وﰻ اﻻٕﺟﺮاءات اﳌﻀﺎدة اﳌﺘ ﺬة ﲡﺎﻫﻪ .وﯾﱲ وﻗﻒ اﻻٕﺟﺮاءات ،ﲟﺠﺮد اﲣﺎذ ﳎﻠﺲ ا ٔﻣﻦ ﻠﺨﻄﻮات اﻟﴬورﯾﺔ، ا وﻟﯿﲔ . وا ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻼم واﺳﺘﻘﺮار ٕﻻ ﺎدة، اﳌﺎدة: 6
ﻃﺒﻘ ًﺎ ﳌﻔﻬﻮم اﳌﺎدة " ،"5ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ﯾﻌﺘﱪ ٔي ﺪوانٔ ،و ﳗﻮم ﻣﺴﻠﺢ ،ﲆ ﻃﺮف ٔو ٔﻛﱶ : ٔ .ﰻ ﺪوان ٔو ﳗﻮم ﻣﺴﻠﺢ ،ﲆ ٔي ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ٔ ،ﺪ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﰲ ٔورو و ٔﻣﺮﲀ اﻟﺸﲈﻟﯿﺔٔ ،و اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﳉﺰا ﺮي ﻣﻦ ﻓﺮﺴﺎ ،وﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﺮﯿﺎٔ ،و ٕا ﺪى اﳉﺰر اﳋﺎﺿﻌﺔ ﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﺳﯿﺎدة ٔ ﺪ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﰲ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ،ﴌ اﳌﺪاراﻟﴪﻃﺎن . ب .اﻟﻌﺪوان ٔو اﻟﻬﺠﻮم ،ﲆ ﻗﻮات ﻣﻘﺎﺗ ٔو ﺳﻔﻦ ٔو ﻃﺎ ﺮات ٔ ﺪ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻨﺎﻃﻖٔ ،و ﱪ ﳎﺎ اﳉﻮىٔ ،و ﻣ ﺎﻫﻪ ا ٕﻻﻗﻠﳰﯿﺔٔ ،و ٕا ﺪى اﳌﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﺑ ٔورو ٔ ،و ﰲ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ،ﺷﲈل ﻣﺪار اﻟﴪﻃﺎن ،ﺣ ﺚ ﰷﻧﺖ ﻗﻮات اﺣ ﻼل ٔ ﺪ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﳣﺮﻛﺰ ﻟﻔﱰة ،ﰷﻧﺖ اﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ﻓﳱﺎ ﻓﺬةٔ ،وﺳﺎرﯾﺔاﳌﻔﻌﻮل . اﳌﺎدة: 7
ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ﻻ ﲤﺲ وﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﺗﻔﴪ ،ﺑ ٔﳖﺎ ﺗﺆﺮ ﲆ ﺣﻘﻮق وواﺟ ﺎت ا ٔﻃﺮاف، ا ٔﻋﻀﺎء ﰲ ا ٔﱈ اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،اﳌﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﲆ ﻣ ﺜﺎﻗﻬﺎ ،ﻛﲈ ﻻ ﲤﺲ ﰲ اﳌﻘﺎم ا ٔول ،ﻣﺴﺆوﻟﯿﺔ ﳎﻠﺲ ا ٔﻣﻦ ﰲ اﳊﻔﺎظ ﲆ اﻟﺴﻼم وا ٔﻣﻦ ا وﻟﯿﲔ ،وﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﺗﻔﴪ ﲆ ﻣ ﻞ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻨﻮال . اﳌﺎدة: 8
ﯾﻌﻠﻦ ﰻ ﻃﺮفٔ ،ﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺗﻮ ﺪ اﻟﱱاﻣﺎت دوﻟﯿﺔ ﺎﻟﯿﺎ ﺑ ﻪ وﺑﲔ ٔﻃﺮاف ٔﺧﺮىٔ ،و دو ﻟﺜﺔ ،ﺗﺘﻌﺎرض ﻣﻊ ﻟﻮاﰁ وﺑﻨﻮد ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ .وﯾﻠﱱم ﺑﻌﺪم اﻟﺘﻌﻬﺪ ٔو اﻟﺘﻮرط ،ﰲ ٔي 30
اﻟﱱاﻣﺎت
دوﻟﯿﺔ،
ﺗ ﺎﻗﺾ
ﻣﻊ
ﻫﺬﻩ
اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ .
اﳌﺎدة: 9
ﯾﻘﻮم ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﺑ ﺸﻜ ﻞ وﻜﻮﻦ ﳎﻠﺲ ،ﯾﱲ ﻓ ﻪ ﲤﺜﯿﻞ ﰻ ﻣﳯﻢ ،ﻟﺒﺤﺚ ودراﺳﺔ ﻗﻀﺎ ﺗﻨﻔ ﺬ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ،وﯾﱲ ﺸﻜ ﻞ وﺑﻨﺎء ﻫﺬا ا ﻠﺲ ،ﲝﯿﺚ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﳚﳣﻊ ﰲ ٔي وﻗﺖ، و ﲆ و ﻪ اﻟﴪ ﺔ .وﯾﻘﻮم ا ﻠﺲ ،ﺑﺘﻜﻮﻦ ﻫﯿﺌﺎت و ٔ ﺰة ﺑﻌﺔ ،ﻃﺎﳌﺎ ﰷن ذ ﴐور ً، وﺑﺼﻔﺔ ﺎﺻﺔ ،ﯾﻘﻮم دون ﺗ ٔ ﲑ ،ﺑ ﺸﻜ ﻞ ﳉﻨﺔ دﻓﺎﻋﯿﺔ ،ﺗﺘﻮﱃ ﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﻮﺻﯿﺔ ﻻٕﺟﺮاءات . (5 )،3 اﳌﺎدﺗﲔ ﺑ ﻔﺬ اﳋﺎﺻﺔ، اﳌﺎدة: 10
ﳝﻜﻦ ﻟ ٔ ﻃﺮاف ،ﻣﻦ ﻼل ﻗﺮار ﺟﲈﻋﻲٔ ،ن ﯾﻄﻠﺒﻮا ﻣﻦ ﰻ دو ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ ٔﺧﺮى ،ﻜﻮن ٕﻣﲀﳖﺎ ﻣﺴﺎﻧﺪة ﻣ ﺎدئ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ،واﳌﺴﺎﳘﺔ ﰲ ﲢﻘ ﻖ ٔﻣﻦ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ، ﻧﻀﲈم إﱃ اﳊﻠﻒ .وﰻ دو ﯾﱲ دﻋﻮﲥﺎ ،ﲆ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﺤﻮ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ،ﳝﻜﳯﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻼل إﯾﺪاع ﻣﺴ ﺪات اﻧﻀﲈ ﺎ ى ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪةٔ ،ن ﺗﺼﺒﺢ ﻋﻀﻮا ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ .وﺗﻘﻮم ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ﺑﺪورﻫﺎ ٕ ﺎﻃﺔ ﰻ ﻃﺮف ﻠﲈً ،ﺑﺘﻘﺪﱘ ﻣ ﻞ ﻫﺬا ﻧﻀﲈم(. ﳞﺎ) ،وﺛﯿﻘﺔ وﻣﺴ ﺪ اﳌﺴ ﺪ ﻟﻬﺎ ،وٕاﯾﺪا ﻪ اﳌﺎدة: 11
ﯾﻘﻮم ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﲆ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ وٕاﻗﺮارﻫﺎٔ ،ﺳﻠﻮب ا ي ﳣﴙ ﻣﻊ دﺳﺘﻮرﱒ ،ﰒ ﯾﻘﻮﻣﻮن ﺑ ﻔ ﺬ ﺑﻨﻮدﻫﺎ وﻟﻮاﲘﻬﺎ .وﯾﱲ إﯾﺪاع و ﺋﻖ وﻣﺴ ﺪات اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ،ﺑ ٔﴎع ﻣﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ، ى اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،واﻟﱵ ﺑﺪورﻫﺎ ﺗﻘﻮم ٕ ﺎﻃﺔ ﰻ ا ول ا ٔﺧﺮى ،اﳌﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﲆ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ،ﲁ ﲻﻠﯿﺔ إﯾﺪاع ﺗﱲ ،ﳞﺎ .وﺗﺪ ﻞ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ﲒ اﻟﺘﻨﻔ ﺬ ،وﺗﺼﺒﺢ ﺳﺎرﯾﺔ اﳌﻔﻌﻮل ،ﺑﲔ ا ول اﳌﺼﺪﻗﺔ ﻠﳱﺎ ،ﲟﺠﺮد إﯾﺪاع ﺎﻟﺒﯿﺔ ا ول اﳌﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﲆ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ،و ﺋﻖ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ .ﲟﺎ ﰲ ذ ،و ﺋﻖ ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﰻ ﻣﻦ :ﺑﻠﺠﯿﲀ -اﳌﻤﻠﻜﺔ اﳌﺘ ﺪة -ﻓﺮﺴﺎ -ﻛﻨﺪا - 31
ﻟﻮﺴﻤﱪج -ﻫﻮﻟﻨﺪا -اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪةٔ .ﻣﺎ ﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ ول ٔﺧﺮى ﻓ ﺼﺒﺢ ﺳﺎرﯾﺔ اﳌﻔﻌﻮل ﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ ﳍﻢ ،ﰲ ﯾﻮم إﯾﺪاع و ﺋﻖ ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻘﻬﻢ ،ﲆ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ى اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة اﳌﺎدة: 12
ﺑﻌﺪ ﻋﴩ ﺳﻨﻮات ﻣﻦ ﴎ ن اﳌﻌﺎﻫﺪةٔ ،و ﰲ ٔي وﻗﺖ ٓﺧﺮ ،ﺳﻮف ﯾﻘ ﻞ ا ٔﻃﺮاف ،ﺑﻨﺎء ﲆ ﻃﻠﺐ ٔ ﺪﱒ ،إﺟﺮاء ﻣﺸﺎورات ،ﺸ ٔن ٕا ﺎدة ﻣﺮاﺟﻌﺔ اﳌﻌﺎﻫﺪة ،ودراﺳﺎﲥﺎ ،ﰲ ﻇﻞ اﻟﻈﺮوف اﻟﱵ ﺗﺆﺮ ﻓ ﺑﻌﺪ ،ﲆ ﺳﻼم و ٔﻣﻦ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘٔ .و ﺑﻨﺎء ﲆ ٔي ﺗﻄﻮﺮ ﻗﺪ ﯾﻄﺮ ٔ ﲆ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺎت ا وﻟﯿﺔ ،وا ٕﻻﻗﻠﳰﯿﺔ ،وذ ﻣﻦ ٔ ﻞ اﳊﻔﺎظ ﲆ ،اﻟﺴﻼم إﻃﺎر ﰲ ا وﻟﯿﲔ، وا ٔﻣﻦ اﳌﺘ ﺪة . ا ٔﱈ ﻣ ﺜﺎق اﳌﺎدة: 13
ﺑﻌﺪ ﻓﱰة ﴎ ن وﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ ﻠﻤﻌﺎﻫﺪة ،ﳌﺪة ﻋﴩﻦ ﺎﻣ ًﺎ ،ﳛﻖ ٔي ﻃﺮف ﺴ ﺎب ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ .وذ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺎم ﻣﻦ ﺗﻘﺪﱘ إﻧﺬارٔ ،و إﺧﻄﺎر ﺑﺬ ﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،اﻟﱵ ﺗﻘﻮم ٕ ﺎﻃﺔ ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺎت ا ٔﻃﺮاف ا ٔﺧﺮى ،ﻠﲈًٕ ،ﯾﺪاع ﰻ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺒﻠﻐﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ إﺧﻄﺎرات، وٕاﻧﺬارات . اﳌﺎدة: 14
ﺗﻮدع اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ ،ﰲ ﲭﻼت وﳏﻔﻮﻇﺎت ،ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ،وﱓ ﺗﻌﺘﱪ ﻧﺼﳱﺎ اﻻٕﳒﻠﲒي واﻟﻔﺮﴘ ،ﲱﯿ ﲔ ،وﺑﻨﻔﺲ ا ر ﺔ ،وﺳﻮف ﯾﱲ إﯾﺪاﻋﻬﺎ ،ﰲ ٔرﺷﯿﻒ ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،ﺣ ﺚ ﺗﻘﻮم ٕرﺳﺎل ﺴﺦ ﻣﻌﳣﺪة ،ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺎت ﳊﻜﻮﻣﺎت اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ . ﲆ اﳌﻮﻗﻌﺔ، ا ٔﺧﺮى ا ول ____________________________________________________ ﺑﺪ ٔ ﴎ ن اﳌﻌﺎﻫﺪة ﰲ ٔ 24ﻏﺴﻄﺲ 1949ﺑﻌﺪ إﯾﺪاع ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻘﺎت ﰻ ا ول اﳌﻮﻗﻌﺔ"..
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اﻟﺼﻴﻐﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة ﻟﻠﻌﻘﻴﺪة اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳّﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﻴﺔ
ﺗ ٔﰐ اﻟﺼﯿﻐﺔ اﳉﺪﯾﺪة ﻠﻌﻘ ﺪة اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺻﺎدق ﻠﳱﺎ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﯾﻮم 26د ﺴﻤﱪ 2014ﻟﺘﺆﻛّﺪ ٔﳘ ّﯿﺔ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﰲ اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ إذ ﺪدت 14ﺧﻄﺮا ﺎرﺟ ﺎ وﻣﻦ ٔﱒ اﻟﻨﻘﺎط اﻟﱵ ﺗﻀ ّﻤﻨﳤﺎ ﺗ اﻟﱵ ﺸﲑ إﱃ ﺧﻄﻮرة ﺣﺸﺪ اﻟﻘﺪرات اﳊﺮﺑﯿﺔ اﻟﱪي واﳌﺎﰄ ﻟﺘﺼﻌﯿﺪ ﻠﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﻗﺮب ﺪودﻫﺎ وﺧﻄﺮ ﴩ وز دة اﻟﻘﻮات ا ٔﺟ ﺒﯿﺔ ﰲ اﳉﻮار ّ اﻟﻀﻐﻮط اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ واﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ﲆ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ،وﻣﻦ ٔ ﺮز ا ﺎﻃﺮ اﶈﳣ اﻟﱵ ﲢﺪّﺛﺖ ﻋﳯﺎ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ " ﺳ ﺎﻗ ﺔ" إﻗﺪام واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﲆ ﻧﺼﺐ ﻣ ﻈﻮﻣﺔ ا رع اﻟﺼﺎروﺧ ﺔ ﰲ ٔورو ،وٕاﺷﺎ ﺔ اﻟﻔﻮﴇ ﰲ دول اﳉﻮار و زرع ٔﻧﻈﻤﺔ ﲻﯿ ﺗﻌﺎدي اﻟﻨﻔﻮذ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻓﳱﺎ، ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ اﻧ ﺸﺎر اﻟﺘﻄﺮف واﻻٕرﻫﺎب دا ﻞ اﻟﺒﻼد ﺴ ﺐ "اﻟﺘﻘﺼﲑ ا وﱄ" ﰲ ﳎﺎﲠﳤﲈ واﳌﺴﺎﻋﻲ ﺳ ﺘﺨﺒﺎرﯾﺔ اﻟﻐﺮﺑﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﺨﺮﯾ ﺔ ،وﻗﺪ ﺪّدت اﻟﻮﺛﯿﻘﺔ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺔ "اﻟﺘﴫﻓﺎت" اﳌﻬﺪدة ﻟ ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻣﺆﻛﺪة ٔ ّن اﳌﲈرﺳﺔ اﻻٕرﻫﺎﺑﯿﺔ اﳋﻄﲑة ﱔ ﰻ ﺸﺎط ﳞﺪف إﱃ ﺗﻐﯿﲑ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ا ﺳﺘﻮري ﰲ ﲢﺎد اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻗﴪا وﺗﻌﻄﯿﻞ ﲻﻞ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎت ا و وﻣ ﺎز ﺔ ا و ﰲ ﺳﯿﺎدﲥﺎ وﺗﻘﺴﲓ اﻟﺒﻼد .. ﻛﲈ ﱂ ﺗُﻐﻔﻞ اﻟﻮﺛﯿﻘﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ اﳊﺪﯾﺚ ﻋﻦ ا ٕﻻ ﻼم وﺗ ٔﺛﲑﻩ اﳋﻄﲑ ﲆ ا ﳣﻊ ﲟﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﳞﺪّد اﻟﻮ ﺪة اﻟﻮﻃﻨﯿﺔ واﻟﺜﻮاﺑﺖ اﻟﺘﺎرﳜﯿﺔ ﻠﺸﻌﺐ اﻟﺮوﳼ .. ٔﻣﺎ ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ﺑ ٔوﻟﻮ ت اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﺣﺴﺐ "اﻟﻌﻘ ﺪة" اﳉﺪﯾﺪة ﻓﺎ ّٕن روﺳﯿﺎ ﲤ ّﺪ ﺟﺴﻮر اﻟﺘﻮاﺻﻞ واﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻣﻊ 3دول ﲆ اﻧﻔﺮادﻫﺎ وﱔ ٔﲞﺎز و ٔوﺳﯿ ﺎ اﳉﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ )اﳌﺴ ﺘﻘﻠﺘﲔ ﻋﻦ ﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ( وروﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﺒﯿﻀﺎء )ﺑﯿﻼروﺳﯿﺎ( ،ﻛﲈ ﺗﺘﻘﺎرب ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﻜ ﻼت واﳌﻨﻈﲈت ا وﻟﯿﺔ ﺮاﺑﻄﺔ ا ول اﳌﺴﺘﻘ وﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ ﺷ ﻨﻐﻬﺎي إﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ 33
ا ٔﱈ اﳌﺘ ﺪة ﲟﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﺴﺘﺪﻋ َﯿﻪ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻦ ﴐورات ﴩ ﻗﻮات ﺣﻔﻆ اﻟﺴﻼم واﻟﺘ ﺴﯿﻖ ا ٔﻣﲏ واﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﲟﺎ ﳜﺪم ا ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ اﻟﺮوﳼ واﻟﺴﻼم اﻟﻌﺎﳌﻲ.. وﯾﺬﻫﺐ ﺻﺎﺋﻐﻮ وﺛﯿﻘﺔ اﻟﻌﻘ ﺪة اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ إﱃ ﺗ ٔ ﯿﺪ ﺣﻖ اﺳﺘ ﺪام اﻟﺴﻼح اﻟﻨﻮوي ردا ﲆ ٔي ﺪوان ﻧﻮوي ﻠﳱﺎ ٔو ﲆ ٔ ﺪ ﻠﻔﺎﲛﺎ ،وا ٔﺧﻄﺮ ﻣﻦ ذ اﻟ ﺸﺪﯾﺪ ﲆ ﺣﻖ اﺳﺘﻌﲈل ٔﺳﻠ ﺔ ا ﻣﺎر اﻟﺸﺎﻣﻞ ردا ﲆ اﺳﺘ ﺪام ٔﺳﻠ ﺔ ﺗﻘﻠﯿﺪﯾﺔ ﺿﺪّﻫﺎ إذا ﻣﺎ ﰷن ﻫﺬا ﻋﺘﺪاء ﺪدا ﻟﻮﺟﻮد ا و .. اﻟﻘﺪﱘ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘ ﺪة اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮاﺻ ا ﳤﺎج اﳌﳯﺞ ا ﻓﺎﻋﻲ ٔﻣﺎ ﻋﻦ اﳉﺪﯾﺪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺑﻼ ّ ﺷﻚ ﻟﱱام اﻟﺼﺎرم ﲝﲈﯾﺔ اﳊﻠﻔﺎء وﻣﺎ ﺑﺪا ٔﻧ ّﻪ "ﺣﺴﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﻣﻔﺮﻃﺔ" ﻠﺘﻮا ﺪ اﻟﻐﺮﰊ ﺣﻮل ﺪودﻫﺎ ،وﻫﺬا ﯾﻌﻮد إﱃ اﻟﺴﯿﺎق اﻟﻌﺎم اﳌﻨﺎﻫﺾ ﻠﻨﻔﻮذ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻣﻦ اﻟﴩق ا ٔوﺳﻂ ]ﺳﻮر [ إﱃ ﳎﺎﻟﻬﺎ اﳊﯿﻮي ]ﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ و ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ[ وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﺗﺆﻛّﺪﻩ ﻣ ﺎورات ﻠﻒ ﺷﲈل اﳌﺘﻜﺮرة ﰲ اﻟﺒﺤﺮ ا ٔﺳﻮد ﻟﺘﻮازي ﻣﻊ ﺗﺼﺎ ﺪ اﻟﺘﻮ ﺮ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺣ ﺚ ﯾﻌﻤﻞ ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ّ اﻟﺮوس ﲆ ا ْود ﻋﻦ ﻣﺼﺎﳊﻬﻢ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ اﳌﻔﺼﻠﯿﺔ ﻫﻨﺎك ،ﳁﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﺮى ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ٕازاء ﻣ ﺎخ دوﱄ ﺪﯾﺪ ﳜﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ اﻟﱵ ٔﻧﺘﺠﺖ "ﻋﻘ ﺪة" 1993ﺣ ﺚ ﰷن اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻞ اﻟﻮﺣ ﺪ ا ي ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﯾﺪﻓﻊ إﱃ "ﺗ ﺸﯿﻂ" اﻟﱰﺳﺎﻧﺔ اﻟﻨﻮوﯾﺔ.. وﳝﻜﻦ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﳌﻬ ّﻤﺔ اﻣ ﺪادا ]ﻣﺎ[ ﻟﻮﺛﯿﻘ ﺔ ﻣــﻦ اﻟﻘــﻮﱊ اﻟﺮوﺳــﻲ ﻠﻌ ﺎم 2000اﻟﱵ ﺣﴫت "ا ﳤﺪﯾﺪات ﰲ ﻠﻒ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ر ﺔ ﺗﺪﻓﻊ ٔي ﺣﺚ ﻟﻼﻋﺘﻘ ﺎد ﺑ ٔن روﺳ ﯿﺎ ﺗﻨﻈـﺮ اﻟ ـﻮم ﻠ ﺎﺗﻮ ﻌ ﺪو ﻓﻌﻠـﻲ وﻟ ﺲ ﺸــﺮﯾﻚ ﻣﻘﻠــﻖ ﳈ ﺎ ﻛ ﺎن ﰲ ﺣﻘ ﺔ اﻟ ﺴ ﻌﯿﻨﺎت ﻣــﻦ اﻟﻘــﺮن اﻟﻌﺸــﺮﻦ وﻫ ﺬﻩ اﻟﻨﻈــﺮة اﳉﺪﯾ ﺪة ﻟﻬ ﺎ ٔﺳﺒﺎ اﳌﻮﺿﻮﻋﯿﺔ"..9 ﻗﺼﺎرى اﻟﻘﻮل ،ﳝﻜ ﻨﺎ ٔن ﻧﻌ ّﺪ وﺛﯿﻘﺔ اﻟﻌﻘ ﺪة اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ اﳉﺪﯾﺪة ﺗﻠﺨﯿﺼﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻟﺘﴫﱖ ﺷﻬﲑ ﻠﺮﺋ ﺲ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻓﻼدﳝﲑ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ذات ﯾﻮم ﻣﻦ ﺷﻬﺮ د ﺴﻤﱪ 2014ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻗﺎل":ا وا ﺮ اﻻٕﻣﱪ ﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻐﺮﺑﯿﺔ ﲢﺎول اﻟﺴﯿﻄﺮة ﲆ اﳌﺼﺎدر اﻟﻮﻃﻨﯿﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ وٕاﱃ ﲡﺮﯾﺪ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻣﻦ ﳐﺎ ﳢﺎ و ٔﺳﺒﺎب ﻗﻮﲥﺎ ﳉﻌﻠﻬﺎ ﺎﺟﺰة ﲤﺎﻣﺎ ..ﰷ ب اﳌﻘ ﺪ" !!. 9
-اﻟدﻛﺗور ﻧزار إﺳﻣﺎﻋﯾل اﻟﺣﯾﺎﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ"ﻗراءة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣذھب اﻟﻌﺳﻛري اﻟروﺳﻲ ﺑﯾن اﻟﻣﺎﺿﻲ واﻟﺣﺎﺿر"
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ﻋﺪوى اﻻﻧﻔﺼﺎل ﻋﻦ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﻣﻦ دواﻓﻊ ﺸ ّﺚ روﺳﯿﺎ ﲟﺼﺎﳊﻬﺎ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ اﳋﻮف ﻣﻦ اﻧ ﺸﺎر ﺪوى ا ّﳣﺮد ﰲ ﻓﻀﺎﲛﺎ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ ،ﻓﺴﻘﻮط ﯿﯿﻒ ﺑﯿﺪ اﻟﻐﺮب ﯾﻐ ّﺬي ﺰ ﺎت ا ّﳣﺮد ﰲ ﲨﻬﻮر ت ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ،ﺑﻞ ا ّٕن ﲢﺎد اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ت ﺪدا ﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﺑ ﺎﱊ اﳊﺮﰷت ﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﺔ دا ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﯾﻘﻞ ﻋﻦ 33ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ اﺛ ّﺔ ﺳﺎﺧ ﺔ ﲆ ﻏﺮار ٔﻗﺎﻟﲓ اﻟﻔﻮﻟﻐﺎ واﻟﺸ ﺸﺎن وﺗﺘﺎر و ﰷرﯾﻠﯿﺎ ﺷﲈل ﻏﺮب روﺳﯿﺎ ،...وﱔ ﳐﺎﻃﺮ "ﺗﻔﻜّﻚ" ّﱪ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﻋﻦ وﻋﯿﻪ ﲠﺎ ﻣ ﺬ اﻋﺘﻼﺋﻪ ﻣ ﺼﺐ رﺋﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻔ ﺪراﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ٔول ﻣﺮة ﺎم 2000ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻗﺎل إﳖّ ﺎ ٔ ﺪ اﳌﻬﺪدات اﻟﺮﺋ ﺴﺔ ﻟ ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ ﻠﺒﻼد.. وروﺳﯿﺎ اﻟﱵ ﺧﴪت ﻣﻌﻈﻢ دول ٔورو اﻟﴩﻗ ﺔ ﻟﻔﺎﺋﺪة اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ و ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﻟ ﺴﺖ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪّة ﳋﺴﺎرة ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ،ﲟﺎ ﯾﻨﺬر ﺧﻮل ﰲ ﻣﺮ "دوﻣ ﻨﻮ" ﺗﺘ ٓﰻ ﻓﳱﺎ اﻟﺴﻄﻮة اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ وﺗ ﺴﺎﻗﻂ ﻣﺮاﻛﺰ ﻧﻔﻮذﻫﺎ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﺗﻠﻮ ا ٓﺧﺮ ﰲ ﻇﻞ اﺣ ﻻت ﺗﻔﺎﰴ اﻟﺘﻮ ﺮ ا ﯾﲏ واﻟﻘﻮﱊ دا ﻠﯿﺎ واﺣ ﺪاد اﻟﲋوع ﻧﻔﺼﺎﱄ ﰲ ﲨﻬﻮر ت اﻟﻘﻮﻗﺎز ﺣ ﺚ اﻟﺘﻨﻮع اﻟﺜﻘﺎﰲ اﳌﺬﻫﻞ ،ورﰬ ﻏﯿﺎب ﺗﻨﻈ ت ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ رزة ﺮﻓﻊ ﺷﻌﺎر ﻧﻔﺼﺎل ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ٕاﻻّ ٔ ّن ﻇﻬﻮر ٔﺣﺰاب ﻣ ﺎﻃﻘ ّﺔ ﺷﻄﺔ ﲆ ﻏﺮار اﳊﺰب اﻟﻘﻮﻗﺎزي واﻟﲀﻟﯿ ﻐﺮادي ﰲ ﺴﻌﯿ ﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻌﴩﻦ ﳚﻌﻞ اﻟﺮوس ﯾﻨﻈﺮون ﺑﻘﻠﻖ إﱃ ﻣﺴﺘﻘ ﻞ ﺑﺼﺪد اﺳﺘ ﺴﺎخ ﺷ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎﴈ..
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اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻟﻤﺎذا ﺗﺤﻤﻞ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ”ﻫﻢّ“ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ؟!!!
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ﻫﻨﺎك ﻧﻘﻄﺔ ﲤﺎ ﺰ ﻣﻔﺼﻠﯿﺔ ﺑﲔ روﺳﯿﺎ واﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ،ﻓﺎﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﻟ ﺴﺖ رؤﯾﺔ ﴯﺼﯿﺔ ٔو ﻣﺸﺨﺼﻨﺔ ﻛﲈ ﻫﻮ اﳊﺎل ﰲ ﻧﻈﲑﲥﺎ اﻟﺮوﺳ ّﯿﺔ ،دور راك ﰲ ٔﻣﺮﲀ ﻻ ﺸﺒﻪ دور ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﰲ روﺳﯿﺎ ،ﰲ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ ﺗﻌﻘّﺪ ٓﻟﯿﺎت ﺻﻨﻊ اﻟﻘﺮار ﻫﻨﺎك ٔﺟ ﺪة دو وﺛﻮاﺑﺖ ” ٔﻣﺔ“ﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ﳝﻘﺮاﻃﯿﲔ وﻻ ﻠﺠﻤﻬﻮرﯾﲔ ﳓﺮاف ﻋﳯﺎ ﻗ ﺪ ﳕ وﺗﻨﺤﴫ اﻟﻔﺮوق ﰲ اﻟﻮﺳﺎﺋﻞ دون اﻟﻐﺎ ت،وﺣﱴ اﻟﻮﺛﯿﻘﺔ اﻟﺘ ﺪﯾ ّﺔ ا ٔ ﲑة اﳌﺘﻌﻠّﻘﺔ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ ﲢﻮﻻ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺮؤﯾﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ اﻟﺼﺎدرة ﻋﻦ إدارة ٔو ﻣﺎ ﻓﲅ ﲢﻤﻞ ّ ﻟ ٔزﻣﺎت واﳌﻠﻔﺎت ا وﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻘﺔ واﳊﺎرﻗﺔ ﺑﻞ ا ّٕن ”اﻟﺼﱪ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ“ا ي ﲢ ّﺪث ﻋﻨﻪ ٔو ﻣﺎ وﺻﺎر ﺴ ﻪ ﳏﻞ ﺗﻨﺪّر ﻣﻦ ﻗ َﻞ اﶺﻬﻮرﯾﲔ ﻟ ﺲ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ ﻃﺎرﺋﺎ ﲆ اﳌﻘﺎرﺑﺔ "ا ﳝﻘﺮاﻃﯿﺔ" ﻠﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ اﳋﺎرﺟ ﺔ رﰬ ﺪاﺛﺔ اﳌﺼﻄﻠﺢ و ﺪّﺗﻪ ،ﻓﺪ ٔب ا ﳝﻘﺮاﻃﯿﲔ ﱪ رﳜﻬﻢ اﳊﺪﯾﺚ ٔن ﯾﻠﻮذو ﺑﻮﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﺎﲻﺔ – – Soft Powerﳌﻌﺎﳉﺔ اﻟﻘﻀﺎ اﻟﺴﺎﺧ ﺔ ،وﻫﺬﻩ ﺎل اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻃﻲ ﻣﻊ ﺗﻔﺎ ﻼت ا ٔزﻣﺔ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺣ ﺚ ﲢﺎول واﺷﻨﻄﻦ إدارة اﻟﴫاع ﱪ ٓﻟﯿﺎت ّ ﲢﲂ ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻛﺬ ا ي ﺴﺘ ﺪﻣﻪ ﻣﻊ ﯿﯿﻒ ،إذ ّﰎ ﻣﺆ ّﺧﺮا اﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ رﺳﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴ ﺎﺗﻮر ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ دﯾﻚ دورﺑﲔ ﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ وزراء ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ٔرﺳ ﲏ ﺴﯿ ﻮك ﲢﻤﻞ ﰲ ﻃﯿﺎﲥﺎ إﻣﻼءات وﺗﺪ ﻼ واﲵﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻌﯿ ﺎت اﻟﻮزارﯾﺔ واﻟﺮﺳﺎ اﻟﱵ ٔﻣﺎط ﻋﳯﺎ اﻠﺜﺎم وز ﺮ اﳋﺎرﺟ ﻪ و ﺮاﱐ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻟﯿﻮﻧﯿﺪ ﻮ ﺎرا ﯾﻌﻮد رﳜﻬﺎ إﱃ 25ﺟﻮان 2015وﳑّﺎ ﺗﻀ ّﻤﻨﺘﻪ ﳊﺮف ﻣﺎ ﯾﲇ ﻧﺼﻪ: ")(...ﳎﻠﺲ اﻟﺸﯿﻮخ ﻣﺎ زال ﯾﺜﻖ ﻓ ﻚ ]ﯾﻘﺼﺪ رﺋ ﺲ اﻟﻮزراء[ وﺸﺎر ﻚ ا ﺎوف اﳌﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑ ﺔ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ﺑﯿﱰو ﺑﻮروﺷ ﻜﻮ ٕﳖﺎء وﺷﯿﻚ ﳋﺪﻣﺔ ﴯﺼﯿﺎت رزة ﰲ اﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ﻜﺮس ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻟﺘﻌﺰﺰ ا ﳝﻘﺮاﻃﯿﺔ ﰲ ﺑﻼدﰼ).." (... ﺗﺘﺤﺮك وﻫﺬا ﻻ ﻜﺸﻒ ﺑﻘﺪر ﻣﺎ ﯾﺆﻛّﺪ ﲻﻮدﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ وﲻﻘﻬﺎ ﺑﲔ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ و ﯿﯿﻒ اﻟﱵ ّ ﺑﻮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒ ﺖ ا ٔﺑﯿﺾ ووﻓﻖ ٔﺟ ﺪة ٔﻣﺮﻜ ّﺔ ﻻ ﻼﻗﺔ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﯿﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﲔ وﺳﯿﺎدﲥﻢ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﯿﺔ !.. وﻟﻌ ّﻞ َﲑ ﻣﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﻧﻼﻣﺲ ﺑﻪ اﳋﻠﻔ ﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ﻠﺮؤﯾﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﻟ ٔزﻣﺎت ا وﻟ ّﯿﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺘﻮﺻﯿﻒ اﻟﺒﻠﯿﻎ اﻟﺘﺎﱄ: 37
ﯾﻌﻮﺿﻬﺎ ﻋﻦ ﻧﻘﺺ اﻟﺘﺎرﱗ " ٔﻣﺮﲀ ﺑ ﺑﻼ رﱗ ﯾُﺬ ﺮ ،ﻟﻜﳯّ ﺎ ذات واﻗﻊ واﻣ ﺪاد ﺟﻐﺮاﰲ ّ ،و ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﻨﻈﺮة ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﺗﻘﻠﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺷ ٔن اﻟﺘﺎرﱗ،و ّ ﺗﻌﻈﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻗﳰﺔ اﳌﻮﻗﻊ واﳊﺪود واﳉﻐﺮاﻓ ﺎ ،ﻟ ﺲ ﲈ رﱗ اﻟﴫاع ﺣﻮل ٔ ّي ﻗﻀﯿﺔ اﳌﻬﻢ ٔن ﯾُﱰﰖ ﻫﺬا اﻟﴫاع إﱃ واﻗﻊ ﺟﻐﺮاﰲ ٔو ﳾء واﻗﻌﻲ ٓﺧﺮ ،اﻟﺘﺎرﻻﱗ ﻟ ﺲ إﻻ ﻣﺎض ﻻ ﻗﳰﺔ ﰲ ﺣ ﺎة اﳌﻮاﻃﻦ ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ 10 ٔو ﰲ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ"
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ﺑﺎﺳﻢ ﺧﻔﺎﺟﻲ ﻓﻲ "اﻟﺸﺨﺼﯿﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﯾﻜﯿﺔ وﺻﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﻘﺮار اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﻲ اﻷﻣﺮﯾﻜﻲ"
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ﺗﻘﻄﻴﻊ أوﺻﺎل اﻟﻔﻀﺎء اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻲ اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﻠﻘﻲ ﻧﻈﺮة ﲆ ﺗﻨﻈﲑات ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﲔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﲔ ﻧﻌﱶ ﲆ ”ﺧ ﺎﻻت“ ﻣ ﻌﻠّﻘﺔ ﺑﻌﺰل ﺗﻐﻮﻟﻬﺎ ﰲ اﳌﺴﺘﻘ ﻞ ،ﻓﻔﻲ ﻛﺘﺎب ”رﻗﻌﺔ اﻟﺸﻄﺮﱋ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻋﻦ ﳏﯿﻄﻬﺎ ﻠ ﺪ ﻣﻦ إﻣﲀ ت ّ اﻟﻜﱪى“]ٔ [1998ﺷﺎر ﻣﺴ ﺸﺎر ا ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ ا ٔﺳﺒﻖ زﯾ ﻐﻨﯿﻮ ﺮﳚ ﺴﲄ إﱃ ﴐورة ﺗﻘﻄﯿﻊ ٔوﺻﺎل اﻟﻔﻀﺎء ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ اﻟﺮوﳼ واﺳﳤﺪاف ﲢﺎد اﻟﻔ ﺪراﱄ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﱴ ﰷن ذ ﳑﻜ ﺎ ﻋﺘﺒﺎر ٔ ّن ا ٔرض اﻟﺸﺎﺳﻌﺔ اﻟﱵ ﲤﺘﺪّ ﻠﳱﺎ روﺳﯿﺎ ٔﻛﱪ ﻣﻦ ٔن ﲢﺘﻀﻦ دو وا ﺪة!.. ّ ﻻﺷﻚ ٔ ّن ﻫﻨﺎك ﺗ ﺴﯿﻘﺎ ﺑﲔ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ وواﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﰲ ﺪد ﻣﻦ اﳌﻠﻔﺎت اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﲆ ﻏﺮار ﻣﲀﲿﺔ اﻻٕرﻫﺎب ،وﻗﺪ ﺎء ا ٕﻻ ﻼن اﻟﺮوﳼ ﺣﻮل اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ اﳉﺪﯾﺪة اﳌﻮﻗّﻊ ﻣﻦ ﻗ ﻞ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺴﲔ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ وﺑﻮش ﻦ ﺎم 2002ﻟ ﺸﺪّد ﲆ ﴐورة اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﳌﺸﱰك ﲆ ٔﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻌﯿﺪ ،ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﻊ ﺗﻔ ّﺠﺮ ا ٔزﻣﺔ ﰲ ﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ ﺎم 2008وﰲ ﺳﻮر ﺎم 2011 و ﺎﺻﺔ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ٔ 2014ﺎدت واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﺑﻨﺎء رؤ ﳤﺎ اﻟﻌﻼﺋﻘ ﺔ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﲟﺎ ﯾ ﳽ وﻓﻜﺮة اﳊﻔﺎظ ﲆ "اﻟﻬﳰﻨﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ" ،ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺮاﺟﻌﺔ ّﰎ اﻟﺘﻌﺒﲑ ﻋﳯﺎ ﴏا ﺔ ﰲ اﳋﻄﺎب اﻟﺴﻨﻮي ٔو ﻣﺎ ﯾﻮم 21ﺎﻧﻔﻲ 2015ﲔ ﻗﺎل: "][...ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻛﻨﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻠﻔﺎﺋﻨﺎ ﻧﻌﻤﻞ ﲜﻬﺪ اﻟﻌﺎم اﳌﺎﴈ ﲆ ﻓﺮض اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت ،اﻓﱰض اﻟﺒﻌﺾ ٔن ﺪوان اﻟﺴﯿﺪ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﻣ ﺎل ﲆ اﳌﻬﺎرة ﺳﱰاﳚﯿﺔ واﻟﻘﻮة ،ﻟﻜﻦ ٔﻣﺮﲀ اﻟﯿﻮم ﻗﻮﯾﺔ وﻣﻮ ﺪة ﻣﻊ ﻠﻔﺎﺋﻨﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ا ي ٔﺻﺒﺤﺖ ﻓ ﻪ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻣﻌﺰو واﻗ ﺼﺎدﻫﺎ ﰲ ﺎ ﺮﰓ ﻟﻬﺎ]"[... 39
ﳁﺎ ﺑﺪا ﳎﺮد ﺸﺨﯿﺺ ﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﻋﺰ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻫﻮ ﰲ ﺣﻘ ﻘ ﻪ ﻣ ﯿﺔ ٔو ﻫﺪف ﺴﻌﻰ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﻮن إﱃ ﲢﻘ ﻘﻪ ،ﻓﻘﺪ "ﲻﻠﺖ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ٕا ن اﳊﺮب اﻟﺒﺎردة وﺑﻌﺪ اﳖﯿﺎر ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ ﲆ ﺻﯿﺎ ﺔ ا ٔوﺿﺎع ا وﻟﯿﺔ ﰲ ا ٔوراﺳﯿﺎ ﻟﻀﲈن ﺗﻮﻃﯿﺪ وﺣﲈﯾﺔ ﻧﻔﻮذﻫﺎ ﰲ ذ اﻟﻨﻄﺎق اﳉﯿﻮﺳﯿﺎﳼ اﻟﻬﺎﺋﻞ ،وﰷﻧﺖ ٔدوات اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ﰲ ذ ﱔ ﻜﻮﻦ ﻠﻒ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﻨﻄﻲ ،واﺳ ﳣﺮار ﻧ ﺸﺎر ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ ﻟﻘﻮا ﺪﻫﺎ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ﰲ ا ٔوراﺳﯿﺎ ، ﻻٕﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﻮاز ت ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﲢ ّﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺪرة ا ٔﻃﺮاف ا وﻟ ّﯿﺔ ﰲ ٔورو و ٓﺳﯿﺎ ﲆ اﻛ ﺴﺎب ﻫﺎﻣﺶ ﻣ ّﺴﻊ ﻠﻤﻨﺎورة" ،11ﻓﺎﻟﺮﻫﺎن ﻣﺮﲄ ﯾﺪور ﺣﻮل ﻣ ﻊ ﺸﻮء ﲢﺎﻟﻔﺎت ﻣﻀﺎدة ﻠﻤﺼﺎﱀ ﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﲢ ّﺪث ﻋﻨﻪ ﺮﳚ ﺴﲄ ﲔ ﲢﺪّث ﻋﻦ"ﴐورة اﻻٕﺑﻘﺎء ﲆ اﻟﺘﻌﺪد ت اﳉﯿﻮﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﰲ ا ٔوراﺳﯿﺎ".. وﳓﻦ ﳓﺎول ﻓﻬﻢ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻃﻲ ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ ﻣﻊ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻠﯿﻨﺎ اﻟﺘﻌﺮﱕ ﲆ وﺛﯿﻘ ﲔ ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺘﲔ ﺻﺪر ﰲ ﺧﻀ ّﻢ ﺗﻔﺎ ﻞ ا ٔزﻣﺔ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ : _ اﺳﺗراﺗﯾﺟﯾﺔ اﻷﻣن اﻟﻘوﻣﻲ ﻟﻠرﺋﯾس اﻷﻣرﯾﻛﻲ ﺑﺎراك أوﺑﺎﻣﺎ: ﰲ ﺑﺪاﯾﺔ ﺎم 2015ﻋﺮﺿﺖ إدارة ٔو ﻣﺎ ﲆ اﻟﻜﻮﻧﻐﺮس وﺛﯿﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ 29ﺻﻔ ﺔ ﲢﺪّد اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ ﻠﺮﺋ ﺲ ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﺗﺒﻘّﻰ ﻣﻦ وﻻﯾﺘﻪ ،واﺳﺘﻌﺮﺿﺖ اﳌﺬﻛّﺮة ٔوﻟﻮ ت اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ اﳋﺎرﺟ ﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ،اﻟﻼﻓﺖ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﻫﻮ ﺮﻛﲒﻫﺎ اﻟﻮاﰣ ﲆ روﺳﯿﺎ واﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻫﺎ دو " ﺪواﻧﯿﺔ" وﺧﻄﺮا ﳤ ّﺪد اﳌﺼﺎﱀ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ّﺔ واﻟﺴﻼم اﻟﻌﺎﳌﻲ ،ﻟﻜﳯّ ﺎ ﰲ اﳌﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﺘ ﺪّث ﻋﻦ "ﺻﱪ اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ" ﰲ ﻣﻌﺎﳉﺔ اﳌﻠﻔﺎت ا وﻟﯿﺔ اﳊﺎرﻗﺔ ﲟﺎ ﯾﻌﲏ ٔ ّن ٔو ﻣﺎ ﳛﺎول إدارة اﻟﴫاع ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ وﻣﺮاﳈﺔ اﻻٕﳒﺎزات اﳉﯿﻮﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﲆ ﺣﺴﺎب روﺳﯿﺎ وذ ﻣﻦ ﻼل ٓﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت واﺳﺘﲋاف اﻟﻘﺪرات اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ﲟﺎ ّ ﺸﲁ ﻋﺒﺌﺎ إﺿﺎﻓ ﺎ ﲆ ﻗ ﺼﺎد ﳜﻠﻮ ذﻫﻦ اﳋﱪاء ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﲔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﲔ ﻣﻦ اﺳﺘ ﺪام دول اﻟﺮوﳼ اﻟﻬﺶ ،دون ٔن َ اﻟﺒﻠﻄﯿﻖ ﰲ اﺣ ﻮاء روﺳﯿﺎ ﱪ إﳞﺎم ا ول اﻟﺜﻼث ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﺰ ﺔ إﻣﱪ ﻟﯿﺔ ى اﻟﺮوس ﺴﳤﺪف اﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻬﺎ واﺳﺘﻘﺮارﻫﺎ وذ ﲢﺖ ﻗﺼﻒ ٕا ﻼﱊ ﻏﺮﰊ ﻣ ﻈﻢ ﯾﺪور ﺣﻮل 11
-د.ﺧﺎﻟد ﻋﺑد اﻟﻌظﯾم ﻓﻲ"اﻟﺻراع ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻧﻔوذ ﻓﻲ اﻷوراﺳﯾﺎ"
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اﻟﺘﺨﻮﯾﻒ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺪّ روﳼ ﳏﳣﻞ ﻠﳣﻬﯿﺪ ﻟﺰ دة ﺪد اﻟﻘﻮات ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﲆ ﲣﻮم ا ٔراﴈ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ !.. _ اﻻﺳﺗراﺗﯾﺟﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﺳﻛرﯾﺔ اﻷﻣرﯾﻛﯾﺔ ﻟﻌﺎم :2015 ﰲ ﺟﻮﯾﻠﯿﺔ 2015ﴩ اﻟﺒ ﺎﻏﻮن وﺛﯿﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ 24ﺻﻔ ﺔ ﻜﺸﻒ ﺗﻔﺎﺻﯿﻞ " ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨ ّﯿﺔ" اﻟﱵ ﲢﺪّﺛﺖ ﻋﻦ دو ْﻟﺘﲔ ﻻﰟ واﻋﺘﱪﲥﲈ ﺸ ّ ن ﲥﺪﯾﺪا ﴏﳛﺎ ﻠﻤﺼﺎﱀ ا ٔﻣ ﯿﺔ اﻟﻘﻮﻣ ﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ،ﻫﺎ ن ا وﻟﺘﺎن ﻫﲈ روﺳﯿﺎ وﻮر اﻟﺸﲈﻟﯿﺔ ،وﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﻌﺮف ٔ ّن ﺑﯿﻮﻧﻎ ﻧﻎ دو ﻣﺪﻋﻮﻣﺔ روﺳﯿﺎ )إﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ا ﰪ اﻟﺼﯿﲏ( ﳔﻠُﺺ إﱃ ﻧ ﺔ ﻣﻔﺎدﻫﺎ ٔ ّن ﺑ ا وا ﺪا ّ ﯾﻘﺾ ﻣﻀﺠﻊ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ وﳝﺜ ّﻞ ﻗﻄﺐ ر رؤ ﳤﺎ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ،ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒ ﻫﻮ ﲁ ﺴﺎﻃﺔ روﺳﯿﺎ ﲢﺎدﯾّﺔ ،ﻓﻠﱧ ﲢﺪّﺛﺖ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﳌﻬ ّﻤﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺼﲔ إﻻ ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﱂ ﺗﻌﺘﱪﻫﺎ "ﺧﻄﺮا ٔﻣ ﯿﺎ اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺎ"ﯾﻀﺎﱔ اﳋﻄﺮﻦ اﻟﺮوﳼ واﻟﻜﻮري اﻟﺸﲈﱄ ،إذ ﻧﻘﺮ ٔ ﰲ " ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ"ﻣﺎ ﯾﲇ ّﻧﺼﻪ: ﻟﻜﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ ا ول ،ﲢﺎول ﺗﻨﻘ ﺢ ﺟﻮاﻧﺐ ٔﺳﺎﺳﯿﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ا وﱄ ،وﺴ ﺑﻄﺮﯾﻘﺔ ﲥﺪد " ّ ﻣﺼﺎﳊﻨﺎ ا ٔﻣ ﯿﺔ اﻟﻘﻮﻣ ﺔ .ﻓ ﯿ ﺳﺎﳘﺖ روﺳﯿﺎ ﰲ ﳎﺎﻻت ٔﻣ ﯿﺔ ﻣ ﺘﻘﺎة ،ﻣ ﻞ ﻣﲀﲿﺔ ا ﺪرات وﻣﲀﲿﺔ اﻻٕرﻫﺎبٔ ،ﺛﺒ ﺖ ﻣﺮار ًا وﻜﺮار ًا ٔﳖﺎ ﻻ ﲢﱰم ﺳﯿﺎدة ﲑاﳖﺎ ،و ٔﳖﺎ ﺗﻘﻮض ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪة ﻻﺳﺘ ﺪام اﻟﻘﻮة ﻟﺘﺤﻘ ﻖ ﻣ ٓرﲠﺎ و ٔﻫﺪاﻓﻬﺎ .واﻻٕﺟﺮاءات اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ّ ا ٔﻣﻦ ا ٕﻻﻗﻠﳰﻲ ﺑﺼﻮرة ﻣ ﺎﴍة ٔو ﻣﻦ ﻼل ﻗﻮات ﲻﯿ .وﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺘﴫﻓﺎت ﺗ ﳤﻚ اﻟﻌﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﺎت اﻟﱵ وﻗﻌﳤﺎ روﺳﯿﺎ ،واﻟﱱﻣﺖ ﻓﳱﺎ ﻟﻌﻤﻞ وﻓﻘ ًﺎ ﻟ ٔﻋﺮاف ا وﻟﯿﺔ ][...روﺳﯿﺎ ٔﺑﺪت ﺪم ا ﱰام ﻟﺴﯿﺎدة ﲑاﳖﺎ ﻣﺮة ﺗﻠﻮ ا ٔﺧﺮى. "... ﳁﻊ ﺗﻔﺎ ﻞ ا ٔزﻣﺔ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺗﺒﺪو روﺳﯿﺎ ﻣﺼﺪر ﺸﻮﺶ و ﺸﻐﯿﺐ ﲆ اﻟﲋوع اﻻٕﻣﱪ ﱄ ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ ﻓ ٔﻛّﺪت ﺑﺬ اﳊﺎ ﺔ إﱃ وﺿﻊ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺎت و ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠ ّﯿﺎت اﻟﻜﻔ ﺑﺘﻘ ﯿﺪ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺮوس واﺣ ﻮاء دورﱒ اﻟﻔﺎ ﻞ ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ ا ٔوراﺳ ّﯿﺔ وﻫﻮ دور ﳝﺘ ّﺪ ﺗ ٔﺛﲑﻩ إﱃ ﻣ ﺎﻃﻖ ٔﺧﺮى ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﰷﻟﴩق ا ٔوﺳﻂ وﻟ ﺲ ٔد ّل ﲆ ذ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺎ اﻟﺴﻮرﯾﺔ .. 41
وﰲ ٔ ّول رد ﻓﻌﻞ روﳼ رﲰﻲ ﲆ اﻟﻮﺛﯿﻘﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ اﳌﺜﲑة ﻠ ﺪل ﻧ ُﻘﻞ ﻋﻦ دﳝﱰى ﺑ ﺴﻜﻮف اﳌﺘ ﺪث ﰟ اﻟﻜﺮﻣﻠﲔ ﻗﻮ "ﳌﺴﻨﺎ ﳖ ﺎ ﺗﺼﺎدﻣ ﺎ ﯾﻔ ﻘﺮ إﱃ ٔي ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﯿﺔ ﲡﺎﻩ ..! " ﺑ : -2015-ﻧﻌﺮض ﻠﯿﲂ ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﯾﲇ اﻟﻨﺺ اﻟﲀﻣﻞ ﻟﻼﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ The United States Military’s Contribution To National Security June 2015 Chairman’s Foreword Chairman’s Foreword Today’s global security environment is the most unpredictable I have seen in 40 years of service. Since the last National Military Strategy was published in 2011, global disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode. We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups – all taking advantage of rapid technological change. Future conflicts will come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much more technically challenging battlefield. They will have increasing implications to the U.S. homeland. This National Military Strategy describes how we will employ our military forces to protect and advance our national interests. We must be able to rapidly adapt to new threats while maintaining comparative advantage over traditional ones. Success will increasingly depend on how well our military 42
instrument can support the other instruments of power and enable our network of allies and partners. The 2015 NMS continues the call for greater agility, innovation, and integration. It reinforces the need for the U.S. military to remain globally engaged to shape the security environment and to preserve our network of alliances. It echoes previous documents in noting the imperative within our profession to develop leaders of competence, character, and consequence. But it also asserts that the application of the military instrument of power against state threats is very different than the application of military power against non-state threats. We are more likely to face prolonged campaigns than conflicts that are resolved quickly‌that control of escalation is becoming more difficult and more important‌and that as a hedge against unpredictability with reduced resources, we may have to adjust our global posture. Despite what is likely to be a difficult future, we are blessed to be able to count on the young Americans who choose to serve, to live an uncommon life, and to defend their fellow citizens. Our focus must remain that they are the best-led and best-equipped force in the world. The 2015 National Military Strategy of the United States offers a blueprint towards that end. This 2015 National Military Strategy addresses the need to counter revisionist states that are challenging international norms as well as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that are 43
undermining transregional security. We are working with allies and partners to deter, deny, and – when necessary – defeat potential state adversaries. Concurrently, we are leading multiple coalition efforts to disrupt, degrade, and defeat VEOs. Central to these efforts is strengthening our global network of allies and partners. This integrated strategy requires us to conduct synchronized operations around the globe, implement institutional reforms at home, and sustain the capabilities, capacity, and readiness required to prevail in conflicts that may differ significantly in scope, scale, and duration The Strategic Environment Complexity and rapid change characterize today’s strategic environment, driven by globalization, the diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts. Globalization is impacting nearly every aspect of human activity. People, products, and information are flowing across borders at unprecedented speed and volume, acting as catalysts for economic development while also increasing societal tensions, competition for resources, and political instability. Central to globalization is the spread of new technologies that enable a global information environment and empower people to see more, share more, create more, and organize faster than ever before. Individuals and groups today have access to more information than entire governments once possessed. They can swiftly organize and act on what they learn, sometimes leading to violent change. States, meanwhile, are 44
using information sharing to develop advanced capabilities of their own. When applied to military systems, this diffusion of technology is challenging competitive advantages long held by the United States such as early warning and precision strike. These changes are amplified by shifting demographics. Youth populations are rapidly growing in Africa and the Middle East, regions that face resource shortages, struggling economies, and deep social fissures. Meanwhile, populations in Europe and across northern Asia are set to decline and get older. Around the world, millions of people are flowing from the countryside into cities in search of work where they are exposed to cultural differences, alienation, and disease. They also are moving across borders and seas in growing numbers, accepting great risk and placing strain on nations that receive them. Despite these changes, states remain the international system’s dominant actors. They are preeminent in their capability to harness power, focus human endeavors, and provide security. Most states today — led by the United States, its allies, and partners — support the established institutions and processes dedicated to preventing conflict, respecting sovereignty, and furthering human rights. Some states, however, are attempting to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens our national security interests. While Russia has contributed in select security areas, such as 45
counternarcotics and counterterrorism, it also has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia’s military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces. These actions violate numerous agreements that Russia has signed in which it committed to act in accordance with international norms, including the UN Charter, Helsinki Accords, Russia-NATO Founding Act, Budapest Memorandum, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Iran also poses strategic challenges to the international community. It is pursuing nuclear and missile delivery technologies despite repeated United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that it cease such efforts. It is a statesponsor of terrorism that has undermined stability in many nations, including Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Iran’s actions have destabilized the region and brought misery to countless people while denying the Iranian people the prospect of a prosperous future. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies also contradicts repeated demands by the international community to cease such efforts. These capabilities directly threaten its neighbors, especially the Republic of Korea and Japan. In time, they will threaten the U.S. homeland as well. North Korea also has conducted cyber attacks, including causing major damage to a U.S. corporation. We support China’s rise and encourage it to become a partner for 46
greater international security. However, China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region. For example, its claims to nearly the entire South China Sea are inconsistent with international law. The international community continues to call on China to settle such issues cooperatively and without coercion. China has responded with aggressive land reclamation efforts that will allow it to position military forces astride vital international sea lanes. None of these nations are believed to be seeking direct military conflict with the United States or our allies. Nonetheless, they each pose serious security concerns which the international community is working to collectively address by way of common policies, shared messages, and coordinated action. As part of that effort, we remain committed to engagement with all nations to communicate our values, promote transparency, and reduce the potential for miscalculation. Accordingly, we continue to invest in a substantial military-to-military relationship with China and we remain ready to engage Russia in areas of common interest, while urging both nations to settle their disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law. Concurrent with state challenges, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) — led by al Qaida and the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) — are working to undermine transregional security, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Such groups are dedicated to radicalizing populations, spreading 47
violence, and leveraging terror to impose their visions of societal organization. They are strongest where governments are weakest, exploiting people trapped in fragile or failed states. In many locations, VEOs coexist with transnational criminal organizations, where they conduct illicit trade and spread corruption, further undermining security and stability. In this complex strategic security environment, the U.S. military does not have the luxury of focusing on one challenge to the exclusion of others. It must provide a full range of military options for addressing both revisionist states and VEOs. Failure to do so will result in greater risk to our country and the international order. II. The Military Environment The United States is the world’s strongest nation, enjoying unique advantages in technology, energy, alliances and partnerships, and demographics. However, these advantages are being challenged. For the past decade, our military campaigns primarily have consisted of operations against violent extremist networks. But today, and into the foreseeable future, we must pay greater attention to challenges posed by state actors. They increasingly have the capability to contest regional freedom of movement and threaten our homeland. Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles, precision strike technologies, unmanned systems, space and cyber capabilities, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – technologies designed to counter U.S. military advantages and curtail access to the global commons. Emerging technologies are impacting the calculus of deterrence 48
and conflict management by increasing uncertainty and compressing decision space. For example, attacks on our communications and sensing systems could occur with little to no warning, impacting our ability to assess, coordinate, communicate, and respond. As a result, future conflicts between states may prove to be unpredictable, costly, and difficult to control. VEOs are taking advantage of emergent technologies as well, using information tools to propagate destructive ideologies, recruit and incite violence, and amplify the perceived power of their movements. They advertise their actions to strike fear in opponents and generate support for their causes. They use improvised explosive devices (IED), suicide vests, and tailored cyber tools to spread terror while seeking ever more sophisticated capabilities, including WMD. Today, the probability of U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing. Should one occur, however, the consequences would be immense. VEOs, in contrast, pose an immediate threat to transregional security by coupling readily available technologies with extremist ideologies. Overlapping state and non-state violence, there exists an area of conflict where actors blend techniques, capabilities, and resources to achieve their objectives. Such “hybrid� conflicts may consist of military forces assuming a non-state identity, as Russia did in the Crimea, or involve a VEO fielding rudimentary combined arms capabilities, as ISIL has 49
demonstrated in Iraq and Syria. Hybrid conflicts also may be comprised of state and non-state actors working together toward shared objectives, employing a wide range of weapons such as we have witnessed in eastern Ukraine. Hybrid conflicts serve to increase ambiguity, complicate decision-making, and slow the coordination of effective responses. Due to these advantages to the aggressor, it is likely that this form of conflict will persist well into the future.
III. An Integrated Military Strategy
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The U.S. military’s purpose is to protect our Nation and win our wars. We do this through military operations to defend the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. Our military supports diplomatic, informational, and economic activities that promote our enduring national interests. As detailed in the 2015 National Security Strategy, our enduring national interests are: the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and a rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. From the enduring national interests, the U.S. military has derived National Security Interests (NSIs) to prioritize its missions. The NSIs are: the survival of the Nation; the prevention of catastrophic attack against U.S. territory; the security of the global economic system; the security, confidence, and reliability of our allies; the protection of American citizens abroad; and the preservation and extension of universal values. NSIs guide military leaders in providing recommendations on when and where our Nation should use military force, the type and degree of force to employ, and at what cost. 51
To secure these interests, this National Military Strategy provides an integrated approach composed of three National Military Objectives: to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries; to disrupt, degrade, and defeat VEOs; and to strengthen our global network of allies and partners. The U.S. military pursues these objectives by conducting globally integrated operations, implementing institutional reforms at home, and sustaining the capabilities, capacity, and readiness required to prevail in conflicts that may differ significantly in scope, scale, and duration. These NMOs support the force planning guidance prescribed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. It states that our Nation requires a U.S. military with the capacity, capability, and readiness to simultaneously defend the homeland; conduct sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and, in multiple regions, deter aggression and assure allies through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails, at any given time, our military will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale, multiphased campaign while denying the objectives of — or imposing unacceptable costs on — another aggressor in a different region.
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A. Deter, Deny, and Defeat State Adversaries The U.S. military is the world’s preeminent Joint Force. It supports the Nation by providing a full range of options to protect the homeland and our interests while assuring the security of our allies. The U.S. military deters aggression by maintaining a credible nuclear capability that is safe, secure, and effective; conducting forward engagement and operations; and maintaining Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces prepared to deploy and conduct operations of sufficient scale and duration to accomplish their missions. Forward deployed, rotational, and globally responsive forces regularly demonstrate the capability and will to act. Should deterrence fail to prevent aggression, the U.S. 53
military stands ready to project power to deny an adversary’s objectives and decisively defeat any actor that threatens the U.S. homeland, our national interests, or our allies and partners. Deterring a direct attack on the United States and our allies is a priority mission, requiring homeland and regional defenses tied to secure conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. Thus U.S. strategic forces remain always ready. U.S. military defenses are enhanced by our North American Aerospace Defense Command Agreement with Canada and close cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. These homeland defense partnerships are complemented by growing investments in the cyber realm designed to protect vital networks and infrastructure. In case of aggression, denying adversaries their goals will be an immediate objective. This places special emphasis on maintaining highly-ready forces forward, as well as well trained and equipped surge forces at home, resilient logistics and transportation infrastructures, networked intelligence, strong communications links, and interoperability with allies and partners. Timely interagency planning and coordination also will be leveraged to develop holistic options that serve to integrate all elements of national power. Should any actor directly attack the United States or our interests, the U.S. military will take action to defend our Nation. We are prepared to project power across all domains to stop aggression and win our Nation’s wars by decisively defeating adversaries. While we prefer to act in concert with others, we will 54
act unilaterally if the situation demands. In the event of an attack, the U.S. military will respond by inflicting damage of such magnitude as to compel the adversary to cease hostilities or render it incapable of further aggression. War against a major adversary would require the full mobilization of all instruments of national power and, to do so, the United States sustains a full-spectrum military that includes strong Reserve and National Guard forces. They provide the force depth needed to achieve victory while simultaneously deterring other threats. B. Disrupt, Degrade, and Defeat VEOs Today, the United States is leading a broad coalition of nations to defeat VEOs in multiple regions by applying pressure across the full extent of their networks. In concert with all elements of national power and international partnerships, these efforts aim to disrupt VEO planning and operations, degrade support structures, remove leadership, interdict finances, impede the flow of foreign fighters, counter malign influences, liberate captured territory, and ultimately defeat them. In support of these efforts, we are widely distributing U.S. military forces and leveraging globally integrated command and control processes to enable transregional operations. Credible regional partners are vital to sustaining counter-VEO campaigns. The U.S. military contributes select combat forces, enabling technologies, and training in support of local partners that provide the majority of forces necessary to 55
restore and secure their homelands. Timelines for these campaigns generally are long. Therefore, they must be conducted in a politically, financially, and militarily sustainable manner that optimizes the power of coalitions, as we are demonstrating in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, the United States and our NATO partners are teaming with the National Unity Government to provide security by way of the Resolute Support mission, working toward establishing a long-term counterterrorism partnership. Similarly, in Iraq a broad coalition of over 60 nations is providing security assistance, training, airlift, and strike support in its struggle against ISIL. Defeating VEOs also requires an appreciation of the nexus between such groups and transnational criminal organizations. A fuller understanding of that relationship will allow us to disrupt illicit funds, weapons, and fighters that are flowing into conflict-ridden regions. Such knowledge also will allow us to work with law enforcement officials to more effectively protect our homeland from terrorists. Defeating VEOs ultimately requires providing security and economic opportunities to at-risk populations. Thus counter-VEO campaigns demand that our military, in close coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations, assist local governments in addressing the root causes of conflict. As part of that effort, the U.S. military regularly contributes to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief endeavors aimed at alleviating suffering and restoring hope 56
C. Strengthen Our Global Network of Allies and Partners America’s global network of allies and partners is a unique strength that provides the foundation for international security and stability. These partnerships also facilitate the growth of prosperity around the world, from which all nations benefit. As we look to the future, the U.S. military and its allies and partners will continue to protect and promote shared interests. We will preserve our alliances, expand partnerships, maintain a global stabilizing presence, and conduct training, exercises, security cooperation activities, and military-to-military engagement. Such activities increase the capabilities and capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter aggression and defeat extremists. The presence of U.S. military forces in key locations around the world underpins the international order and provides opportunities to engage with other countries while positioning forces to respond to crises. Therefore we will press forward with the rebalance to the AsiaPacific region, placing our most advanced capabilities and greater capacity in that vital theater. We will strengthen our alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. We also will deepen our security relationship with India and build upon our partnerships with New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Bangladesh. Such efforts are essential to maintaining regional peace and building capabilities to provide for missile defense, 57
cyber security, maritime security, and disaster relief. In Europe, we remain steadfast in our commitment to our NATO allies. NATO provides vital collective security guarantees and is strategically important for deterring conflict, particularly in light of recent Russian aggression on its periphery. U.S. Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, our European Reassurance Initiative, NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, and the many activities, exercises, and investments contained in them serve to underline our dedication to alliance solidarity, unity, and security. We also will continue to support our NATO partners to increase their interoperability with U.S. forces and to provide for their own defense. In the Middle East, we remain fully committed to Israel’s security and Qualitative Military Edge. We also are helping other vital partners in that region increase their defenses, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt, and Pakistan. Additionally, we are working to strengthen institutions across Africa, aimed at fostering stability, building peacekeeping capacity, and countering transregional extremism. And the U.S. military is supporting interagency efforts with Latin American and Caribbean states to promote regional stability and counter transnational criminal organizations. Combined training and exercises increase the readiness of our allies and partners while enhancing the interoperability and responsiveness of U.S. forces. With advanced partners like NATO, 58
Australia, Japan, and Korea, our exercises emphasize sophisticated capabilities such as assuring access to contested environments and deterring and responding to hybrid conflicts. With other partners, training often focuses on improving skills in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, disaster relief, support to law enforcement, and search and rescue. Security cooperation activities are at the heart of our efforts to provide a stabilizing presence in forward theaters. These build relationships that serve mutual security interests. They also develop partner military capabilities for self-defense and support to multinational operations. Through such activities, we coordinate with other U.S. agencies and mission partners to build cultural awareness and affirm relationships that increase regional stability. D. Advance Globally Integrated Operations The execution of integrated operations requires a Joint Force capable of swift and decisive force projection around the world. As detailed in the “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020,� globally integrated operations emphasize eight key components: employing mission command; seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative; leveraging global agility; partnering; demonstrating flexibility in establishing joint forces; improving crossdomain synergy; using flexible, low-signature capabilities; and being increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended consequences. Such operations rely upon a global logistics and 59
transportation network, secure communications, and integrated joint and partner intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In executing globally integrated operations, U.S. military forces work closely with international and interagency partners to generate strategic options for our Nation. In doing so, military commanders use the following prioritization of military missions to advise our national leaders: Maintain a Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. U.S. strategic forces are kept at the highest state of readiness, always prepared to respond to threats to the homeland and our vital interests. Accordingly, we are investing to sustain and modernize our nuclear enterprise. We continue to implement the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and 2011 New START Treaty while ensuring our national defense needs are met. Concurrently, we are enhancing our command and control capabilities for strategic and regional nuclear forces. Provide for Military Defense of the Homeland. Emerging state and non-state capabilities pose varied and direct threats to our homeland. Thus we are striving to interdict attack preparations abroad, defend against limited ballistic missile attacks, and protect cyber systems and physical infrastructure. Key homeland defense capabilities include resilient space-based and terrestrial indications and warning systems; an integrated intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination architecture; a Ground-Based Interceptor force; a Cyber Mission Force; and, ready ground, air 60
and naval forces. We also are leveraging domestic and regional partnerships to improve information sharing and unity of effort. These capabilities will better defend us against both high technology threats and terrorist dangers. Defeat an Adversary. In the event of an attack against the United States or one of its allies, the U.S. military along with allies and partners will project power across multiple domains to decisively defeat the adversary by compelling it to cease hostilities or render its military incapable of further aggression. Provide a Global, Stabilizing Presence. The presence of U.S. military forces in key locations around the world underpins the security of our allies and partners, provides stability to enhance economic growth and regional integration, and positions the Joint Force to execute emergency actions in response to a crisis. Combat Terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic VEOs use to advance their interests. The best way to counter VEOs is by way of sustained pressure using local forces augmented by specialized U.S. and coalition military strengths such as ISR, precision strike, training, and logistical support. Counterterrorism operations also involve coordinated efforts with other U.S. agencies, working together to interdict and disrupt threats targeting the U.S. homeland. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. Nuclear, chemical, and biological agents pose uniquely destructive threats. They can empower a small group of actors with terrible destructive potential. Thus combatting WMD as far from our homeland as possible is a key mission for the 61
U.S. military. Toward that end, we team with multinational and U.S. interagency partners to locate, track, interdict, and secure or destroy WMD, its components, and the means and facilities needed to make it, wherever possible. Deny an Adversary’s Objectives. Denying an adversary’s goals or imposing unacceptable costs is central to achieving our objectives. This puts emphasis on maintaining highly-ready, forward-deployed forces, well trained and equipped surge forces at home, robust transportation infrastructure and assets, and reliable and resilient communications links with allies and partners. These capabilities provide the means to curtail crises before they can escalate. Respond to Crisis and Conduct Limited Contingency Operations. Another form of power projection is teaming with partners to conduct limited contingency operations. Such operations may involve flowing additional U.S. forces and capabilities to a given region to strengthen deterrence, prevent escalation, and reassure allies. Additionally, the U.S. military sustains ready forces around the world to defend our citizens and protect diplomatic facilities. Conduct Military Engagement and Security Cooperation. The U.S. military strengthens regional stability by conducting security cooperation activities with foreign defense establishments. Such activities support mutual security interests, develop partner capabilities for self-defense, and prepare for multinational operations. Strengthening partners is fundamental to our security, building strategic depth for our national defense. Conduct 62
Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. The U.S. military also remains ready to conduct limited stability operations when required, working with interagency, coalition, and host-nation forces. Such efforts emphasize unique elements of our forces: civilmilitary affairs teams, building partner capacity, information support teams, and cultural outreach programs. Provide Support to Civil Authorities. When man-made or natural disasters impact the United States, our military community offers support to civil authorities in concert with other U.S. agencies. As part of that effort, we integrate military and civil capabilities through FEMA’s National Planning System and National Exercise Program. During domestic events, U.S. military forces — including National Guard and Reserve units — provide trained personnel, communications capabilities, lift, and logistical and planning support. They work alongside civilian first-responders to mitigate the impact of such incidents and keep our citizens safe. Conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. Over the years, U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen have quickly and effectively delivered life-sustaining aid to desperate people all around the world. Such efforts sometimes last only a few weeks. At other times, they last much longer. In all cases, taking action to relieve suffering reflects our professional ethos and the values in which we believe. E. Resourcing the Strategy We will not realize the goals of this 2015 63
National Military Strategy without sufficient resources. Like those that came before it, this strategy assumes a commitment to projecting global influence, supporting allies and partners, and maintaining the All-Volunteer Force. To execute this strategy, the U.S. military requires a sufficient level of investment in capacity, capabilities, and readiness so that when our Nation calls, our military remains ready to deliver success. IV. Joint Force Initiatives The U.S. Joint Force combines people, processes, and programs to execute globally integrated operations and achieve our National Military Objectives. This requires innovative leaders, optimized decision-making, and advanced military capabilities. A. People and the Profession of Arms: Improving Upon Our Greatest Advantage Our military and civilian professionals are our decisive advantage. They are the foundation of our operational excellence and our ability to successfully innovate. Therefore, we are dedicated to building creative, adaptive professionals skilled at leading organizational change while operating in complexity. To accomplish this, we are evolving our organizational culture and strengthening our leadership. As we look to future challenges, the U.S. military will remain ready to meet unanticipated demands. We must prepare our Service members to fight under conditions of complexity and persistent danger, conditions that demand courage, toughness, adaptability, and endurance as well as an abiding commitment to our Nation’s values and professional military ethic. We are prioritizing leader development. To retain 64
our warfighting edge, we are stressing innovative leader development across the All-Volunteer Force — officer, enlisted, and civilian — through a combination of training, education, broad experience, and opportunity. These elements build the expertise that is the wellspring of innovation. Toward that end, our training increasingly blends physical and virtual experiences to simulate contested environments and operations in denied or degraded conditions. Our military education system also is updating how it selects and incentivizes faculty, rewards critical thought, and promotes our most innovative minds. Continuous, demanding education inspires new ideas and identifies better ways to accomplish our missions. In developing the Joint leaders of tomorrow, we emphasize six attributes. Our leaders will: Strive to understand the environment in which they operate and the effect of applying all instruments of national power Anticipate and adapt to surprise, uncertainty, and chaos Work to recognize change and lead transitions Operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding Make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms Think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations We are adapting our organizational culture. To enhance our warfighting capability, we must attract, develop, and retain the right people at every echelon. Central to 65
this effort is understanding how society is changing. Today’s youth grow up in a thoroughly connected environment. They are comfortable using technology and interactive social structures to solve problems. These young men and women are tomorrow’s leaders and we need their service. Therefore, the U.S. military must be willing to embrace social and cultural change to better identify, cultivate, and reward such talent. To do so, we are exploring how our personnel policies and promotion practices must evolve to leverage 21st century skills. We are seeking new ways to attract people with valuable civilian sector experience. We also are experimenting with giving military personnel greater access to civilian innovation practices through flexible career options. In this effort, the Reserve Components provide a critical bridge to the civilian population, infusing the Joint Force with unique skills and diverse perspectives. Also critical to building the best military possible are our efforts to further integrate women across the force by providing them greater opportunities for service. We are promoting ethical leadership. Ethical leadership is central to protecting and strengthening our military family. This requires cultivating a professional climate that reinforces our respect for core values, promotes accountability, and appreciates the contributions of every member of our professional community. To help us meet these goals, we are moving forward with a campaign of trust that stresses mutual 66
respect and emphasizes the importance of a positive culture enhanced by quality programs for sexual assault prevention and response, suicide prevention, and high-risk behavior avoidance. B. Processes: Capturing Innovation and Efficiencies Agile, efficient, and focused processes are means to accomplish our strategic objectives. Such processes include promoting greater interoperability with joint, interagency, and international partners while encouraging action through decentralized execution. We are conducting resource-informed planning. For nearly a generation, we have consumed readiness as quickly as we have generated it. As a result, our long-term readiness has declined. Therefore, we are taking action to better balance achieving our operational goals with sustaining ready surge forces at home. We are revising operational plans to be more flexible, creative, and integrated across Combatant Commands. We also are providing the Services with time to reset, modernize, and replace vital equipment. Our goal is to strengthen deterrence while ensuring the long-term viability of our full-spectrum power projection capacity. Additionally, we are more fully coordinating requirements, plans, and operational execution at home and abroad to maximize collective capabilities against common concerns. And we are using tailored forces that deploy for limited timeframes to execute specific missions, recognizing that “campaign persistence� is necessary against determined adversaries. We are improving our global agility. The ability to quickly aggregate and disaggregate 67
forces anywhere in the world is the essence of global agility. We are striving to increase our agility by improving campaign planning, sustaining a resilient global posture, and implementing dynamic force management processes that adjust presence in anticipation of events, to better seize opportunities, deter adversaries, and assure allies and partners. We also are more fully sharing forces among Combatant Commands to address transregional threats. We are positioning forces where they are most needed, exemplified by our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region as well as our evolving presence in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. We also are updating international agreements to assure access and provide legal protection for our people. Such agreements allow us to strengthen the relationships that are the foundation of trust. We are demanding greater effectiveness and efficiencies. In a resourceconstrained environment, we are striving to be careful stewards of our resources. Programmatic discipline by the Services has never been more important, as it is vital to generating economic efficiencies. We are working to sustain our industrial base while seeking savings through the Department of Defense’s Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative. We are selectively using contractor support when it best serves the mission. We also are reducing staffs, streamlining functions, eliminating redundancies, and producing more integrated and effective organizations. C. 68
Programs: Sustaining Our Quality Edge Effective programs enable our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen to fight and win. Delivering next-generation programs on schedule and within cost is vital, as our current systems increasingly are being challenged by adversary capabilities. To win against the diverse range of state and non-state threats confronting us, we must think innovatively, challenge assumptions, and embrace change. We are improving joint interoperability. We are in the process of defining the next set of interoperability standards for future capabilities. In view of the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges we increasingly face, our future force will have to operate in contested environments. Key to assuring such access will be deploying secure, interoperable systems between Services, allies, interagency, and commercial partners. Priority efforts in that regard are establishing a Joint Information Environment (JIE), advancing globally integrated logistics, and building an integrated Joint ISR Enterprise. The results of these initiatives — particularly the enhanced connectivity and cybersecurity provided by the JIE — will provide the foundation for future interoperability. We are investing to enhance decisive advantages. Future capabilities must sustain our ability to defend the homeland and project military power globally. Important investments to counter A2/AD, space, cyber, and hybrid threats include: space and terrestrial-based indications and warning systems, integrated and resilient ISR platforms, strategic lift, 69
longrange precision strike weapons, missile defense technologies, undersea systems, remotely operated vehicles and technologies, special operations forces, and the Cyber Mission Force, among others. We also are improving our global sustainment capabilities and upgrading our command and control infrastructure to better support widely dispersed operations. We are modernizing our nuclear enterprise and working to protect our Nation against asymmetric threats. To improve institutional agility, we are expanding relations with American businesses, including many of the most innovative companies in the world, to learn their best practices. Further, we are aligning our programmatic efforts to take advantage of insights gleaned from the Defense Innovation Initiative, which is aimed at identifying potential strategic and operational advantages through wargaming, concept development, and a wide array of technology investments. As we develop new capabilities to counter threats along the continuum of conflict, we also must procure sufficient capacity and readiness to sustain our global responsibilities. This may include evolving traditional platforms. Or it may require developing entirely new systems that are affordable and flexible. In all cases, our programs must allow us to quickly adapt, to counter adversaries employing unexpected techniques or weapons. V. Conclusion This 2015 National Military Strategy provides an overview of our strategic challenges and details how we will 70
employ the Joint Force to keep our Nation, allies, and partners safe. It is a strategy that recognizes the increasing complexity of the global environment, driven by rapid and profound change. It also acknowledges our significant advantages, our commitment to international norms, the importance of our allies and partners, and the powerful allure of freedom and human dignity. When placed in balance against the challenges before us, these strengths will serve us well and help us achieve a more secure future.
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اﻟﺘﻘـﻠﻴﺺ ﻣﻦ أﻫﻤﻴﺔ اﻷﺳﻄﻮل اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﺤﺮ اﻷﺳﻮد ﺮﯾﺪ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ّﺔ ﻗﱰاب ﻣﻦ اﳊﺪود اﻟﻐﺮﺑ ّﯿﺔ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ﱪ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ وٕاﻓﺮاغ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﰲ اﻟﺒﺤﺮ ا ٔﺳﻮد ﻣﻦ ﻣﻀﻤﻮﻧﻪ ،ﱪ إﺿﻌﺎف دورﻫﺎ ا ﻓﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ا ٔﺳﻄﻮل ّ ّ اﳌﻔﺼﲇ ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﳉﻨﻮﺑﯿﺔ ﺣ ﺚ ﺗ ﺼﺐ اﻟﻘﺎ ﺪة ا ٔ ّﱒ ﰲ ﺷﺒﻪ ﺟﺰﺮة اﻟﻘﺮم ﺴﻮاﺳﺘﻮﺑﻮل ﻟﺘﻘﻮم ﲟﻬﺎم ﻣ ّﻨﻮ ﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺑ ﳯﺎ ﺣﲈﯾﺔ اﳊﺰام ﻗ ﺼﺎدي واﳌﻼ ﺔ اﻟﺒﺤﺮﯾﺔ ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺸﺎرﻛﺔ ﰲ ﲻﻠﯿﺎت ﺣﻔﻆ اﻟﺴﻼم ا ٔﳑﯿﺔ ... ﰥ اﻟﻘﺮم ﺎم 2014ﺑﻌﺪ اﺳﺘﻔ ﺎء ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﺗﻘﺮ ٔ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﺣﺴﺎ ﻫﻮ إﻗﺪام روﺳﯿﺎ ﲆ ّ ﺟﺮى ﻻٕﻗﻠﲓ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ اﳌﳣﺘّﻊ ﲝﲂ ذاﰐ واﺳﻊ؛ ﻫﺬا ﻧﻀﲈم ﻠّﺺ اﻟﺮوس ﻣﻦ ﻣ ٔزق اﻧﺘﻔﺎء ﺴﻌﻰ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ اﳌﱪر اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﱐ ﻟﺘﻮا ﺪ ٔﺳﻄﻮل اﻟﺒﺤﺮ ا ٔﺳﻮد ﲝﻠﻮل ﺎم ، 2017 إﱃ اﺳ ﯿﯿﻒ إﱃ ﻓﻠﻜﻬﺎ ﱪ اﺳﺘﺪرا ﺎ إﱃ ﻠﻒ ﺷﲈل ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ و ﻟﺘﺎﱄ إد ﺎﻟﻬﺎ ﲢﺖ اﳌﻈ ا ٔﻣ ﯿﺔ ا ٔﻃﻠﺴﯿﺔ ﲟﺎ ﯾﻘ ّﺪ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ا ب اﻟﺮوﳼ ُوﳚﻬﺰ ﲆ ﺧﻂ دﻓﺎ ﻪ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﻲ ﰲ اﻟﺒﺤﺮ ا ٔﺳﻮد ا ي ﯾﺒﺪو اﻟﯿﻮم ﰲ ٔزﱓ ٔ ﻣﻪ ﳤﺎء اﻟﺘﻀﯿﯿﻘﺎت اﻟﱵ ﰷﻧﺖ ﲤﺎرﺳﻬﺎ اﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ﺑﲔ اﳊﲔ وا ٓﺧﺮ وﱔ ﺗﻀﯿﯿﻘﺎت ﺰﯾﺪ ٔوﺗﻨﻘﺺ ﺣﺴﺐ اﻟﺘﻘﻠّﺒﺎت اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ واﻟﻀﻐﻮط اﻟﺸﻌﺒﯿﺔ إذ ﰷﻧﺖ روﺳﯿﺎ ُﲢﺮم ٔﺣ ﺎ ﻣﻦ إد ﺎل ٓﻟﯿﺎت ﻋﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ﺪﯾﺪة إﱃ ا ٔﺳﻄﻮل..
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اﻟﺨﺸﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻧﻀﻤﺎم ﺷﺮق أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ إﻟﻰ روﺳﻴﺎ ﲣﴙ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻣﻦ ٔن ﺗﺆول ا ٔﻣﻮر ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ إﱃ اﻧﻘﺴﺎ ﺎ وذﻫﺎب ﺷﻄﺮﻫﺎ اﻟﴩﰶ إﱃ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻛﲈ ﺪث ﻣﻊ ﺷﺒﻪ ﺟﺰﺮة اﻟﻘﺮم،وﻫﻮ ا ٔﻣﺮ ا ي ﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﺴ ﺴﯿﻐﻪ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﻮن ﻧﻈﺮا ﳌﺎ ﯾُﻌﺮف ﺑﻪ ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺮﻛّﺰ ﻠﱶوة وﻠﺼﻨﺎ ﺎت اﻟﺜﻘ ن ،ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ اﳊﺮص ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ ﲆ ﻋﺰل روﺳﯿﺎ وﲥﻤ ﺶ دورﻫﺎ ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ و ﰲ ﺳ ﻞ ذ ﺮاﻫﺎ ...":ﻗﺪ وﻃﺪت واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻼﻗﺎﲥﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺳﺒﻊ ﲨﻬﻮر ت ﺳﻮﻓ ﺘﯿﺔ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ وﱔٔ :ذرﺑﯿﺠ ﺎن، ﺟﻮرﺟ ﺎ ،ﰷزاﺧﺴﺘﺎن ،ﻗﺮ ﺴﺘﺎن ،ﻃﺎﺟﻜﺴﺘﺎن ﺮﳈ ﺴﺘﺎنٔ ،وز ﺴﺘﺎن" ،ﺸﲁ ﻫﺎم ،ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺴﻨﻮات ا ٔﺧ ـﺮة ،ﺴ ﺐ رﻏﺒﳤﺎ ﴪ اﻟﻌﺰ ﲆ اﻟﺼﻌﯿﺪ ﻗ ﺼﺎدي ،ﰲ ﳎﺎل اﻟﱶوات ﰲ ٓﺳ ﯿﺎ اﻟﻮﺳـﻄﻰ ،وٕاﻋ ﺎدة اﳊﯿﻮﯾﺔ واﻟ ﺸﺎط إﱃ ﻃﺮﯾﻖ اﳊﺮﺮ .ﻣﻊ إﺑﻌﺎد روﺳﯿﺎ ﻓ ٔﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﻣﻌﻈﻢ ﺗ ا ول ﺷـﺮاﻛﺔ ﻣ ﻊ ﻠ ﻒ ا ٔﻃﻠﴘ ﰟ اﻟﴩاﻛﺔ ﻣﻦ ٔ ﻞ اﻟﺴﻼم"..12
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-ﻣوﺳﻰ اﻟزﻋﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ "اﻻﺳﺗراﺗﯾﺟﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻟﻠوﻻﯾﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﺣدة ..ﺣرب ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﻧﺎﻓﺳﯾن أﻋداء وأﺻدﻗﺎء"
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اﻣﺘﺪاد ]ﻣﺎ[ﻟﻠﺴﺠﺎل ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮق اﻷوﺳﻂ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﻜﻮن واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻗﺪ ﲻﺪت ﻓﻌﻼ إﱃ إﺷﻌﺎل ﻓ ﯿﻞ ا ٔزﻣﺔ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ”ﻋﻘﺎ “ ﳌﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﲆ ﻣﻮاﻗﻔﻬﺎ ”اﳌ ّﳣﺮدة“ ﰲ اﻟﴩق ا ٔوﺳﻂ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻠﻔﺎت ﺎرﻗﺔ ﯾ ٔﰐ ﲆ ر ٔﺳﻬﺎ اﳌﻠﻒ اﻟﺴﻮري وا ٕﻻ ﺮاﱐ ،وﺑﻌﯿﺪا ﻋﻦ ﻣ ﻄﻖ ”اﳉﺮﳝﺔ واﻟﻌﻘﺎب“ﻣﻦ ﺑﲔ ا ٔدوات اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳ ّﯿﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت ا وﻟﯿﺔ ﳒﺪ ﻣﺎ ُﺴ ّﻤﻰ“اﳌﻘﺎﯾﻀﺔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳ ّﯿﺔ“ﳁﻦ اﳌﻬﻢ ﻠﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ٔن ﲤﺘ ورﻗﺔ ﺿﻐﻂ إﺿﺎﻓ ﺔ ﲆ روﺳﯿﺎ وﻟﻦ ﲡﺪ ٔﻓﻀﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺸﺎ ﺴﳤﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻘﻄﺔ ﺳﺎﺧ ﺔ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ،وﻟﻮ ﺪ إﱃ اﻟﻮراء ..إﱃ ا ٔ م ا ٔوﱃ ﻻﺣ ﺎ ﺎت ﻣ ﺪان ﺳﺘﻘﻼل ﻟﻌﺎﲳﺔ ﯿﯿﻒ ﻧﻌﱶ ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﻀﺪ ﻓﻜﺮة وﺟﻮد ٔ د ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﺣﺮﺖ وﲢﺮك اﳌﺸﻬﺪ ﻣﻦ وراء اﻟﺴﺘﺎر إذ ﺗﻘﻔﺰ إﱃ ٔذﻫﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﺻﻮرة ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﲔ ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﲔ -ﰷن ﻣﻦ ﺑ ﳯﻢ اﻟﺴ ﺎﺗﻮر اﶺﻬﻮري ﺟﻮن ﻣﺎﻛﲔ -وﱒ ﯾﻘﻔﻮن ﺟ ﺒﺎ إﱃ ﺟ ﺐ ﻣﻊ اﶈﺘ ﲔ ”اﳌﺮﯾﺒﲔ“ا ﻦ ﺮﺗﺪون ﺑﺪﻻت ﻣ ﺸﺎﲠﺔ وﯾﻌﺘﺼﻤﻮن ﲞﯿﺎم ﻣ ﺸﺎﲠﺔ ﰲ ﻣ ﺪان ﺳﺘﻘﻼل ﻜ ﯿﻒ !!.. ﻓﺎﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ﻗﺪ ٔﺳﻔﺮت ﻋﻦ و ﻬﺎ اﻻٕﻣﱪ ﱄ اﳌﻀﺎد ﻟﲁ ﳏﺎو ﺻﻌﻮد ٔو ﻫﳰﻨﺔ ﻣﻦ ٔي دو ﺻﻐﲑة ٔم ﺒﲑة ﻣ ﺬ ﺎم 1992ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﴩت "ﻧﯿﻮﯾﻮرك ﳝﺰ" ﺗﻔﺎﺻﯿﻞ اﻟﺮؤﯾﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ اﳉﺪﯾﺪة ﻟ ٔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ اﻟﱵ ﺷﺎرك ﰲ وﺿﻌﻬﺎ اﻟﺒ ﺎﻏﻮن وﳎﻠﺲ ا ٔﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮﱊ ..
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اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ اﻟﺘﺮدد اﻷوروﺑﻲ ﺣﻴﺎل اﻟﻤﻠﻒ اﻷوﻛﺮاﻧﻲ
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ﺑﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﳊﺎل ﻻ ﺴ ﺘﻄﯿﻊ اﳊﺪﯾﺚ ﻋﻦ اورو وا ﺪة ،ﻓ ﺤﻦ ٕازاء ”اﻧﻘﺴﺎم“ ٔوروﰊ ٕازاء ا ٔزﻣﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ اﳌﺴﺘﻌﺮة ﻣ ﺬ ٔﺷﻬﺮ ،ﻟﻜ ﻨﺎ ﲔ ﻧﺘ ﺪّث ﻋﻦ ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﻓﺎٕﻧﻨﺎ ﻗﻄﻌﺎ ﻧﺘ ﺪث ﻋﻦ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺔ ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ ﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺴﻬﻢ ﰻ ﻣﻦ ﺮﻟﲔ و رﺲ ﰲ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮارﻫﺎ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﳼ ﺸﲁ ٔﻛﱶ ﺗ ٔﺛﲑا ووﺿﻮ ﺎ وﰲ رﺻﺪ ﺴﯿﻂ ﻟﺘﻌﺎﻃﻲ ﲢﺎد ﻧﻠﺤﻆ ﺗﻠﻜﺆا ﻠﯿﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻃﻲ ﺗﻠﻮح ﳎﺮد اﻟﺘﻠﻮﱖ ﻟﺘﺤﺮك اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي اﶺﺎﻋﻲ وﱂ ﺗﻄﻮرات اﳊﺎ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ اﳌﺮﻜﺔ ﻓﲅ ّ ﻣﻊ ّ ﺗﻌﻤﺪ إﱃ ﺴﻠﯿﻂ ”اﳌﺮ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ“ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت ﲆ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ،..ﻟﯿﻨﻘﺪح اﻟﺴﺆال اﻟﻜ ﲑ :ﻣﺎ ا ي ﳚﻌﻞ ﺣﻀﻮر ا ٔوروﺑﯿﲔ ﻫﺘﺎ إﱃ ﻫﺬﻩ ا ر ﺔ ﻓ ﯾﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ّ ﲟﻠﻒ ﺳﺎﺧﻦ ﳞ ّﻢ دو ﻣﺮﴮﺔ ﻟﻼﻟﺘ ﺎق ﺮﺐ ﲢﺎد ا ٔورورﰊ؟!..
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أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻨﻀﻮي ﺗﺤﺖ اﻟﻤﻈﻠﺔ اﻷﻣﻨﻴﺔ اﻷوروﺑﻴﺔ ﺑﺪاﯾﺔ ﻠﯿﻨﺎ ٔن ﺸﲑ إﱃ ٔ ّن ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﱂ ﺗﻨﻀ ّﻢ ﺑﻌﺪ إﱃ ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ،و ﻟﺘﺎﱄ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﺑﻨﻮد ﻣﻌﺎﻫﺪة ﻣﺎﺳﱰﳜﺖ 13اﳌﺘﻌﻠّﻘﺔ ﺑﺘﻌﺰﺰ اﻟﻮ ﺪة ا ٔوروﺑﯿﺔ اﻗ ﺼﺎد وﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺎ و ٔﻣ ﯿﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﻠﳱﺎ ﲟﺎ ﯾﻘ ّﺪ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﲔ ﰲ ﺗﻌﺎﻃﳱﻢ ﻣﻊ ا ٔزﻣﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ..
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-ﻣﻌﺎھدة ﻓﺎرﻗﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ اﻟﺗﻛﺗل اﻷورﺑﻲ اﻟذي ﺑﺎت ﯾﺣﻣل اﺳم"اﻻﺗﺣﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ"ﺗ ّم ﺗوﻗﯾﻌﮭﺎ ﯾوم 07ﻓﯾﻔري 1992ودﺧﻠت ﺣﯾّز اﻟﻧﻔﺎذ ﻓﻲ ﻧوﻓﻣﺑر 1993
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ارﺗﺒﺎط اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺎت اﻷوروﺑﻴﺔ ﺑﺮوﺳﻴﺎ ﻏﲏ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺒﯿﺎن اﻓ ﺼﺎد ت ا ول ورروﺑﯿﺔ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﻄﺔ ارﺗﺒﺎﻃﺎ ﺒﲑا ﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ﺎﺻﺔ ﰲ ﳎﺎل ّ اﳌﻮارد اﻟﻄﺎﻗ ﺔ ]اﻟﻐﺎز اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﻲ واﻟﻨﻔﻂ[ ﺣ ﺚ ﯾﻮﻓّﺮ اﻟﺮوس 40ﳌﺌﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺎ ﺎت ا ٔوروﺑﯿﲔ ﻠﻄﺎﻗﺔ وﻗﻄﻊ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻻٕﻣﺪادات ﻋﳯﻢ ﺳ ّ ﺸﲁ ﻣﺸﳫﺔ ﺣﻘ ﻘ ﺔ ﳍﻢ. ﻛﲈ ٔ ّن اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ اﳌﻀﺎدة ﺴﺒ ﺖ ﰲ ﺧﺴﺎ ﺮ ﻣﻌﺘﱪة ﻟﻼﻗ ﺼﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﺣ ﺚ اﳓﺪر اﻟﯿﻮرو إﱃ ٔﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ 1.34دوﻻر ،وﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﻤﺪ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ا ٔوروﰊ ﻟﻼﺳ ر إﱃ ﻃﻤ ٔﻧﺔ ﲻﻼﺋﻪ وٕاﺑﻼﻏﻬﻢ ٔن اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت اﻟﻮاﺳﻌﺔ »ﺗﺒﻘﻰ ﺧﻄﺮا ﺑﻌﯿﺪا« ،ﻣﺸﲑا إﱃ ٔﻧﻪ ﺣﱴ اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت ا ٔﻣﲑﯿﺔ ﳏﺪودة“ﻓﻔﻲ ذ إﺷﺎرة واﲵﺔ إﱃ ا ٔ ﺮ ﻗ ﺼﺎدي اﻟﺴﻠﱯ اﻟﻜ ﲑ ﻠﻌﻘﻮ ت ﺗﻄﻮرات ٔزﻣﺔ اﻟﯿﻮ ن واﺣ ل ﺧﺮو ﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﯿﻮرو ﺑﻌﺪ ﺳﺘﻔ ﺎء ﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﻊ ّ ا ٔ ﲑ ،،وﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﻌﲅ ٔ ّن ﲩﻢ اﻟﺘﺒﺎدل اﻟﺘ ﺎري ﺑﲔ روﺳﯿﺎ و ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﺑﻠﻎ 400 ﻣﻠﯿﺎر دوﻻر ﺎم 2012ﻧﻔﻬﻢ ﺳ ﺐ ﻣ ﻨﺎع ا ٔوروﰊ .ﻋﻦ ا ﻫﺎب ﺑﻌﯿﺪا ﰲ ﻓﺮض اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت ﲆ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ.. وﻗﺪ ﳊﻖ اﻟﴬر ﺸﲁ رﺋ ﺲ ﺑ ٔﳌﺎﻧﯿﺎ ٔﻛﱪ ﻗﻮة اﻗ ﺼﺎدﯾﺔ ﰲ ﲢﺎد ،وﰷن اﲢﺎد ﻏﺮف اﻟﺘ ﺎرة واﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ا ٔﳌﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻗﺪ ا ﱰض ﻣ ﺬ اﻟﺒﺪاﯾﺔ ﲆ اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت ﻣﺸﲑا إﱃ ارﺗﺒﺎط ﳓﻮ 300 ٔﻟﻒ ﺎﻣﻞ وﻣﻮﻇﻒ ﰲ ٔﳌﺎﻧﯿﺎ ﻻﻗ ﺼﺎد اﻟﺮوﳼ. وﰲ ﺳﯿﺎق ﻣ ﺼﻞ ﻻ ﯾﻔﻮﺗﻨﺎ ٔن ﻧﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ﻫﻨﺎك ﺷﻌﻮرا ٔوروﺑﯿﺎ ﺎﻣﺎ ﺑ ٔ ّن اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ﲢﺎول اﺳﺘﻐﻼل ﲢﺎد ﻟﺘﻀﯿﯿﻖ اﳋﻨﺎق ﻗ ﺼﺎدي ﲆ روﺳﯿﺎ وﺴﻌﻰ إﱃ ﲢﻘ ﻖ ﻣ ٓرﲠﺎ اﳉﯿﻮاﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠ ّﯿﺔ ﲆ ﺣﺴﺎب ﻣﺼﺎﱀ ٔﻋﻀﺎﺋﻪ ،إذ ﻠﯿﻨﺎ ٔن ﺴ ّ ﻞ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺴﯿﺎق ٔ ّن 78
اﻟﺘﺒﺎدل اﻟﺘ ﺎري ﺑﲔ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﲔ واﻟﺮوس ﯾﻌﺎدل ﻋﴩة ٔﺿﻌﺎف ﲩﻢ رﺗﺒﺎط اﻟﺘ ﺎري ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ اﻟﺮوﳼ..
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اﻧﻘﺴﺎم أوروﺑﻲ ﺣﻴﺎل اﻷزﻣﺔ اﻷوﻛﺮاﻧﻴّﺔ
ﻫﻨﺎك اﻧﻘﺴﺎم ٔوروﰊ ﺣ ﺎل اﳌﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﻦ روﺳﯿﺎ وﻣﺴﺎ ﻓﺮض ﻋﻘﻮ ت ﻠﳱﺎ ،ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ اﳌﺜﺎل :ﻫﻨﺎك ﲤﻠﻤﻞ ﻓﺮﴘ اﳌﺎﱐ ..ﲢ ّﻤﺲ ”ﺑﻠﻄﯿﻘﻲ“ ]ﻣﻦ دول اﻟﺒﻠﻄﯿﻖ اﻟﺜﻼث :اﺳﺘﻮﻧﯿﺎ وﻟﺘﻔ ﺎ وﻟﯿﺘﻮاﻧﯿﺎ[..رﻓﺾ ﻣﻦ اﻠﻮ ﺴﻤﺒﻮرغ وا ﳮﺴﺎ وﻓﻘﺎ ﳌﺎ ٔﻛّﺪﻩ وز ﺮ ﺎرﺟ ﺔ ﻟﻮ ﺴﺒﻮرﲼﺎن ﴏح وز ﺮ ٔﺳ ﯿﻠﺒﻮرن ﰲ ﺗﴫﱖ ﻟﺼﺤﯿﻔﺔ ”دي ﺮﴘ“ ا ﳮﺴﺎوﯾﺔ،وﲤﻠﻤﻞ إﯾﻄﺎﱄ ﺣ ﺚ ّ اﳋﺎرﺟ ﺔ اﻻٕﯾﻄﺎﱄ ٔﻣﺎم ﲱﻔ ﲔ ٔ ﺎﻧﺐ ﰲ روﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻼ“:ا ّٕن ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﻟ ﺲ ﺻﻨﺒﻮر ﻋﻘﻮ ت" ! ،ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻩ رﺳﺎ "دﯾﻐﻮﻟﯿﺔ" إﱃ اﻟﻮﻻ ت اﳌﺘ ﺪة ﻣﻔﺎدُﻫﺎ رﻓﺾ اﻟﻬﳰﻨﺔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻜ ﺔ ﲆ اﻟﻘﺮار ا ٔوروﰊ ،ﻓ ﻌﺪ اﳖﯿﺎر ﲢﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓ ﯿﱵ ﱂ ﯾﻌﺪ اﻟﺘﻘﺎرب ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ- ا ٔوروﰊ ﺑﺘ اﳌﺘﺎﻧﺔ وذ اﻟﻮﺿﻮح ا ي ﰷن ﻠﯿﻪ ﺴ ﺐ ﺷﺒﺢ " اﳋﻄﺮ ا ٔﲪﺮ" ..
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اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺤﻤّﺲ ﻟﻀﻢّ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ ﻻ ﯾﺒﺪو ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﻣ ﺤ ّﻤﺴﺎ ﻻﺳﺘﻘ ﺎل ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ..ﻓﻘﺪ اﺳﺘﻐﺮﻗﺖ ﻣﻔﺎوﺿﺎت ﻧﻀﲈم ﺑﲔ اﳉﺎﻧﺒﲔ ﻣﺪة ﻃﻮﯾ ﺴ ﺎ وﱂ ﯾﻘﻊ اﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ ﰲ ا ﳯﺎﯾﺔ ﺳﻮى إﱃ اﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺔ اﻧ ﺴﺎب ﻣ ﻘ ﻟﴩوط واﻟﺘﻌﻠ ت اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﺗﻨﻔ ﺬﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﯿﯿﻒ،ورﲟﺎ ٔﻣﻜ ﻨﺎ ﺗﻔﺴﲑ ﻫﺬا ”اﻟﱪود“ﲞﺸﯿﺔ ا ٔوروﺑﯿﲔ ﻣﻦ ﰥ دو ﻣ ﻘ ﳌﺸﺎﰻ وا ﯾﻮن وﻣﺎزاﻟﺖ ﺎﺟﺰة ﻋﻦ اﻟﺘ ﻠﺺ ﻣﻦ ا ور اﻟﺮوﳼ رﰬ ﳏﺎوﻻت اﻟﻔﲀك ﻣﻦ ٔﴎ اﻟﺘﺎرﱗ واﳉﻐﺮاﻓ ﺎ.
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اﻷوروﺑﻴﻮن ﻣﺘﻤﺴّﻜﻮن ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻞ اﻟﺴﻠﻤﻲ
ﯾﺒﺪو ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﻣﺼ ّﻤﲈ ﲆ إﳖﺎء ا ٔزﻣﺔ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺳﻠﻤ ّﯿﺎ وﺗﺪ ﻞ اﳌﺒﺎدرة ا ٔﳌﺎﻧﯿﺔ - ﻟﻜﻦ ﺗ ٔ ﯿﺪ اﳌﺒﺎدرة ﲆ و ﺪة ا ٔراﴈ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧ ّﯿﺔ“ﻟ ﺲ اﻟﺴ ﺎرﯾﻮ اﻟﻔﺮﺴﯿﺔ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻻٕﻃﺎرّ ، ا ي ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ُﺮﴈ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ وﻻﺳ ٔ ّن ﳘﳤﺎ ﺗﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ﴩق ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﻣ ﻔﺼﻞ ٔو ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﲻﯿ ﰲ ﯿﯿﻒ رﰬ ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﺗﺪّﻋﻲ داﲚﺎ اﻟﱱا ﺎ ﺑﻮﺛﯿﻘﺔ ﻓ ﯿﻨﺎ ﻟﻌﺎم 2011اﳌﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺘﻜﺮﺲ اﻟﺜﻘﺔ وﺻﯿﺎﻧﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﲟﺎ ﯾﻘ ﻀﯿﻪ ذ ﻣﻦ ﻗ ﻮل ﲨ ﻣﻦ اﻻٕﺟﺮاءات اﻟﺘﻔ ﺸﯿﺔ ﻟﻌﺪد ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮاﻗﻊ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﳌﺬ ﻮرة ﺣﴫا ﰲ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق ا ي ﺗﺒ ّ ﻪ ﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ واﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﰲ ٔورو ﻟﯿﺘﲀﻣﻞ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻟﺘﻨﻔ ﺬ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻌﺎﻫﺪة "ﺳﺘﺎرت "3اﳌﻮﻗّﻌﺔ ﺑﲔ ﻣ ﺪﻓ ﺪﯾﻒ و ٔو ﻣﺎ ﯾﻮم08 ٔﻓﺮﯾﻞ 2010اﳌﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﳊ ّﺪ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﺳﻠ ﺔ ﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ اﻟﻬﺠﻮﻣ ﺔ واﻟﱵ د ﻠﺖ ّﲒ اﻟﺘﻨﻔ ﺬ ﰲ ﺷﻬﺮ ﻓ ﻔﺮي 2011ﲆ ٔن ﺴ ّﳣﺮ ﳌﺪة 10ﺳﻨﻮات ﲆ ا ٔﻗ ّﻞ ﯾﻘﻊ ٔﺛﻨﺎءﻫﺎ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﯿﺺ ﻣﻦ ﺪد اﻟﺸﺤﻨﺎت اﻟﻨﻮوﯾﺔ اﻟﻘ ﺎﻟﯿﺔ واﻟﺼﻮارﱗ اﻟﺒﺎﻟ ﺴ ﺔ اﻟﻌﺎ ﺮة ﻠﻘﺎرات ﲆ ٔن ﺗ ّﱲ ﻣ ﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﰻ ذ ﺰ رات رﻗﺎﺑﯿﺔ ﻣ ﺒﺎد ..
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اﺧﺘﻼﻓـﺎت أوروﺑﻴﺔ _ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺔ ﻃﻔﺖ ﲆ اﻟﺴﻄﺢ اﺧ ﻼﻓﺎت واﲵﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺮؤى ﺑﲔ ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ وﺑﲔ ﯿﯿﻒ، ﻓﺎ ٔوروﺑﯿﻮن ﱂ ﯾﻘ ﻠﻮا ﳌﺒﺎدرة ا ٔو ﺮاﻧ ّﯿﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﺿﯿﺔ ﺑ ﴩ ﻗﻮات ﳊﻔﻆ اﻟﺴﻼم ﴍﰶ اﻟﺒﻼد ﲠﺪف ﺿﲈن ﺗﻨﻔ ﺬ اﺗﻔﺎق ﻣ ﺴﻚ ﺑﻌﺪ اﺳ ﳣﺮار اﻟﻘ ﺎل ّ ٔ ،ن ﻫﺬا اﻻٕﺟﺮاء ﻗﺪ ﯾُﻔﻬﻢ ﻣ ﻪ ﳏﺎو ﻠﳣﻠّﺺ ﻣﻦ ”اﻟﱱاﻣﺎت ﻣ ﺴﻚ“و ﻧﻘﻼب ﲆ ﳐﺮ ﺎﺗﻪ اﻟﱵ ﱂ ﺗﺘ ّﺪث ﻋﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳋﻄﻮة ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺮ ،وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﯾﻌﯿﺪ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﻔﺎوﺿ ّﯿﺔ إﱃ ﻧﻘﻄﺔ اﻟﺼﻔﺮ ﺎﺻﺔ ٔ ّن ﳎﻠﺲ ا ٔﻣﻦ ا وﱄ ٔﺻﺪر ﻗﺮارﻩ رﰴ 2202ا اﰪ ﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﻣ ﺴﻚ 2ا ي وﻗﻊ اﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ إﻟﯿﻪ ٕ ﴍاف ﰻ ﻣﻦ ﻓﺮﺴﺎ و ٔﳌﺎﻧﯿﺎ وﺗﻀ ّﻤﻦ 13ﺑﻨﺪا وﻣﻦ ٔ ﺮز اﻟﻨﻘﺎط اﻟﱵ ّﻧﺺ ﻠﳱﺎ : وﻗﻒ إﻃﻼق اﻟﻨﺎر ﰲ داﻧﯿ ﺴﻚ وﻟﻮ ﺎ ﺴﻚ . ﲮﺐ ا ٔﺳﻠ ﺔ اﻟﺜﻘ وٕا ﺸﺎء ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ﺎز ﰲ ﻣﺴﺘﻮى ﺧﻂ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳌﺮﺳﻮم ٔﻣﺎم ﻗﻮاتدوﻧﺒﺎس ﰲ ﺳ ﳣﱪ . 2014 ا ﺧﻮل ﰲ ﺣﻮار ﯾﺪور ﺣﻮل ﻃﺮﯾﻘﺔ إﺟﺮاء ﻧﺘ ﺎ ت اﶈﻠﯿﺔ ﻣﻊ ا ٔ ﺬ ﺑﻌﲔ ﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﻧﻈﺎم اﳊﲂ ا اﰐ اﳌﺆﻗﺖ ﰲ ﻣ ﺎﻃﻖ ﳏﺪدة ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻃﻌﱵ دوﻧ ﺴﺘﻚ وﻟﻮ ﺎ ﺴﻚ واﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺘﻘ ﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﺴﯿﺎﳼ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ ا ٔﻗﺎﻟﲓ. إﯾﻘﺎف اﳌﻼﺣﻘﺎت واﻟﺘ ﻌﺎت ﲝﻖ اﻟﻨﺎﺷﻄﲔ ﰲ داﻧﯿ ﺴﻚ وﻟﻮ ﺎﺴﻚ ﰲ إﻃﺎر ﻋﻔﻮ ﺎمواﺳﻊ. ﺳﯿﻄﺮة ﯿﯿﻒ ﲆ ﰷﻣﻞ ﺪود ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﲟﻨﺎﻃﻖ اﻟﴫاع . ﺰع ﺳﻼح ا ﻤﻮ ﺎت ﲑ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﯿﺔ واﻟﴩوع ﰲ اﻟﻘ ﺎم ٕﺻﻼ ﺎت دﺳﺘﻮرﯾﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺑﺪءﴎ ن ا ﺳﺘﻮر اﳉﺪﯾﺪ ﺣﱴ ﳖﺎﯾﺔ ﺎم 2015ﺗﻌﺰ ﺰا ﻟﻼﻣﺮﻛﺰﯾّﺔ . 83
وﻗﺪ ﺧﺮﺟﺖ ّﳃﺘﺎ ﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ ”ﺷ ﻨﻐﻬﺎي“ 14وﶍﻮ ﺔ ”اﻟﱪﻜﺲ“ 15اﳌﻨﻌﻘﺪ ن ﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ] 08و09 ﺟﻮﯾﻠﯿﺔ [2015ﺑﺘﻮﺻﯿﺎت ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﱃ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ ﺗﻔﺎﻫﲈت“ﻣ ﺴﻚ“ ﺑ ﻮدﻫﺎ ال 13ﲟﺎ ﻓﳱﺎ اﻟﺒﻨﺪ اﳌﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ﺳﺘﻌﺎدة اﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ﺳﯿﻄﺮﲥﺎ اﻟﲀﻣ ﲆ ﺪود ا و ..
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ﻣﻧظﻣﺔ ﺷﻧﻐﮭﺎي ﻟﻠﺗﻌﺎون أُﺳﺳت ﻋﺎم 2001وﺗﺿ ّم :روﺳﯾﺎ – أوزﺑﺎﻛﺳﺗﺎن – اﻟﺻﯾن – ﻛﺎزاﺧﺳﺗﺎن – ﻛﯾرﻏﯾزﺳﺗﺎن – طﺎﺟﯾﻛﺳﺗﺎن.15 -ﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺔ "اﻟﺑرﯾﻛس" B .R.I.C.Sﺗﺿ ّم ﻛﻼ ﻣن :اﻟﺑرازﯾل ،روﺳﯾﺎ ،اﻟﮭﻧد ،اﻟﺻﯾن ،ﺟﻧوب أﻓرﯾﻘﯾﺎ .
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اﻟﺨﺎﺗﻤﺔ:
ﺑﻌﺪ ٔ م ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻮ ﺮ اﳌﯿﺪاﱐ ا ي ٔﺳﻔﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻣ ﺎت اﻟﻘ ﲇ واﳉﺮ و ٔﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺼﻒ ﻣﻠﯿﻮن زح ،وﻗّﻊ ﳑﺜﻠﻮ ﻃﺮﰲ اﻟﲋاع ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﺮوﺗﻮﻮﻻ ﻼل ﻣﺸﺎورات ﶍﻮ ﺔ اﻻﺗﺼﺎل اﻟﺜﻼﺛﯿﺔ اﳌﺆﻟﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﳑﺜﲇ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ،وروﺳﯿﺎ وﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ واﻟﺘﻌﺎون ا ٔوروﰊ ﻟﻮﻗﻒ إﻃﻼق اﻟﻨﺎر، وﻗﺪ د ﻞ ّﲒ اﻟﺘﻨﻔ ﺬ ﯾﻮم 05ﺳ ﳣﱪ 2014ﻟﺘﺆذن ٓ -ﻧﺬاك -ﻧﻔﺮاج وﺷﯿﻚ ﻟ ٔزﻣﺔ ،وﻗﺪ ﲡﺴﺪ اﻟﺮؤﯾﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﻠﺮﺋ ﺴﲔ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ واﻟﺮوﳼ ﺑﯿﻮﺮ ﺗﻀ ّﻤﻨﺖ ﺧﻄﺔ اﻟ ﺴﻮﯾﺔ 12ﻧﻘﻄﺔ ّ ﺑﻮروﺷ ﻜﻮ وﻓﻼدﳝﲑ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ: -1ﺿﲈن اﻟﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﻔﻮري ﻻﺳﺘ ﺪام اﻟﺴﻼح ﻣﻦ ﻗ ﻞ اﻟﻄﺮﻓﲔ. 2ﺿﲈن اﳌﺮاﻗ ﺔ واﻟﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ ﻗ ﻞ ﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ واﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﰲ ٔورو ﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺪم اﺳﺘ ﺪاما ٔﺳﻠ ﺔ. 3ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ ﻻﻣﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ ،ﲟﺎ ﰲ ذ ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﯾﻖ إﻗﺮار ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ٔو ﺮاﱐ ”ﺣﻮل اﻟﻨﻈﺎماﳌﺆﻗﺖ ﻟ ٕﻼدارة ا اﺗﯿﺔ اﶈﻠﯿﺔ ﰲ ﻣ ﺎﻃﻖ ﳏﺪدة ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻃﻌﱵ دوﻧﯿ ﺴﻚ وﻟﻮ ﺎﺴﻚ”. 4ﺗ ٔﻣﲔ اﺳ ﳣﺮار اﳌﺮاﻗ ﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﲚﺔ ﺎﻟﯿ ًﺎ ﲆ اﳊﺪود اﳊﻜﻮﻣ ﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻗ ﻞﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ واﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﰲ ٔورو ﻣﻊ إﻗﺎﻣﺔ ﻣ ﻄﻘﺔ ٓﻣ ﺔ ﰲ اﳌﻨﺎﻃﻖ اﳊﺪودﯾﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ. 5اﻻٕﻓﺮاح ﻋﻦ اﻟﺮﻫﺎ ﻦ واﳌﻌﺘﻘﻠﲔ ﺸﲁ ﲑ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﱐ ﰷﻓﺔ دون إﺑﻄﺎء. 6إﻗﺮار ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﲟﻨﻊ ﻣﻼﺣﻘﺔ وﻣﻌﺎﻗ ﺔ ا ٔﺷ ﺎص ﺴ ﺐ ا ٔ ﺪاث اﻟﱵ وﻗﻌﺖ ﰲ ﻣ ﺎﻃﻖﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻃﻌﱵ دوﻧﯿ ﺴﻚ وﻟﻮ ﺎﺴﻚ ﰲ ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ. 7ﺳ ﳣﺮار ﳊﻮار اﻟﻮﻃﲏ اﻟﺸﺎﻣﻞ. 8اﲣﺎذ اﻻٕﺟﺮاءات اﻟﴬورﯾﺔ ﻟﺘﺤﺴﲔ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﱐ ﰲ دوﻧﺒﺎس. 9ﺗ ٔﻣﲔ إﺟﺮاء اﻧﺘ ﺎ ت ﳏﻠﯿﺔ ﻣ ﻜﺮة ﻃﺒﻘ ًﺎ ﻠﻘﺎﻧﻮن ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ”ﺣﻮل اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﳌﺆﻗﺖ ﻟ ٕﻼدارةا اﺗﯿﺔ ﰲ ﻣ ﺎﻃﻖ ﳏﺪدة ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻃﻌﱵ دوﻧﯿ ﺴﻚ وﻟﻮ ﺎ ﺴﻚ“ )ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﳋﺎص). 85
10ﲮﺐ اﻟ ﺸﻜ ﻼت اﳌﺴﻠ ﺔ ﲑ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﯿﺔ ،وا ٓﻻت اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ ،واﳌﻘﺎﺗﻠﲔ اﳌﺮ ﺰﻗﺔ ﻣﻦا ٔراﴈ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ. 11إﻗﺮار ﺮ ﻣﺞ ﳖﻮض اﻗ ﺼﺎدي وﻧﺒﺎس وٕا ﺎدة اﻟ ﺸﺎط اﳊﯿﺎﰐ ﻟ ٕﻼﻗﻠﲓ. 12ﺗﻮﻓﲑ ﺿﲈ ت ٔﻣ ﯿﺔ ﺎﺻﺔ ﻠﻤﺸﺎرﻛﲔ ﰲ اﳌﺸﺎورات.ﲑ ٔ ّن ﻫﺬا اﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﳊﺎﺻﻞ ﺑﲔ ﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﲔ واﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ ُﻣ َﲏ ﻟﻔﺸﻞ إذ ﱂ ﯾﺘﻮﻗّﻒ إﻃﻼق اﻟﻨﺎر إﻻ ﺳﺎ ﺎت ﳏﺪودة ﻓﲀن اﳌ ٓل ٔﻛﱶ دﻣﻮﯾﺔ وﻣ ٔﺳﻮﯾﺔ. ﻓﺮﰬ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﻟﺜﻼﰔ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻧ ُﺬر ﺴﺪاد و ﱰاب ﺑﺪت ﻣ ﻮاﻓﺮة ﺸﲁ ﺒﲑ ،ﲤﻠّﻜ ﺎ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺸﻌﻮر وﳓﻦ ﺴﻤﻊ ﺗﴫﳛﺎت اﻟﻼﻋﺒﲔ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﯿﲔ ﲆ اﳌﻠﻌﺐ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ٓﻧﺬاك ،ﻓﻔﻲ ﺗﴫﱖ ﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ﺮﳌﺎن دوﻧﯿ ﺴﻚ ”ﺑﻮر ﺲ ﻟﯿﺘﻔ ﻨﻮف“ﻟﻮﰷ ﻓﺮا ﺲ ﺮاس ّ ٔ “:ﱒ ﳾء ﺑﻌﺪ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻔﺎوﺿﺎت ﻫﻮ ﱰاف ﲜﻤﻬﻮرﯾّﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘ ّ دا ﻞ ﲨﻬﻮرﯾﺔ دوﻧ ﺴﺘﻚ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﯿﺔ ٔو دا ﻞ ﻧﻮﻓﻮروﺳﯿﺎ]”روﺳﯿﺎ اﳉﺪﯾﺪة“ﻣﺼﻄﻠﺢ ﺑﻮﺗ ﲏ ﯾُﻄﻠﻖ ﲆ ﻣ ﺎﻃﻖ ﻣﻦ ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ وﺟ ﻮﲠﺎ[“وﯾﻀﯿﻒ ”ﴍﻃﺎن ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻦ ﴍوط ﯿﯿﻒ ﻣﻘ ﻮﻻن ﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﯿﻨﺎ :وﻗﻒ إﻃﻼق اﻟﻨﺎر وﺗﺒﺎدل ﴎى ! ”..ﰲ اﳌﻘﺎﺑﻞ ٔﺑﺪى اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ اﳌﺆﻗﺖ ٔوﻟﯿﻜﺴﻨﺪر ﲤﺴﻚ ﯿﯿﻒ ﺗﲑﺸ ﻮف ﰲ ز رة ٔداﻫﺎ ﯾﻮم 08ﺳ ﳣﱪ 2014ﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﴫاع ﴍق اﻟﺒﻼد ّ ﲁ ﺷﱪ ﻣﻦ ٔرض ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ؛ وﰲ ﺳﯿﺎق ﻣ ﺼﻞ ﻗﺎل اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ اﻟﺮوﳼ ﻓﻼدﳝﲑ ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ”روﺳﯿﺎ ا ٓن ﲢﺎول ٕا ﻼن ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ دو ﻣﺴﺘﻘ “ﻓ ّﻟﻮح ﲢﺎد ا ٔوروﰊ ﺑ ﺴﻠﯿﻂ اﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ إﱃ اﺗﻔﺎق ﻣ ﺴﻚ ،وﻧﻨﻘﻞ ﻋﻦ ا ٔﻣﲔ ”اﳌﺮ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ“ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت وذ ﺑُﻌﯿﺪ ّ ﻟﯿﴫح داﯾﻔﺪ ﰷﻣﺮون اﻟﻌﺎم ﳊﻠﻒ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ” ٔﻧﺪرس ﻓﻮج راﲰﻮﺳﻦ“ﻗﻮ “:روﺳﯿﺎ ﺮا ﺧﺼﲈ“ ّ رﺋ ﺲ اﻟﻮزراء اﻟﱪﯾﻄﺎﱐ ﻗﺎﺋﻼ “:ﲆ دول اﳊﻠﻒ -اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ -ﺗﻐﯿﲑ اﺳﱰاﺗﯿﺠﯿﳤﺎ ﲡﺎﻩ روﺳﯿﺎ“ وﰲ ﻣﺆﲤﺮ ﲱﻔﻲ ﻋﻘﺪﻩ ﰲ ﻧﯿﻮﺑﻮرت ﰲ ﺮﯾﻄﺎﻧﯿﺎ ﰲ ﺧ ﺎم ﳃﺔ اﳊﻠﻒ ﻃﻠﴘ ﯾﻘﻮل اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ا ٔﻣﺮﲄ راك ٔو ﻣﺎ“ﳓﻦ ﻣ ﻔﺎﺋﻠﻮن .ﻟﻜﻦ واﺳ ﺎدا اﱃ اﻟﺘﺠﺮﺑﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﻓ ﺤﻦ اﯾﻀﺎ ﻣ ﺸﻜﻜﻮن“ ازاء ”ا ﱰام ﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﲔ“ ﻟﻮﻗﻒ اﻃﻼق اﻟﻨﺎر ﻫﺬا وازاء ”ﺗﻮﻗّﻒ اﻟﺮوس ﻋﻦ ا ﳤﺎ ﻬﻢ ﺳﯿﺎدة وﺳﻼﻣﺔ اراﴈ او ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ”،واﺧ ُﳣﺖ ﳃﺔ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﰲ وﯾﻠﺰ ﰲ ﺷﻬﺮ ﺳ ﳣﱪ 2014 ﰥ ﺑﺘﻮﺟ ﻪ ﻋﺒﺎرت ﺷﺪﯾﺪة اﻠﻬ ﺔ إﱃ روﺳﯿﺎ ﻋﯿﺔ ﻠﳱﺎ "اﺟ ﯿﺎ ﺎ"ﺟ ﻮب ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ و ّ 86
اﻟﻘﺮم ...،وﻣﻀﺖ ا ٔ م ﻟﺘﻮ ّﺮ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺒﺎ ،إﱃ ٔن ّﰎ ﺗﻮﻗ ﻊ اﺗﻔﺎق ﻣ ﺴﻚ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺴﳤ ّﻞ ﺎم ﻟﻜﻦ ﺑﻨﻮد اﻻﺗﻔﺎق وا ﺖ ﻋﺮاﻗ ﻞ ﺒﲑة ﻋﻨﺪ 2015ﰲ ﻣﺎ اﻋ ُﺘﱪ ﻠ ]ﻣﺎ[ ﻠﻮﺿﻊ اﳌﺘ ٔ ّزمّ ، ﺴﺘﻘﺮ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ﲆ ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻮ ﺮ واﳌﺼﺎدﻣﺎت اﳌﺴﻠ ﺔ ﺑﲔ ﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﲔ اﳌﺪﻋﻮﻣﲔ اﻟﺘﻨﻔ ﺬ ﻟ ّ ﻣﻦ روﺳﯿﺎ واﻟﻘﻮات ا ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺔ اﳌﺪﻋﻮﻣﺔ ﻏﺮﺑﯿﺎ ﴍق اﻟﺒﻼد ،ﻓﻔﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ا ي ﺗﻌﱱم ﻓ ﻪ ﯾﻠﻮح ﺑﻮﺗﲔ ﰲ "ﻣﻌﺮض ﻋﺴﻜﺮي" ﺑﻨﺼﺐ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﴩ ٔﺳﻠ ﺔ ﺛﻘ ﰲ ٔورو اﻟﴩﻗ ﺔ ّ 40ﺻﺎرو ﺎ ﺪﯾﺪا ﺎ ﺮا ﻠﻘﺎرات ﲝﻠﻮل ﳖﺎﯾﺔ ﺎم ،2015ﻓﺮﰬ ﻮد ﶍﻮ ﺔ اﻻﺗﺼﺎل اﻟﺘﻄﻮري ]ﺑﺼﯿﻐﺔ ﺸﳫﳱﺎ ا ٔ ّوﱄ ] ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ-روﺳﯿﺎ-ﻣ ﻈﻤﺔ ا ٔﻣﻦ واﻟﺘﻌﺎون ا ٔوروﰊ[ و ّ اﻟﻨﻮرﻣﺎﻧﺪئ :و ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ-روﺳﯿﺎٔ -ﳌﺎﻧﯿﺎ-ﻓﺮﺴﺎ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻣﺎ ﲢﻘﻖ إﱃ ّﺪ ا ٓن ﻻ ﯾﻌﺪو ٔن ﻜﻮن ﺳﻮى ﳏﺎو ﻻٕدارة ا ٔزﻣﺔ ﺑﺪﻻ ﻣﻦ ﻠّﻬﺎ ،ﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺗﻌﺎﻇﻢ دور ﺗﻨﻈﲓ "اﻟﻘﻄﺎع ا ٔﳝﻦ" ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ اﳌﺘﻄﺮف وزﻋﳰﻪ دﻣ ﱰي روش ا ي ﯾﺘﻌﻬّﺪ ﲟﻮاﺻ اﻟﻘ ﺎل ﰲ ﴍق ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﺣﱴ ﲢﺮﺮ اﻟﺒﻼد ﳑّﺎ ﺴ ّﻤﯿﻪ " ﺣ ﻼل اﻟﺮوﳼ"دون ٔ ّي اﻋﺘﺪاد ﺑ ٔ ّي ﻣﻌﺎﻫﺪة ﻗﺪ ﺗﱪ ﺎ اﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﳌﺮﻛﺰﯾﺔ ﻣﻊ اﳌ ّﳣﺮد ﻦ اﳌﻮاﻟﲔ ﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺎ ا ﻦ ﯾﻄﺎﻟﺒﻮن ﺮﻓﻊ اﳊﺼﺎر ﻗ ﺼﺎدي ﻋﻨﺎ ﳌﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﯾﻨﺼﺎن ﲆ اﻟﻌﻔﻮ ﻋﻦ اﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﲔ اﻟﱵ ﺴﯿﻄﺮون ﻠﳱﺎ ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ ﻧﺼﲔ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧ ّﯿﲔ ّ وﻣ ﺢ اﳌﻨﺎﻃﻖ اﻟﱵ ﺴﯿﻄﺮون ﻠﳱﺎ ﺣﲂ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ٔوﺳﻊ .. ﺻﻔﻮة اﻟﻘﻮل؛ رﰬ ﻃﻐﯿﺎن ﻧ ُﺬر ﺴﺪاد ﲆ ﺑﻮادر ﻧﻔﺮاج ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻨﺎ ﺴ ﻌﺪ ٔن ﯾﺼﻞ اﻟﴫاع ﺑﲔ اﻟﻌﻤﻼﻗﲔ اﻟﺮوﳼ وا ٔﻣﺮﲄ إﱃ ّﺪ ﱰاب اﳌﺒﺎﴍ ﺑﻞ ﺳ ﻘﻰ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺘﻮى اﻟﻘﺬاﺋﻒ اﻠﻔﻈﯿﺔ إﱃ ﺎﻧﺐ اﺳﺘ ﺪام ﺑﻌﺾ ٔداوت اﳊﺮب اﻟﺒﺎردة ٔن ﺗﻌﻤﺪ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ إﱃ ﺗﻮﻗ ﻊ اﺗﻔﺎﻗ ﺎت ﻋﺴﻜﺮﯾّﺔ ﻣﻊ ﯿﯿﻒ ﻓ ﺗﻄﺎﻟﺐ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﺑﻀﲈ ت ٔﻣ ّﯿﺔ ﺗُﺒﻘﻲ ﻗﻮا ﺪ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ و ٔﺳﺎﻃﯿ ﺎرج ٔو ﺮاﻧﯿﺎ ﻼوة ﲆ إﺟﺮاء اﳌﻨﺎورات واﻟﺘﺪرﯾﺒﺎت اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻄﺮف ٔو ذاك.. ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺒﺪو ٔوﰣ ﻣﻦ ٔن ﺸﲑ إﻟﯿﻪ ٔ ّن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻣﺎ ﳛﻔّﺰ ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ ﲆ ا ﳤﺪﺋﺔ ،ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺿﻊ ﻗ ﺼﺎدي ﺻﻌﺐ ﯾﻌﺎﱐ وﻃ ٔة اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت اﻟﻐﺮﺑﯿﺔ اﻟﺜﻘ ﲆ ﺑ ﲢ ّﻤﻞ ﻋﺐء ﺗﻨﻈﲓ ا ٔﻟﻌﺎب ا ٔوﳌﺒﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺘﻮﯾﺔ ﺴﻮﴚ و ﺴﺘﻌ ّﺪ ﻟﺘﻨﻈﲓ ﻣﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ ٔس اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻟﻜﺮة اﻟﻘﺪم ﺎم 2018وﻫﻮ 87
وﺿﻊ ﻣﺮﺑﻚ ﺗﺒﺪو روﺳﯿﺎ ﻓ ﻪ ﰲ ﻏﲎ ﻋﻦ ٔ ّي ﺗﺼﻌﯿﺪ ،رﰬ ٕاﴏار ﯿﯿﻒ ﲆ إﻟﻐﺎء ُﻣﺨﺮ ﺎت ﻧﺘ ﺎ ت اﻟﱵ ٔﺟﺮاﻫﺎ ﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﯿﻮن ﯾﻮم 02ﻧﻮﳁﱪ .. 2014 وﻫﻨﺎك ..ﰲ رﻦ رﻛﲔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺸﻬﺪ ا ٔو ﺮاﱐ ﺮى“اﻟﺘﻨﲔ“ ﳣﻠﻤ اﳌﻌﻬﻮد ﻣﳣﱰﺳﺎ ﻠﻒ ﻣﻮاﻗﻒ ﻣ ﺤﻔّﻈﺔ ودﻋﻮات ﳕﻄ ّﯿﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ إﱃ ﻞ ﺳﻠﻤﻲ ﻠﲋاع ،ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﺗﻘ ﺑﯿﻜﲔ ﺗﻌﺰز ﻼﻗﺎﲥﺎ ”اﻟﻨﻔﻄ ّﯿﺔ اﻟﻐﺎزﯾﺔ“ ﻣﻊ ﻫﻮ ٔ ّن ﺗﻮاﺻﻞ اﻟﺘﻮ ّﺮ ﳜﺪم ﻣﺼﻠﺤﳤﺎ ﳌﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺪاﻋﯿﺎت ّ روﺳﯿﺎ ﰲ ﻇﻞ ﺗﺼﺎ ﺪ اﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت ﻗ ﺼﺎدﯾﺔ اﻟﻐﺮﺑﯿﺔ ﲆ اﻟﺮوس واﻟﻌﻘﻮ ت اﻟﺮوﺳﯿﺔ اﳌﻀﺎدة اﳌﺘﺼ ﻟﻐﺎز ،ﻓ ﻌﺪ ٔ م ﻣﻦ ﺗﻮﻗ ﻊ اﺗﻔﺎق ﺗﻮرﯾﺪ 38ﻣﻠﯿﺎر ﻣﱰ ﻣﻜﻌﺐ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻐﺎز اﻟﺮوﳼ ﺳﻨﻮ ،واﺻﻠﺖ اﻟﺼﲔ اﺳﺘﻐﻼل ﺗﻔﺎ ﻼت ا ٔزﻣﺔ ا ٔو ﺮاﻧ ّﯿﺔ ﺎم ٕ 2014ﺮام اﺗﻔﺎق إﻃﺎر ﲻﻞ ﻟﺘﻮرﯾﺪ اﳌﻨﺘ ﺎت اﻟﻐﺎزﯾﺔ ..
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اﻟﻤﺼﺎدر واﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻊ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺪوﻟﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻘﺮﯾﺮ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺪﯾﻤﻘﺮاطﯿﺔ – "دﺳﺘﻮر أوﻛﺮاﻧﯿﺎ اﻟﺼﺎدرﻋﺎم 1996ﺷﺎﻣﻼ ﺗﻌﺪﯾﻼﺗﮫ ﻟﻐﺎﯾﺔ . "2014
ﺑﺎﺳﻢ ﺧﻔﺎﺟﻲ "اﻟﺸﺨﺼﯿﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﯾﻜﯿﺔ وﺻﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﻘﺮار اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﻲاﻷﻣﺮﯾﻜﻲ"-اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺎت اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ". ﺟﺎﺳﻢ ﺳﻠﻄﺎن –"ﺟﯿﻮﺑﻮﻟﯿﺘﯿﻚ :ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺗﺘﺤﺪّث اﻟﺠﻐﺮاﻓﯿﺎ"دار ﺗﻤﻜﯿﻦﻟﻸﺑﺤﺎث واﻟﻨﺸﺮ. ﺟﻮن ﺑﯿﻨﺪر وﺳﺎﯾﻤﻮن آﺷﺮوود – "اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ :ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻗﺼﯿﺮةﺟﺪا" -ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ :ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﻏﺮﯾﺐ ﻋﻠﻲ. ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﻈﯿﻢ "-اﻟﺼﺮاع ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﻔﻮذ ﻓﻲ اﻷوراﺳﯿﺎ". زﯾﺒﯿﻐﻨﯿﻮ ﺑﺮﯾﺠﻨﺴﻜﻲ -رﻗﻌﺔ اﻟﺸﻄﺮﻧﺞ اﻟﻜﺒﺮى ) اﻷوﻟﻮﯾّﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﯾﻜﯿﺔوﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎﺗﮭﺎ اﻟﺠﯿﻮﺳﺘﺮاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ ( _اﻟﺘﺮﺟﻤﺔ :أﻣﻞ اﻟﺸﺮﻗﻲ .اﻟﻄﺒﻌﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﯿﺔ ،،دار اﻷھﻠﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﺸﺮ واﻟﺘﻮزﯾﻊ.
ﻣﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺼﺤﺎﻓﺔ واﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ "-أوﻛﺮاﻧﯿﺎ وﺟﻮرﺟﯿﺎ وﻣﻮﻟﺪاﻓﯿﺎ:اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻖإﻟﻰ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﻮ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ". 89
ﻣﻮﺳﻰ اﻟﺰﻋﺒﻲ "-اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﯿﺠﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻮﻻﯾﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ..ﺣﺮب ﻋﻠﻰاﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺴﯿﻦ أﻋﺪاء وأﺻﺪﻗﺎء". ﻧﺰار إﺳﻤﺎﻋﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﯿﺎﻟﻲ "-ﻗﺮاءة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺬھﺐ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﺑﯿﻦاﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ واﻟﺤﺎﺿﺮ". -اﻷرﻗﺎم ﻣﻦ "وﯾﻜﯿﺒﯿﺪﯾﺎ"واﻟﻤﻮاﻗﻊ اﻹﺧﺒﺎرﯾﺔ.
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اﻟﻔﻬﺮس ﻣﻘﺪّﻣﺔ 05 ﺗﻮﻃﺌﺔ 07 اﻟﺒﺎب ا ٔول :ﻟﻤﺎذا ﺗﺘﻤﺴّﻚ روﺳﻴﺎ ﺑﺄوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ ؟!!! اﻣﺘﺪاد ]ﻣﺎ[ ﻟﻠﺼﺮاع اﻟﺠﻮرﺟﻲ 10 اﻟﺒﻮﺗﻴﻨﻴﺔ" ..اﻟﻘﻴﺼﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة" !! 12 اﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎرات روﺳﻴّﺔ ﺿﺨﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ 14 -أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ "ﺧﺎﺻﺮة روﺳﻴﺎ اﻟﺮﺧﻮة"15
ﺗﺮﻛﺰ اﻟﺜﺮوة ﻓﻲ ﺷﺮق أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ 19 اﻟﺘﻮﺟّﺲ اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻮﺳّﻊ اﻷوروﺑﻲ 22 -اﻟﺘﻮﺟّﺲ اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻮﺳّﻊ اﻷﻃﻠﺴﻲ 25
اﻟﺼﻴﻐﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة ﻟﻠﻌﻘﻴﺪة اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳّﺔ اﻟﺮوﺳﻴﺔ 33 -ﻋﺪوى اﻻﻧﻔﺼﺎل ﻋﻦ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ 35
اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﺎﱐ :ﻟﻤﺎذا ﺗﺤﻤﻞ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ”ﻫﻢّ“ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ؟!!! 91
ﺗﻘﻄﻴﻊ أوﺻﺎل اﻟﻔﻀﺎء اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻲ اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ 39 اﻟﺘﻘـﻠﻴﺺ ﻣﻦ أﻫﻤﻴﺔ اﻷﺳﻄﻮل اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﺤﺮ اﻷﺳﻮد 72 اﻟﺨﺸﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻧﻀﻤﺎم ﺷﺮق أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ إﻟﻰ روﺳﻴﺎ 73 -اﻣﺘﺪاد]ﻣﺎ[ ﻟﺴﺠﺎل اﻟﺸﺮق اﻷوﺳﻂ 74
اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ :اﻟﺘﺮدد اﻷوروﺑﻲ ﺣﻴﺎل اﻟﻤﻠﻒ اﻷوﻛﺮاﻧﻲ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻨﻀﻮي ﺗﺤﺖ اﻟﻤﻈﻠﺔ اﻷﻣﻨﻴﺔ اﻷوروﺑﻴﺔ 77 ارﺗﺒﺎط اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺎت اﻷوروﺑﻴﺔ ﺑﺮوﺳﻴﺎ 78 اﻧﻘﺴﺎم أوروﺑﻲ ﺣﻴﺎل اﻷزﻣﺔ اﻷوﻛﺮاﻧﻴّﺔ 80 اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺤﻤّﺲ ﻟﻀﻢّ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺎ 81 اﻷوروﺑﻴﻮن ﻣﺘﻤﺴّﻜﻮن ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻞ اﻟﺴﻠﻤﻲ 82 -اﺧﺘﻼﻓـﺎت أوروﺑﻴﺔ _ أوﻛﺮاﻧﻴﺔ 83
اﻟﺨﺎﺗﻤﺔ 85 اﻟﻤﺼﺎدر واﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻊ 89 اﻟﺼﻔﺤﺔ اﻟﺮﺳﻤﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﻜﺎﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﺎﯾﺴﺒﻮك: اﻟﻜﺎﺗﺐ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﻲ ﺻﺎﺑﺮ اﻟﻨﻔﺰاوي 92
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