Fix, Fly, Fight Just-in-Time Production
Three U.S. aircraft carriers at Midway represented a vital peacetime investment in naval superiority. (Originally published in Proceedings, January 2023) By CAPT Matt "Nilla" Wright, USN
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ccording to noted military historian John Keegan, the Battle of Midway was “an ‘incredible victory,’ as great a reversal of strategic fortune as the naval world had ever seen, before or since.”1 That U.S. victory turned the tide of World War II in the Pacific, just six months after the U.S. Pacific Fleet was mauled by the Imperial Japanese Navy’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Midway’s rightful place in history is secure, and at the center of the lore are the battle’s three victorious aircraft carriers: USS Yorktown (CV 5), Enterprise (CV 6), and Hornet (CV 8). These three ships, the only available U.S. aircraft carriers in the Pacific, launched the air strikes that wrecked the Kido Butai—Japan’s previously invincible “mobile striking force,” comprised of the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū, and Sōryū.2
Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was willing to risk Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet at Midway in part because he knew reinforcements would soon arrive, as the shipbuilding industry was primed to produce warships at scale. A future U.S. admiral may face a similar decision, but without the reassurance new ships are on the way. Naval History and Heritage Command
As World War II fades further into the past, the U.S. Navy risks developing a dangerous misperception about its triumph over Japan. Once awakened by the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor, U.S. industrial base might have built an unstoppable military juggernaut that steamrolled an outmatched enemy. While this rings true for the naval triumphs of 1944 and 1945, the ships that held the line against an ascendant Imperial Japan in 1942 were purchased and built during the interwar years. The Battle of the Coral Sea, Midway, and the Guadalcanal Campaign were all fought with ships that made up the “peacetime navy.” USS Enterprise (CV 6) was one of three U.S. aircraft carriers—all built during peacetime—at the Battle of Midway. “Big E”/Mark Karvon
A significant part of the history around the Battle of Midway as the herculean efforts to repair Yorktown in time to meet the advancing Japanese fleet. Badly damaged during the Battle of the Coral Sea less than a month prior, she was sent to Pearl Harbor, where her repairs were estimated to require three months—to which Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz famously replied, “We must have this ship back in three days.”3 Yorktown went straight from the repair facility to join the impending battle with hundreds of men still working to patch her battle damage.4 Her air wing later destroyed the Sōryū and aided Enterprise aircraft in the attack that sank the Hiryū.5 It is easy to wonder if Midway would have turned from victory to defeat if the Yorktown had missed the battle. However, a more important question is: What would have happened at Midway if the Yorktown and her sister ships had not been built at all?
Rotor Review #163 Winter '24
Today, with “the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor,” there are lessons to learn from the peacetime investment preceding World War II.6 Naval Power as a Political Choice The U.S. Navy of 1933 was a shadow of its former self. It had grown to parity with the Royal Navy by the end of World War I, with 774 ships, including 39 battleships, in 1918. However, the Fleet quickly aged and dwindled to an interwar low of 308 ships in 1931.7 The Five-Power Treaty for naval arms limitation signed during the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22 and subsequent London Naval Treaty of 1930 placed limitations on naval construction for the United States and its potential rivals. In addition, domestic political trends toward isolationism and fiscal austerity further limited U.S. naval construction. While Japan was contriving to exploit treaty loopholes, the United States limited naval construction with the Cruiser Act of 1929.8 Shrinking the Navy by 60 percent reduced the nation’s shipbuilding capacity, as the number of active private 40
