
4 minute read
Hiking: Moving Without a Hitch
By Chief Aviation Structural Mechanic Nicholas Lemus, USN, VRM-30 (originally published in MECH Magazine)
On September 23, 2022, a CMV22B Osprey landed aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). While spinning on deck, the aircrew noticed a popped latch on the right hand (RH) nacelle. The pilots had to shut down the aircraft engines to secure the popped latch. The maintenance crew went to get a ladder and position it next to the RH nacelle so it could be secured. Upon restart of the CMV-22B, the plane received multiple faults from systems associated with the RH nacelle. Maintenance continued to work on the problem for another 15 minutes and determined that more in-depth troubleshooting was needed to figure out what was wrong with the aircraft. The flight deck coordinator requested the aircraft remain on deck but required tail-over-deck to further troubleshoot the issues. The handler told the flight deck coordinator that he wanted the aircraft moved down into the hangar bay to finish the troubleshooting.
To allow the aircraft to maneuver into the hangar bay, the nose landing gear needs to be raised. This is to ensure that the spotting dolly can fit around the nose landing gear so it doesn’t damage the aircraft’s forward-looking infrared (FLIR) camera or gear doors. This is called “hiking” the aircraft. The procedure requires nitrogen to be put into the nose landing strut. This sufficiently raises the strut, which is then kept in place by a hike pin to ensure the strut does not fail. While this is a routine maintenance procedure, it still requires the proper tools and paperwork to be completed correctly and within regulations. However, the maintenance crew did not bring the required licenses to operate the nitrogen cart used to raise the strut. In addition, the maintenance crew did not bring the hike pin to ensure the strut would stay in place. On top of those issues, the crew did not notify ships’ personnel that the aircraft was not hiked before moving it from the flight deck to the hangar. The maintenance crew provided a brake rider and no one else for the movement. All of these mistakes were preventable, and they led to a mishap that never should have happened.
The maintenance chiefs went to their shop so they could communicate the situation with their squadron. After a phone call with VRM-30, a maintainer came into the shop and said a chief was needed in the hangar because a mishap had occurred. Due to the aircraft not being hiked by the maintenance crew, the spotting dolly could not fit under the aircraft with an adequate amount of space. As a result, the spotting dolly had hit the FLIR while moving the aircraft in the hangar bay. Looking back at the whole evolution, the squadron failed before even stepping onto the ship. Not bringing the appropriate licenses and support equipment was a mistake from the beginning. The squadron’s publications reference moving the aircraft into the hangar, and the evolution requires the aircraft to be hiked before moving it into the hangar bay. The ship’s publications also direct maintainers and aircraft handlers to ensure the aircraft is hiked prior to maneuvering in accordance with their spotting procedures. The squadron should have had a member of maintenance leadership stay with the aircraft throughout the whole movement.
The CMV-22B aircraft is fairly new to the Fleet, bringing with it a lack of knowledge and experience moving the aircraft around the carrier’s flight deck and hangar bay. VRM-30 will hold multiple trainings before underway periods to mitigate occurrences of this type in the future and will interface with CVN flight and hangar deck crews to ensure they understand the unique requirements of deploying with the CMV-22B.
