Focus - Full Spectrum Rotary Wing Seapower Assault Pillar RF Threat - Update Surviving the High-End Fight By LT Addison "Poon" Pellerano, USN
T
he strategic outlook of the Naval Services has rapidly changed in the past five years, moving from a landbased war against terrorism and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to an inter-state strategic competition.1 The competition with our near-peer adversaries requires extensive modernization and strategic forethought to recover from the past two decades of war and strategic atrophy.2 While Naval rotary-wing aircraft survivability focused on acquiring nonradio frequency (RF) countermeasures and threat warning systems to fight the war on terror, state actors have developed highly sophisticated, RF-based, anti-access area-denial (A2AD) capabilities. The battlefield has now clearly shifted to a longrange overwater fight against technologically advanced adversaries, requiring a renewed focus on RF countermeasures and RF threat warning systems. With the release of the tri-service strategy document “Advantage at Sea” in December of 2020, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and Commandant of the Coast Guard (CCG) collectively published their perspectives on the likelihood of future conflicts and directives on how the Naval Service should prepare for those scenarios.3 In addition to the policy shift from desert wars against non-state actors towards the nearpeer threat, the rapid increase in People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) spending, acquisitions of new ships, and RFbased surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems are changing the battlefield. This contested environment will challenge Navy and Marine Corp aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) in the beyondvisual range fight. More effective RF threat warning and defeat
capabilities are urgently needed to maintain our competitive edge. As of August 2020, the PLA(N) has launched 25 Type 052D Destroyers (Luyang III) and 8 Type 055 Destroyers (Renhai), both classes wielding an impressive armament including the upgrade to the HHQ-9, allowing the ship to target and engage aircraft at a range beyond 200 km.3 The RF threat does not just come from numerous advanced warships, but from the islands and reefs China has either created or unlawfully seized over the past decade. The installation of HHQ-9B battalions has created a defense network across the South China Sea, adding to the contested environment and making it more difficult to provide support to the ships and troops operating in and around the South China Sea.5 As the Naval Service moves to one integrated fighting force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard rotary-wing assets will be exposed to these adversaries and their integrated air defense (IAD) network, while working to achieve Combatant Commander objectives. Naval rotary-wing communities need to recognize the urgent requirement to shift its survivability focus from short-range, infrared threats to field upgraded, networked RF threat warning systems and endeavor to acquire advanced defeat mechanisms for the high-end fight. Footnotes 1. Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.” 2. Mattis, ibid. 3. Berger, Gilday, and Schultz, “Advantage at Sea.” 4.Vavasseur, “Shipyard in China Launched The 25th Type 052D and 8th Type 055 Destroyers For PLAN.” 5.“China Deploys YJ-12B and HQ-9B Missiles on South China Sea Islands.”
Satellite image taken on March 19 shows the Fiery Cross Reef, one of China's artificial island bases in the South China Sea. Reuters Photo
Rotor Review #152 Spring '21
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