HSC Restructure: Resolving Organizational Dissonance through Cultural Alignment

By LT Rob “OG” Swain, USN, Helicopter Sea Combat Weapons School Pacific

“Fly whatever you want, but don’t fly helicopters.” In 2013, I received this life advice from a trusted mentor. Recognizing the gravity of platform selection, I had reached out to my uncle–a retired Navy Captain who served 27 years in the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE)–and planned to apply his counsel without reservation. As I pen my thoughts on the guidance for the Naval Helicopter Association’s Rotor Review magazine, I am sure readers can infer how well I followed those instructions.

Six years of service in the Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Community has provided me the opportunity to analyze what generated this rotary-wing aversion in my fixed-wing flying uncle. Through this reflection, I arrived at three conclusions. First: it has been one of the great privileges of my life to serve in the rotary-wing community. Second: the rotary-wing community faces platform-specific cultural challenges within the NAE. And third: prospective restructure of HSC presents an opportunity to address and resolve twenty years of developed “organizational dissonance.”

An organization intended for operations from the sea, but fielded with a helicopter capable of operating as medium lift, with modular weapons systems, readiness requirements spanning from open ocean to high altitude mountain flying, and fueled by an adaptable “get it done” culture enabled institutionalized mission creep in HSC and conflicting, informal community selfidentification. The MH-60S is currently entering “legacy” status and Naval Aviation is readying for Great Power Competition through the development of “Air Wing of the Future.” The effects of these two factors drive an HSC reorganization for the first time since 2001. By not only physically restructuring, but culturally aligning HSC, the organization can take advantage of this watershed moment in helicopter history to not only answer “what we do” but define “who we are.”

HSC reorganization poses several unknowns. How will this modify training and readiness (T&R) and the Air Combat Training Continuum (ACTC) Syllabus? How will it affect the HSC Requirements of Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE)? How will it impact MH-60S operational availability and employment capacity to combatant Commanders (CCMDs)? Despite the uncertainty, reorganization can affect positive change in HSC culture while validating the questions: “why does HSC exist?” and “what does HSC do?”

Community culture critically impacts effective operations and comprises “organizational and individual norms and values.” A community’s ideology provides “explanation of why the organization serves broader and more important purposes. [It] helps members justify to themselves why they are doing what they are doing and help make the case to others.” When an organization executes global and diverse operations, “this requires even greater communication” and coordinating efforts. Understanding the unique challenge of fostering an aligned organizational culture in HSC requires a brief overview of community history.

At the turn of the 21st century, the Navy operated eight different helicopter type/model/series (T/M/S) with specialized missions. The UH-3H “Sea King” flew reserve unit logistics and Distinguished Visitor (DV) flights, the MH-53E “Sea Dragon” conducted airborne mine countermeasures (AMCM) and logistics support, and the SH-60F “Ocean Hawk” handled carrier strike group (CSG) plane guard and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). In addition, the HH-60H “Rescue Hawk” launched for CSG plane guard, personnel recovery (PR), and special operations force (SOF) support: the SH-60B “Sea Hawk” executed ASW and limited antisurface warfare (ASUW) aboard cruisers and destroyers (CRUDES), and the SH2F “Sea Sprite” embarked on national scientific ships providing logistics and PR. Finally, the HH-1N “Huey” handled naval air station search and rescue (SAR), and the CH-46D “Sea Knight” satisfied amphibious ship SAR responsibilities, logistics, and SOF support. This Naval Air Forces’ portfolio of specialized rotary-wing platforms demanded eight unique supply chains, eight unique maintenance programs, and a cohort of pilots and aircrewmen to man five unique series of helicopter squadrons with distinct organizational cultures and operating environments

HSC-14 conducts anti-surface warfare training with SBT-1 and SFWP against 8 high-speed mobile surface targets.

Photo by SO1 Rivera

Faced with an urgent need to replace the H-46, and informed by the end of the H-1, H-2, and H-3’s functional lifespans, the Head of Naval Aviation Requirements voiced the need for a more efficient course forward. Fewer helicopter T/M/S would facilitate significant cost savings for the Navy and relieve aircrew and maintenance manpower concerns. In 1997, the Helicopter Master Plan outlined an acquisitions proposal designed to deliver two vertical lift T/M/S capable of executing the multi-mission requirements of the previous medium-lift variants. To shape the squadron framework consolidating eight T/M/S into two, rotary-wing leadership implemented Helicopter Concept of Operations (HELO CONOPS).

HELO CONOPS combined the Helicopter Anti-Submarine (HS), Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light (HSL), Helicopter Combat Support (HC), and Helicopter Combat Support Special (HCS) squadrons into Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC)–flying the MH-60S “Knight Hawk”–and Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM)–flying the MH-60R “Strike Hawk.” HELO CONOPS directed HSL to transition to HSM, and HC to transition to HSC with 50% of HS transitioning to HSM and 50% transitioning to HSC. The architects of Helicopter Master Plan and HELO CONOPS envisioned synchronized hunter/ killer teaming of the MH-60R with its robust sensor suite fighting alongside the MH-60S for air operations in support of maritime surface warfare. The intent for the MH-60S and MH-60R to execute mixed-platform operations did not represent a novel concept for the Navy or greater Department of Defense (DoD). Throughout the armed services and across decades of warfighting, dissimilar rotary-wing teaming proved a highly effective technique to bridge capability gaps and leverage individual platform strengths.

During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Army OH-1 “Loach” light observation helicopters provided targeting information to Navy, Marine Corps, and Army AH-1 and UH-1 gunships. In support of SOF during every major conflict since the 1980s, the Army 160th Special Operations Air Regiment (SOAR) refined tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for their H-6 “Little Bird,” H-60 “Black Hawk,” and H-47 “Chinook” helicopters to operate seamlessly in unison. During Operation Inherent Resolve, the Air Force HH-60G Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) squadron in Iraq established standardized operating procedures with collocated Army AH-64E “Apache” units for CSAR TTPs. In 1986, the Marine Corps changed the designation of their Marine Attack Helicopter (HMA) squadrons to Marine Light Attack Helicopter (HMLA) by integrating the UH-1N “Huey” into the exclusively AH-1T “Cobra” inventories. Standardized TTPs, cohesive mission focus, and an aligned warfighting culture for mixed T/M/S aircrews proved highly successful for Marine Air Ground Task Force operations across every conflict over the last thirty years.

Navy Helicopter Master Plan and HELO CONOPS hoped to mirror the sister services’ hunter/killer successes. Twenty years later, however, an analysis of Navy rotary-wing application does not reflect the optimistic hunter/killer vision. HSM and HSC maintain individual SOPs, write series-specific language for application of the same TTPs, develop discrete Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) training curricula, focus training efforts in disaggregated environments, and largely focus on autonomous execution with limited integration in the same primary mission area of ASUW. Though the two Navy helicopter communities share the same aircraft model, fly in the same carrier air wings (CVWs), and train to the same tactical publications, HSM advertises three primary mission areas while HSC debates over the prioritization of fifteen. So, what happened? The conversation returns to culture.

Originally, HELO CONOPS outlined a plan to transition 50% of HS to HSM and 50% of HS to HSC. In execution, however, 10% of HS transitioned to HSM and 90% of HS transitioned to HSC. While both communities faced similar functional challenges in their respective infancies with new airframes, the HC/HS cultural dichotomy did not manifest in the HSL to HSM transition. The ripples of an expeditionary detachment-modeled logistics community marrying ASW and PR carrier-based squadrons required more than just familiarization with new equipment; it required the fostering of a new and aligned community culture. The divergent trajectory of HSC, however, generated a feudalistic organization of competing focus.

The architects of Helicopter Master Plan sought to replace the H-46 Fleet logistics workhorse that, by 2000, was “literally falling out of the sky.” Unlike the MH-60R, which benefited from the robust and deliberate Navy acquisitions process for shipboard helicopter operations, the MH-60S represented a hybridized Army/Navy-borne aircraft spawning from an Army airframe purchase surplus during the Gulf Wars. Shipboard-enabling modifications provided a platform with multimission potential designed for operational growth. In the early 2000s, with U.S. forces becoming embroiled in overland counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East, coupled with the diminished Soviet maritime threat and a Department of Defense (DoD) dismissal of rising Chinese maritime capability, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in Central Command (CENTCOM) experienced no shortage of demand for rotary-wing support. The MH-60S could meet many requests for forces.

In 2005, CENTCOM outlined the request for a Naval Air Ambulance Detachment (NAAD) in Kuwait as a six-month capability gap in Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) to relieve the Army’s burden of pre-emergency hospital care to service members involved in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. Instead, the 2515th NAAD evolved into a seven-year enduring commitment for HSC. During a critical period for establishing cultural identity in the new community, the NAAD demonstrated that the MH-60S could provide effective overland support. The adaptability and innovation of NAAD personnel led to seven successful years of selfless “sand Sailor” service, 2,293 MEDEVACs, and a stark departure from the resourced intent of HSC to support operations at sea and in the littorals.

The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) maintains responsibility for operations in the maritime domain. Assets resourced for the Navy maintain responsibility for ensuring maritime superiority at sea and in the littorals. While this seems obvious, tracking the employment of Navy helicopters after 2001, history reveals a distinct HSC exodus from the ocean to the overland environment not experienced by HSM. This feet-dry employment complicated the ability of early HSC leadership to establish an aligned and distinct definition of “who we are” and “what we do” in support of maritime operations.

An MH-60S Knight Hawk helicopter takes off from the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3). Kearsarge is underway conducting Afloat Training Group 1.4 basic phase training.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Tommy Lamkin, USN.

An MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the Black Knights of Helicopter Sea Combat Support Squadron (HSC) 4 participates in a helicopter training exercise over Diamond Head crater on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. HSC-4 is attached to Carrier Air Wing (CAG) 2 embarked on the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76). U.S. Navy photo by Ensign Joseph Pfaff, USN.

Simultaneous to the Navy’s demonstration of overland MH-60S mission execution in SOF, PR, and life-saving efforts in Iraq and Kuwait in the mid-2000s, HSC sought to retain the HS community’s ASUW mission. In 2008, a modified HSC Capabilities Production Document (CPD) outlined requirements for a forward-firing configuration of the MH-60S designed specifically for CSG defense against fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft (FAC/FIAC). An influx in funding for armed helicopter kits allowed the ASUW mission to expand to the expeditionary HSC squadrons deploying with Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) in support of Defense of the Amphibious Task Force (DATF).

The Navy originally planned for nine ESGs. Naval Air Warfare (N98) resourced aircraft to support nine two-plane MH-60S detachments on the LHD to fly alongside eighteen two-plane MH-60R detachments deployed on ESG CRUDES vessels. In theory, the ESG would maintain organic ship defense through these hunter/killer rotary-wing teams. By 2010, however, Naval Surface Forces declared they could not provide the CRUDES hulls to facilitate the ESG concept. The Navy elected to continue with the legacy Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) model without HSM. In an effort to bridge the DATF gap created by the absence of four planned MH-60Rs, HSC offered a “zero sum” augment of an additional MH-60S on the LHD sourced from other requirements.

The increase from two to three MH-60S on the LHD expanded the operational potential of the HSC ARG/MEU Sea Combat Detachments from plane guard, logistics, and limited ASUW to supporting all Amphibious Task Force operations. Over the past six years, expeditionary three-aircraft HSC Sea Combat Detachments on both coasts have worked to validate the adaptable utility of the MH-60S in support of all ARG/MEU operations. Innovative aircrews have fought for relevancy and force multiplication potential with a ground swell of participation alongside the MEU in assault support (ASPT), tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP), and close air support (CAS). Bottom-up proofs of concept, however, do not change the resourced requirements for a DATF and Fleet Support Operations (FSO) Navy helicopter detachment on the ARG. These departures from the ROC/POE and bottom-up adjustments to T&R precipitate confusion and frustration at all levels of expeditionary HSC. When aircraft capability and application is not tempered by funded requirements, the variability in guidance from operational commanders leads to detachment after detachment “reinventing the wheel” to define HSC’s place in the ARG.

Air Force Airmen from the 48th Rescue Squadron load gear for a joint Search and Rescue (SAR) operation throughout the areas affected by Hurricane Harvey utilizing Air Force small boats and Navy helicopters from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 7. U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Christopher Lindahl, USN.

An MH-60S assigned to HSC-28 aboard HM Mount Bay for a 2019 mine sweeping experiment.

Defining “what we do” calls attention to the resourced purpose of Navy rotary wing: maritime attack and Fleet support operations. DoD assets must frame all operations by the tactical considerations of warfighting. The flexible utility of HSC facilitates rapid embarkation of aircraft on all air-capable Navy shipping. This has allowed the DoD to set a dangerous precedent by satisfying Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA) calls for almost any homeland crisis with U.S. Code Title 10 active-duty units. While state and local officials maintain responsibility for “preparing for and coordinating the provision of assistance for domestic emergencies…and have the authority to deploy and employ National Guard forces,” the DoD displays a penchant for rapidly sortieing MH-60S detachments. The proverbial “easy button” of employing active-duty assets ahead of U.S. Code Title 32 Air National Guard and Army National Guard aircraft for almost any homeland disaster relief effort levies a tax with which HSC cannot recover without significant time, resource, and impacts to operational readiness for warfighting both in the operational and fleet replacement squadrons. Though homeland missions to include hurricane relief and firefighting remain critical to national security and stability, if misunderstood to represent primary mission areas rather than contingency operations with DoD readiness impacts, these complicate the HSC understanding of “who we are.”

Today, MH-60S pilots and aircrewmen demonstrate an impressive full-spectrum execution of rotary-wing operational support. Over the past twenty years, HSC aircrews have saved the lives of isolated service members, both overwater and overland. HSC has also provided medium-lift to SOF task forces, stood operational CAS alerts alongside tier-one assets, conducted maritime interdiction against suspect vessels, and performed Airborne Use of Force with the U.S. Coast Guard. HSC has enabled Fleet logistics, executed extensive humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts, and deployed mine countermeasures systems. The multi-mission utility of the platform remains uncontested, but how does this precipitate “organizational dissonance?”

Without formal and consistent direction from centralized leadership on community values, priorities, and left and right limits of operational availability informed by senior NAE and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) guidance, an individual’s understanding of organizational culture and prioritized mission areas develops through mentorship and personal experience. An HSC-26 “Desert Hawk” flying out of Bahrain may focus on the importance of logistics support in CENTCOM after indoctrination into a forty-year tradition rooted in the legacy operations of HC-2. An HSC-6 “Screamin’ Indian” embarked on CVN 68 may focus on the importance of ASUW in Indonesia-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) after indoctrination into a forty-year tradition of ship defense rooted in the legacy operations of HS-6. The necessity to provide equity between HC and HS personnel and primary mission areas in the formative years of HSC’s organizational culture generated the divisive mantra in the newly formed community “big S little C” or “big C little S.”

The insidious ripples of this organizational dissonance permitted a rift to develop between the HSC ROC/POE (both CVW and Expeditionary), T&R, ACTC, and in the values HSC subconsciously instills through Fleet Replacement Pilot (FRP) and Aircrewman (FRAC) indoctrination. For years, a legacy HC-centric FRS syllabus anchoring solely on detailed Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) systems and SAR procedures failed to contextualize foundational knowledge through the lens of warfighting and combat support; “tactics'' became a term mutually exclusive from NATOPS. The HSC ACTC Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Program (SWTP) developed in parallel to T&R and informed bottom-up changes to the T&R instruction rather than functioning as a derivative enabler of resourced rotary-wing readiness for the Fleet. “What we do” and “who we are” matured to a place of conflicting personal opinion.

To combat organizational dissonance, leadership at all echelons must eliminate informal self-identification through clear community messaging in alignment with the Navy’s strategic maritime focus and greater DoD governing documents. When organizational priorities develop in isolation across the ranks “without clearly understanding the organization and its environment, the results can intensify organizational frustration and ineffectiveness.” Operational readiness in assigned primary mission areas remains the unambiguous purpose of all military units. Historical context shedding light on what contributed to organizational dissonance in HSC can inform “the organization’s knowledge base and help to develop insights that are actionable.” An influx of LCS Aviation Detachments for the expeditionary squadrons and downsizing CVW squadrons from eight to five aircraft directs attention from community thinkers to how HSC strategically generates readiness.

Sailors secure a MH-60S Seahawk from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 4 prior to refueling and launching aboard Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Cincinnati (LCS 20). U.S. Navy photo by LTJG Melissa Spoerl, USN.

In early 2020, informed by the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Great Power Competition, Distributed Maritime Operations, Littoral Operations in Contested Environments, and Air Wing of the Future, Commander, Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Pacific (CHSCWP), published an HSC Mission Statement. The document outlines how the HSC Community puzzle piece fits into contemporary Fleet operations. Regardless of previous rotary-wing operational efforts, the document mirrors Commander’s Guidance across the NAE, directing that the Navy will aggressively return attention to maritime superiority, and all efforts should align to support and achieve this national security goal. The mission statement outlines the purpose of HSC: to provide manned and unmanned helicopter operations in “maritime attack, combat support, and airborne mine countermeasures.”

The HSC restructure will require a methodical and informed plan of action based on resourced requirements of the organization to “pivot back to the sea.” Chaired by CHSCWP leadership and staffed by action officers from CHSCWP, HSC3, HSC-2, HSC Weapons School Atlantic, HSC Weapons School Pacific, and SEAWOLF, HSC established three working groups to guide the reorganization of community maintenance, training, and force structure.

The governing documents that will shape a restructured HSC organizational identity include the ROC/POE, T&R, and the ACTC. While all of these instructions should align and complement one another, this proves difficult when different people and disparate organizations develop the documents independently with individual priorities for HSC. Starting in January 2021, the training working group will scrutinize the governing instructions to identify inefficiencies in maintenance and training hours that detract from operational readiness of the community. Even though FRS training and ACTC should enable readiness, and T&R should be informed by and derivative of the ROC/POE, a major restructure will require writing and developing these adjusted documents in parallel. The restructure calls for not only clear vertical guidance from leadership to the working groups on the community’s focused maritime direction but also open lines of lateral communication between working groups to appropriately align efforts and eliminate mission prioritization based on personal opinion.

My uncle retired from the Navy in 2009. His exposure to Navy helicopters reflected an organization in transition, facing an identity crisis, and struggling for solidarity while navigating complex and uncertain operational environments. He watched HSC repeatedly pivot in an attempt to satisfy the insatiable demand for vertical lift across a burgeoning spectrum of missions while supporting Navy relevancy in overland conflict. “Fly whatever you want, but don’t fly helicopters” reflected neither criticism toward the capabilities of the platform nor the aptitude of the people. It signaled the challenge of the Navy rotarywing business model.

Navy rotary-wing currently benefits from a unique opportunity to resolve HSC organizational dissonance. Restructure will allow for cultural alignment and organizational efficiencies in HSC, and all of Navy rotary-wing can gain from the dividends of reorganization. Emphasis on the MH-60S’s operational purpose to maintain maritime superiority will present new opportunities for fostering the HSC/HSM maritime employment relationship and reinvigorate Navy hunter/killer helicopter teaming for air operations in support of maritime surface warfare (AOMSW). Refined training syllabi reflecting operational employment of HSC will mitigate organizational frustration, increase job satisfaction, and yield higher retention among junior officers and enlisted Sailors. By aligning these governing instructions, limiting operations to the resourced and funded requirements of the MH-60S, and through focused attention on sustainable maritime combat and combat support contributing to DoD operational readiness and availability, HSC will garner validated confidence in “what we do,” and a universal understanding of “who we are.”

Two MH-60S accompany an MQ-8