Features Preparing the Navy for the Indo-Pacific: Advancing UAS for Great Power Competition By Carl Forsling and Chris Misner
A
fter twenty years engaged in the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. Navy finds itself having to rapidly retool its arsenal for a new set of threats and missions. Combating terrorism is a very different mission than facing a peer competitor in the Indo-Pacific. This shift will challenge every community in the Navy, but perhaps none more than the Surface Fleet. During any conflict against a peer or near-peer adversary, U.S. Navy surface The V-247 Vigilant is an example of a modern unmanned system designed to meet the combatants will challenges posed by future conflicts. Image by Bell, Textron. Inc need to find, fix, and destroy surface and submarine targets at ranges beyond those supported by UAS means that the use of highly capable weapons, such as current embarked unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and the Tomahawk Block V, is greatly constrained. As a result, helicopters. Any future system must significantly reduce the surface combatants are left dependent on higher-echelon logistical support needed to support and sustain operations. It assets to acquire and track targets. must combine the vertical-lift capability of a helicopter with the speed and range of a conventional fixed-wing aircraft, Similarly, those combatants rely on Maritime Patrol and provide 24-hour persistent surveillance, and be able to deliver national assets to alert them of potential threats. Peer and long-range precision fires. near-peer adversaries have systems like the YJ-12B cruise missile that can be launched from well outside the range of Surface Action Groups (SAGs) face significant capability current Navy tactical UASs. By the time the ship’s organic gaps in organic Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, sensors detect the inbound threat, the time-to-impact is short, and Targeting (ISR-T). While manned aircraft, such as the and the point of origin has moved. Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance (MPRA) P-8 Poseidon, conduct a significant part of this mission, UAS are by-and-large This puts a significant burden on a finite quantity of MPRA more suitable. While the MQ-4C Triton is an outstanding and other shore-based assets, which are further limited by their ISR-T platform, offering the long-range and endurance of a runway and infrastructure requirements. Supporting surface UAS, it shares some of the same liabilities as the P-8—it needs combatants conducting Distributed Maritime Operations a long runway and infrastructure ashore. (DMO) will severely stress even well-resourced land-based air support. Even if there are sufficient assets, they may not be The Navy lags in fielding shipboard-capable UAS to perform near the point of need in terms of either responsiveness to this mission. The MQ-8C, ScanEagle, and RQ-21A all have emergent threats or in time-on-station once they arrive. They limited range, significantly less than 150 nm. This means that are further constrained by competing higher priorities, and in the ship’s own weapons will usually outrange the visibility the event of a peer or near-peer conflict, there will be a lot of afforded by its UAS support. You can only hit what you can competition. observe. The limited range and endurance of current Naval Rotor Review #162 Fall '23
62
