Features Logistics, Not PR, is the Key Mission to Consider for HSC (CVW) By LCDR Matthew “Cheeese” Wellens, USN
W
ith Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Carrier Air Wing (CVW) squadrons facing a significant restructure, there has been much discussion about what the reduction to three MH-60S on the aircraft carrier (CVN) means. For example, in the Fall 2021 Issue #154 of Rotor Review, CDR Tom “Brother” Murray focused on the effect a three aircraft CVN footprint will have on the ability to perform missions such as Personnel Recovery (PR) and contended that more than three MH-60S helicopters on the carrier are necessary to maintain the air wing’s PR capability. However, too little discussion has centered on the more prominent issue: the effect a three aircraft footprint will have on Carrier Strike Group (CSG) logistics.
squadrons accomplish these tasks daily and enable all facets of CSG operations. However, this raises an important question: are three MH-60S on the carrier enough for CSG logistics requirements?
General Eisenhower captured the critical importance of logistics, saying “you will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” It follows that naval logistics today are of the utmost importance given the expected operational area of our CSGs in this era of Great Power Competition.
Absolutely not. Any HSC (CVW) pilot or aircrew will tell you three aircraft are not enough to meet their logistics requirements from previous deployments. The decision to embark an air wing that has just three MH-60S on the carrier might brief well since it keeps deck space below the prescribed operational density threshold, but it does not adequately consider the realities of CSG operations. Even with a reduced search and rescue requirement, there will be many painful days on deployment when the carrier is unable to execute logistics tasking due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance on the MH-60S. One response might be to send in the MH-60R to pinch hit; however, its lack of cabin space and reduced power margins result in an aircraft with much less logistics capability. Furthermore, Romeos are also facing a smaller carrier presence, despite an ever-increasing appetite for their services.
The venerable MH-60S is one of the few platforms that performs CSG logistics underway. The aircraft is second to none when it comes to myriad logistics tasks such as vertical replenishment (VERTREP), moving Sailors to and from their ships, flying maintainers to the beach after an F/A-18 diverts, conducting emergent medical evacuations, backing up Carrier Onboard Delivery detachments when their aircraft break down, conducting Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief, transporting the admiral, and more. Deployed HSC (CVW)
Another potential response could be to use helicopter detachments on Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships. While they are available during underway replenishment, CLF Dets are often unavailable to assist with tasking from the carrier at other times since they routinely need to resupply in port and replenish other ships. Despite these constraints, CLF helo dets, whether composed of active duty HSC crews or civilian contractor crews, will likely need to assume a larger role as a result of HSC’s smaller carrier presence. Given the decreased
Rotor Review #155 Winter '22
44
