Logistics, Not PR, is the Key Mission to Consider for HSC

By LCDR Matthew “Cheeese” Wellens, USN

With Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Carrier Air Wing (CVW) squadrons facing a significant restructure, there has been much discussion about what the reduction to three MH-60S on the aircraft carrier (CVN) means. For example, in the Fall 2021 Issue #154 of Rotor Review, CDR Tom “Brother” Murray focused on the effect a three aircraft CVN footprint will have on the ability to perform missions such as Personnel Recovery (PR) and contended that more than three MH-60S helicopters on the carrier are necessary to maintain the air wing’s PR capability. However, too little discussion has centered on the more prominent issue: the effect a three aircraft footprint will have on Carrier Strike Group (CSG) logistics.

General Eisenhower captured the critical importance of logistics, saying “you will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” It follows that naval logistics today are of the utmost importance given the expected operational area of our CSGs in this era of Great Power Competition.

The venerable MH-60S is one of the few platforms that performs CSG logistics underway. The aircraft is second to none when it comes to myriad logistics tasks such as vertical replenishment (VERTREP), moving Sailors to and from their ships, flying maintainers to the beach after an F/A-18 diverts, conducting emergent medical evacuations, backing up Carrier Onboard Delivery detachments when their aircraft break down, conducting Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief, transporting the admiral, and more. Deployed HSC (CVW) squadrons accomplish these tasks daily and enable all facets of CSG operations. However, this raises an important question: are three MH-60S on the carrier enough for CSG logistics requirements?

Absolutely not. Any HSC (CVW) pilot or aircrew will tell you three aircraft are not enough to meet their logistics requirements from previous deployments. The decision to embark an air wing that has just three MH-60S on the carrier might brief well since it keeps deck space below the prescribed operational density threshold, but it does not adequately consider the realities of CSG operations. Even with a reduced search and rescue requirement, there will be many painful days on deployment when the carrier is unable to execute logistics tasking due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance on the MH-60S. One response might be to send in the MH-60R to pinch hit; however, its lack of cabin space and reduced power margins result in an aircraft with much less logistics capability. Furthermore, Romeos are also facing a smaller carrier presence, despite an ever-increasing appetite for their services.

Another potential response could be to use helicopter detachments on Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships. While they are available during underway replenishment, CLF Dets are often unavailable to assist with tasking from the carrier at other times since they routinely need to resupply in port and replenish other ships. Despite these constraints, CLF helo dets, whether composed of active duty HSC crews or civilian contractor crews, will likely need to assume a larger role as a result of HSC’s smaller carrier presence. Given the decreased

CVN deck space available for the MH-60S, the potentially larger role of CLF dets, and the Navy’s push for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), the Navy should strive to place HSC detachments on every CLF ship. HSC crews provide flexibility and capabilities in other mission areas beyond what contract services can provide, a factor that will become increasingly important in the DMO environment.

The HSC Community can help itself by better marketing its vital role in CSG logistics. For example, in a 5 ½ month Western Pacific deployment without a CLF det in 2017, HSC-4 transported approximately 700 passengers and 3 million pounds of cargo over roughly 300 logistics sorties while simultaneously conducting other operational tasking and necessary training. That same deployment with just three MH-60S would not only feature a less capable HSC squadron, but more importantly, it would feature a CSG less ready for combat operations across the board due to insufficient logistics capacity. Advertising the effects of a smaller HSC (CVW) squadron to pervasive missions like logistics is more likely to resonate with Navy leadership than the effects to narrower missions involving the MH-60S.

Logistics isn’t sexy, but it is a critically important and high visibility mission that HSC (CVW) squadrons have an indispensable role in every day. Any case for more than three MH-60S on the carrier needs to start and end with logistics. This discussion is one that might capture the attention of leaders at fleet commands, type commands, and within the strike group. On the other hand, any argument that centers on long range PR will struggle to gain traction.

About the Author

LCDR Matthew “Cheeese” Wellens is an HSC pilot who has experienced three CVN deployments to U.S. 5th and 7th Fleets and is now the Flag Aide to the Naval Inspector General. Please feel free to share your thoughts with him at matthew.t.wellens.mil@us.navy. mil.

An MH-60S Seahawk helicopter, assigned to the "Tridents" of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 9, lifts supplies from the flight deck of USNS Patuxent (T-AO 201) during a vertical replenishment with USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)

. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Sawyer Connally