Building Back Better

Building Back Better Altadena’s Recovery and Lessons from Santa Rosa

Commissioned by The Olson Company APRIL 2025

2

About the Rose Institute

About the Olson Company

The Rose Institute of State and Local Government is a leading source of objective, non-partisan information on California state and local governments. Founded at Claremont McKenna College in 1973, the Institute’s mission is to enhance the education of students at CMC, produce high quality research, and promote public understanding on issues of state and local government, politics, and policy, with an emphasis on California.

Since 1988, The Olson Company’s mission has been to work hand-in-hand with cities to solve the critical shortage of urban housing by promoting and investing in responsible development that improves quality of life for everyone. The Company approaches development by listening and seeking to understand the social, cultural, and aesthetic qualities of the neighborhoods in which it builds. The Olson Company works in collaboration with community stakeholders, city staff and officials to deliver creative solutions for neighbors and future residents. Its communities lower environmental impacts by relying on existing infrastructure, reducing or eliminating commute times and encouraging walkability to support local businesses, amenities, and resources. The Company’s success would not be possible without the partnership it has enjoyed with over 100 California cities and neighborhoods.

Project Team Kenneth P. Miller, JD, PhD Bipasa Nadon, JD Jessica Jin ___ Andrea Santillan CMC ’25 Alexander Bishop CMC ’26 Samuel Yao CMC ’27 Jathan Pai CMC ’28 Stephanie Li PZ ’28

Acknowledgments Joseph M. Bessette, PhD Marionette Moore

Cover Image: Reconstruction of Santa Rosa’s Coffey Park neigborhood after Tubbs Fire (Adobe Stock) Right Image: Aerial view of Pasadena prior to the Eaton Fire (Adobe Stock)

3

Contents I. INTRODUCTION

4

II. TWO COMMUNITIES STRUCK BY WILDFIRES

8

III. SANTA ROSA’S RECOVERY

9

IV. ALTADENA’S CHALLENGE

21

V. A SILVER LINING FOR CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING FUTURE?

26

4

I. Introduction In the aftermath of the 2025 Eaton Fire, how will Altadena rebuild?

Santa Rosa’s recovery after the 2017 Tubbs Fire offers key lessons.

Eaton Canyon Fire (Adobe Stock)

The Eaton Fire and California’s increasing fire risk On January 7, 2025, the Eaton Fire ignited at the base of the San Gabriel Mountains, near the community of Altadena in unincorporated Los Angeles County. When the fire was finally contained three weeks later, it had burned more than 14,000 acres, caused 17 deaths, and destroyed thousands of structures.1 The inferno completely consumed or severely damaged nearly half of Altadena’s properties, as well as others in nearby Pasadena, including almost 7,000 residences–mostly single family homes, but also duplexes, courtyard bungalows, apartment units, condominiums, and mobile homes.2 At the same time, another fire raged just 30 miles to the west in Pacific Palisades. That fire burned nearly 24,000 acres and destroyed or severely damaged more than 6,000 homes. Together, the two fires wiped out more than 12,000 residences in Southern California, seriously compounding the region’s housing crisis.3 State and local

policymakers now face the urgent challenge of reconstructing these communities. This report focuses on the task of rebuilding Altadena. We do so by examining how Santa Rosa, a community in Northern California, successfully recovered from a similar blaze, and by analyzing the tension in California between preserving neighborhood character, maximizing new home construction, minimizing the risk of building in fire-prone areas, and containing costs. The report also concludes that applying the urgency and efficiency of post-fire recoveries to everyday housing policy and procedures would help solve the state’s broader housing crisis.

We note at the outset that the pattern of wildfire damage and recovery is becoming more acute in California. Years of inadequate utility maintenance and forest management practices, combined with warmer and drier conditions, have resulted in more frequent and intense fires.4 The Eaton and Palisades conflagrations are two of the four most destructive fires in California’s history as measured

1

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, “Eaton Fire | Cal Fire,” n.d., accessed March 8, 2025, https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025/1/7/eaton-fire.

2

Doug Smith and Sandhya Kambhampati, “Real estate losses from fires may top $30 billion, from old mobile homes to $23-million mansions,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2025, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-02-21/real-estate-losses-from-palisades-and-eaton-fires-top-30-billion.

3

Smith and Kambhampati, “Real estate losses.”

4

Julie Cart, “California infernos in January? Here’s why wildfire season keeps getting longer and more devastating,” CalMatters, January 8, 2025, https://calmatters.org/ explainers/california-wildfire-season-worsening-explained/.; California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, “Top 20 Most Destructive California Wildfires,” n.d., accessed March 8, 2025, https://34c031f8-c9fd-4018-8c5a-4159cdff6b0d-cdn-endpoint.azureedge.net/-/media/calfire-website/our-impact/fire-statistics/ top20_destruction.

5

by total structures burned, all of which have occurred in the past decade. The other two at the top of the list are the massive 2018 Camp Fire in Butte County, which destroyed the town of Paradise, and the 2017 Tubbs Fire in Sonoma and Napa Counties, which leveled a significant portion of the city of Santa Rosa, as we discuss further below.5 As wildfires become both more common and more destructive, California faces serious urban planning, environmental, and economic choices when considering how best to prevent, mitigate, and recover from wildfire disasters.

Prior to the Eaton Fire, a Cal Fire analysis found that 95% of home loss due to previous wildfires occurred in “very high” severity zones.8 Yet, the VHFHSZ system is an increasingly imperfect barometer for determining fire mitigation policies and funding. A Los Angeles Times analysis found that 83% of structures razed in the Eaton fire were outside Cal Fire’s VHFHSZ.9 The model’s inaccuracy is due in part to its inability to predict all factors that contribute to a wildfire’s spread. In the case of the Eaton fire, dry and strong Santa Ana winds pushed the fire farther into developed areas than the model predicted.

Most state and local policies related to wildfires prioritize fire suppression and fuel management within the wildland-urban interface (WUI).6 Broadly, the WUI refers to any area where human development abuts undeveloped wildlands. These areas are particularly susceptible to wildfires. California’s wildfire policies have focused on retrofitting existing homes, maintaining defensible space by reducing fuel around structures, and imposing stricter building requirements to improve fire resilience rather than restricting development within the WUI.7

However, the Eaton fire was not the first of its kind. More than 45% of home loss from Northern California’s Tubbs Fire was also outside of high fire risk areas. As in Altadena, strong winds drove the fire beyond the WUI into Santa Rosa’s interior neighborhoods.10

After the 1980 Panorama Fire in San Bernardino County, the state directed its fire response agency (Cal Fire) to map areas vulnerable to wildfire disasters. Cal Fire classifies hazard potential in areas where the state has financial responsibility for wildfire protection and prevention (State Responsibility Areas) as well as for local jurisdictions (Local Responsibility Areas). These Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZs) are categorized as medium, high, and very high fire-hazard based on terrain, vegetation, fire history, climate conditions, and ember cast computer modeling. Regions with the highest level of fire hazard within the WUI are classified as “very high fire-hazard severity zones” or VHFHSZs. Since Cal Fire began classifying these severity zones, they have increasingly become a pillar in the state’s fire mitigation policymaking and are referenced in at least 50 pieces of legislation, codes, grants and other state rules and documents.

The Eaton and Tubbs Fires demonstrate that many of the state’s urban communities are increasingly susceptible to wildfire disasters. This fact carries serious policy consequences as state and local policymakers are forced to consider how to promote housing production while reducing the risk of replacing or adding housing in fire-prone areas.

Lessons from Santa Rosa’s recovery Santa Rosa’s recovery is largely considered a success story and in many ways can serve as a model for Altadena.

The Tubbs Fire burned more than 3,000 homes within Santa Rosa’s city limits – roughly 5% of the city’s housing stock.11 By 2020, a mere three years after the fire, Santa Rosa was able to rebuild more than 80% of destroyed homes.12 This report examines how actions by city and county governments helped Santa Rosa rebuild at a rapid pace and return residents to their homes. In Altadena, county officials are already using many of the lessons learned from the Tubbs Fire recovery – from establishing a dedicated department to expediting permitting to

5

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, “Top 20.”

6

Karen Chapple, et al., Rebuilding for a Resilient Recovery: Planning in California’s Wildland Urban Interface, Next 10, June 16, 2021, 7, https://www.next10.org/sites/default/ files/2021-06/Next10-Rebuilding-Resilient.pdf.

7

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, “Wildland Hazards and Building Codes,” n.d., accessed March 9, 2025, .https://osfm.fire.ca.gov/what-we-do/ code-development-and-analysis/wildland-hazards-and-building-codes

8

Noah Haggerty, Ben Poston, and Sean Greene, “Cal Fire’s predictions didn’t foresee the Altadena inferno. Now it’s changing its fire-hazard maps,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2025, https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2025-02-04/cal-fire-maps-did-not-predict-altadena.

9

Haggerty, Poston, and Greene, “Cal Fire’s predictions.”

10

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, “Tubbs Fire | Cal Fire,” n.d., accessed March 8, 2025, https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2017/10/8/tubbs-firecentral-lnu-complex; California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, “Top 20.”

11

Jessica Garrison, “This California city lost thousands of homes to fire. Santa Rosa’s rebuilding has lessons for L.A.,” Los Angeles Times, January 22, 2025, https://www. latimes.com/california/story/2025-01-22/santa-rosa-offers-hope-lessons-for-rebuilding-after-la-fires/.

12

Garrison, “California city lost thousands.”

anticipating wildfire-related hazards like drinking water contamination.13 This report suggests that Altadena can take further lessons from Santa Rosa’s experience.

From one crisis to another: Rebuilding amidst California’s housing crisis The rebuilding of Altadena comes at a time when California is facing a widespread housing crisis. In the nearly eight years since the Tubbs Fire, the state has reckoned with an acute housing shortage caused by decades of insufficient housing development. Several factors, including scarcity of developable land in prime locations, local opposition to new housing, and state and local policies that restrict development and raise the cost of construction, have resulted in severe underproduction and sky-high real estate prices.

Estimates of the state’s housing shortfall range wildly from 1 to 3.5 million units, yet experts uniformly agree that the state is failing to meet demand by a wide margin. This deficit has led to an affordability crisis with real social costs. Californians are far more likely to spend more than half their income on housing than other Americans, causing many cost-burdened lower-to middle-income households to relocate out of state.14 Moreover, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has identified the state’s lack of affordable housing as a primary driver of the state’s homelessness crisis. As of December 2024, HUD reported approximately 187,000 people were homeless in California, the most of any state, and that the state accounted for nearly one-half of the nation’s unhoused homeless population.15 Since 1969, California’s Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) has required local governments to meet regional housing needs through the Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA). Across 23 regions in California, the HCD allocates targets for very-low-income, low-income, moderate-income, and

above-moderate-income housing unit production over an eight-year period. Within each region, each city must plan to meet its RHNA through its Housing Element, which then must be approved by the state. Historically, local jurisdictions have failed to adhere to their RHNA and Housing Element plans, largely due to local opposition and lax enforcement.

Over the past decade, California has focused intently on addressing its housing crisis. State lawmakers have proposed hundreds of housing-related bills each year, demonstrating their determination to tackle this issue.

The new state laws include: increased requirements for local governments to plan and zone for regional housing needs; restrictions on local governments’ opposition to new development; incentives to promote more infill and high-density development, including laws preventing local governments from denying permits to build accessory dwelling units (ADUs) in most cases; and new mechanisms to enforce these goals. Most ambitiously, the state set a production target of 2.5 million new units by 2030.

Despite this flood of pro-housing policies, most cities in California have struggled to meet new housing requirements.16 Although California doubled affordable housing production from the four-year period ending 2019 to the four-year period ending 2023, for every year between 2019 and 2023, the state built less than a fifth of that year’s housing production goal.17 California’s efforts to produce more housing conflict with its desire to reduce fire risk. New state policies designed to streamline permitting and increase housing density have expanded housing development in wildland-urban interface zones, which in turn has increased the fire threat to homes.18 At the same time, strategies to mitigate fire risk have increased housing development costs by limiting land available for construction and imposing more stringent building codes.

13

Paulina Pineda, “Santa Rosa wrote the playbook for the long road to recovery after 2017 Tubbs Fire. These lessons could aid Los Angeles,” The Press Democrat, February 2, 2025, https://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/news/santa-rosa-fire-lessons-los-angeles/#:~:text=After%20the %20efforts%20where%20staff%20could%20walk%20 residents%20through%20the%20design,%20permitting%20and%20review%20process

14

Hans Johnson and Eric McGhee, “Three Decades of Housing Challenges in the Golden State,” Public Policy Institute of California, December 3, 2024, https://www.ppic. org/blog/three-decades-of-housing-challenges-in-the-golden-state/.

15

Tanya de Sousa and Meghan Henry, “The 2024 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress: Part I: Point-In-Time Estimates for Homelessness,” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, December 2024, 8, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2024-AHAR-Part-1.pdf.

16

Ryan Lenney and George Ashford, Where Do State and Local Housing Policy Priorities Diverge? Rose Institute of State and Local Government, April 2024, 7, https://s10294. pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Housing-Element-Report_FINAL_no-marks.pdf.

17

Mazzella, Danielle, “California Affordable Housing Needs Report,” California Housing Partnership, January 2024, 3, https://chpc.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/ California-Affordable-Housing-Needs-Report-2024-1.pdf.

18

Umair Irfan, “5 approaches that experts say are our best shot at surviving future wildfires,” Vox, February 7, 2025, https://www.vox.com/climate/398719/los-angeles-firereconstruction-insurance-housing

Building back better: What defines a successful recovery?

With these and other considerations in play, three broad strategies will factor into Altadena’s reconstruction: like-for-like rebuilding, managed retreat, and higher density in place.19 1.

Like-for-like rebuilding: Like-for-like policies expedite the permitting process for replacement structures that closely mirror what was destroyed on a parcel, allowing for little to no modifications.

This approach aims to quickly rebuild burned areas while preserving community character and adhering to existing zoning rules.

2.

Managed retreat: Managed retreat policies prioritize mitigating future wildfire threats by incentivizing home owners to relocate to less fire prone areas. In the highest-risk areas, this may involve buying out properties or ceasing redevelopment in vulnerable WUI zones, then converting those areas into open buffer zones or green spaces to act as fire breaks. The goal would be to reduce future losses by removing structures from the most hazardous sites. In turn, communities would have to increase density in lower risk areas to accommodate relocated households.

3.

Higher density in place: Higher density in place policies align with managed retreat strategies by promoting denser reconstruction along urban corridors. This approach also calls for infill development, adding multi-story housing and mixed-use buildings in established, lower-risk areas. However, this approach does allow for redevelopment in high-risk areas. Rather than retreating entirely from vulnerable WUI zones, this calls for wildfire mitigation strategies and retrofitting options to reduce risk. While this strategy aims to reduce future sprawl into fire-prone regions, it ultimately relies on homeowners to reduce the fire risk on their existing properties.20

19

Chapple, et al., Rebuilding for a Resilient Recovery, 2.

20

Andrew Hay and Brad Brooks, “After fires, Los Angeles gets moonshot moment to rebuild,” Reuters, January 31, 2025, https://www.reuters. com/world/us/after-fires-los-angeles-gets-moonshot-momentrebuild-2025-01-30/

After the Tubbs Fire, Santa Rosa prioritized likefor-like reconstruction and approved high-density building for some fire-impacted lots. Section II discusses Santa Rosa’s Tubbs Fire response in greater detail.

Similarly, following the Eaton Fire, Los Angeles County officials have outlined a vision for Altadena’s recovery that includes elements of two of these strategies: like-for-like and higher density in place. Officials have approved like-for-like rebuilding permits as a part of an expedited permitting process. At the same time, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors has unanimously adopted the West San Gabriel Valley Area Plan, which encourages development in Altadena’s interior corridors and restricts development in its highest fire risk areas in the foothills. State and local officials are also considering several policies that impose stricter building requirements in fire-vulnerable areas.

We note that various additional factors, including availability of homeowner’s insurance coverage, will help determine whether residents can rebuild. Many residents in fire-prone areas struggle to obtain insurance coverage due in part to insurance industry resistance to issuing homeowner’s policies in these areas. That said, insurance issues are beyond the scope of this report, which focuses on local government responses to the Tubbs and Eaton Fires and the effects of statewide housing policies California enacted in the years preceding the Eaton Fire.

8

II. Two Communities Struck by Wildfires Santa Rosa and Altadena are suburban communities that suffered massive home losses in wildfires. They share other similarities as well as key differences.

The communities of Santa Rosa and Altadena have many similarities as well as important differences. Most significantly for this report, both communities were classified as low fire risk, yet in both places massive wildfires wiped out thousands of homes.21 Other similarities are worth noting. Both Santa Rosa and Altadena are long-established suburban communities with majority white, middle class populations, most of whom reside in single-family homes. And both communities take pride in their distinctive local cultures that include high levels of citizen participation in community affairs. But on other measures, the two places differ. First, Santa Rosa is considerably larger, with a population about four times the size of Altadena. In 2017, the year of the Tubbs Fire, Santa Rosa had 67,537 housing units and an estimated population of about 175,000. By comparison, in 2023, shortly before the Eaton Fire, Altadena had 15,744 housing units and an estimated population of 42,000.22 Second, Altadena is wealthier overall. Its households had a higher median income than in Santa Rosa (even after adjusting for inflation after 2017) and its homes had a higher median value. Altadena also has far fewer renter-occupied units than Santa Rosa, and the vast majority of its residents own their own homes. At the time of the respective fires, Altadena’s housing stock was older than Santa Rosa’s, which may have contributed to the number of homes lost. Finally, Altadena has a comparatively large African American community (18% of the city’s total population), compared to 2% in Santa Rosa.23

It is also important to note that the two communities differ in their local government status and structure.

Santa Rosa is an incorporated city, governed by an elected city council and administered by a city manager. It enacts its own local ordinances and provides its own municipal services. By contrast, Altadena is not a city, but rather an unincorporated area within Los Angeles County. The U.S. Census Bureau classifies Altadena as a “Census Designated Place” or “CDP,” which means it is a “closely settled, unincorporated communit[y] that [is] locally recognized and identified by name.”24 Because it is unincorporated, Altadena lacks its own local government. Although it has a town council, that body is advisory. Instead, Altadena is governed by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and receives local services such as fire protection and law enforcement from Los Angeles County. The county is also responsible for Altadena’s land use, zoning, and permitting policies.25

21

Los Angeles County Department of Regional Planning, “Fire Hazard Severity Zones Policy Map (General Plan 2035),” n.d., accessed March 31, 2025, https://planning. lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Exhibit-D-gp_2035_2021-FIG_12-5_Fire_Hazard_Severity_Zones_Policy_Map_Responsibility-REFERENCE.pdf.

22

U.S. Census Bureau, American Communities Survey (ACS) Demographic and Housing Data, 2017 5-year Estimates Data Profiles, Santa Rosa City, California https:// data.census.gov/table/ACSDP5Y2017.DP05?q=Santa+Rosa+city,+California+2017; 2023 5-year Estimates Data Profiles, Altadena CDP California, https://data.census.gov/ profile/Altadena_CDP,_California?g=160XX00US0601290.

23

U.S. Census Bureau, “Quickfacts: Santa Rosa city, California; Altadena CDP, California,” population estimates July 1, 2024, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ santarosacitycalifornia,altadenacdpcalifornia/PST045224.

24

U.S. Census Bureau, “Census Designated Places,” n.d., accessed March 17, 2025, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/bas/information/cdp.html.

25

Altadena Town Council, “About: Altadena Town Council,” n.d., accessed March 19, 2025, https://altadenatowncouncil.org/about/.

9

Reconstruction of Santa Rosa’s Coffey Park neigborhood after Tubbs Fire (Adobe Stock)

III. Santa Rosa’s Recovery Widely considered a success, Santa Rosa created the playbook for urban wildfire recovery.

Santa Rosa is the largest city in Northern California’s legendary wine country. Located in the heart of Sonoma County, approximately 65 miles north of San Francisco and 20 miles inland from the coast, the city is bisected by U.S. Highway 101 and separated from the Napa Valley by the Mayacama range to the east. It is governed by a city council and administered by a city manager. It also serves as the administrative seat for Sonoma County.

In 2017, this middle class suburban community was home to about 175,000 residents, the majority of whom (53%) owned their homes.26 Nearly 58% of the city’s housing

stock consisted of single-family homes, the majority of which (67%) were constructed between 1960-2000.27 Santa Rosa has a history of infrequent yet severe wildfires driven largely by hot, dry Diablo winds.28 On October 8, 2017, the Tubbs Fire ignited in the neighboring Napa County town of Calistoga. The Tubbs Fire was one of more than a dozen blazes simultaneously raging in Northern California at that time. Winds of up to 80 mph pushed the fire southwestward from Calistoga across wildland hills into Sonoma County.29 When the fire reached Santa Rosa, it jumped over U.S. Highway 101 and toward the Coffey

26

U.S. Census Bureau, “Tenure by House Heating Fuel,” American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, Table B25117, 2017, https://data.census.gov/ table/ACSDT5Y2017.B25117?q=Santa+Rosa+house+2017.

27

City of Santa Rosa, “2023 – 2031 Santa Rosa Housing Element Summary,” January 2023, https://www.santarosaforward.com/files/managed/Document/754/ SR_Housing_Element_Summary_1-11-2023FV.pdf.

28

Chapple, et al., Rebuilding for a Resilient Recovery, 15.

29

City of Santa Rosa, “Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Wildfire Annex: Community Wildfire Protection Plan,” September 18, 2020, 31, https://www.firesafesonoma.org/ wp-content/uploads/9-2020-final_srs_cwpp-2020-compressed-1.pdf.

10

WITHIN SANTA ROSA CITY LIMITS ALONE, THE FIRE DESTROYED 3,043 HOMES (NEARLY 5% OF SANTA ROSA’S HOUSING STOCK) AND CAUSED AN ESTIMATED $1.2 BILLION IN DAMAGE.

Park neighborhood, an area not previously designated as part of the wildland-urban interface.30 By the time it was contained, the Tubbs fire had burned nearly 37,000 acres and more than 5,600 structures.

Within Santa Rosa city limits alone, the fire destroyed 3,043 homes (nearly 5% of Santa Rosa’s housing stock) and caused an estimated $1.2 billion in damage.31 Most homes in the city’s Coffey Park, Larkfield-Wikiup, and Fountain Grove neighborhoods were destroyed.32

The City’s Response In the fire’s aftermath, Santa Rosa officials were determined to help displaced residents repair or reconstruct their homes as expeditiously as possible. The city took the following actions: ●

Created in collaboration with Sonoma County a “Sonoma County Recovers” website to provide residents recovery information.35

●

Enacted an urgency ordinance that streamlined the process for development and design review and allowed affected residents to live in temporary housing, such as RVs, mobile homes, and tiny homes, on their properties while rebuilding.36

●

Opened the Resilient City Permit Center, which exclusively served fire survivors. The Center was designed to expedite design and permit reviews, and homeowners in the fire-damaged neighborhoods were encouraged to use its services. The city also created a Resilient City Zoning Guide to assist homeowners through the permitting and inspection process.37

●

Established Resilient City Zoning Areas to cover six fire-affected neighborhoods. Residents of these areas would have access to recovery services, including the Resilient City Permit Center.38

Table 1. Tubbs Fire Damage

Total Damage33

Structures damaged

5,636

Acres burned

36,807

Fatalities

Housing units destroyed within Santa Rosa34

22

Units destroyed

3,043

Single family units destroyed

2,600

ADUs destroyed

26

Multifamily units destroyed

223

30

Doug Smith and Nina Agrawal, “Despite clear risks, Santa Rosa neighborhood that burned down was exempt from state fire regulations,” Los Angeles Times, October 15, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-coffey-park-explainer-20171011-story.html.

31

Witt O’Briens, “Coming Together in Crisis: The Santa Rosa Story,” April 2019, 3-4, https://issuu.com/cityofsantarosa/docs/aar_-_csr; Laura J. Nelson, Sonali Kohli, Paige St. John, Dakota Smith, and Nina Agrawal, “Death toll from Northern California fires jumps to at least 34; 5,700 structures destroyed,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-fires-20171013-story.html.

32

Priya Krishnakumar, Joe Fox, and Chris Keller, “Here’s where more than 7,500 buildings were destroyed and damaged in California’s wine country fires,” Los Angeles Times, October 25, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-northern-california-fires-structures/.

33

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, “Tubbs Fire.”

34

City of Santa Rosa, “Resilient City Recovery Reporting Dashboard,” n.d., accessed March 9, 2025, https://santarosa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/ dashboards/07e39ea4077c42a883430a9f60103bc2

35

Witt O’Briens, “Coming Together in Crisis,” 28.; Cf. https://www.sonomacountyrecovers.org/, https://issuu.com/cityofsantarosa/docs/csr_rc_zoning_info_sheet_v9_jt.

36

Witt O’Briens, “Coming Together in Crisis,” 28.

37

Witt O’Briens, “Coming Together in Crisis,” 28.

38

City of Santa Rosa, “Resilient City Zoning,” n.d., accessed March 27, 2025, https://www.srcity.org/2674/Resilient-City-Zoning.

●

●

Added certainty by reducing discretionary review and creating express permitting processes.40

●

Expedited “like-for-like” permits for residents looking to rebuild their homes with few or no modifications.41

●

Waived fees for some permits, such as discretionary planning permit fees, as well as fees for demolition permits and temporary housing.42 Aggressively reduced fees on multifamily housing and reduced fees for accessory dwelling units (ADUs).43

●

●

39

Increased its capacity to assist affected homeowners by contracting with Bureau Veritas, a private company that specializes in testing, inspections, and certifications, to review building permit plans, conduct inspections, and answer general questions.39

Implemented by-right development policies that allowed increased building heights, reduced parking requirements, and streamlined accessory dwelling unit (ADU) regulations. Allowed owners to build and occupy detached ADUs before constructing a single-family residence on affected parcels.44

market and attract developers and leverage funds to address regional housing needs.46 ●

Adopted a 100 percent density bonus.47

●

Adopted measures to streamline permitting of new higher density infill home construction in areas outside the fire zone where the city sought to create new housing, especially downtown and in other transit service areas.48

●

Prioritized resident engagement and public transparency as a part of its recovery process. Held more than 250 rebuild and recovery meetings and the city council established a rebuild/build ad hoc committee that met weekly with city staff. Regular city council updates, multilingual communication efforts, and dedicated recovery resources kept residents informed.49

●

Provided additional online resources, so residents could track the rebuilding progress through published online maps that provided real-time updates on clean-up, permitting, and construction.50

●

Proposed a 1/4-cent increase to the sales tax to support rebuilding fire-damaged infrastructure, which voters approved in November 2018.51

Established a Joint Powers Agreement with Sonoma County to form the Renewal Enterprise District (RED) “to create a structure for development of funding and other incentives to facilitate and encourage climate-smart, resilient and affordable housing, as well as other community development projects.”45 RED worked across jurisdictions to

International City/County Management Association (ICMA), Disaster Case Studies: Santa Rosa Tubbs Fire, September 2022, 2, Resilient City Zoning | Santa Rosa, CAhttps://icma.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Santa%20Rosa%20case%20study%20v3.pdf.

40 David Guhin, “The Santa Rosa Story: Housing Crisis to Housing Opportunity,” Western City, September 1, 2019, https://www.westerncity.com/article/santa-rosa-storyhousing-crisis-housing-opportunity.

41

Jesse Roman, “Build. Burn. Repeat?” National Fire Protection Association Journal, January 2, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20230318012706/https://www.nfpa.org/ News-and-Research/Publications-and-media/NFPA-Journal/2018/January-February-2018/Features/Build-Burn-Repeat.

42

City of Santa Rosa, “Resilient City Zoning.”

43

Guhin, “The Santa Rosa Story.”

44

CivicWell, “Rebuilding after the Fires: Housing Lessons for All Communities,” March 28, 2019, https://civicwell.org/civic-news/rebuilding-after-the-fires-housinglessons/.

45

City of Santa Rosa, Approving the Joint Powers Agreement for the Creation of a Renewal Enterprise District Through a Joint Powers Authority Comprised Initially of the City of Santa Rosa and County of Sonoma, RES-2018-218, June 26, 2018, https://www.srcity.org/DocumentCenter/View/23222/Renewal-Enterprise-District-JPA-Resolution.

46 David Guhin, “18-0904 - Staff Report,” City of Santa Rosa, December 4, 2018, https://www.srcity.org/DocumentCenter/View/23221/Renewal-Enterprise-District-JPACityStaffReport.

47

City of Santa Rosa, “RED JPA Board Meeting: Promoting Housing in Sonoma County: Renewal Enterprise District (RED),” February 27, 2019, 10, https://www.srcity.org/ DocumentCenter/View/23307/REDJPA-Overview-022719.; Guhin, “The Santa Rosa Story.”

48

City of Santa Rosa, “RED JPA Board Meeting: Promoting Housing,” 10.

49 ICMA, Santa Rosa Tubbs Fire, 2.

50

City of Santa Rosa, “Rebuilding After the Fires,”n.d., accessed March 9, 2025, https://www.srcity.org/3018/Rebuilding

51

Colin Atagi, “Santa Rosa’s public safety tax leads in early returns,” The Press Democrat, November 8, 2022. https://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/news/early-resultsyes-on-measure-h-tax-increase-extension-for-santa-rosa-publi/.

12

A Successful Recovery Before the Tubbs Fire, Santa Rosa, like many California cities, struggled to build enough new housing to meet demand.52 The loss of more than 3,000 housing units was a major setback for the city’s efforts to address its housing needs. This was especially true because nearly all residents displaced by the fire wanted to stay in the area. According to a report, a year after the fire 96 percent of residents displaced by the Tubbs Fire chose to remain in Sonoma or Napa Counties.53

SANTA ROSA OFFICIALS SAW RECOVERY FROM THE FIRE AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS ON

Santa Rosa officials saw recovery from the fire as an opportunity to make progress on their broader housing goals, with then-mayor Chris Coursey saying he would consider it a failure if by 2020 the city’s housing stock did not exceed 2017 levels.54 Accordingly, as they set out to swiftly rebuild the burn area, local officials also amended the city’s Downtown Station Area Specific Plan to incentivize high density infill housing near transit in the city’s urban core.55 The city has made some of these post-fire policies permanent, including streamlined like-for-like rebuilding permits and expanded over-the-counter planning approvals for housing projects that increase density in downtown district.

THEIR BROADER HOUSING GOALS, WITH THEN-MAYOR CHRIS COURSEY SAYING HE WOULD CONSIDER IT A FAILURE IF BY 2020 THE CITY’S HOUSING STOCK DID NOT EXCEED 2017 LEVELS.

Results Santa Rosa’s action plan helped homeowners in the fire zones rebuild more quickly than many expected. The city’s clear and consistent pro-housing policies gave developers the certainty they needed to build new homes.56 The Resilient City Permit Center and its private contractors greatly expedited review cycles, reducing permit processing times from 10 months to 3 months, shortening review times to five days for minor changes, and allowing 24-hour inspection turnarounds.57 And, by leaning on technology such as live maps to provide up-to-date reporting, the city made it easy for all stakeholders to stay informed and connect with available resources.58 Local developers also aided the recovery process by drawing up a handful of home designs that were pre-approved by local officials, allowing residents to choose from a menu of options and lowering costs.59 Many projects took advantage of this 52

Guhin, “The Santa Rosa Story.”

53

Chapple, et al., Rebuilding for a Resilient Recovery, 14, citing Census data.

54

Guhin, “The Santa Rosa Story.”

55

RED JPA Board, “Promoting Housing in Sonoma County,” 10.

56

ICMA, Santa Rosa Tubbs Fire, 2.

57

CivicWell, “Rebuilding after the Fires: Housing Lessons for All Communities;” City of Santa Rosa, “FAQ Santa Rosa, CA,” n.d., https://www.srcity.org/2932/_--FAQ—.

58

ICMA, Santa Rosa Tubbs Fire, 3.

59

Chris Kirkham, Judith Langowski and Peter Henderson, “Earlier California fire shows how Los Angeles could rebuild,” Reuters, January 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/ world/us/earlier-california-fire-shows-how-los-angeles-could-rebuild-2025-01-27/

13

Homes under construction in Coffey Park, Santa Rosa in October 2019 (Adobe Stock)

streamlined process, resulting in construction or permitting of 3,228 units.60

that ADU development was an instrumental part of the city’s recovery process.61

Moreover, Santa Rosa built back more densely. Today, the city has more housing units than before the fire, including more units in the fire-affected areas. This growth in housing stock and density can be attributed in part to the proliferation of Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) in the city’s rebuilt neighborhoods. Santa Rosa’s embrace of ADUs is part of a statewide trend. When the California Legislature began removing barriers to ADU permitting in 2016, ADU construction dramatically ramped up across the state. In Santa Rosa, homeowners in the burn zones have been able to add accessory units to their reconstructed properties, which has helped some cover the cost of rebuilding. In addition, some owners have lived in their ADUs while waiting for completion of their primary residences. In Santa Rosa’s fire zones, the number of ADUs has increased signifcantly since 2017.

The Tubbs Fire destroyed 26 ADUs in Santa Rosa; today 134 ADUs have been constructed or are actively permitted in the affected areas. Santa Rosa officials have concluded

Similarly, the number of multifamily units has increased in Santa Rosa’s fire areas. While the Tubbs Fire destroyed 223 multifamily units, 733 multifamily units have been built or permitted in these areas in the years thereafter.62 A further surge of multifamily development in the burn zone is on its way, including two large apartment complexes with a total of 650 units on the site of a destroyed mobile home park and inn.

In addition, during the fire recovery period, Santa Rosa redoubled its efforts to increase housing density in the city’s downtown area. The city adopted the Downtown Station Area Specific Plan (DSASP) in 2020, with the goal of significantly increasing housing density and transit-oriented development in Santa Rosa’s downtown district.63 This summary of the city’s actions demonstrates that Santa Rosa’s leaders had the political will to take the state’s housing targets seriously and used the recovery process to address those needs.

60 City of Santa Rosa, “Resilient City Recovery Reporting Dashboard.”

61

Guhin, “The Santa Rosa Story.”

62

Guhin, “The Santa Rosa Story.”

63

City of Santa Rosa, “Downtown-Station Area Specific Plan,” n.d., accessed March 31, 2025, https://www.srcity.org/2911/Downtown-Station-Area-Specific-Plan

14

Santa Rosa Resilient City Recovery Reporting In response to the 2017 Tubbs Fire, Santa Rosa City Council adopted several ordinances that aimed to streamline the rebuilding process for affected residents.

To track its recovery efforts, Santa Rosa publishes data related to residential permits and parcels on an online dashboard known as the Resilient City Recovery Reporting Dashboard. This dashboard contains information regarding the number of untis destroyed by the Tubbs Fire as well as the types of units destroyed.

This is a snapshot of Santa Rosa’s Resilient City Recovery Reporting Dashboard.

As of April 1, 2025, there are 3,228 housing units with permit activity in Santa Rosa. The vast majority of these units (77%) are already complete. These units are constructed across 2,180 residential parcels.

This dashboard reveals that more housing units have been rebuilt than destroyed. And, that Santa Rosa has rebuilt denser (on fewer parcels) than before. It also suggests that Santa Rosa’s efforts to expedite like-for-like permits may have been effective. Nearly 70% of all permits were for the same building plan or had only minor changes.

3,228 Permitted Units Current Progress by Housing Units 2,478 Structure Complete 331 In Construction 376 Permit Issued, Construction Pending 42 Permit Review in Process

2,403 Active Residential Parcels Current Progress by Parcels Rebuilding 2,180 Structure Complete 170 In Construction 25 Permit Issued, Construction Pending 28 Permit Review in Process

Building Plan Changes 60.0% Minor Changes

Source: City of Santa Rosa, “Resilient City Recovery Reporting Dashboard,” n.d., accessed April 1, 2025, https://www.arcgis.com/apps/ dashboards/07e39ea4077c42a883430a9f60103bc2.

Note: The total number of permitted housing units (Structure Complete, In Construction, Permit Issued, Construction Pending, and Permit Review in Process adds up to 3,227 rather than 3,228. These figures are live and subject to change and correction by the City of Santa Rosa.

9.2% Same Plan

30.8% Major Changes

15

Units Destroyed in the Tubbs Fire vs. Units Actively in the Rebuild Process Units with Permit Activity

Units Destroyed

3,228

Housing Units with Permit Activity

3,043

Housing Units Destroyed

Units Destroyed and Units with Permitting Activity by Housing Type Units with Permit Activity

Units Destroyed

733 Multi-Family Units

134 Accessory Dwelling Units

26 ADUs Destroyed

223 Multi-Family Units Destroyed

2,361 Single Family Dwelling Units

2,600 Single Family Units Destroyed

Residential Parcels with Units Destroyed in the Tubbs Fire vs.

Residential Parcels with Permit Activity Parcels with Permit Activity

Parcels Destroyed

2,403 Residential Parcels with Permit Activity

2,673 Residential Parcels with Destroyed Units

16

Santa Rosa Resilient City Combining District

Resilient City Zones created after the Tubbs Fire 1

A majority of the destruction from the Tubbs Fire was concentrated in the northernmost parts of Santa Rosa. In order to accelerate the rebuilding process, Santa Rosa created the Resilient City combining zoning district to exclusively serve fire-affected communities. The district is divided into six zones. Damaged and destroyed properties within the Resilient City zones received priority treatment and are expedited through the permitting and review process. In addition, certain permitting and construction fees are either waived or reduced.

Coffey Park Area 1,422 Destroyed Housing Units

2

Fountaingrove Area 1,619 Destroyed Housing Units

The Santa Rosa Resilient City Dashboard reports on the rebuilding progress by Resilient City Zone. For data reporting purposes, the Fountaingrove Area includes the Fountainview, Highway 101 Corridor, and Montecito Heights Areas. As of April 1, 2025, there are 1,381 housing units with permit activity in the Coffey Park Area and 1,328 housing units with permit activity in the combined Fountaingrove Area.

3

Fountainview Area

4

Highway 101 Corridor Area

5

Montecito Heights Area

6

Oakmont Area 2 Destroyed Single Family Homes

Sources: City of Santa Rosa, “Resilient City Recovery Reporting Dashboard.”

City of Santa Rosa, “Planning,” n.d., accessed March 29, 2025, https://maps.srcity.org/Html5Viewer/Index. html?viewer=Planning&scale=76800%C2%A2er=6369333.666666665,1924133.333333335.

City of Santa Rosa, “Summary of Residential Destruction Resulting from October 2017 Wildfires,” April 19, 2019, https://www.srcity.org/DocumentCenter/View/24254/Summaryof-Residential-Destruction-Resulting-from-October-2017-Wildfires_41919.

Downtown Station Area Specific Plan (DSASP) As a part of its Resilient City Development Measures, Santa Rosa fast-tracked housing development in both burn areas and throughout most of the Downtown Station Area. The City implemented a Downtown High-Density Residential Incentive Program, which dramatically reduced fees for higher density projects that began construction before August 2023. Ultimately, this process led Santa Rosa to adopt a new Downtown Station Area Specific Plan in October 2020. The DSASP aims to develop around existing transit infrastructure in Santa Rosa’s downtown core with the goal of adding approximately 7,000 new residential units.

City of Santa Rosa, “Downtown Station Area Specific Plan Final,” n.d., accessed April 1, 2025, https://www.srcity.org/DocumentCenter/ View/30873/Downtown-Station-Area-Specific-Plan_Final.

Coffey Park Area Resilient Zone 2 ADUs 67 Mobile Homes

1,422 Total Destroyed Housing Units

123 Multi-Family (33 structures) 1,230 Single Family

66 ADUs

1,381 Housing Units with Permit Activity

114 Multi-Family 1,201 Single Family

17

Fountaingrove Area Resilient Zone

Accessory Dwelling Units

The Fountaingrove Area includes Fountainview, Highway 101 Corridor, and Montecito Heights.

During Santa Rosa’s rebuilding process, the number of ADUs permitted and constructed greatly increased when compared to the number of units destroyed by the Tubbs Fire.

24 ADUs 127 Mobile Homes

1,619 Total Destroyed Housing Units

68 ADUs

66 ADUs

100 Multi-Family (12 structures) 1,368 Single Family

68 ADUs

1,328 Housing Units with Permit Activity

24 Destroyed

102 Multi-Family 1,158 Single Family 2 Destroyed Coffey Park Area

Fountaingrove Area

Tubbs Fire Resilient City Zones Coffey Park Fountaingrove Fountainview Highway 101 Corridor / Round Barr Montecito Heights Oakmont

Fire Wildland-Urban Interface City Limits Downtown Station Area Plan

18

Potential missed opportunities Despite Santa Rosa’s many successes in the recovery process, some stakeholders believed that city officials were “letting a good crisis go to waste,” either because they had not taken enough advantage of the opportunity to increase housing density, or because they had not sufficiently prioritized fire resiliency.

More aggressively pursuing housing density Santa Rosa is a sprawling, predominantly low-density community with few undeveloped large parcels of land.

With the exception of downtown, Santa Rosa is mostly zoned single-use, and mixed-use development is sparse.64 But the Tubbs Fire, by razing entire neighborhoods, effectively increased the city’s buildable lots by 235 percent and opened the door to radical change.65 Some housing advocates wanted the city to require much more dense housing in some of the burn zones. A notable example was Shirlee Zane, then-chair of the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors, who was particularly focused on Coffey Park, a low-density neighborhood that abuts a commuter rail line. Supervisor Zane said, “I think this fire, and the rebuilding, is going to blow up our culture here. I’ve been saying ‘build, baby, build’ since the beginning of this year because of the terrible housing shortage we have, and this is an opportunity to do different types of building.” Zane added: “I hope NIMBYism dies right now.”

Although the fire indeed presented Santa Rosa an opportunity to overhaul its urban plan, it declined to do so. Rather than requiring substantially greater density in the fire zones, the city focused on maintaining their character while increasing housing units in the downtown district through the Downtown Station Area Specific Plan.

More than half a decade after the Tubbs Fire, 58% of Santa Rosa’s residential structures are still single-family homes.66 The city recognized that homeowners in the fire zones had experienced a massive trauma—they had lost not only their homes and possessions, but also their neighborhoods. City leaders wanted to make fire victims whole rather than radically change their neighborhoods’ density in pursuit of an alternative urban vision. As Mayor Coursey said, “We are not currently considering rezoning single-family-home neighborhoods as multifamily housing areas. In the areas that have burned, people have a vested right to rebuild what they had before.” The mayor noted, however, that some commercial areas had burned in the fire and that “they might be ripe for multifamily-housing construction.”67 In fact, the city followed this two-pronged strategy.

As discussed above, allowing incremental growth in density in single-family residential fire zones, especially through options like ADUs that provide benefits to homeowners, while pursuing greater housing density in the city’s downtown or other commercial or transit zones, was an appropriate way to address the city’s housing shortage while respecting the victims of the fire.

64

“Land Use and Economic Development,” City of Santa Rosa, October 2024, 2-31, https://www.santarosaforward.com/files/managed/Document/946/2.SR_2050_GP_ LU-ED_10-03-2024.pdf.

65

City of Santa Rosa, “2023-2031 Housing Element,” 4-38.

66

City of Santa Rosa, “2023-2031 Housing Element Summary,” 8.

67

Editorial Board, “Rebuild Santa Rosa the right way,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 27, 2017, https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Editorial-RebuildSanta-Rosa-the-right-way-12310322.php.

19

Aerial view of Sonoma County (Adobe Stock)

More actively prioritizing fire resiliency While some contend Santa Rosa should have rebuilt its Tubbs-affected areas more densely, others question the wisdom of increasing housing in places with a history of wildfires.68 In February 2018, Santa Rosa City Council voted 6-1 to rezone a burned area of Fountaingrove known as Round Barn Village to allow a new 237-unit townhome development. Councilmember Julie Combs was the lone no vote.

She warned: “We are setting a precedent to build more new housing in a fire hazard area when we vote today …

I just think we need to not put more sleeping people in a fire hazard area.”69 This view raises the question: Should a city encourage people to build houses in fire-prone areas? Or should it seek to limit new construction in those areas? And, if the city allows building, should it require owners to pay for a high level of fire resiliency?

Following the Tubbs Fire, Santa Rosa allowed owners to rebuild in all the fire zones, and approved increased density in some of these areas. To mitigate fire risk, the city imposed stricter building and defensible space requirements for all properties. In addition, since 2020, the city has enforced the stringent building and defensible space requirements of California Building Code Chapter 7A for homes constructed within a VHFHSZ (such as the Fountaingrove neighborhood) and for property owners in the city-designated WUI areas who make certain improvements to their properties.

The city council decided, however, not to require residents rebuilding in the Coffey Park neighborhood to satisfy California Building Code Section 7A’s requirements.70 Although the council seriously considered the question, it ultimately concluded that the Tubbs Fire’s invasion into the Coffey Park neighborhood (unlike areas in the WUI zone) had been an improbable event, and that imposing

68

Chapple, et al., Rebuilding for a Resilient Recovery, 15.

69

Lauren Sommer, “Getting Back What You Lost--Rebuilding in a Wildfire Zone.” NPR Morning Edition, October 16, 2018. https://www.npr.org/2018/10/16/656532029/ getting-back-what-you-lost-rebuilding-in-a-wildfire-zone.

70

Searles, Nicholls, Hubred, et al., “Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Wildfire Annex,” 15.

20

the heavy cost of Section 7A compliance on fire survivors rebuilding in that neighborhood was unwarranted.71 Again, the city was making difficult judgments about how to help displaced residents return to their neighborhoods while also helping the city become more fire-resilient. One can disagree about Santa Rosa’s individual choices, but its overall approach seems appropriately balanced.

Santa Rosa’s Housing Success Santa Rosa’s post-fire housing policies have earned positive recognition. In July 2023, Gov. Newsom announced the city had received the state’s Prohousing Designation. This prestigious award, administered by California’s Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), honors a city’s commitment to housing availability and affordability. To receive the Prohousing Designation, a city or county must demonstrate it is promoting housing development in a variety of ways, including streamlining multifamily housing developments, up-zoning in places near jobs and transit to reduce emissions, and creating more affordable homes in places that have excluded minority households or those earning lower incomes.

One of Santa Rosa’s projects that received high marks was its adoption of the Southwest Greenway Plan, which will preserve up to 47 acres of parklands and open space and provide 244 multifamily housing units in an underutilized area previously designated for Highway 12 expansion.72 In addition, Santa Rosa is presently on track to create 4,685 units of new housing by 2031, including 1,919 affordable housing units. With 397 units under construction starting June 30, 2022, the city’s 2023-2031 Housing Element accounts for 163% of Santa Rosa’s remaining total Regional Housing Needs Allocation.73

71

Dale Kasler and Ryan Sabalow, “Burned-out California town ignores stricter building codes, even with wildfire threat,” Sacramento Bee, November 15, 2019, https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article236909028.html.

72

City of Santa Rosa Department of Planning and Economic Development, “City of Santa Rosa Earns State of California’s Prohousing Designation,” July 14, 2023, https://www.srcity.org/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=2253#:~:text=Gavin%20 Newsom%20announced%20the%20City,addressing%20housing%20 availability%20and%20affordability.

73

Santa Rosa Forward, “Housing Element,” n.d., accessed April 1, 2025, https:// www.santarosaforward.com/HE.

SANTA ROSA IS PRESENTLY ON TRACK TO CREATE 4,685 UNITS OF NEW HOUSING BY 2031, INCLUDING 1,919 AFFORDABLE HOUSING UNITS. WITH 397 UNITS UNDER CONSTRUCTION STARTING JUNE 30, 2022, THE CITY’S 2023-2031 HOUSING ELEMENT ACCOUNTS FOR 163% OF SANTA ROSA’S REMAINING TOTAL REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS ALLOCATION.

21

Aerial view of Altadena and the San Gabriel Mountains (Adobe Stock)

IV. Altadena’s Challenge Los Angeles County officials have already implemented lessons from Santa Rosa. However, in many ways Altadena’s challenge is greater.

Altadena is located on approximately 8.5 square miles at the base of the San Gabriel Mountains in the northwestern San Gabriel Valley, about 30 miles northeast of downtown Los Angeles and directly north of Pasadena.

The community is bounded on three sides by wildlands: the Arroyo Seco, the Angeles National Forest, and Eaton Canyon. At the time of the Eaton Fire, Altadena was home to more than 40,000 residents. It is an unincorporated community in Los Angeles County and is governed by the county.

The Eaton Fire descended on a community where the vast majority (78%) of residents were homeowners.

Ninety-two percent of Altadena’s residences were

single-family homes and 78% were constructed prior to 1960.74 Some multifamily residences were located near commercial corridors, including Lake Avenue, Altadena Drive, Fair Oaks Avenue, Lincoln Avenue, and Washington Boulevard. The aging housing stock, combined with a low vacancy rate (4.6%), contributed to high housing costs and a lack of affordable housing.75 Median home prices exceeded $1.07 million and among Altadena’s population of renters, nearly half were classified as rent-burdened.76 The fire ignited on January 7, 2025 in Eaton Canyon, just north of Altadena. It was one of fourteen wildfires that threatened the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas that month. Drought conditions and Santa Ana

74

U.S. Census Bureau, “Households and Families,” American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Subject Tables, Table S1101, 2023, https://data.census.gov/table/ ACSST5Y2023.S1101?q=altadena+cdp; “Altadena, CA Housing,” bestplaces, n.d., accessed March 26, 2025, https://www.bestplaces.net/housing/city/california/altadena

75

Jonathan Lansner, “Pasadena 2nd hardest spot to find a rental in US after wildfires,” Daily Bulletin, March 11, 2025, https://www.dailybulletin.com/2025/03/11/pasadena2nd-hardest-spot-to-find-a-rental-in-us-after-wildfires/.

76

“Hearing Materials.” Los Angeles County Department of Planning, December 5, 2024, https://planning.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Altadena-CommunitySpecific-Goals-and-Policies.pdf.

22

Home destroyed in Altadena during the Eaton Fire (Adobe Stock)

winds that reached speeds up to 100 mph contributed to the fire’s spread and destruction.77 A mere 15 minutes after the Eaton Fire was first reported, Pasadena and Los Angeles County fire crews arrived on the scene.78 By that time, however, the fire had already grown to roughly 10 acres and high winds were spreading embers into Altadena’s neighborhoods. When the fire was finally contained three weeks later, it had destroyed more than 9,000 structures and claimed 17 lives, making it the second most destructive and fifth deadliest fire in California history.79 The losses included nearly 4,885 single-family units and more than 2,000 multifamily units, nearly half of Altadena’s housing inventory.80 Roughly 83% of the destroyed homes were outside Cal Fire’s designated “very high” fire hazard severity zones.81

Table 2. Eaton Fire Damage

Total Damage82

Structures damaged

9,414

Acres burnt

14,021

Fatalities

Housing units destroyed by Eaton83

17

Single family dwelling units destroyed

4,885

Duplexes and bungalow courtyard-style homes destroyed

1,779

Condominiums destroyed

363

Apartment units destroyed

217

77

Chris Oberholtz, “Southern California fears the worst as devastating 100-mph Santa Ana winds are set to return,” New York Post, January 20, 2025, https://nypost. com/2025/01/20/us-news/southern-california-braces-for-extreme-fire-weather-as-100-mph-winds-return/.

78

Matthew Ormseth, Salvador Hernandez and Terry Castleman, “How did a cluster of homes near the Eaton fire’s ignition point emerge unscathed?” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 2025, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-01-17/eaton-fire-ignition-point-homes

79

Cal Fire, “Top 20 Most Destructive California Wildfires.”

80 Smith and Kambhampati, “Real estate losses.”

81

Haggerty, Poston, and Greene, “Cal Fire’s predictions didn’t foresee the Altadena inferno.”

82

Cal Fire, “Eaton Fire | Cal Fire.”

83

Smith and Kambhampati, “Real estate losses.”

23

Altadena’s Recovery As in Santa Rosa, local officials believe the post-fire task of rehousing Altadena’s displaced residents is their top priority. In Altadena, Los Angeles County assumes this responsibility. The Altadena town council is advisory only and the community is governed by county officials.

Altadena’s dependence on the county for its recovery contrasts starkly with Santa Rosa. As discussed previously, Santa Rosa’s government focused intently on rebuilding its mid-sized city after the Tubbs fire, supported by Sonoma County resources. By comparison, after the Eaton Fire, Altadena’s 40,000 residents must turn for help to their county government, which is responsible for providing services to the most populous county in the United States, with 9.7 million residents. Given the many demands they face, it is unlikely the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and county administrative agencies can offer the same sustained focus on Altadena’s fire recovery that the city of Santa Rosa provided its community.84 That said, Los Angeles County has taken important early steps to speed Altadena’s recovery, many of which resemble actions that Santa Rosa pursued shortly after the Tubbs Fire. The county created a website called Los Angeles County Recovers (recovery.lacounty.gov/) to provide information and assistance for residents displaced by the Eaton and Palisades Fires and has established an expedited permitting process, including “One-Stop” permitting centers in Altadena with various agencies (e.g.

Public Works, Planning, and Fire) on-site, to guide owners seeking to rebuild.85 Pursuant to Los Angeles County’s Disaster Recovery Ordinance, adopted in 2023, the county will support rebuilding efforts in the Altadena fire zone by waiving certain permit requirements, authorizing certain temporary housing and accessory structures on affected lots, and approving permits for like-for-like housing construction (same size, location, and purpose) with slight modifications to the previous structure’s design, so long as the new residence does not increase the floor area, size, height or building footprint of the old home by more than 10%. A like-for-like rebuild need not comply with current zoning and setback requirements; however, it needs to comply with current Building, Fire, and Health and Safety Code requirements. The county says it will expedite like-for-like permit application reviews and will

waive discretionary hearings and other zoning reviews.86 Many of these measures mirror Santa Rosa’s efforts to help residents quickly rebuild their homes and to restore neighborhoods in a manner consistent with their pre-fire character.

At the same time, it does not appear that the county is waiving building codes, and all new construction and repair work that does not meet like-for-like requirements will need to comply with current zoning and building laws. Similar to Santa Rosa, the county is encouraging, but not requiring, compliance with Chapter 7A building requirements in areas outside VHFHSZs In an early move, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution on January 28, 2025 titled: “Los Angeles County Recovery Efforts and Building Urgency Into Implementation of Long-term Disaster Support.” In addition to directing county agencies to take actions to facilitate fire recovery, the resolution notably petitioned Governor Newsom to suspend in the Eaton Fire zone a list of state housing mandates. The list included state energy efficiency requirements that all new homes be constructed with residential solar panels, be “all electric ready” (that is, designed to rely exclusively on electricity rather than natural gas or other carbon energy sources), and be equipped for storage batteries. Alternatively, the motion called for full rebates to owners who are required to install solar on rebuilt homes. Further, the motion called on the governor to temporarily suspend in the fire zone a number of state housing mandates. Among other requirements, the supervisors asked the governor to temporarily suspend part or all of the following laws: ●

Density Bonus Law

●

Permit streamlining for certain affordable housing projects

●

The obligation to fulfill any Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) the local jurisdiction allocated to the fire impact areas

●

Requirements for contractors to hire a “skilled and trained workforce”

●

The 90-day time frame for approving ADUs in fire impacted communities

84

Nils Gilman, “The most meaningful reform LA County can make post-fires is to its sprawling government.” Cal Matters, February 4, 2025, https://calmatters.org/ commentary/2025/02/los-angeles-county-reform-government/.

85

LA County Recovers,“One-Stop Permit Centers,” n.d., accessed March 10, 2025, https://recovery.lacounty.gov/rebuilding/one-stop-permit-centers/.

86

County of Los Angeles Ordinances Chapter 22.256 - DISASTER RECOVERY, https://library.municode.com/ca/los_angeles_county/codes/code_of_ ordinances?nodeId=TIT22PLZO_DIV9AD_CH22.256DIRE; LA County Recovers, “Rebuilding,” n.d., accessed March 10, 2025, https://recovery.lacounty.gov/ rebuilding/#174061 8253912-253e4236-a503/.

24

The supervisors indicated that these temporary suspensions of state housing laws are needed to add local flexibility to retain the character of the communities, and provide more flexibility in timing of the replacement units.87 Amy Bodek, LA County’s Director of Regional Planning concurred: “In order to provide the community the ability to return and not face immediate displacement, we understand the need to pause some of these policies.”88 In addition, some of the requested exemptions are focused on cost. One of the biggest challenges for residents rebuilding in a fire zone is to meet the high cost of new home construction. In California, many state regulations contribute to these costs, including rules requiring residents to install solar panels and other energy-efficient elements in new homes.

Critics have attacked the Board’s requests for exemptions.

Affordable housing advocates alleged the Board was unnecessarily undermining laws designed to address the state’s housing crisis. Nolan Gray, California YIMBY’s Senior Director of Legislation and Research said, “This is just totally going in the wrong direction. There’s so much in here that has nothing to do with helping people rebuild.”89 Soon after the fires, Governor Newsom issued executive orders suspending in the fire areas some provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the California Coastal Act, which are often seen as impediments to residential development.90 It remains uncertain whether the governor will suspend other state mandates as the supervisors requested. Meanwhile, state lawmakers have also introduced a number of bills intended to assist fire recovery. Like local officials, state lawmakers are focused on expediting Altadena’s recovery

while also considering stricter building and home hardening requirements to reduce fire risk.91 As is evident from their early fire response, LA County supervisors are seeking to preserve Altadena as a predominantly low-density residential community—just as Santa Rosa largely chose to do. As in Santa Rosa, Altadena’s housing density will likely increase in the fire zone through the addition of ADUs, which are protected by state law.92As earlier noted, ADUs have become an increasingly popular form of housing in California and are comparatively easy to design and build on a lot cleared by wildfire.

Housing density could also increase in the Altadena fire zone through lot splits under California’s SB 9. This law, adopted in 2021, authorizes homeowners to 1) split one lot into two and 2) build two units on a single lot. The law thus allows homeowners to build four homes on a parcel that previously only permitted one. The law marked a shift from California’s long-standing policies promoting single-unit zoning, and it holds the potential to meaningfully change the character of residential communities across the state. In practice, however, far fewer homeowners have pursued SB 9 lot splits than have built ADUs.93 It is harder to receive permitting for SB 9 lot splits in fire-risk areas. SB 9 says it excludes these splits in very high fire hazard severity zones, but also says that the exclusion “does not apply to sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development[.]”94 Guidance from Los Angeles County Planning, issued in April 2024 and updated March 19, 2025, states that no portion of the project site may be located in a very high fire severity zone “unless all new and existing structures on the project site will be in com-

87

Rebecca Ellis, “L.A. County says state housing laws stand in the way of rebuilding. Advocates disagree.” Los Angeles Times, January 29, 2025, https://www.latimes.com/ california/story/2025-01-29/l-a-county-says-state-housing-laws-stand-in-way-of-rebuilding-advocates-disagree.

88

Ellis, “L.A. County says.”

89

Ellis, “L.A. County says.”

90 Governor Gavin Newsom, Executive Order No. N-04-25, California Governor’s Office, January 12, 2025, https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/EO-N-4-25Rebuilding-Final-signed.pdf.

91

Muhammad Alameldin, Andres Chaidez, and Yumna Talaat, “2025 California Legislative Preview: Rebuilding, Accelerating Production and Funding Affordable Housing,” Terner Center for Housing Innovation, March 17, 2025, https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/2025-california-legislative-preview-rebuilding-accelerating-production-andstrengthening-protections/.

92

“WSGVAP Fact Sheet for North Altadena Land Use Changes,” Los Angeles County Department of Planning, n.d., 4, accessed March 9, 2025, https://planning.lacounty. gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/WSGVAP_Fact_Sheet_for_North_Altadena_Land_Use_Changes.pdf/

93

David Garcia and Muhammad Alameldin, “California’s HOME Act Turns One: Data and Insights from the First Year of Senate Bill 9,” Terner Center for Housing Innovation, January 18, 2023, https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/research-and-policy/sb-9-turns-one-applications/; “SB 450 — Strengthening SB 9,” California YIMBY, n.d., accessed March 14, 2025, https://cayimby.org/legislation/sb-450/

94 California Government Code, Title 7, Chapter 4.2, Section 65913.4, Subsection 6(D). https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection. xhtml?sectionNum=65913.4.&lawCode=GOV/.

25

pliance with fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to current building standards and fire safety regulations[.]”95 It is more likely that Altadena, like Santa Rosa, will see the greatest increase in housing density through construction of new multifamily housing in and around its major commercial zones and transit corridors.

West San Gabriel Valley Area Plan As evidence of this approach, on March 11, 2025 the Board of Supervisors unanimously approved the adoption of the West San Gabriel Valley Area Plan, a long-range planning document that guides the development plan for Altadena and other unincorporated communities in the West San Gabriel Valley.96 The new land use plan seeks to balance two major goals: increasing housing inventory by allowing for higher density construction along Altadena’s central corridors and reducing wildfire risk by restricting new construction in the foothills.

The Area Plan encourages higher density along major transit corridors. Specifically, it aims to increase density in Altadena’s interior, permitting apartments and other multifamily residential buildings along Lake Avenue, Altadena Drive, Allen Ave, Fair Oaks Avenue, and Lincoln Avenue.97 The Plan also prioritizes infrastructure developments along Altadena Drive and Lincoln Avenue to accommodate more mixed-use development and multifamily housing.98

95

David DeGrazia, “Senate Bill 9: Ministerial Approvals of up to Two Principal Dwelling Units and Urban Lot Splits On Single-Family Residential-Zoned Parcels,” Los Angeles County Department of Planning, April 4, 2024, 3, https://planning.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/sb9_memo-2. pdf.; Los Angeles County Department of Planning, “Senate Bill 9 (SB 9) Implementation Memo Summary,” March 19, 2025, https://planning.lacounty. gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/sb9-summary.pdf. SB 9 has also been subject to legal challenge. A Los Angeles County court ruled that SB 9 is not constitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to its stated purpose of increasing access to affordable housing. The lawsuit was brought by the cities of Redondo Beach, Carson, Torrance, Whittier, and Del Mar. The state has not appealed the decision and the ruling applies only to the five plaintiff cities.

96 David Wilson, “Supervisors approve long-range development policy plan for West San Gabriel Valley,” San Gabriel Valley Tribune, March 17, 2025, https://www.sgvtribune.com/2025/03/11/supervisors-approve-long-rangedevelopment-policy-plan-for-west-san-gabriel-valley/.

97

“West San Gabriel Valley Area Plan: Proposed Land Use Policy,” Los Angeles County Department of Planning, March 2024, https://planning.lacounty.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WSGVAP_LargeMap_LUP_240330_Altadena. pdf.

98

Los Angeles County Department of Planning, “Hearing Materials.”

Results It is too early to say how the rebuilding of Altadena will compare to Santa Rosa’s successful recovery. In many ways, Altadena’s challenge is more daunting.

It has suffered greater destruction than Santa Rosa, its rebuilding efforts are guided by a more distant government with far more constituents and responsibilities, and it must navigate state housing policies that have become more complex and costly.

Yet, the community’s rebuilding effort seems to be making reasonable progress. Two months after the Eaton Fire was contained, more than 100 Altadena residents had submitted blueprints to the L.A. County Department of Public Works, and permits were being processed.

26

Aerial view of a housing development in the City of Los Angeles (Adobe Stock)

V. A Silver Lining for California’s Housing Future?

The efforts of Santa Rosa and Altadena to “build back better” highlight tensions in California housing policy and offer ways to improve homebuilding in the state.

By destroying thousands of homes, the Tubbs and Eaton Fires deepened the state’s housing crisis. The fires also shed light on some of the tensions that make this crisis so intractable—tensions between neighborhood preservation, new housing production, fire resiliency, and affordability. One silver lining of these tragedies is that the recovery efforts have demonstrated how local officials can resolve these tensions in reasonable ways, while also expediting the process.

Rebuilding Santa Rosa and Altadena has required balancing many competing interests. First, leaders in these communities have felt compelled to help residents reconstruct their homes in a way that preserves the essential character of their old neighborhoods. Santa Rosa’s mayor expressed the widely shared view that people who lose their homes “have a vested right to rebuild what they had before.” In Santa Rosa, that meant rebuilding many single-family homes in low-density, residential communities—often “like-for-like.” It appears

Altadena will rebuild largely along similar lines, based on similar considerations.

At the same time, policymakers in these communities have been forced to consider state mandates to expand housing stock, which usually means increasing housing density. Santa Rosa modestly increased density in the burn zones by permitting many new ADUs in traditional single-family neighborhoods and by adding multifamily developments in a few, select locations, including the site of an old inn. Without neglecting the rebuilding process, the city also used the catalyst of the fire to increase new in-fill housing development in other priority non-fire areas, such as the downtown district.

The reconstruction of Altadena will provide opportunities to increase housing density and many housing advocates will not want to “let a good crisis go to waste.” At minimum, as in Santa Rosa, construction of ADUs will expand housing density in Altadena’s burn zones. But tensions will likely rise if many property owners in those areas take

27

advantage of SB 9 lot splits or if county officials permit a sharp increase in high-density housing in neighborhoods that were low-density before the fires. The strategy outlined in the West San Gabriel Valley Area Plan—that is, prioritizing high-density residential development in Altadena’s main commercial and transit corridors rather than its low-density neighborhoods—aligns with Santa Rosa’s approach and similarly strikes an appropriate balance of interests.

Meanwhile, the shocking experiences of the fires themselves have intensified concerns about fire resiliency. In both Santa Rosa and Altadena, wildfires wiped out entire residential neighborhoods at massive cost to individual homeowners and to the broader society. These and similar disasters such as Paradise and Palisades cause many to ask whether we should allow homebuilding in fire-prone areas at all, and, if so, whether we should require homes in those areas to be hardened against fire risks. The combination of California’s topography and historical patterns of housing development have long created residential areas in or near the wildland-urban interface—some, like Altadena, have been there for at least a century. Moreover, the pressure to build new housing in the state makes it difficult to limit construction in these areas.

Since we cannot completely withdraw from fire-prone areas, it seems reasonable to take protective measures.

Yet, that choice, too, involves tradeoffs. It is estimated that compliance with California’s Building Code Section 7A, which requires fire-resistant siding, tempered glass windows, fire-resistant vents for attics and crawl spaces, vegetation management, and the like, is effective in reducing fire risk, with houses that meet those standards 40% less likely to be destroyed in a wildfire than those that do not. Yet including these protective features adds somewhere between $2,800 and $27,100 to construction costs, depending on the level of fire resistance and region.99 The state requires homes built in VHFHSZs to comply with Chapter 7A, but allows local governments to decide whether to impose these requirements in other areas.

Santa Rosa wrestled with the decision whether to require Chapter 7A compliance in the Coffey Park neighborhood, which was destroyed by the Tubbs fire but is far removed from wildlands. The city council decided that the high

cost of meeting Chapter 7A standards would make new housing even more difficult to afford, and that in the Coffey Park neighborhood the benefit was not worth the cost.

This decision highlighted the trade-offs of housing regulation. While it may be desirable to make homes fire-resistant—or solar powered, energy-efficient, all-electric, or otherwise climate-friendly—requiring these features generally adds to the already high cost of home construction and thus contributes to California’s housing affordability crisis. As suggested by the Los Angeles County Supervisors’ appeal to the governor to suspend certain housing regulatory mandates in the Eaton Fire zone, policymakers need to consider (and reconsider) the pile-on effects of regulatory costs on people who struggle to buy homes in the state.

Perhaps most importantly, Santa Rosa’s successful rebuilding after the Tubbs Fire shows that in a fire recovery local governments can achieve efficient procedures for green-lighting housing production. Early signs suggest that Los Angeles County is approaching the Eaton Fire recovery with a similar urgency. But what happens after the community rebuilds?

Notably, Santa Rosa officials have said they have begun applying some of the processes they developed during the fire recovery to expedite housing projects outside the fire zone. This commitment to streamlining reviews is essential to building houses more efficiently and less expensively throughout the state. In a promising recent sign, a bipartisan group of California lawmakers led by Assemblymember Buffy Wicks has introduced the Fast Track Housing Package, which includes more than 20 bills designed to eliminate systemic delays in the housing approval process.100 If policymakers embrace these types of reforms and treat all housing development with the urgency and focus of a fire recovery—balancing interests and streamlining processes—they will not only “build back better” in Altadena and other fire zones, but also make meaningful headway in solving California’s broader housing crisis.

99 Kimiko Barrett, “Construction costs for a wildfire-resistant home: California edition.” Headwaters Economics, July 27, 2022, https://headwaterseconomics.org/naturalhazards/wildfire-resistant-costs-california/.

100 Erin Ivie, “California Legislature Releases Sweeping Bill Package to Fast Track Housing Production.” Office of Assemblymember Buffy Wicks, March 27, 2025, https://a14. asmdc.org/press-releases/20250327-california-legislature-releases-sweeping-bill-package-fast-track-housing.

28

Bibliography Alameldin, Muhammad, Andres Chaidez, and Yumna Talaat. “2025 California Legislative Preview: Rebuilding, Accelerating Production and Funding Affordable Housing.” Terner Center for Housing Innovation, March 17, 2025. https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/2025-california-legislative-preview-rebuilding-accelerating-production-and-strengthening-protections/.

“Altadena, CA Housing.” bestplaces, n.d. Accessed March 26, 2025. https://www.bestplaces.net/housing/city/california/altadena.

Altadena Town Council. “About: Altadena Town Council.” n.d. Accessed March 19, 2025. https://altadenatowncouncil.org/about/.

Atagi, Colin. “Santa Rosa’s public safety tax leads in early returns.” The Press Democrat, November 8, 2022. https://www.pressdemocrat. com/article/news/early-results-yes-on-measure-h-tax-increase-extension-for-santa-rosa-publi/.

Barrett, Kimiko. “Construction costs for a wildfire-resistant home: California edition.” Headwaters Economics, July 27, 2022, https://headwaterseconomics.org/natural-hazards/wildfire-resistant-costs-california/.

Cart, Julie. “California infernos in January? Here’s why wildfire season keeps getting longer and more devastating.” CalMatters, January 8, 2025. https://calmatters.org/explainers/california-wildfire-season-worsening-explained/.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. “Eaton Fire | Cal Fire.” n.d. Accessed March 19, 2025. https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025/1/7/eaton-fire.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. “Fire Hazard Severity Zones FAQs.” 2024. https://34c031f8-c9fd-4018-8c5a4159cdff6b0d-cdn-endpoint.azureedge.net/-/media/osfm-website/what-we-do/community-wildfire-preparedness-and-mitigation/ fire-hazard-severity-zones/2024-fhsz-faqs_english.pdf?rev=538374a27bb44bbab4c2786ff2eafb39&hash=AD4DB7857E3EF6F0BEC0B56429A1C262 California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. “How To Create Defensible Space for Wildfire Safety. Ready for Wildfire.” n.d. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://readyforwildfire.org/prepare-for-wildfire/defensible-space/.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. “Tubbs Fire | Cal Fire.” n.d. Accessed March 8, 2025. https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2017/10/8/tubbs-fire-central-lnu-complex.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. “Top 20 Most Destructive California Wildfires.” n.d. Accessed March 8, 2025. https://34c031f8-c9fd-4018-8c5a-4159cdff6b0d-cdn-endpoint.azureedge.net/-/media/calfire-website/our-impact/fire-statistics/top20_ destruction.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. “Wildland Hazards and Building Codes.” n.d. Accessed March 8, 2025. https://osfm. fire.ca.gov/what-we-do/code-development-and-analysis/wildland-hazards-and-building-codes.

California Government Code, Title 7, Chapter 4.2, Section 65913.4, Subsection 6(D). https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=65913.4.&lawCode=GOV/.

California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. “Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS).” n.d. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/operations/planning-preparedness-prevention/california-specialized-training-institute/hazardous-materials-program/standardized-emergency-management-system-sems/.

California Legislative Analyst’s Office. “The 2019-20 Budget: Overview of the Governor’s Budget.” 2019. https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/ Report/3919.

California State University, Los Angeles. “Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) Guidelines.” n.d. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://www.calstatela.edu/sites/default/files/sems_guide_0_accessible.pdf.

California YIMBY. “SB 450 — Strengthening SB 9.” n.d. Accessed March 8, 2025. https://cayimby.org/legislation/sb-450/.

Chapple, Karen, et al. Rebuilding for a Resilient Recovery: Planning in California’s Wildland Urban Interface. Next 10, June 16, 2021.

Christopher, Ben. “New fire maps put nearly 4 million Californians in hazardous zones. What does that mean for the people who live there?” CalMatters, March 24, 2025. https://calmatters.org/housing/2025/03/calfire-maps-hazard-california/.

City of Redondo Beach, et al. v. Rob Bonta, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 22STCP01143, decided April 22, 2024. https://catimes.brightspotcdn.com/00/20/aef6c3904f27b55c88227f4a3679/sb-9-ruling-la-superior-court-4-22-24.pdf.

City of Santa Rosa. “2023-2031 Housing Element.” February 14, 2023. https://www.srcity.org/DocumentCenter/View/40437/Housing-Element---Adopted-February-2023?bidId=.

29

City of Santa Rosa. “2023-2031 Housing Element Summary.” January 2023. https://www.santarosaforward.com/files/managed/Document/754/SR_Housing_Element_Summary_1-11-2023FV.pdf.

City of Santa Rosa. Approving the Joint Powers Agreement for the Creation of a Renewal Enterprise District Through a Joint Powers Authority Comprised Initially of the City of Santa Rosa and County of Sonoma. RES-2018-218, June 26, 2018.

City of Santa Rosa. “Downtown-Station Area Specific Plan.” n.d. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://www.srcity.org/2911/Downtown-Station-Area-Specific-Plan.

City of Santa Rosa. “Land Use and Economic Development.” October 2024. https://www.santarosaforward.com/files/managed/Document/946/2.SR_2050_GP_LU-ED_10-03-2024.pdf.

City of Santa Rosa. “Rebuilding After the Fires.” n.d. Accessed March 9, 2025. https://www.srcity.org/3018/Rebuilding City of Santa Rosa. “RED JPA Board Meeting: Promoting Housing in Sonoma County: Renewal Enterprise District (RED).” February 27, 2019. https://www.srcity.org/DocumentCenter/View/23307/REDJPA-Overview-022719.

City of Santa Rosa. “Resilient City Recovery Reporting Dashboard.” n.d. Accessed March 9, 2025. https://santarosa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/ dashboards/07e39ea4077c42a883430a9f60103bc2.

City of Santa Rosa. “Resilient City Zoning.” n.d. Accessed March 27, 2025. https://www.srcity.org/2674/Resilient-City-Zoning.

City of Santa Rosa. “Summary of Residential Destruction Resulting from October 2017 Wildfires.” April 19, 2019. https://www.srcity.org/DocumentCenter/View/24254/Summary-of-Residential-Destruction-Resulting-from-October-2017-Wildfires_41919.

City of Santa Rosa Department of Planning and Economic Development. “City of Santa Rosa Earns State of California’s Prohousing Designation,” July 14, 2023. https://www.srcity.org/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=2253#:~:text=Gavin%20Newsom%20announced%20the%20City,addressing%20housing%20availability%20and%20affordability.

CivicWell. “Rebuilding after the Fires: Housing Lessons for All Communities.” March 28, 2019. https://civicwell.org/civic-news/rebuilding-after-the-fires-housing-lessons/.

County of Sonoma. “Code of Ordinances, Chapter 40 - Sonoma Complex Fire Disaster Recovery.” https://library.municode.com/ca/sonoma_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CH40SOCOFIDIRE. County of Sonoma. “Use of Travel Trailers & Recreational Vehicles for Sonoma Fire Victims,” Permit Sonoma, n.d. Accessed March 9, 2025. https://www.permitsonoma.com/rebuilding/rebuildingprocess/rebuildingresourcesanddocuments.

DeGrazia, David. “Senate Bill 9: Ministerial Approvals of up to Two Principal Dwelling Units and Urban Lot Splits On Single-Family Residential-Zoned Parcels.” Los Angeles County Department of Planning, April 4, 2024. https://planning.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/sb9_memo-2.pdf. de Sousa, Tanya, and Meghan Henry. “The 2024 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress: Part I: Point-In-Time Estimates for Homelessness.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, December 2024, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/ sites/default/files/pdf/2024-AHAR-Part-1.pdf.

DiCamillo, Mark. “Tabulations from a February 2025 Poll of Los Angeles County Registered Voters About the Wildfires.” University of California, Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies, February 26, 2025. https://igs.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/complete_tabulations_. pdf.

Dillon, Liam. “Most Angelenos back tougher building codes, restrictions on homebuilding in wildfire zones, poll finds.” Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2025. https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-03-12/most-angelenos-back-tougher-building-codes-restrictions-onhomebuilding-in-wildfire-zones-poll-finds/.

Dillon, Liam and Dakota Smith. “In milestone, L.A. approves first permits for rebuilding homes after Palisades fire.” Los Angeles Times, March 21, 2025. https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2025-03-21/in-milestone-l-a-approves-first-permits-for-rebuilding-homesafter-palisades-fire/.

Editorial Board. “Rebuild Santa Rosa the right way.” San Francisco Chronicle, October 27, 2017, https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Editorial-Rebuild-Santa-Rosa-the-right-way-12310322.php.

Ellis, Rebecca. “L.A. County says state housing laws stand in the way of rebuilding. Advocates disagree.” Los Angeles Times, January 29, 2025, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-01-29/l-a-county-says-state-housing-laws-stand-in-way-of-rebuilding-advocates-disagree.

Garcia, David and Muhammad Alameldin. “California’s HOME Act Turns One: Data and Insights from the First Year of Senate Bill 9.” Terner Center for Housing Innovation, January 18, 2023. https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/research-and-policy/sb-9-turns-one-applications/.

Garrison, Jessica. “This California city lost thousands of homes to fire. Santa Rosa’s rebuilding has lessons for L.A.” Los Angeles Times, January 22, 2025. https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-01-22/santa-rosa-offers-hope-lessons-for-rebuilding-after-la-fires/.

Gilman, Nils. “The most meaningful reform LA County can make post-fires is to its sprawling government.” Cal Matters, February 4, 2025. https://calmatters.org/commentary/2025/02/los-angeles-county-reform-government/.

30

Governor Gavin Newsom. Executive Order No. N-04-25. California Governor’s Office, January 12, 2025. https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/EO-N-4-25-Rebuilding-Final-signed.pdf.

Gray, Nolan. “California ADU Reform: A Retrospective.” California YIMBY, n.d. Accessed March 8, 2025. https://cayimby.org/reports/california-adu-reform-a-retrospective/.

Guhin, David. “18-0904 - Staff Report.” City Council, City of Santa Rosa, December 4, 2018. https://www.srcity.org/DocumentCenter/ View/23221/Renewal-Enterprise-District-JPA-CityStaffReport.

Guhin, David. “Formation of the Renewal Enterprise District Joint Powers Authority.” City Council, City of Santa Rosa, December 4, 2018. https://renewalenterprisedistrict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/2018.12.04-City-Presentation.pdf.

Guhin, David. “The Santa Rosa Story: Housing Crisis to Housing Opportunity.” Western City, September 1, 2019. https://www.westerncity. com/article/santa-rosa-story-housing-crisis-housing-opportunity.

Haggerty, Noah and Sean Greene. “New fire maps increase hazard zones in L.A. and Southern California by 3.5 million acres.” Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2025. https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2025-03-24/new-fire-hazard-maps-for-los-angeles-and-southerncalifornia/.

Haggerty, Noah, Stephanie Poston and Sean Greene. “Cal Fire’s predictions didn’t foresee the Altadena inferno. Now it’s changing its fire-hazard maps.” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2025. https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2025-02-04/cal-fire-maps-didnot-predict-altadena.

Hay, Andrew and Brad Brooks. “After fires, Los Angeles gets moonshot moment to rebuild.” Reuters, January 31, 2025. https://www.reuters. com/world/us/after-fires-los-angeles-gets-moonshot-moment-rebuild-2025-01-30/ International City/County Management Association (ICMA). Disaster Case Studies: Santa Rosa Tubbs Fire. September 2022. https://icma. org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Santa%20Rosa%20case%20study%20v3.pdf.

Irfan, Umair. “5 approaches that experts say are our best shot at surviving future wildfires.” Vox, February 7, 2025. https://www.vox.com/ climate/398719/los-angeles-fire-reconstruction-insurance-housing.

Ivie, Erin. “California Legislature Releases Sweeping Bill Package to Fast Track Housing Production.” Office of Assemblymember Buffy Wicks. March 27, 2025, https://a14.asmdc.org/press-releases/20250327-california-legislature-releases-sweeping-bill-package-fast-track-housing.

Johnson, Julie and Harsha Devulapalli. “Fire risk maps for all of California now available after latest Cal Fire update.” San Francisco Chronicle, March 25, 2025. https://www.sfchronicle.com/projects/2025/cal-fire-risk-map/.

Johnson, Hans and Eric McGhee. “Three Decades of Housing Challenges in the Golden State.” Public Policy Institute of California, December 3, 2024. https://www.ppic.org/blog/three-decades-of-housing-challenges-in-the-golden-state/.

Kasler, Dale and Ryan Sabalow. “Burned-out California town ignores stricter building codes, even with wildfire threat.” The Sacramento Bee, November 15, 2019. https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article236909028.html.

Kirkham, Chris, Judith Langowski, and Peter Henderson. “Earlier California fire shows how Los Angeles could rebuild.” Reuters, January 27, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/earlier-california-fire-shows-how-los-angeles-could-rebuild-2025-01-27/.

Krishnakumar, Priya, Joe Fox, and Chris Keller. “Here’s where more than 7,500 buildings were destroyed and damaged in California’s wine country fires.” Los Angeles Times, October 25, 2017. https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-northern-california-fires-structures/.

Lansner, Jonathan. “Pasadena 2nd hardest spot to find a rental in US after wildfires.” Daily Bulletin, March 11, 2025. https://www.dailybulletin.com/2025/03/11/pasadena-2nd-hardest-spot-to-find-a-rental-in-us-after-wildfires/.

Lenney, Ryan and George Ashford. Where Do State and Local Housing Policy Priorities Diverge? Rose Institute of State and Local Government, April 2024. https://s10294.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Housing-Element-Report_FINAL_no-marks.pdf.

LA County Recovers. “One-Stop Permit Centers.” n.d. Accessed March 10, 2025. https://recovery.lacounty.gov/rebuilding/one-stop-permitcenters/.

LA County Recovers. “Rebuilding.” n.d. Accessed March 10, 2025. https://recovery.lacounty.gov/rebuilding/#1740618253912-253e4236 -a503/.

Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. “Motion by Supervisors Kathryn Barger and Lindsey P. Horvath, Los Angeles County Recovery Efforts and Building Urgency into Implementation of Long-Term Disaster Support.” January 28, 2025. https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/199811.pdf.

Los Angeles County Department of Planning. “Hearing Materials.” December 5, 2024. https://planning.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Altadena-Community-Specific-Goals-and-Policies.pdf.

Los Angeles County Department of Planning. “Senate Bill 9 (SB 9) Implementation Memo Summary.” March 19, 2025. https://planning. lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/sb9-summary.pdf.

31

Los Angeles County Department of Planning. “West San Gabriel Valley Area Plan: Proposed Land Use Policy.”March 2024. https://planning. lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WSGVAP_LargeMap_LUP_240330_Altadena.pdf.

Los Angeles County Department of Planning. “WSGVAP Fact Sheet for North Altadena Land Use Changes.” n.d. Accessed March 10, 2025. https://planning.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/WSGVAP_Fact_Sheet_for_North_Altadena_Land_Use_Changes.pdf/.

Los Angeles County Department of Regional Planning, “Fire Hazard Severity Zones Policy Map (General Plan 2035).” n.d. Accessed March 31, 2025. https://planning.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Exhibit-D-gp_2035_2021-FIG_12-5_Fire_Hazard_Severity_Zones_Policy_Map_Responsibility-REFERENCE.pdf.

Mazzella, Danielle. “California Affordable Housing Needs Report.” California Housing Partnership, January 2024. https://chpc.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/California-Affordable-Housing-Needs-Report-2024-1.pdf.

Nelson, Laura J., Sonali Kohli, Paige St. John, Dakota Smith, and Nina Agrawal. “Death toll from Northern California fires jumps to at least 34; 5,700 structures destroyed.” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2017. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-fires-20171013-story.html.

Nichols, Chris. “After years of delays, CalFire says updated and expanded wildfire hazard maps are on their way.” CapRadio, December 20, 2021. https://www.capradio.org/articles/2021/12/20/after-years-of-delays-calfire-says-updated-and-expanded-wildfire-hazard-maps-areon-their-way/&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1742346597884360&usg=AOvVaw0hlYfiSMhql63rsllmQb1z/.

Ormseth, Matthew, Salvador Hernandez and Terry Castleman. “How did a cluster of homes near the Eaton fire’s ignition point emerge unscathed?” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 2025. https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-01-17/eaton-fire-ignition-point-homes.

Oberholtz, Chris. “Southern California fears the worst as devastating 100-mph Santa Ana winds are set to return.” New York Post, January 20, 2025. https://nypost.com/2025/01/20/us-news/southern-california-braces-for-extreme-fire-weather-as-100-mph-winds-return/.

Pineda, Paulina. “Santa Rosa Approves Housing Policies to Aid Recovery After Disasters.” The Press Democrat, November 22, 2024. https:// www.pressdemocrat.com/article/news/santa-rosa-housing-policies-disaster-recovery/.

Pineda, Paulina. “Santa Rosa wrote the playbook for the long road to recovery after 2017 Tubbs Fire. These lessons could aid Los Angeles.”

The Press Democrat, February 2, 2025. https://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/news/santa-rosa-fire-lessons-los-angeles/.

Roman, Jesse. “Build. Burn. Repeat?” National Fire Protection Association Journal, January 2, 2018. https://web.archive.org/ web/20230318012706/https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Publications-and-media/NFPA-Journal/2018/January-February-2018/ Features/Build-Burn-Repeat.

Santa Rosa Forward, “Housing Element.” n.d. Accessed April 1, 2025, https://www.santarosaforward.com/HE. Searles, Dennis, Ben Nicholls, Kevin Hubred, et al. “Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Wildfire Annex.” City of Santa Rosa, September 18, 2020. https://www.firesafesonoma.org/wp-content/uploads/9-2020-final_srs_cwpp-2020-compressed-1.pdf.

Smith, Doug and Nina Agrawal. “Despite clear risks, Santa Rosa neighborhood that burned down was exempt from state fire regulations.”

Los Angeles Times, October 15, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-coffey-park-explainer-20171011-story.html.

Smith, Doug and Sandhya Kambhampati. “Real estate losses from fires may top $30 billion, from old mobile homes to $23-million mansions.” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2025. https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-02-21/real-estate-losses-from-palisadesand-eaton-fires-top-30-billion.

Sommer, Lauren. “Getting Back What You Lost--Rebuilding in a Wildfire Zone.” NPR Morning Edition, October 16, 2018. https://www.npr. org/2018/10/16/656532029/getting-back-what-you-lost-rebuilding-in-a-wildfire-zone.

U.S. Census Bureau. “ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates.’ American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Data Profiles, Table DP05, 2023. https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDP5Y2023.DP05?q=altadena,+California+2023.

U.S. Census Bureau. “ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates.” American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Data Profiles, Table DP05, 2017. https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDP5Y2017.DP05?q=Santa+Rosa+city,+California+2017.

U.S. Census Bureau. “Households and Families.” American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Subject Tables, Table S1101, 2023. https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST5Y2023.S1101?q=altadena+cdp.

U.S. Census Bureau. “Quickfacts: Santa Rosa city, California; Altadena CDP, California.” population estimates July 1, 2024. https://www. census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/santarosacitycalifornia,altadenacdpcalifornia/PST045224.

U.S. Census Bureau. “Tenure by House Heating Fuel.” American Community Survey, ACS 5-Year Estimates Detailed Tables, Table B25117, 2017. https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT5Y2017.B25117?q=Santa+Rosa+house+2017.

Wilson, David. “Supervisors approve long-range development policy plan for West San Gabriel Valley.” San Gabriel Valley Tribune, March 17, 2025. https://www.sgvtribune.com/2025/03/11/supervisors-approve-long-range-development-policy-plan-for-west-san-gabriel-valley/.

Witt O’Briens. “Coming Together in Crisis: The Santa Rosa Story.” April 2019. https://issuu.com/cityofsantarosa/docs/aar_-_csr.