“IT’S ALWAYS BEEN ABOUT DOING THE MOST GOOD.” Ashley Hinson reflects on why she ran for office, and what drives her in her job today.
What America Means to THE FREE WORLD
by PAUL D. MILLER
PLUS: ENDING THE STRATEGIC HOLIDAY
by Shawn Creamer
AND: THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE COST IF WE RETREAT
with
essays by
Don Bacon, Dusty Johnson & Jen Kiggans
4 What America Means to the Free World
By Paul D. Miller
The world would be a much different place if the Nazis or Soviets had prevailed. Instead, we have a world characterized by American ideals: ordered liberty within and among nations.
8 In the Face of Authoritarianism, the United States Must Lead
By Don Bacon
As authoritarian regimes grow more aggressive across the globe, the U.S. must stand with the world’s strongest coalition of democratic nations
to confront these threats.
10 America’s Role Abroad
By Dusty
Johnson
In this moment of international conflict, the U.S. has a choice – to lead or retreat. In stark contrast to our former president, President Trump has chosen to lead.
11 Peace, Prosperity, and the Importance of U.S. Leadership Around the World
By Jen Kiggans
America’s global leadership has not only made our nation more prosperous and secure, but has led to decades of goodwill with nearly every developed country in the world.
12 Ending the Strategic Holiday
By Shawn Creamer
The People’s Republic of China now presents an acute threat to international peace and security.
The U.S. is the only nation which has the capability and the resources to prevent PRC dominion.
Cover Story (cont’d)
15 U.S. Spending on Hard and Soft Power
By Steven Kosiak
At the same time the Trump Administration is proposing a large increase in military spending, it has proposed draconian cuts to the international affairs budget.
17 Modernizing America’s Nuclear Arsenal
By Robert Peters
At a time when America’s adversaries are expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals, the U.S. must accelerate efforts to do the same to make sure our nation does not fall behind.
19 Can Donald Trump Rebalance the Transatlantic Relationship?
By Justin Logan
At the NATO summit in the Hague, the President has a historic opportunity to shift the burden of conventional defense in Europe onto European shoulders.
Debate -- “Should the U.S. Rejoin the World Health Organization?”
22 Yes, Our Absence Weakens Global Health and Cedes Ground to our Rivals
By Judd L. Walson
23 No, it is a Mismanaged Money Pit that is Resistant to Reform
By Brett Schaefer
Sections
3 In this Edition
26 News & Events
28 Ripon Profile of U.S. Rep. Ashley Hinson
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THE RIPON SOCIETY HONORARY CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY BOARD
U.S. Senators:
Shelley Moore Capito - Senate Co-Chair
Todd Young - Senate Co-Chair
Marsha Blackburn
Bill Cassidy, M.D.
Susan M. Collins
John Curtis
Steve Daines
Joni Ernst
Deb Fischer
John Hoeven
Jerry Moran
Mike Rounds
Thom Tillis
Roger Wicker
U.S. Representatives:
Frank Lucas - House Co-Chair
August Pfluger - House Co-Chair
Stephanie Bice - House Co-Chair
Mark Amodei
Jodey Arrington
Don Bacon
Troy Balderson
Andy Barr
Mike Bost
Rob Bresnahan
Vern Buchanan
Ken Calvert
Kat Cammack
Mike Carey
Buddy Carter
Juan Ciscomani
Tom Cole
Jake Ellzey
Tom Emmer
Ron Estes
Gabe Evans
Julie Fedorchak
Randy Feenstra
Brian Fitzpatrick
Scott Franklin
Andrew Garbarino
Tony Gonzales
Sam Graves
Pat Harrigan
Kevin Hern
French Hill
Ashley Hinson
Bill Huizenga
Dusty Johnson
Dave Joyce
John Joyce, M.D.
Mike Kelly
Jen Kiggans
Kevin Kiley
Young Kim
Darin LaHood
Bob Latta
Laurel Lee
Julia Letlow
Celeste Maloy
Brian Mast
Michael McCaul
Carol Miller
John Moolenaar
Blake Moore
Greg Murphy, M.D.
Dan Newhouse
Zach Nunn
Jay Obernolte
Guy Reschenthaler
Michael Rulli
María Elvira Salazar
Steve Scalise
Pete Sessions
Adrian Smith
Jason Smith
Lloyd Smucker
Pete Stauber
Bryan Steil
Glenn “GT” Thompson
Mike Turner
David Valadao
Ann Wagner
Steve Womack
Rudy Yakym
In this edition
Less than a week after American bombers struck three nuclear weapons facilities in Iran, the latest edition of The Ripon Forum examines what the United States means to the free world with a series of essays about the importance of U.S. leadership and why this leadership will be critical to keeping the world peaceful, prosperous, and free in the coming years.
“The free world is good for America, and America is good for the free world,” writes Georgetown University Professor Paul D. Miller in the lead essay of this latest edition. “Today the free world has enemies abroad and doubts at home. China and Russia are mounting a full-spectrum assault on the free world; Iran and North Korea are smaller satellites to their efforts. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran’s proxy attack on Israel, and China’s maneuvering against Taiwan are not isolated developments. They are all attacks on the free world order.”
“We should face the threat the same way we always have. American grand strategy at its best always aims to preserve and expand American power by preserving and expanding American ideals. Power and justice go hand-in-hand. They are the twin pillars — better yet, the two fists — of an effective strategy. Power without justice is cynical and immoral; justice without power is weak and naïve. Together, they are tough-minded but morally aspirational, focused on American interests but mindful of our impact on the world at large. That means, first, American power — and the power of our free world allies — must remain unmatched.”
Nebraska Congressman and retired Air Force Brigadier General Don Bacon agrees. “America’s global leadership faces unprecedented tests as authoritarian regimes grow more aggressive across Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East,” the lawmaker writes. “We must stand united with the world’s strongest coalition of democratic nations to confront these threats. However, the strength of this alliance depends on more than statements and symbolism. It demands action and an American resolve backed by real capability.”
Dusty Johnson, who represents South Dakota in the U.S. House and Chairs the Republican Main Street Caucus, strikes a similar note in his essay. “America is safer and more secure when we have an engaged and strong presence in global affairs,” Johnson writes. “In the face of international conflict, America has a choice – to lead or retreat. In stark contrast to our former president, President Trump has chosen to lead. This decision affects the whole world as countries look to how America responds to threats of war, invasions, and attacks on our allies. They look to America’s leadership.”
According to Virginia Congresswoman and Navy veteran Jen Kiggans, this leadership is long overdue. “During President Biden’s Administration,” she writes, “threats abroad reached critical levels. Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China became increasingly aggressive towards Taiwan and internationally, and Iran supported, and continues to support, violent terrorism in the Middle East. While thankfully not in our backyard, these events pose a very real threat to our peace here at home and thus require American leadership to ensure those who seek to harm our interests are kept in check or defeated.”
In other essays examining the importance of U.S. leadership in the face of increasing global threats, Atlantic Council senior fellow and retired U.S. Army Colonel Shawn Creamer writes about the rise of China and why it is time for the U.S. to end what he argues is a three decade-long “strategic holiday” and take this threat seriously. Steven Kosiak of the Quincy Institute examines U.S. spending on hard and soft power and shares his thoughts about where the Trump is Administration is spending too much, and far too little. Robert Peters of the Heritage Foundation discusses the need for America to modernize its nuclear arsenal. And Justin Logan of the Cato Institute provides a preview of the upcoming NATO Summit in the Hague and why he believes it is time for the President to rebalance the transatlantic alliance.
Johns Hopkins Professor Judd Walson squares off with Brett Schaeffer of the American Enterprise Institute in a debate over whether America should rejoin the World Health Organization. And in the latest Ripon Profile, Iowa Congresswoman and former journalist Ashley Hinson reflects on why she ran for political office, and what drives her in her job today.
We hope you find this edition of The Ripon Forum interesting and informative, and, as always, we welcome any questions or comments you may have.
Lou Zickar
Editor
of The Ripon Forum louzickar@riponsociety.org
What America Means to THE FREE WORLD
by PAUL D. MILLER
In any high school in America, teenagers organize themselves into social groups: cheerleaders and jocks, nerds and goths, artists and preppies. No one tells them to do so. It is a natural human instinct. We form groups, and each group has a distinct culture around shared values.
And the school as a whole has a culture. If the most socially influential subgroup is also kind, generous, and full of integrity, that will influence the culture of the whole school. If the most socially influential group consists of bullies or cheaters, that will also affect the culture of the whole school.
If Draco, Crabbe, and Goyle were the most popular or influential students at Hogwarts, it would be a very different school than the one in which Harry, Hermione, and Ron raised an army against Voldemort and his Death Eaters.
What is true at a high school is true at any level of social organization, including world order. World order is a social system made up of the patterned interactions among the states, intergovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations of the world. World order has its own culture. Its culture takes shape from the norms, values, and behavior of
its most powerful members.
For three centuries, the United Kingdom and the United States have been among the most powerful and influential nations in the world — sometimes the most powerful. Which means the culture of world order in large part reflects our values and our interests.
We might have had fascist order if the Nazis got the bomb first. We might have had a communist world order if the Soviets had prevailed. We might have had an Islamist-jihadist world order if al-Qaida or ISIS got their way.
Instead, we have a world order characterized — imperfectly, and not universally — by American ideals: ordered liberty within and among nations. Scholars have a clunky name for it (the “liberal international order”) and its opponents smear it with another name (“globalism”).
I prefer a simpler title: the free world.
We have a free world because freedom-loving nations consistently defeated their opponents — Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler and Tojo, the Soviets, and more. Which means America helped build the free world. Sometimes consciously, as when we fought “to make the world safe for democracy,” as Woodrow Wilson said, or to defend the ideals of the Atlantic Charter, under which Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill fought the Second World War. We consciously built the free world when we championed free trade or forcibly democratized our former enemies after World War II.
work together with us on almost every imaginable issue of global concern. An unfree world is a world in which America is poorer, weaker, and more vulnerable on every front.
Today the free world has enemies abroad and doubts at home. China and Russia are mounting a full-spectrum assault on the free world; Iran and North Korea are smaller satellites to their efforts. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran’s proxy attack on Israel, and China’s maneuvering against Taiwan are not isolated developments. They are all attacks on the free world order.
For three centuries, the United Kingdom and the United States have been among the most powerful and influential nations in the world — sometimes the most powerful. Which means the culture of world order in large part reflects our values and our interests.
The consequences of each conflict will not be limited to their regions but will ripple outward and affect the culture of world order. If they get away with aggression — if tyrants and terrorists attack, conquer, and kill with impunity — we live in a very different kind of world. It will no longer be a free world, but a world in which might makes right; a world in which “the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer as they must,” as Thucydides memorably put it. It will be a world in which Draco (Russia) takes the school and hands it to Voldemort (China).
Just as often, we built it through our example and through the pressure of outcompeting our opponents. Over the long run, America and our allies are vastly superior at producing wealth, peace, and human flourishing than the fascist, communist, Islamist, and authoritarian alternatives — and their people know it. If you want to compete with America, sooner or later you must adapt to our way of doing things or get left behind — and when our opponents adapt to our ways, we win.
The free world is good for America, and America is good for the free world. The free world is the outer perimeter of American security, an engine of American prosperity, and a tool of American influence. We are safer because half the world agrees with our ideals and sees the world the same way we do. We are richer because half the world trades with us on equal footing. We are stronger because we have friends and allies who
We should face the threat the same way we always have. American grand strategy at its best always aims to preserve and expand American power by preserving and expanding American ideals. Power and justice go hand-in-hand. They are the twin pillars — better yet, the two fists — of an effective strategy. Power without justice is cynical and immoral; justice without power is weak and na ï ve. Together, they are tough-minded but morally aspirational, focused on American interests but mindful of our impact on the world at large.
That means, first, American power — and the power of our free world allies — must remain unmatched. The U.S. defense budget during the Cold War averaged close to 9 percent of GDP. Today, it is closer to 3 percent. That is inadequate to the task of defending the free world. The U.S. needs a large and sustained increase in spending for hard power: guns and bombs, a modern nuclear arsenal, shipyards and aircraft carriers, missile defenses, and spy satellites. We need to sustain a network of military bases and platforms of access in the key geopolitical theaters around the world.
Second, America must rearm with the weapons of soft power. During the Cold War, we gave hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign aid to allies and partners around the world through organizations like the U.S. Agency for International Development. We created media outlets to spread the American message, like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. We invested in a cadre of diplomats who spoke foreign languages and traveled the world. These tools of soft power advertised American ideals and helped win the Cold War.
Unfortunately, we have comprehensively dismantled these tools and disarmed ourselves of our soft power. After the Cold War, we took a “peace dividend” and cut back on everything, leaving most international affairs bureaucracies limping along as shells of their former selves, demoralized, underfunded, and poorly staffed. When they unsurprisingly proved ineffective, the public turned against them, and President Donald Trump gave them the coup de grace this year.
The fight against Russian and Chinese authoritarianism is the fight of the 21 st century. America must fight and win the Second Cold War, which means we must advance American power and American ideals. We need guns and bombs, and we need dollars and diplomats.
Above all, we need leaders, statesmen and stateswomen, of character, integrity, and competence. We need a cadre of politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, and soldiers who know how to pull the levers of the government’s complex machinery and make it work for the American people. (It would help if Congress would fix itself and its budget process and then free the executive to streamline the bureaucracy).
But more than how, we need statesmen and stateswomen who understand why to pull the levers. We need a renewed sense of civic pride and national purpose, rooted in an awareness of our history and our Creed of liberty and equality. American grand strategy aims at national greatness, yes, but that is not our ultimate purpose. Greatness for its own sake is just national ego. Pride makes poor strategy, neither effective nor just. True greatness is the side effect of victory in a just cause. With our Creed, we have justice on our side; whether we achieve victory is yet unknown. But those twin goals — victory and justice, power and ideals — those are the calling of our time. RF
Dr. Paul D. Miller is a Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He serves as co-chair of the Global Politics and Security concentration in the MSFS program.
Paul D. Miller
In the Face of Authoritarianism, the United States Must Lead
by DON BACON
America’s global leadership faces unprecedented tests as authoritarian regimes grow more aggressive across Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. We must stand united with the world’s strongest coalition of democratic nations to confront these threats. However, the strength of this alliance depends on more than statements and symbolism. It demands action and an American resolve backed by real capability.
The battlefield today extends far beyond land, air, and sea. We are already at war in the cyberspace. These attacks don’t always make front-page headlines, but they are constant, deliberate, and increasingly more damaging. The United States has faced a growing barrage of cyber intrusions from China and other foreign adversaries. These cyber-attacks, while harmful to all Americans, also serve as preparation for potential future conflicts, allowing our adversaries to test and refine their capabilities against our systems.
China’s Volt Typhoon operation is just one example of ongoing threats to America’s most essential civilian infrastructure. It has targeted power grids, water systems, transportation networks, and communication platforms, with the explicit intention of establishing access that could disrupt or paralyze us in a future crisis. These actions are not theoretical but are happening now, in real time, across the systems Americans rely on every day.
want to succeed in the cyber domain, we need much more. Our forces are gathering strong cyber intelligence but are usually constrained by overly restrictive rules of engagement. In many cases, they are forced to sit on valuable information because they lack the authority to act. We cannot keep absorbing punches without the ability to punch back. We cannot deter future attacks if our adversaries believe there are no consequences. Cyber Command must be empowered to act and defend effectively when necessary.
Meanwhile, Russia remains a clear and persistent threat to both our and European security. Putin’s demands that NATO withdraw from the Baltics reveal the true scope of his ambitions. A Russian victory in Ukraine would embolden authoritarian leaders worldwide and directly threaten the international order that has underpinned decades of relative peace and prosperity.
We must stand united with the world’s strongest coalition of democratic nations...
China is also watching Ukraine very carefully. The lessons Beijing draws from the battlefield in Europe will shape its decisions in the Indo-Pacific. If the United States wavers in its support for Ukraine, it sends a dangerous message that America can be outwaited or outlasted. That kind of signal would be deeply destabilizing, especially for Taiwan.
Last month, Lieutenant General William Hartman, Acting Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and performing the duties of Director of the National Security Agency, testified before the Cyber Subcommittee, of which I serve as Chairman. Gen. Hartman noted our service cyber components have only recently attained foundational readiness. Foundational readiness has a particular meaning, and the fact that it took us more than a dozen years to reach this point is not something to celebrate. I’m encouraged we’re finally beginning to close the gap, but foundational readiness alone is not enough. If we
We are far behind and must act now to ensure Taiwan has the tools and systems it needs to defend itself. The time to prepare is before, not after, an invasion. Taiwan doesn’t need American troops on the ground. It requires the means to hold the line while the world responds. Failing to provide that support would invite exactly the kind of crisis we hope to avoid.
In the Middle East, Iran continues to support terrorism and fuel instability through a vast network of proxies and militias. When I served in Iraq, I saw the consequences
firsthand. Iranian-backed groups were responsible for the deaths of more than 600 American service members. Today, that same regime provides weapons and support to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which carry out brutal attacks against Israeli civilians.
Over the weekend, the State of Israel conducted precision strikes on Iran’s nuclear weapons program and military leadership. Despite repeated warnings, the Iranian regime has recklessly accelerated its progress toward development of a nuclear weapon.
I regret it came to this point, Israel’s actions are necessary and justified. The United States must stand with Israel by demanding Iran’s complete, immediate, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization and by re-imposing President Trump’s maximum pressure policies on the Iranian regime until this is achieved.
…the strength of this alliance depends on more than statements and symbolism. It demands action and an American resolve backed by real capability.
Following the recent vote by the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency which found Iran to be in non-compliance of its obligations under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, Iran inexplicably announced its intent to deepen its willful breach of the treaty by constructing a third nuclear enrichment facility.
These events, combined with its existing stockpile of highly enriched Uranium and recent weapons development
American leadership isn’t free. It comes with a cost, risk, and responsibility. But the cost of retreat is far greater. History has taught us that time and again. That means strengthening our conventional military, investing in cyber capabilities, supporting our allies, and making clear that America will continue to lead. The choice is clear. We must lead. RF
Don Bacon represents the 2nd District of Nebraska in the U.S. House of Representatives. A Member of the Armed Services Committee, he serves as Chairman of the Cyber, Information Technologies and Innovation Subcommittee.
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America’s Role Abroad
by DUSTY JOHNSON
America must protect our national security – that must be the first priority. But beyond our borders, America needs a strong, prepared, and focused military to keep us secure at home and protect our allies from the threat of invasion from communist, dictatorial regimes like China and Russia.
America is safer and more secure when we have an engaged and strong presence in global affairs. In the face of international conflict, America has a choice – to lead or retreat. In stark contrast to our former president, President Trump has chosen to lead.
This decision affects the whole world as countries look to how America responds to threats of war, invasions, and attacks on our allies. They look to America’s leadership.
In the past few years, we’ve witnessed conflicts that may be the result of weak foreign policy. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, Hamas’ attack on Israel, China’s looming threat to invade Taiwan, and a nuclear Iran. America can’t sit back and watch. When disaster strikes, America must enforce strong, decisive repercussions on the perpetrator. We must remember that these perpetrators are terrorists, communists, and dictators who oppress others, even their own citizens, for economic and political gain.
Another prime example of American leadership abroad is President Trump’s attack on Houthi ships blocking the Suez Canal. For more than a year under Joe Biden’s leadership, terrorist ships blocked passage through the Suez Canal, firing at U.S. ships that utilize this shortcut in the Red Sea, disrupting global trade and supply chains. Less than two months into President Trump’s second term, he took decisive and powerful action by attacking the Iran-backed Houthi ships. This response made it clear to the world – there will be a price to pay for terrorist acts.
When America retreats from fighting violence and terrorism, our enemies are all too eager to take our place. This doesn’t mean we need boots on the ground in every country, but we must remain a beacon of freedom and demonstrate peace through strength.
When America retreats from fighting violence and terrorism, our enemies are all too eager to take our place.
We have seen the highest number of violent conflicts since World War II. The lack of leadership abroad under the previous administration created a power vacuum that has been filled by our adversaries, whose goals and interests are antithetical to peace and freedom.
Under President Biden’s leadership, the U.S. made little effort to end the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, President Trump has spent months in conversations with Putin and Zelenskyy to negotiate an end to the deadly war. Let me be clear, Putin is a thug. His invasion of Ukraine was an attack on innocent lives. These actions should never be tolerated, and this war must end.
Harry Truman pivoted America away from isolationism toward engagement in global affairs to stop the spread of communism. Ronald Reagan’s famous quote, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall,” turned the tides of history as President Gorbachev bowed to Reagan’s direction. Teddy Roosevelt spurred American influence abroad by building the Panama Canal and intervening in countries with unstable economic and political conditions. Each of these leaders rejected isolationism. Under their administrations, authoritarian, communist, and tyrannical rule could not stand. Their leadership ended world wars, Nazi Germany, and caused the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union’s communist policies.
In America, we are once again faced with the decision to lead or retreat in the fight against authoritarians, communists, and terrorists. Under President Trump’s leadership, America will stand for freedom in Israel, Ukraine, Taiwan, and across the globe, and stand in strong opposition to those who disagree. Each country does not have to look like America, but we must be clear in our mission, ready to act, and steadfast in keeping our word. We cannot retreat, because the world is a safer place when America leads. RF
Dusty Johnson represents South Dakota in the U.S. House of Representatives. He is a Member of the Select Committee on China, and serves as Chairman of the Republican Main Street Caucus.
Peace, Prosperity, and the Importance of U.S. Leadership
by JEN KIGGANS
For decades, America’s leadership on the world stage has made our nation more prosperous and more secure. Our strong alliances and mutual security guarantees have resulted in decades of hard-earned goodwill with nearly every developed country in the world. We enjoy robust support and leadership in international organizations, and have been able to structure the global trade regime in ways that make America richer and safer. Maintaining this leadership status and remaining the partner of choice for allied nations not only benefits freedom-loving people across the world, but is firmly within our national security self-interest.
During President Biden’s Administration, threats abroad reached critical levels. Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China became increasingly aggressive towards Taiwan and internationally, and Iran supported, and continues to support, violent terrorism in the Middle East. While thankfully not in our backyard, these events pose a very real threat to our peace here at home and thus require American leadership to ensure those who seek to harm our interests are kept in check or defeated.
In order to prevent China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea from succeeding, we must focus on deterrence through displays of hard and soft power. Such deterrence is particularly important in Ukraine, as this battleground serves as a symbol and a proxy for potential conflicts to come. China is closely watching how we and our allies respond to Russia’s invasion. Aiding Ukraine and our allies in Eastern Europe in keeping Russia from their borders sends a powerful message, not only to leaders in these nations, but to China, which threatens to use violence to push us from the first island chain and take Taiwan by force. Last month, President Macron pointed this out directly: if Russia is allowed to take Ukrainian territory “without restrictions, without any constraints, what could happen in Taiwan? What will you do the day something happens in the Philippines?”
America has the resources and the capability to deter those seeking to harm our interests, but we are much more powerful when in concert with our allies. China is preparing to fight a war just 80 miles from its shore. It can concentrate its entire military in just one small area requiring minimal logistics. American forces must travel thousands of miles. But when Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia are fighting with us, our forces are much closer to the fight, creating a much stronger deterrent that can help prevent conflict in the first place.
Our strong alliances and mutual security guarantees have resulted in decades of hard-earned goodwill with nearly every developed country in the world.
China remains our greatest military and economic adversary, and they are consistently partnering with Russia, Iran, and North Korea to degrade the American-led western world order we have so carefully built for over a century. China seeks an exclusive sphere of influence in East Asia. Russia wants America to disengage in Europe so it can bully its neighbors and turn them against the West. Iran seeks to diminish American influence in the Middle East and develop nuclear weapons. North Korea harasses our military partner, South Korea, and is developing intercontinental nuclear missiles to threaten the American homeland. Each of these adversaries has its own objectives, but they share a common goal of denying America influence and our ability to partner with our allies.
To continue in our leadership role, we must strengthen alliances abroad, increase financial and military support for our allies currently in conflict, and have a leadership role in any multilateral setting. Tangible and easily accomplished means abound: increased arms sales to Ukraine and Taiwan; expanding presence of American forces in Eastern Europe and Asia; and providing robust leadership in the international organizations, such as NATO, that we created that have advanced American interests for seventy years.
America is a natural leader. We are a city upon a hill for billions of people around the world. We have built a world order around American leadership that has made us, and those who wish to partner with us, immensely prosperous. Our leadership and alliances are of immense economic and security value to us, and we should not give them up without a fight. RF
Jen Kiggans represents the 2nd District of Virginia in the U.S. House of Representatives. A Member of the Armed Services Committee, she spent 10 years in the U.S. Navy, where she served as a pilot flying H-46 and H-3 helicopters and completed two deployments to the Persian Gulf.
Ending the Strategic Holiday Rising to meet the China Challenge
by SHAWN CREAMER
The United States has been on a strategic holiday for more than three decades, leading to a withering of American power and global position. Many of the assumptions underpinning American strategy during this period have not withstood the test of time, particularly those concerning the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The prevailing theory driving China policy was that accommodation and wealth would lead to increased liberalization. This belief proved an illusion and led to inaction. The PRC now presents an acute threat to international peace and security. The United States is the only nation which has the capability and the resources to prevent PRC dominion.
Chairman Xi is not an anomaly but the embodiment of enduring Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ambitions —to rewrite global rules, reassert dominance over neighbors, and seek retribution against the West. The Party retains its Leninist soul.
China has pursued a strategy linking economic growth with military might. In fewer than 50 years, CCP leaders built the world’s second-largest economy by relentlessly exploiting Chinese society, manipulating Western sensibilities, and skillfully navigating the fault lines of the international system.
enabling the conversion of national strength into both hard and soft power.
Chinese rearmament has been underway for over 30 years. The PRC has been very clear about the timelines and goal for its military buildup — to field a world-class military by 2049. The buildup has already shifted the balance of power in the Western Pacific.
China’s naval growth is historic, exceeding 370 ships and possibly reaching 600 by the latter 2030s. The Coast Guard has quadrupled in size. China’s air force now fields a robust fleet of advanced fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft developed through both indigenous innovation and IP theft. Meanwhile, the Chinese army is preparing for large-scale missions, including airborne assault, amphibious assault and land-based-breach and exploitation.
Chairman Xi is not an anomaly but the embodiment of enduring Chinese Communist Party ambitions — to rewrite global rules, reassert dominance over neighbors, and seek retribution against the West.
The CCP has played the long game, incrementally building Chinese national strength. It did so by manipulating a core Western vulnerability — its short-term profit orientation. State-backed entities stole trillions in intellectual property (IP), while one-sided trade policies allowed China to capture global manufacturing and establish monopolies across supply chain ecosystems.
As China developed, the CCP ensured civilian and military requirements were integrated into dual-use projects,
The Chinese military has also made substantial progress toward operational jointness, building theater-level unified command headquarters and improving training and integration across the force.
China is also rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, expected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. In comparison, the U.S. and Russia each currently deploy around 1,700 strategic warheads. Cold War strategic thought is inadequate for guiding policy in this emerging multipolar “Third Nuclear Age.”
While Chinese forces may still lag in some qualitative aspects when compared to the United States, the Chinese military is now fielding weapons equal to or more advanced than the United States. The Ukraine war has validated what the PRC has been doing for modernization, including a rapid move toward unmanned systems.
(cont’d on page 14)
PRC Official Defense Budget (2000-2023)
Source: DOD Annual Report to Congress, 2024 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, page 148 Official Defense Budget (PPP) Defense spending (MER) GDP Growth
DoD assesses:* Beijing spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defense budget. ** PRC defense budget doubled from 2013-2023, averaging 6% annual growth above inflation.
The Ukraine war has also demonstrated that in largescale conflict, quantity is a quality of its own. When firepower, attrition, and defense outweigh speed and maneuver as the character of war, scale and mass matter. Should a Sino-American conflict occur, it will most likely be both large-scale and protracted. In such a war, production will matter greatly to terminating the war on favorable terms.
China’s confidence to exert itself more aggressively has grown as its geostrategic power increased. The CCP has viewed the past two decades as a “strategic opportunity,” leveraging U.S. distraction and global crises to its advantage. Although the 2011 U.S. pivot to the Pacific may have surprised China, its failure to follow through gave the PRC time to advance and solidify gains.
Over the past 35 years, America has allowed its bureaucracy to bloat, infrastructure and manufacturing base to decay, and military power to decline. It has become overburdened by debt. For much of this era, the U.S. has funded the defense of an early fight, not the winning moves for a protracted war. This erosion of American power has left it vulnerable.
Despite this bleak picture, not all is lost. For every measure of Chinese strength, there is a corresponding weakness. The PRC faces profound internal challenges: a looming demographic crisis, restive minority populations, unsustainable levels of corporate and public debt, and severe environmental degradation.
The United States can contain the Chinese threat — but only through serious, sustained action. Preparedness is realized with actions, not words.
across the federal government. It must supervise the resurrection of Cold War-era mobilization programs.
The President must direct — and Congress must fund — a multi-theater defense strategy. The active and reserve force must be sized accordingly for deterrence and to fight the first 12 months of a large-scale war.
The Defense Department must prepare detailed plans to expand the force for a multi-year protracted war. The nuclear triad must be modernized and diversified to reflect the multipolar nuclear landscape.
The United States can contain the Chinese threat — but only through serious, sustained action. Preparedness is realized with actions, not words.
America must restore fiscal discipline to remain a great power. Congress must pass budgets on time, prioritize essential functions, and eliminate spending on nonessential amenities. Taxation cannot solve out of control spending.
Federal fraud is another critical issue. The Government Accountability Office estimates fraudulent losses in federal spending at up to $521 billion annually, with some estimates as high as $750 billion. This must be addressed.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency should be revitalized and restored to its original national security mission. It must become a standalone agency reporting directly to the President, responsible for coordinating preparedness and integrating emergency management
The Selective Service System (SSS) requires a complete overhaul. By law, the SSS must deliver 100,000 conscripts within 210 days. This goal is highly unrealistic. The military is unprepared to absorb this number of recruits, and the defense industrial base (DIB) lacks the capacity to fight a large-scale war and support a major force expansion.
If the U.S. wants a capable and resilient DIB, it must invest accordingly. That means diversifying away from large defense primes, expanding government arsenals, integrating civilian industry, and leveraging co-development and coproduction with allies. In conjunction with these efforts, the U.S. will need to begin the systematic strategic decoupling of its economy from the PRC and cut off Chinese student visas to not resource the mechanisms of a future defeat.
Confronting the full scope of the China challenge demands that the United States reject its decades-long pattern of underinvestment, shorttermism, and bureaucratic inertia. The balance of power is shifting, and the window to deter aggression, strengthen alliances, and reconstitute American strength is narrowing. If the U.S. is to preserve international peace and security, and uphold a free and open order, it must act with urgency to revitalize its national defense, rebuild its industrial and institutional foundations, and reestablish the credibility of its deterrent posture. RF
Shawn Creamer is a retired U.S. Army Colonel, where he served as an infantry officer for 30 years. In retirement, Shawn serves as a strategic advisor for Artesion Inc, as a fellow with the Institute for Corean-American Studies, and as a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and the GeoStrategy Initiative.
Shawn Creamer
U.S. Spending on Hard and Soft Power: Measuring Trump Administration Plans Against
Requirements
by STEVEN KOSIAK
The Trump Administration and Republican Congress appear to be committed to a large increase in military spending. While we do not yet have a detailed picture of the Administration’s long-term defense budget plans, the Administration’s so-called “skinny” budget, released in early May, includes a proposed defense budget for 2026 that would top $1 trillion — marking a 13 percent jump from this year’s level. At the same time, the Administration has proposed to dramatically reduce the amount of funding allocated to the international affairs budget, cutting it by some 85 percent in 2026. From a national security perspective, neither of these proposals appears prudent. Indeed, if implemented, these very different treatments of U.S. “hard power” and “soft power” are more likely to weaken, than strengthen, America’s security.
At some $900 billion, the recently enacted 2025 U.S. defense budget is already 14 percent higher (in “real” inflation-adjusted terms) than it was in 1985 at the height of the Cold War. And under the Administration’s request, in 2026 the U.S. defense budget would reach its highest peacetime level ever. Such a significant increase in military spending would represent a wasteful and — worse — counterproductive, allocation of resources.
most authoritative recent estimate, even after adjusting for various components of military spending left out of China’s (as well as, in some cases, the United States’) official defense budget and other factors, the United States annually spends roughly three times more on its military than does China.1
Under the Administration’s request, in 2026 the U.S. defense budget would reach its highest peacetime level ever.
In reality, current levels of military spending are more than adequate to meet America’s key national security requirements and significantly exceed what would be needed were the United States to adopt a more restrained approach to its security. The United States already spends far more on its military than does any other country, including China — our closest rival. According to the
This is far more favorable math than during the Cold War, when the United States and its NATO allies combined were estimated to spend only modestly more on their militaries than the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Moreover, as a share of their economies, at 3.2 percent of GDP, U.S. military spending already far exceeds what U.S. allies and friends in both Europe and East Asia — the countries the U.S. military is largely intended to help defend — spend on their own militaries (Germany and Japan, for example, allocate 1.5 percent and 1.2 percent, respectively, of their economies to defense), or what China spends (about 1.7 percent of GDP).
But worse than simply being unnecessary, a large increase in military spending could have severely negative consequences for U.S. security over the long run. This is because when combined with the large tax cuts included in the reconciliation bill supported by the Administration and Republican Congress — which is only very partially paid for through cuts in non-
1) M. Taylor Fravel, George J. Gilboy and Eric Higgenbotham, “Estimating China’s Defense Spending: How to Get It Wrong (and Right), “ Texas National Security Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3, Summer 2024, p. 41, https://tnsr.org/2024/06/estimatingchinas-defense-spending-how-to-get-it-wrong-and-right/
Steven Kosiak
defense programs like Medicaid — such an increase will accelerate and exacerbate the growth in the federal debt, already projected to reach 166 percent of GDP by 2054. And it is difficult to imagine a weaker and more fragile economic, financial, and budgetary foundation upon which to rest the country’s long-term security — including, ultimately, its military capabilities.
At the same time the Trump Administration is proposing a large increase in military spending, it has proposed draconian cuts to the international affairs budget. Including proposed rescissions of previously appropriated funds, under the Administration’s request, the budget for the State Department and other international affairs programs would be cut by 85 percent in 2026, to $9.4 billion. Even excluding the rescissions, it would amount to a 49 percent cut and bring the international affairs budget to $31.4 billion. This disconnect between spending on hard power and soft power is very much contrary to the approaches of past Republican Presidents —specifically, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush — who oversaw similar increases in defense spending. In both cases, those administrations matched their efforts to increase defense spending with comparably large boosts to the U.S. international affairs budget.
budget, the ratio would expand to 108-to-1 (or 32-to-1, if the proposed rescissions are excluded) in 2026.
As with defense, the United States currently spends more on foreign aid than any other country. But in this case, its edge is far more modest. In 2024, for example, the United States spent roughly as much on “official development assistance” (which accounts for most, but not all, non-military assistance) as the next three highest contributors — Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan — combined. The cuts included in the Trump Administration’s budget proposal would reduce U.S. spending on these programs to levels comparable to or below those of these U.S. allies. Worse yet, the Trump Administration is proposing deep cuts in some of the most effective U.S. foreign assistance programs — with traditionally very strong bipartisan support — such as global health and humanitarian assistance. Moreover, it has already taken steps to largely dismantle the country’s highly-skilled USAID workforce — which may be even more damaging than the proposed budget cuts.
At the same time the Trump Administration is proposing a large increase in military spending, it has proposed draconian cuts to the international affairs budget.
Another indication of just how unprecedented and dramatic the Trump Administration’s proposed cut to the international affairs budget can be seen by comparing relative levels of spending on defense and the international affairs budget. The United States has always spent far more on military capabilities than international affairs programs. But the ratio has never been anything near as wide as that proposed by the Trump Administration. This year, the United States will spend roughly $15 on defense for every dollar spent on international affairs programs, only modestly below the 12-to-1 ratio sustained at the height of the Reagan Administration’s Cold War defense buildup. By comparison, under the Trump Administration’s proposed
In the end, how much the U.S. spends on its military and international affairs programs should be based on a careful consideration of both requirements and affordability. A detailed analysis and weighing of these factors are well beyond the scope of this brief article. However, the discussion above suggests that the Trump Administration is pursuing a far more costly and risky approach to defense plans and spending than is needed, while simultaneously starving international affairs programs to a degree that is both dangerous and short-sighted. RF
Steven Kosiak is a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute and a partner at ISM Strategies in Washington, D.C. He is also a senior adjunct faculty member at American University’s School of International Service (SIS) and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).
Modernizing America’s Nuclear Arsenal A Necessary Cost of Deterrence
by ROBERT PETERS
America’s nuclear arsenal is aging — and is ill-fit for today’s challenges. Even once the nuclear modernization program currently underway is complete sometime in the 2040s, America’s arsenal will not be sufficient for the current threat environment, or for potential threats of the 21st century.
The United States has not built a new, fully constituted nuclear weapon since 1989. Many of the warheads in the arsenal are decades older. Beyond the warheads, the platforms designed to deliver the warheads are also out of date, and in many cases, well past their lifespan.
The B-52 bomber was first fielded when Dwight Eisenhower was president. The Minuteman III ballistic missile was supposed to retire when Ronald Reagan was president. And the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines will be operating well into the 2030s and 2040s — years after the end of their program life.
2026. According to the NNSA, it will not hit that mark until 2035 — nine years behind schedule.
This is all in sharp contrast to the Cold War, when the United States built literally thousands of nuclear weapons a year. Indeed, the United States broke ground at the Rocky Flats plutonium production facility in 1951. Eighteen months later, the first plutonium pit rolled off the assembly line. In contrast, the United States built its first new, diamond stamped plutonium pit in 2024 — 14 years after the 2010 nuclear modernization program began.
Robert Peters
The United States has not built a new, fully constituted nuclear weapon since 1989. Many of the warheads in the arsenal are decades older.
While the United States is modernizing its entire arsenal, this modernization program is far behind schedule. The Sentinel ballistic missile — meant to replace the antiquated Minuteman III — is over budget and behind schedule, causing the Air Force to state that some Minutemans will be operating until 2050. The Columbia-class submarine program, meant to replace the current ballistic missile submarine fleet, are also on the cusp of being late
Most worryingly, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the government agency that builds nuclear weapons, is far behind schedule in virtually every aspect of the modernization process. To take one example, NNSA was originally meant to be building 80 plutonium pits —the fissile core at the heart of a nuclear weapon — a year by
Compare this with what America’s adversaries are doing with their nuclear arsenals. Russia has roughly 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons operationally deployed and capable of striking America’s allies in Europe. In contrast, the United States has less than 10 percent of that number deployed in Europe as part of NATO’s deterrent — and fewer than that operationally ready at America’s bases in the U.S. homeland.
Similarly, China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet and is fielding dual-capable ballistic and cruise missiles that can target American ships and bases from Japan to Guam to Australia with nuclear or conventional weapons. They are, in other words, fielding an arsenal that is optimized to fight a theater nuclear war
And they are doing this at a time when the United States maintains no non-strategic nuclear weapons in the entire Pacific theater — having removed all its nuclear weapons from South Korea at the end of the Cold War and retiring the nuclear-variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile under President Obama. Indeed, the Department of
Defense believes that by 2030, China will have upwards of 1,000 nuclear weapons (a 500 percent increase from 2020) and 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035 — the same number of strategic nuclear weapons fielded by the United States and Russia today — with no signs of stopping warhead production or deployment.
At the same time, North Korea continues to produce ever more reliable and mature missiles and ever more nuclear weapons. In December 2024, then Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer noted that Pakistan, a nuclearweapon state, is building intercontinental ballistic missiles — and had yet to provide a reason as to why they need nuclear-capable missiles that can strike the American homeland. Finally, the regime in Iran is for all intents and purposes a nuclear threshold state, with enough highly-enriched uranium to produce fissile material for a number of weapons within weeks What then does the United States need to do, in light of all this?
First, President Trump must make nuclear modernization a priority — and give guidance to the Department of Defense and Department of Energy to build the nuclear arsenal of the 21st century.
Second, the Department of Energy and the NNSA Administrator must put the nuclear weapons complex on a wartime footing in order to accelerate the timelines to produce new nuclear warheads at scale.
Third, the President and the requisite cabinet secretaries should waive requisite National Environmental Protection Act and workplace safety regulations in order to ensure that the United States can build the warheads, missiles, bombers, and submarines necessary to ensure that the American arsenal remains credible.
China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet and is fielding dual-capable ballistic and cruise missiles that can target American ships and bases from Japan to Guam to Australia with nuclear or conventional weapons.
Finally, the Department of Defense must identify specific force requirements — quantity and desired capabilities — to build the arsenal that will protect America for the better part of the 21st century.
Nuclear weapons are the cornerstone and ultimate guarantor of American security. We must ensure that they remain credible to our adversaries, given our adversaries’ increasing reliance on their own nuclear weapons. RF
Robert Peters is a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security.
Can Donald Trump Rebalance the Transatlantic Relationship?
by JUSTIN LOGAN
Though the foreign-policy attention at present is focused on the Middle East, President Donald Trump has a historic opportunity to shift the burden of conventional defense in Europe onto European shoulders. At the NATO summit in the Hague, Trump has an opportunity to fix a problem he has pointed to for decades.
The central U.S. interest in Europe has been preventing one country from dominating the continent —“counterhegemony” in political science-speak. In World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, the United States bore great costs to prevent Kaiser Wilhelm, Adolf Hitler, and Josef Stalin from gaining control over other European powers. Today, there is no equivalent of Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. What this means for U.S. policy in Europe — and what it has meant since the end of the Cold War — is Washington should focus on becoming what Jeane Kirkpatrick in 1990 termed “a normal country in a normal time.”
including into countries that are close to indefensible, such as the Baltic states in 2004. Before admitting these countries, U.S. policymakers ignored the defense requirements of these countries until Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. Even then, the plans were inadequate, to the point that as late as 2022, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was warning that under existing plans, her country would be “wiped off the map.”
Donald Trump’s view has long been different. In 1987, he took out a full-page ad in the New York Times, observing that our allies’ “stake in their protection is far greater than ours.” In a 1988 appearance on Oprah Winfrey, he laid out a clear goal: to “make our allies pay their fair share.” He clearly held this view through his initial run for president, and into his first administration.
Justin Logan
Instead, when the Cold War ended peacefully, U.S. policymakers kept the U.S. “pacifier” in Europe. Whenever the Europeans would make efforts, however halting, to take up their own defense with more seriousness, the Americans would scuttle the efforts. In 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright gave a speech in the South of France in which she denounced any European efforts that violated what she termed the “Three Ds”: if Europe undertook any measures that would duplicate NATO capabilities, decouple Europe from NATO, or discriminate against NATO primacy, the Americans would view such measures as hostile.
When the Cold War ended peacefully, U.S. policymakers kept the U.S. “pacifier” in Europe. Whenever the Europeans would make efforts, however halting, to take up their own defense with more seriousness, the Americans would scuttle the efforts.
The Americans undertook NATO expansion, and kept the lead in Europe, at a time when deterrence seemed cheap if not free. All the while, NATO continued expanding,
In the first Trump administration, however, establishment advisers like John Bolton and Jim Mattis were reluctant to help their boss pursue this vision. In the second term, Trump is surrounded by people who seem more willing to do so. The question is whether they have a coherent approach at all, and if so, whether it will work.
Thus far, the administration seems to be focused on forcing NATO members to dedicate 3.5 percent of GDP to defense, then counting the countries that do so as good allies. This policy has at least two downsides. First, denominators matter. 3.5 percent of Latvia’s GDP is $1.5 billion. 3.5 percent of Germany’s GDP is $156 billion.
Realistically, no matter how much the Baltic states spend, their efforts will be mostly irrelevant to conventional deterrence in Europe. Their combined active-duty armed forces contain roughly 40,000 troops—around the same number of personnel as the New York Police Department.
(One should clarify further: the NYPD is probably better armed.)
The second problem is that the administration has shown little interest in pursuing U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe. After Russia invaded Ukraine, the Biden administration sent an additional 20,000 U.S. servicemembers to reassure Europe of the U.S. commitment. With Russia having demonstrated it cannot overpower Ukraine, there is little reason to reassure the Europeans now. In fact, the danger of reassuring Europe is that you may succeed; a reassured Europe is less likely to step up and spend more, and better, on defense.
large for European countries squared off against Russia. Still, a Kremlin that cannot overwhelm Ukraine cannot pose a hegemonic threat against the core European powers.
Today, there is no equivalent of Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. What this means for U.S. policy in Europe is Washington should focus on becoming what Jeane Kirkpatrick in 1990 termed “a normal country in a normal time.”
In 2011, no less an establishment figure than Robert Gates warned that “there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”
And that is what U.S. policy should be pursuing. NATO Europe possesses roughly 10 times Russia’s GDP, five to six times its population, and, depending on how one counts, two to three times as much military spending as Russia. True, there are redundancies in that spending, and the questions of command and threat perceptions loom
The funds have grown more precious, and the patience has worn thinner. Americans should hope that the Trump administration succeeds in a fundamental rebalance of the transatlantic relationship. RF
Justin Logan is the director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
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Should the U.S. Rejoin the World Health Organization? Yes, Our Absence Weakens Global Health and Cedes Ground to our Rivals
by JUDD WALSON
“Face reality as it is, not as it was or as you wish it to be.” — Jack Welch
In an increasingly politically polarized world, it is critical that U.S. strategic decisions are based on objective assessments of risks and benefits. While it may be tempting to imagine a world in which the U.S. can isolate itself from global problems, including the spread of infectious disease and the impact of humanitarian crises resulting from conflict and migration, we must remain clear-eyed. The global population is interconnected in ways that do not respect political boundaries. Diseases travel faster than diplomatic envoys. The abrupt withdrawal of the U.S. from the WHO, coupled with the significant reductions in foreign assistance, will certainly lead to the collapse of already fragile health systems. The result will be increased death and disease, with resulting political and economic upheavals that will harm many, including Americans. This is the reality.
in 1948, as a unified, permanent health body under the newly formed United Nations. The United States played a foundational role in shaping this vision. That commitment deepened after the Soviet Union withdrew from the WHO in 1949, creating a vacuum that the U.S. stepped in to fill, politically, financially, and diplomatically. Subsequently, strong leadership from U.S. scientists and institutions helped the WHO to achieve remarkable successes, including the eradication of smallpox. The WHO became not only a vehicle for improving health but also a platform for promoting transparency and democratic values in an era marked by cold war political polarization.
Strong leadership from U.S. scientists and institutions helped the WHO to achieve remarkable successes, including the eradication of smallpox.
The global community has long recognized the need for international collaboration to limit the global impact of disease. International Sanitary Conferences were convened in the middle of the nineteenth century, largely to manage outbreaks of epidemic disease. In 1902, the need for a permanent international organization to manage health led to the establishment of the International Sanitary Office of the American Republics and the International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP) in 1907. The devastation of World War II led to the recognition that these institutions lacked broad authority, universal membership, or sustainable support. As a result, the WHO was formed
However, since the early 1990s, the WHO has gradually refashioned itself from a mostly technical agency focused on disease control and epidemiology into a coordinator, strategic planner, and convener of global health initiatives. This transformation was prompted by the changing landscape of global health financing and the rise of powerful non-state actors such as the Gates Foundation, GAVI and the Global Fund. While this strategic pivot has allowed the WHO to maintain a central role in increasingly complex global health ecosystem, the WHO has become overstretched trying to lead, coordinate, advocate, and deliver services, often with insufficient resources and with limited institutional agility. In parallel, the WHO bureaucracy has grown. Slow responses and unclear communication during the West African Ebola crisis in 2014–2016 and again during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic have eroded confidence and exposed significant organizational challenges.
(cont’d on page 24)
Judd Walson
Should the U.S. Rejoin the World Health Organization? No, it is a Mismanaged Money Pit that is Resistant to Reform
by BRETT SCHAEFER
To the consternation of the international health community, President Donald Trump withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO) on the very first day of his second term. This restored his decision to withdraw from and suspend funding to the WHO in his first term. But his 2025 executive order went further, including recalling U.S. government personnel working with the WHO. The decision presents four rationales: mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, its vulnerability to inappropriate political influence, the failure to adopt reforms to focus on core priorities, and disproportionate dependence on the United States for funding.
These complaints have merits.
The COVID pandemic was the international health crisis for which the WHO was built. Instead, it failed. From the very beginning, the WHO leadership appeared more concerned with kowtowing to Beijing than acting quickly and decisively to contain the pandemic.
ing information about the virus when, in fact, they did the opposite. The WHO downplayed the possibility that COVID-19 originated from a laboratory in Wuhan while evidence increasingly supports that conclusion.
China’s actions relating to COVID were appalling and the WHO covered for Beijing.
The COVID pandemic was the international health crisis for which the WHO was built. Instead, it failed.
China’s actions relating to COVID were appalling and the WHO covered for Beijing. It was Taiwan, not China, that first alerted the WHO about potential human-to-human transmission of COVID-19, only to have WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus echo Chinese misrepresentations: “Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus.” Beijing impeded timely access by international experts into Wuhan, China, early in the pandemic. Yet, the WHO thanked China for its cooperation. WHO Director General lavishly praised China’s willingness to “immediately” share genetic sequenc-
To this day, the Chinese government has failed to disclose the most basic information about the provenance of the COVID virus, and the WHO has never formally condemned Beijing for its lack of cooperation.
On the budget, the trend is sharply upward, increasing from $2.73 billion in 2004-2005 to $6.83 billion in 2024-2025. The WHO relies heavily on voluntary contributions, and the U.S. has historically provided the lion’s share, especially voluntary contributions, to support WHO efforts on contagious disease. Meanwhile, China provided almost nothing in voluntary contributions. WHO reported donor information confirms that the U.S. remained the largest government contributor to the WHO in both assessed and voluntary contributions as of March 2025 providing 16 times more voluntary funding than Beijing.
You would think that this generosity would be reflected in WHO priorities. But complaints of multiple U.S. administrations that the WHO focused too much on health issues that pose no threat of contagion are often disregarded. Currently, the WHO claims to address nearly 200 health topics, including earth quakes, obesity, road safety, and volcanic eruptions, most of which have little connection to communicable diseases or pandemics. In a world of limited resources, these activities divert from the
(cont’d on next page)
Brett Schaefer
(Schaefer, cont’d)
core WHO mission.
Exactly how much of the budget goes to these activities is unclear, which is another problem. An article from over a decade ago noted that 61 percent of the regular budget, funded by assessed contributions, was allocated to communicable diseases compared to 91 percent of voluntary extra-budgetary funds focused on communicable diseases. More recent budgets obscure this information. The 2024-2025 budget outline lists broad categories like health emergencies or healthier populations, but even the detailed budget documents provide little specificity in 62 pages of jargon. The WHO website provides also categorizes expenditures generically. The fact that the WHO does not forthrightly provide this data undermines confidence.
And then there are persistent problems of misconduct, mismanagement, and politicization. The WHO had to create a special unit in 2021 to investigate 287 allegations of sexual misconduct by its staff. Whistleblowers allege corruption and misallocation of funds. WHO has also been a partisan in the conflict between Israel and Hamas terrorists largely ignoring repeated violations by Hamas of hospitals in the Gaza strip while simultaneously condemning Israel for demanding evacuation of civilians from health
facilities that Hamas misused to hide facilities and weapons.
In short, while the WHO provides valuable services and is uniquely placed in the international system to address health issues of global scope, the Trump administration is not wrong to express deep concern about prioritization, budgetary imbalances, vulnerability to politicization, and the need for reforms.
The real mystery is why the WHO leadership and the other member states, instead of expressing disappointment in the decision, have not proposed changes to convince the U.S. to reconsider. Trump expressed willingness when he signed the executive order: “They wanted us back so badly; so, we’ll see what happens.”
If the WHO isn’t interested in implementing changes to keep the U.S. engaged, the U.S. will pursue those goals elsewhere whether bilaterally or multilaterally inside the UN system or outside. Reducing infant and maternal mortality, immunization, bolstering health in developing nations, and detecting and preventing new pandemics are indisputable goods and the U.S. won’t abandon them even if it adjusts funding or shifts avenues to pursue them. RF
Brett D. Schaefer is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
(Walson, cont’d)
As a result, some argue that the U.S. should distance itself from the WHO and instead form alternative alliances or rely on bilateral mechanisms. But this misunderstands both the nature of global health threats and the geopolitical stakes. In the words of Earl Wilson, "Snow and adolescence are the only problems that disappear if you ignore them long enough." Walking away from the WHO will not address these challenges, it simply strengthens the hand of others. Our absence weakens U.S. influence globally and cedes critical ground to geopolitical rivals, most notably China. Rather than standing aside and allowing others to determine global health priorities, set normative guidance and develop systems for monitoring and responding to health threats that impact us and those we rely upon for trade, innovation, capital and information, the U.S. must reengage with the WHO.
Reengagement now will allow the U.S. to strategically determine whether to shape the WHO into a more effective, accountable, and efficient organization or to work with the international community to replace the WHO with a viable alternative that is better positioned to deliver on pressing global health needs. The U.S. is uniquely positioned to play a leadership role in deter-
mining how these needs are best met. Reengagement is the only means by which the U.S. can actively participate in this process. Reengagement will also signal to our allies and our rivals that America is committed to relationships that are essential, not just for health, but for economic and political security.
We may not want to engage with institutions like the WHO, but we must. Global crises demand collective solutions. While consensus-based organizations are inherently slow and bureaucratic, they remain the only sustainable path forward towards better health for all, including Americans. The future of U.S. security and economic stability depends on our willingness to lead, not walk away.
RF
Judd L. Walson, MD, MPH is the Robert E. Black Chair of the Department of International Health and a Professor of International Health, Medicine and Pediatrics at Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Walson has worked extensively to improve childhood survival, growth and development globally. He has significant experience with public health programming, policy formulation, product development and strategic planning, and has worked with multi-lateral organizations, industry partners and private foundations to inform evidence-based decisions.
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Latta & Bentz Discuss America’s Future Energy Needs
WASHINGTON, DC – In remarks on June 10th before a dinner meeting of The Ripon Society, U.S. Reps. Bob Latta (OH-05) and Cliff Bentz (OR-02) discussed the growing demand for energy in the United States and the effort they are leading to make sure American families and businesses have the energy they need to be secure and successful in the coming years.
The two Members of Congress both serve on the Energy & Commerce Committee. Latta, who has been a member of the committee for 15 years and serves as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy, opened the discussion by outlining his efforts to rebuild and fortify America’s energy grid.
generation going because when you look at the numbers out there, they’re talking about taking off a hundred gigawatts of power in the very near future at the exact same time we’re supposed to be adding on 150 gigawatts just to make it to where we’re supposed to be.”
centers, we were being told that they’d probably be using about four and a half to six percent more of the energy out there, but we’re really probably going to need up to ten percent this year alone – and, it’s not that they only have one source of power, they’ve got to have two backups – it’s a massive amount of energy that has to be produced for those centers.
“Right now, we’re leading the world. I want to make sure we keep leading the world because when we’re talking about data centers and AI, there is no second place –we have to win.”
“When we’re talking about data centers and AI, there is no second place – we have to win.”
“We’ve had multiple hearings since the beginning of this Congress. The same question I’ve asked everybody in the last four years is, ‘Do we have to have more energy in this country or less?’ And everybody has answered the same thing – we have to have more energy.
“Not only do we have to have more energy, but we also can’t be taking anything off generation right now. We have got to keep all
Bob Latta, Remarks to The Ripon Society, June 10, 2025
The Chairman then discussed the importance of tackling permitting reform as soon as possible because, “if you can get the energy up, but you can’t get where it needs to be, it is a massive issue.”
He also noted that there’s a new strain on America’s energy grid: AI data centers.
“When you look at the data
Latta then discussed the Committee’s “allof-the-above” approach to energy production.
“We’re talking about bringing Three Mile Island back online. If you said that ten years ago, we’d have been laughed at, but we need to bring these on, and also Palisades up in Michigan, to bring that back online. We’re talking about everything out there when it comes to energy. We’re not picking the winners. We’re not picking the losers. Nuclear is going to play a massive role in this.”
Bentz, who is serving his third term in Congress and first term on E&C, reflected on his time both as
a state legislator and as the Water Subcommittee Chairman on the Natural Resources Committee, and how his experience supports his current work on E&C.
“I saw the synergy that would exist between our two committees. In my background of twelve years in the Oregon legislature, I was on water all those years, but I also got on energy, because I realized that the future in many respects was going to be in that space. I realized – exactly what the Chairman just said – that we could not give away this kind of balancing power in that case.”
Later on, the pair of legislators fielded a number of questions, including one on permitting reform.
“It has got to get done because what good is it to be able to be
the number one in the world in natural gas production and be able to outproduce Russia and Saudi Arabia in oil production on any given day if we can’t move from point A to point B? We have got to get this done,” Latta answered.
“There’s no alternative,” the Ohio lawmaker continued. “Because if you always start over at zero every Congress, we’re going backwards. We’re never moving forward. We have got to get this done because we have great possibilities – what we can do out there, not only in this country, but around the world.”
The Members were also asked to share the top concerns they’re hearing from constituents back home. Latta answered first.
“They want us to get the job
done. They say they don’t want to hear it on TV. They just want to see action. They want to see something concrete into the future. And because people worry about their jobs, they worry about their children, and they want to make sure that we’re moving forward.”
Bentz, who is the sole Republican in Oregon’s congressional delegation, shared that his constituents are supportive of the Big Beautiful Bill.
“Tariffs are a great big deal in many, many spaces. For the most part, there’s a huge support for the tax bill. Huge, huge, huge. You don’t hear as much about it as you or I would like, but there’s no doubt that people believe that if we don’t get that tax bill passed, there will be a recession.” RF
