Scenario For Seeking to Break Impasse on Middle East - March 8 1971

gIs_RFr/NOp{s/sEp DEPAR'i'MHhIT OF STATE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: rl

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Melvir: R" Laird Secrctary of Defense

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The Honorable Henry A" Kissinger Assistant to the PresiCent SUBJECT: Middle East peace Settlement

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Secretary Rogers has asked me to i:rvite you to a meeting in his office tomorrow, March g, Lg1L, at 3:00 p.xl. to discuss the attached paper on a Middle East Peace settlement. please let me knor+ if this time is convenient for you This meeting wilI be preparatory to a meeting the secretary understands the presidlnt wishes-to have the following day.

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Theodore L" Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary

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Attachment:

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Scenario for 56 sse on

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There are more indicators

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favorabl.'to

" solution today than at any time since the creation of the state of r=r".1.1 The UAR and Jordan have

said'explicitly they are ready.to rnake. a peace agreement with fsrael, and the UAR has publicly offered to accept Four Power guarantees power pgaceKee q.ru and ea .ELrtII :r-s_s..eevs Four r(Jwe.f' peacekeegiinE force to make the peace agreement stj.c!<. . syria has rnore -4-

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rsraeli grie pro. quc,. rsraelf s uffiri1lLngness to conunit.iteetr to withdraw to the international border with the u,A.R.: r; a" regrettabLe as it is, reflects not only a.conviction that. a. continuing rsraeli presence in eastern sinai, and p.articriiatly at sharm aI-shaykh, is essential for.rsraeli securityr.uut also a deep concern that a concessi.on rr"r; wlrl then read to ott br '.

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concessionsonthe.}ordaniansidea1ongthell.nesofour.I9.69 pI.anandposeib1yonthe8yr1ansideaswe11.Thgrsrae1t.

I nepartment. = The Israelis wil1 H, acommit themselves $trnd 9r

in our juilgmen! concede pieceineal to withdrawal to the Lnternationdr uo'ider ' i. not,

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EbetweenEgyptandIgrae1lntheabsenbeof.someunderstand14g: E rith the u"s" on the rest of the package and trl ---- --:on what wtt(l.. t4"y . .vs crrr(r --ean expect from the u.s. in return. l{e have spelled out the . rest of the package in most, but. not alr respects in our 196.9

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plan. The rsraelis do not agree withlth" pla.nl but in.oor. , ' ,, Judgment. a maJor effsrt should be made now, whtlo favorablg . .

area lndlcatora provlde the opportunltyr to get the rEraells to accept, that plan wittr certaln augrnentations and coroirary .

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lnducements.

rtre gbJect rould be to get the rsraelL Gorrr*rrunen!

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to the rsraeri cabinet. and to the country.ag.a package 'rto brLng peace and aesure Israel r-s securLty irith ' . .. the backing of its best friend, the United States.,' Even if i : Israel should prove v unwilling u..w-&-rr.Y to ulJ Lrrrrllri r-v come to .: LL, ctlt an understanding ullqgrsE,anolng. i :l .': = ',? 'e with us aiong the rines lines d.escribed, such a quiet dialocrue ,.-. dialogue :E between us might have the benefit of f,orcing more concret6" '..=A .:: .Hdecisionsonthepartofthersrae1iGovernmentandof ,.2 '.'3 beoinning a process of reappraisar within w4Hr4ll rsraer. The " rDi-: : e rsraeli people have not comprehended the errE r'eaL pryrrtr-IteCtlllitr.. &Eq! significance. .? ::& ,;-_E,tU.A.R.wi11ingnesstomakeaPeaceagreement..: be presented

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draft teLegrarn to the field sets forth :-1 wvsr make to the i -r [n detail the e].ements of an approach we would Z a

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tsraeli Government in arll.alL out ef,fort to obtain a funda-

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r^--^t r- policy shift in rsraelts Israelts -^a!--on the tdrritoriaL aspects. aspects .1 P.c - -^LLr ----.EE$trasettlement.Thisapproachconsibtsof,spe115.ngout -55:B ;!r.

1 ['or rsrael with greater specificity than heretofore: (r) the t iS,-'-,i 'i ositions on which we would support Israel in the Jarfing .

6 .' negoti.ations with respect to border changes u guarantee.s r.

"3 "ol '-t demilj.tari.zed zones and peacekeeping forces; and (2) (z) the : . ; i& a' or^! r -L^---r ^c bilateraL kinds of assurances and undertakings we would 3kindsofbi1atera].assurancesandundertakingswewould 3 Eenterint,oagev1denceofsupportofIsrae].lssecurJ.t1za{ld ' 'n - cr :?ourcommitmenttothedurabi1ityofasettlementinwtrich :?ourcommitmenttothedurabi1ityofasettlementinwtrich :+i :+l Israel would trade the tanglble securi.ty i.t deri.rres fqom. . ., = 'onentdl ohifr-

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the occupatLon of Arab territories for l.ntangfble Arab- '. .

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pledges and lnternatLonal guarantees. 6d'p8."" rna

belligerency.

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The approach we envisage

relies.largely on u.s. inducements to rsraer, but it is predicated on assumption that we must be prepared, to make clear to what we feel our o$rn r.nterests require from.rsrael in for these inducements, including the further niaterlal support rsrael seeks ln the arms and. financial fields"r ..., Bhere are many risks in this course r there could. bell. . ,o a prolonged period of xsraeLi. resistance and publ-ic $ criticism of the Administration, durlng wliich there wouLd .

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a constant danger of rsraeli'provocatLon that could:.' ,.' $tB------.'' t cause the u.A.R. to retreat from its prese-nt forthcoming ,,.; o = position and read to renewed hostilities.

Even if rsragl a c $rnade the concessions we wourd askn there would be no .,i.. = Slertainty that, the Arabs woui.d in the end swarrow the ."',,,

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',: leraeli poseLtion ne would sepport=-â&#x201A;Źrgrp no ...: ., significant demilltarized zones ora rsraeLss s{de of t}rei.' borders, and a continued reraeri. posttion,i.n a,united '

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JerusaLern" Bef,ore docldJ"ng on our course

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wâ&#x201A;Ź need the best and most, consr.dered JudEnent,:. 1..,' avallable and would in the first l.netirnce, among ottrEr , '. . .',

things, want to consurt our chiefs of counttl,eg concerned.

SECRETAIODIS,/CEDAR

Mr"esr.on

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not to go ahead on the basis outrined in-" the enclosed draft, while we may be able to keep the eeaEel fire and oarrlng tarks going for a few nore webks r srâ&#x201A;Źlwould. anticipate thei:eartry termlnation of both to be followed uy. increasing dipromatic isoration of the u.s. with rsraet t . growl'ng hosttllty to the u.s. ln the Arab world, radLcal ,"' we decide

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Arab pressure on moderate Arab 'regimes r ard probably arrot*riir round of hostllities af,ter whlch we would be faced onge ',' j.. i.

-again with the task of trying to pick up the pleces arid !a revive efforts for a pol-itical settrement.

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we decide

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to go ahead on the scenario outrined liergl need to make a massive effort to orchestrate our...".'

8'approach to rsraer vLs-a-vis the sovi'et unr.on, u.g. putir-c. o-

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"-.t will'r i i-^ be important,s --- as we press the rsraer.is.to < nodify their posJ.ti-on, that we make it, unmistakably ci.bar to' the soviet [Inion that none of this i.s intended to weaken rsraelrs securLty,of that this gives the soviets an . opportunity to push the parametere of brinkmanship. we wil} have to make it very clear to the soviet union that.. we wiLl not, be. put in the posltion of'. baing pushed, uy trrenr: to push the rsrielis and that our wLllingness to encourage., the rsraeLig will not remain unaffected by acttons of .thLs :.'

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that rsraer may begin prepaqat{oh of a pubric relatLons campalgn in thls country. l$e atreadi r'' l see these rsraeli rsraeli themes: the u.s. is i's trying trvina L& J 4.r)' ootL us rro r., get g(, to uv YE , trt, to ,'.5.:_ 'iio-a' aqree rsraeli withdrawal --J- -- to total *v-qe*r w& urr\rrcrwdJ. to I-(, the pre-June llnes Ene Pfg-dune lines;i th they .o o.c are trying to convince the Amerj_can peopJ.e we are trying to '. ; ,.= do the same as l9s7; that we are t,rying ,,d ".'=6 elJrrry get them to utJ .gsL EIteIIl E0 to .w1tn_ with_ draw before they get, a full peace agreement. rn the fiqst I: - ----.' '..a i-nstance r nâ&#x201A;Ź should go to the rsraelis promptry and urge ,:: i' thiit ,. { -i G '; ii )ur dif ferences be sorted out in private v"srtl channels and .that the ': !

Z '.=cE 3'.) tubLic aspects be minimiaed or at tr-east kep in proporiiorl,.

6 v o -,. Er - , tf past experience is indicative, we are unlikely to qonvLnce '6= 4 :' B F \:ne rsraelis to adopt such s+vs a restrained publlc relations '.'

There are signs

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as many way8

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^--^: i9rspossib1etoeitheravoj.dortoame1ioratethepub1ic:.] . B .{ onfrontation aspect between rsraeL and the united states

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if the *ve Israelis se*4p step e usl/ up ul, thei.r Lrrg&I _.campaign, we are likely to find that We too wiLl have to j pursue a major public reLations approach. Therefore, on an. n

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ursent basis we are prepari.ng a paper which wir.r single out,. verv simply the principal rsraeli themes that we can expecb

over the coming weeks and equarry simple responses on our part. The set of themes that we develop.wlrl have to be.

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Congressional Aspects

i detaired strategy for making clear our views with key members of congress. ?{e can expect a substantial campaLgn, but we are in a verr good.., position to demonstrate that our appfoach Ie ful1y protegtive of rsrael r s securl.ty interests. !{e have one thLng going for There should be developed

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tn publtc relat{ons terms and wlth the Congress wl[ich can be exploited to the maxLmumr I{trlle the American p.eopre. ue both

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have great sympathy

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in this country amon$ all strata of society: $*'.ttheMiddI.eEastcandet,eriorate.insuchawaythatiL',4 8r could bring the united states into a very much unwanted war.. .xl 'Gt + ot o ! ro ure exteni, which it appears ro the American people that, it '(l a otrsrael,rg Lntransigence r.n seeking'territoriar concessirrir, 4 it" a $[espite 6ur stronE bilatera]. undertakdngs to its es! securi.ty.r,:. t\) I

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bring us'Lnto an undesirable'and unwanted confrontatLonr. € irr.". will be tremendous slmpat!ry on poth El.des of the. arere 1:hat

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March I

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DRAFT TETEGRAM

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rrvrrvNs ACTIONT AmernDassy Amembassy IEL TEL AVIV AVIV IMMEDIATE TMMEDIATE

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CAIR0 AMEMBASSY BEIRIII USINT

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' rsrael and in Four power cont,extr wâ&#x201A;Ź have taken steps to deal ,rith ' : 'i'mmediate probJ'em of (ai keeping .uen reaction to unsatJ.efactory. rsraeli response to JarrLng Jarring within manageabLe manaqeabl-e b.rrr,,lo bounds,^ I :."t""tt (b) ext,ending cease-fires and (c) preserving ,Jarring negoti-at,ions. trmmediate ainr of these steps i.s to win :

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undeiway .--1 with uAR,

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conti.nue us-Goi di.alogue designed to .. : obtain posit,ive IsraeLj. Eesponse t've&LrvEi ri,rcte.la response .to to tyarfinEts JarrinErs fofmr.lLatiofr. formr.llatiorr. . on questj.on -..^-ar^- of withdrawar and f,inar. border as i.t.

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in effect asking rsraeL to take. step which we see as prpgmalrc qurd ggg in clasgr.c :. . -

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reiates to UAR-Israel settlement.

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we are

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2 of TEL to TEL AVIV

negotiatlng gLve-and-take without prejudice to itg .' ... j 'positlon on other l.ssues Ln context uAR-rsrael settlementl

or on other ti.e., .rordanian and Syrian) aspects ofj ..' settlement. rsraelp howevery seea this lucve not only

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of securLty threat, it feels would arise if it ; ''i' withdraws from all of sinai but also as compromLse.of :. basic principle Ln its negotiating posltion acrosF the. board, wlth lmmediate implicatiene for other aspecti pr overaLl Arab-Israetl settlement.- i.B.r in abandonmeilt'. of its concept of seeking to use Lts oecupation oi erab terrLtory as x.ever to, obtaLn territorLal concessiine in .l strateglc. areas, ae part of, i f,lnal peace settlereqti Arabs undoubtedly see tlrle Lesue in same Llgtrt" terms

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concession ilarring is seekina vis-a-vJn nlp sL iayaanr-{a-;

to its overall posltlon of prLneiple. gle have therefori.i conc}uded that only approach,with ghance of succeeaing ,. is to deal wtth thls Lssue on level. of fundamental dtfference in principtre between USG and GOI. Thls wt1l involve putting; to rsrael a totar posLtLon desLgned to bring about basic,:

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state of the world message?

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by sperlinE out

posi-tions on sharm er-sher.kh, demrr.itarr.zed zones, ind e'aza. 'r. which were Lef t open or v- ..vt.rrEr.t&trrrE\A not ment,ioned &ll in E{lQgâ&#x201A;Ź: t,hose qogumgnt$;.

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rn our view, only such an effort has a shance of brj.nqin&. inging. rsraeli poJ.lcy. f,ramework sufflcienttry Lnto LLne wi.th our' S a I c,

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owntom1kesett1e!nentwegeekposslb!,eand,l.nf1rst i.nstance, to get over Lmmediate truid:.e on wlthdrawal' and;

borders in UAR-fsraelL negottatj.one;

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of aecomprishlng thi.er wâ&#x201A;Ź need qr. make an offer to Gor whrch wilr confront r.t wrth tota}, pJ.cture of cholcee i.t f,aces and u.s" a'surances tt Lan 'i e:rpect, and to wtrleh i.t canrlot arrotd respondlng. ei we see lt, flrs. tGlr wourd r.n these circumstancea have to To have any chance

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elther(a}seekto1eadherparty,governmentandpourrq opinlon to adjust to new framework ior approactr to .hr'ab;: rsrael settlement whtch dld not REPEAT not lnyolve 'seektng ,

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substantl.a1terrltorlalacqulsitlon;or(b}seekto...

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mobillze rsraelL and u.sn domestic opposltlon to

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whlchwedefer,however,toAmbassadorBarbour'gJud9meag,j,

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(b). fn either event, . , T however, such an overaLL approach on our part would'. hopefully, 3 oC. o 8- set in motion the kind of reappraisal in rsraelo perhaps.

-''-; i !'eadinE to political " real.ignment,s o which we have i.ncreaslng.ly l 9 , felt may be necessary before cor can be brought to rLsk : the compromises that peaee ; wtlL w4rr entaiL srlLql& rvsvs P Ej is that she would

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s.," ; ,5" To set thls scenari-o in rnotion, secretary 3

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€ i-n Ambassador Rabin to make present,ation aJ.ong l_ines or . .' o- | , ---.lara 5" A - K beLow. Ambassador Barbour wouLd foltowl up o oo '.. o with parallel presentatl.on to Eban. we thtnk lt pref,erable,. o ol:-' '. ' ' not to engage pM or presLdent directry at flrst stage, tn oordertogiveGo3tlmeforeonsideredref1eqt1oirbefoie o reactinE to us. gefore lnitlatlng thts maJor effort. :

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wlth '@r o we need your

comments and counsel on

procedure and subst,ance.

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Secretary and, preel.dent.

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you feel consultatlon $ash{figton

desirable before launchl,ng t*rls effortr s€ are prep€irqd' ; brlng you to rlashlngton lnunedtatety i9r _11rfll,:l

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6. Followlng are erements of apprbaeh we envr.sJge, stated ln form of tentatlve talklni polnts r A. peacemakLng process has reached crrtrcal moment, and there i,srspeculation of crlsis in us-rgrael{ rerations beglnnlng to appear in reirael and here.

Bn For both rsraelrs and our'own i.nterestg, we 'It ls Lmportant to have frank and open dLscusslon of .

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situatLon before rumors which are beglnning to sprdad poison the atmosphere of our relations. c. president Nlxon and l{rs, rrbir have burlt

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relationship of mutrrar trust, whi.ch is soundry base.d on.

PresLdentf s commltrne.nt to rsraelrs .survLval and on it..' , .' .

rirn determr.na*.on rhey "n.'" ;" ;;;";-;-;;; ";"ngr.on of Soviet lnfluence Ln the Mlddle East. . .: D. we both know that, drfferences have developed . .. between'us. &et us face. them frankry.before they grrorr, to polnt wh'ere they distort and ovebshadow great arba ofj common Lnterest and values we shaned .,, ,':.

E" After

t une Lg6?

war, us

flrm conunitment to go arl the way wlth Israel to achleye peEce wl.th ttq Ara,b nelghborr. !{a snld thon, and aay todayr wo wlll not be'I party to a ueturn to no-pei6â&#x201A;Źr no-wir.annlstlce sLtuatlon of pre-orme 5, 196? perrod. As prree for return qf.: ..;ii

,

:

madre

r r

lili I

jl

.,6

SEcRET/NOprS/eEpAR

occupLed

terrltory, rsraelts nelghbors

mu.st recognl.zej'

'

rsrael r s sovereignty and rsraer r s borders, and cornrnitl,'. "' ' themselves to rsrael to il.ve l.n peace wlth lt aa " "nt egual and sovereLgn state. presi.dent Nlxon remains

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tt

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, to thls goal. . ,,' F. rn 1969, thls AdmlnlstratLon made two funaament'al

eornmitted

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'

rsrael and lts Arab neighbora ls as essential to our intbregts as to rsraelrs.', the search for peace requir"" lth. expenditure of . .' resources,, u"s and of v! u.s. v'p. poritichr. capr.tal In rn the Ene Hvrru.r.recll recTPJ.E,â&#x201A;ŹlI Peaee between

Arab world, but the stakes are so high that eueh,

;

,

expenditure ls fully warranted.. we have invested heaviJ-y in this search for two years " Vtta1 Amerylcan .

interests are lnvolvedo (b) peace wirr not REPEAT not be possible on

:

:

:

ithebasi.s.of,anysubstanti.a].changbsinthe:

i o_-_ o'.6

+ o ,a = ' 8-

geographlcaL map of the area as j.t existed frorn L949 to 1967. We have resLsted and wl}l contj-nr.le-

to resist a totar retuqlr t,o thdt ffiap, because of the need to resorve tn a flnal settlement such"

:

r

.'.. . , '

':..

mattersagthegtatusof."7erusa1.em,thestatus'of aza, and

.the

anomaLLes

ln the l{est Bank armfsd,fde ll tt

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sEenEq/NqDIs/cEDAR

to pre-June 5f

,,

196? srtuatron.would reave etrementei

{ a

that other than r.nsubstantral lchanges wourd u"l ;' . : accepted by present or any future Arab eovernrnintr..

This has been our posLtlon since Lg67, -.rra or :

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we have 10ng had doubts that, uAR was

i'

preaard

:

move from armLstice and

belllgereney to peace and. co-exLstence" and that anytother Arab stater rncrud{ng,, 'rordan, could so lr*rve untrl uAR drd., we have never trubte'd.

.;

:n , . , Mlddle Easit. '.' ;' : - now thirrk that uAR has gLven sufflcLent earnest of itg -. .' , intentions to be serLously tested; we belLeve further.tttit .... ,: .. while sovLets wlrl not press carro to conpromi.ser I ndrthdf will lt seek to obstruet a settrement. rt wrrr r.rg"ryrl,..

a-

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at that tlme.-'l : . -l that thls was aleo Israelrs pogltion"

sovLet professLone

of desLre for peaee in

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defertotheUARonthBmatterat,tir."Junctureand.l.n;.i:.

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Ho t{6 &16 flrmly oonv{need, as we have been front : begLnnlng, that Arab s{de can only be truly tested ln . . .: :. ,v

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rt rs not asked to make subgtantr"i;,

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terrltoria1concegsl.on$iwhere,lnotherwords,lt.*"..'. ,:, asked instead to offer conunr.tments-to accept rsraer ag.

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a soverer.gn state wrthln substantlally the borders of,' j,., ' : '-.

1949-67, and to accept guarantees that wtrl qlace a..: .,. -' r' '. meaningful bars on rts abrlt,ty to renounee or vrolate ,

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those comrnLtments.

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of.ThislstheconceptunderJ.yi.ngtheposi.tions o*J 4r.V urrE P(JSJ. EJ.ons ?

-,tr ? z set forth in the u.s. proposals of october and Decernuer.,

li in the Presidentrs state of the world message ' ' . ,, $- $ t . ' and we now ask that xsrael accept those propos_als arrd. ..'

AE i , ?r ==

7, 9a

.

L969' and

= I =

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the eraboratr.ons eet forth berow ae e new po!.icy ba.se for negotLatlng under $arrrng the tbrms. of a fr.natr . ".

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we recognize the fundamental policy chanEes : ''' -lw}rich$reareaskingIsrae1toaccept.Wereco9nizethe *e'qsJ' LLt ct(;( "-"" 7 '. . .

- serious- security concerns that such a policy ehange ralses..

E 3 To meet these concernsr wâ&#x201A;Ź are prepared g to conunit ourselveg

1

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to the following assurances to Isradlt ..j (r) As neEotiations between rsraer and tiie ',.; g ,: stateE progressr wQ wour.d support, foll0wlng I .Arab =4 poaLtlona on speci.fi.c elemenrs 1 ; ia (a] -@. ; we beLieve aI1 [ ? oo

.

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Israeli presence at Sharm el_Sheikh wilL be unacceptable to the U"A.R.

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or-r^under any eonditj.ores and, if insj.sted upon, wi.J.l roake peace unattaj,n"bXq" ; .'., '. hle har.iol,^- r-u-s +----, r r,E ,: ' _ ,,v pe**svE bel"ieve" ", tfin rJrdr; Jlrrrae-L ttrat Israelrs Secul.ity

=.curiity

, fu1j.y met by American nuilitary par_ ticipation i.n..a UN presence ther.

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.

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are prepared to agree to the j-n_ , clus j.on of a U"S. contingent iq a UIV force stationed at sharnr e'-she'ktrr ind We

.

to lnsi.st forcer

that, .termination

BS wetr L .as

of

that,

of the verLfi.i.ati,on '.t.

' procedures on demLlLtarl.zed zones and {ts terminationr .should be barred

a specLfic period .(e.E.r f,Lve y.e.ar6i_'

, sBcREr/iloprs,/cEDAR

;,

L.

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sEpFErlNoPrs/bEpAR :

and subject thereafter

to ttre

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-r of the Security Council" Furtherr w€ would not excrude usingr our veto to prevent such termination. ! approvaL

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to LrJ sorrle come Eo grils themselves in to grlps in'.'the .the ,, ,.]arring talks with the probtemsi of " security arrangements and DMZs. r{gL --

.

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wor.rld make known

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our view t\.t no reasonable.

option shouLd be excluded from:di.scussiorrul by the parties,. incJ.uding: (a) pro_

.

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.

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of Sinaii and (b) includion of tsraeti : : and U.A.R. representatives e_ es under sa\a\=.L a UN. Cl, UtI

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of demiLitarization. lfe thtnlc ..ttrat, , SECRETAIODIS,/CEDAR :

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that in light of rsraeli agreement_.to accept the former international frontier: frontier -- .--' aa the final border between rsrael .and the U.A.R. u.A.rl.,p the ure parties shourd should be givere

a

c.

E o' iio

I

makg known to mar(e to t-ha Ir-A p -T=rr{.-.Ure U.A.R.' ,larring and --r 1.1 the Err€] otrl€E othbr three thrge powers our our strontr u.ir:r.r strong vj.ew

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We.will

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SEcRET/NOprs/cEpAR

from le""on"l of, the past and wigl,. =. ,'i .o '6

modern technblogy

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guards against

:

plus built_in safe_

,

unilateral termlnati-gnr.:

,;

viable' and effective

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be devised which would engage pajor poi.r" and at same time avoid placing..for".s

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forces inter alia) on Israelo s borders..

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could l.

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UN mechanism

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: support an overall UN peacekeeping

,

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.anracan*^J .l: ,rpotrersrepreseirted j.n ttreheadquarters, but with observer units on the ground .: i' 'l . along ttre UAR-rsraeli border j.irnj.ted : ,

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wor.lld support,. one

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of ilre foJ.J.owing

two

IsraeL wouLd ap&qsr wrirrtrrtr crtj{Je[rT; iccept aa smal.J. smal.l der1l.Lj..t, demi.Li.tarj.zed

- buff,er and the presence of

Uf,,tr

observers

gypt accepts t0taL or armost total demj.i.itarization of . the Sinaii or (b) tf Egypt is wtlllpg to .

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.

acCept only a .more Ltnrtted are6i.

of

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JECRET/NOprs/cEpAR

.,,

demilitarLzation on its side of the borderr. not press rsrael to accept demilitarlzatlon

we.

ort

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-[rre

would suppor.t an

rsraeli voi'ce in dei mining ttre finar disposition of Gaza, wtriehj at a minimum wourd bar rts return to uAR contror.,ana introduction of any Arab military or para-mirita forces Ln ttre Gaaa area and be superviged by a. i force made up of smalt. porrers. lfe would f&vor. danian acquisition of Gaza, but would not, exciud interim UN admlnistration if ttrls proves feaeib in negotiations between rsraer and ilordan.

I

(o

.'I -6

Gaza?

of navigation. we woura suppoit tti.b 'ab rlght of Israel, on parity.wtttr other natione, freedom of navigation through the suez'.canar and the Straits of Tiran. (e) Refpgees.. t{e wourd support a sorutionlof ttre ' .-"i refugee problenr along ttre lines of our.Decembet ' i969 paper aliowing for the return of refugees' rsrael only in such numbers and at such.ratiis.as satisfactory to it. ,we wourd gd.ve furl e'uppo't to an understandlng that rsraer would bt expected to (d)

Freedom

accept no more than 1001000 refugees a4d this.on condltLon ttrat each ref,ugee wourd be reiutred;to

eomi.t hlnse}f to live

Ln .t

-.i,q-,;

EECRETAIODIS,/CEDAR.

IL

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SEcFET/NODrs/cEDAR

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!{egt Bqnh.' We. believe prlnctple of, : I'Lnsubstantlal alteratlonsr should.:b6

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accouni considerations of local,. .'

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:.:,,. security and of adml.nLstratlve and ,I ii' ,,. economLc convelrieflcâ&#x201A;Ź. Such altQrations

,: , should, however, be based on L949 '':.::, armLstLce llne.and coutrd not encompds.s r ,. retentlon of Israell posttLons on

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ktver.

.We

belLeve entl.re

Weet'

:

Bank should be .demLlLtarized. We also

belleve that partles should be given . reasonabX.e opportunity to work gut .: security arrangements for verifyl,ng

J

.

.

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o

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demllLtalcLzatLon and controJ.Ling fedayeen

actlvltles on West Bank whlch

would be based essenti.ally on Jbtnt, partlei.patLon of fsraeL and .Tordan, perhaps under some klnd of [tH orrrUo.Lta. .

o a a

o

.

We be!.i.eve dlordan

{s more apt tb

joint arranEements wlth than Egypt on {ts terltory, constder

Altprnati.velyr

wâ&#x201A;Ź trould support.

I

f,orge eonslstLng

US

of small pa*er:' 1i'

IsraeL

.t

SEERET,/NODIS/CEDAR

L4

representatlves $rlth same guarariteesl '' r agalnst termlnatlon ag Ln case of UAR border and Sharm el-Sheikh,

a @

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(gl ,]erusalem.

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We .support prlnclples .' , .. unlted clty and of free access to

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wlthln cLty. We be}iev& need ls for admlnistratLve arrangements..: tthlch w111 leave rgrael ln positton l movement

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role ln the admlnlstretlOn and economy of ifrat part of clty

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formerly control}ed by i.t" (h)

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'Golan Helqhts," .We would contl.nue to., maLntaln posltt6n that there j.s no

'1 ,

basis for taklng up questJ"on of Syrlan- t Israeli. settlement in absence of 'gvrLa*, ,

, t,

of Resolut{on Z4Z, If

acceptance

Israella press do know what our posllton would be should.syrla accept Resolutlon 2Q2t become party to.'rTarrlng negotlatdosrs. ana. .

conunlt $.tself as UAR and ilord.o i.i"*r* tj j done to enter Eleice agreement w{th . j XsraelT wâ&#x201A;Ź would. telt then we would ' ' support prlnclple that. !n neVott3tton3'. : t,

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alteratlon of Syrian-fsraeli boundary to assure Israel permanent poeltlon,. on GoLan Helghts e .

J' o q

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(r) Negotiatlng procedures.

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We would

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negotlatlons to Forelgn Mlnlster level .,, 1. ,, , . would urge JarrLng to take thls .stef; .,,] I : and Arabs to accept tt I and wouXd . ' ,, ."1 urge Jarring and Arabs to move to ..

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dlrect form of negotlattone. at'

.

an early date.

(2)

that any,settlernent would and vulnerabLe to po!.lticaj" changes Ln

Becogrnlzlng

be fragLJ.e

Arab world, we would enter blLdteraL.arranEemente

w{th ferael ps follows;

&I Long-terrn arrangernents to aatisfy.

IsraeS.i arms requi.rements under ,.rraooor. , ' ' fLnanciaL terms, within the r^rithi errs context, vvrt LgrA l. (l& of' any area arms Llmltatlon aEreements tp whlch IsraeL and "Lts Arab neighboiro

nlght,subscrLbe. Speclfically, f; would (a) bonqlude contracts for .

dellvery, beglpnlng ln .}uly 1971, , of, the F-4 and A-{ aLrtraft fsraei ..

'.

,

:,

,

SECRET,/NODIS/CEDAR

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o

has requestedr

o 3 o

mllIlon tn mllLtary sales credlte

@

on concessional terms ln Fy ?l2 p'; and (c) provide $S00 mllllon ln'

,) o (! ()

o

{

credlts and grants ln Fy 73.

Further unilateral U"So decLaratlons in support of IsraeLrs securltyr' lncludlng both executj.ve and :

@

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&) provlde $SOO

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congresBLonaL' deeLaratLons .

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sf bilateral defense.' consultattons, agaLnst contingency that peaee settlement threatened to break down and fsraelL security threatened. Speclftcaltry, aEree to FormalizatLon

,

forrnalLze consuLtatLon arrangements , : i.n two $tays, (t) forrnalized commitment.i and arnangement,s (by exchange

of .lettgo=':

between Presj.dent and prLme MLnlster)

to consglt on possLble Jolnt, or paralletr .: actLon to be t-aken ln the event fsratell.j eecurlty Ls ;feopardlzedl and (Zli fornaf consultatlon affangement between our..

i

I

mllltary representatlveC for fullect': I

.t

.i, poeslble exchange of ,LntellLgence r' LnformatLon on a contLnu{ng baet". , i

SEC,BET^{ODrS,/CEDAR

-'

-l

o-

o o

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR

L7

o

(d,

o o

,o -

MaJor U.S.

financlal contrlbutlon

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' to conversLon of the fsraell econbmy. ":'',,to peacetlme rines ;; ;;;;l ,:

.)

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ii> !o ^(, ,9c = ir; 't=lu

lnter alLaI an Lncrease in PIJ 480 contrlbutLons and a substantial comrnltment tb trsrael to begln desalLnL.zatlon proJecto : .'', (3) Flnallyr wâ&#x201A;Ź would undertatce dlplomat{c

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development schemeg. Bhese would. . lnclude,

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wv (r(D tJF

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'exchangeswlththeSovletst,oseekanunddrstandlng., that a f,lnatr Arab-rsrael settlement wourd be pararriled by a us-sovlet agreement not to base operatlonal ,,.., combat forces of elther maJor power on the terrltory,, ,, of reraer or any neLghborlng Arab country. rhls i.

would requLre

:,

Th{e would

':

that $ovlet aLr and ground operationaL ,..:,

not, however, be a preeondltLon to

a

settlement along the absve lln'es.

l1

K.

The blLateraL agsurances

a maJor and far-reachlng tJ.S. rlttr and share ttre r'tsfa of a "l ,.I

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t

.!

..II

a

r

sE9RETINOpIs -pAR

rsraelL withdrawarl with insubstantlal exceptlons in territorial tgrmsr from terrltoriei occupJ.ed in r967,

polttlcal-legal context of such a settlement, honeveri would represent a substantlal advance over that exietlngl in 1967. xsraalts soverelgnty and.tts borders would for the flrst tLme be recognLzed by Lts neLghbors Ln eontractual. ,:.: form. The settrement would be unden*itten and guarantded by the international comnuni.ty. 'And it wourd be underwrLtten by the unLted states whlch r Bn tangl.ble evl.dence . ' of lts undertaklng, wourd physicalry conunit AmerLcan personnel to peacekeeplng forees on the ground and would . enter a serles of blrateral politlcal, milltary and economto: arrangements wi.th rsrael. outr wJ.llingnegs to enter these arrangemente and assume these under.takinEs ia dependent, .: solely on rsraelts wiLllngness to accept the u.s. posltiorie. aB set forth Ln our docunents of, october and Decernber, 19Gg' , The

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and the President0e ,St,ate oâ&#x201A;Ź the Worl.d message and _

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DECLASSIFIED

oeett nas r''""n una nu. ?szo and order 13526 pursuant to Executive reviewed been This document has

J"t"ttined '

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SEENETflTODIS/CEDAN

to be declassified'

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