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STAIES ).]FORJ,,AI ON
AGENCY
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Assistant to tle President lor Nalional Security Affairs Proposal lor NSC Reriev of U.S. Policy Toward JapD
I believ€ aother NSC reviev ol ourpoticy would b€ highly desirabre ar this rime.
tovald Jap
NSDM 13 ol May 23r 1969 sei lorth a pra.iicat formula tor our Jalan policy, rerying mainly on tne 6mootn execution of existi,g policies. Thar fornula ed ihe psy.hological benetits froft the Okinawa reversion decirion delused the videty aricipated "1969 crigis'in U.S. -JalaD rerations. In recent months, hov€ver, tllere hawe been indications of increaEins stEins in the relarions]1ip as the Japmese move tovard grearer independe,ce ad note $ftL corcern directions ad Deasures being urSed in the u,s. vnictr do ,ol co.ve.ge sitn th€ir oM irterests. As a re.ult, estabrished u,s. policies could dlift our ot alienftenr $i!h tne realiti€s ot
Jap 's changins situation.
In lhe economic and porifi.al areas I believe rhere are sev.ral indications of these problems, ln rne psy.hotogical area of our relationship, I note that public opinion surveys and ments of JapaD€se attitudes have iended ro co.firm or t]1ese st!ains. TheBe dev€ropeents appear to be particula!}y loused intcnse reerinas whi.h could unsetde Iroad areas of ou. retationship, some influential figlres in Japan a.e disturbed by their perception of appricarions of rhe Nixon Doctrine, and ureir leerines ale retlected in press and otner Dedia
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