command and control functions over the SAM units and also often integrates the SAM battery into the broader structures of an air defence system.130 Iran’s Final Report indicated that the SAM operator was required to contact a Coordination Center (also referred to as a “Command Center”) to verify targets and receive approval to fire. However, Iran has provided insufficient information that would allow the Forensic Team to conclude definitively if the SA-15 unit that downed Flight PS752 was part of a larger SAM battery. Iran also provided no information to indicate whether the Coordination Center was a battery command post, to identify its specific location, or to detail its role or position within the IRGC’s air defence command structure. Given this lack of clear explanations by Iran, the Forensic Team applies the term “SAM unit’s immediate C2” when analyzing IRGC command and control functions. This immediate C2 would be one level up the chain of command from the SAM unit and its operator. Military experts consulted by the Forensic Team indicated that the SAM unit’s immediate C2 would have been responsible for overseeing the SAM unit, including any actions by the operator, and would have been integrated into the IRGC’s air defence structure to ensure situational awareness. Iran’s Final Report pointed to actions by the SAM operator as the primary cause of the Flight PS752 shoot-down. It claimed an unanticipated chain of events resulted in the SAM operator firing missiles at Flight PS752. It identified errors related to alignment of the SAM unit, defective communication with the Coordination Center, misidentification of Flight PS752 as a threat, and a failure to follow military procedures by firing at Flight PS752 without approval.131 The Forensic Team assessed these claims and determined that they provide an incomplete explanation of events. Iran has failed to provide information to convincingly explain how and why each of the alleged errors occurred. Importantly, Iran provided no information that would establish the specific steps the SAM operator did or did not take to determine whether Flight PS752 was a civilian aircraft or a threat. Iran’s Final Report also did not recognize the relevance of command and control functions to the operator’s purported errors or provide any information on the quality of training or supervision. Despite the significance of these factors as an immediate cause of the shoot-down and an essential element to resolve in preventing similar events in the future, Iran considered them to be out of scope in its Final Report and has presented no information on military actions aside from that of the SAM operator. The Forensic Team identified credible information related to actions taken by the IRGC SAM operator and his command which are outlined in the next section (Command and Control Failures).
Operator Action # 1 – Misalignment An air defence Transporter, Launcher and Radar such as the SA-15, when in good condition and used properly, should allow the operator to make a distinction between a cruise missile and a large civilian aircraft. The capabilities of individual air defence units are enhanced by integration and regular information exchanges with command and control (C2), as the defence network as a whole would likely have extensive situational awareness. Missile system experts consulted by the Forensic Team indicated that it was conceivable for the operator to introduce a 105-degree misalignment. However, they further indicated that militaries as advanced as Iran’s
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