OTHER CLAIMS

Other Claims

The Forensic Team also analyzed Iran’s claims that “the last communication between the second missile and the defence system was recorded in a place close to the aircraft route” and the SA-15 system showed “a message indicating that the second missile strike had failed and the aircraft cleared radar lock-on after some time.”145 Iran’s Final Report also stated that investigators were unable to come to a conclusion regarding the detonation and effect of the second missile due to the uncertainty of information and analysis.146 Missile system experts advised the Forensic Team that once the missile was in flight, the operator likely could have prevented it from hitting the target by discontinuing the radar guidance at any point up until the intercept. The Forensic Team’s analysis and statements from Iran suggest that this did not occur. The Forensic Team’s analysis of available video of the shoot-down indicates that the second missile does appear to have detonated. Although it is not clear how this detonation would have occurred, missile system experts suggest that it is possible the missile continued on an unguided trajectory and the proximity fuse arm signal was already sent or the missile impacted the aircraft and detonated. The extent of damage caused by the second missile could not be determined.

Knowledge of the SA-15 unit suggests that a three- or four-person crew is generally required to operate the system and includes a vehicle commander, system operator, and vehicle driver.147 The Iranian Final Report focuses exclusively on SAM operator actions but fails to cover the role of other crew members or how they influenced the chain of events. Why did no other IRGC personnel, either within the unit or at the next level of command, identify the misalignment or ensure that standard procedures were followed when identifying the target as hostile and firing without receiving approval? This raises questions about the responsibility and proficiency of the SAM unit crew in addition to the operator. The Forensic Team was unable to confirm whether or not these issues were an isolated occurrence or indicative of a more systemic problem within Iran’s air defence forces. Unfortunately, these are some of the key remaining questions that only Iran can answer.

Military officials within elements of the IRGC – including senior officers – almost certainly knew immediately that Iran was responsible for firing the missiles that brought down Flight PS752. It is unknown, however, who among civilian officials and senior leadership was aware of this fact, as well as when and how the information was managed. The Forensic Team cannot confirm media reports claiming that President Rouhani himself was informed only two days later (on January 10, 2020) by military officials.148 Brigadier General Hajizadeh did concede at a public press conference that he had been informed that a target had been hit over Tehran but claimed he “had no permission to say anything to anyone” including to civilian officials until the situation was assessed.149

On February 9, 2021, CBC News published an article based on an audio recording of a man that their sources identified as Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif. On the Farsi-language recording reviewed by CBC News, the individual identified as Zarif is heard suggesting the downing was accidental – but later says there are a “thousand possibilities” including an intentional act by possible “infiltrators” that he would never be told about.150 Based on the Forensic Team’s assessment of the CBC News reporting and other statements, it is believed that the comments on the possible explanations for the downing of Flight PS752 were of a hypothetical nature when stating that the truth “may never be revealed.”

Based on an analysis of the totality of available information,151 the Forensic Team concludes that while the act of shooting was a deliberate and intended action, it is unlikely the SAM operator knowingly shot down Flight PS752 as a civilian airliner, but rather he likely misidentified it as a hostile target. Despite the series of significant actions taken by the SAM operator, the shoot-down could have been prevented by a properly functioning C2. This is analyzed in the following section.