of military alert or tension, which might endanger civil aircraft.” Iran’s air defences were on high alert and presented a clear and present danger to civil aviation. The level of risk was assessed inadequately, and Iran failed to take sufficient measures to safeguard civil aircraft from military hazards. ICAO standards and recommended practices and guidance emphasize the importance of protecting civilian aircraft in conflict zones. The Dutch investigation into the downing of MH17 also resulted in the identification of a number of recommended practices to help the international community safeguard civil aviation against similar tragedies. These underscored the importance of sound risk assessment, the timely closure or restriction of airspace, and that States provide early and specific information to airlines on potential threats from military activities. The Forensic Team’s analysis determined that Iran’s management of its airspace was inconsistent with these international standards and recommendations.
Mitigation Measures and Notifications to Airmen Iran’s Final Report claimed that Iran’s overall determination of risk was sound and that mitigation measures were identified to achieve an “acceptable level of risk.”102 The Final Report further claimed that Iran’s military re-evaluated the risks and incorporated elements that were not included in its initial determination (“transient conditions” and the chain of events that led to firing missiles at Flight PS752). This re-assessment arrived at the same conclusion – Flight PS752 remained safe to fly. The military also determined the plan implemented on January 8, 2020 to protect civil aircraft from misidentification by the IRGC remained valid and indicated no additional mitigation measures would have been required due to the aircraft’s routing. Based on the events that unfolded, it is clear that Iran’s judgement was proven wrong. It is the Forensic Team’s assessment that these determinations and the plan to protect civilian aircraft were severely flawed, as conditions were far more dangerous than Iran suggests. Iran’s plan to mitigate risk included a requirement that flights departing IKA obtain military approval for take-off. By Iran’s own admission, the professed goal of requiring advanced approval prior to take-off was to ensure the correct identification of civil flights by the Iranian defence network and avoid targeting civilian aircraft by mistake.103 The Iranian report further stated that the following actions specific to Flight PS752 were conducted as intended and there were no deficiencies among civilian authorities: •
Submission of Flight PS752’s flight plan to the military sector;
•
Provision of military clearance to civilian air traffic control for Flight PS752’s engine start-up and takeoff; and
•
Receipt of civil surveillance radar information, including flight specifications for Flight PS752, by the Civil-Military Operational Coordination Center (CMOCC).104
Iran claimed that the civil and military sectors coordinated airspace management activities through the CMOCC to ensure the security of airports as well as to distinguish “commercial flights from anonymous and hostile flights.”105 Iran further claimed that the CMOCC was operated by the military and located in the Tehran Area Control Center, a civilian body that is responsible for communicating all civilian flights to the military sector. Iran’s Final Report asserted that this structure was operational and functioning properly at the time of Flight PS752’s departure.106 37
