Iran Failed to Take Measures to Ensure the Safety of its Airspace and to Notify Airlines of the Risks KEY FINDINGS • Iran decided to keep the majority of its airspace open to civil aviation notwithstanding the heightened level of military alertness on January 7–8, 2020. Its Final Report provides information related to this decision and their determination that flights from IKA were “low risk.” However, it fails to address contradictory information suggesting that risk levels were much higher. The Forensic Team found this determination and Iran’s corresponding decision to keep its airspace open over Tehran were flawed and completely fell short of internationally recognized standards to ensure airspace safety • Iran reported that it planned and successfully implemented mitigation measures to protect flights from the threat of misidentification on the morning of January 8, 2020. The lone mitigation measure that appears to have been implemented for flights departing IKA was a requirement to obtain military approval for take-off. While Iran recognized that risk-levels exceeded expectations and planned mitigations failed to prevent the downing of Flight PS752, its Final Report identifies no specific deficiencies in the decisions or actions of the civil-sector or its coordination with the military sector. Iran has therefore provided insufficient information to explain why the only implemented measure that related to Flight PS752 failed. It has also failed to explain why basic preventative measures that could have avoided this tragedy were not taken. • The Forensic Team could not locate any official Iranian notifications to air carriers prior to the departure of Flight PS752. Iran did not make reference to having issued a NOTAM or any other information to air carriers regarding the status of ongoing military activities on January 8, 2020. This failure to advise airlines of the clear risks of flying that day likely fell short of expected international standards. • The Final Report from Iran suggested “transient conditions” and SAM operator errors were not factored into its flawed assessment of risks to civilian aircraft. Iran also indicated the inclusion of such factors would not have changed Iran’s determination that Flight PS752 was safe to fly or necessitated additional mitigation measures. As events unfolded, it is clear that conditions were far more dangerous and Iran’s judgement was proven wrong.
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