While the act of shooting the missiles was a deliberate and intended action, the information available to the Forensic Team indicates the IRGC SAM unit operator likely misidentified Flight PS752 as a hostile target. A properly functioning command and control system, procedures, and effective training are meant to prevent this outcome; however, Iran has not provided any substantive information on these important factors. Iran’s incomplete explanation of the events and the absence of supporting evidence undermines the credibility of its assertion that the SAM operator’s actions were the sole cause of the downing. With respect to Iran’s claim that the IRGC SAM operator fired upon Flight PS752 without the necessary approval from its command and control, there is no information that the Forensic Team is aware of that would contradict this assertion. While it is likely that authority to fire on aerial targets was delegated to lower levels of Iran’s military than usual given high alert levels, it is very unlikely the SAM operator would have been authorized to launch missiles without approval from his command. However, given the number and sequence of events known to the Forensic Team, Iran has not provided sufficient information or explanations to account for the broader questions this raises. Important questions about the proficiency of the IRGC SAM operator who downed Flight PS752, including the adequacy of his training, the target validation process, and the supervision of SAM operators under such circumstances, remain unanswered.
Key Finding 3: Command and Control Failures Finally, while Iran recognized that risk levels exceeded expectations and planned mitigations failed to prevent the downing of Flight PS752, Iran’s Final Report and other public statements from senior Iranian military leaders focus exclusively on the SAM operator’s decisions. Iran’s account refuses to analyze the full range of deficiencies in the military sector that played a major role in the downing. Iran’s military command and control over the SAM unit failed. If it were functioning properly, the shoot-down would not have occurred. The Forensic Team determined that the SAM unit’s immediate command and control should have identified a SAM-unit misalignment as significant as the 105 degrees reported by Iranian authorities. Standard military procedure would dictate that the SAM unit would not operate in isolation but as part of an integrated air defence structure to enhance situational awareness and decision making. Iran’s Final Report states that SAM units were required to engage their command and control to distinguish hostile targets from commercial aircraft and obtain approval to fire. Based on Iran’s stated protocols, it is reasonable to conclude there were very likely multiple interactions between the operator and his command and control as part of identification procedures for flights that departed IKA before Flight PS752. Given the likely misalignment, previous departing flights would also have likely appeared to be coming from an inaccurate direction (i.e. the southwest). Nine other flights departed IKA before Flight PS752 on January 8, 2020, including eight departures after Iran launched missiles into Iraq. If the operator followed the same procedure that Iran claimed he followed for Flight PS752, the operator would have engaged his command to assist with their identification as hostile targets or commercial aircraft.
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