HSSOP08 Provide Fuel Disruption Plan by Provide Community

Fuel Disruption Plan

Version: V2

Ratified by: Finance and Investment Committee

Date ratified: October 2024

Job Title of author: Nicky Mclean

Emergency Preparedness Resilience & Response (EPRR) Manager

Reviewed by Committee or Expert Group Health Directorate Board

1. Introduction

This plan provides the framework for coordinating Provides response to a fuel disruption or shortage regardless of cause. It is not a standalone document and supplements to the organisations existing Major Incident and Business Continuity Plans by providing additional information and guidance specific to managing the effects of fuel shortage. In line with national guidance the plan is:

• Constructed to deal with a wide range of possibilities

• Based on an integrated and cooperative multi-sector approach

• Built on effective business continuity arrangements

• Responsive to local challenges and needs; and

• Supported by strong local, regional and national leadership measures.

The procedures within this plan are for use within the existing framework for command, control and coordination as detailed in the Provide Major Incident Plan. The activation of procedures from within this plan may place Provide at either Major Incident ‘STANDBY’ or ‘DECLARED’ status, with the exact status being decided by the Provide Incident Director.

2. Purpose

When activated this plan contains procedures that allow the organisation to:

• Receive Notifications of actual or potential fuel disruption or shortages

• Enable staff who deliver critical or essential services to access fuel as per the Temporary Logo Schemes (TLS) if activated or any locally agreed arrangements.

• Ensure that critical services are maintained though business continuity procedures

• Reduce the effects of fuel disruption/shortage on vulnerable service users and minimise any impact on their healthcare

• Provide timely, authoritative and up-to-date information for staff including messages about responsible fuel purchasing and conservation; and

• Return to normal working after a fuel shortage as rapidly and efficiently as possible.

In the event of an actual or threatened fuel supply emergency in the UK, emergency powers under the Energy Act 1976 may be brought into force by the UK government. The powers allow the regulation or prohibition of the production, supply, acquisition or use of substances used as fuel. These powers also underpin many of the national control measures that the government might put in place in response to a fuel supply emergency

3. Definitions

Term Definition

AEO Accountable Emergency Officer

Business Continuity Plan

Documented procedures that guide organisations to respond, recover, resume and restore to a pre-defined level of operation following disruption

Category One Responder As defined in the CCA Category One responders are those organisations at the core of emergencyresponse such as emergency services and local authorities and are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. This includes all Acute Organisations and Ambulance Organisations, Public Health England and NHS England/NHS Improvement. Although not

Civil Contingencies

Act 2004 (CCA)

listed, as a community and mental health provider PROVIDE is expected to plan and respond to incidents in the same way as category one responders.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) delivers a single framework for the protection of civil protection in the UK. The Act divides responder organisations into two categories; Category One and Category Two depending on the extent of their involvement in civil protection work

DFS Designated Fuel Station

Major Incident

NEP-F

A major incident is any occurrence that presents serious threat to the health of the community or causes such numbers or types of casualties, as to require special arrangements to be implemented.

The National Emergency Plan for Fuel

TLS Temporary Logo scheme

4. Duties

4.1

Chief Executive

The Group Chief Executive has the overall responsibility for emergency preparedness, resilience and response (EPRR) and is accountable to the Board for ensuring that systems are in place to facilitate an effective incident response including the continuity of critical/essential services irrespective of the cause.

4.2

Accountable Emergency Officer (AEO)

The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Provide Health and Group Chief Nurse is the nominated Accountable Emergency Officer (AEO) who is responsible for ensuring the full implementation of the organisation’s Business Continuity Policy (on behalf of the Provide Group Chief Executive). The AEO may be called upon to help in the response of any incident that result in the corporate (this) plan being invoked

4.3

Emergency Preparedness Resilience & Response Manager

The Emergency Preparedness Resilience & Response (EPRR) Manager is responsible for assisting the AEO in implementing the arrangements within this plan and where available may be asked to provide advice during the incident response

4.4 All staff

All staff have a role to play in business continuity in escalating fuel disruption issues, assisting service leads/managers in keeping the service running as normal as possible, and being flexible in their working arrangements.

Action cards are contained within Section 9 of this plan which detail staff specific actions.

5. Consultation and Communication

This procedure has been reviewed by the Health Directorate Board and ratified by the Finance and Investment Committee (FIC).

6. Monitoring

NHS England EPRR Annual Assurance Process

All NHS organisations and providers of NHS funded care are held to account by NHS England or having effective EPRR processes and systems in place. An annual assurance process is used by NHS England to seek assurance that organisations are

prepared to respond to an emergency and have the resilience in place to continue to provide safe patient care during a major incident or business continuity event, including fuel disruption. The indicators are set against the EPRR core standards, and an action plan is agreed against any standard that is assessed as requiring improvement. Progress against the action plan is monitored through Senior Leadership Team (SLT).

Fuel disruption incidents will be monitored by the EPRR manager through SLT and any lessons identified will be considered for changes to EPRR practice.

Internal Audit Programme

Provides internal auditors may also choose to audit the organisations business continuity arrangements which may include fuel disruption on an annual basis. Any resulting recommendations from the audit will be monitored through the Finance and Investment Committee.

7. National Control Measures

The National Emergency Plan for Fuel (NEP-F) sets out Government’s options, priorities and principles in responding to a major fuel supply disruption in Great Britain. The NEP-F details a wide range of measures, both statutory and non-statutory, that can be implemented by Government to support industry in responding to any disruption. The principal aim is to maintain fuel supplies as close to normal levels as possible. As with all decisions concerning the use of Emergency Plans, there are clear objectives which lie behind it and which the possible measures are designed to address, namely to:

• protect human life and, as far as possible, property.;

• support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and

• uphold the rule of law and democratic process.

The majority of potential fuel supply disruptions can be addressed by measures to help industry maintain fuel supply. However, the Government does have emergency powers under the Energy Act 1976, which it can use to control supply and demand of petroleum products. It should be noted that use of these emergency powers is reserved for the most severe of disruptions. Only when an incident has the potential to cause significant and widespread disruption to oil supply will Government consider activating measures within the NEP-F. The decision to activate the measures in the NEP-F can only be taken at a national level.

Local Resilience Fora and relevant organisations providing essential services are expected to have robust business continuity plans in place that take into account of their own local and organisational context. Business continuity plans should align in principle to the NEP-F but not rely on early activation of the NEP-F measures. The main tools within the NEP-F are firstly measures to maintain fuel supply which include downstream oil industry protocol, reserve tanker fleet & drivers, relaxation of drivers' hours and oil stocks release. The measures to control supply and demand of fuels detailed below would only be activated in the event of a severe national fuel supply shortage.

7.1 Maximum Purchase Scheme (MPS)

This limits the public to 15 litres of fuel per visit. This is designed to ensure that all motorists can make essential journeys and workers in priority sectors using private vehicles can purchase sufficient fuel to go about their daily business. Restrictions could also be applied by reducing the hours during which fuel can be sold at filling stations.

7.2 Designated Filling Stations (DFS)

This scheme controls the supply of road fuels to a defined number of UK filling stations that will provide fuel to priority users only. Local authorities are responsible for leading on the identification of and planning forDFS sites in consultation with multiagency partners. The DFS will only supply road fuel to appropriately branded vehicles or those issued with a temporary logo. A list of designated fuel stations for the locations that Provide operates from is maintained by the Emergency Preparedness Team and is also available on Resilience Direct. The list is classified as officialsensitive and will only be shared with appropriate persons.

7.3 Temporary Logo Scheme (TLS)

This scheme is designed for priority users of non-logoed vehicles. Organisations must prioritise the issuing of logos but should not rely upon the DFS or TLS schemes for their core resilience. All TLS users must be aware on the process for receiving fuel. The logo must be clearly displayed in the front of the vehicle at all times and be prepared to present work identification (see Section 9.6 for TLS implementation procedures).

7.4 Bulk Distribution Scheme (BDS).

This enables oil companies and distributors to prioritise fuel products to DFS sites, truck stops, depots and commercial storage sites in the event of an emergency. They also include transport sector depots to enable public transport infrastructure to be maintained.

7.5 Mutual Aid

Mutual aid arrangements to support the delivery of essential services locally, particularly healthcare, where there is a reliance on non-logoed vehicles will be developed through multi-agency Local Resilience Forums on a voluntary basis. The arrangement will aim to make an efficient and flexible use of resources for example by re-deploying logoed vehicles and drivers to provide mobility to other responders in their delivery of essential services

Please Note: It is a prosecutable offence under the under section 18(2) of the Energy Act 1976 for any member of staff to abuse their position by obtaining fuel under any of the above schemes for anything other than carrying out an essential Provide service. Any member of staff found abusing the above schemes may also be subject to additional internal disciplinary procedures.

8. Fuel shortage notification procedures and trigger levels

8.1Notification of Fuel shortage

8.1.1 National Notifications

The Government is the immediate focal point for all information concerning downstream oil. The relevant government department will receive information on any potential fuel disruption through their links with the oil industry or through other Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and the Government Liaison Team based in Department Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED). The government will decide what measures should be taken, including whether to activate measures of the NEP-F and the Emergency Powers from the Energy Act 1976.

It is noted that the use of social media and twenty-four-hour news cycles will see concerns over supply spreading throughout the population very quickly and it is

unlikely that there will be any official notice period of possible fuel supply disruption prior to its effects being visible which is why it important to act as soon as actionable information is received

8.1.2 Regional Notifications

At Regional level, a full multi-agency Partnership or Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) will be held. The SCG will be responsible for setting the strategy and reporting rhythm for the disruption to inform its decisions.

Within the Essex Region, the Essex Resilience Forum may implement a Voluntary Fuel (VFA). This is a voluntary agreement between multi partner agencies across Essex and fuel providers to prioritise the supply of fuel during a disruption to supply incident. A summary of the agreement can be found as at Appendix D.

8.1.3 Local and NHS Notification

Provide will be informed of any current/anticipated Emergency Fuel measures via Integrated Care Boards (ICB) and/or NHS England (NHSE) NHSE & ICBs should also be informed of any significant information about difficulties due to fuel shortages in the Organisation. This will either be through the reporting measures as detailed in Section 5 or via the Emergency Preparedness Resilience and Response (EPRR) Manager

It is recognised that the government may not invoke the NEP-F but we may still be impacted by a fuel disruption incident. The command-and-control arrangements may be set up and actions followed as in Section 9 of this plan in order for the organisation to coordinate the response

8.2 National Fuel Emergency Plan trigger levels and Responses

The NEP-F contains four trigger levels that give an indication of what level of response is required by organisations involved in managing the effects of fuel disruption. The trigger levels enable all responders to obtain a consistent understanding of the severity of the fuel emergency at national level and to plan accordingly.

During a fuel disruption the Government will maintain oversight of the situation across the UK. The Government Liaison Team will sit on Strategic Coordinating Groups (SGC).

The NEP-F carries potential scenarios/actions against each level as in Table 1 below

Lowest alert level when the situation is as normal. This period is used by organisations for testing and reviewing the NEP-F and business continuity processes and for maintaining contacts between stakeholders.

LEVEL 2 –BLACK

Incident occurs with the potential to cause disruption to fuel supplies. A higher

• Protocol is reviewed and maintained as per the regional planning cycle.

• DFS sites checked and plans reviewed by Local Authorities/Councils

• Organisations review business continuity plans and priority users

• Training and exercising

• SCG virtual meetings

• Partnerships alerted

Potential Fuel Emergency state of preparedness is required and action may need to be taken to coordinate a precautionary emergency response, including increased monitoring by the government.

LEVEL 3 –AMBER Actual Fuel Emergency

LEVEL 4 – RED

Severe Fuel Emergency

Significant disruption to fuel supplies requiring action to coordinate the emergency response across government and industry.

• Organisations activate business continuity arrangements and introduce calming measures

• Organisations prepare priority user lists, temporary logos and DFS

• SGC meets and regional information sharing structures activated

• Local demand calling measures enforced

• Local Authorities ready to activate DFS plans

• Organisations ready to issue temporary logos

Severe disruption to fuel supplies requiring immediate action to coordinate the emergency response and consequence management across government and industry.

• SGC sits as required

• NEP-F activated

• BDS, DFS, TLS and MPS schemes activated

• Regional coordination of situational reports and impact assessments

• Exit/recovery strategy

9. Detailed Provide Fuel Disruption Response

9.1 Provide level one actions

National Trigger Level 1 – White normal status does not require any direct response as this refers to all year planning including reviewing the fuel shortage plan, business continuity plans and ensuring staff are trained and plans exercised

9.2 Provide level two actions

An incident occurs with the potential to cause disruption to fuel supplies where a higher level of preparedness and monitoring is required by all organisations. Some precautionary emergency measures might be put in place nationally

1 Consider forming a Fuel Group to respond to initial stages. Group to include Executive Lead, emergency preparedness, operational leads, procurement and estates

Accountable Emergency Officer (AEO)

2 Initiate an urgent review of all service business continuity arrangements Emergency Preparedness Resilience and Response (EPRR) manager / AEO/ All Directorates

3 Monitor any emerging information and planning guidance, reporting the findings to the AEO or nominated deputy EPRR Manager

4 Consider relevant actions detailed in the Essex Voluntary Fuel Agreement for Essex region (see Appendix D for further details). For other regions confirm processes with relevant LRF

5 Review current fuel response strategies in respect of any updated optimal practices and past experience.

6 Accelerate, consolidate and test all ORGANISATION WIDE fuel shortage preparedness procedures

EPRR Manager / Fuel Group

Accelerate, consolidate and test all LOCAL fuel shortage preparedness procedures All Directorates

8 Confirm that all local services have identified their priority car users and that their lists are up to date or initiate arrangements to identify essential car users within the Organisation

EPRR Manager / Fuel Group

9 Assess the Organisation estate for reliance on fuel supply (i.e. generators) and mitigate any identified risks Estates

10 Ensure access to all electric car charging points and the Provide electric fleet is accessible and prioritised for essential users only Estates

11 Assess the potential for critical supply chain failure and ensure that critical consumable supplies are checked and replenished in anticipation of potential delivery problems / shortages. Consider the implication of PPE deliveries.

12 Review communication strategies available to inform staff of the current situation and the special arrangements (national and local) required to reduce demand and improve fuel efficiency.

Procurement Team

EPRR Manager / Communications Department

Ensure on-going liaison with the relevant ICB (and/or NHS England) to monitor changes (up or down) in the Trigger Level

9.3 Provide level three actions

NATIONAL TRIGGER LEVEL 3 – ‘AMBER’ Actual Fuel Emergency

Significant disruption to fuel supplies requiring action to coordinate the emergency response across government and industry.

Actions

STANDBY ACTIONS

Owner/Responder

(Before Temporary Logo Scheme and Business Continuity Plans are implemented in Organisation)

1 Monitor and review any National Control Measures that have been put in place, activating them within the Organisation as necessary. If in place, contacting the Local Resilience Forum or Strategic Coordinating Group to confirm localised arrangements for implementing the Temporary Logo Scheme (TLS) or relevant localised Fuel Agreements put in place - i.e. Essex Voluntary Fuel Agreement (VFA)

EPRR Manager / Fuel Group

2 All services to prepare up to date lists of the patients in the community who are at increased risk during a fuel shortage (see Appendix A).

All directorates

3 Liaise with key external service providers to confirm they have activated business continuity plans or reviewed arrangements to ensure staff and other critical resources are available Procurement Team

DECLARED ACTIONS

(After VFA or TLS and Business Continuity Plans are implemented in Organisation*)

If either the VFA or TLS is implemented in the Organisation (for more detail see section 9 6) it is suggested that the command and control arrangements in the PROVIDE Major Incident Plan and all localised BCPs are activated.

4 Co-ordinate arrangements to ensure staff and other critical resources will remain available to guarantee the well-being of service users.

5 Work with the NHSE to assess healthcare impacts, co-ordinate responses and explore opportunities for mutual aid.

6 Implement appropriate strategies to reduce demand and improve fuel efficiency within Organisation (see section 4.7) and disseminate to staff

7 Work with services across the Organisation to review any changes required to individual care plans for the at risk individuals identified in the previous action (e.g. assess the need for daily visits / phone calls and the availability of formal / informal carers (visits should be considered for those living on their own and without contact of a daily carer) and ensure that all at risk patients are discussed and monitored during appropriate team meetings

PROVIDE Incident Director/ Incident Management Team (IMT)

IMT/All directorates

8 Notify relevant ICB of any service delivery issues arising from fuel shortages IMT

Ensure on-going liaison with the relevant ICB (and/or NHS England) to monitor changes (up or down) in the Trigger Level

*Due to the complexities of implementing the TLS and BCPs across the Organisation it is suggested that at this point the organisation considers declaring a critical/major incident to activate the appropriate command, control and coordination actions to manage the situation.

9.4 Provide level four actions

NATIONAL TRIGGER LEVEL 4 – ‘Red’ Severe Fuel Emergency

Severe disruption to fuel supplies requiring immediate action to coordinate the emergency response and consequence management across government and industry.

SUGGESTED PROVIDE MAJOR INCIDENT STATUS

Actions

Owner/Responder

All PROVIDE Level 3 Actions continue to apply

1 Review security situation and discuss any staff safety issues with Police and the Local Security Manager. If necessary seek their advice with any problems you are aware of and issue any appropriate Staff Safety messages.

2 Review the Temporary Logo Scheme and business continuity effects across the Organisation

3 Conduct regular update meetings and SitReps and liaise regally with all internal and external partners. IMT

Regional Critical/Major Incident arrangements apply.

The Government's News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will assume overall responsibility for communications.

On-going liaison with the ICBs.NHSE to monitor changes in the Trigger Level

9.5 Maintaining business continuity

In a fuel shortage Provide resource, i.e. staff, vehicles, equipment that run on that fuel may become increasingly difficult to rely on or run. Therefore, some Provide services may have to be scaled down or cancelled. For example, clinics or client home visits may have to be suspended and some staff may be required to work from home while others may be required to work in different locations. However, it is essential that the organisation maintains its critical services and that patient care is maintained during the disruption caused by the fuel storage as far as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances.

The organisation has developed Business Continuity Plans that identify the key areas of activity within each part of the organisation and the resources needed to sustain these activities. The Business Continuity Plans will assist the Provide Incident Director and Major Incident Team in making decisions about allocation of resources during a major incident.

9.6 Implementing the Temporary Logo scheme

9.6.1 At Provide Fuel Shortage Level Two (or National Trigger Level ‘Black’) each locality will be asked to identify priority users this should be linked to the service business continuity plan and advise the Provide Incident Management Team for confirmation. Once the user has been confirmed as a defined priority user each locality will be informed who is authorised to use a temporary logo either through the TLS if activated by government or any voluntary fuel agreement. The Directorate will issue the temporary logo.

The number of Temporary Logo’s issued by PROVIDE will be in proportion to the overall severity of the fuel shortage.

The priority order / categories to be used by PROVIDE will also include:

• Necessary legal obligations, (Children’s Act 2004, Mental Health Act 2007 etc).

• Other emergency clinical and social services

This priority order may vary depending on the time of the year and the pressures at the time (seasonal flu, heatwave, cold weather etc).

Only staff who complete essential or critical activities as listed in their business continuity plans should be issued with a Temporary Logo.

9.6.2 Once the scheme is activated:

• The issue of a Temporary Logo will be strictly controlled by the Provide Incident Management Team who will ensure a strict priority basis in line with Business Continuity arrangements and priority categories as above.

• Users’ details will be recorded on the log sheet at appendix C

• The Incident Management Team will be responsible for ensuring that the criteria have been applied and that the staff are advised of the “terms and conditions of use”. The logo will only be issued to individuals authorised by the PROVIDE Incident Director

• The Temporary Logo (as at appendix B) is classed as “controlled stationery” and will be kept by the Emergency Preparedness Team.

• At a DFS, drivers will need to produce the Temporary Logo together with their Provide photographic ID badge.

• All Temporary Logos will be recalled once the fuel emergency is over.

9.6.3 It is to be noted that within Provide the same principles as outlined above for the National Temporary Logo scheme will be applied for the Essex Voluntary Fuel Agreement (VFA) logo within Essex and any other regional processes in place at the time.

9.7 Fuel demand calming measures and conservation actions

In a national fuel shortage, it will be necessary for the organisation to reduce their overall demand for transport fuels actions the Provide Incident Director might wish to consider the following:

• Reducing fuel usage by promoting public transport

• Increasing the use of virtual platforms for meetings and appointments

• Cancelling of non-urgent training

• Partnering on critical activities to reduce duplication (i.e. home visits)

• Prioritising resources and rescheduling work to deliver key services only.

• Encouraging agile working and staff working from home

• Encouraging car sharing and the use of bicycles

• Using electric vehicles wherever possible

9.8 Relaxation of Regulations

External

Regulations

During a fuel shortage national and local delivery target and performance assessments will be kept under review by those responsible during and if found necessary by risk and impact assessments regulations might be adjusted to take account of local or national circumstances. If national guidance regarding targets and performance has not been released then the organisation is able to identify a requirement for this option, through its own risk and impact assessments, before appropriate authority from the relevant ICB and/or commissioners as appropriate. However, the organisation should not plan on this being an inevitable consequence of any fuel crisis, regardless of severity.

9.9 Identifying service users at increased vulnerability

During a fuel shortage the organisation will identify any vulnerable patients that may be affected by the fuel shortage and minimise any impact to their healthcare. The process required to identify vulnerable patients is similar to that used in the organisation’s Heat Wave with community leads from across the organisation asked to compile a list of the vulnerable patients in their locality. This will then be used to determine if the fuel shortage is likely to have a bearing on the provision of their healthcare or wellbeing. Appendix A contains the full procedure to be used.

10.Command and Control arrangements

10.1 Strategic (Gold) command

Unlike more sudden Major Incidents, a fuel disruption or shortage that has a long lead up might not require the Director On-Call to take the role of Incident Director as more appropriate Executive Director (for example the Executive Lead for Emergency Preparedness) might be better suited to the role.

The Provide Incident Director will have the same responsibilities as they would in any other major incident. However, due to the nature of fuel shortage it will be unlikely that a full Strategic (Gold) Command will be running all of the time, and the Provide Incident Director may continue as many of their usual responsibilities as the situation allows.

10.2 Tactical (Silver) control

The Tactical (Silver) Command will manage the tactical incident response and coordinate all internal situational reports, messages and requests. If enquiries come in to the Tactical (Silver) Command, which are felt to be outside of the Tactical (Silver) remit the request, will be cascaded up to the Provide Incident Director who will address it directly.

10.3 Operational (Bronze)

When the fuel shortage leads tothe activating of Business Continuity Plans the Operational (Bronze) response will be key to keeping the services running on the ground. It is assumed that each area will appoint a Director who will assume the position of Operational (Bronze) controllers for their localities and report into Tactical (Silver) Command as required The general actions that all Heads of Service/Service leads should take for loss of the major utilities can be found in their business continuity plans.

11.Communications

11.1 Incident communications officer (ICO) responsibilities

The Communications Team will liaise with the Provide Incident Director to agree the key messages that need to be put out to all Organisation staff. The ICO will also have responsibility for liaising with the NHSE and ICB communications, the DHSC communications office and the media specialists for Strategic (Gold) Command (if not NHSE). The ICO will use the channels of communications as identified in the Provide Major Incident Plan.

12.Recovery

12.1 Debrief

Immediately after a fuel shortage incident is STOOD DOWN a series of ‘hot debriefs’ will be held. The Provide Incident Director or Chief Executive will have the responsibility for debriefing all director level staff who in turn will debrief Operational Level staff directly involved in the response. Further information about the debriefing process can be found in the Provide Major Incident Plan.

12.2 Post-incident recovery

During the fuel shortage, the Incident Management Team or Recovery Group (if sitting) will meet to assess the disruption to the organisation’s functions caused by the incident, including any long-term implications. This assessment will include:

• Effects on staffing (e.g. loss of staff through injury or sickness, impact of overtime worked by staff during the incident on staffing levels)

• Disruption caused to patient care

• Disruption caused to other Provide functions

• Damage inflicted to Provide property or property the organisation shares

• Financial losses

• Future provision of services in the short-, medium- and long-term.

This information will be used to assist in making decisions about priorities during the incident and post-incident recovery period.

Appendix A – Patients at risk

Compiling lists of patients ‘at risk’

This section contains the procedure to be used to produce lists of patients deemed to be at increased risk during fuel shortages. In the case of fuel shortage this is limited to people reliant on home visits by community healthcare professionals (community nurses).

‘At Risk’ list

The Organisation’s Community teams need to identify patients in their locality who will be at risk during a fuel shortage. These individuals will either need a home visit or a telephone call to check on their wellbeing. As fuel will be in short supply home visits should be limited to those patients where there is a critical need. Careful co-ordination will be required between health and social care teams to ensure that the appropriate organisations are aware of individuals at risk and is therefore in a position to discharge their responsibilities accordingly. Where possible health and social care teams should share transport arrangements to avoid unnecessary journeys.

Lists need to be drawn up by all community teams of those individuals who have been assessed as not in ‘Critical Need’ and therefore not receiving a home visit so they can be contacted by telephone. To ensure these individuals are still monitored a Organisation ‘call centre’ (either physically in Organisation or via Organisation mobiles) will be set up so suitably qualified staff can phone the at risk people on the list.

An example of the type of table to be use for these lists is included below in Word format below. All the data requested, including contact details for the, must be provided to allow the Organisation’s ‘call centre’ to contact the individuals and arrange follow up as required. It will be up community teams to identify those patients who fall into the above criteria who are not going to be visited by the team during the fuel shortage.

Example of Spreadsheet: “At risk patients not due to be visited – (Team Name)”

Appendix

Appendix C – Issue Log

Appendix D – ESSEX Voluntary Fuel Agreement (VFA) SUMMARY

Overview

The Essex Voluntary Fuel Agreement (VFA) is designed to deliver additional resilience to essential workers in Essex during periods of disruption to fuel supplies where the government has not yet activated the NEP-F.

Specific petrol stations once confirmed at system level as partaking within this agreement will have limited fuel reserves set aside for Essential/Key workers around Essex. To ensure efficiency of this agreement, it is crucial providers have fully explored their own business continuity plans and after doing so a capability gap still exists that affects critical services.

Key points: -

• Requires a multi-agency (system) SCG to activate and lead on (cannot just be one provider alone) where there is a potential for the disruption of fuel supplies and coordinated action is required to ensure delivery of critical services across Essex

• Voluntary on the part of the fuel providers as they can withdraw at any point.

• Cannot be used at fuel stations that are not part of the agreement (awareness detailed below)

• As part of this agreement, NHS Critical users would include Acute and Community services

• Superseded by the NEP-F if this gets activated

Use of a temporary VFA logo

• If deemed required by the SCG, the Fuel Information Cell may issue temporary logos for vehicles that have been approved.

Temporary logos relate only to the vehicle and not the user meaning a user cannot use a temporary logo to fuel other staff or family members vehicles.

• To ensure that this scheme is properly controlled, each organisation will be responsible for the administration of the temporary logo signs once issued. To achieve this, a single point of contact must be appointed, and details communicated to the Fuel Information Cell

Retailers who are providing fuel as a part of this scheme should be provided with standard logo signage to indicate that they are a participant in the agreement.

• For PROVIDE, this scheme will be managed using the same fundamentals as The Temporary Logo Scheme.

Accessing

fuel

In addition to the above temporary logo, the driver must have their organisation’s photographic identification cardto hand and colleagues drawing fuel must be in possession of a valid method of payment.

Figure 1 - Key Features of the VFA

Click here to enter text.